Cablegram 31[A] LONDON, 29 February 1944, 9 p.m.
Addressed to the Prime Minister, Mr. Curtin. Dominions Office
telegram D.277 of 23rd February. 
The Eire High Commissioner  in London came to see me to-day
about the United States note with regard to the German Minister
 and Japanese Consul-General  in Dublin. The object of his
visit was to tell me that de Valera  had definitely decided to
return a polite negative to the American request and to ask me for
de Valera to ascertain whether the Australian Government would be
prepared to intervene with a view to having the American note
Dulanty told me that de Valera has seen the Canadian High
Commissioner in Dublin  asking him to communicate with the
Canadian Government to request them to use their influence to have
the American note withdrawn.
I told Dulanty that I would communicate with you and would let him
know your reply.
I understand that the reply of the Canadian Government to de
Valera through the Canadian High Commissioner in Dublin was on the
'As Mr. de Valera knew Canadian Government had long earnestly
hoped that Eire Government would come to share their conviction
that the permanent interests of Irish people were identified with
United Nations victory.
The Canadian Government had welcomed each indication of Irish
sympathy and support and kept alive the hope that Eire would feet
able to make some more direct contribution to winning the war.
They would be very glad, therefore, to see the Axis Missions
removed from Dublin and were thus in full sympathy with the object
of the approach made by the United States and United Kingdom
The question which Mr. de Valera had raised was not one in which
the Canadian Government could intervene. In their view, Mr. de
Valera would be well advised to comply with the request made by
the United States and United Kingdom Governments.'
Suggest that the reply which you authorise me to give to Dulanty
should be drawn on similar lines to that of the Canadian reply.
The following points will probably be of interest to you-
1. The request to the Eire Government was made on United States
initiative at the instance of their military authorities who were
deeply concerned about the security of American and Allied troops
in view of events expected in the not distant future.
There are grounds for thinking that the Eire Government were at
first inclined to think that the action had not been initiated by
the United States Government but by the United Kingdom Government
who were using the United States Government in the matter. These
suspicions have, I think, now been removed, particularly as a
result of a conversation between Stettinius and the Fire Minister
 in Washington.
3. The Eire Government's first reaction to the American note was
that it was an ultimatum which, if not complied with, would be
followed by military action.
This impression has now been removed again, mainly by the
3. Some doubts are felt as to whether the sending of a formal
written communication was the best method of achieving the object
the United States Government had in view and some criticism has
been offered of the wording of the communication as savouring too
much of an ultimatum.
On the first point I understand the American attitude is that as
some tragedy might happen to American forces which would be
traceable to the action of enemy agents in Eire, it was necessary
to take formal action to prevent this, and also to have on record
that they had done so.
On the latter point I cannot express a view as the text of the
American communication is not available here.