253 Evatt to Dunk

Cablegram EC16 LONDON, 19 September 1945, 10.20 p.m.

MOST IMMEDIATE PERSONAL SECRET

I would like you to chase up for me the following matters.

1. My cable to Chifley and Beasley regarding the proposal to send forces for Tokyo. [1] This is urgent.

2. I am sure you will agree that it is most important to link up talks with the United States over Lend Lease termination and proposed financial arrangements with Australia's general policy towards the United States. I notice that Halifax and Keynes are said to be in touch with Dominion Ministers at Washington. It is most important that Australia's interests should be protected and I do not think that this protection can be assumed if the matter is cleared through Halifax and Keynes rather than directly with the United States. Our external relationships are closely involved. I know that you will appreciate the force of this.

Please keep me fully advised and ensure that a most cautious attitude will be adopted before any new tariff arrangements are made. Please also get from Burton and see the notes exchanged between myself and the American Government on the question of reciprocal trade arrangements, which show clearly that negotiations for our proposed [2] arrangement with the United States Government were in fact vetoed by the United Kingdom Government despite an earlier promise on their part to assist such an arrangement. [3] Burton knows the details.

3. I think you can assure the Prime Minister that we have made substantial progress towards the recognition of our rights to participation in the making of the Peace Treaty. The fact that we have struck the first blow in relation to the European settlement is all to the good because the really crucial matters for Australia will come up later when the Far Eastern Settlement is under consideration. Best wishes.

1 Document 246.

2 A sign here indicates 'word omitted'.

3 See Documents on Australian Foreign Policy 1937-49, vol. VI, Document 355, and vol. VII Document 98. In conversations with the Dominions and later with the U.S. Govt, in 1943, the U.K. Govt had proposed abandoning bilateral discussions in favour of a multilateral approach.

[AA : A1066, A45/2/5/4]