2 Mr S. M. Bruce, High Commissioner in London, to Mr R. G. Casey, Minister to the United States

Cablegram 29 LONDON, 1 July 1940, 8.39 p.m.

Foreign Office Telegram No. 1325 to Lord Lothian [1] is in my view

of transcending importance and presents an opportunity to put a

case to the President [2] and Sumner Welles [3] based on United

States self-interest to induce them to do what it is vital in our

interest should be done.

Apart from a declaration of war by the United States making the

U.K. and the U.S. fleets a common unit there is no immediate help

of outstanding value that the U.S. can render.

The vital necessity is that the U.S. should immediately organise

her unparalleled economic potentialities, but if this is to be

effective sufficiently to accelerate the pace of the existing

machine profound and fundamental reorganisation on a national

basis will have to be effected (see Telegram to Lothian No. 1325,

1 b).

This would be essential in the interests of the U.S. if the U.K.

were to go the way of France, but will be equally essential if the

U.K. can resist invasion and carry on with British fleet based on

the U.K., as, in my view, through loss of time and destruction of

factories due to enemy air action, British production, however

well organized, cannot reach the volume necessary to obtain air

supremacy and equip the divisions required to meet the position in

Africa and the Middle East as it develops, [and carry] [4] out

sporadic but perpetual harassing of the enemy along the 2000 miles

of European coast line it now occupies, which will be essential.

It will therefore be necessary to look to the U.S. and Canada

primarily and to Australia to a minor extent to meet this need.

Our approach to the U.S. in my view should be to make clear beyond

any possibility of doubt that there is no contribution in man-

power for land forces which the U.S. would be asked to or in fact

could usefully make-that it is enough if through her industrial

capacity her help can be rendered-that out of our experience we

can tell her that nothing short of an all-in national effort will

be sufficient to make that industrial capacity produce the results

required of it-urge that any action in any case taken at once is

to be presumed in U.S.'s own interests quite apart from its value

to us in carrying on the struggle.

Repeated to Canberra, No. 500.

1 U.K. Ambassador to the United States. The cablegram, dispatched

On 30 June, instructed Lothian to convey to the U.S. Govt that the

U.K. Govt, having made a thorough review of the economic situation

created by the fall of France, desired 'to impress upon the United

States administration their conviction that, in order to achieve

victory at the earliest possible moment, [they] must look to the

United States to furnish equipment, supplies of aircraft and other

munitions and essential raw materials on an altogether larger

scale than hitherto'. See file AA: A3300, 47.

2 Franklin D. Roosevelt.

3 U.S. Under-Secretary of State.

4 Corrected from Braces copy on file AA: M100, July 1940.

[AA: A3300, 47]