My H524  and telegrams Nos. 616  and 3.  Further
information now available from 'secret but entirely trustworthy
source' referred to in previous telegrams.
(1) In a telegram to the Japanese Minister at Lisbon  on 24th
November the Japanese Minister for Foreign Affairs  referred to
Japan's desire to proceed in due course to develop Timor's oil
resources and urged him 'to bear in mind the great importance of
the question in relation realization our national [fuel] 
supply scheme and also as an offset to the American "stringent
embargo" against Japan'.
(2) On 4th December the Japanese Minister at Lisbon reported to
the Minister for Foreign Affairs that 'it will be quite impossible
for us to gain our desired objectives by means of ordinary
negotiations. Judging from Portugal's treatment of Belgian
interests and from unjust suspicions that Bitoque's (presumably
Wittouck ) activities with a view to getting oil rights are
being carried out in co-operation with Japan, there is reason to
suspect that Portuguese have decided definitely not to grant such
concessions to Japan'.
(3) On 21st December the Japanese Minister for Foreign Affairs
telegraphed to the Minister at Lisbon: 'We consider that we must
make use of Macao to break this deadlock', instancing the cutting
of land and water communication in order to induce an acute food
shortage, or occupation of the coast opposite Macao. Pointing out
that he wanted to attain his objective if possible without
resorting to such pressure he authorized the Minister 'to make
dear our demands and, if they persist in refusing to reconsider
the matter, to hint in a roundabout way at pressure'. He added:
'It is quite possible that as you say the machinations of Great
Britain are behind this business so it may be necessary to
negotiate with Great Britain too, depending on how the matter
(4) On 22nd December the Japanese Minister at Lisbon reported home
that Australian contract was now as good as settled. He asked the
Minister for Foreign Affairs: 'Do your instructions mean that you
intend to dispute the monopoly of the Australian company over the
area in which they have the concession?' i.e. east of longitude
125 degrees 50 minutes east. He pointed out that 'an early
withdrawal of the Australian monopoly is link[ed] up with
closeness of relations which bind the Portuguese Government with
British'. He urged that Japan should try to acquire rights in the
district west longitude mentioned above comprising roughly one-
third of Portuguese Timor and having established a footing bide
her time until a proper opportunity presented itself.
(5) On 30th December the Japanese Minister for Foreign Affairs
'Although we should be satisfied if Sapt's  entry into the
field were permitted, what I believed to be essential was that the
monopoly itself should be disputed and that Portuguese should be
made to be to [sic] first to suggest a definite scheme for a
compromise. If we endeavoured to acquire concession for the
western territory that would be tantamount to overlooking for the
time being fact of other party being in possession and I would
therefore prefer not to make such a proposal as yet'.
(With regard to the proposed pressure on Macao you will remember
similar reports to this effect early in 1939.)
1 On file AA: A981, Timor (Portuguese) 22, iv.
2 This is an incorrect reference to cablegram 716. See Documents
on Australian Foreign Policy 1937-49, vol. II, Document 417.
3 Document 1.
4 Kikuji Yonezawa.
5 Admiral Kichisaburo, Nomura.
6 This word has been inserted from Stirling's file copy on AA:
A2937, Timor Oil.
7 S. F. Wittouck, Managing Director of the Asia Investment
8 Sociedade Agricola Patria e Travaryo.
[AA: A981, TIMOR (PORTUGUESE) 22, iv]