Cablegram 154A LONDON, 9 November 1944, 3.30 p.m.
Addressed to the Prime Minister, Mr. Curtin.
Dominions Office telegram 1638 of the 3rd of November. 
This telegram raises two important issues:-
(1) The taking of the far reaching decisions by the United Kingdom
Government involved in the replies given to the three questions
posed by the Polish Government  without consultation with the
(2) The policy involved in such decisions.
With regard to (1) I have made a personal protest and have doubts
as to whether you should let it pass without some comment. I feel,
however, the necessity of sorting out the trouble between the
Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and the Poles is so important
and the time factor is so urgent that the need for the United
Kingdom Government to act with speed has to be taken into account
and that you may decide in the circumstances to let the matter
With regard to (2) there are such grave differences of opinion on
the issues involved that it is probably desirable that we should
express our views so that they are on record, even if we feel
compelled to acquiesce in the attitude which the United Kingdom
Government has adopted.
To make this point clear it is necessary that I should indicate to
you what are the various trends of thought at present current with
regard to the future of Germany.
In my previous telegrams I have given you some indication of the
direction in which these are going. It might, however, be useful
if I summarised the position as I see it at the moment. While all
schools of thought are agreed upon the necessity of rendering
Germany impotent for aggression in the future, there is
considerable divergence of view as to how this can best be
accomplished. These views might be summarised as follows:-
(1) Those who hold that Germany should be ruthlessly broken up and
large sections of her territory taken from her.
(2) Those who believe the disintegration of Germany is desirable,
but feel that it should be accomplished by the Germans themselves
who would be encouraged to adopt this course by the method of
occupation in the post-war period.
(3) Those who hold that it is unnecessary to bring about the
disintegration of Germany, either forcefully or voluntarily, and
believe that Germany can be rendered impotent for aggression in
the future by an international control of her heavy industries.
Between these positive schools of thought there is a great volume
of indeterminate opinion which recognises the transcending
importance of the issue. Among those in this class, and included
among those who are advocates of (2) and (3) above, there are a
great number who feel that in finding a solution it is necessary:-
(a) To avoid creating such a feeling of resentment among all
German peoples as would form a bond for the maintenance and
progressive development of German nationalism.
(b) To avoid the economic destruction of Germany because of the
repercussions of such destruction upon the economy of Europe and
of a world as a [whole]. 
[(c) To avoid creating a festering sore in the] heart of Europe
from which political disturbances of all kinds will tend to spread
(d) To avoid the creating of German minorities, such as that in
the Sudetenland prior to the war.
(e) To avoid the transfer back to a truncated Germany of large
German populations which it is unable economically to maintain,
thus creating for the first time a real problem of 'Lebensraum'.
Relating the above thoughts to the specific issues raised by the
United Kingdom reply to the Polish Government's questions, I would
draw your attention in particular to paragraph 5(2) of telegram
under reference by which the United Kingdom Government are now
committed to the [principle] that Poland should have the right to
extend her territory up to the Line of the River Oder, including
the port of Stettin, i.e., the German province of Pomerania.
This undertaking in my view goes too far and would involve either
(d) or (e) above. While it is clear that the principle of
territorial compensation (dangerous as past experience has shown
it to be) to Poland has to be accepted, if for no other reason
than to enable Mikolajczyk  to get away with a settlement with
his own people, I see grave dangers in Poland's western boundary
being extended as far as the Oder. It [is] possible that the Poles
themselves may recognise this fact and in exercising the right it
is proposed to confer on them will be more moderate than the
United Kingdom Government's reply invites them to be.
If you agree with my views I suggest that a telegram putting on
record our apprehensions in this regard would be useful.