



**Advancing Multilateral Partnerships for Economic Development**

**Mid Term Review – final draft**

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**Disclaimer**

This review was undertaken by Graham Teskey (review leader), Mr Rudini Baoy, (co-evaluator), and Ms Fatima Verzosa (gender and inclusion specialist). The views expressed in this report are those of the Review Team and do not necessarily reflect those of the Australian Government, Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade (DFAT) or Abt Associates.

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**Acronyms and Abbreviations**

| **Acronyms and abbreviations** | **Description** |
| --- | --- |
| **AGaP** | Australia World Bank Growth and Prosperity Trust Fund |
| **AHC** | Australian High Commission |
| **ADB** | Asian Development Bank |
| **AMIC** | Advanced Middle-Income Country |
| **AMPED** | Advancing Multilateral Partnerships for Economic Development |
| **AQC** | Aid Quality Check |
| **DFAT** | Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade (Australian Government) |
| **DWSD** | Department of Welfare and Social Development |
| **EOPO** | End-of-Program Outcome |
| **GEDSI** | Gender equality, disability, and social inclusion |
| **GPH** | Government of the Philippines |
| **IDD** | Investment Design Document |
| **IFC** | International Finance Corporation |
| **IO** | Intermediate Outcome |
| **IMR** | Investment Monitoring Report |
| **MDTF** | Multi-Donor Trust Fund |
| **MELF** | Monitoring, Evaluation, and Learning Framework |
| **MFIs** | Multilateral Financial Institutions |
| **PALMSS** | Procurement, Administrative and Logistics Management Support Service for Aid Program Delivery |
| **PPA** | Partner Performance Assessment |
| **SC** | Steering Committee |
| **SDTF** | Single Donor Trust Fund |
| **SSC** | Stories of Significant Change |
| **ToC** | Theory of Change |
| **TF** | Trust Fund |
| **TTL** | Task Team Leader |
| **TWG** | Technical Working Group |
| **UNICEF** | United Nations Children’s Fund |
| **WB** | World Bank |
| **WBG** | World Bank Group |

# **Executive Summary**

**The Advancing Multilateral Partnerships for Economic Development (AMPED) program is a five-year (2019-24), AUD25 million investment that seeks to strengthen the capacity of the Government of the Philippines (GPH) to manage the economy for growth.** It seeks to achieve this by enabling responsive support from three multilateral financial institutions (MFIs): the World Bank (WB), the International Finance Corporation (IFC) and the Asian Development Bank (ADB). DFAT engaged a three-person team to undertake a Mid-Term Review (MTR) in 2023, guided by the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) Development Assistance Committee’s aid effectiveness criteria (see Annex 4 on lines of enquiry). The MTR team reviewed 83 documents (program design, reporting and review documents and analytical reports) and interviewed 57 stakeholders (Philippine Government, DFAT and implementation partners) in Canberra and through an in-country mission in May 2023. The findings are presented in this report.

**AMPED was designed to be flexible and adaptive. In practice, it is a disparate set of (largely effective) activities that lacks overall strategic coherence**. It was designed to provide flexible support to the MFIs. DFAT’s selection of projects was to “follow an iterative process of identification and prioritisation.”[[1]](#footnote-2) The MTR team found that many of the individual investments are producing results, albeit with different interpretations of what constitutes ‘a result’. Many of these results are necessary, but insufficient, in helping the Philippines achieve advanced middle-income country (AMIC) status. Most of the work of the MFIs can best be described as upstream enabling reforms, changing the way the country’s institutions function in order to incentivise investment and inclusive growth. AMPED has also supported preparation of downstream infrastructure investments. This is consistent with the design but contributes less directly to the higher-level outcome of supporting the government to manage the economy for growth. UNICEF was brought into the program as a fourth partner in 2020 to address the economic impacts of COVID-19. The activities supported through UNICEF (and some COVID response activities by the MFI partners) are focused on investments in people – the poorest and most marginalised. While these were appropriate responses to the pandemic, they were a departure from the strategic intent of AMPED.

**The MTR team is of the view that the program should not continue in its current form.** The concern is not the purpose of the program (economic governance reform is absolutely relevant for the Philippines). It is its breadth and incoherence, and the way it operates – its modality – that are problematic. The current modality explains the ways in which the program does not ‘work.’ The challenges associated with the flexible, partner-led design were exacerbated by changes made in response to COVID, implementation delays caused by the pandemic and Embassy staffing constraints. AMPED funds 40 or so individual projects: social protection initiatives and pilot projects are mixed with insurance reforms, a public-private partnership to build a cancer hospital, the rehabilitation of a hydro-electric plant, reforms of the business environment, an irrigation initiative, and building roads. The program is delivered by four partners, with no effective, operationalised program-level monitoring and evaluation system. A monitoring evaluation and learning framework (MELF) was introduced in 2021, but never properly operationalised. Each partner undertook some monitoring of its own activities but reporting to DFAT was patchy and not guided by the MELF. Each partner has a different view of their responsibilities to DFAT. The review team consulted two different teams in the ADB: the Social Protection and Mindanao Irrigation teams. The former seemed reluctant to involve DFAT in processing changes in workplans and negotiating project revisions with DSWD. Regarding the latter, while ADB noted they welcomed DFAT's involvement, they did not proactively seek DFAT's engagement in the discussion of activities.

**Further, the economic and policy contexts in the Philippines and Australia have changed since the program was designed in 2018**.COVID-19lockdowns severely constricted economic activity in the Philippines, causing growth to contract by almost 10 per cent in 2020 and poverty to spike despite significant government assistance. While economic growth has now returned to pre-pandemic levels, the Philippines will continue to feel the effects of human capital scarring – particularly learning loss and work shifting to less productive jobs and sectors.[[2]](#footnote-3) Furthermore, both countries now have new governments, with new policy priorities, and the geo-strategic context in the region has changed. For all these reasons the MTR team recommends a design refresh, noting that the overall investment remains important and relevant. The challenge for the next iteration of the program will be to maintain access to the deep technical excellence of (especially) the WB and the IFC, while putting in place a management structure that enables a meaningful three-way partnership among the multilateral financial institutions (MFIs), the GPH and DFAT.

**Australia’s new International Development Policy mandates a stronger focus on climate change and maintains DFAT’s strong commitment to gender equality.** For that reason, the MTR has focused particularly on the extent to which gender is reflected in the current AMPED program, and in the policy priorities of the four implementing partners. Within the program there are some activities directed specifically at gender equality, but few directed at addressing climate change. Both gender equality and climate change should be key considerations in the strategic ‘future choices’, as potential drivers of the investment portfolio, rather than important, yet secondary, concerns.

**Gender considerations barely featured in the program (by design).** Neither gender equality nor disability inclusion was a significant objective in the AMPED design. As such, AMPED has no program level GEDSI objectives. The four implementing partners used their own gender policies to ‘ensure’ gender integration in their projects, resulting, inevitably, in an incoherent approach. Gender mainstreaming efforts and reporting at individual activity level is patchy. Partners followed their own gender policies, frameworks, and templates. The MTR team found some evidence of gender-sensitive approaches in program implementation, such as the Padayon Sustainable Livelihood Program’s approach to matching livelihood support for women with childcare burdens and time poverty. The WB also undertook two laudable gender analyses (see Section 2.5 below).

**The current AMPED program is primarily designed to support the GPH in its economic reform priorities**. The MTR team have concluded that the purpose of the program (at Goal, Objective, and End of Program Outcome (EOPO) level, following the latest DFAT guidance) should be refined and clarified. EOPO1 is to ‘strengthen the ability of the GPH to manage the economy for growth, with participation of the private sector’. The problem with this is its ambition and scope. Nothing is counted out, and success requires the unambiguous demonstration of improved GPH capacity to manage the economy. Currently there is no evidence of the latter.

A less ambitious Goal should be adopted for the next iteration of the program: possibly to use a slightly revised version of EOPO1 as the program goal: ‘To strengthen the ability of the GPH to manage the economy for inclusive growth’ (one could add ‘with a focus on the role of the private sector’). Intermediate Outcomes (IOs) could stand be slightly reworded and less ambitious. Indicators would give specificity.

The question that follows is which partners are best place to achieve this? The MTR team suggests that they are the WB and the IFC. In addition to the privileged position they (along with ADB) enjoy with the GPH based on the quality of their in-country technical expertise, there are four reasons for prioritising these two MFIs. First, while their work is primarily focused on upstream economic reform, they also engage directly with the private sector. Second, the WB is public sector focused while the IFC is private sector focused. They are therefore complementary – and the GPH needs both in tandem. Third, they are sister organisations, and thus more disposed to work in alignment, and to listen to, and respect, each other. Fourth, from what the MTR team could divine, the DFAT/WB/IFC relationship is more effective than the DFAT/ADB relationship (outside of social protection, at least).

**By prioritising upstream economic policy reform and partnering with the WB and the IFC, DFAT will be able to sharpen its relationship with the GPH via these two trusted partners.** It will enable increased strategic coherence. The MTR team would recommend dropping the social protection component of the program with UNICEF and ADB and taking forward social protection work through the new SPRING program. The next iteration of AMPED should focus on a narrower range of policy reforms and avoid downstream initiatives such as infrastructure rehabilitation. Clearer strategic intent and only two partners will go a long way to dispelling the perception of programmatic incoherence.

**Future choices are summarised in Figure 1.** These are presented in more detail in section 14.

**Figure 1: Future choices**

**Strategic**

|  |  |
| --- | --- |
| **Recommendation** | **Comments** |
| **1** **There should be a follow-on program addressing economic reform.** | Policy reforms to the institutional environment will be critical to the Philippines achieving AMIC status. The case for DFAT involvement is strong. DFAT should commission a design refresh as soon as possible to ensure a seamless transition. |
| **2 DFAT should clarify the strategic intent of the program, and the relationship EOPO should be dropped.** | It is recommended that the new program indicate Australia’s thematic priorities: gender equality and women’s economic empowerment, climate change, particularly green energy transition, and the broader regulatory environment (see Annex 5 for more detailed gender recommendations).  The EOPO should specify that Australia is *making* *a contribution* to strengthening the ability of the GPH to manage the economy for inclusive economic growth. |
| **3 The design refresh should specify that its focus will be on *upstream* policy, legal, and regulatory reforms.** | *Downstream* work (projects, localised initiatives, and physical investments) would fall outside the scope of the program. Figure 8 shows a high-level conceptual framework for what the successor program could look like, with upstream interventions incentivising (but not directly investing in) improved downstream inclusive economic growth outcomes. |
| **4** **DFAT should choose its preferred delivery modality.** | As noted in section 5.2 the current direct funding modality minimises Australia’s involvement in the program and its visibility to the GPH. It is recommended that DFAT consider three options: the MTR team would recommend option 1, but if this is not possible then option 3, but only if DFAT are willing to delegate authority to the program unit. |
| **5 DFAT to clarify what constitutes a ‘result’ of the program.** | Economic governance reforms are messy: one reform demands another. They are by definition long-term ventures. It is unrealistic to expect specific, downstream development outcomes in the time period of the program. Any new program must be realistic and modest in setting its EOPOs. Section 4.5 presents one way of articulating ‘results’. |

**Programmatic**

| **Recommendations** | **Comments** |
| --- | --- |
| 6 DFAT should reassign the social protection components of AMPED to the new SPRING program. | DFAT has designed a new human development program, SPRING. DFAT’s investments in social protection should sit under this program, including the UNICEF element of AMPED, and the ADB’s social protection project, if they are to be continued, since alignment is stronger. |
| **7 If the strategic intent of the program is given greater focus, DFAT should consider having two principal partners – the WB and the IFC.** | All three MFIs enjoy privileged positions with the GPH. However, there are four reasons for prioritising the WB and IFC:   * they are primarily focused on upstream economic reforms (although both do some downstream work too). * they are complementary – the WB is public sector focused while the IFC is private sector focused. * they are sister organisations * the DFAT/WB/IFC relationship seems more effective than the DFAT/ADB relationship (outside of social protection). |
| **8 The next iteration of the program must have a convincing, realistic, and achievable MELF.** | To date, there has been no external independent reporting at the program level. There has been annual internal program reporting through the IMRs, but these were not informed by an operational program MELF. |
| **9 DFAT should make GEDSI expectations clear from the outset** | DFAT needs to make its design, performance and reporting standards on gender and disability equity clear to all implementing partners, including responsibility for building the knowledge and skills of their implementing teams. This needs to be reflected in and made enforceable through legal agreements (see more detailed recommendations in Annex 5). |

**Operational**

|  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- |
| **Recommendations** | **Comments** | |
| **10 DFAT should consider what it means by visibility.** | | Visibility has to be earned. It is more than a logo on a document or asking to comment on documents. If DFAT are serious about visibility, then it must allocate staff time and resources to substantive technical engagement. |
| **11 Regular informal DFAT-WB meetings.** | | As well as valuing clarity on DFAT policy priorities, partners (especially the WB) would value a window into Australian expertise, particularly as the Philippines strives for AMIC status. |
| **12 Partners must better incorporate, and report on, gender and social inclusion.** | | Standard performance information required by DFAT on gender and disability equity should be made clear to implementing partners as part of the award agreements. |
| **13 Safeguards to be assessed at activity level.** | | Given the diversity of the program, there is little purpose in assessing safeguards at the portfolio level. Partners should be required to report on safeguards at activity level, however. |
| **14 Consider moving to a 2-3-year rolling program for the AGaP Trust fund and consider re=establishing the flexible ‘just in time’ funding line.** | | Funding gaps delay implementation and cause the GPH frustration. The WB is frequently asked to provide ‘just in time’ support. There used to be such a mechanism in the Trust Fund, but it was discontinued following the 2020 AGaP Steering Committee Meeting.[[3]](#footnote-4) DFAT may wish to reconsider. |
| **15 Revisit AMPED oversight arrangements.** | | The design and functioning of the SCs and the TWGs depend on the wider design of the program: what control and direction is desired by DFAT? |
| **16 The successor program should introduce strict investment selection criteria.** | | Anything goes in the current program. DFAT and its partners should be required to adhere more closely to clearly defined agreed strategic priorities. |

# **The original AMPED investment design**

## 1.1 Strategic intent

**AMPED was designed by DFAT in 2018 to support inclusive economic growth through multilateral development partners (WB, ADB and IFC).** It came about for two reasons: (i) DFAT was unable to get Philippines Government sign-off for the implementation of its bilateral economic program; (ii) a desire to intensify DFAT’s economic work. AMPED was designed to enable Australia to continue to engage with the GPH on economic issues, to respond quickly and opportunistically to GPH requests that aligned with Australia’s strategic objectives, and to catalyse and leverage multilateral resources.[[4]](#footnote-5) It seeks to contribute to sustainable and inclusive growth in the Philippines by supporting upstream regulatory reform (EOPO1, IO1.1), preparation of downstream infrastructure investments (IO1.2) and private sector development of inclusive products and services (IO1.3). AMPED is also intended to strengthen Australia’s partnerships with GPH and the partner MFIs (EOPO2, IO2.1). These intended outcomes are discussed further in Sections 1.4, 1.5 and 1.6 below. The full program logic is at Annex 7.

## Why upstream institutional change?

**International evidence tells us that institutional change (influencing the ‘rules of the game’) in economic governance is critical for sustained and sustainable economic growth** – let alone sustained and sustainable inclusive economic growth. The work that the IFC, the WB, and the ADB are doing are designed to put in place laws, rules, regulations, processes, and procedures that will assist the Philippines economy achieve AMIC status. At lower levels of economic development, substantial growth and transformation can occur even without major improvements in most state institutions, including a relatively poorly functioning legal and law enforcement sector, poor social service delivery, and high levels of corruption. As long as the macroeconomic environment is reasonably well managed and there is a basic level of service provision economies can grow and jobs can be created at relatively high (if inequitable) growth rates. But growth and development tend to falter as countries at more advanced middle-income phases are faced with interlocking economic and political challenges requiring an extraordinary range of institutional restructuring and improvement. This is what the AMPED program is striving to achieve. Consequently, such an institutional transformation program is absolutely necessary and justified.

## The three original implementing partners

**The investments and activities being implemented by the three original delivery partners are summarised below.**

1. World Bank
   * **Australia-World Bank Growth and Prosperity in the Philippines (AGaP) Trust Fund** (March 2019 to June 2024, USD10.55 million) to facilitate knowledge exchange to assist the government to design and implement key economic policy reforms.
   * **Agus-Pulangi Hydropower Complex (APHC) Rehabilitation Multi-Donor Trust Fund** (August 2019 to June 2024, USD2 million) to examine the feasibility of and support project preparation for the rehabilitation of APHC (this includes AUD 2.1 million contributed by DFAT’s regional Partnerships for Infrastructure program).
2. ADB
   * **Technical Assistance for the Preparation of the Mindanao Irrigation Development Project (MIDP)** (October 2020 to December 2022, USD500,000) to develop feasibility studies and design for the planned MIDP investment projects aimed at increasing agricultural productivity in Mindanao.

**Graduation from Poverty Approach** (January 2021 to June 2024, USD1.1 million) to enhance delivery of the Philippine social protection program.

1. IFC
   * **Private Sector Development Program (PSDP)** (February 2019 to June 2022, USD2 million) to support private sector growth and address challenges that hinder greater private sector economic participation.

## 1.4 The End of Program Outcomes

**AMPED has two broad End of Program Outcomes (EOPOs): one focused on its developmental objectives, and the other on Australia’s relationships with the GPH and the partner MFIs** (see Annex 7).

**EOPO1: Strengthened ability of the GPH to manage the economy for growth, with participation of the private sector.** This is the ‘development result’ that will contribute to the achievement of the development objectives for the Philippines and address the GPH’s need to sustain inclusive economic growth.

**EOPO2: A strong partnership between Australia, the Philippines, and MFIs.** This is the ‘performance result’, which is the outcome due to the aid investment mechanism itself and its contribution to Australia’s and the MFIs’ relationships with the GPH.

## 1.5 The Intermediate Outcomes

**AMPED has four Intermediate Outcomes (IOs). Three IOs are expected under EOPO1:**

* **IO1.1 –** Selected government agencies implement economic policy reform initiatives.
* **IO1.2 –** Economically important long-term investment projects implemented by GPH are managed to international standards.
* **IO1.3 –** Private sector firms respond to GPH policy reforms by bringing to market inclusive products and services.

**One IO is expected under EOPO2:**

* **IO2.1** – Australia and partner MFIs effectively utilise AMPED to respond to GPH requests for technical assistance in key economic reform areas.

## 1.6 The shortcomings of the AMPED program logic

**The MTR team has identified five problems with the AMPED program logic.** First, that there is no natural fit between the two EOPOs. Second, IOs 1.1 and 1.2 are long term and could never be achieved in the timeframe of AMPED. IO 1.2 is extremely demanding, requiring implementation to international standards. Third, there is no theory of change explaining the expected change pathways implied by the program logic, no assessment of the program’s political feasibility, nor any reviews or revisions to the program logic in response to the significant changes in context, such as the COVID-19 crisis. Fourth, the Monitoring Evaluation and Learning Framework in the design document was ambitious at the outset. DFAT commissioned an update in 2021, which proposed a set of 15 sensible indicators, but this was not able to be used by the Embassy due to staffing constraints. This means that there is no comprehensive or rigorous data base against which to make robust judgements on program progress. Fifth, as noted above, AMPED has no investment-level GEDSI or even gender objectives.[[5]](#footnote-6) It was intended that MFI partners would use their own gender equality frameworks. As noted below in Section 2.5 this approach was ineffective.

**The logic of the program is that by supporting the projects of MFIs, AMPED will be able to help DFAT and its partner MFIs achieve the development objectives identified in their respective country strategies**. By providing funding through the MFIs, DFAT will be able to maintain an active relationship with key GPH economic agencies. Section 5.2 below explains why this latter objective was not met.

**DFAT Design and Monitoring and Evaluation Standards require that program logics should be reviewed at least annually** particularly at the intermediate outcome, output, and activity levels. DFAT commissioned a review of the AMPED MELF in 2021, which recommended DFAT engage with AMPED partners to make minor revisions to the program logic to (i) reflect the program’s response to COVID-19 recovery and (ii) to improve the line of sight between the AMPED supported activities and the program’s intended outcomes. However, due to limited resources, this recommendation was never implemented. More regular reviews could have provided opportunities for investment managers and implementing partners to jointly analyse changes in the operating context and improve the program logic by specifying the key assumptions (the necessary and sufficient conditions for success) about how change will happen and how the investment will influence that change.

1.6 The principle of flexibility

**AMPED was designed as a flexible program able to respond emerging GPH priorities within its broad economic reform agenda.** As the design document states, “the Government of the Philippines will require discrete technical assistance from, and opportunistic engagement with, development partners to capitalise on the current economic momentum”.[[6]](#footnote-7) The benefits of a flexible program modality include responsiveness to emerging GPH priorities and reform opportunities. However, the attendant risk, which has borne out in relation to AMPED, is of strategic drift and incoherence. The absence of tighter programmatic parameters and management has resulted in a portfolio of weakly related activities – many of which achieved significant results – but which do not add up to a coherent whole.

# **How the program evolved**

## 2.1 The onset of COVID

**COVID-19 restrictions and business closures saw the economy contract by almost 17 per cent in mid-2020, causing a spike in poverty and a drop in government revenue collection**.[[7]](#footnote-8) Strict containment measures combined with the global economic downturn caused a recession of unprecedented scale.[[8]](#footnote-9) Loss of income and livelihood opportunities took a heavy toll, particularly on the poorest and most vulnerable (retail, construction, farming and informal sector workers were most heavily affected).[[9]](#footnote-10) Micro, small and medium enterprises (MSMEs) also faced a sharp drop in demand and revenue.[[10]](#footnote-11)

**The strict lockdown in the Philippines also hampered the Embassy’s ability to engage with both its MFI and GPH partners in 2020 and 2021.** This was compounded by a DFAT restructure that resulted in the abolition of the Manila Economic Counsellor and some locally engaged staff positions, necessitating lighter touch management of AMPED, spread across different sections in the Embassy.[[11]](#footnote-12)

**The Philippines economy has rebounded strongly, if unevenly, after COVID.** Its dynamism is rooted in strong consumer demand supported by a vibrant labour market and huge remittances. Growth was restored to 5.6 per cent by 2021, and 7.6 per cent in 2022. In line with global pressures, rising food and energy prices accelerated inflation from less than 4 per cent in 2021 to almost 8 per cent in 2022. Poverty had fallen from 23.5 per cent in 2015 to 17.6 in 2019 but rose to 18.1 per cent in 2021. COVID-19 also exacerbated income inequality, causing a significant shift toward less productive sectors and occupations. The share of wage work fell and self-employment and employment in family businesses rose, reversing almost three decades of structural change that had shifted employment to more productive sectors.[[12]](#footnote-13) The ADB forecasts GDP growth at 6 per cent in 2023 and 6.2 per cent in 2024[[13]](#footnote-14) and notes that with continued recovery and reform the country is getting back on track to achieve AMIC status by 2025 (per capita income range of US$4,256-US$13,205).

**Currently there is international confidence in the economy**, but the weaknesses in the economic regulatory environment, and the bureaucracy difficulty in obtaining business licenses - for local as well as foreign investors – underscore the importance of continued economic reform, and thus this program. The new Marcos administration has won plaudits from commentators regarding its economic reform commitments: the challenge will be to maintain them and ensure their implementation. The AMPED program has a key role to play here.

## 2.2 Choices made: the fourth partner added

**To address the poverty impacts of COVID-19, the Embassy supported a range of social protection initiatives through AMPED, including through a new partnership with UNICEF**. UNICEF was engaged to improve the equity, child focus and shock responsiveness of social protection in the Philippines, including in the Bangsamoro Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao (BARMM). While these were valuable development investments, they were a departure from the strategic intent of AMPED. The social protection work, while relevant to the Embassy’s broader poverty reduction objectives, does not contribute to AMPED program outcomes on upstream economic governance reform, downstream infrastructure, or private sector development.

**The World Bank and IFC also undertook COVID response activities under AMPED.** Some of these aligned broadly with AMPED outcomes (e.g., support for a loan to promote competitiveness and enhance economic resilience; and a project to track economic impacts of the pandemic), but others (on social protection reforms, disability policy, COVID vaccine response) fall outside the program’s scope.

## 2.3 New Marcos government - policy priorities

**In January 2023, the new Marcos government launched the Philippine Development Plan 2023–2028 (PDP)** setting in motion the government’s ambitious economic recovery program anchored on *Ambisyon Natin* 2040, a 25-year plan that envisions “a prosperous middle-class Philippine society where no one is poor.” The overall goal of the PDP is to reinvigorate the creation of high-quality jobs and accelerate poverty reduction by steering the economy back to its high growth trajectory and effecting economic and social transformation towards a prosperous, inclusive, and resilient society.

**Over the next six years, the PDP specifies the following headline socio-economic targets**:

* maintain annual economic growth rate between 6 and 7 per cent in 2023 and between 6.5 to 8 per cent between 2024 to 2028.
* create better and resilient jobs and keep unemployment rate within 4 to 5 per cent.
* keep food and overall prices low and stable, with food and overall inflation kept within 2 to 4 per cent between 2024 and 2028.
* enforce fiscal discipline by reducing the national government deficit to GDP ratio from 6.5 per cent in 2022 to 3 per cent in 2028.
* transform the production sectors through innovation and bring the country within the top one third of the Global Competition Index by 2028.

2.4 Government of Australia – new policy priorities

**Australia also published a new International Development Policy in August 2023.** It centres on building effective, accountable states that drive their own development, and on enhancing state and community resilience to external shocks – including through structural reforms to improve economic performance.[[14]](#footnote-15) Key policy priorities include addressing climate change and promoting gender equality and disability equity and rights. DFAT will publish new strategies on gender equality and disability equity in 2024.

**DFAT recognise that women’s economic empowerment is a driver of economic growth, inclusion, and prosperity**. Empowering women is one of the best ways to promote inclusive economic growth and to achieve peace and security. Australia’s new development policy (i) reinstates a target that at least 80 per cent of investments will effectively address gender inequality; and (ii) introduces a requirement for all new investments valued over AUD3 million to have a significant gender equality objective.[[15]](#footnote-16)

2.5 How the partners approached GEDSI

**Despite the four partners’ rhetorical commitment to gender, the MTR team heard it said a number of times that “gender is not relevant at this upstream macro policy reform level.”** This view contradicts most of the literature. Economic growth is an inherently gendered process and gender-based inequalities can be barriers to shared prosperity.  For growth to be truly inclusive and gender-equitable, the pattern of growth must create decent work and productive employment opportunities for women and men. Policymakers need to rethink the role of macro-level economic policies, including trade, industrial, macroeconomic, finance, and investment policies.[[16]](#footnote-17) Each partner's policies and practice are summarised below.

**World Bank: Gender equality is central to the World Bank Group’s (WBG) goals of ending extreme poverty and boosting shared prosperity in a sustainable manner**. It recognises that investing in women and girls is ‘smart economics’: increased women’s labour force participation and earnings are associated with reduced poverty and faster growth, higher income levels, increased employment. While the WBG has moved in its 2024-30 Gender Strategy beyond ‘mainstreaming’ to an approach that pursues specific gender outcomes in its interventions, the strategy in place guiding the AMPED supported work to date has been less ambitious.[[17]](#footnote-18)

**The WB gender specialist was not aware of any DFAT requirement to integrate gender equality and disability inclusion into AMPED, mainly because** the WBG does not conduct “gender tagging” (a process that triggers support to promote gender equality) for technical assistance work, only for larger lending projects, and there was no requirement for gender integration in the Administration Arrangement. However, because there was an implied expectation or assumption that the MFIs will apply their own gender policies to mainstream gender into AMPED, the review team were told that DFAT made requests to the AGaP secretariat to include gender in their activities. Nevertheless, the World Bank did undertake some laudable gender analyses: a robust gender analysis to inform its Angus-Pulangi hydropower rehabilitation project, and an influential study on Overcoming Barriers to Women’s Economic Empowerment in the Philippines, which served as an important data source on women’s workforce participation, especially during COVID. The study enhanced knowledge within the WBG to address challenges to women’s economic empowerment and informed the gender tagging of 17 financing projects through which entry points were identified for gender mainstreaming. It also influenced the Philippine Statistics Agency to add new questions on home-based work into its labour force survey,[[18]](#footnote-19) and DFAT has used the data from the study extensively across its development portfolio.

**IFC: The IFC has a dedicated Gender and Economic Inclusion Team which provides gender advice to projects and sets corporate gender targets**. It seeks to integrate gender into projects through (i) identification of gaps (e.g., gender gaps in leadership, employment, women in technological and non-traditional roles), (ii) design of specific interventions; and (iii) at least one gender indicator with sex-disaggregated data in the M&E plan. The team serves as a resource for task team leaders and their departments who undertake the gender analysis. No gender analyses were undertaken for the IFC’s AMPED activities, however. The IFC stated that the design of its AMPED supported Private Sector Development program was informed by its gender experience in similar projects.

**ADB: The ADB's Policy on Gender and Development adopts gender mainstreaming as the key means to promote gender equality and women's empowerment**. It requires gender equality considerations to be addressed in all ADB operations. Accelerating progress on gender equality is an operational priority for ADB in its ‘Strategy 2030’[[19]](#footnote-20). The ADB is committed to supporting gender equality in at least 75% of its sovereign and non-sovereign operations by 2030, especially in health, education, agriculture, natural resource management, employment, and financial services (microfinance). ADB regularly conducts gender analysis based on key indicators in its developing member countries to help ensure all ADB projects fully address gender issues and contribute to reducing gender inequality in their design and implementation. It is worth noting that ADB’s Gender Mainstreaming Guidelines do not require a separate gender analysis or action plan for TA-supported knowledge generation, capacity-building, and implementation activities. The gender assessment and action plan (GAAP) applies to ADB-financed loan projects. The Padayon SLP graduation project was supported through TA resources and exclusively targeted household beneficiaries of the 4Ps - a national program being supported by ADB through the ESAP. Indeed, the ESAP includes a dedicated GAAP which the Bank regularly monitors and updates.

**UNICEF: The Gender Policy 2021-2030 aligns with the UN’s Sustainable Development Goals.** The mandate for UNICEF goes beyond simply responding to the manifestations of inequality, and instead work actively to remove the underlying structural barriers – such as harmful social norms and gendered power systems – that perpetuate inequalities. UNICEF recognises that gender norms and expectations impact all children and women, and that girls, as well as children of diverse genders, are at disproportionate risk of gender-based discrimination, rights violations, and denial of full access to resources and opportunities. This transformative, values-based approach seeks to empower disadvantaged children and adolescents of all gender identities; positions gender equality as fundamental to child rights; and places a special emphasis on promoting the leadership and wellbeing of girls and women. UNICEF’s Gender Action Plan (GAP) under AMPED was focused on improving the delivery of social protection and laying the foundation of a shock-responsive and gender-responsive social protection system in the Bangsamoro Autonomous Region of Muslim Mindanao (BARMM) as a transformative and equitable mechanism to reduce discrimination in accessing resources and opportunities primarily among disadvantaged children. UNICEF finds that such work is particularly challenging in the BARMM, because of its entrenched social norms. It is to UNICEF’s advantage that they have an active gender focal point for BARMM.

**AMPED’s four partners all give policy and strategic priority to gender equality but the degree to which they apply and report on these strategies in relation to AMPED has been varied**. UNICEF’s commitment is the most foundational and potentially transformational. For this reason, it will be important for DFAT to maintain its partnership with UNICEF, although the MTR team would suggest not through the AMPED but the Embassy’s new SPRING program. Despite the MFIs’ rhetorical commitment to gender equality, and because AMPED had no program-level gender equality objectives, integration of gender equality was not a significant consideration in the implementation of AMPED. Using a ‘crosswalk analysis’ that tracks gender commitments and actions on the part of DFAT and the four partners – from policy statements to award agreements to conduct of gender analyses to gender action plans and use of gender indicators to track and report progress – it is clear that the agreements with the partners were generally silent on gender.

2.6 Relevance and alignment

**The program remains unequivocally relevant to both the Philippines and Australian governments.** The economic priorities of the recently elected President Marcos government were summarised in section 2.3 above. As noted above in Section 2.4, Australia’s new International Development Policy prioritises support for structural reforms to improve economic performance and accords high priority to gender equality.[[20]](#footnote-21) Section 2.5 above summarise the gender policies of DFAT and the four implementing partners.

**The strategic priorities of ADB and IFC are closely aligned with the development priorities of DFAT and the GPH.** The ADB country strategy 2018-2023 supports policy reforms, institutional capacity development, and financing investments that promote high and inclusive growth. It seeks to mainstream gender equality, private sector development, governance, and environmentally sustainable development.

**WB and IFC operations in the Philippines are guided by the World Bank Group’s Country Partnership Framework (CPF) for the Philippines (2019 –2023).** The CPF aims to reduce core constraints to inclusive growth and poverty reduction in relation to people, competition, and key vulnerabilities. The CPF integrates three complementary and mutually reinforcing focus areas: (i) investing in Filipinos; (ii) competitiveness and economic opportunity for job creation; and (iii) addressing core vulnerabilities by building peace and resilience. Across these areas, the CPF will extend a cross-cutting focus on governance and digital transformation.

**UNICEF and DFAT are strongly aligned on issues of gender, disability, and social inclusion** in their global, regional, and bilateral partnerships**.** UNICEF has an active gender focal point in the Philippines and a set of gender markers (quantitative and qualitative) at corporate and project levels. It is committed through its Country Development Plan to gender transformative programming across all sectors, including social protection.[[21]](#footnote-22)

3 Progress and Performance

## 3.1 DFAT’s assessment of AMPED progress

**There has been no overall independent review of AMPED to date.** DFAT did commission an independent review of the World Bank AGaP trust fund in 2022, which found that “AGaP’s activities significantly contributed to its overall objective of facilitating knowledge exchange and assisting the Government of the Philippines in the design and implementation of policy reforms and programs”. The other partnerships under AMPED did not meet the threshold for independent reviews, but DFAT has undertaken three internal summary ‘reviews’: an Aid Quality Check (AQC) at end 2019, and two Investment Monitoring Reports (IMRs) at end the of 2020 and 2021. The December 2019 AQC was more by way of description than assessment, although scores were noted as follows: effectiveness 4 (on the usual DFAT scale of 1-6); efficiency 4; gender equity scored 3 but was noted “as not an objective of this program”; risk 4; disability (meaning in this context inclusion) 4; safeguards 4; climate change 4; and private sector “not at all”.

**The MTR team concludes that DFAT is broadly content with the program to date.** The analysis below offers the view of the MTR team on progress towards the Intermediate Outcomes, and the extent to which the program can be considered on track to achieve its two EOPOs. The analysis in Sections 3.2 – 3.4 below focuses primarily on effectiveness (integrating GEDSI and efficiency considerations). The MTR team’s assessments of Efficiency and Sustainability and additional detail on GEDSI are provided in Annex 5.

* 1. Progress towards Intermediate Outcomes (IOs)

**IO1.1 – Selected government agencies implement economic policy reform initiatives.**

**Reasonable progress has been achieved against this Intermediate Outcome**. AMPED-supported activities, mainly implemented by the IFC, catalysed development and implementation of significant economic policy reforms, particularly in improving the business enabling environment. These include:

* passage of a Revised Corporation Code that abolished minimum capital requirements to level the playing field and improve competition (Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC)).
* promulgation of a Rule on Administrative Search and Inspection by the Supreme Court enabling the Philippine Competition Commission to obtain evidence and prosecute anti-competitive behaviour.
* establishment of a National Business One-Stop Shop / Central Business Portal and streamlining among the ‘starting a business’ agencies, to enable more efficient business registration (SEC, Bureau of Internal Revenue, Social Security System, PhilHealth, Home Development Mutual Fund, Quezon City Government, and the Department of Trade and Industry).
* expansion of the jurisdictional value of small claims courts (up to pesos 400,000 from pesos 300,000) as of 1 April 2019, resulting in the simplified resolution of commercial disputes leading to time and cost reduction for enforcing contracts (Supreme Court of the Philippines).
* issuances by the SEC requiring greater disclosure of transactions with interested parties and allowing more inputs in stockholder meetings to provide greater protection for minority investors (SEC).
* passage of the IRRs of the Ease of Doing Business Act, which enables the exercise of full powers by the Anti-Red Tape Authority (ARTA) and full implementation of the ARTA Charter (ARTA).
* introduction of a National Competition Policy by NEDA to enhance private sector participation on productivity and competitiveness (NEDA, PCC).
* Investment enabling reforms allowing the entry of new players into the telecommunications industry.

**Activities to support GPH on COVID-19 response included:**

* Establishment of a real-time monitoring system to track household level economic impacts of COVID, vaccine uptake and school closures, to inform government policy responses.
* Leveraging PHP 500 million WB financing for the COVID Emergency Response Project (including use of a self-audit tool by people with disabilities to assess accessibility of health infrastructure) and USD 600 million for a development policy loan on Promoting Competitiveness and Enhancing Resilience.

**IO1.2 –** **Economically important long-term investment projects implemented by GPH are managed to international standards.** Minimal progress has been achieved here, as these activities are highly contingent on the approval by the GPH as well as by the MFIs regarding final project designs and loan arrangements.

**AMPED has provided technical assistance for two projects here: with the WB for the preparation of the Agus-Pulangi Hydropower Complex (APHC) Rehabilitation Project (subsequently terminated)[[22]](#footnote-23); and with the ADB for the preparation of the USD100 million loan for the Mindanao Irrigation Development Project (MIDP).** The grant for the preparation of the APHC rehabilitation project supported a ‘Multiple Options Study’ which provided the technical foundation for the subsequent feasibility study of APHC sub-projects. Project activities were significantly delayed due to uncertainty about the institutional arrangements for the project, and ultimately terminated when the GPH opted to finance the APHC through a public private partnership rather than the WB. On the MIDP, AMPED provided technical assistance for the preparation of feasibility studies for the four irrigation sub-projects, preparation of project design, and assessment of capacities of the project implementing agencies. TA was delayed by the pandemic.

**IO1.3 Targeted private sector firms bring to market inclusive products and services:** Reasonable progress has been made here. AMPED funded and completed eight activities through the Private Sector Development Program of the IFC:

* Typhoon and Drought Index Insurance: a joint venture between the CARD microfinance institution and Pioneer Insurance to administer new crop insurance products for climate risks including typhoons, tropical depressions, and droughts for smallholder farmers. CARD sold almost 7,000 policies to farmers with AMPED support, exceeding its target by 11 per cent.
* Supply Chain Finance Market Development for SME lending: supported DoF, the Land Registration Authority and five large financial institutions to develop a supply chain finance market on growth strategy design, product development, personnel capacity building and risk management.
* Risk Management, including codesign and piloting with BanKo of a new microfinance lending products and a new predictive statistical application scorecard to accelerate approvals, and support to Esquire to improve access to finance for women-owned SMEs.
* Secured Transactions: the IFC made some progress towards improving access to finance for SMEs using “moveable assets” as collateral by helping the LRA establish a unified collateral registry. The Implementing Rules and Regulations for the Personal Property Security Act did not fully pave the way for development of a substantive moveables finance market, unfortunately, the final IRR issued in November 2019 deviated significantly from the technical working group version on which IFC provided input.
* Building Resilience Index: development of a risk mapping and resilience assessment tool for the real estate industry. It standardises and quantifies location-specific disaster risk and resilience based on adaptation measures implemented, to inform lenders, developers, insurers, buyers, and government. Businesses have already committed to make more than1.86 million square metres of building space more resilient - almost double the target.
* Philippines Cities Platform: supported vaccine supply chain, procurement and testing, equitable access, and vaccine infrastructure capacity building in Quezon City.
* Joint Capital Markets Program: capacity development activities for corporations to improve access to financial services for the poor.
* Philippines General Hospital Cancer Facility: facilitation of a PPP for a new 300-bed standalone cancer centre, which will focus on making improved cancer prevention, screening, and treatment more accessible for the poor.

**Large-scale deployment of typhoon insurance supports smallholder farmers** Agriculture accounts for 25 percent of the Philippines workforce and nine percent of its GDP. 90 per cent of the country's farmers are smallholders, and 48.5 per cent live below the poverty line. They are highly vulnerable to natural disasters. The Philippines suffers on average 20 typhoons a year, which cause significant damage to farms and assets. This makes it difficult for smallholders to escape poverty, and plunges many near-poor households back into poverty. The high risk of typhoons is a key reason banks are unwilling to lend to farmers. The IFC successfully developed a typhoon insurance product in 2017 - the country’s first private sector-led crop insurance. DFAT provided support through AMPED in 2019 to expand it. By June 2022, 37,462 typhoon insurance policies had been sold in 12 provinces at a value of $6,819,070 - 25 percent above the target. 6,282 farmers had received payouts based on this insurance, with 98 per cent of claims (against a target of 30 per cent) met in five days, and a rejection rate of only 0.65 per cent (against a target of less than 10 percent). In February 2022, the country's first public-private partnership on crop insurance was signed. This has the potential to transform the agri-insurance industry. DFAT is also supporting IFC through AMPED to develop drought insurance.

**Figure 2 summarises progress against IOs.** A deeply rigorous assessment is not possible given the absence of an operationalised MELF.

**Figure 2: Progress against Intermediate Outcomes**

| **Intermediate Outcome** | **Progress** | **Comment** |
| --- | --- | --- |
| **IO1.1: Selected government agencies implement economic reform initiatives** | Reasonable progress. Key achievements include:   * WB two activities on Covid (real-time monitoring and support to GPH on implementation) * IFC on business regulatory environment reforms | All four partners stressed the importance of sustained and active involvement of their GPH agency counterpart and head.  The new-ish Marcos administration has given a boost to upstream economic policy reform. |
| **IO1.2: Economically important economic development projects are implemented by GPH to international standards** | Progress has been poor:   * The Cancer Centre (IFC: the country’s first public-private partnership) was held up awaiting authorisation from the GPH to proceed but finally approved in 2023. * The two Mindanao projects (ADB irrigation and WB Agus-Pulangi hydro) both) were delayed by Covid and technical difficulties arising. The Augus Pelangi project was ultimately cancelled. | Many of the delay factors here were beyond the control of the partners.  The insistence on implementation to international standards may be somewhat unrealistic.  A wider question is whether an economic governance program, designed to influence upstream policy positions, should include these downstream physical infrastructure components. The MTR would conclude that it should not. |
| **IO1.3: Targeted private sector firms bring to market inclusive products and services** | Reasonable progress. Key achievements include:   * Typhoon and drought index insurance * Building Resilience Index * Risk management (support to microfinance institutions) | Some of this work is genuinely innovative. The scale of these initiatives is modest, but they are being sustained and are growing. |
| **IO2.1: Australia and partner MFIs effectively utilise AMPED to respond to GPH requests for TA in key economic reforms** | Fair to say that this has been achieved. All partners emphasised DFAT’s responsiveness and flexibility | Each partner identified its preferred activities, which were discussed and agreed to a greater or lesser extent with the GPH, and then submitted for formal sign off by DFAT. DFAT’s role in activity identification was minimal – indeed non-existent. |

3.3 Progress towards End of Program Outcomes (EOPOs)

**Figure 3 summarises the judgements of the team regarding progress against EOPOs.** Both EOPOs can be said to have been partially achieved, although this judgement comes with a severe health warning due to the absence of a MELF.

**Figure 3: Progress against EOPOs**

| **Objective** | **Progress** | **Comment** |
| --- | --- | --- |
| **EOPO1: Strengthen the ability of the GPH to manage the economy for growth, with participation of the private sector** | Partially achieved, although it is impossible to offer anything more than a comment here as indicators were only developed in 2021, and never used to assess progress.  How would strengthening be measured?  The MTR team’s overall judgement would be that currently political commitment exists and that in some ways “the ability of the GPH to manage the economy” is being strengthened. But it should be stressed that this is a judgement call not a definitive finding. | There are many aspects to ‘organisational strengthening’ The most important is the wider institutional environment: does it incentivise performance and functionality? These incentives come from political commitment, the quality of organisational leadership, the existence of a functioning individual performance management system, and the calibre and commitment of staff.  All interlocutors noted an increase in commitment, interest, and engagement from the GPH following the installation of the Marcos administration. |
| **EOPO2: A stronger partnership between Australia, the Philippines, and the MFIs** | Partially achieved. The relationship with the WB is the most secure, ADB the least. The WB was strongly appreciative of the Single Donor Trust Fund (SDTF) model. The more thoughtful of MTR interlocutors saw real benefits in a more active DFAT: through its convening power, its ability to leverage relationships, its ability to bring partners together, and its ability to cross-fertilise ideas. “DFAT is a key anchor partner in the Philippines.”[[23]](#footnote-24) On the less positive side, there was a view that DFAT is too risk averse, too impatient for results, and not taking full advantage of its potential impact. There is no evidence that the program has strengthened Australia’s partnership with the GPH. This does not mean it has not happened – just that the MTR team did not find it. | By relying on the three MFIs and UNICEF to deliver support to the GPH, DFAT’s role was ‘designed out’ at the start. While it was necessary due to political constraints at the time AMPED was designed, the modality (see Figures 5.1 and 5.2) has resulted in DFAT marginalisation. |

3.4 Additional results outside AMPED intended outcomes

**Social protection work supported through AMPED also achieved some notable results, including:**

* design and implementation of a national identification system (PhilSys) with the Philippine Statistics Authority and registration of over 43 million individuals. A national ID system enables significant efficiencies in registration of participants in social protection programs.
* strengthened DSWD social protection delivery systems (transition from cash cards to electronic payment instruments integration of different social protection systems’ registration and poverty targeting databases).
* piloting the Graduating from Poverty Approach, which facilitates access for (mostly women) graduates of DSWD’s conditional cash transfer program to productive assets and training to build livelihoods.
* pioneering research on the costs of raising children with disabilities, which supported DSWD’s poverty measurement approach and poverty reduction policies for people with disabilities.
* leveraging USD 900 million for the Beneficiary FIRST social protection program, which bolstered the capacity of GPH systems to prevent, detect and respond to COVID-19 and strengthened national systems for public health preparedness.

**Pilot of innovative livelihoods support approach improves large scale government program.** DSWD established a Sustainable Livelihood Program (SLP) in 2011 to support poor households to set up small businesses. It provided skills training and interest-free loans, but even with no interest, loan repayment rates were low. DSWD shifted from loans to grants, but participants still struggled to establish livelihoods and tended to use the grants for consumption. In response, the ADB through AMPED piloted a new approach: the *Padayon* Sustainable Livelihoods Program. Padayon is based on an innovative ‘graduation from poverty’ approach developed by BRAC in Bangladesh, which addresses the multidimensional nature of poverty. It is a comprehensive set of sequenced interventions including cash transfers, livelihoods promotion (productive asset transfer and training), financial inclusion (financial literacy, savings support); and social empowerment (life skills training, coaching). AMPED supported a Padayon pilot in 2021-2022 with 2,784 participants (88 per cent women) in the provinces of Iloilo, Bukidnon, and Sultan Kudarat. Locally relevant livelihood opportunities were determined based on gender-sensitive local market assessments. 83 per cent of the households in the pilot met at least 7 of the 11 graduation criteria, resulting in increased income from livelihoods, improved health behaviours, disaster preparedness, and better waste disposal. DSWD is now integrating key elements of Padayon into SLP including the localised market assessment, livelihood matching, skills training, business management and financial literacy training, and intensive monitoring and coaching.

3.5 Summary of partner performance

This section offers a summary of partner performance. Scoring for DFAT’s two most recent internal Partner Performance Assessments (PPAs) for the AGaP component of AMPED indicate adequate performance. In addition to these internal DFAT assessments, a 2022 independent mid-term review of AGaP (which accounts for 40% of the AMPED budget) was positive about the program. No PPAs are available for the other three delivery partners, as they are prepared only for partners holding agreements exceeding AUD3 million. Additional analysis based on document review and interviews is summarised below in Figure 4.

**Figure 4: Partner performance – summary**

| **Partner** | **Strengths** | **Challenges** |
| --- | --- | --- |
| WB | * Breadth and depth of technical skills. * Policy influence. * Trusted access to core GPH agencies. * Financial resources available – through development policy loans. * Able to leverage technical assistance funds from DFAT. * First port of call for GPH “when knowledge is needed”. * Seem to make an effort to ‘involve’ DFAT. * With the exception of the hydropower complex, WB delivered consistently on time and within budget | * Values and guards its relationship with the GPH * WB staff noted that in many reforms, gender indicators were “not applicable” * External factors beyond the Bank’s control led to significant delays and ultimate cancellation of the Agus Pulangi hydropower Complex |
| ADB | * Strong GPH relationships, especially with DWSD on social protection. * Good relations with UNICEF social protection staff * Can use TA to access loan finance. * Potential access to broader expertise of the regional office co-located in Manila. | * See DFAT as merely a funder – and one of many * Prefer once per annum reporting as with other donors * Significant delays on the Mindanao irrigation project (due largely to COVID) |
| UNICEF | * Deep commitment to gender, disability, and social inclusion. * Technical skills respected by the other partners. * Brings operational on-the-ground knowledge to the policy table. * Influential with DWSD and the Ministry of Social Services and Development in the BARMM. | * Sometimes has to ‘shout a little loudly’ to get heard * Significant delays om the BARMM social protection work, with only half the allocated funds executed (due largely to COVID travel restrictions) |
| IFC | * Deep niche financial and private sector skills and understanding. * Internal IFC staff have the ability to ‘hand hold’ GPH agencies and assist on day-to-day implementation. * Long-term relationship with GPH (which has suffered its ups and downs with changes of administrations). * Timely delivery of activities | * Constructing a clear and accessible ‘narrative’ as regards what they do |
| DFAT | * Convening power * Leveraging and brokering relationships * Bringing partners together * Cross fertilisation and exchange of ideas * Diplomatic status buys a seat at the table | * Lack of technical skills in some areas * Want ‘visibility’ but unable to dedicate the time and the effort to generate it. * Often fail to turn up to meetings, citing ‘pressure of work’. |
| GPH | * Without its active involvement nothing at all will happen. * A committed counterpart is critical. | * Has many procedures and decision-making bodies to persuade – can be a slow process. |

## 3.6 Synthesis of what worked and why

**Upstream economic policy, legal and regulatory reforms are more likely to have nationwide transformative impact than downstream projects**. It is also more feasible to achieve results in upstream policy reform than downstream infrastructure projects within the timeframe of an investment like AMPED. The challenges of uncertain approval processes and delays were demonstrated through the APHC and MIDP projects, neither of which resulted in a loan agreement, let alone delivery of infrastructure within the program period.

**Successful reforms were underpinned by high quality, detailed analytical work**. This is true of all policy areas, but strong analysis seemed to help in particular with promotion of gender equality and social inclusion – issues on which it was otherwise difficult to get traction.

* The *Overcoming Barriers to Women’s Economic Participation* report undertaken by the World Bank is a good example. It provided focused analysis on the ways gender norms play out in relation to economic policy areas, helping to elucidate the issues and entry points. As noted above, his research influenced PSA labour market surveys and a range of other WB and DFAT investments.
* The data and analysis from the World Bank’s real time monitoring of household-level COVID impacts put the issue of vaccine hesitancy on the GPH agenda and influenced the policy responses.
* The UNICEF study on the Costs of Raising Children with Disabilities is another example of how high-quality analytical work influenced policy reforms (DSWD’s development and piloting of a social protection program for children with disabilities).

**AMPED and disability**

**Pioneering research on costs associated with disability influences policy.** AMPED supported UNICEF research (a nationally representative survey and in-depth interviews with families and health professionals), which quantified for the first time the additional costs faced by families with a child with a disability. Costs are 40 to 80 per cent higher than for other families (mostly additional health costs). Poverty rates of households with children with disabilities are 50 per cent higher overall. While the Philippine government provides subsidies and health insurance to people with a disability ID card, there are significant financial and other barriers to obtaining the ID. Only one of five children with a disability in the Philippines has a disability ID card – generally those who are better off. Families in the richest quintile receive 43 per cent of the subsidy, with only 6 per cent going to those in the poorest quintile. The findings of the UNICEF study informed **the development of a new national methodology for poverty measurement**, and the design and piloting of a social protection program for children with disabilities. It also influenced congressional deliberations on a national disability policy that would double the subsidy.

**Economic reform initiatives are more effective when they involve sustained engagement in the policy process**. Philippine government reform processes tend to involve a large number of decision makers across multiple agencies. They also often require civil servants to persuade legislators and other political stakeholders of the benefits of the reform. The responsive, practical governance support provided by the WB through the AGaP-supported development policy loan series is a good example of sustained engagement to shepherd through reforms. It leveraged the MFIs’ strong relationships with GPH economic agencies that DFAT itself does not have.[[24]](#footnote-25)

**Flexible grant funding enabled life-saving support**. There was considerable vaccine hesitancy in the Philippines. The threat to lives and the economy were significant. Urgent action was needed. AMPED quickly mobilised a real time monitoring project to run four rounds of household surveys on the socio-economic impacts of COVID-19. The data this generated on vaccine hesitancy was used to formulate policy responses. AMPED was then able to support the Department of Health to implement its COVID-19 Emergency Response Project. Real progress was made in tackling COVID-19 vaccine hesitancy. The Philippines started with the lowest baseline in ASEAN but later overtook regional peers. Rates of fully vaccinated adults increased from 1% in June 2021 to 36% in November 2021, over 77% as in June 2022. It employed a whole of government approach, engaging several national agencies and local government units. These two grants totalling less than AUD 1 million undoubtedly saved thousands of lives. It demonstrates the importance of having a flexible grant funding mechanism available immediately when emergencies arise.

**The flexibility of the AMPED model has been useful in enabling responsiveness to emerging GPH priorities** and reform opportunities (such as the flexible COVID response grant that helped identify and respond to vaccine hesitancy).

**4 Program and management issues that arose during implementation**

## 4.1 Monitoring and Evaluation

**The Embassy is keenly aware of weaknesses in the MELF.** Both the 2021 and 2022 IMRs note that existing MELF indicators are of limited value in telling the investment’s overall performance story. This makes any objective assessment of progress a challenge.

**There has been no reporting at the program level.** The problems with the program logic and MELF framework were noted in section 1.6 above. Recognising the problem, DFAT commissioned the services of Clear Horizon in 2021 to review the existing – un-implemented - MELF. The review noted that most M&E activities had not been implemented due to: (i) lack of awareness about the MELF among AMPED partners; (ii) the perception of some partners that AMPED performance indicators are not fit-for-purpose and are too quantitative in orientation; and (iii) DFAT did not contract any MELF support as envisaged in the AMPED IDD.

**Clear Horizon proposed a revised the MELF**. It proposed 15 indicators: a mix of the general (‘relevant changes in political economy context’) and the specific (‘extent of and reasons for deviations in expenditure …. compared to plans’). Some of the 15 sets of ‘information’ were voluminous in themselves (‘a summary of outputs produced, outcomes achieved, and any unintended consequences’). The report also recommended commissioning a ‘MEL Support Hub’, with approximately 40-50 days of technical assistance input per year.

**The recommendations were never enacted due to COVID-19 restrictions and resource constraints in the Embassy**: it lost one of its three Counsellors, as well as some locally engaged positions. It is an easy recommendation that any new program must *adequately and appropriately* design and implement a much more realistic MELF, and that there must be capability in the Embassy meaningfully to manage it – setting clear expectations with partners on monitoring, evaluation, and reporting requirements from the outset.

**Each AMPED partner used its own set of outcome and output indicators, formats, and templates, reporting activity level results that were challenging to link with the AMPED Intermediate Outcomes**. Annex 8 maps the AMPED investment level indicators and the indicators actually used by AMPED partners against the AMPED outcomes. Despite repeated requests from DFAT to partners to assess contributions of their activities to AMPED outcomes, this was never provided. As with DFAT’s gender equality requirements, performance reporting expectations were not reflected in Administration Agreements or Operational Manuals, so were not able to be enforced.

**reporting at the partner level was varied in terms of quality and format.** In summary:

* **WB:** the WB submitted six monthly reports regarding the Trust Fund.[[25]](#footnote-26) For an organisation that prides itself on its quantitative skills, these progress reports did not meet DFAT M&E requirements, as they are primarily descriptive and provide data only on disbursements. There is a limited discussion of progress against outputs. There was no attempt to link the project to AMPED EOPOs. The same applies to reporting the Agus-Pulangi hydropower projects, which focused on physical progress and financial expenditure (for an infrastructure project this may be more justified). Some of this reflects the minimum service level required of the WB in the Trust Fund operations manual. An agreement to revise the manual to include clear expectations on GEDSI, MEL and reporting is an outcome of the AGaP midterm review.
* **ADB:** the ADB submitted a detailed Final Interim Report regarding its Strengthening Social Protection project in April 2022. In effect it was an annual report covering the March 2021 – March 2022 period. It was activity and output focused but comprehensive and gave a clear picture of next steps. The ADB also submitted two progress reports (2021, 2022, and 2023) for the Mindanao Irrigation Development Project.
* **UNICEF:** UNICEF submitted annual progress reports regarding the AUD 1.9 million 2019-2023 project to improve the equity, child focus, and shock responsiveness of GPH social protection systems. These reports emphasised activity progress reporting and financial expenditures. There was again no attempt to link the project to AMPED’s EOPOs.
* **IFC:** the IFC submitted a completion report for its March 2019 - June 2022 in December 2022. It is a good report, detailing all the project components, and attempts to assess contribution to outcomes and impacts, and reflects on lessons learned. There is also a brief consideration of visibility, although it is primarily about the use of logos. Although AMPED is referenced, there is no effort to relate IFC outcomes to the two EOPOs.

**Monitoring and reporting at the program level was non-existent, while reporting at the partner / project level was – gender excepted - adequate.** The M&E Hub recommended in the program design document was never implemented, so the only program-level reporting was DFAT’s internal annual quality checks.The absence of an operationalised monitoring, evaluation and reporting system resulted in the Embassy being unable to articulate a convincing narrative either to the GPH or to Canberra. The program was doing lots of good things but capturing them in a simple two paragraph brief was not possible. The issue is that the goal of the program is too permissive (it bars little if anything) and the implementing partners have prioritised their own agendas.

**Little attention has been paid to knowledge management and communications.** This is due both to the nature of the program (funding a multiplicity of activities that don’t ‘speak to each other’), and resource scarcity in the Embassy. The ‘stories of significant change’ (SSCs) developed for this review (incorporated as text boxes) suggests that the program is delivering ‘results’, but that these ‘results’ will be at the activity or investment level, rather than an unequivocal assessment that “the GPH has now demonstrably acquired strengthened capacity to manage the economy for economic growth with the participation of the private sector.” This is partly the justification for a tighter Goal and a more modest EOPO in the next iteration of the program. Implementing partners should be required to produce SSCs as well as reporting how much money they have spent, when they spent it, and on what. These SSCs should include an assessment of the reasons underpinning success. Over time a modest library of SSCs would be developed, allowing broader lessons to be learned about successful MIC upstream policy reforms.

## 4.2 Governance and Oversight

**Partners were largely content with existing oversight arrangements**. The question regarding oversight arrangements is the function they are required to perform. The MTR team concluded that the Steering Committees (SC) now function largely as reporting mechanisms, rather than as strategic oversight or decision-making bodies. They receive reports from implementing partners and ‘rubber stamp’ activity proposals from the partners.[[26]](#footnote-27) In this way they can be said to duplicate the role of the Technical Working Groups (TWGs). The MTR team found that the TWGs rarely met and were devoid of a meaningful role. If DFAT is content with the implementing partners leading the investment portfolio of the program, the only thing that needs to change is to drop the TWGs. Partners indicated they would welcome more substantive DFAT engagement in the future especially in those technical areas where Australia has advanced.

**If, however DFAT wish to play a more directive role, then the Terms of Reference and the functioning of the Steering Committees must change.** This will require DFAT to play a more active and engaged role, ensuring that the Steering Committee(s) meet, provide strategic guidance, and make decisions on investment choices based on pre-determined, agreed criteria.

**The WB expressed a desire for regular (but not necessarily frequent) informal meetings with DFAT staff.** As well as being kept informed of Australia’s policy priorities and Embassy staff changes, Bank staff would appreciate having a window into Australia’s technical expertise in economic policy reform and sector regulation. This seems eminently sensible, especially as the Philippine’s economy moves towards AMIC status and its need for regulatory experience intensifies.

## 4.3 Securing Policy Influence

The AMPED program is primarily designed to support the GPH in its economic reform priorities. As this MTR has noted, there are examples of ‘success’ here. There are two questions regarding the achievement of ‘policy influence’ on which DFAT should reflect. First, influence over what, and second, which organisations are best placed to deliver that influence? The MTR team have concluded that the purpose of the program (at Goal, Objective, and EOPO level, following the latest DFAT guidance) should be refined and clarified. The current Goal is “to contribute to the Philippines’ rapid, sustainable, and inclusive economic growth.’ EOPO1 is ‘strengthen the ability of the GPH to manage the economy for growth, with participation of the private sector’. The distinction between the Goal and the EOPO is logical: the strengthened ability of the GPH to manage the economy should lead to better economic growth. The two problems with this are its ambition and scope. Nothing is counted out, and success requires the unambiguous demonstration of improved GPH capacity to manage the economy. Currently there is no unambiguous evidence of the latter – in fact, there is no evidence at all.

It is recommended therefore that a less ambitious Goal be adopted for the next iteration of the program. One option would be to use a slightly revised EOPO1 as the program goal: ‘To strengthen the ability of the GPH to manage the economy for inclusive growth’ (one could add ‘with a focus on the role of the private sector’). The IOs under IO1 could stand but be slightly reworded and less ambitious. Indicators would give specificity. This would answer the question of influence over what policies.

The second question is which organisations are best placed to achieve this? The MTR would suggest that they are the WB and the IFC. The MTR team suggests that they are the WB and the IFC. In addition to the privileged position they (along with ADB) enjoy with GPH based on the quality of their in-country technical expertise, there are four reasons for prioritising these two MFIs. First, their work is primarily focused on upstream economic reform, although both organisations also engage downstream. Second, the WB is public sector focused while the IFC is private sector focused. They are therefore complementary – and the GPH needs both in tandem. Third, they are sister organisations, and thus more disposed to work in alignment, and to listen to, and respect, each other. Fourth, from what the MTR team could divine, the DFAT/WB/IFC relationship is more effective than the DFAT/ADB relationship (outside of social protection, at least).

**By prioritising upstream economic policy reform and partnering with the WB and the IFC, DFAT will be able to sharpen its relationship with the GPH via these to preferred and trusted partners.** It will enable increased strategic coherence. DFAT will be able to take forward the social protection elements of AMPED, which are important in making growth more inclusive, in its new SPRING (Social Protection, Inclusion and Gender Equality) program. It will be important that AMPED (and its next phase or successor) and SPRING are managed in a coordinated way, to maximise synergies and provide insights into how upstream AMPED-supported policy reforms are playing out in real people’s lives.

**The MTR team would also recommend dropping the downstream initiatives such as infrastructure rehabilitation**. Clearer strategic intent and only two partners will go a long way to dispelling the perception of programmatic incoherence.

# **5 Looking forward**

5.1 Strategic Issues to be resolved

**The MTR team identified four strategic questions DFAT must address before signing off a new phase of the program:**

1. What is the balance of the program between its developmental impact (EOPO1) and the three-fold partnership objective (EOPO 2)?
2. What is the strategic (development) intent for the program? Its lack of focus has led to concerns of strategic incoherence. The MTR team would endorse this view.
3. What is DFAT’s preferred modality for delivering the program – through a direct bilateral, government to government relationship (as it was in the previous program) or directly through selected MFIs?
4. How will ‘results’ be measured in any successor program?

**The first three issues are related.** The MTR team were struck by the variety of activities funded under the program. None are ‘out of order.’ But the program is fragmented because it has funded forty or so individual projects, and few demonstrate strategic coherence.Social protection initiatives and pilot projects are mixed with insurance reforms, a cancer hospital, rehabilitating an electricity plant, reforming the business environment, economic policy reforms, irrigation, and building roads. There is a mix of upstream and downstream activities. In addressing these three issues, the MTR team would suggest that the ‘trick’ has to be how to ensure DFAT does not lose the technical influence and excellence of its partners (especially the WB and the IFC), while at the same time maximising its own exposure, involvement, and visibility. Three options are presented in section 5.3 below.

5.2 Partners

**The relationship among partners is complex.** There are four MFIs, the GPH and DFAT, so six organisations altogether which generate 15 separate one-to-one relationships. These relationships differ in intensity, according to need, intersecting programs, and personalities. All four implementing partners noted the churn of DFAT staff and the subsequent need to start the relationship over each time. Each of the four implementing partners of course experienced their relationship with DFAT from their own perspective. Three of the four MFIs felt the involvement of DFAT was positive – cordial, collaborative, and responsive. The degree of DFAT involvement varied according to the ‘depth of the DFAT bench’ (as one partner called it). Social protection was one area where DFAT was judged to have added technical value by both the ADB and UNICEF, although the IFC appreciated the long-term involvement and commitment of the Embassy economists. Some ADB staff felt they were often having to brief DFAT staff to bring them up to speed on technical issues, given staff- turnover in the Embassy.

**Collaboration with the ADB was good in the area of social protection.** The 14th Joint Review Mission in 2023 for the Expanded Social Assistance Project (ESAP) for example included UNICEF, DFAT, and ADB staff who enjoyed a strong working relationship and travelled together to Tacloban to observe implementation of the 4Ps and the Sustainable Livelihoods Program (SLP). All three agencies delivered complementary observations and recommendations to the Department of Social Welfare and Development (DSWD) to strengthen various aspects of their social protection programs and systems. ADB has also kept DFAT involved in major Padayon SLP graduation project activities such as the Midterm Review and Leaning Visit in Iloilo in 2022 and the final report presentation and knowledge sharing discussions in 2023. DFAT provided inputs on project implementation and sustainability of the graduation results during these events. ADB also coordinates closely with DFAT through periodic catch-up meetings and a series of informal discussions at the working level, including between DFAT’s project officer and ADB’s project coordinator to ensure we are all aware of current challenges and milestones in the integration of Padayon SLP results into DSWD’s main SLP program. Moreover, DFAT actively participated in ADB’s recent 2023 Asia Pacific Social Protection Week, with more than a dozen DFAT and Australian Embassy staff attending the event and contributing to the rich discussions

**Partners were generally positive about DFAT**: its flexibility and its responsiveness (and its timely responsiveness). There was however a sense that DFAT was excessively risk averse and had missed opportunities to promote ‘rules of the game’ change. One common view was that DFAT were frequently invited to meetings but did not attend, citing pressure of work. Implementing partners noted that ‘visibility’ was more than turning up to meetings, branding, and the DFAT logo on reports. Visibility comes from deep intellectual engagement by DFAT, and outside of social protection this was largely absent.

**The MTR team inferred that the original vision for the partnership was as presented in Figure 5.1 – an effective partnership among equals.** What actually came about is presented in Figure 5.2 - a straight line, with the implementing partners as intermediaries between the GPH and DFAT. All four partners informed the MTR team that they themselves had ‘identified’ the investment activities to be funded under AMPED – activities which aligned first and foremost with their own strategic priorities, and which also aligned with GPH priorities. DFAT priorities were a (sometimes distant) third. Once endorsed by GPH the partner would seek DFAT approval, which was always forthcoming – none of the partners could identify an investment which had been turned down by DFAT. This is not necessarily a bad thing – investments could have met DFAT priorities. The majority of the discussions were held bilaterally between the partner and the GPH, with DFAT rarely in attendance. Sometimes this was necessary, as sensitive, and confidential issues were being discussed. Sometimes it was seen as pragmatic as meetings were concerned with ‘handholding’ the GPH, helping them push through the mechanics of the reforms (IFC emphasised this point), and sometimes it was at the request of the GPH.


**Figure 5: How the modality played out**

**Fig 5.1: The vision**

Figure 5.1 presents the original vision for the partnership:

Three boxes labelled partner, DFAT and GPH. Partner and DFAT are joined with a two-way arrow marked ‘reporting’; DFAT and GPH are joined with a two-way arrow ‘strategic oversight’; and GPH and Partner are joined with an arrow ‘implementation’.


**Fig 5.2: What happened**



5.3 **Modality options**

There are two ‘end of spectrum’ modality options: the current arrangements where DFAT manages selected MFIs directly, or a more direct government to government partnership managed by a third party. There are pros and cons of each (Figure 6).

**Figure 6: Modality pros and cons**

|  | **DFAT managed MFI partnerships** | **Government to government partnership** |
| --- | --- | --- |
| **Pros** | * Potentially gives DFAT access to upstream policy debates * Cheap | * Potentially reduces transactions costs to DFAT (but evidence from Facilities does not bear this out). * Gives greater access to GPH - but access is not synonymous with influence. The MFIs have the technical knowledge that GPH needs. |
| **Cons** | * Significantly reduces access to GPH * Imposes significant management and oversight burden on DFAT * DFAT does not have the technical skills to engage on an equal level with the MFIs * Limits Australian ‘visibility’ | * Funded MFIs will dislike it– the managing contractor will be another layer to negotiate to get to DFAT. * Managing contractor likely to end up being no more than a post box. * Danger of losing the very thing that GPH wants – especially the WB and IFC: access to global technical expertise; ability to respond to GPH requests; close working relationships with key GPH departments; experience of Australian development cooperation programs dating back to 2009 when the Australia-WB Philippines Trust Fund (AMPED’s precursor program) was launched; continuity of economic reforms initiated and supported by AMPED; efficiency of running a program through WB. * Likely to end up being less efficient. |

**There are three options. The first option is to appoint a third counsellor to the Embassy staff**, with sole responsibility for management and oversight of the program, and a dedicated small team to help manage the AMPED investment. The appointee would need to be a seasoned economist familiar with middle income country reforms and issues. This would enable direct technical engagement by DFAT with MFIs and with GPH economic agencies, enabling greater visibility and more scope for direct policy influence. It would also bring the ability to facilitate engagement with Australian economic agencies where appropriate. However, this is unlikely to be possible due to constraints on the departmental budget. Even if it were, it may be difficult to identify and attract an officer with the requisite expertise and experience.

**DFAT could consider a second option: going to the market to identify and appoint a suitably qualified individual and placing them inside the Embassy.** One such arrangement now exists in the Embassy in Cambodia. This person would have no other duties apart from the management of the program and inserting themselves with the partners and – principally – with the GPH. Such a position could be funded from program costs (administered budget), potentially making it a more viable option. However, it would be highly dependent on recruiting the right person with the right mix of technical and (small d) diplomatic skills. It is unlikely that an externally contracted adviser could supervise the Embassy staff that would still be needed to help manage the program. This adviser would also be less integrated into the Embassy leadership team than a DFAT Counsellor and would not have the same ability to engage with other Australian government agencies at Post or in Canberra.

**The third option is to put in place a small, highly skilled program office, somewhat akin to the Partnerships for Infrastructure (P4I) model.** Three people should be sufficient: a program director, a technical lead, and an administrative manager. This unit could be designed almost as an extension of DFAT.However, it would only work (and be financially viable) if most - but not all - functions now undertaken by DFAT are delegated to the unit. This would free up a lot of DFAT staff time. However, the experience of such initiatives is not always positive. DFAT tend to continue to micro-manage these arrangements and seem reluctant to change their established ways of working. This option is also the costliest of the three – though still likely cheaper than a fully staffed bilateral program - and with the advantage of continued partnerships with the MFIs. Compared to the current arrangement, or Option 1, it would add another layer between DFAT and the MFIs.

**If Option 1 is not possible, then the MTR team would recommend Option 3 since it would ensure sufficient dedicated technical engagement with and oversight of the program**. The trade-off is of course that this would create an additional layer, but DFAT does not appear to have the time or technical capacity to play this role directly.

**Section 1.2 above noted that AMPED is primarily about upstream policy and institutional change**, though it has also supported preparation of downstream infrastructure investments. This raises the question of what DFAT considers a ‘result.’ The journey from the provision of technical assistance to policy reform implementation – let alone the generation of development outcomes – is a long one and will almost certainly take longer than the lifetime of the program. Given that DFAT’s December 2022 design guidelines require that the EOPOs be *deliverable by the project in the timeframe of the project* suggests that program EOPOs should be less ambitious than they currently are.[[27]](#footnote-28)

**The World Bank team offered a persuasive theorisation of what constitutes effectiveness and results.[[28]](#footnote-29)** The team stressed that the process of economic policy reform is continuous (one reform will lead to the need for another), and that most reforms are interconnected (again, one reform demands another). Figure 7 summarises the Bank’s (informal, inferred) approach to assessing results and influence. The MTR team would emphasise that access is not the same as influence. Influence requires the hard yards of engagement on the technical substance of the issue at hand: it requires analytics and evidence from other similar jurisdictions that the reform may deliver the desired policy outcome. A mere meeting with GPH officials and even ministers cannot be equated with influence. This is why DFAT cannot afford to lose its relationship with the WBG.

**Figure 7: The World Bank’s inferred approach to influencing**

A pie chart divided into five (5) segments depicting WB’s inferred approach to influencing and marked as follows read in a clockwise direction: (i) Request for technical advice received – the process in in place and working; (ii) How well is the assignment progressing – are GPH satisfied?; (iii) Does the assignment lead to further requests from the GPH; (iv) Are some of the policy recommendations accepted by GPH?; and, (v) Has implementation commenced?



## 5.4 Recommendations and entry points

**1 DFAT should proceed with a design refresh of the AMPED program.** Sustained economic reform is criticalif the Philippines is to reach AMIC status. Australia is a valued and high-profile development partner, and an increasingly important strategic partner. To vacate this space would be folly. The design update should be commissioned as soon as possible to ensure a seamless transition from the current program.

**2 The strategic intent of the program should be clarified.** The current program has two EOPOs, one about developmental impact and the other about the threefold GPH-partner-DFAT relationship. It is recommended that the former be modified in two ways: first, to stress that Australia is *making a contribution* to strengthening the ability of the GPH to manage the economy for inclusive economic growth, and second, to indicate Australia’s thematic priorities: gender and women’s economic empowerment, climate change, and the broader regulatory environment. (See section 5 for a full presentation of GEDSI recommendations). It is recommended that EOPO2 be dropped. A successful EOPO1 will deliver the quality relationships that DFAT seeks.

**3 The design update should specify that its focus will be on *upstream* policy, legal, and regulatory reforms**. *Downstream* work (projects, localised initiatives and physical investments would fall outside the scope). Figure 8 shows the high-level conceptual framework for what the successor program could look like, with upstream interventions supported by the program incentivising (but not directly supporting) improved downstream inclusive economic growth outcomes.

**Figure 8: AMPED design update- conceptual framework**



**4 DFAT should reassign the social protection components of AMPED to the SPRING program.** A strong case can be made that the UNICEF element of AMPED, and the ADB’s social protection project should be transferred to this new program. There is a counter-case in favour of leaving the social protection within the program – it provides the inclusion in the term ‘inclusive economic growth’. The MTR team’s interlocutors in UNICEF argued that the social protection component should stay where it is. The arguments are finely balanced. The MTR have concluded that a transfer to the SPRING program is more appropriate. The two programs could – and indeed should – be managed in close coordination.

**5 DFAT should consider its preferred delivery modality.** As noted in section 5.2 and depicted in Figure 5, the current direct funding modality minimises Australia’s involvement in the program and its visibility to the GPH. It is recommended that DFAT consider the options: the MTR team would recommend option 1, bit if that is not possible, then option 3, but only if DFAT are willing to delegate authority to the program unit.

**6 DFAT should consider what constitutes a ‘result’ of the successor program.** Section 3.5 above noted that economic governance reforms are messy: one reform demands another. They are by definition long-term ventures. It is unrealistic therefore to expect specific, downstream development outcomes in the time period of the program. Given that DFAT’s latest guidance on program design draws the line of accountability above the EOPO level, any new program must be realistic and modest in setting its EOPOs. Section 5.3 presented one way of articulating ‘results’.This should be further explored in the design refresh.

**7 If the strategic intent of the program is clarified as in recommendation 1, DFAT should engage two partners – the WB and the IFC.** In addition to their privileged positions with GPH, based on the depth and breadth of their technical expertise, there are four reasons:

* their work is primarily, bit not solely, focused on upstream economic governance reforms.
* the WB is public sector focused while the IFC is private sector focused. They are therefore complementary – and the GPH needs both in tandem.
* they are sister organisations, and thus more disposed to work in alignment, and to listen to, and respect, each other.
* the MTR team assessed that the DFAT/WB/IFC relationship is stronger than the DFAT/AB relationship (outside of social protection, that is).

**8 The next iteration of the program must have a convincing, realistic, and achievable MELF.** The current AMPED program has seen no reporting at the program level. The four individual partners have reported against their own work plans and programs, to differing levels of sophistication.

**9 Partners must better integrate, and report on, gender and social inclusion in their projects.** DFAT needs to make its design, performance and reporting standards on gender and disability equity clear to all implementing partners, including responsibility for building the knowledge and skills of their implementing teams. This needs to be reflected in and made enforceable through legal agreements (see Annex 5 for more detailed recommendations).

**10 DFAT should consider what it means by, and how it can better achieve, visibility.** Visibility has to be earned. The four delivery partners see DFAT primarily as a funder rather than as a partner. Visibility is more than a logo on a document or asking to comment on documents. If DFAT are serious about visibility, then it must allocate staff time and resources to substantive technical engagement. Otherwise, it will remain a bystander. Or as the ADB suggested, it could be like most of the other contributors to their trust funds: just put the money in, do nothing and receive the annual report at the year’s end.

**11 Regular informal DFAT-WB meetings.**  In addition to valuing clarity on DFAT policy priorities, partners (especially the WB) would value a window into Australian expertise, particularly as the Philippines strives for AMIC status.

**12** **Safeguards to be assessed at project level.** Given the diversity of the program, there is little purpose in assessing safeguards at the portfolio level. Partners should be required to report on safeguards at activity level, however.

**13 Consider moving to a two- or three-year rolling program for the AGaP Trust Fund and establish an unspecified ‘just in time’ funding line.** Funding gaps delay implementation and cause the GPH frustration. The GPH decision making cycle is considerably faster than that of Australia, and the WB is frequently asked to provide ‘just in time’ support. There used to be such a mechanism in the Trust Fund, but it was discontinued following the 2020 AGaP Steering Committee Meeting.[[29]](#footnote-30) DFAT may wish to reconsider.

**14** **DFAT to reconsider the role and functioning of the Steering Committees and the Technical Working Groups.** Currently they seem to duplicate each other and the SCs do not provide strategic guidance.

**15 Introduce strict investment criteria in the successor program.** Anything goes in the current program: partners should be required to adhere more closely to DFAT strategic priorities.

# **Annexes**

**Annex 1. Review Terms of Reference**

1. The Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade (DFAT) is seeking an independent review team to undertake a Midterm Progress Review of the *Advancing Multilateral Partnerships for Economic Development* (AMPED) investment, Australia’s bilateral economic governance and infrastructure program to the Philippines.

**Background and Orientation**

1. The AMPED investment (2019-24, up to AUD $25 million) enables DFAT to engage with multilateral development partners to contribute to inclusive economic growth and recovery, and to support development of critical economic infrastructure in the Philippines.
2. AMPED has two end-of-program outcomes (EOPO):
3. EOPO 1: strengthened ability of the Philippine government to manage the economy for growth, with participation of the private sector. As the development result, this aims to address sustainable inclusive economic growth issues.
4. EOPO 2: a strong partnership between Australia, the Philippines, and multilateral partners. As the performance result, this aims to improve the relationship of Australia and multilateral partners with the Philippine government.
5. The investment focuses on three themes, reviewed annually, which are areas of mutual interest:
6. supporting the Philippines Government reform policies related to governance, business, trade, investment, the labour market, and social protection
7. supporting the Philippine Government’s development of selected long-term investments (e.g., infrastructure)
8. support the private sector to create inclusive products and services.
9. Under AMPED, each activity (or partnership) with a multilateral entity has a separate agreement with DFAT, under the umbrella of the overall AMPED investment[[30]](#footnote-31). Each activity has standalone governance, implementation and monitoring and evaluation mechanisms tailored to the nature of the partnership. Activities are managed by a range of DFAT program officers in the Australian Embassy. The Economic Growth and Social Inclusion team coordinates the overall AMPED investment to ensure coherence, manage and coordinate quality assurance and performance reporting, to ensure that outputs and intermediate outcomes contribute to the EOPOs.
10. AMPED’s partnerships are as follows:

| **Multilateral Partner** | **Agreements/Arrangements** |
| --- | --- |
| **World Bank** | **Australia-World Bank Growth and Prosperity in the Philippines (AGaP) Single-Donor Trust Fund** (03/2019 to 06/2024, USD $10.55 million) to facilitate knowledge exchange to assist the government to design and implement key economic policy reforms  **Agus-Pulangi Hydropower Complex (APHC) Rehabilitation Multi-Donor Trust Fund** (08/2019-06/2024, USD $2 million) to examine the feasibility of and support project preparation for the rehabilitation of APHC |
| **International Finance Corporation (IFC)** | **Private Sector Development Program (PSDP)** (02/2019 to 06/2022, USD $2 million) to support private sector growth and address challenges that hinder greater private sector economic participation. Consideration is being made to support a second phase of this work. |
| **United Nations Children's Fund (UNICEF)** | **Improving Equity, Child Focus and Shock-Responsiveness of Philippines Social Protection Project** (12/2019 to 12/2023, USD $1.3 million) to enhance operational systems for implementation of government social protection programs, lay foundations for shock-responsive social protection in the Bangsamoro, and influence social protection policies |
| **Asian Development Bank (ADB)** | **Technical Assistance for the Preparation of the Mindanao Irrigation Development Project (MIDP)** (10/2020 to 12/2022, USD $500,000) to develop feasibility studies and design for the planned MIDP investment projects aimed at increasing agricultural productivity in Mindanao  **Graduation from Poverty Approach** (01/2021 to 06/2024, USD $1.1 million) to enhance delivery of the Philippine social protection program. |

**Objectives**

1. The AMPED design document stipulates that an independent Progress Review of the AMPED investment will be commissioned by the Australian Embassy to the Philippines around halfway through implementation of the investment. It was envisaged this would provide an opportunity to reshape AMPED to align with priorities of the new Philippine administration in 2022, and to aide consideration of options for future development assistance to the Philippines.
2. The review will assess the implementation progress of the AMPED investment at midterm (July 2018 to June 2022)against its EOPOs and recommend relevant adjustments towards its completion.
3. The review will make recommendations on the following priorities:
   1. **Performance assessment**: Using the AMPED investment’s program logic (developed in 2021), assess the investment’s progress towards the achievement of its intended outcomes based on the OECD-defined evaluation criteria of Efficiency, Effectiveness and Sustainability, with particular emphasis on Gender Equality, Disability, and Social Inclusion (GEDSI) issues.
   2. **Policy influence:** Document lessons learned from the implementation of AMPED partnerships, particularly on AMPED’s modality of delivering aid in the Philippines and its ability to respond to and influence the priorities of the Philippine government.
   3. **Monitoring and evaluation:** The review will be an opportunity to conduct a more in-depth review of the AMPED program logic, selection criteria, and balance of activities across development result areas and partner-nominated sub-themes, and recommend changes where necessary
   4. **Knowledge management and communications:** Develop case studies outlining the success of a range of activities undertaken through the AMPED investment. Recommend ways to communicate AMPED’s achievements; and build greater knowledge within DFAT and beyond of the analysis and insights provided through the various AMPED activities with multilateral partners in the Philippines.
   5. **Future choices:** Based on the above assessments, the review will provide recommendations to DFAT senior executives and AMPED investment managers on options to help ensure that AMPED will achieve its intended outcomes, including:
      1. governance arrangements and implementation arrangements
      2. the appropriate mix and number of implementation partners
      3. added value to Australia of specific partnerships, and, where feasible, recommending options and/or priorities for programming future AMPED funds.

**Scope and Methodology**

1. **Period of Coverage.** The independent midterm progress review will assess progress of **AMPED’s implementation from July 2018 to June 2022.** As this covers the period when the COVID-19 pandemic impacted on the implementation of DFAT investments, the review should assess AMPED’s progress pre-COVID-19 pandemic and the implementation years that were affected.
2. **Key Questions:** The evaluation team will develop its proposed methodology and questions as part of its evaluation plan. Key questions should be based on the OECD-defined evaluation criteria of efficiency, effectiveness, and sustainability, with particular emphasis on gender equality, disability and social inclusion (GEDSI), and in line with [DFAT’s Monitoring and Evaluation Standards](https://www.dfat.gov.au/about-us/publications/Pages/dfat-monitoring-and-evaluation-standards) and [Partner Performance Assessment Ratings Matrix](https://www.dfat.gov.au/about-us/publications/Pages/partner-performance-assessment). Consideration should be made in the evaluation plan as to appropriate meetings and consultations to be undertaken during the review process, including modality (online or face to face).[[31]](#footnote-32) The evaluation plan should broadly cover the following areas:

* relevance
* effectiveness
* efficiency
* sustainability
* gender equality
* monitoring and evaluation
* risk management and safeguards.

1. The team led by the Lead Evaluation Specialist will submit the following outputs to DFAT:

| **Outputs** | **Requirements** |
| --- | --- |
| 1. **Evaluation Plan** | * To be developed by the Evaluator Adviser in consultation with Manila Post * Should include an evaluation design; process for information collection and analysis; final evaluation questions (as agreed with DFAT); and challenges to achieving evaluation objectives and how these will be addressed. |
| 1. **Significant change case studies of AMPED** | Develop ‘significant policy change case studies ‘(short, retrospective, and evidence-rich narrative) that:  • describe a significant achievement and explain why this is important  • describe the contribution of Australia (including through implementing partners) to the achievement; and who else played a role  • note lessons captured that could be applied by other investments, or broader aid managers Australian Embassy Philippines. |
| 1. **Aide Memoire** | 2-3 pages, following [DFAT’s preferred format](http://dfatintranet.titan.satin.lo/managing-aid/aid-programming-guide/Documents/Aide-Memoire-Outline.docx) to be submitted and presented to DFAT and the multilateral partners by the end of in-country consultations, and prior to drafting the review report. |
| 1. **Review Report** | Maximum of 20 pages, excluding attachments, in line with DFAT’s [Monitoring and Evaluation Standards](https://www.dfat.gov.au/sites/default/files/monitoring-evaluation-standards.pdf) with concise Executive Summary, submitted within 10 working days of receiving DFAT comments on draft evaluation report. |

1. All outputs listed above must be prepared in accordance with [DFAT’s Monitoring and Evaluation Policy](https://www.dfat.gov.au/development/performance-assessment/development-evaluation/development-evaluation-policy) should meet DFAT’s [accessibility guidelines for published documents](https://www.dfat.gov.au/about-us/about-this-website/accessible-documents/creating-documents-meet-accessibility-guidelines), and are subject to DFAT’s acceptance and approval.

**Timeframe / Duration and Phasing**

1. This requirement is for a total of 55 days with distribution of input days across evaluation team, to be determined by the Contractor.
2. The proposed timeline for the conduct of the review between January 2022 – April 2023, and is roughly as follows:

|  |  |
| --- | --- |
| **Activities** | **Period** |
| Contracting of review team (c/o DFAT) | 4 weeks from finalisation of TOR |
| Mobilisation of evaluation team (e.g., initial briefings; preparation and approval of evaluation plan; document review) | 2 weeks |
| Review Mission (e.g., stakeholder interviews; project visits (if required); presentation of aide memoire) including conduct of Informal partner’s meeting, in line with the approved evaluation plan) | 4 weeks |
| Writing of draft IPR Report that includes an annex on the Informal Partners Meeting outcomes and Significant Policy Change case study | 3 weeks |
| DFAT and multilateral partners review of draft IPR Report | 2 weeks |
| Preparation and approval of final DFAT Evaluation Report | 1 week |

**Annex 2. Review team roles and responsibilities**

|  |  |
| --- | --- |
| 1. Role | 1. Responsibility |
| 1. Graham Teskey 2. Lead Evaluator | * Ensure the MTR is implemented according to the Terms of Reference and the Review Plan * Management of the MTR Team and assignment of duties * Draft and submit the MTR Plan * Lead the development of reports and key deliverables * Take responsibility for liaison with DFAT * Coordinate and lead author of the deliverables, and ensure submission of high-quality deliverables |
| 1. Rudini Baoy 2. Co-evaluator | * Lead the coordination of selected components of the review * Work with MTR team members regularly to debrief and exchange information * Contribute to the background research and document review * Along with the Team Leader, generate findings, lessons learned and recommendations |
| 1. Fatima Versoza 2. GEDSI specialist | * Lead discussions with interlocutors on all aspects of GEDSI * Lead the MTR review assessment work on GEDSI * Ensure GEDSI is factored into each stage of the MTR * Contribute to the background research and document review * Work with MTR team members regularly to debrief and exchange information * Along with the Team Leader, generate findings, lessons learned and recommendations |

**Annex 3. List of stakeholders interviewed**

| **Organisation** | **Name, Role** |
| --- | --- |
| DFAT | Hae Kyong Yu, Australian Ambassador to the Philippines |
| DFAT | Dr Moya Collett, Deputy Head of Mission, Australian Embassy, Manila |
| DFAT | Richard Sisson, previous Deputy Head of Mission. Now AS Canberra, Development Risk, Implementation and Evaluation Branch |
| DFAT | Thanh Le, Counsellor Development, Australian Embassy, Manila |
| DFAT | Ms Sheona McKenna, ex Counsellor Development, Australian Embassy, Manila. Now Director Fiji, Office of the Pacific DFAT Canberra |
| DFAT | Georgina Harley-Cavanough, First Secretary, Australian Embassy, Manila |
| DFAT | Grace Borja, Senior Program Manager, Australian Embassy, Manila |
| DFAT | Grace Angela Aquino, Program Office, Australian Embassy, Manila |
| DFAT | Simon Reid, First Secretary Economic, Australian Embassy, Manila |
| DFAT | Elnora Palomo, Senior Program Officer, Australian Embassy, Manila |
| DFAT | Abigail Bakker, Second Secretary, Australian, Embassy, Manila |
| DFAT | Juno Barbra Cabotan, Australian Embassy, Manila |
| DFAT | Nardia Simpson, ex-Counsellor Economic, Australian Embassy, Manila. Now Deputy Head of Mission, Dhaka Bangladesh |
| DFAT | Daniel San Jose, formerly DFAT Program Officer and AGaP Trust Fund Manager |
| AusTrade | Christopher Lim, Minister-Counsellor (Commercial), Australian Embassy, Manila |
| WB | Yoonyoung Cho, Senior Economist, Washington, DC |
| WB | Ruth Rodriguez, Senior Social Protection Specialist, WB Office, Manila |
| WB | Paula Cerutti, Social Protection Specialist, WB Office, Manila |
| WB | Sharon Faye A Piza, Economist, WB Office, Manila |
| WB | Ronald Mutasa, Program Leader, Human Capital Cluster, WB Office, Bangkok, Thailand |
| WB | Yolanda (Lani) Azarcon, Senior Operations Officer, Washington, DC |
| WB | Rommel Herrera, Operations Officer and current Trust Fund Manager, WB Office, Manila |
| WB | Jaime Frais, Co-Task Team Leader, WB Office, Manila |
| WB | Kevin Thomas Garcia Cruz, Economist. MTI team, WB Office, Manila |
| WB | Davit Melikyan, Senior Governance Adviser, WB Office, Manila |
| WB | Heejin Lee, Co-Task Team Leader, WB Office, Manila |
| WB  WB | Zoe Adriel Palispis Escobar, Adviser, WB Office, Manila  Mary Morrison, Gender Advisor |
| IFC | Kevin Mathees, Partnerships Lead, IFC Office, Bangkok, Thailand |
| IFC | Nishanta Jayasooriya, Operations Officer, +Financial Institutions Group, IFC Office, Manila |
| IFC | Paul Xavier Espinosa, Operations Officer, Risk Management and Climate Finance, IFC Office, Manila |
| IFC | Regina Alvarez Planas, Project Lead, Financial Institutions Group, IFC Office, Manila |
| IFC | Paramita Dasgupta, Major Markets Advisory Services, IFC Office, Singapore |
| IFC | Roberto Martin Galang, Short-term Consultant |
| IFC | Lin Huang, Project Lead, Financial Infrastructure, IFC Office, Beijing |
| IFC | Amy Luinsta, Gender Focal Point, Manila |
| ADB | Yukiko Ito, Senior Social Protection Specialist, ADB Office, Manila |
| ADB | Joven Valenzuela, Project Coordinator, ADB Office, Manila |
| ADB | Amir Hamza Jilani, Senior Social Sector Economist, ADB Office, Manila |
| ADB | Junko Sagara, Water Resources Specialist, Natural Resources and Agriculture Division, ADB Office, Manila |
| ADB | Criselda Rufino, Project Analyst, Natural Resources and Agriculture Division, ADB Office, Manila |
| UNICEF | Jacques Gimeno, Gender Focal Point, Manila |
| UNICEF | Amina Rafia Zeina Lim, Gender Focal Point, Bangsamoro Autonomous Region of Muslim Mindanao, Cotabato |
| UNICEF | Rosella Agcaoili, Social Policy Specialist, Manila |
| UNICEF | Maya Fachrani Faisal, Chief of Social Policy, Manila |
| UNDP | John Alikpala, Economist, Manila |
| GPH | Jimmy Francis T. Schuck II, Deputy Program Manager, Department of Social Development and Welfare |
| Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas | Jerome Minglana, President BPI Direct |
| Partnerships for Infrastructure (P4I) | Gary Ellem, Head of Regional Engagement, P4I Office, Bangkok, Thailand |
| P4I | Sheila Villaluz, County Partnerships Adviser, P4I Office, Manila |
| P4I | Bernard Minn, Country Engagement Manager, P4I Office, Bangkok |
| Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas | Mynard Mojica, Deputy Director, Policy Development Group, Manila |
| Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas | Golda Cainglet Financial Inclusion Officer, Manila |
| Ministry of Social Services and Development | Lyca Sarenas, Chief of Policy, Bangsamoro Autonomous Region of Muslim Mindanao, Cotabato |
| Consultant | Beth Elson, UK (author of the 2022 AGaP Independent Review) |

**Annex 4: Key lines of enquiry**

| **Review Criteria** | **Key MTR Questions** | **Proposed lines of enquiry/sub-questions** | **Key informants** |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |
| **Relevance** | To what extent are AMPED’s two EOPOs, its approach, focus and key activities relevant to the economy of the Philippines as it stands at the moment?  Does the program meet the policy priorities of the new government of the Philippines, and the government of Australia?  How can AMPED best remain relevant to the future economic development of the Philippines? | * To what extent do the activities. intermediate outcomes, and EOPOs of AMPED, its approach, focus and key activities remain relevant to the new policy directions of the GPH? * Should any changes be made to the design and content of the program to improve effectiveness and sustainability? * How does the program align with other externally funded economic support programs? * Is AMPED ‘missing any tricks’ to influence GPH economic policy and performance? | HOM and DHOM  DFAT economics team  GPH MDA colleagues  Partner economists in WB, IFC, and ADB |
| **Effectiveness** | To what extent has the program been effective in:   * improving the ability of the GPH to manage, oversee, and steer the economy? * How effective has been the implementation of specific projects within AMPED (infrastructure and for example social protection)? * Strengthening the relationship between the GPH and Australia? * Influencing GPH policies and responding to changes in GPH policy direction? * The private sector?   To what extent was program effectiveness hampered by COVID19?  What modalities has the program used, and to what extent have they been effective?  Has the program strengthened the tripartite GoA-GPH-multilateral relationship? | * What specific evidence is there to illustrate any progress made? * What have the progress reports reported since the program began, particularly as regards:   + GPH policy decisions, processes, and outcomes   + Infrastructure spending (budgeted, actual) * What have been the major issues with regard to either supporting or constraining project by project implementation? * Does the program need a communications plan? If so, what could it look like? * How effective is overall AMPED oversight and coordination among the four partners and with GPH? * What are the arguments for and against the modalities adopted by AMPED? * Are there opportunities for improving AMPED’s performance and contribution to higher development outcomes? | DFAT  Officials in the GPH  WB, ADB, UNICEF and IFC colleagues |
| **Efficiency** | To what extend have the four partners made good use of time and resources towards achieving AMPED’s EOPOs?  To what extent has COVID-19 impacted on the efficiency of AMPED towards achieving the two EOPOs?  Does the program represent value for money? | * Are Embassy resources appropriate to oversee and manage the program? * What are the strengths and weaknesses of the AMPED planning and budgeting system? * Were the activities implemented and resources utilized as planned? If not, what were the reasons for deviations and how did these affect program targets? * Are there opportunities for adjusting program activities and resource allocations to improve program efficiency? | DFAT program team  Partner representatives  GPH colleagues |
| **Sustainability** | What are the prospects that the outcomes and activities of AMPED will be sustained after the life of the program? | * Are technical, organisational, and financial capacities adequate to ensure continuity of program activities? * Are policies in place to ensure continuity of AMPED activities? * Are there opportunities for improving sustainability of AMPED interventions? | DFAT program team  Partner representatives  GPH officials |
| **Gender equality** | To what extent has AMPED supported gender analysis and made a difference to gender equality and women’s empowerment?  To what extent has AMPED supported analysing and addressing barriers based on gender and its intersection with other inclusion/exclusion issues (e.g., religion, ethnicity and indigeneity, geographical location, political representation, etc.) in achieving its EOPOs?  What are the viable future options for doing more? | * To what extent have gender issues been front and centre of program planning and design? * To what extent is gender a priority for the four partners in the program? * What are the barriers and constraints to further gender prioritisation? | DFAT program team  DFAT gender advisers  Partner representatives |
| **MELF** | Has the MELF met DFAT’s needs for both accountability and for lesson learning and adaptive management?  Does the MELF meet DFAT M&E standards?  How logical is the program logic?  Is there a convincing Theory of Change?  Did the MELF identify successful case studies? | * To what extent has the program MELF delivered convincing and timely data regarding IOs and EOPOs? If not, why not, and how could this be addressed * How can the MELF be revised to improve communications and telling the story of the program? * What is the overall ToC for AMPED, and has it been reviewed and revised over the life of the program? * What stories of significant change can be identified? What made them successful? * Are there other program outcomes that should be captured by the AMPED program logic or ToC? | DFAT program team |
| **Risk and safeguards** | How robust and comprehensive is the risk and safeguard framework?  Has it been assessed and/or updated? | * Who holds responsibility in the Embassy for the Risk and Safeguard framework? Is the framework considered adequate? * To what extent are any changes needed? | DFAT program team |

**Annex 5. Efficiency, Sustainability and GEDSI**

How efficient is the program?

Efficiency is a slippery term. Strictly speaking it refers to financial cost per unit of output. But because AMPED does not have consistent ‘outputs’ (widgets) it is not possible to use the strict definition of the term. More appropriate efficiency questions relate to the quality and cost of services being bought by the program, the views of the customer (here the GPH), and if there are alternative ways of procuring the same quality of services at a lower cost. The MTR team have concluded that as far as can be seen from the documentation and stakeholder comments, the services provided (i.e., the technical advice) are of high quality. The team has not reviewed any of the partner documentation as much of it is confidential to the GPH, so this cannot be considered a definitive view. However, government interlocutors spoke highly and genuinely of the advice they received. This was particularly the case regarding the WB and the IFC. The MTR team do not know how much these services cost (daily fee rates), but it is hard to imagine the corporate private sector would be cheaper. The AGaP trust fund with the WB also enabled DFAT to respond quickly to emerging opportunities and needs such as COVID-19 through an existing, established mechanism and set of relationships.

**There is one important aspect to the question of efficiency: the access to ADB and WB loan funding that DFAT trust funds can facilitate.** To the extent that this happens (any unequivocal demonstration is impossible) it would mean DFAT funding is very efficient indeed. AMPED support for WB policy loan preparation appears to have leveraged at least three substantial loans (worth USD500-600 million each) and some smaller loans through the IFC. The impact of the relatively small AMPED technical assistance funds is amplified through its association with the WB’s loan portfolio.

Partner level comments

**Projects implementation by IFC may be viewed as efficient when viewed from the timeliness of completion of project activities.** By the end of the agreed implementation period (June 2022), all nine IFC activities funded by DFAT were completed. Efficiency in terms of utilisation of grant funds cannot be determined in the absence of an updated financial report from DFAT.

**The implementation of the ADB executed Mindanao Irrigation Development Project was delayed due to COVID-19 travel restrictions and the need to conduct additional feasibility studies for sub-projects**. Despite the implementation delays, project spending was within the DFAT-approved grant amount.

**The World Bank projects were almost all delivered within project budgets and timeframes.** The AGaP MTR notes based on documents reviewed that resources were used efficiently.As noted above, it can also be argued that AMPED-supported activities leveraged significant WB financing. The one exception was the Agus Pulangi Hydropower Complex (APHC), which experienced significant delays, and was ultimately cancelled when the GPH elected to pursue a PPP arrangement rather than WB financing.

**UNICEF was effective in the delivery of its agreed activities but cannot be said to have been efficient– albeit due largely to factors beyond its control.** Delays to its work in the BARMM related to COVID-19 travel restrictions meant it expended only half of the funds allocated within the planned implementation period.

Value for money

**To improve efficiency and VfM,[[32]](#footnote-33) the MTR team would suggest that the AGaP trust fund be planned on a two, or three, year cycle and rolled over annually.** Current funding arrangements can result in funding gaps which delay implementation and cause the GPH frustration. The GPH decision making cycle is considerably faster than that of Australia, and the WB is frequently asked to provide ‘just in time’ support. There used to be flexible funding window to provide ‘just-in-time’ support for emerging needs and requests from Government.  However, the 2022 AGaP independent review report recommended that this be discontinued. [[33]](#footnote-34)

**Sustainability**

**This is a tricky question to answer for two reasons**. First, the program is not one coherent ‘whole’ which can be ‘sustained,’ and second, many (most) individual activities are about institutional reforms – i.e., revised processes, decisions, and policy positions being adopted by the GPH. The question is not whether activities will be sustained, rather it is whether these new policy positions and processes will be implemented, and if so, how effectively? There are examples of reforms that are continuing to be implemented beyond the duration of the activity. For example, the Typhoon Index Insurance activity, implemented by the IFC from March 2019 to June 2022. By that date, 37,462 policies had been taken out. Today the figure is over 50,000.

**A positive view would suggest that ‘sustainability’ of AMPED-funded activities is likely** considering that: (i) projects are responsive to the identified needs of project clients and beneficiaries; (ii) projects were identified based on the priorities of the GPH and MFI; and (iii) project partners already appear to be adopting the policy recommendations (e.g., business regulatory policy reforms) or expected to implement the outputs of project preparation support (e.g., the MIDP project). Barriers to sustainability are possible changes in government priorities that may result in realignment of project counterpart budgets and inadequate capacity to implement the project by government counterparts.

**GEDSI**

**There was very little consideration of gender in the design, and AMPED has no program level GEDSI objectives.** The four implementing partners used their own gender policies to ‘ensure’ gender integration in their projects. All partners acknowledged that they need to give more attention to gender and inclusion.

**Despite the four partners’ rhetorical commitment to gender, the MTR team heard it said a number of times that “gender is not relevant at this upstream macro policy reform level.”** This view contradicts most of the literature. Economic growth is an inherently gendered process and gender-based inequalities can be barriers to shared prosperity.  For growth to be truly inclusive and gender-equitable, the pattern of growth must create decent work and productive employment opportunities for women and men. Policymakers need to adopt human rights as a guiding normative framework and to rethink the role of macro-level economic policies, including trade, industrial, macroeconomic, finance, and investment policies.[[34]](#footnote-35)

**IFC targets their lending programs to expand access to financial services for women**. The Bangko Sentral project on Supply Chain Finance showed that little effort was made to discuss gender and inclusion. The IFC posited that the microenterprise sector is dominated by women, hence, gender issues were already being met. DFAT’s Private Sector Development Program through its BPI-CARD partner, has provided microfinancing to about 87 per cent women-owned enterprises. It would be useful for IFC to ensure that project partners are aware that the project has been funded by DFAT.

**Gender reporting at individual activity level is patchy.** The MTR team found some evidence of gender-sensitive approaches in program implementation, such as the Padayon (Sustainable Livelihoods Program)’s approach to matching livelihoods for women with childcare burdens and time poverty. However, indicators are only at the household level. The absence of reported sex-disaggregated data limited any gender analysis, and measurement of gender outcomes.

**The World Bank did two laudable pieces of gender analysis.** It undertook a robust gender analysis in the infrastructure sector related to the Agus-Pulangi hydropower rehabilitation project. Unfortunately, the cancellation of the project meant that its recommendations were not able to be actioned. The second was the influential study on Overcoming Barriers to Women’s Economic Empowerment in the Philippines, which served as an important data source on women’s workforce participation. It enhanced knowledge within the WBG to address challenges to women’s economic empowerment and informed the gender-tagging of 17 financing projects and helped identify entry points for gender mainstreaming. It also influenced the Philippine Statistics Agency to add new questions on home-based work into its labour force survey,[[35]](#footnote-36) and DFAT noted that they have used the data from the study extensively across their development portfolio.

**Partners followed (to varying degrees) their own gender policies, frameworks, and templates:**

* The WBG does not apply its internal gender tagging process to analytical work; only to its investment projects and lending portfolio.
* IFC follows the same gender policy as the WB. It uses a gender-flagging system to determine gender mainstreaming in its projects. No gender analysis was done. The design of the IFC’s Private Sector Development program was informed by its gender experience in similar projects.
* Similar to WB, ADB does not require a separate gender analysis for technical assistance, only for financed loan projects. They relied on their experience with similar projects, such as the Extended Social Assistance Program with DSWD.
* UNICEF’s work focused mainly on social protection for children, with a particular focus on children with disability, with little reference to their work with women. UNICEF’s gender policy has a gender-transformation objective, the only one among the AMPED partners that aims to transform unequal social norms. UNICEF finds that such work is particularly challenging in the BARMM, because of its entrenched system of patriarchal structures, beliefs, and traditional practices.

**What you write is what you get – contracts!** GEDSI does not seem to have been included as a requirement in the administrative arrangements and contracts under AMPED. This could have provided more direction and clarity of expectations to partners.

**WB only gender tag for development policy loans, not Technical Assistance.** Gender tagging is used by the World Bank only for their lending programs, and not for project-based grants. The WB gender specialists said that the DFAT funding is too small to make it a good use of their time.

**Gender recommendations**

**A. For Multilateral Partners:**

**Current Round (to the extent feasible under the present arrangements with partners)**

**1 Support for Philippine gender laws.** AMPED’s economic reform objectives seek to be responsive to the needs of the GPH. There are two gender laws that mandate gender mainstreaming in all programs/projects, in all sectors and at all levels. These two laws provide the anchor for AMPED support for gender mainstreaming in the MFI’s program assistance with the Philippines government agencies.

* **Republic Act 9710: Magna Carta of Women of 2009, known as the Filipino women’s bill of rights**. This provides the critical ground-breaking opportunity for gender mainstreaming with the provision of five per cent agency budget for gender and development, and for the adoption of gender mainstreaming[[36]](#footnote-37) as a mandated strategy for integrating gender in policies, plans and projects in all sectors and at all levels. All bilateral agencies are mandated by this law to prepare gender plans and budgets which are approved by the Philippine Commission on Women and the Department of Budget and Management and audited by the Commission on Audit. The use of the five per cent budget is a low-hanging fruit that can be a sustainability mechanism to continue donor interventions.
* **RA 7192 (Women in Development and Nation Building Act of 1992)** provided that 5–30 per cent of official development assistance funds received from foreign governments and multilateral agencies and organisations should be set aside and used by the agencies concerned to support gender-responsive programs that complement the government GAD funds.

1. **Use of enabling laws and policies to advance gender-transformative program assistance**. With reference to AMPED’s social protection program for Indigenous Peoples (IPs) and marginalised groups (women, adolescent girls) in the BARMM, two important policies provide opportunities for UNICEF’s gender-transformative program assistance, such as addressing the issue of early age at marriage and reproductive health in Family Development Sessions (FDS) of 4Ps.

* Gender and Development (GAD) Code enacted in 2010 by the Regional Legislative Assembly increases access to health services (as part of social protection) for women and men, insurance coverage through PhilHealth, setting up of women’s and children’s protection desks to handle cases of violence, including trafficking, and stipulates 18 years as the minimum age for marriage. The GAD Code creates an avenue for advocacy to change the Code of Muslim Personal Laws, which permits Muslim males to marry at 15 and Muslim females to marry at the age of puberty.
* Reproductive Health Care Act enacted by the Regional Legislative Assembly in 2012. seeks to ensure that women and couples have access to FP and other reproductive health services, such as skilled birth attendants, emergency obstetric care, reproductive health supplies and medicine, and in crisis situations, access to maternal, newborn and child health (MNCH).

**B. For DFAT**

**Current round:**

* **Hold a Collaboration and Learning event for all partner gender specialists** and advisors to examine the extent of gender integration as a cross-cutting theme among the AMPED, present good practices from their internal gender policies and processes, and lessons learned that are gender-related. Even if partners have not been responsive to the DFAT expectations on gender integration, there have been gender gains at the activity level in IFC’s assistance to the microenterprise sector, UNICEF’s social protection assistance in FDS sessions on gender equality, and ADB’s pilot project of Graduation from Poverty. The collaboration and learning meeting can be set in the context of a next round or future assistance. As a good practice, these meetings should be conducted on an annual basis to build the knowledge based on the gender work of AMPED partners and could be the basis of more gender stories of significant change.

**Next Round (including good practices for gender mainstreaming)**

* **Clarity of gender expectations is key to gender outcomes**. For the next round, the first gender entry point is the inclusion of gender provisions in administration arrangements/agreements with MFIs, and in sub-grants/contracts under AMPED projects. Gender provision could include a clear statement, not an implied or embedded assumption or expectation, that the MFIs will apply their own gender policies, gender tools, strategies/approaches to mainstream gender in DFAT programs, projects, and activities.
* **Additionally, inclusion of standard GEDSI language, performance standards, and reporting of gender outcomes in the agreements are critical in ensure that gender is mainstreamed**. Performance standards could include the requirement to conduct a gender analysis[[37]](#footnote-38) prior to the design of a program/project; identify priority gender issues (at least one) and activities to address them; develop gender-related indicator to track progress; collection of sex-disaggregated data for all people-level indicators; develop a gender action plan with activities, indicators, targets, and budget; and annual reporting of gender outcomes.
* **Conduct a crosswalk analysis at the mid-term of the engagement**. Crosswalk analysis examines the gender provisions and how the gender analysis findings were integrated into the project designs, and cross walked at several levels -- (a) into solicitation of proposals, administrative arrangements; (b) how the gender analysis findings were reflected into the project gender action plans and their integration into annual workplan; (c) whether gender sensitive indicators with targets and budgets were adopted in M&E plans; and (d) how the gender results were reported in the partners’ annual reports.
* **DFAT needs to hold their MFI partners accountable in building the internal capacity of the partners’ technical team on mainstreaming gender and social inclusion**. Wearing the gender leans is not automatic; it is learned. In practice, gender mainstreaming begins with collection of sex- disaggregated data, conduct of gender analysis to identify gender issues and gaps, development of a gender action plan or strategy to address the identified challenges and gaps, and use of indicators to monitor results, and report on gender outcomes.
* **Within DFAT, consider adding gender integration as part of the technical team responsibilities and job descriptions,** including gender integration as one of the criteria for technical evaluation for project selection (e.g., onboarding of technical experts with GEWE skills), and assigning of points for gender in scoring proposals.
* **Consider the development of a DFAT GEDSI Toolkit, which could guide partner technical teams on gender mainstreaming.** The toolkit could contain how-to-notes; guidance on crosswalk analysis; gender action planning; gender analysis tools; gender checklists for project design, implementation, monitoring and evaluation and reporting; roles and responsibilities of gender focal points; and gender training modules.

**Annex 6: Risk management and safeguards**

Risks

**The original IDD of December 2018 identified the risk level as ‘medium’, despite the initial Risk and Safeguards Tool suggesting a ‘low’ risk rating.** The IDD identified three risks:


1. Conflicts may arise in the relationship between an MFI and the GPH agency it is supporting through AMPED if there are disagreements regarding the project outputs. Such conflict may lead the GPH agency to be dissatisfied with DFAT Post.
2. Advisory services provided through AMPED are discontinued by MFIs upon instruction by the GPH agency, resulting from either a change in overall GPH policy/strategy or changes in agency leadership/priorities.
3. Australia’s reputation may be damaged if it is negatively associated with projects funded by AMPED (e.g., unpopular economic reforms supported by MFI). To mitigate this potential risk, visibility and branding guidelines will be prepared by DFAT Post and agreed with MFIs. This may include upfront agreement between DFAT Post and the MFI on how to manage visibility and branding for each individual project under AMPED.

**As far as the MTR team can tell, none of these risks has materialised.** The GPH – even under the previous administration – expressed satisfaction with the activities funded by the program (although awareness that Australia has funded them is limited). The risks monitored during implementation related more to potential downstream environmental safeguards risks related to the Mindanao irrigation project, delays in government approvals, weak collaboration among partners, and risks to the strategic coherence of the program.

Safeguards

**The same can be said for safeguards.** The ‘Safeguards Screening Checklist,’ (Annex 5 in the IDD), is rather indeterminate, with many categories assessed as ‘unsure’ or ‘possible’. Given the fact that AMPED is funding literally dozens of investments, it is hard to see the value of screening at this level. Any new program should require safeguards to be assessed at activity level, with a clear requirement reflected in administration arrangements and contracts.

## **Annex 7: The AMPED Program Logic** (as per approved investment design in 2018)



The overall goal of Advancing Multilateral Partnerships for Economic Development in the Philippines (AMPED) is to contribute to the Philippines’ rapid, sustainable, and inclusive economic growth. At this strategic level, AMPED aligns with the PDP 2017-2022 ambitions for ‘inequality-reducing transformation’ and an ‘enabling and supportive economic environment’ and well as Sustainable Development Goals 1 (No Poverty), 8 (Decent Work and Economic Growth), 9 (Industry, Innovation and Infrastructure); and 10 (Reduced Inequalities).

Through AMPED, Australia works with selected MFIs that share its aspiration for ‘inclusive economic growth’ in the country. Originally three MFIs have been identified as partners: WB/IBRD, WB/IFC, and ADB[[38]](#footnote-39). AMPED has been designed not only to deliver on Australia’s objective inclusive economy but also contribute to specific development objectives in WBG and ADB’s respective country strategies

The investment will achieve two End-of-Program Outcomes (EOPOs) within its lifetime:

* **EOPO1**: Strengthened ability of the GPH to manage the economy for growth, with participation of the private sector

EOPO1 is the ‘development result’ that will contribute to the achievement of the development objectives for the Philippines and address the GPH’s need to sustain inclusive economic growth. Three intermediate outcomes are expected under EOPO1:

* **IO1.1** – Selected government agencies implement economic policy reform initiatives
* **IO1.2** – Economically important long-term investment projects implemented by GPH are managed to international standards
* **IO1.3** – Private sector firms respond to GPH policy reforms by bringing to market inclusive products and services
* **EOPO2**: A strong partnership between Australia, the Philippines, and MFIs

AMPED also has a ‘performance result’ which is the outcome due to the aid investment mechanism itself and its contribution to Australia and the MFIs’ relationship with the GPH. One intermediate outcome is expected under EOPO2:

* **IO2.1 – Australia and partner MFIs effectively utilise AMPED to respond to GPH requests for technical assistance in key economic reform areas.**

Indicative projects for potential AMPED implementation have also been identified by MFIs during the design preparation process and presented below according to the themes that these contribute to.

1. **Theme:** **Support GPH reform policies related to governance, business, trade, investment, the labor market and social protection**

|  |  |
| --- | --- |
| Activity/Partner | Projects |
| Inclusive Economic Growth Facility: WB | Technical advice on: economic reforms, customs reform, (particularly automation), competition reforms |
| Private Sector Development Program: IFC | Analytical and advisory services on better business regulations and doing business reform |
| Technical Assistance for Social Innovation: IFC | - |

1. **Theme: Support GPH development of selected long-term investments**

| Activity/Partner | Projects |
| --- | --- |
| Inclusive Economic Growth Facility: WB | Feasibility Study on Agus River Hydropower Complex |
| Private Sector Development Program: IFC | - |
| Technical Assistance for Social Innovation: IFC | - |

1. **Theme: Support the private sector to create inclusive products**

|  |  |
| --- | --- |
| Activity/Partner | Projects |
| Inclusive Economic Growth Facility: WB | Study on gender gap mapping for the Conditional Cash Transfer program |
| Private Sector Development Program: IFC | Capacity building activities for firms to increase access to financial services for the poor and vulnerable |
| Technical Assistance for Social Innovation: IFC | Technical Assistance for social protection and social innovation |

Selection of projects by DFAT will follow an iterative process of identification and prioritisation in consideration of the following:

* GPH directly requests DFAT for assistance on a specific project that aligns with an AMPED theme
* priority projects identified with GPH already in the MFI pipeline but no available MFI funding yet
* availability of MFI technical expertise for a particular project requested by GPH; and
* potential contribution of the project output to AMPED EOPOs and IOs.

In summary, the logic is that AMPED will support projects for GPH agencies and private sector initiatives proposed by MFIs. The MFIs will provide technical assistance, analytical and advisory services to government agencies to enable them to introduce, reform, and better implement, policies that stimulate economic activities and increase access to services of the economically vulnerable. In specific instances, MFIs can assist with the preparation of critical infrastructure projects if requested by GPH. If these GPH agencies successfully implement these projects with MFI support, they will improve their ability to manage the aspects of the economy they are responsible for. Private sector firms will be able to continue and/or expand their business activities. Important public infrastructure projects will be well designed and built using GPH and/or MFI funding. Better government economic policies, greater business activity, and increased investments in infrastructure are assumed to contribute to the expansion of the economy that is inclusive.

By supporting projects of MFIs that are of common interest, AMPED will help DFAT and each partner MFI achieve the development objectives identified in their respective country strategies. By providing funding through the MFIs, DFAT can respond to GPH requests and maintain an active relationship with key economic GPH agencies. By working closely with like-minded MFIs, DFAT can better advocate for policies and create more opportunities for policy dialogue with GPH. By helping MFIs and GPH achieve their development objectives, these AMPED counterparts will perceive Australian assistance positively and will desire to continue working in partnership with Australia. Being able to work in partnership with MFIs and GPH agencies to address economic-related issues is assumed to be a good indicator of Australia’ strong economic bilateral relationships (i.e. Australia-GPH and Australia-MFI)

## **Annex 8. Review of AMPED investment level MELF and implementing partners’ MEFs**

**Background**

The 2018 AMPED Investment Design Document (IDD) had an embedded assumption that the high level of congruence between the country strategy outcomes of AMPED partners meant that the MFI partners’ M&E systems could be used to monitor the performance of AMPED at the investment level. DFAT must also have assumed the expected results from MFI partners’ activities would link to AMPED Outcomes – and that progress reporting from each Trust Fund would therefore contribute to the AMPED MELF.

All MFIs have sophisticated and robust M&E systems. However, they have been used primarily to track performance at activity level, rather than their contribution to AMPED outcomes. DFAT could have been more explicit in articulating expectations for performance measurement and reporting, requiring alignment with the AMPED Program Logic and MEL Framework.

The review assesses the extent to which the MFIs’ M&E systems could provide information to track progress against AMPED outcomes through their own indicators for monitoring activity-level and outcome-level results.

**Monitoring Indicators**

The AMPED IDD provided indicators at three levels: EOPO (investment level), Intermediate Outcomes that contribute to the EOPOs, and Outputs (activity-level). The table below presents these indicators (total of 19), expected data sources. At the EOPO level, while none of the MFIs adopted the AMPED indicators, the qualitative reports they submitted to DFAT on activities and results provided some information relevant to them.

**Table 1. AMPED Outcome and Output Indicators under IDD**

| **EOPO** | **AMPED Indicators** | **Expected Data Source and status of MFI Reporting** |
| --- | --- | --- |
| **EOPO 1 Development Result:** Strengthen the ability of GPH to manage the economy, with participation of the private sector, for sustainable and inclusive economic growth | 1. Number of reform initiatives related to rapid, sustainable, and inclusive economic growth adopted/passed by GPH, which was supported by AMPED.  2. Economic policy changes assisted by AMPED reform initiatives.  3. Portfolio value of inclusive products and services as percent of total portfolio held by private sector firms, which were supported by AMPED. | 1 Expected data source was MFI M&E Systems. MFIs provided descriptive reporting of results from contributing activities, e.g. narrative on TA provided to agencies on economic reforms, were provided by WB AGaP and IFC.  2. Same as 1.  3. Expected data source was MFI M&E Systems. Indicator was not adopted, and no reporting provided. |
| **EOPO 2 Performance Result**: A stronger partnership between Australia, the Philippines, and MFIs | 1. Value of MFI investment as a proportion of total DFAT multilateral (i.e. MFI + non-MFI) investments, and compared to total Philippines bilateral investments  2. Level of engagement/interaction between DFAT, MFIs and GPH | 1. Expected data sources were DFAT Aidworks and IMRs and MFI completion reports. MFIs reported financial summary (committed and expended funds) and amounts leveraged by AMPED support from MFIs lending/grants (WB AGaP, ADB, IFC and UNICEF).  2. Expected data sources were engagement logs and DFAT Partner Performance Assessments. MFIs provided qualitative information on engagement with GPH, and summaries were reported in DFAT IMRs. |

| **Intermediate Outcomes** | **Indicators** | **Expected Data Source/Status of Reporting** |
| --- | --- | --- |
| **Intermediate Development Outcome 101.1.** Selected government agencies implement economic policy reform initiatives | 1. Number of GPH entities with economic, fiscal management or social protection mandates, implementing reform policies supported by AMPED. | 1. Expected data source was MFI M&E Systems. MFIs reported on the number of TA provided to agencies on economic/business reforms (WB AGaP, IFC, UNICEF) but there were limitations. AGaP reports lacked detail on outcomes and implementation issues/risks; IFC needed to align better with AMPED EOPOs and improve M&E; and ADB needed to improve reporting on cross-cutting themes. |
| **Intermediate Development Outcome 101.2** Economically important long-term investment projects implemented by GPH are managed to international standards. | 1. Number of AMPED-supported GPH long-term investment projects, which use international-standard project, budget and/or procurement systems.  2. Value of AMPED-supported GPH long-term investment projects, which use international-standards for project, budget and/or procurement systems. | 1. Expected data sources were MFI M&E Systems. MFIs only provided completed feasibility studies of infrastructure projects but no reporting against AMPED outcomes.  2. Expected data source was MFI M&E Systems. MFIs did not report on total value of projects. |
| **Intermediate Development Outcome 101.3** Targeted Private sector firms bring to market inclusive products and services. | 1. Number of supported private sectors firms which developed inclusive products and services. | 1. Expected data source was MFI M&E Systems.  IFC reported on the private firms it assisted, e.g. Bangko Savings Bank, Esquire Financing Inc., CARD Inc., CRD MRI Insurance |
| **Intermediate Investment Performance Outcome 102.1.** Australia and partner MFIs effectively utilise AMPED to respond to GPH requests for technical assistance in key economic reform areas | 1. Number of technical assistance requests by GPH, which are granted funding through AMPED.  2. Yearly value of technical assistance requests by GPH, which are granted funding through AMPED as percent of AMPED total committed amount  3. Number of Satisfactory Ratings in MFIs’ Partner Performance Assessments (PPA) | 1. Expected data source was MFI M&E systems. Data provided was primarily from WB AGaP. Narrative reports provided by IFC and UNICEF  2. Expected data source was MFI M&E systems. MFIs provided no reporting against this indicator.  3. Data source was DFAT PPA Ratings for WB AGaP in 2020, 2021, and 2022; and for APHC in 2021. |

| **Outputs** | **Indicators** | **Expected Data Source/Status of Reporting** |
| --- | --- | --- |
| **Development Output: Theme 1:** Support GPH reform policies related to governance, business, trade, investment, the labour market, and social protection. | 1. Value of technical assistance contracts-days disbursed by AMPED to beneficiary GPH entities.  2. Number of technical assistance and/or advisory projects on economic reform provided to GPH agencies | 1. Expected data source was MFI M&E Systems. Nothing was reported.  2. Expected data source was MFI M&E Systems. Some data was reported by WB AGaP and IFC. |
| **Development Output: Theme 2:** Support GPH in the development of selected long-term investments (e.g. infrastructure). | 1. Value of technical assistance contract-days disbursed by AMPED to supporting long-term infrastructure projects.  2. Number of technical assistance and/or advisory projects on infrastructure development provided to GPH agencies | 1. Expected data source was MFI M&E Systems. Nothing was reported.  2. Expected data source was MFI M&E Systems. Data was reported by WB (APHC) and ADB (MIDP) |
| **Development Output Theme 3:** Support the private sector to create inclusive products and services as well as for human capital development | 1. Value of technical assistance contract-days allocated by AMPED to supporting private sector firms in developing inclusive products and services.  2). Number of technical assistance and/or advisory projects provided to private sector partners. | 1. Expected data source was MFI M&E Systems. Nothing was reported.  2. Expected data source was MFI M&E Systems. Data was reported by IFC on private sector partners assisted, e.g. Bangko Savings Bank, Esquire Financing Inc., CARD Inc., CRD MRI Insurance. |
| **Investment Performance Output:** AMPED governance mechanisms in place that allow for efficient and effective collaboration between AMPED partners in the management and execution of the investment | 1. Number of planned Steering Committee Meetings versus actual | 1. Expected data source was DFAT Post and MFI M&E Systems. DFAT AQCs and IMRs provided descriptive reporting. |

**Analysis of AMPED Indicators and updated MELF**

In April 2021, DFAT engaged M&E firm, Clear Horizon, to review and propose revisions to the AMPED MELF described above. Its report concluded that the AMPED MELF was characterised by “many performance indicators (without baselines or targets) for AMPED’s expected outputs, intermediate and end of program outcomes (EOPOs), largely for collection through AMPED partner “sophisticated and robust” M&E systems. It noted that the MELF was supported by several evaluation questions for exploration during the AMPED mid-term review (MTR), with a proposed Partnership Engagement Index to measure progress against EOPO 2, routine DFAT access to AMPED Partner’s Activity/Project level M&E data; DFAT participation in AMPED partner supervision/review missions; DFAT-contracted STA inputs to conduct six-monthly AMPED overall M&E reporting and assessments based on performance information provided by each [AMPED partner] and review the MEL Framework.

It went on to note that most of these proposed MEL arrangements were not implemented, for a range of reasons: “the MELF was not actively socialised by DFAT to AMPED partners during program inception, due to conflicting priorities. Consequently, there was varying levels of awareness of the AMPED MELF among these partners. There was a perception by some partners that the AMPED performance indicators are not fit for purpose – reflecting the difficulty of identifying meaningful performance indicators for such a diverse and responsive facility. DFAT staff also reported a perception that the MELF was too quantitative in orientation; and DFAT did not contract STA MEL advisory support as envisaged by the design.”

In light of these findings, the MEL Team (Clear Horizon) proposed an updated MELF in which reporting would focus on four guiding questions on relevance, results and effectiveness, efficiency and GEDSI (see below in Table 2). Rather than identifying indicators, the updated MELF identified 15 sets of information to be collected, guidance on how it would be collected and who will be responsible for data collection. Under the proposed updated MELF, reporting is mainly qualitative and descriptive, with most information collected from minutes of partners’ meetings, self-appraisal, partner reporting and supervision reports, partnership surveys, and DFAT counterpart interviews. The MTR Team notes that the 15 sets of information were voluminous as the system, requiring collection of both general (relevant changes in the economy) and specific information (% of activities on track or meeting agreed standards). To support implementation of the updated MELF, the Clear Horizon team recommended engagement of a MEL Support Hub, with 40-50 technical assistance days per year. Due to COVID restrictions and resource constraints, DFAT did not implement any of these recommendations.

**Table 2. Updated MELF**

| **Monitoring Framework Criteria, Questions** | **Information to be collected** | **How information will be collected** | **Who is responsible** |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |
| **Relevance**  How well is AMPED adapting to changes in the political-economy and development context? | * Relevant changes in political-economy context * Examples of AMPED partners adapting to these changes | * Informal partners meetings (minutes) * DFAT counterpart interviews | DFAT |
| **Results and Effectiveness**  How effective has progress been under AMPED’s three development result areas? | * % Activities meeting agreed design standards (by dev result area) * % Activities on track against their expected results (by dev result area) | * Document self-appraisal * QA of self-appraisals (sample) | AMPED Partners  MEL Adviser |
| **Results and Effectiveness**  How effective has progress been under AMPED’s three development result areas? | * Key achievements and challenges (by dev result area) * Summary of outputs produced, outcomes achieved, and any unintended results | * Partner reporting,   Partner supervision reports   * DFAT counterpart interviews | AMPED Partners  DFAT |
| **Results and Effectiveness**  How effective has progress been under AMPED’s three development result areas? | * SPC case studies aligned to CRP PAF Key Results | * Stories of Significant Change | MEL Adviser |
| **Results and Effectiveness**  To what extent is AMPED demonstrating stronger partnerships? | * % AMPED partnerships meeting agreed standards | * Partnership survey | MEL Adviser |
| **Results and Effectiveness**  To what extent is AMPED demonstrating stronger partnerships? | * Summary of partnerships established * Key partnership achievements and challenges | * Partner reporting,   Partner supervision reports   * DFAT counterpart interviews | AMPED Partners  DFAT |
| **Efficiency**  How efficiently is AMPED being delivered? | * Extent of and reasons for deviations in expenditure and activity implementation compared to plans * Suitability of staffing, skills, and experience levels * Extent of harmonisation with other development partners and alignment with GPH priorities | * Partner reporting, Partner supervision reports * DFAT counterpart interviews * DFAT counterpart interviews | AMPED Partners  DFAT  DFAT |
| **GEDSI**  How well is GEDSI being mainstreamed within AMPED Activities? | * % Activities meeting agreed GEDSI standards * Key GEDSI achievements and challenges | * Document self-appraisal, QA of self-appraisals (sample) * Partner reporting, Partner supervision reports |  |

**AMPED partners’ monitoring and evaluation systems: Indicators and Intermediate Outcomes Supported**

There is clear evidence that MFIs used their own systems, templates, and reporting formats, each with their own program indicators. For example, ADB provided DFAT with its own annual reports using its own templates, which only partially meet AMPED data requirements as defined in the IDD and the updated MELF.

Below is a picture of the monitoring indicators used by MFIs for reporting to DFAT on AMPED-supported activities, and the intermediate outcomes that are supported by the partners’ adopted indicators. A composite picture of MFI accomplishments that contribute to the EOPOs and intermediate outcomes in the AMPED MELF in its original design could potentially emerge from culling the outcome and output data from progress and completion reports. The data could also be analyzed to respond to the guide questions in the updated MELF. At the Activity level, specific indicators were designed as fit-for-purpose for the Activity outputs.

**1. WB AGaP.** Objective: To facilitate knowledge exchange and assist the Government of the Philippines in the design and implementation of policy reforms and programs. AGaP’s results chain and end-of-program outcomes are structured into four areas (processes), each with their own set of indicators, from which composite data for reporting on economic policy reforms are collected.

| **Activity** | **Indicators** | **Intermediate Outcomes Supported** |
| --- | --- | --- |
| **1). Project development and preparation**:  1.1. Projects to support GPH policy reform priorities enhanced.  1.2. Support activities to project preparation conducted. | Outcome/KPI Indicator:   * Increased relevance and timeliness of projects developed.   Output Indicators:  Number of projects that have been pilot-tested.   * Number of project feasibility studies completed. * Number of situational studies / analyses conducted. * Number of safeguards instruments completed. * Number of project-related consultations undertaken. | IO 101.2 |
| **2). Policy Reform and Dialogue**  2.1. GPH capacities on evidence-based and inclusive policy development and formulation improved.  2.2. Government capacity development projects and technical assistance on relevant policies and programs implemented. | Outcome/KPI Indicator:  • Increased utilization of research results and empirical data by relevant government agencies in policy development.  Output Indicators:  • Number of advisory services and analytics reports completed.  • Number of reports on options / trade-offs for government programs/policy reforms completed  • Number of “How to Notes” for Implementation supported.  • Number of inputs to IRRs of Government Policies / Legislations provided.  • Number of training programs conducted.  • Number of knowledge exchange with other countries undertaken.  • Number of workshops among government agencies conducted.  Number of government personnel that have participated in Trust Fund- supported training and learning activities. | IO 101.1  IO 102.1 |
| **3. Public debate and awareness**  3.1. Awareness of identified stakeholders to relevant GPH policies and programs increased.  3.2. Public debate informed by empirical evidence and analysis enhanced.  3.3. Public information, education and awareness projects on relevant policies and programs conducted. | Outcome/KPI Indicator:  • Increased proportion of identified stakeholders that have become aware or have gained knowledge on relevant government policies and programs per thematic area.  Outcome Indicator:   * Increased number of references made on studies / analysis supported by the Trust Fund during public debates per thematic area.   Output Indicators:  • Number of dissemination workshops, forum and stakeholder consultations conducted.  • Number of participants that benefitted from dissemination workshops and stakeholder consultations.  • Number of information, education, and communication materials. | IO 101.1 |
| **4. Partnerships and implementation platforms**  4.1. Partnerships and platforms for effective and efficient collaboration strengthened.  4.2. Partnerships and governance platforms for collaboration established. | Outcome/KPI Indicator:  • Increased satisfaction on the collaboration platform established.  Output Indicators:  • Presence of functional implementation structure and procedures.  • Number of collaborative activities conducted. | EOPO 2 (level of engagement) |

**2. WB Angus-Pulangi Hydropower Complex Rehabilitation Multi-Donor Trust Fund.** Objective: To develop the analytical foundation and support project identification and preparation activities for rehabilitation of APHC.

| **Activity** | **Indicators** | **Intermediate Outcomes Supported** |
| --- | --- | --- |
| 2.1. Multiple Options Study on Rehabilitation of the Agus-Pulangi Hydropower Complex | Multiple Options Study (MOS) to enable Bank’s policy dialogue on APHC with GPH. | IO 101.2 |
| 2.2. Preparation Project for Agus-Pulangi Hydropower Complex for Rehabilitation | Preparation of Feasibility Study (FS) and project tender (tender design, technical specifications, and bidding documents). | IO 101.2 |

**3. ADB Mindanao Irrigation Investment Project (MIDP).** Target outcome: Improved productivity and climate resilience of irrigated agriculture.

| **Activity** | **Indicators** | **Intermediate Outcomes Supported** |
| --- | --- | --- |
| Output 1: Strengthened capacities of National Irrigation Administration and relevant agencies to plan, design, and manage irrigation systems more sustainably. | Output 1: Assess technical, financial, economic, social, environmental viability of the project and prepare climate risk assessment, gender assessment, and procurement risk assessment; (  Output 2: Prepare the project design, scope, costs and implementing arrangements, and prepare project documents according to ADB and government requirements; and  Output 3: Assess sector, stakeholders, and institutional capacity and conduct capacity building trainings/workshops and consultations. | IO 101.2 |
| Output 2: Development of efficient and climate-resilient irrigation systems. | 1. Modernized at least five national or communal irrigation systems and developed five small-scale irrigation systems in Mindanao.  2. Established O&M schemes and asset management systems. | - |
| Output 3. Adoption of climate resilient irrigated farming practices. | 1. On-farm water supply by water-saving techniques and effective use of groundwater where appropriate.  2. Farming techniques such as adoption of  climate-adaptive seed varieties and sustainable soil management.  3. Market support for rice and diversified HVCs including provision of post-harvest and marketing facilities.  4. Trainings and advisory services to extension officers, irrigators’ associations, cooperatives, and farmers including women. | IO 101.2 |

**4.** **ADB Padayon Sustainable Livelihood Program (SLP)**. Objective: Pilot-test the use of the Graduation Approach in implementing the SLP in selected municipalities of the targeted regions, which has four Graduation pillars:

| **Activity** | **Indicators** | **Intermediate Outcomes Supported** |
| --- | --- | --- |
| 1) Social Protection to support  2) Livelihoods Promotion  3) Financial Inclusion  4) Social Empowerment | Targeted 3,000 households who are current 4Ps beneficiaries on level 3 of DSWD’s Social Welfare and Development Indicators (SWDI)\* and have not previously received livelihood assistance from SLP who were provided with:  1. Basic income security and support for immediate needs, such as consumption support and access to health and education.  2. Cash grant to start or grow existing livelihoods along with technical skills training to manage the livelihood.  3. Access to formal financial services, accompanied with financial literacy training.  4. Regular check-ins, coaching, and mentorship by frontline staff and life skills training that builds knowledge on important social and health topics.  \* The SWDI is DSWD's tool to monitor progress in poverty alleviation by using data in assessing the level of well-being of Filipino households using data on income, health, and education. Based on their SWDI score, households are classified as either level 1 (survival), level 2 (self-subsistent), or level 3 (self-sufficient). | Social protection |

**5.** **UNICEF Improving Equity, Child Focus and Shock-Responsiveness of Philippines Social Protection Project.** Objective: Enhance operational systems for implementation of government social protection programs, lay foundations for shock-responsive social protection in the Bangsamoro, and influence social protection policies.

| **Activity** | **Indicators** | **Intermediate Outcomes Supported** |
| --- | --- | --- |
| Programme Outcome:  The most disadvantaged children, families and communities in remote rural areas and impoverished urban pockets have access to inclusive systems that protect them from poverty and enhance their ability  to appropriately respond to emergencies and climate change risks. | 1. Number of families moving up to the next SWDI (Social Welfare Development Indicator) level from 2019 status. | Social Protection |
| Programme Outputs:  Output 1: Improved capacity of DSWD to deliver an equitable and inclusive national social protection programme. | 1. Existence of an integrated digital case management system and case referral pathways (CRP) for child protection of 4Ps beneficiaries.  2. Number of Social Workers successfully completing and passing the training course on case management cum child protection.  3. Existence of an updated 4P’s policy on Homeless Street Families (HSF).  4. Number of 4Ps IP focals who successfully pass the post-training evaluation on the culture and IP sensitivity module. | Social Protection |
| Output 2: Improved capacity of DSWD to deliver a social protection programme for children with disabilities. | 1. Existence of a disability-sensitive social protection programme for children with disabilities. | Social Protection |
| Output 3: Improved processes and systems of the MSSD- financial assistance programmes in BARMM. | 1. Availability of an Operations Manual and Financial Guidelines on the MSSD Cash Assistance Programs. | Social Protection |
| Output 4. Improved capacity of BARMM to assess and plan for the needs of the social service workforce. | 1. Existence of training needs and competency gaps analysis for the social service workforce in BARMM.  2. Availability of a BARMM-endorsed 10-year costed plan to strengthen to social services ready for implementation. | Social Protection |
| Output 5: New policies on social protection are adopted by NEDA. | 1. Presence of a Social Protection Index  2. Public expenditure review/benefit incidence analysis of social protection available (national methodology adopted) | Social Protection |
| Output 6. Improved public knowledge about 4P’s for Indigenous peoples (IPs), homeless street families (HSF)and children with disabilities (CWDs). | 1. Percent of participants during dissemination workshops, public fora who can identify key messages on new SP programmes.  2. Number of knowledge products produced. | Social Protection |
| Output 7: COVID Response  Improved knowledge of national government on social protection responses for COVID. | 1. Existence of data and evidence on the child poverty impact/economic fallout due to COVID and social protection responses. | Social Protection |

**3. IFC Private Sector Development Program (PSDP)**. Objective: Support private sector growth and address challenges that hinder greater private sector economic participation. PSDP contributed to AMPED’s aims through the pursuit of three core themes of private sector development.

| **Activity** | **Indicators** | **Intermediate Outcomes Supported** |
| --- | --- | --- |
| 1**. Business Reforms**: Analytical and advisory services on better business regulations and doing business reform.  2. **Access to Finance**: Capacity building for firms to increase access to financial services for the poor and vulnerable.  3. **Inclusive Products and Services**: Support to the private sector to create inclusive products and services, including but not limited to the areas of disaster resilience and gender. | Outcome/KPI Indicator: Descriptive/qualitative outcomes on ease in doing business and economy-wide reforms.  Output Indicators (High-level development results):  1. EAP Risk Management (Bangko Savings Bank)  1.1. Number of new financial products  1.2. Number of microloans  1.3. Value of micro loans disbursed  1.4. Number of micro loans disbursed to women  1.5. Value of micro loans disbursed to women  2. Typhoon Index Insurance  2.1. Number of insurance policies outstanding (individual)  2.2. Value of insurance contracts issued (US$)  2.3. Number of new financial products launched  3. PGH Cancer Center PPP  3.1. Number of financing facilitated  3.2. Number of females with new or improved access to services  3.3. Number of people receiving access to healthcare  4. Building Resilience Index (BRI)  4.1. Number of entities making decisions informed by BRI App  4.2. Number of square meters registered in the BRI App  4.3. Number of participants in workshops, training events, seminars, conferences, etc.  4.4. Number of women participants in workshops, training  events, seminars, conferences, etc.  4.5. Number of training modules, new products, and toolkits developed. | IO 101.3 |

**Recommendations**

As DFAT moves into the completion phase of AMPED, and considering that neither the MEL from the IDD nor the updated MELF proposed by Clear Horizon was implemented, the IMR team makes six recommendations that could strengthen the monitoring of AMPED Intermediate Outcomes:

**1.** Adoption of the common indicators being used by the WB and IFC on economic and business reforms, e.g., ease of doing business and economy-wide reforms. This could provide a good database to tell the AMPED story. For example, as gathered from AGaP progress and completion reports 2019-2021, around 30 national/local government agencies have been provided with TA services that resulted in significant economic reforms.

**2.** Adoption of collaboration/engagement indicators that could be reported by all MFIs as they engage with GPH entities. The WB and IFC are closely engaged with the economic and business sectors. The ADB and UNICEF work collaboratively with GPH agencies involved in social protection.

**3.** The MRT Team has conducted an appreciative enquiry of AMPED accomplishments across the MFIs’ activities. The results of this exercise and the final MTR report provide a good basis for reporting on AMPED achievements.

**4.** If the UNICEF and ADB partnerships on social protection are brought into the SPRING program, it could draw on relevant indicators established by those partners at the outcome and activity levels, against which data is already being collected.

**5.** DFAT should seek to address important issues identified through this review and the AGaP MTR before AMPED closes. These include the lack of detail on outcomes and implementation issues in AGaP reports; the need for better alignment of IFC programs with AMPED EOPOs, and improved M&E; and improved reporting by ADB on cross-cutting themes.

**6.** Across the three MFIs, there is a need to develop indicators on gender equality and social inclusion, as current indicators need to be expanded beyond the numbers reported, e.g., women trained, number of women entrepreneurs assisted, with greater focus on impacts on women’s empowerment and gender-transformative approaches.

1. DFAT, AMPED Investment Design Document, p. 12. [↑](#footnote-ref-2)
2. World Bank, Overcoming Poverty and Inequality in the Philippines: Past, Present, and Prospects for the Future, 2022. <https://documents1.worldbank.org/curated/en/099325011232224571/pdf/P17486101e29310810abaf0e8e336aed85a.pdf> [↑](#footnote-ref-3)
3. Australia-World Bank Growth and Prosperity in the Philippines (AGaP) Trust Fund Independent Midterm Review [↑](#footnote-ref-4)
4. DFAT, Minute on Approval of Investment Design Document: Advancing Multilateral Partnerships for Economic Development, 13 December 2018 [↑](#footnote-ref-5)
5. DFAT Aid Quality Check for Gender Equality, AMPED (27/05/2020) [↑](#footnote-ref-6)
6. DFAT, AMPED Investment Design Document, 2018, p. ii. [↑](#footnote-ref-7)
7. National Economic Development Authority (NEDA), Philippine Development Plan 2023-2028, 2022, p. 6. [↑](#footnote-ref-8)
8. World Bank, Building a Resilient Recovery: Philippines Economic Update, December 2020. <https://openknowledge.worldbank.org/server/api/core/bitstreams/32c4198c-5961-5dc1-a296-e94ba2a3c3c8/content> [↑](#footnote-ref-9)
9. Fallesen, D., How COVID-19 impacted vulnerable communities in the Philippines, World Bank, November 2021. <https://blogs.worldbank.org/eastasiapacific/how-covid-19-impacted-vulnerable-communities-philippines#:~:text=Economic%20impact%20on%20communities,and%20its%20severe%20economic%20impact>. [↑](#footnote-ref-10)
10. Shinozaki S and Rao, N., COVID-19 Impact on Micro Small and Medium-sized Enterprises Under the Lockdown: Evidence from a Rapid Survey in the Philippines. Asian Development Bank Institute, February 2021. <https://www.adb.org/sites/default/files/publication/677321/adbi-wp1216.pdf> [↑](#footnote-ref-11)
11. Since this review was undertaken the position of the Economic Counsellor has been reinstated [↑](#footnote-ref-12)
12. World Bank, Overcoming Poverty and Inequality in the Philippines: Past, Present, and Prospects for the Future, 2022. <https://documents1.worldbank.org/curated/en/099325011232224571/pdf/P17486101e29310810abaf0e8e336aed85a.pdf>, p. 52. [↑](#footnote-ref-13)
13. Asian Development Outlook, April 2023 [↑](#footnote-ref-14)
14. Australian DFAT, *Australia’s International Development Policy for a Peaceful, Stable and Prosperous Indo-Pacific*.<https://www.dfat.gov.au/sites/default/files/international-development-policy.pdf>. p. 38 [↑](#footnote-ref-15)
15. DFAT uses the Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development’s Development Assistance Committee gender policy markers, which requires DFAT program managers to note, when an activity begins, whether an investment has a ‘principal’ or ‘significant’ gender equality objective. AidWorks, DFAT’s online aid management system, provides guidance on how to identify in which category of spending an activity falls [↑](#footnote-ref-16)
16. Diane Elson and Anuradha Seth, Gender Equality, and Inclusive Growth: Economic Policies to Achieve Sustainable Development. UN Women, 2019 [↑](#footnote-ref-17)
17. ## World Bank Group Gender Strategy (FY16-23): Gender Equality, Poverty Reduction, and Inclusive Growth. 201

    [↑](#footnote-ref-18)
18. Elson, B and Enerva, M., Australia-World Bank Growth and Prosperity in the Philippines (AGaP) Trust Fund Independent Midterm Review, December 2022, p.30 [↑](#footnote-ref-19)
19. Strategy 2030: Achieving a Prosperous, Inclusive, Resilient, and Sustainable Asia and the Pacific [↑](#footnote-ref-20)
20. Australian DFAT, *Australia’s International Development Policy for a Peaceful, Stable and Prosperous Indo-Pacific*.<https://www.dfat.gov.au/sites/default/files/international-development-policy.pdf>. pp.14, 38 [↑](#footnote-ref-21)
21. See draft UNICEF Country Development Plan to be presented to the Executive Board in February 2024. [2024-PL2-Philippines-draft-CPD-EN-2023-11-14.pdf (unicef.org)](https://www.unicef.org/executiveboard/media/19076/file/2024-PL2-Philippines-draft-CPD-EN-2023-11-14.pdf) [↑](#footnote-ref-22)
22. The World Bank has advised DFAT that GPH has decided to finance the APHC through a public-private partnership rather than with WB financing [↑](#footnote-ref-23)
23. IFC staff member [↑](#footnote-ref-24)
24. Elson and Enerva, op. cit., pp.22, 25 [↑](#footnote-ref-25)
25. As of May 2023, DFAT await the July – December 2022 six monthly report [↑](#footnote-ref-26)
26. Many of which have been trailed beforehand with DFAT [↑](#footnote-ref-27)
27. DFAT. Design Monitoring and Evaluation Standards, December 2022 [↑](#footnote-ref-28)
28. This the MTR team inferred: it is certainly not the Bank’s formal position on this. [↑](#footnote-ref-29)
29. Australia-World Bank Growth and Prosperity in the Philippines (AGaP) Trust Fund Independent Midterm Review [↑](#footnote-ref-30)
30. For DFAT aid management terminology, please refer to [DFAT’s Programming Guide glossary](https://www.dfat.gov.au/sites/default/files/aid-programming-guide-glossary.pdf) [↑](#footnote-ref-31)
31. For example, a potential meeting to be included in the evaluation plan, recommended by the AMPED design is a meeting to be convened by DFAT, that brings AMPED partners together to discuss achievements and challenges (a requirement in the AMPED design). A possible output for this as part of the review process, could be a write up of the results, to be utilised to inform the evaluation’s assessments, and to be included in the aide memoire and final report. [↑](#footnote-ref-32)
32. DFAT defines value for money as the economic, efficient, effective, and ethical use of funds. <https://www.dfat.gov.au/aid/who-we-work-with/value-for-money-principles/Pages/value-for-money-principles>. [↑](#footnote-ref-33)
33. Australia-World Bank Growth and Prosperity in the Philippines (AGaP) Trust Fund Independent Midterm Review [↑](#footnote-ref-34)
34. Diane Elson and Anuradha Seth, Gender Equality, and Inclusive Growth: Economic Policies to Achieve Sustainable Development. UN Women, 2019 [↑](#footnote-ref-35)
35. Elson, B and Enerva, M., Australia-World Bank Growth and Prosperity in the Philippines (AgaP) Trust Fund Independent Midterm Review, December 2022, p.30. [↑](#footnote-ref-36)
36. Gender mainstreaming is the process of assessing the implications for women and men of any planned action, including legislation, policies, or programs in all areas and at all levels so that women and men benefit equally, and inequality is not perpetuated. [↑](#footnote-ref-37)
37. Gender analysis is the process of identifying the gaps, issues and differences in the status, roles and responsibilities of women and men, as well as their access to and control of resources, benefits, and opportunities, at the household, communities, and societal levels. [↑](#footnote-ref-38)
38. During the implementation phase, UNICEF was added into the mix [↑](#footnote-ref-39)