Cablegram UN801 NEW YORK, 26 November 1946, 1.25 a.m.
1. I called on Byrnes this morning, 25th, and pressed for active
United States support for Australian Trusteeship Agreement in
present form. Bailey came with me. Byrnes was cordial, sent you
his personal regards, and paid handsome tribute to your share in
writing into the Charter the provisions for protection and
advancement of native peoples.
2. I explained that the present text has been accepted by
Parliament, and that change now was politically impossible. He
appreciated your position in this regard, and undertook to discuss
the matter with his Assembly delegation.
3. On merits of the particular amendments regarding welfare,
protection and the freedoms, Byrnes remarked that you had been a
torch bearer in the fight for better colonial conditions, and such
provisions seemed fully in accord with your policy. in reply, we
explained the principles on which you had acted in drafting the
agreement in a form Simple, fulfilling all Charter requirements,
and suited to conditions of territory.
4. I commenced with general political reasons for support by the
United States, e.g., continuance in peace of co-operation in the
Pacific area during war, Australian support of the United States
in other fields like atomic energy, recent Australian decisions
regarding International Trade Organisation and International Bank
5. I pointed out that the main critics of Trusteeship Agreements
are countries which are either unfriendly to the United States or
whose friendship is rather unstable, while Australia has proved
herself a good neighbour of the United States and a stable friend
in time of need.
6. Elaborating 5, we further pointed out that the draft agreements
submitted by all Mandatory States are being attacked by China and
India in an effort to break down control of immigration, by the
Soviet, China and India in an attempt to break down the defence
provisions, and by the Soviet, its satellites and India along
Marxist lines as exhibitions of reactionary Colonialism.
7. We urged that the inevitable effect of pressing now for
including the clauses proposed by the United States delegation
would be to exhibit distrust of good faith and administrative
policy of the Australian Government in New Guinea, which would be
completely unjustified, and which we were sure the United States
would never wish to do.
8. The real question now was why the United States should join in
the attack on the Mandatories for the purpose only of including
unnecessary and abstract clauses such as those proposed. 
9. By joining in present attack on Mandatories, the United States
Government was helping to build up the case for an attack on its
own draft agreement for the Japanese Islands.
10. Byrnes was evidently not informed on the details of the
matter, and agreed to discuss it at once with his Assembly
delegation. He repeated his appreciation of the political aspects
of Australia's position.
11. I saw Vandenberg subsequently. Byrnes had already discussed
the position with him. Vandenberg was also cordial and sent
greetings. He assured me of general support but referred me to
Dulles on the specific matter.
12. During the afternoon of 25th I also saw Dulles with Bailey.
Personal sympathy of Dulles as already reported is in our favour
but he is under instructions from the State Department which has
felt obliged to ask formally from us by way of proposed
modifications what they have asked and obtained from other
Mandatories earlier. Dulles, therefore, felt that under present
conditions the United States delegation would not be able to give
us active support in Sub-Committee or in Committee. He did say,
however, that they would not press their amendments strongly and
that some of them were only there for record. When agreements did
reach Plenary Meeting of Assembly he thought we could count on
active support of the United Nations  for approval of
Australian draft in whatever form.
13. Byrnes has not seen Dulles since my talk with Byrnes this
morning. I shall, therefore, take the matter up again when he has