172 Throssell to Shann

Minute CANBERRA, 28 July 1947

SECRET

INDONESIA

If the Indonesia situation is to be raised by Australia in the Security Council it is suggested that the attention of the Security Council be drawn to the situation under [Chapter VII] [1] Article 39 [2] for the following reasons:-

(i) There seems little point in discussing a 'likely danger to maintenance of international peace and security' when a breach of the peace has already occurred.

(ii) The Dutch are reported to be confident that military operations will be over before any international action is taken.

(See 247 from Batavia.) [3] [While] investigations under Chapter VI [4] [are being taken] they will have gained their objectives.

Under Chapter VII, Article 40 [5], provisional measures may be taken to bring hostilities to a halt while investigations and conciliation are proceeding. There is no power under Chapter VI to force cessation of hostilities.

(iii) The U.K. and U.S. have expressed doubts as to the efficacy of the Security Council's intervention. If the Security Council does take a hand and fails to restore peace without delay, confidence in the U.N. will be dangerously reduced. The growing attitude of contempt for the U.N. threatens the foundations of the whole organisation. [6]

1 Words in square brackets were added by hand.

2 Article 39 of the United Nations Charter empowers the Security Council to determine the existence of any threat to the peace, breach of the peace, or act of aggression, and to make recommendations, or decide what measures shall be taken, to maintain or restore international peace and security.

3 Document 158.

4 Under Chapter VI (Article 34) of the United Nations Charter, the Security Council may investigate any dispute, or any situation which might lead to international friction or give rise to a dispute, in order to determine whether the continuance of the dispute or situation is likely to endanger the maintenance of international peace and security.

5 Article 40 of the United Nations Charter empowers the Security Council, in order to prevent aggravation of a situation and before making recommendations or deciding upon measures as provided for by Article 39 (see note 2), to call upon the parties concerned to comply with such provisional measures as it deems necessary or desirable, such measures to be without prejudice to their rights, claims or position.

6 An annotation by A. H. Loomes reads: 'I agree'.

[AA:A1838/274, 854/10/4, i]