Cablegram [64A]  LONDON, 23 March 1943, 9.30 p.m.
Your telegrams Nos. 38, 39 and 40 of 18th March. 
Your recent message to the Prime Minister  as well as your
message of 19th January to the President and the Prime Minister
 are now under close examination by the Chiefs of Staff with a
view to submitting a draft reply. [My Service Advisers] and I
[are] giving all possible support to the case for increased
allocation of aircraft to the South-West Pacific that you ask for.
We find that we are confronted with the following arguments:-
(a) your request involves a departure from the agreed strategic
policy on Hitler First which Australia has acquiesced in, even if
not in entire agreement with it ;
(b) that the additional allocation asked for of 1,500 operational
and 500 transport aircraft represents an increase out of all
relation to other theatres of operations and would place in the
South-West Pacific an air strength in excess of what is required
to give effect to the agreed strategy;
(c) that, contrary to the view expressed in paragraph (6) of your
telegram of 19th January, the provision and maintenance of the
additional aircraft asked for would impose extensive demands on
(d) that, while the air bases that the Japanese are creating may
be sufficient to enable a strength of 1,500 to 2,000 planes to be
operated from them, Japan will not be able to provide anything
like this number of planes to do so;
(e) that the air strength allotted to the South-West Pacific for
1943 is adequate to meet any threat that may develop against
Australia or her territories and to prevent the Japanese improving
(f) that it is not sufficiently clear from General MacArthur's
statement in your telegram of 19th January or from your telegrams
as to what is the exact method of operations contemplated in the
event of additional air strength being provided as to warrant an
allocation that would have serious repercussions upon contemplated
(g) that, in view of the consistent line taken by the Prime
Minister and the Chiefs of Staff in resisting suggestions for a
modification of the strategic plan to allow more intensive
operations in the Pacific as a whole, they could not now instruct
the British representatives on the Combined Chiefs of Staff
Committee in Washington to support a similar proposal in respect
of the South-West Pacific Area.
The above sets out the arguments we are up against, and below I
indicate how we are trying to meet them.
With regard to (a), we have admitted that Australia has acquiesced
in the broad strategic plans but that in doing so we had not
contemplated that the South-West Pacific Area would be so starved
of forces as to enable
Japan to remain a potential threat to Australia itself and in any
event so to consolidate their position north of Australia that the
time of their eventual defeat would be prolonged possibly by
The attitude here is that the potential threat to Australia is not
a serious one; to which we have argued that such an assumption
cannot be accepted. In support of such argument, we have pointed
out that, in view of the statement at the Casablanca Conference
regarding unconditional surrender , the Japanese might well
undertake a bold or even a desperate adventure in the South-West
Pacific, before Germany can be beaten, and while the United
Nations' strength is committed elsewhere.
We have pointed out that, if Japan decided on such a course, she
would have to act quickly in the face of United Nations'
increasing strength and the object would probably be to deprive
the United Nations of main facilities for mounting a counter
offensive from the South and South-West Pacific Areas.
We have also stressed that, on the basis of broad United Nations
strategy, it is essential that Japan should be prevented from
driving us further back in the Pacific. This could only be done by
engaging in limited offensives for which necessary forces,
particularly air, must be available and that only by such forces
being available can the Japanese be kept sufficiently engaged to
cause a constant drainage on their resources.
The above are only samples of the arguments we are using but in
addition we have dug out everything we could from speeches,
cables, etc., and in particular I have used strongly your point
about 'too little and too late'.
With regard to (b), I am pressing for the latest figures in
connection with the estimate of total United Nations production of
aircraft during 1943 and the order of battle for all theatres
during the same period. So far, the information I have obtained is
not very satisfactory.
With regard to production, there is great difficulty in getting
figures out of the Americans and past experience has shown that
even when obtained they are seldom lived up to (Note-my own
impression is that now America is getting into her stride her
estimates will be progressively realised).
With regard to the order of battle-difficulty has been experienced
in getting information from the Americans but it is hoped that
figures will be available in the next two or three weeks.
In view of this lack of definite information, it is difficult to
assess the position. The sort of argument that one is met with is
that for 1943 the total allocation of transport planes to the
United Kingdom for all theatres is 600 and that the allocation of
an additional 500 to the South-West Pacific would mean a
diminution of this figure to an extent that could not be
contemplated in view of the United Kingdom's commitments.
With regard to (c), we have met this argument by pointing out that
Australian plans have all been laid on the basis both for air and
ground personnel of seventy-three squadrons whereas aircraft for
only thirty squadrons are to be provided after [sic] April, 1943.
In reply to the argument that even if this is so, and the greater
part of the aircraft can be flown, the provision of petrol, bombs,
spares and other equipment would involve a heavy drain on
shipping, we have contended that the shipping involved would not
be great and the object to be attained is so important as to
warrant its employment.
As to (d), on this point it is argued that the total first-line
strength that Japan will be in a position to maintain is 1,800
aircraft, of which 850 would have to be retained in Japan and the
northern area and some 500 to cover Malaya, Burma, Siam and Indo-
From this, it is suggested that any concentration that could be
brought into the South-West Pacific Area is a relatively limited
one. Against this, we have pointed out that Japan appears to have
concentrated on mobility of her Air Force and that, from the
number of landing grounds she has established, it would be
possible for her to bring about a large concentration in the
South-West Pacific, and that, if she decided on a desperate
adventure as we have suggested, she might well take a risk and
effect such a concentration. This is countered by the statement
that the risk would be too great, to which we have pointed out
that the Japanese have achieved most of their successes up to date
by taking risks.
With regard to (e), in reply to this contention, we have used the
argument under (d) and have in addition pointed out that surely
the people on the spot are better able to judge this fact and that
MacArthur's statement and your telegrams have shown that the view
held here is not shared in Australia.
With regard to (f), this point we have had to rather slide over
and I shall be obliged if you can give us anything to help us to
deal with this argument.
As to (g), on this point we have argued strongly that the cases
are not parallel. The suggestions which have been resisted were
based on the desirability of an offensive in the Pacific as a
whole with new and increased commitments which would have
constituted a drain upon allied resources not envisaged in the
present strategic plan.
Your proposals are for the provision of [the] force necessary to
give effect to the present strategic plan which contemplates the
safety of Australia and prevention of the Japanese strengthening
and consolidating their position so as to make their eventual
defeat more difficult and prolonged.
In this connection we have also used the argument that, in the
event of the Japanese embarking on a desperate adventure, it is in
the best interests [of the United Nations] as a whole that they
should not only be prevented from achieving their objective but
that the adventure should be decisively defeated and such losses
inflicted on them as would materially affect their power to
continue the struggle.
This could only be done if necessary forces particularly in the
air were available. We have contended that the chances of Japan
adopting a reckless course are sufficient to warrant the provision
of ample forces and that one should be prepared to gain full
[advantage] from it.
I have cabled at this length to give you as clear a picture of the
position here as I can. I shall be obliged for any information,
arguments or suggestions that you can send to help my Service
Advisers and myself in our discussions.