My immediately preceding telegram. 
'I charge Mr. Fadden with a gross breach of faith in revealing
proceedings of the Advisory War Council at a time when he was
Prime Minister. This is a violation of his oath as a member of the
Council, and not the conduct expected of a former Prime Minister.
2. I also charge him with referring to a secret cablegram from Mr.
Churchill  in defiance of an understanding reached between
members of the War Cabinet and the Advisory War Council at Mr.
Churchill's request that we would not publicly refer to them
during the election campaign.
3. Finally I charge Mr. Fadden with a complete distortion of the
facts to serve his political ends.
4. In view of Mr. Fadden's outrageous conduct, I must state the
facts, which must be as brief as possible out of respect for the
assurance I have given Mr. Churchill on behalf of the members of
the Australian War Cabinet and Advisory War Council-
"At a meeting of the Advisory War Council in September, 1941 ,
a cablegram from Mr. Churchill  was read to the Council.
It dealt with the situation in the Pacific, and said that the
United Kingdom Government was contemplating placing a force of
capital ships, including first class units, in the triangle Aden-
Singapore Simonstown before the end of the year.
As the entire conception of Australian defence for years had been
based on the principle that a fleet in this region would ensure
the security of Australia against invasion, I asked that there
should be a review of the general position in the light of Mr.
Churchill's cablegram, and that consideration might be given to a
reduction in the numbers of militia forces called up for duty and
their period of training. I said that I did not favour any
reduction in the naval and air war efforts of the Commonwealth and
that it might be found that the situation warranted the transfer
of men from Army activities to munitions production.
It was agreed that any developments which had a favourable
reaction on the local defence position would be kept under notice.
As was known, the position with Japan deteriorated, the PRINCE OF
WALES and REPULSE were despatched as the first instalment of the
Fleet, and Singapore was lost."
5. I have answered Mr. Fadden's challenge. To complete the
picture, I would add that, a week before the meeting in question,
a statement had been made that one of the main objects of Sir
Earle Page's visit to London in 1941, as a representative of the
Fadden Government, was to present a case for the strengthening of
the forces based on Singapore in accordance with Mr. Churchill's
cablegram, in order to case the manpower position arising from the
calling up for continuous service or long periods of training of a
large home defence army.'