Proliferation Security Initiative: Lisbon, 4-5 March 2004
fifth Plenary meeting of the Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI) took
place at Palácio Foz, Lisbon, on 4-5 March 2004, building on deliberations at Madrid (12/06/03);
Brisbane (9 -10/07/03); Paris (3 - 4/09/03) and London (9 -10/10/03). Australia,
Canada, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, the Netherlands, Norway, Poland, Portugal,
Singapore, Spain, the UK and the US were represented.
2. The participants reaffirmed
their strong determination to respond effectively to the threat represented
by proliferation and trafficking of WMD, their delivery systems and related
materials worldwide. Recent developments leave no doubt as to the seriousness
of the danger posed by such proliferation activities. The PSI has been successful
in raising worldwide awareness to this threat and in fostering the international
co-operation that is required to stop WMD-related shipments as well as the
proliferation networks. Trafficking in WMD constitutes a global threat to
international peace and security. It is an unacceptable activity and should
be addressed by all countries. If linked to terrorism, it can represent a
random threat to anyone, in any continent.
3. Deterring trafficking
is therefore in the interest of all peace loving countries. The open nature
of this Initiative is reiterated and the contributions from countries that
share PSI concerns, principles and goals continue to be welcomed. This is
a global endeavour with an inclusive nature and it relies on the widest possible
co-operation between states from different parts of the world. Participants
considered that geographical balance and regional diversity are assets that
need to be preserved, as they represent an important added value to PSI effectiveness.
In this spirit, the strengthened commitment of Canada, Norway and Singapore
to the PSI is warmly welcomed.
4. Participants supported the call by US
President Bush to expand the role of the PSI to not only interdict shipments
of WMD, their delivery systems and related materials, but to cooperate in
preventing WMD proliferation facilitators (i.e. individuals, companies, other
entities) from engaging in this deadly trade. They also warmly welcomed contributions
by other participants namely the UK. Participants agreed to pursue greater
co-operation through military and intelligence services and law enforcement
to shut down proliferation facilitators and bring them to justice.
PSI participants agree to begin examining the key steps necessary
for this expanded role, including:
- identifying national points of contact and internal processes developed
for this goal;
- developing and sharing national analyses of key proliferation
actors and networks, their financing sources, and other support structures;
- undertaking national action to identify law enforcement authorities and
other tools or assets that could be brought to bear against efforts to
stop proliferation facilitators.
5. The participants agreed that
it was essential to continue broadening the international consensus in favour
of the fight against the proliferation of WMD, their delivery systems and
related materials, as well as to the widening of the international political
and operational support for PSI aims and actions. This will be carried out
notably by building on previous outreach activities (over 60 countries have
expressed support for the Paris Statement of Interdiction Principles until
now). This may also be done by concluding bilateral agreements with interested
States, notably in view of obtaining their consent for expeditious procedures
for the boarding of vessels flying their flag, as required. The first examples
of such bilateral agreements seem to indicate that this is an approach that
can bear fruit most rapidly and which participants could/should usefully
6. Regarding significant developments related
to the fight against WMD-related trafficking, complementary efforts by all
relevant international organizations and information sharing with such organizations
should be pursued as appropriate.
outreach activities have shown to be an effective awareness-raising tool. They provide a useful framework for enhancing the involvement in
the PSI activities and create a link between its global aims and the various
regional contexts. Participants are encouraged to host further meetings to present and promote
the PSI along the lines of those organised by Japan and Poland. The Portuguese
announcement of one such outreach meeting for the African continent was welcomed.
8. While continuing to promote
wide support tor the Initiative, participants agreed to focus their outreach
efforts particularly on states that have potentially unique contributions
to make to interdictions efforts (i.e. flag states, transhipment states,
overflight states, transit states and coastal states). The support of all countries interested in PSI and cooperation in interdiction
is welcome and states are encouraged to consider the following practical
steps that can establish the basis for involvement in PSI activities:
Formally commit to and publicly endorse the PSI and its Statement
of Interdiction Principles and indicate willingness to take all steps available
to support PSI efforts.
Undertake a review and provide information on current national legal
authorities to undertake interdictions at sea, in the air or on land. Indicate
willingness to strengthen authorities where appropriate.
Identify specific national assets that might contribute to PSI efforts
(e.g. information sharing, military and/or law enforcement assets).
Provide points of contact for PSI interdiction requests and other
operational activities. Establish appropriate internal government processes to coordinate PSI response
Be willing to actively participate in PSI interdiction training exercises
and actual operations as opportunities arise.
Be willing to consider signing relevant agreements (e.g. boarding
agreements) or to otherwise establish a concrete basis for cooperation with
PSI efforts (e.g. MOU on overflight denial).
9. The participants discussed
the proposed amendments to the Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful
Acts against the Safety of Maritime Navigation (SUA) that would criminalise
the transport of weapons of mass destruction, their delivery systems and
related materials on commercial vessels at sea.
10. The participants noted
with satisfaction that the PSI is by now operationally active. They also
recognised that specific, significant progress was thereby obtained in fighting
proliferation activities and that PSI partners had contributed decisively
to recently disclosed successes in the disruption or indeed dismantling of
some previously covert WMD programmes.
11. The meeting heard a report
from the chairman of the operational experts meeting that took place in Washington,
DC, on 16-17 December 2003. It encouraged the operational experts to pursue
their work at the meeting that was announced by Canada, to take place in
April, notably in view of reaching conclusions on the improvement and rationalisation
of the PSI exercise programme, providing for improved thematic and geographical
balance, as well as on several other steps identified at the Washington meeting.
12. Training is required for
operational effectiveness. Six exercises took place in different parts of
the world since the launching of the PSI and further important operational
activities are foreseen in the months to come. The Plenary took note with
satisfaction that the UK, Australia, Spain, France, Italy, the US, Germany
and Poland have organised or will organise PSI exercises. Other participants
are encouraged to take similar initiatives, in the framework of a co-ordinated
and rationalised exercise programme.
13. The Plenary particularly
drew the participants' attention to the fact that the attainment of the PSI
goals requires continued efforts within the operational experts group to
work through operational legal issues, as commenced at the Washington meeting.
All countries are encouraged to take the necessary steps to improve their
legal systems and practical tools to strengthen their capacity to effectively
act as and when required to take action consistent with the PSI Statement
of Interdiction Principles. Bearing in mind our common goals, appropriate consultations might be required
in this regard.
Future of PSI:
14. Not yet one year from the
moment it was launched, the Proliferation Security Initiative has established
itself as a crucial instrument to respond effectively to some of the most
serious security challenges of the XXI century. This is reflected in the
growing number of countries supporting the PSI. All participate in this sense
in the Initiative and all their contributions are warmly welcomed. Just like proliferation can be a multifaceted phenomenon, the responses may
have to be flexible and may need to take many shapes and forms.
15. PSI is an activity, not
an organisation. Progress since the London Plenary demonstrates that the
main lines of the PSI are now well established and that several directions
of action can be pursued separately but still in a mutually reinforcing mode.
However, to further build the PSI as an activity, political vision and strategic
guidance remain necessary. Further consideration shall be given to the suggestion
of establishing a network of contact points at policy level among participants.
16. To commemorate the anniversary of the launching of the PSI
Poland offered to host a meeting in Krakow that will bring together all countries
that support the PSI.