296 Officer to Department of External Affairs

Cablegram Hague 145 THE HAGUE, 21 August 1947, 5.55 p.m.

IMMEDIATE SECRET

Indonesia.

My telegram 144. [1]

1. In spite of moderately worded resolution passed by Congress of the Dutch Labour Party on 16th August, I fear that the Government is under heavy pressure locally and from Batavia to disregard the Security Council and to go on to Jogjakarta. Except the Communists and the Independent Left Wing, the view is that the Security Council is interfering in a domestic matter. [2] violence and depredation.

2. I have expressed at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs my anxiety at this attitude and left them in no doubt as to the serious results of any such action. They endeavoured to reassure me but I remain anxious.

3. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs appears to be awaiting the decision o[n] Kleffens proposal and the Chinese resolution. They are most anxious that Australia should allow their Consul-General to act with his colleagues and hope that some way may be found round our reservations to allow him to do so.

4. I urged the Ministry of Foreign Affairs once again to avail themselves of the Australian offer. [3]

5. You will no doubt have heard from the United Kingdom Government on the Dutch memorandum to them and U.S.A., virtually calling for help. [4]

1 Dispatched on 19 August, it reported that the tone of the mainstream Dutch press was becoming sharper and tending to advocate a resumption of military operations in Indonesia.

2 A sign here indicates 'mutilated'.

3 Presumably the offer of Australian-American arbitration (see Document 255).

4 The memorandum handed to the United Kingdom Ambassador in The Hague on 20 August contended that the Security Council's call for a cessation of hostilities had had an effect widely at variance with its intention; that rather than preventing further bloodshed and disorder, it had created a situation in which elements of the Republican armed forces were able to terrorise the inhabitants of Indonesia at will. The Netherlands Government considered this situation to be 'intolerable' and sought any constructive and practical suggestions the Government of the United Kingdom cared to make. In cabling the text of the memorandum to the Australian Government on 25 August, Addison commented that it was possible the Dutch memorandum was not a genuine appeal for suggestions, but rather pan of a preliminary campaign to prepare other countries for, and to justify, a possible denunciation by the Netherlands Government of the 'cease-fire'.

[AA:A1068/1, E47/23/6/1]