Cablegram 220[A] LONDON, 17 November 1943, 9.18 p.m.
Your 164 of th November. 
The staff conversations have now taken place and in my immediately
following telegram  I send you text of a report which I have
received from Williams and Wrigley.
The position as I understand it is that while the Air Ministry
appreciates your desire that 'the R.A.A.F. in South-West Pacific
Area should be expanded and maintained at a strength appropriate
to Australia's equitable share of operations in this theatre' they
do not feel that this will best be achieved by withdrawing
Australian squadrons or personnel in large numbers from control of
While it might be expected that they would adopt this attitude, in
view of the tremendous efforts that are being made to increase the
weight of the attack in Europe at the present critical stage of
the war, I think there is something in the arguments which they
advance. These, as I understand them, are:
1. That the transfer to Australia of our own Nos. 3 and 10
Squadrons would mean the withdrawal from active operations of two
highly trained and efficient squadrons for a period of from three
to six months.
2. That the withdrawal of Australian personnel from Article XV
squadrons  would disorganise these squadrons and put them out
of action for varying periods.
3. That the value of personnel withdrawn under (2) to Australia,
owing to necessity of retraining under different conditions and
with different machines, would not be commensurate with the
disadvantages resulting here.
4. That the disorganisation of 13 squadrons resulting from the
transference of 2,000 ground personnel to Australia would be a
most serious loss to the effective strength of the R.A.F.
5. That the desire of the Australian Government for the expansion
of the R.A.A.F. would be better accomplished by-
(a) The retention by Australia of whatever personnel is required
for the development programme even if this involved a diminution
in the flow of Australian personnel under the E.A.T.S.
(b) Ensuring the flow of aircraft from America to enable the
R.A.A.F. expansion programme to proceed smoothly.
(c) Pressing the Americans to supply the necessary maintenance
units for their own squadrons thereby releasing Australian
manpower at present engaged in providing these maintenance
(d) Continuing and expanding the present arrangements under which
men who have completed their tours of duty and other selected
personnel are returned to Australia, than by providing for the
necessary expansion of the R.A.A.F. by withdrawals from the
control of the R.A.F. of Australian squadrons and personnel, with
the consequent repercussions upon the European air effort.
Owing to the anxiety which the Air Ministry feels at the prospect
of having to release substantial numbers of Australians from the
control of the R.A.F., I am convinced that we can obtain the
maximum support of the Chiefs of Staff here with the Combined
Chiefs of Staff in Washington for the implementation of whatever
programme you may decide upon if it is based upon looking to the
United States of America to provide the required aircraft and to
release Australian manpower by the United States of America
providing its own maintenance requirements.
Further staff conversations are now suspended pending your
instructions in the light of Williams' and Wrigley's report.