99 Cablegram From Spender to Casey[1]

Cablegram, Washington, 10 July 1951

1216. EMERGENCY RESTRICTED

Dulles called the New Zealand representative (in Berendsen's absence) and myself in this afternoon and persisted with the final draft security treaty between Australia, New Zealand and the United States. New drafts of Articles 7 and 8 read as follows:-

(a) Article 7:

The Parties hereby establish a Council, consisting of their Foreign Ministers or their deputies to consider matters concerning the implementation of this treaty. The Council should be so organised as to be able to meet at any time.

(b) Article 8:

Pending the development of a more comprehensive system of regional security in the Pacific Area and the development by the United Nations of more effective means to maintain international peace and security the Council established by Article VII is authorised to maintain a consultative relationship with States, Regional Organisations, Associations of States [or] other Authorities in the Pacific Area in a position to further the purpose of this treaty and to contribute to the security of that area.

2. With reference to Article 7 Dulles said that words 'consisting of their Foreign Ministers or their Deputies' had been included in order to preserve the principle that the civilian authority had the last word as well as placing the authority of the Council at the highest level. With regard to Article 8 he said that the inclusion of the phrase 'in the Pacific Area' had been made to conform with N.A.T.O. and the organisation of American States which both applied to a definite geographical area. He pointed out however, that both N.A.T.O. and the organisation of American States as geographically defined included States in the Pacific Area and said moreover that the present wording of the Treaty did not preclude consultations with other regional organisations etc. and that under the present wording is considered that the Council envisaged in Article 7 could consult with whomsoever they chose.

3. Dulles said that he had a great co-operation from Mr. Marshall and Assist[ant] Secretary of Defense Lovett[2] who had agreed to the text as now drafted. The text had also been agreed to by the Secretary of State and would be presented to the President for his approval at noon tomorrow. In view of approval of Acheson, Marshall and himself, Dulles anticipated no objections from the President and hoped that the text as agreed would be released on 12th July.

4. Having in mind your statement reported in telegrams 788[3] of 10th July and your telegram 763 of 5th July I informed Dulles that I was certain you would have no objection to the text which he handed me today. I gained the strong impression that to recommit the amendments to Articles 7 and 8 would only result in long drawn out negotiations with the likelihood of the Security Treaty not being initialled or signed before the Japanese Peace Treaty. I am satisfied from what he said that Dulles having gone to the trouble of clearing the draft subject to the President's approval so that announcement of the terms could be made concurrently with the Japanese Peace Treaty further negotiations as to verbiage will prove fruitless.

5. Subject to the President's approval Dulles contemplates the initialling of the draft Security Treaty on 12th July on which day the Japanese Peace Treaty will be released to the press. The text of the Japanese Treaty however has already been leaked to the Associated Press and therefore I do not think it will steal too greatly its limelight.

6. I personally see some merit in the amendment to Article 7 and no substantial objection to the amendment in Article 8 since the willingness to consult on broader issues will depend in any event on the United States and we shall have to take this in good faith.

7. In the circumstances subject to anything I may hear from you in the meantime I shall assume that (a) You agree with the present text and (b) That you agree to initialling of the document on 12th July. In this connexion I would point out that the initialling of this document on the day on which the Draft Peace Treaty is officially made public has considerable advantage to ourselves.

8. As indicated Berendsen was not present at the discussion and on a number of occasions he has shown hesitancy regarding textual alterations. It is most important that New Zealand clears this matter with despatch so that nothing will prevent initialling on 12th July and thus bring an end to the negotiations. I would urge telephonic clearance between you and New Zealand so that Berendsen will receive immediate instructions to agree.

9. I shall advise you immediately of the President's concurrence. Reference your memorandum No. 418 of 5th July see my immediately following telegram.

1 In Cablegram 120 (28 June) Gordon Walker indicated that the revised text of Articles VII and VIII of the draft security agreement were acceptable to the UK Government. Consequently, in Cablegram 740 (30 June), Casey informed Spender that Dulles could be informed that, 'so far as Australia is concerned, he is authorised to initial the text as now agreed and that we would welcome early publication at a time mutually agreeable to the three Governments'. Casey also asked Spender to 'sound out Dulles as to the possibility of the tripartite treaty being signed earlier than the Japanese Peace Treaty'. In Cablegram 763 (5 July) Casey affirmed the desirability of formal signature at an early date for several reasons. First, Doidge had communicated his view that criticism of the Japanese peace settlement might jeopardise ratification of the security agreement. Second, Australian and US differences on the international control of raw materials, particularly wool, might soon come to a head. Third, the Australian Government had received advice that Thomas Dewey, the Republican presidential nominee in 1948, 'may come out as advocate of a general Far East pact, analogous to Atlantic Pact' and perhaps weaken Republican support for the tripartite agreement. Spender reported in Cablegram 1186 (6 July) that he had urged on Dulles the necessity of early initialling.

2 Robert A. Lovett.

3 It advised that Casey had stated in answer to a question in the House of Representatives on 10 July that he was aware of reports that Holland had announced in New Zealand that the texts of the Japanese Peace Treaty and the security agreement might be 'made public in a matter of days'. Casey had stated that the draft of the Japanese Treaty was being circulated to interested governments and that he believed and hoped that the terms of the security agreement would be finalised 'in the quite immediate future' and that 'it was not impossible that they would be made known within a matter of days'.

[NAA : A1838, 250/7/10, i]