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Australian Government - Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade

Advancing the interests of Australia and Australians internationally

Australian Government - Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade

Advancing the interests of Australia and Australians internationally

Appendices

Appendix A World Nuclear Energy, December 2011

Table 16: World Nuclear Energy, December 2011[36]
Operating Reactors
% of Total Electricity in 2011
Reactors under Construction
Total
Capacity (GWe)
Total
Capacity (GWe)
United States*
104
101.5
19.3
1
1.2
France*
58
63.1
77.7
1
1.6
Japan*
50
44.2
18.1
2
2.7
Russian Federation*
33
23.6
17.6
10
8.2
Republic of Korea*
21
18.8
34.6
5
5.6
India
20
4.4
3.7
7
4.8
Canada*
18
12.6
15.3
0
0
United Kingdom*
18
10.0
17.8
0
0
China*
16
11.8
1.9
26
26.7
Ukraine
15
13.1
47.2
2
1.9
Sweden*
10
9.3
39.6
0
0
Germany*
9
12.1
17.8
0
0
Spain*
8
7.6
19.5
0
0
Belgium*
7
5.9
54.0
0
0
Taiwan[37]
6
5.0
19.0
2
2.6
Czech Republic*
6
3.8
33.0
0
0
Switzerland*
5
3.3
40.9
0
0
Finland*
4
2.7
31.6
1
1.6
Hungary*
4
1.9
43.3
0
0
Slovak Republic*
4
1.8
54.0
2
0.8
Pakistan
3
0.7
3.8
2
0.6
Bulgaria*
2
1.9
32.6
2
1.9
Brazil
2
1.9
3.2
1
1.2
South Africa
2
1.8
5.2
0
0
Romania*
2
1.3
19.0
0
0
Mexico*
2
1.3
3.6
0
0
Argentina*
2
0.9
5.0
1
0.7
Slovenia*
1
0.7
41.7
0
0
Netherlands*
1
0.5
3.6
0
0
Armenia
1
0.4
33.2
0
0
Iran
1
0.9
0.0
0
0
TOTAL
435
368.8
N/A
65
62.1

Source: IAEA Reference Data Series No.2 (2012 Edition). Nuclear Power Reactors in the World.

Appendix B Australia's Bilateral Nuclear Cooperation Agreements

Table 17: Australia's Bilateral NUCLEAR COOPERATION Agreements at 30 June 2012
Country Entry into Force
Republic of Korea 2 May 1979
United Kingdom 24 July 1979
Finland 9 February 1980
Canada 9 March 1981
Sweden 22 May 1981
France 12 September 1981
Philippines 11 May 1982
Japan 17 August 1982
Switzerland 27 July 1988
Egypt 2 June 1989
Mexico 17 July 1992
New Zealand 1 May 2000
United States (covering cooperation on Silex technology) 24 May 2000
Czech Republic 17 May 2002
United States (covering supply to Taiwan) 17 May 2002
Hungary 15 June 2002
Argentina 12 January 2005
People's Republic of China[38] 3 February 2007
Russian Federation 11 November 2010
United States 22 December 2010
Euratom[39] 1 January 2012

Note: The above list does not include Australia's safeguards Agreement with the IAEA, concluded on 10 July 1974. In addition to the above Agreements, Australia also has an Exchange of Notes constituting an Agreement with Singapore Concerning Cooperation on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Materials, which entered into force on 15 December 1989.

Appendix C Status of Additional Protocols

At 30 June 2012, there were 70 states (plus Taiwan) with significant nuclear activities[40]. Of these states, five were nuclear weapon states (NWS), 62 were non-nuclear-weapon states (NNWS) party to the NPT, and three were non-NPT Parties.

In the following tables, states with significant nuclear activities are shown in bold*.

At 30 June 2012, there were a total of 116 states with an Additional Protocol in force, an increase of seven over the same time last year. Of the 62 NNWS NPT Parties with significant nuclear activities, 53 had an Additional Protocol in force (Table 18).

Table 18: States with Additional Protocols in force at 30 June 2012
State
Afghanistan Congo, Republic of the Guatemala Mali
Albania Costa Rica Haiti Malta
Andorra Croatia Holy See Marshall Islands
Angola Cuba Hungary* Mauritania
Armenia* Cyprus Iceland Mauritius
Australia* Czech Republic* Indonesia* Mexico*
Austria* DR Congo* Ireland Moldova
Azerbaijan Denmark* Italy* Monaco
Bahrain Dominique Republic Jamaica* Mongolia
Bangladesh* Ecuador Japan* Montenegro
Belgium* El Salvador Jordan Morocco*
Botswana Estonia* Kazakhstan* Mozambique
Bulgaria* Fiji Kenya Namibia
Burkina Faso Finland* Kuwait Netherlands*
Burundi France* Kyrgyzstan New Zealand
Canada* FYROM Latvia* Nicaragua
Central African Rep Gabon Lesotho Niger
Chad The Gambia Libya* Nigeria*
Chile* Georgia* Lithuania* Norway*
China* Germany* Luxembourg Palau
Colombia* Ghana* Madagascar Panama
Comoros Greece* Malawi Paraguay
Peru* Rwanda Swaziland Uganda
Philippines* Seychelles Sweden* Ukraine*
Poland* Singapore Switzerland* United Arab Emirates
Portugal* Slovakia* Tajikistan* United Kingdom*
Republic of Korea* Slovenia* Tanzania United States of America*
Romania* South Africa* Turkey* Uruguay
Russia* Spain* Turkmenistan Uzbekistan*
TOTAL: 116 states (including 53 NNWS with significant nuclear activities), plus Taiwan

Source: International Atomic Energy Agency (www.iaea.org/OurWork/SV/Safeguards/sg_protocol.html)

At 30 June 2012, 26 states did not have an Additional Protocol (AP) in force but had signed an AP and/or had an AP approved by the IAEA Board of Governors. During the period from 1 July 2011 to 30 June 2012 three states either signed or had the Board of Governors approve an AP (Table 19).

Table 19: States with an ADDITIONAL PROTOCOL signed or approved but not in force at 30 June 2012
State
Algeria* Djibouti Kiribati Togo
Belarus* Guinea Liechtenstein Tunisia
Benin Guinea-Bissau Malaysia* Vanuatu
Bosnia and Herzegovina Honduras Senegal Vietnam*
Cameroon India (non-NPT)* Serbia* Zambia
Cape Verde Iran[41]* Thailand*
Côte d'Ivoir Iraq* Timor-Leste
TOTAL: 26 states (including 8 NNWS NPT Parties with significant nuclear activities)

Source: International Atomic Energy Agency (www.iaea.org/OurWork/SV/Safeguards/documents/sir_table.pdf)

The remaining six NNWS NPT Parties and two non-NPT states with significant nuclear activities had not signed an Additional Protocol.

Table 20: States with Significant Nuclear Activities and no AP at 30 June 2012
State
Argentina* DPRK[42]* Israel (non-NPT)* Syria*
Brazil* Egypt* Pakistan (non-NPT)* Venezuela*
TOTAL: 8 states (including 6 NPT Parties)

Source: International Atomic Energy Agency (www.iaea.org/OurWork/SV/Safeguards/documents/sir_table.pdf)

Appendix D IAEA Statements of Conclusions for Australia 2011

Inventory verification inspections carried out by the IAEA at Australian nuclear facilities and locations are shown in Table 7. In addition, the IAEA carries out a range of other verification activities, such as short notice inspections, complementary accesses, design verifications and data collection and analysis.

The IAEA's conclusions for Australia are provided at two levels: a component of the overarching findings and conclusions published in the IAEA's Safeguards Statement for 2011 (see Appendix E); and the statements of conclusions of inspections in Australia under Article 91(b) of Australia's NPT Safeguards Agreement and the statement of conclusions the IAEA has drawn from Additional Protocol verification activities under Article 10.c of the Additional Protocol.

The highest level conclusion, known as the "broader conclusions", the IAEA draws in the Safeguards Statement, is in paragraph 1(a) of the Safeguards Statement that "the Secretariat found no indication of the diversion of declared nuclear material from peaceful nuclear activities and no indication of undeclared nuclear material or activities. On this basis, the Secretariat concluded that, for these States, all nuclear material remained in peaceful activities." Australia is on the list of countries covered by the IAEA's broader conclusion in the Safeguards Statement for 2011. The IAEA has drawn the broader conclusion for Australia every year since 2000.

The IAEA's statements of conclusions of inspections under Article 91(b) for the inspections it carried out in May 2012 were not available at the time of publishing this Annual Report. The 91(b) statements will be published when available on ASNO's website (www.dfat.gov.au/asno).

The IAEA's Additional Protocol Article 10.c statements for the complementary accesses shown in Table 7 were as follows:

Access pursuant to Article 4.a.(i) did not indicate the presence of undeclared nuclear material or activities at:

  • Beverley uranium mine[43]
  • University of Melbourne

Access pursuant to Article 4.a.(i) did not indicate the presence of undeclared nuclear material or activities at the following site, however, final conclusion is pending the results and evaluation of environmental samples:

  • SSL Laboratories, Lucas Heights Science and Technology Centre

Addendum to Appendix D

IAEA Statements of Conclusions for Australia 2011

As noted in Appendix D of the 2011-12 Annual Report, at the time of publishing that report the IAEA's statement of conclusions of inspections under Article 91(b) of Australia's NPT safeguards agreement were not available. These statements are now available and published in this addendum to Appendix D. Further detail on the IAEA's compliance conclusions is in Appendix D of the 2011-12 Annual Report.

The verification activities carried out by the IAEA at Australian nuclear facilities and locations in 2011-12 were provided in table 7 in Output 1.1 of the 2011-12 Annual Report. These verification activities included: short notice inventory verification inspections; routine inventory verification inspections; design information verification inspections; and, complementary access. The table below summarises the 91(b) statements arising from the short notice inventory verification inspections and routine inventory verification inspections carried out in 2011-12. The IAEA's conclusions from the complementary access activities were published in Appendix D of the 2011-12 Annual Report.

TABLE: IAEA CONCLUSIONS OF INSPECTIONS IN AUSTRALIA
Verification Activity Applicable Facilities End Date of Material Balance Period Conclusion
Examination of records OPAL
R&D Laboratories
Bulk Storage Facility
16/05/2012
14/05/2012
17/05/2012
‘The records satisfied the Agency requirements.’
Examination of Reports to the Agency OPAL
R&D Laboratories
Bulk Storage Facility
16/05/2012
15/05/2012
17/05/2012
‘The reports did not satisfy the Agency requirements because State reports were not despatched to the Agency within the timing specified by the Facility Attachment.’1
Application of Containment and Surveillance Measures Bulk Storage Facility 17/05/2012 ‘The application of containment measures adequately complemented the nuclear material accountancy measures.’
Verification of Physical Inventory OPAL
R&D Laboratories
Bulk Storage Facility
16/05/2012
14/05/2012
17/05/2012
‘The physical inventory declared by the operator was verified and the results satisfied the Agency requirements.’
Confirmation of the Absence of Unrecorded Production of Direct-Use Material from Material Subject to Safeguards OPAL 16/05/2012 ‘The absence of unrecorded production of plutonium from nuclear material subject to safeguards was confirmed by the Agency in accordance with its requirements.’
Verification Activities for Timely Detection OPAL
16/05/2012 'The verification activities for timely detection during the material balance period satisfied the Agency requirements.’

1. These accounting reports were submitted by ASNO approximately 40 days overdue due to the need to balance competing priorities at that time.

Appendix E IAEA Safeguards Statement for 2011

The following is extracted from the IAEA's Annual Report for 2011.

In 2011, safeguards were applied for 178 States44,45,with safeguards agreements in force with the Agency. The Secretariat's findings and conclusions for 2011 are reported below with regard to each type of safeguards agreement. These findings and conclusions are based upon an evaluation of all the information available to the Agency in exercising its rights and fulfilling its safeguards obligations for that year.

  1. One hundred and nine States[44] had both comprehensive safeguards agreements and additional protocols in force:
    1. For 58 of these States[45], the Secretariat found no indication of the diversion of declared nuclear material from peaceful nuclear activities and no indication of undeclared nuclear material or activities. On this basis, the Secretariat concluded that, for these States, all nuclear material remained in peaceful activities.
    2. For 51 of these States, the Secretariat found no indication of the diversion of declared nuclear material from peaceful nuclear activities. Evaluations regarding the absence of undeclared nuclear material and activities for each of these States remained ongoing. On this basis, the Secretariat concluded that, for these States, declared nuclear material remained in peaceful activities.
  2. Safeguards activities were implemented for 61 States with comprehensive safeguards agreements in force, but without additional protocols in force. For these States, the Secretariat found no indication of the diversion of declared nuclear material from peaceful nuclear activities. On this basis, the Secretariat concluded that, for these States, declared nuclear material remained in peaceful activities.

While the Secretariat concluded that, for 2011, declared nuclear material in Iran remained in peaceful activities, it was unable to conclude that all nuclear material in Iran was in peaceful activities.

  1. As of the end of 2011, 14 non-nuclear-weapon States party to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons had yet to bring into force comprehensive safeguards agreements with the Agency as required by Article III of that Treaty. For these States, the Secretariat could not draw any safeguards conclusions.
  2. Three States had safeguards agreements in force based on INFCIRC/66/Rev.2, requiring the application of safeguards to nuclear material, facilities and other items specified in the relevant safeguards agreement. For these States, the Secretariat found no indication of the diversion of nuclear material or of the misuse of the facilities or other items to which safeguards had been applied. On this basis, the Secretariat concluded that, for these States, nuclear material, facilities or other items to which safeguards had been applied remained in peaceful activities.
  3. Five nuclear-weapon States had voluntary offer agreements and additional protocols in force. Safeguards were implemented with regard to declared nuclear material in selected facilities in all five States. For these States, the Secretariat found no indication of the diversion of nuclear material to which safeguards had been applied. On this basis, the Secretariat concluded that, for these States, nuclear material to which safeguards had been applied in selected facilities remained in peaceful activities or had been withdrawn from safeguards as provided for in the agreements.

Appendix F Status of CTBT International Monitoring System Facilities in Australia

Table 21: Status of Australian CTBT IMS FACILITIES at 30 June 2012
Facility Status Operator
Primary Seismic Stations
Warramunga, NT Operational and certified against CTBTO standards ANU
Alice Springs, NT Operational and certified against CTBTO standards GA/USA
Stephens Creek, NSW Operational and certified against CTBTO standards GA
Mawson, Australian Antarctic Territory Operational and certified against CTBTO standards GA
Auxiliary Seismic Stations
Charters Towers, QLD Operational and certified against CTBTO standards GA
Fitzroy Crossing, WA Operational and certified against CTBTO standards GA
Narrogin, WA Operational and certified against CTBTO standards GA
Infrasound Stations
Warramunga, NT Operational and certified against CTBTO standards ANU
Hobart, TAS Operational and certified against CTBTO standards GA
Shannon, WA Operational and certified against CTBTO standards GA
Cocos Islands Operational and certified against CTBTO standards GA
Davis Base, Australian Antarctic Territory Site survey completed GA
Radionuclide Stations
Melbourne[46], VIC Operational and certified against CTBTO standards ARPANSA
Perth, WA Operational and certified against CTBTO standards ARPANSA
Townsville, QLD Operational and certified against CTBTO standards ARPANSA
Darwin[47], NT Operational and certified against CTBTO standards ARPANSA
Cocos Islands Operational and certified against CTBTO standards ARPANSA
Macquarie Island, TAS Operational and certified against CTBTO standards ARPANSA
Mawson, Australian Antarctic Territory Operational and certified against CTBTO standards ARPANSA
Radionuclide Laboratory
Melbourne, VIC Operational and certified against CTBTO standards ARPANSA
Hydroacoustic Stations
Cape Leeuwin, WA Operational and certified against CTBTO standards GA

Appendix G Information Publication Scheme Statement

Agencies subject to the Freedom of Information Act 1982 (FOI Act) are required to publish information to the public as part of the Information Publication Scheme (IPS). This requirement is in Part II of the FOI Act and has replaced the former requirement to publish a section 8 statement in an annual report. Each agency must display on its website a plan showing what information it publishes In accordance with the IPS requirements.

An agency plan showing what information is published in accordance with IPS requirements is accessible from the Information Publication Scheme page (http://www.dfat.gov.au/foi/ips.html).

Publications, Presentations and Submissions

ASNO produced a range of publications and conducted various presentations to increase community awareness and understanding of ASNO responsibilities and issues for which it has expertise. ASNO also made a number of submissions to Parliamentary and other inquiries. These include:

  • Allen Andrews, John Kalish, Stephen Newman and Justine Johnston. 2011. Bomb radiocarbon dating of three important reef-fish species using Indo-Pacific D14C chronologies. Marine and Freshwater Research 62: 1259-1269.
  • Craig Everton, Australia's Nuclear Cooperation Agreement, presentation given at the AusIMM International Uranium Conference, Adelaide, June 2012.
  • Craig Everton, Evolving the IAEA's System of State-Evaluations and Safeguards Implementation, paper for the INMM 51st Annual Meeting, Palm Desert, USA, July 2011.
  • Craig Everton, Stephan Bayer and Michael East, Safeguarding Uranium Production and Export – Conventional and Non-Conventional Resources, paper for the 7th INMM-ESARDA joint workshop on "Future Directions For Nuclear Safeguards and Verification", Aix-en-Provence, France, October 2011.
  • John Kalish, Australia's regulation and control of uranium ore concentrate, IAEA Seminar on Good Practices in the Processing and Control of Uranium Ore Concentrate, Windhoek, Namibia, 23–27 April 2012.
  • John Kalish, The Australian experience with implementing safeguards, International Training on Course on State Systems on Accounting for and Control of Nuclear Materials, Tokai-mura, Japan, 30 November 2011.
  • Josy Meyer and Kearyn Ferguson, What is the Chemical Weapons Convention and How Does it Affect your company? Defence Export Control Office Newsletter, June 2012.
  • Josy Meyer, Australia's Chemical Trade Controls, 10th Annual Meeting of National Authorities of States Parties in Asia, Colombo, 26-28 June 2012.
  • Josy Meyer, Regional and sub-regional cooperation on CWC Implementation, 10th Annual Meeting of National Authorities of States Parties in Asia, Colombo, 26–28 June 2012.
  • Josy Meyer, The CWC and Regulatory Requirements for Schedule 1 Facilities, Defence Science and Technology Organisation, Melbourne, 26 August 2011.
  • Malcolm Coxhead, Disarmament verification-Concepts and techniques for verifying weapons dismantlement UK Norway Initiative Workshop on Nuclear Disarmament Verification, London, 7–9 December 2011, London, United Kingdom.
  • Rob Floyd, ASNO and Australia's efforts to counter WMD proliferation, ANSTO Distinguished Lecture Series, Sydney, Australia, February, 2012.
  • Rob Floyd, ASNO and Australia's efforts to counter WMD proliferation, DSTO, Melbourne, Australia, September, 2011.
  • Rob Floyd, Government Engagement-Training as a means of maintaining and enhancing the profile of safeguards, IUGG Address, Melbourne, Australia, July, 2011.
  • Rob Floyd, Integrated approaches to effective controls for uranium mining by government and industry-The case for nuclear security, IAEA general Conference, Vienna, September, 2011.
  • Rob Floyd, Operating Uranium Mines: Policy Perspectives, AUA Annual Conference, Adelaide, May 2012.
  • Rob Floyd and Russell Leslie, Government Engagement –Training as a Means of Maintaining and Enhancing the Profile of Safeguards, paper for the INMM 51st Annual Meeting, Palm Desert, USA, July 2011.
  • Rob Floyd, Science and CTBT verification, IUGG Address, Melbourne, Australia, July 2011.
  • Rob Floyd, WMD Non-Proliferation: Australia's Commitment and Regional Security Challenges, Public Forum, National Security College, ANU, Canberra October 2011.
  • Rob Floyd, WMD Proliferation: Australia's Security and Policy Challenges, National Security College, ANU, Canberra, February and August 2011.
  • Russell Leslie and Rob Floyd, Protection of Safeguards Sensitive Information: the Tension Between the Need to Know and the Need to Get the Job Done, paper for the INMM 51st Annual Meeting, Palm Desert, USA, July 2011.
  • Stephan Bayer and Craig Everton, Physical Protection (Security) Requirements for the Transport of Uranium, presentation given at the AusIMM International Uranium Conference, Adelaide, June 2012.
  • Stephan Bayer, Seoul Nuclear Security Summit, Presentation to Public Service Audience, Barton 2 March 2012.
  • Stephan Bayer, The Australian Experience in Implementing Safeguards and Physical Protection, International Training Course on State Systems of Accounting for and Control of Nuclear Facilities, Beijing, China, 20 September 2011.
  • Vanessa Masters, Australian Perspective on Nuclear Security in Southeast Asia, Presentation at the "Prospects for Nuclear Security Partnership in Southeast Asia" Conference in October 2011.
  • Vanessa Masters, The Agreement Between Australia and the United States of America Concerning Peaceful Uses of Nuclear Energy, Presentation at the US Nuclear Materials Management & Safeguards System (NMMSS) Conference in May 2012.

List of Requirements

This list is prepared from the checklist of annual report requirements set out in Attachment F to the Requirements for Annual Reports for Departments, Executive Agencies and FMA Act Bodies as approved by the Joint Committee of Public Accounts and Audit under subsections 63(2) and 70(2) of the Public Service Act 1999 on 28 June 2012.

Description Requirement Location
Letter of transmittal Mandatory Page iii
Table of contents Mandatory Page v
Index Mandatory Page 121
Glossary Mandatory Page 115
Contact officer(s) Mandatory Page ii
Internet home page address and Internet address for report Mandatory Page ii
Review by Statutory officer
Review by statutory office holder Mandatory Pages 3–11
Summary of significant issues and developments Suggested Pages 3–11
Overview of department's performance and financial results Suggested N/A
Outlook for following year Suggested Pages 9–11
Significant issues and developments – portfolio Portfolio departments – suggested N/A
Departmental Overview
Role and functions Mandatory Page 41
Organisational structure Mandatory Page 94
Outcome and program structure Mandatory Page 48
Where outcome and program structures differ from PB Statements/PAES or other portfolio statements accompanying any other additional appropriation bills (other portfolio statements), details of variation and reasons for change Mandatory N/A
Portfolio structure Mandatory for portfolio departments DFAT
Report on Performance
Review of performance during the year in relation to programs and contribution to outcomes Mandatory Page 53–88
Actual performance in relation to deliverables and KPIs set out in PB Statements/PAES or other portfolio statements Mandatory DFAT
Where performance targets differ from the PBS/ PAES, details of both former and new targets, and reasons for the change Mandatory N/A
Narrative discussion and analysis of performance Mandatory Pages 53–89
Trend information Mandatory Pages 53–89
Significant changes in nature of principal functions/ services Suggested N/A
Performance of purchaser/provider arrangements If applicable, suggested N/A
Factors, events or trends influencing departmental performance Suggested N/A
Contribution of risk management in achieving objectives Suggested N/A
Social inclusion outcomes If applicable, mandatory N/A
Performance against service charter customer service standards, complaints data, and the department's response to complaints If applicable, mandatory N/A
Discussion and analysis of the department's financial performance Mandatory Page 95
Discussion of any significant changes from the prior year, from budget or anticipated to have a significant impact on future operations Suggested N/A
Agency resource statement and summary resource tables by outcomes Mandatory DFAT
Developments since the end of the financial year that have affected or may significantly affect the department's operations or financial results in future If applicable, mandatory N/A
Management and Accountability
Corporate Governance
Agency heads are required to certify that their agency comply with the Commonwealth Fraud Control Guidelines. Mandatory DFAT
Statement of the main corporate governance practices in place Mandatory DFAT
Names of the senior executive and their responsibilities Suggested Page 93
Senior management committees and their roles Suggested N/A
Corporate and operational planning and associated performance reporting and review Suggested DFAT
Approach adopted to identifying areas of significant financial or operational risk Suggested DFAT
Policy and practices on the establishment and maintenance of appropriate ethical standards Suggested DFAT
How nature and amount of remuneration for SES officers is determined Suggested Page 93
External Scrutiny
Significant developments in external scrutiny Mandatory DFAT
Judicial decisions and decisions of administrative tribunals Mandatory DFAT
Reports by the Auditor-General, a Parliamentary Committee or the Commonwealth Ombudsman Mandatory DFAT
Management of Human Resources
Assessment of effectiveness in managing and developing human resources to achieve departmental objectives Mandatory DFAT
Workforce planning, staff turnover and retention Suggested Page 94
Impact and features of enterprise or collective agreements, individual flexibility arrangements (IFAs), determinations, common law contracts and AWAs Suggested DFAT
Training and development undertaken and its impact Suggested Page 95
Work health and safety performance Suggested DFAT
Productivity gains Suggested DFAT
Statistics on staffing Mandatory Page 94
Enterprise or collective agreements, IFAs, determinations, common law contracts and AWAs Mandatory DFAT
Performance pay Mandatory DFAT
Assets Management
Assessment of effectiveness of assets management If applicable, mandatory DFAT
Purchasing
Assessment of purchasing against core policies and principles Mandatory DFAT
Consultants
The annual report must include a summary statement detailing the number of new consultancy services contracts let during the year; the total actual expenditure on all new consultancy contracts let during the year (inclusive of GST); the number of ongoing consultancy contracts that were active in the reporting year; and the total actual expenditure in the reporting year on the ongoing consultancy contracts (inclusive of GST). The annual report must include a statement noting that information on contracts and consultancies is available through the AusTender website. Mandatory DFAT
Australia National Audit Office Access Clauses
Absence of provisions in contracts allowing access by the Auditor-General Mandatory DFAT
Exempt Contracts
Contracts exempt from the AusTender Mandatory DFAT
Financial Statements
Financial Statements Mandatory DFAT
Other Mandatory Information
Work health and safety (Schedule 2, Part 4 of the Work Health and Safety Act 2011) Mandatory DFAT
Advertising and Market Research (Section 311A of the Commonwealth Electoral Act 1918) and statement on advertising campaigns Mandatory DFAT
Ecologically sustainable development and environmental performance (Section 516A of the Environment Protection and Biodiversity Conservation Act 1999) Mandatory DFAT
Compliance with the agency's obligations under the Carer Recognition Act 2010 If applicable, mandatory DFAT
Grant programs Mandatory DFAT
Disability reporting – explicit and transparent reference to agency-level information available through other reporting mechanisms Mandatory DFAT
Information Publication Scheme statement Mandatory Page 109
Correction of material errors in previous annual report If applicable, mandatory N/A
List of Requirements Mandatory Pages 111–114

Glossary

Additional Protocol

(AP)

An agreement designed to complement a state's Safeguards Agreement with the IAEA in order to strengthen the effectiveness and improve the efficiency of the safeguards system. The model text of the Additional Protocol is set out in IAEA document INFCIRC/540.
ANSTO Australian Nuclear Science and Technology Organisation
APSN Asia-Pacific Safeguards Network
ARPANSA Australian Radiation Protection and Nuclear Safety Agency
ASSP Australian Safeguards Support Program
Australian Obligated Nuclear Material (AONM) Australian Obligated Nuclear Material. Australian uranium and nuclear material derived therefrom, which is subject to obligations pursuant to Australia's bilateral nuclear cooperation agreements.
Challenge Inspection (For CWC purposes) An inspection, requested by a CWC State Party, of any facility or location in the territory or in any other place under the jurisdiction or control of another State Party.
Complementary Access The right of the IAEA, pursuant to the Additional Protocol, for access to a site or location to carry out verification activities.

Comprehensive Safeguards Agreement

(CSA)

Agreement between a state and the IAEA for the application of safeguards to all of the state's current and future nuclear activities (equivalent to 'full scope' safeguards) based on IAEA document INFCIRC/153.
Concise Note Supplementary explanatory notes on formal reports from a national safeguards authority to the IAEA.
Conversion Purification of uranium ore concentrates or recycled nuclear material and conversion to a chemical form suitable for isotopic enrichment or fuel fabrication.
CPPNM Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material
CTBT Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty
CTBTO Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty Organization. The Vienna-based international organisation established at entry into force of the CTBT to ensure the implementation of its provisions.
Customs Australian Customs & Border Protection Service
CWC Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production, Stockpiling and Use of Chemical Weapons and on their Destruction. Also known as the Chemical Weapons Convention.
CWC Scheduled Chemicals Chemicals listed in the three Schedules to the Chemical Weapons Convention. Some are chemical warfare agents and others are dual-use chemicals (that can be used in industry or in the manufacture of chemical warfare agents).
Department of Defence Australian Department of Defence

Depleted Uranium

(DU)

Uranium with a 235U content less than that found in nature (e.g. as a result of uranium enrichment processes).
DFAT Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade
Direct-Use Material Nuclear material defined for safeguards purposes as being usable for nuclear explosives without transmutation or further enrichment, e.g. plutonium, HEU and 233U.

Discrete Organic Chemical

(DOC)

Any chemical belonging to the class of chemical compounds consisting of all compounds of carbon, except for its oxides, sulphides and metal carbonates, identifiable by chemical name, by structural formula, if known, and by Chemical Abstracts Service registry number, if assigned. Long chain polymers are not included in this definition.
DPRK Democratic People's Republic of Korea
DSTO Defence Science and Technology Organisation
Enrichment A physical or chemical process for increasing the proportion of a particular isotope. Uranium enrichment involves increasing the proportion of 235U from its level in natural uranium, 0.711%. For LEU fuel the proportion of 235U (the enrichment level) is typically increased to between 3% and 5%.
Euratom Atomic Energy Agency of the European Union. Euratom's safeguards office, called the Directorate General of Transport and Energy H (DG), is responsible for the application of safeguards to all nuclear material in Austria, Belgium, Bulgaria, Cyprus, Czech Republic, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Ireland, Italy, Latvia, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Malta, Netherlands, Poland, Portugal, Romania, Slovakia, Slovenia, Spain, and Sweden; and to all nuclear material in civil facilities in France and the United Kingdom.
Facility

(For CWC purposes) A plant, plant site or production/processing unit.

(For safeguards purposes) A reactor, critical facility, conversion plant, fabrication plant, reprocessing plant, isotope separation plant, separate storage location or any location where safeguards significant amounts of nuclear material are customarily used.

Fissile Referring to a nuclide capable of undergoing fission by neutrons of any energy, including 'thermal' neutrons (e.g. 233U, 235U, 239Pu and 241Pu).
Fissile Material Cut-off Treaty (FMCT) A proposed international treaty to prohibit production of fissile material for nuclear weapons.
Fission The splitting of an atomic nucleus into roughly equal parts, often by a neutron. In a fission reaction, a neutron collides with a fissile nuclide (e.g. 235U) that then splits, releasing energy and further neutrons. Some of these neutrons may go on to collide with other fissile nuclei, setting up a nuclear chain reaction.
Fissionable Referring to a nuclide capable of undergoing fission by 'fast' neutrons (e.g. 233U, 235U, 238U, 239Pu, 240Pu, 241Pu and 242Pu).
Full Scope Safeguards The application of IAEA safeguards to all of a state's present and future nuclear activities. Now more commonly referred to as comprehensive safeguards.
GA Geoscience Australia
GW Gigawatt (Giga = billion, 109).
GWe Gigawatts of electrical power.
GWt Gigawatts of thermal power.
Heavy Water
(D2O)
Water enriched in the 'heavy' hydrogen isotope deuterium (2H) which consists of a proton and a neutron. D2O occurs naturally as about one part in 6000 of ordinary water. D2O is a very efficient moderator, enabling the use of natural uranium in a nuclear reactor.
HIFAR High Flux Australian Reactor. The 10 MWt research reactor located at ANSTO, Lucas Heights.

High enriched uranium

(HEU)

Uranium enriched to 20% or more in 235U. Weapons-grade HEU is enriched to over 90% 235U.
Hydroacoustic Term referring to underwater propagation of pressure waves (sounds). One category of CTBT IMS station monitoring changes in water pressure generated by sound waves in the water.
IAEA International Atomic Energy Agency
Indirect-Use Material Nuclear material that cannot be used for a nuclear explosive without transmutation or further enrichment (e.g. depleted uranium, natural uranium, LEU and thorium).
INFCIRC IAEA Information Circular. A series of documents published by the IAEA setting out, inter alia, safeguards, physical protection and export control arrangements.
INFCIRC/153 (Corrected) The model agreement used by the IAEA as a basis for comprehensive safeguards agreements with non-nuclear-weapon states party to the NPT.
INFCIRC/225 Rev.5 (Corrected) IAEA document entitled 'Nuclear Security Recommendations on Physical Protection of Nuclear Materials and Nuclear Facilities'. Its recommendations reflect a consensus of views among IAEA member states on desirable requirements for physical protection measures on nuclear material and facilities, that is, measures taken for their physical security.

INFCIRC/540

(Corrected)

The model text of the Additional Protocol.
INFCIRC/66 Rev.2 The model safeguards agreement used by the IAEA since 1965. Essentially this agreement is facility-specific. For NNWS party to the NPT it has been replaced by INFCIRC/153.
Infrasound Sound in the frequency range of about 0.02 to 4 Hertz. One category of CTBT IMS stations will monitor sound at these frequencies with the aim of detecting explosive events such as a nuclear test explosion at a range up to 5000 km.
Integrated safeguards The optimum combination of all safeguards measures under comprehensive safeguards agreements and the Additional Protocol to achieve maximum effectiveness and efficiency.

International Data Centre

(IDC)

Data gathered by monitoring stations in the CTBT IMS network are compiled, analysed to identified events and archived by the Vienna-based IDC. IDC products giving the data about events are made available to CTBT signatories.

International Monitoring System

(IMS)

A network of monitoring stations and analytical laboratories established pursuant to the CTBT which, together with the IDC, gather and analyse data with the aim of detecting any nuclear explosion.

Inventory Change Report

(ICR)

A formal report from a national safeguards authority to the IAEA on changes to nuclear materials inventories in a given period.
Isotopes Nuclides with the same number of protons, but different numbers of neutrons, e.g. 235U (92 protons and 143 neutrons) and 238U (92 protons and 146 neutrons). The number of neutrons in an atomic nucleus, while not significantly altering its chemistry, does alter its properties in nuclear reactions. As the number of protons is the same, isotopes are different forms of the same chemical element.
Light water H2O. Ordinary water.

Light water reactor

(LWR)

A power reactor which is both moderated and cooled by ordinary (light) water. In this type of reactor, the uranium fuel must be slightly enriched (that is, LEU).

Low Enriched Uranium

(LEU)

Low Enriched Uranium. Uranium enriched to less than 20% 235U. Commonly, LEU used as fuel in light water reactors is enriched to between 3% and 5% 235U.

Material Balance Area

(MBA)

A delineation for nuclear accounting purposes as required under comprehensive safeguards agreements. It is a defined and delineated area in or outside of a facility such that: (a) the quantity of nuclear material in each transfer into or out of the material balance area can be determined; and (b) The physical inventory of nuclear material in the material balance area" can be determined; in order that the nuclear material balance can be established for IAEA safeguards purposes.

Material Balance Report

(MBR)

A formal report from a national safeguards authority to the IAEA comparing consolidated inventory changes in a given period with the verified inventories at the start and end of that period.

Mixed oxide fuel

(MOX)

Mixed oxide reactor fuel, consisting of a mixture of uranium and plutonium oxides. The plutonium content of fresh MOX fuel for a LWR is typically around 5–7%.
Moata Small training reactor previously located at Lucas Heights.
Moderator A material used to slow fast neutrons to thermal speeds where they can readily be absorbed by 235U or plutonium nuclei and initiate a fission reaction. The most commonly used moderator materials are light water, heavy water or graphite.
MUF Material Unaccounted For. A term used in nuclear materials accountancy to mean the difference between operator records and the verified physical inventory. A certain level of MUF is expected due to measurement processes. MUF does not usually indicate "missing" material – because it is a difference due to measurement, MUF can have either a negative or a positive value.
MWe Megawatts of electrical power.
MWt Megawatts of thermal power.
Natural uranium In nature uranium consists predominantly of the isotope 238U (approx. 99.3%), with the fissile isotope 235U comprising only 0.711%.
Non-nuclear-weapon state(s) (NNWS) States not recognised by the NPT as having nuclear weapons at 1 January 1967 when the Treaty was negotiated.
NPT Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons.
Nuclear material Any source material or special fissionable material as defined in Article XX of the IAEA Statute (in practice, this means uranium, thorium and plutonium).

Nuclear-weapon state(s)

(NWS)

States recognised by the NPT as having nuclear weapons at 1 January 1967 when the Treaty was negotiated, namely the United States, Russia, the United Kingdom, France and China.
Nuclide Nuclear species characterised by the number of protons (atomic number) and the number of neutrons. The total number of protons and neutrons is called the mass number of the nuclide.

Old Chemical Weapons

(OCW)

Defined under the Chemical Weapons Convention as:

a) chemical weapons produced before 1925; or

b) chemical weapons produced between 1925 and 1946 that have deteriorated to such extent that they can no longer be used as chemical weapons.

On-Site Inspection

(OSI)

On-Site Inspection. A short notice challenge-type inspection provided for in the CTBT as a means for investigation concerns about non-compliance with the prohibition on nuclear explosions.
OPAL Open Pool Australian Light-Water reactor. The 20 MWt research reactor located at ANSTO, Lucas Heights, reached full power on 3 November 2006 and was officially opened on 20 April 2007.
OPCW Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons

Other Chemical Production Facility

(OCPF)

Defined under the Chemical Weapons Convention as all plant sites that:

a) produced by synthesis during the previous calendar year more than 200 tonnes of unscheduled discrete organic chemicals; or

b) comprise one or more plants which produced by synthesis during the previous calendar year more than 30 tonnes of an unscheduled discrete organic chemical containing the elements phosphorus, sulphur or fluorine.

Physical Inventory Listing

(PIL)

A formal report from a national safeguards authority to the IAEA on nuclear materials inventories at a given time (generally the end of a Material Balance Report period).
PrepCom Preparatory Commission. In this report the term is used for the Preparatory Commission for the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty Organization.
Production (For CWC purposes) The formation of a chemical through chemical reaction. Production of chemicals specified by the CWC is declarable, even if produced as intermediates and irrespective of whether or not they are isolated.
PTS Provisional Technical Secretariat for the CTBTO Preparatory Commission
239Pu An isotope of plutonium with atomic mass 239 (94 protons and 145 neutrons). The fissile isotope of plutonium most suitable for nuclear weapons.
R&D Research and Development.
Radionuclide An isotope with an unstable nucleus that disintegrates and emits energy in the process. Radionuclides may occur naturally, but they can also be artificially produced, and are often called radioisotopes. One category of CTBT IMS stations will detect radionuclide particles in the air. Other IMS stations are equipped with radionuclide noble gas technology to detect the abundance of the noble gas xenon in the air.
Reprocessing Processing of spent nuclear fuel to separate uranium and plutonium from highly radioactive fission products.
Safeguards Inspector For domestic purposes, person declared under section 57 of the Safeguards Act to undertake inspections to ensure compliance with provisions of the Act and to assist IAEA Inspectors in the conduct of Agency inspections and complementary access in Australia.
Seismic Referring to the movements of the ground that can be generated by earthquakes, explosions etc. The seismic element of the CTBT monitoring system is a network of 50 primary stations and 120 auxiliary stations. Analysis of seismic waves can be used to distinguish between earthquakes and explosive events.

Small Quantities Protocol

(SQP)

A protocol to a state's Safeguards Agreement with the IAEA, for states with small quantities of nuclear material and no nuclear facilities. The protocol holds in abeyance most of the provisions of the state's Safeguards Agreement.
Source Material Uranium containing the mixture of isotopes occurring in nature; uranium depleted In the isotope uranium-235; thorium; or, any of the foregoing in the form of metal, alloy, chemical compound, or concentrates.
Special Fissionable Material Plutonium-239; uranium-233; uranium enriched in the isotopes 235 or 233; any material containing one or more of the foregoing. The term special fissionable material does not include source material.

Standing Advisory Group on Safeguard Implementation

(SAGSI)

An international group of experts appointed by, and advising, the IAEA Director General on safeguards implementation matters.
232Th The only naturally occurring isotope of thorium, having an atomic mass of 232 (90 protons and 142 neutrons).
233U An isotope of uranium containing 233 nucleons, usually produced through neutron irradiation of 232Th.
235U An isotope of uranium containing 235 nucleons (92 protons and 143 neutrons) which occurs as 0.711% of natural uranium.
238U An isotope of uranium containing 238 nucleons (92 protons and 146 neutrons) which occurs as about 99.3% of natural uranium.
UNSCR United Nations Security Council Resolution

Uranium ore concentrate

(UOC)

A commercial product of a uranium mill usually containing a high proportion (greater than 90%) of uranium oxide.

Weapons of Mass Destruction

(WMD)

Refers to nuclear, chemical, biological and occasionally radiological weapons.

[36] Countries having bilateral agreements with Australia covering use of AONM are marked with an asterisk. These countries operate 385 power reactors, which produce around 17% of total world electricity and about 92% of world nuclear energy.

[37] Supply of AONM to Taiwan is covered by an agreement between Australia and the United States.

[38] Australia has two agreements with China, one covering nuclear material transfers and one covering nuclear cooperation.

[39] Euratom is the atomic energy agency of the European Union. The Euratom agreement covers all 27 member states.

[40] 'Significant nuclear activities' encompasses any amount of nuclear material in a facility or 'location outside a facility' (LOF), or nuclear material in excess of the exemption limits in INFCIRC/153 paragraph 37.

[41] Iran implemented its AP 'provisionally' from 2003 but 'suspended' this in 2005.

[42] On 10 January 2003, DPRK gave notice of withdrawal from the NPT. Pending clarification of its status, DPRK is counted here as an NPT Party.

[43] This Complementary Access took place in March 2011 as reported in ASNO's 2010-11 Annual Report, but the Article 10.c statement was not available at the time of publishing the 2010-11 Annual Report.

[44] These States do not include the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK), where the IAEA did not implement safeguards and, therefore, could not draw any conclusion.

[45] And Taiwan, China.

[46] In addition to the IMS particulate monitoring station at Melbourne, an IMS noble gas monitoring system is installed and operating in a testing and evaluation phase.

[47] In addition to the IMS particulate monitoring station at Darwin, an IMS noble gas monitoring system is installed and operating in a testing and evaluation phase.

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