9 Bruce to Curtin

Cablegram 111 [A] LONDON, 25 July 1942, 2.25 p.m.

IMMEDIATE FOR THE PRIME MINISTER MOST SECRET PERSONAL HIMSELF

My telegram 107 of 20th July. [1] The discussions on very high

level referred to were with Hopkins, Marshall and King who arrived

in this country on Friday of last week. Their presence here was

kept a very close secret and I was specially asked to make no

reference to it. The object of the visit was to review with the

Government and Chiefs of Staff [here our broad] [2] strategy of

the war.

As a result of a week of almost continuous discussions, agreement

has been reached between the Chiefs of Staff and Marshall and King

which will now be submitted to the President and War Cabinet here

for confirmation.

The decisions do not involve any departure from the major

strategic policy already agreed upon but make recommendations of

an operational character which it is not possible for me to

telegraph. My own impression of the decisions is that they are

sound. [3]

The contacts which have been established by the Chiefs of Staff

with Marshall and King during the past week will be of the utmost

value and constitute in my view the greatest step forward that has

yet been taken towards the establishment of Anglo-American

strategy and operational co-operation.

In particular I am glad to say that the discussions showed a

greater appreciation of the importance of the Pacific which is

exemplified by the allocation to that theatre of substantial

American Air Forces previously car-marked for the European

theatre.

The above is of course most secret and confidential.

BRUCE

1 On file AA: M100, July 1942.

2 Inserted from Bruce's copy on the file cited in note 1.

3 The principal decision was to give priority to an Allied landing

in French North Africa rather than in northern France.

[FA:A3195, 1942, 1.29312]