Skip to content
Australian Government - Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade

Advancing the interests of Australia and Australians internationally

Australian Government - Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade

Advancing the interests of Australia and Australians internationally

Australian Safeguards and Non-Proliferation Office

Annual Report 1999-2000

The IAEAs Safeguards Statement for 1999

In fulfilling the safeguards obligations of the Agency in 1999, the Secretariat did not find any indication that nuclear material which had been declared and placed under safeguards had been diverted for any military purpose or for purposes unknown, or that facilities, equipment or non-nuclear material placed under safeguards were being misused. All the information available to the Agency supports the conclusion that the nuclear material and other items placed under safeguards remained in peaceful nuclear activities or were otherwise adequately accounted for.

In 1999, the Agency was in the early stages of implementing protocols additional to safeguards agreements (additional protocols). Having completed the evaluation of all the information available to the Agency in respect of two States, including information obtained through activities pursuant to their comprehensive safeguards agreements and additional protocols, the Agency found no indication either of diversion of declared nuclear material or of the presence of undeclared nuclear material or activities in those States. In the case of other States with comprehensive safeguards agreements and an additional protocols in force, the evaluation of the information available to the Agency was not yet complete.

The Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK) remains in non-compliance with its safeguards agreement. The Agency is still unable to verify the correctness and completeness of the initial declaration of nuclear material made by the DPRK and is, therefore, unable to conclude that there has been no diversion of nuclear material in the DPRK. Although the safeguards agreement between the DPRK and the Agency remains binding and in force, the Agency is able to implement only some of the required safeguards measures in the DPRK. These measures include monitoring the freeze on the DPRK's graphite moderated reactors and related facilities, as requested by the United Nations Security Council and as foreseen in the Agreed Framework of October 1994 between the United States of America and the DPRK.

Since 1991, the Agency's safeguards activities in Iraq under the comprehensive safeguards agreement concluded pursuant to the Treaty on the non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) have been implemented as part of the activities carried out by the Agency in Iraq pursuant to United Nations Security Council resolution 687 and related resolutions. In 1999, the Agency was not in a position to implement its Security Council mandated activities in Iraq and could not, therefore, provide any assurance that Iraq was in compliance with its obligations under these resolutions. In these circumstances, given the requirements of its safeguards system, and pursuant to Iraq's safeguards agreement, the Agency scheduled, for December 1999, a physical inventory verification of the nuclear material subject to safeguards in Iraq with the objective of verifying the presence of the nuclear material in question. The inspection could not be carried out in December 1999 because the Government of Iraq provided the necessary visas for safeguards inspectors only in January 2000.

Note: The planned physical inventory verification inspection in Iraq took place from 22 to 25 January 2000. The inspectors were able to verify the presence of the nuclear material subject to safeguards.

Return to the ASNO Annual Report Index | Australian Uranium Exports

Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade