Cablegram S25 LONDON, 31 August 1944, 7.20 p.m.
Your 165. 
I am in the most cordial agreement with your view as to the
unwisdom of attaching too much importance to events which,
although infuriating in themselves, are relatively minor. I am
also in agreement that the Soviet Government has at times 'caused
some real embarrassment'. I have constantly urged that these
things should not be taken too tragically (my 14A of January 27th
) and your telegram will reinforce me in continuing to do so.
I have conveyed your views to Eden. As far as he personally is
concerned it is to a large extent a case of preaching to the
converted and the Prime Minister is equally sound. There are,
however, others both in the Foreign Office and in the United
Kingdom Government who are not sufficiently alive to the paramount
need for co-operation with the U.S.S.R. and who are too prone to
exploit any trivial incident.
The recent dismissal of the Soviet air representative at Bari
(Dominions Office D.1148 of August 15th ) was in my view a
clear instance of taking the Soviet too seriously. Soviet
Government activity in Greek affairs to which you refer was of an
unfortunate character and the behaviour of Novikoff , their
representative in Cairo (my 59A of April 28th ) has contributed
to the creation of a wrong atmosphere.
The most serious matter, however, is the Soviet attitude towards
the resistance movement in Warsaw, particularly the refusal of the
Soviet Government to allow the landing of the United States air
force in Russian territory (Dominions Office D.1176 ). This
action has had a deplorable effect both here and in the United
States mainly because of sinister rumours that the Soviet are
deliberately refraining from pressing the attack on Warsaw to the
end so that the resistance forces may be annihilated.
The Warsaw episode is tragic and may have the most unfortunate
consequences including the resignation of Mikolajczyk.  Its
explanation is I think, the following:
The Poles behaved foolishly in starting their Warsaw insurrection
without previous agreement with the Russians. On the other hand,
the rising was undoubtedly to some extent provoked by Russian
broadcasts (Dominions Office D.1178 paragraph 7 ). When the
rising Government got into trouble and there was not an immediate
thrust by the Russian land forces to relieve them, an operation
which would not have fitted in with the Russian plan of campaign,
the Poles in Warsaw denounced the Russians and in broadcasts
referred contemptuously to the 'so-called Curzon Line' and
announced the intention of fighting to the last man for Polish
Vilna  and Polish L'vov. The attitude of the insurgents
naturally antagonised the Russians and the present unfortunate
situation was created.
The position is deplorable but if handled with patience, I
believe, may be resolved. Today's Times conveys an admirable
article analysing the position with sympathy and understanding and
concluding with an earnest appeal that the matter should not be
allowed to rest where it stands and that a renewed and sincere
endeavour should be made in London, in Washington and in Moscow to
resolve the deadlock.