Cablegram UN850 NEW YORK, 30 November 1946, 2.47 a.m.
Assembly 291. Disarmament.
1. Second day of disarmament debate opened with speech by Makin.
2. Speaking first on the method of regulation and reduction of
armaments we said that the responsibilities of the Security
Council and the Military Staff Committee were laid down in Article
26. In addition it has already been decided by the Assembly that
atomic energy required a special method of handling as a wider
problem involving both peaceful and harmful uses. The Commission
had made progress but was most seriously handicapped by lack of
agreement on safeguards. The Assembly should reaffirm the
Commission's terms of reference and make clear that control and
safeguards must be accomplished through single international
treaty to ensure that these were carried out concurrently. Dr.
Evatt's original emphasis on unity of the problem and his outline
of atomic energy control system were quoted. 
3. Commenting on addendum to Soviet proposal  we pointed out
that the problem was not simply banning atom bombs but control
over atomic energy in the widest sense and the majority of the
Commission were in broad agreement on a comprehensive system of
control through an international authority and based on an
international convention. In view of the large measure of
agreement on this in the Atomic Energy Commission, Assembly should
ask itself whether the Soviet proposal would mean abandonment of
work already done and attempt to make an approach which the
majority of Commission had already found too narrow. We also asked
the Soviet to explain more exactly the nature and functions of the
Commission proposed in sub-paragraph B of their addendum and its
relationship to proposals now before the Atomic Energy Commission.
What did the Soviet mean by 'control'. What was the relationship
between their proposed commissions and existing organs of the
United Nations. If their commissions were established 'within
framework of the Security Council' did that mean decisions of the
Commission would be subject to the veto. We quoted Dr. Evatt's
statements on this aspect.  Furthermore, it was doubtful
whether, under the Charter, the executive powers of the Security
Council were sufficiently wide for it to discharge all the tasks
relating to reduction, regulation and control of armaments and
atomic energy. Responsibility of the Security Council and the
Military Staff Committee in disarmament related to 'planning'.
4. Turning to the Assembly's interest in the subject we referred
to the responsibility under Article 11(1) to recommend to the
Security Council positive general principles of disarmament. These
might be based on the Charter, previous decisions of the Assembly
and past experience and we outlined the following principles for
(a) Disarmament is inseparable from and dependent upon confidence
in the effectiveness of security measures and on United Nations
and general improvement in international relations.
(b) Regulation of armaments must be determined in the light of
obligations under Article 43.
(c) Account must be taken of regional arrangements or agencies.
(d) Obligations under any plans must fall equally on members and
must be multilateral, substantive and qualitative as well as
quantitative. The principle of national sovereignty must not
obstruct effective system of regulation.
(e) Any system must be world-wide. (See Article 2, paragraph 6.)