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| FINAL REPORT |
| Annual Partnership Performance Report 2015 |
| Draft Report |
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****Australian Aid—managed by the Palladium Group on behalf of the Australian Government

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ABBREVIATIONS AND ACRONYMS

|  | **English** | **Indonesian** |
| --- | --- | --- |
| ACDP | Analytical and Capacity Development Partnership | Kemitraan untuk Pengembangan Kapasitas dan Analisis |
| ADB | Asian Development Bank | Bank Pembangunan Asia |
| AIBEP | Australia Indonesia Basic Education Program | Program Pendidikan Dasar Australia Indonesia |
| AIEP | Australia Indonesia Education Partnership | Kemitraan Pendidikan Australia Indonesia |
| APBN | National Budget | Anggaran Pendapatan dan Belanja Negara |
| APBN-P | National Budget Amendment | Anggaran Pendapatan dan Belanja Negara – Perubahan |
| APPR | Annual Partnership Performance Report | Laporan Tahunan Kinerja Kemitraan |
| AQC | Aid Quality Checks | Evaluasi Kualitas Bantuan |
| ATOG | ACDP Technical Oversight Group | Kelompok Pengawasan Teknis ACDP |
| AUD | Australian Dollar | Dolar Australia |
| Balitbang | National Office for Research and Development | Badan Penelitian dan Pengembangan |
| BAN-S/M | National Accreditation Board – School/Madrasah | Badan Akreditasi Nasional-Sekolah/Madrasah |
| BAP | Provincial Accreditation Board | Badan Akreditasi Propinsi |
| Bappenas | Ministry of National Development Planning | Badan Perencanaan Pembangunan Nasional |
| BOS | School Operational Grants | Bantuan Operasional Sekolah |
| C1 | Component 1 of the Education Partnership | Komponen 1 Kemitraan Pendidikan |
| C2 | Component 2 of the Education Partnership | Komponen 2 Kemitraan Pendidikan |
| C3 | Component 3 of the Education Partnership | Komponen 3 Kemitraan Pendidikan |
| C4 | Component 4 of the Education Partnership | Komponen 4 Kemitraan Pendidikan |
| CAT | Core Advisory Team | Tim Penasehat Inti |
| CHS | Complaints Handling System | Sistem Penanganan Pengaduan |
| CMC | Construction Management Consultant | Konsultan Manajemen Pembangunan Sekolah |
| CPD | Continuous Professional Development | Pengembangan Keprofesian Berkelanjutan Kepala Sekolah / Madrasah |
| CSO | Civil Society Organization | Organisasi Masyarakat Sipil |
| DAC | Development Assistance Committee | Komite Bantuan Pembangunan |
| DAPODIK | Education Management Information System (MoEC) | Data Pokok Pendidikan (Sistem Informasi Manajemen Pendidikan dikembangkan Kemdikbud) |
| DDI | Council for the Promotion of Islamic Teaching | Dewan Da’wah Islamiyah |
| DEO | District Education Official | Pejabat Dinas Pendidikan Tingkat Kabupaten |
| DFAT | Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade | Departemen Luar Negeri dan Perdagangan Australia |
| DG | Directorate General | Direktorat Jendral |
| DIPA | Budget Implementation Line Items | Daftar Isian Pelaksanaan Anggaran |
| EE | Eligible Entities | Satuan Kerja |
| EMIS | Education Management Information System (MoRA) | Sistem Informasi Manajemen Pendidikan (dikembangkan Kemenag) |
| EOCO | End-of-Component-Outcome | Tujuan Akhir Komponen |
| EOPO | End-of-Partnership-Outcome | Tujuan Akhir Kemitraan/Program |
| EP | Education Partnership | Kemitraan Pendidikan |
| EPOS | Education Partnership Outreach Service | Pelayanan Humas Kemitraan Pendidikan |
| ESR | Education Sector Review | Tinjauan Sektor Pendidikan |
| ESSP | Education Sector Support Program | Program Dukungan untuk Sektor Pendidikan |
| EU | European Union | Uni Eropa |
| FGD | Focus Group Discussion | Diskusi Kelompok Terfokus |
| FM | Field Monitor | Petugas Pemantau Lapangan |
| GA | Grant Agreement | Kesepakatan Hibah |
| GER | Gross Enrolment Rate | Angka Partisipasi Kasar (APK) |
| GoA | Government of Australia | Pemerintah Australia |
| GOG | Governance Oversight Group | Kelompok Pengawasan Tata Kelola Program |
| GoI | Government of Indonesia | Pemerintah RI |
| G20 | Group of Twenty | Negara-negara Anggota G20 |
| HRMD | Human Resources Management and Development (ProDEP Component) | Manajemen dan Pengembangan Sumber Daya Manusia (Komponen ProDEP) |
| ICT | Information and Communication Technology | Teknologi Informasi dan Komunikasi |
| IDC | Indefinite Delivery Contracts | Kontrak Pelaksanaan Jangka Tidak Tentu |
| IDR | Indonesian Rupiah | Rupiah Indonesia |
| IP | Implementing Partner | Mitra Pelaksana |
| ITOG | Infrastructure Technical Oversight Group | Kelompok Pengawasan Teknis Infrastruktur |
| JRF | Joint Result Framework | Kerangka Hasil Bersama |
| JSE | Junior Secondary Education | Pendidikan Sekolah Menengah Pertama |
| JSS | Junior Secondary School | Sekolah Menengah Pertama |
| K2P | Knowledge-to-Policy | Dasar Pengetahuan untuk Kebijakan |
| Kandep | District Office of MoRA | Kantor Departmen Agama |
| Kanwil | Provincial Office of MoRA | Kantor Wilayah Departmen Agama |
| KKG | Teacher Working Group | Kelompok Kerja Guru |
| KKM | Madrasah Working Group | Kelompok Kerja Madrasah |
| Kopi Darat | Education Roundtable Discussion | Kongkow Pendidikan: Diskusi Ahli dan Tukar Pendapat |
| KPI | Key Performance Indicator | Indikator Kinerja Utama |
| KPS | School Construction Consultants | Konsultan Pembangunan Sekolah |
| KSI | Knowledge Sector Initiative (DFAT Program) | Inisiatif Pengetahuan Sektor (Program DFAT) |
| LPPKS | Principal Development and Empowerment Agency | Lembaga Pengembangan dan Pemberdayaan Kepala Sekolah |
| MA/MAK | Islamic Senior Secondary School/Islamic Senior Secondary Vocational School | Madrasah Aliyah/Madrasah Aliyah Kejuruan |
| MAMPU | Empowering Indonesian Women for Poverty Reduction Project (DFAT Program) | Proyek Maju Perempuan Indonesia untuk Penanggulangan Kemiskinan (Program DFAT) |
| MBM | Madrasah-Based Management | Manajemen Berbasis Madrasah |
| MC | Managing Contractor | Kontraktor Pengelola |
| M&E | Monitoring and Evaluation | Monitoring dan Evaluasi |
| M&G | Management and Governance | Manajemen dan Tata Kelola Pemerintahan |
| MDAs | Ministries, Departments and Agencies | Kementrian, Departemen, dan Lembaga |
| MDC | Madrasah Development Center | Pusat Pengembangan Madrasah |
| MGMP | School Subject Teacher Forum at Cluster Level | Musyawarah Guru Mata Pelajaran |
| MI | Islamic Elementary School | Madrasah Ibtidaiyah |
| MoEC | Ministry of Education and Culture | Kementerian Pendidikan dan Kebudayaan |
| MoF | Ministry of Finance | Kementerian Keuangan |
| MoHA | Ministry of Home Affairs | Kementerian Dalam Negeri |
| MoRA | Ministry of Religious Affairs | Kementerian Agama |
| MSS | Minimum Service Standard | Standar Pelayanan Minimum |
| MTOG | Madrasah Technical Oversight Group | Kelompok Pengawasan Teknis Madrasah |
| MTR | Mid-Term Review | Tinjauan pada Pertengahan Program |
| MTs | Islamic Junior Secondary School | Madrasah Tsanawiyah |
| NES | National Education Standard | Standar Nasional Pendidikan |
| NSIP | New School Induction Program | Program Induksi untuk Sekolah Baru |
| NU | *Nahdlatul Ulama*, Indonesian Islamic Civil Society Organisation | Nahdlatul Ulama |
| OECD | Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development | Organisasi untuk Kerja Sama Ekonomi dan Pembangunan |
| OLL | On-Line Learning | Pembelajaran Moda Online |
| OMT | Operational Management Team | Tim Manajemen Operasional |
| P4TK | Centre for Development and Empowerment of Teacher and Education Personnel | Pusat Pengembangan dan Pemberdayaan Pendidik dan Tenaga Kependidikan |
| PASKA | Centre for Policy Analysis and Synchronisation | Pusat Analisis dan Sikronisasi Kebijakan |
| PENDIS | Directorate General for Islamic Education | Direktorat Jendral Pendidikan Islam |
| PENMA | Directorate for Madrasah Education | Direktoral Pendidikan Madrasah |
| PPIP | Principals Performance Improvement Program | Program Peningkatan Kinerja Kepala Sekolah |
| PPP | Principals Preparation Program | Program Penyiapan Calon Kepala Sekolah |
| ProDEP | Professional Development for Education Personnel | Pengembangan Profesi |
| PSDMPK | Education and Culture Human Resources Development | Pengembangan Sumber Daya Manusia Pendidikan dan Kebudayaan |
| PSM | Propensity Score Matching | Analisis Skor Kecenderungan |
| Puslitjak | Centre for Research and Policy | Pusat Studi dan Kebijakan |
| Puspendik | Centre for Education Assessment | Pusat Penilaian Pendidikan |
| Q | Quarter | Kwartal |
| QRS | Quality Reporting System | Sistem Pelaporan Kualitas Program |
| Renstra | Strategic Plan | Rencana Strategis |
| RPJMN | National Medium-Term Development Plan | Rencana Pembangunan Jangka Menengah Nasional |
| SATAP | One Roof School | Sekolah Satu Atap |
| SBM | School-Based Management | Manajemen Berbasis Sekolah |
| SCC | School Construction Committee | Komite Pembangunan Sekolah |
| SD | Elementary School | Sekolah Dasar |
| SDTOG | Staff Development Technical Oversight Group | Kelompok Pengawasan Teknis untuk Pengembangan Staff |
| SEAMEO | Southeast Asian Ministers of Education Organization | Organisasi Menteri Pendidikan Asia Tenggara |
| SEAMOLEC | Southeast Asian Ministers of Education Organization Regional Open Learning Centre | Pusat Pendidikan Terbuka dan Jarak Jauh SEAMEO |
| SMP | Junior Secondary School | Sekolah Menengah Pertama |
| SMPN | Public Junior Secondary School | Sekolah Menengah Pertama Negeri |
| SNIP | Sub-National Implementation Partner | Mitra Pelaksana Sub-Nasional |
| SPD | Supervisor Professional Development | Program Pendampingan Kepala Sekolah oleh Pengawas Sekolah |
| SP&FM | Strategic Planning and Financial Management (ProDEP Component) | Perencanaan Strategis dan Manajemen Keuangan (Komponen ProDEP) |
| SSQ | School Systems and Quality | Program Sistem dan Mutu Sekolah |
| TA | Technical Assistance | Bantuan Teknis |
| TK-PPA | Provincial Coordination Team for Aceh Education Development | Tim Koordinasi – Pengembangan Pendidikan Aceh |
| TOG | Technical Oversight Group | Kelompok Pengawasan Teknis |
| TT | A Madrasah that is not yet accredited | Tidak Terakreditasi |
| UKG | Teachers’ Competency Test | Uji Kompetensi Guru |
| UKKS | Principal Competency Test | Uji Kompetensi Kepala Sekolah |
| UoL | Unit of Learning | Badan Pembelajaran Umum |
| USB | New School Unit | Unit Sekolah Baru |
| USD | United States Dollar | Dolar Amerika Serikat |
| VFM | Value for Money | Nilai yang diperoleh untuk dana tertentu |
| WiPS | Working in Partner Systems | Bekerja dalam Sistem Mitra |

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POM is fully accountable for the content of this report: the views contained in this report do not necessarily represent those of the Education Partnership, the Governments of Indonesia or Australia, or of the people consulted during the fieldwork.

Amendment history

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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

***What is the Education Partnership?***

The AUD 368.8m investment in the Education Partnership (EP) is Australia’s largest development initiative in Indonesia. The EP’s vision is to improve education service delivery in Indonesia. The EP focuses its effort on the attainment of four End-of-Partnership-Outcomes (EOPOs):

* Enrolment in JSE in participating districts increases (Component 1).
* Management of schools and *Madrasah[[1]](#footnote-2)* improves in participating districts (Component 2).
* Quality of Madrasah service provision improves (in line with National Education Standards) in targeted districts (Component 3).
* Analytical Capacity and Development Partnership (ACDP) evidence is incorporated in relevant education sector policies, regulations, plans and budgets (Component 4).

These EOPOs describe the highest level of change over which the EP has significant influence. The EP uses various modalities to deliver its support, e.g. earmarked budget support (Components 1 and 2), project delivery (Component 3), and technical assistance to GoI agencies (Components 1-4). Since late 2013, the majority of expenditure in Components 1 and 2 has been made through government systems.

***What is the APPR?***

The Annual Partnership Performance Report (APPR) provides an objective assessment of program achievements, weaknesses, opportunities and challenges. As such, it speaks to the Australian Government’s aid scrutiny objectives, whilst also seeking to inform program management decisions and strategic dialogue between the Governments of Australia and of Indonesia about sector performance and emerging priorities.

The APPR is produced by the EP Performance Oversight and Monitoring (POM) team. POM’s analysis of EP performance draws on OECD’s DAC criteria of relevance, efficiency, effectiveness, impact and sustainability. As such, it also speaks to the requirements of GoA’s Investment Quality Reporting (IQR) and the associated Aid Quality Checks.

The 2015 APPR – POM’s fourth, full APPR of the EP – reports and analyses program performance in 2015. It seeks to deliver:

* A clear, concise and evidence-informed picture of achievements over the year.
* A clear and concise commentary about concerns and possible challenges in 2016 and beyond.
* A set of action-oriented recommendations.

With Components 2 and 3 closing in June 2016, Component 1 expected to close at the end of 2016[[2]](#footnote-3) and Component 4 concluding in mid-2017, the emphasis of the 2015 APPR differs a little to that of previous years. Where appropriate, the APPR continues to support improvements to the management and implementation of the EP. That is particularly the case insofar as Component 4 is concerned. However, elsewhere the emphasis shifts to informing GoI/GoA on the performance of the EP and to identifying recommendations that should ensure optimal effectiveness, impact and sustainability. Equally, POM has sought to capture lessons that have relevance to DFAT’s Forward Program[[3]](#footnote-4), particularly insofar as its design, delivery, management, governance and performance appraisal is concerned.

***What is POM’s overall assessment of EP performance?***

If 2014 was the year during which the installation of new governments on both sides of the Partnership signalled change to the scope of EP activities and a revision of priorities, then 2015 has been the year in which policy changes and priorities have been interpreted and translated into action. Significant cuts to the EP budget, coupled with major restructuring within the main counterpart ministry (the Ministry of Education and Culture or MoEC), ensured that the final year of the Partnership has been a challenging one: for the institutional partners tasked with interpreting new policies and for the implementing partners tasked with making the relevant adjustments to activities and ways of working. It has been an equally challenging year from an evaluation perspective, as the effects of budget cuts and restructuring have been felt unevenly across the Partnership. As a consequence, POM’s overall assessment has been shaped by efforts to retain the consistency of approach that is required of a linear series of evaluations, but with careful consideration of the unique dynamics of the final year of the Partnership and the circumstances within which decisions had to be made.

The balance of POM’s assessment of Partnership performance in 2015 falls on positive ground. The Partnership in general proved to be sufficiently flexible in adapting to significant policy changes, while Components demonstrated initiative in overcoming specific constraints posed by those changes. Moreover, a general upswing in the effectiveness of program activities was accompanied by the Government of Indonesia’s uptake of a range of discreet elements of the program. POM is hopeful that this will have a lasting impact upon the quality of education services in Indonesia. However, outstanding critical issues coalesce around the question of the EP’s legacy and therefore the extent to which key (institutional) benefits will be sustained.

***What did the APPR conclude about Component 1?***

* By December 2015, 996 schools – 587 USB and 409 SATAP – had been completed in 240 districts in 29 provinces. Construction of these new schools has led to the creation of 4,749 new classrooms and an additional 151,968 student places. Of the 1,005 schools constructed in the first three cycles, only nine were incomplete at the end of 2015 (<1%). More importantly, the findings of the *EOPO 1 Evaluation Study* (2015) indicate that C1 attained the EOPO of increased enrolments for Junior Secondary Education (JSE) in targeted districts. Moreover, analysis of district data indicated that improvement across a range of related JSE indicators was attributable to C1 investments.
* The development of an audio-visual package of construction guidelines for Cycle 4 produced improvements in the efficiency of school construction. Importantly, they also represent a valuable asset for future school construction activities. GoI has stated an interest in the adoption of various C1 practices and resources. POM is confident that the Field Monitor (FM) system and Complaint Handling System (CHS) will be adopted in part. The take-up of site selection and school construction systems (i.e. manuals, guidelines, training modules, database management technologies) will be more comprehensive. It has been proposed by MoEC that generic forms of these systems be developed in order that they may be applied to primary and senior secondary school planning and construction: a positive development.
* These positives must be considered in light of the following concerns:
  + Projections made for Cycle 4 school construction estimate that 40 schools will not be completed before the Component’s scheduled closure date of 30 June 2016. The cessation of Field Monitoring and other construction oversight activities pose a risk to the security of Cycle 4 investments.
  + Despite a decade of Australian-funded school construction activity – first through the Australia Indonesia Basic Education Program (2005-11) and then the EP (2011-16) - the limited time and resources available for the preparation and handover of C1 best practices and resources, *and the assisted integration of those resources into existing GoI systems*, may undermine the long-term institutional impact of specific Component investments.
* In terms of assessment against DAC criteria, the relevance of Component 1 remained unchanged (Score: 3). While the efficiency of routine activities improved, the risk posed by incomplete schools warranted a lowering of the score for efficiency (Score: 5). Evidence of improving enrolment rates and attributable program impact for them was reflected in an improved score for effectiveness (Score: 5). Impact assessment (Score: 4) remained steady, while the overall sustainability of C1 improved (Score: 5).

***What did the APPR conclude about Component 2?***

* Component 2 recorded a limited number of achievements in 2015. Grant Agreement-financed training in 2015 was provided to 9,179 participants between October and December 2015. The majority of these participants were engaged in principal’s Continuous Professional Development (CPD), with a smaller number (n = 62) being trained in the Supervisor Professional Development (SPD) and Principals Performance Improvement Program (PPIP) components.
* There is widespread consensus that ProDEP remains relevant to the needs and priorities of the Government of Indonesia (and specifically MoEC), that its technical basis has numerous upsides and that its ambitions are well aligned with DFAT commitments, i.e. to improve the quality of education. The establishment of the On-Line Learning (OLL) system in 2015 was consistent with MoEC priorities and it could offer potential upsides in terms of its cost-effective ‘reach’ in due course. The On-Line-Learning modality is now implemented in 40 districts with MoEC financing.
* These positives must be considered in light of two concerns:
  + The overall progress of C2 in 2015 was severely compromised by delays caused by changes to its institutional, policy and political landscape, most notably a restructure within MoEC in mid-2015. These events conspired to compound the impacts of delays to C2 implementation in earlier years. This meant that the delivery of the 2015 training program did not commence until October.
  + The numbers of education personnel participating in ProDEP to date are below initial expectations and there is insufficient appetite in 2015/16 to conduct an initial exploration of the effectiveness of ProDEP as a vehicle for producing improvements in education service quality. While the technical foundations appear strong and GoI has made various commitments to continue ProDEP, the system remains in a fledging state as DFAT’s commitment to C2 comes to a close in mid-2016.
* In terms of assessment against DAC criteria, C2 remains highly relevant in terms of its aspirations but the WiPs-based approach upon which Australian support was founded sat increasingly at odds with DFAT policy (Score: 4). The efficiency of the program was severely compromised by various delays in 2015 (Score: 3), while the effectiveness of the program was hampered by the ongoing absence of a critical mass of trained persons applying their new competencies and an associated absence of evidence of the actual or probable effect of that application on the quality of school management (Score: 3). As a consequence, it is difficult to say with any confidence that ProDEP will deliver positive long-term impacts in all participating districts (Score: 3), though there are signs that GoI is keen to sustain the initiative (Score: 4).

***What did the APPR conclude about Component 3?***

* C3 has supported 1,632 Madrasah (1,500 targeted and 132 non-targeted) for accreditation preparation. The sectoral impact of the program was significantly augmented in 2015 by MoRA’s own accreditation preparation program for 3,153 Madrasah. C3 made valuable contributions to this program in terms of technical assistance and training.
* Accreditation preparation activities during 2015 produced the strongest outcomes to date. Four hundred and sixteen (416) Madrasah were targeted for assistance during Phase 3 of the program. Assessment results showed that 96% attained a ranking of A or B, an outcome that was well-above the MORA’s Renstra target of 50%. At a systems level, the demonstrated success of the C3 model as a mechanism for Madrasah accreditation produced the traction required for more complex forms of collaboration at both the central and provincial levels. This collaboration underwrote the production of a regulation to develop a key component of a proposed quality assurance framework for the Islamic education sector.
* Overall, C3 demonstrated a much improved balance in terms of activities related to Madrasah accreditation and activities directed towards strengthening the system for improved service provision. The latter activities stimulated MoRA’s appetite to support such an agenda.
* These positives must be considered in light of the following concern:
  + Key system strengthening outcomes (e.g. the Madrasah Development Center regulation and the Grand Design) currently have a ‘provisional status’ in terms of anticipated impacts in the sense that it is not clear where the momentum to carry them forward will come from as Component draws to an end.
  + The maximisation of C3 outcomes requires ongoing investments to address equity issues (e.g. varying capacity of MDCs) and to boost MoRA capacity at the point of service delivery in Madrasah themselves.
* In terms of assessment against DAC criteria, C3’s performance warranted score increases across all five criteria. C3 performed particularly well in the areas of relevance (Score: 6), efficiency (Score: 5) and effectiveness (Score: 5). The lower scores for the criteria of impact (Score: 4) and sustainability (Score: 4), relate to the aforementioned concerns about how the ‘momentum’ generated by C3 will be sustained.

***What did the APPR conclude about Component 4?***

* At the end of December 2015 ACDP had completed 34 studies. A further six studies or activities of a similar nature were ongoing. Together, these 40 activities constitute about USD 30m of contracted commitments. Besides its support to the conclusion of GoI’s mid-term planning documents, notable achievements in 2015 included the submission of the final Overview of Islamic Education Sub-Sector in Indonesia to MoRA’s Directorate General of Islamic Education, the successful conclusion of policy research on behalf of the Provincial Coordinating Team for Aceh Education Development (TK-PPA), and the submission of the *Final Evaluation of ICT in Education in Papua*.
* Encouragingly, the ACDP exhibited far greater diversity and flexibility in terms of its product offerings and activities in 2015. This included the development of various policy briefs and the provision of *ad hoc* support to various partner institutions. However, its standout achievement in 2015 was its increased willingness and improved ability to communicate and disseminate research findings, both within government and through the media. These changes bode well for ACDP’s effectiveness over the next 12-15 months.
* These positives must be considered in light of two concerns:
  + A range of (senior) GoI stakeholders continue to express concerns about the delays associated with procurement and mobilisation.
  + There is no clear indication of what, if any, institutional benefits ACDP wishes to sustain and how that may be achieved during the remaining phase of operations, despite the tabling of a sustainability strategy as part of contract extension negotiations in the first half of 2015.
* In terms of assessment against DAC criteria, the internal and external relevance of the program increased in 2015 (Score: 5), whereas its efficiency (Score: 3) and sustainability (Score: 2) remain areas of concern. A change in ACDP’s approach in 2014-15 suggests greater actual and potential effectiveness (Score: 5) and impact (Score: 4), even if its tracking and reporting of high-level results remain poor.

***What did the APPR conclude about program oversight?***

* 2015 was a highly challenging year from a program oversight perspective. DFAT, GoI and Implementing Partners found themselves having to respond to the Indonesian Government’s new high-level aspirations coupled with the restructuring and re-staffing of MoEC. In parallel, they also found themselves having to interpret Australia’s new aid policy framework, respond to the attendant need to secure political return on aid investments, and the ramifications of various staffing and budget cuts. When taken together, 2015 was characterised by a general sense of uncertainty about expectations and intentions. While C1 and C3 were comparatively sheltered, the institutional changes and associated uncertainties had considerable impact on C2 and C4: the two components with the most numerous government stakeholders and arguably the loftiest aspirations.
* Those Components in which support was delivered via a WiPS modality (C1 and C2) were subjected to a higher (and understandable) degree of scrutiny. They also experienced the highest reductions in budget (both real and as a percentage). The corresponding reduction in scope of Component activities was generally accepted by GoI partners and in some instance reflected an appropriate scaling-back of commitments in light of GoI financing capacity and declining rates of return on investments (e.g. slowing rates of JSE GER growth). However, the uncertainty produced by the way in which cuts were made, particularly in relation to Component 2, was a source of concern to key stakeholders throughout the year. Equally, DFAT’s apparent drive to ‘wrap-up and hand-over’ rather than ‘transition’ the EP towards future forms of engagement is regarded as being regretful by implementing partners.
* Looking ahead, Implementing partners and key GoI figures are generally supportive of the Embassy’s shift to a leaner, more agile program. Equally, there is an acceptance that new aid investments must go further to blend the attainment of developmental outcomes with the Embassy’s political needs and aspirations. To that extent, the Basic Education Unit could rightly argue that its implementation of DFAT’s rhetorical and policy commitments is fully consistent with GoA’s desire to transition its relationship with Indonesia from that of donor-aid recipient to that of a mature relationship between two G20 neighbours.
* DFAT worked hard to expand forms of engagement at a variety of levels, with a particular focus on high level engagements within the key counterpart ministry (MoEC). In time, it is distinctly possible that the Forward Program will constitute a stronger “partnership” between the two governments than what was seen in the *Education Partnership* of 2011-16/17. Nonetheless, as the Embassy transitions from the EP to its Forward Program it must ensure that it sets a clear strategic direction, that it clearly communicates what it wants from its investments and those implementing them, and that it invests in appropriate capacity building measures such that key actors possess the understanding, the capacity and the capability to meet the Embassy’s more political expectations of its aid program.

***What next steps are proposed?***

Based on its findings, the APPR offers a total of 25 recommendations. These are presented over the page. It is recognised that some recommendations relate to ongoing work and that considerable progress in actioning some of the recommendations may already have been made.

Key recommendations

| **Recommendations** | **Level of urgency** | **Prime Responsibility** |
| --- | --- | --- |
| **Component 1** | | |
| R1: Institutional partners should develop and implement a plan to ensure professional completion of Cycle 4 schools. | \*\*\* | DFAT and MoEC |
| R2: MoEC and DFAT should continue their efforts to maximise existing investments in systems strengthening (e.g. guidelines, monitoring, CHS, and site selection). | \*\*\* | MoEC and DFAT |
| **Component 2** | | |
| R3: The performance of ProDEP, be assessed with due consideration given to the relative merits of its Units of Learning, components (e.g. CPD, SPD), and delivery modalities (e.g. direct, on-line learning) that are particularly applied in GoI financed districts. | \*\*\* | MoEC with DFAT |
| R4: The relevant findings and implications of ACDP’s *Evaluation of Principals Preparation Program* (ACDP 042) for ProDEP be identified and applied. | \*\*\* | MoEC with DFAT and ACDP |
| R5: Light-touch reviews of the GoI-financed ProDEP “replication” in 2016 should be undertaken on a frequent and ongoing basis so that real-time learnings are captured and applied, and such that more evidence becomes available about ProDEP’s ongoing relevance and effectiveness. | \*\* | MoEC with DFAT |
| R6: Subsequent to assessing the performance of ProDEP, a revised sustainability plan should be developed that reflects experience to date and emerging opportunities at national and district levels to adopt a properly timed and sequenced ProDEP that is relevant to the needs of the sector and decision makers. | \*\*\* | MoEC with DFAT |
| R7: Consideration should be given to the provision of DFAT-financed technical assistance in support of the appraisal and, where applicable, further development of ProDEP. | \*\* | DFAT |
| **Component 3** | | |
| R8: Lessons should be captured about how external funding has been secured for Madrasah quality improvement measures. | \*\*\* | MoRA |
| R9: The first meeting of the steering committee for the Grand Design should be convened at the earliest convenience to identify priorities and forms of further technical assistance that may accelerate implementation of the Grand Design. | \*\*\* | MoRA |
| R10: The merits of introducing a variable-funding mechanism to improve MDC capacity should be considered under existing financing plans for MDCs. | \*\* | MoRA |
| R11: The efficacy and size of block grants as a stimulus for quality improvement should be assessed. Block grants earmarked for training programs are an option that should be investigated. | \*\* | MoRA |
| R12: The suitability and performance of Madrasah Working Groups (KKM) in facilitating MoRA’s Madrasah Upgrading Program should be evaluated. | \*\* | MoRA |
| R13: The findings of the social inclusion pilot program should be assessed in order to better understand how the Islamic education section might take a lead in social inclusion strategies. | \* | MoRA |
| R14: Consideration should be given to involving representatives of non-state organisations (e.g. Al Ma’arif) in decision-making about private Madrasah quality improvement. | \* | MoRA |
| **Component 4** | | |
| R15: ACDP should invest in full-time, dedicated M&E resources to improve reporting and to facilitate learning, continuous improvement and the strategic management of its portfolio. | \*\*\* | ACDP with ADB |
| R16: ADB’s procurement processes should be reviewed and subsequently revised to ensure that they facilitate the timely delivery of required services so that the Secretariat can meet GoI’s expectations. | \*\*\* | ADB with ACDP |
| R17: The draft Sustainability Strategy prepared in the first half of 2015 should be reviewed, finalised, and then implemented. | \*\*\* | ACDP |
| R18: The ACDP should facilitate evidence utilisation and incorporation by ensuring that the K2P component of activities is sufficiently resourced and implemented. | \*\* | ACDP |
| **Program Oversight** | | |
| R19: A clear description of both the development and political outcomes expected from future investments under the DFAT Education Forward Program should be provided not least to facilitate program design, implementation, monitoring and evaluation. | \*\*\* | DFAT |
| R20: Clearer guidance should be provided to DFAT staff and Implementing Partners about the Basic Education Unit’s expectations for achieving political outcomes and how these might be achieved. | \*\* | DFAT |
| R21: Regular (six-monthly) reviews should be undertaken related to the achievement of the high-level outcomes expected in DFAT’s Education Forward Program, coupled with an identification of opportunities to improve the return on DFAT’s investment. | \*\*\* | DFAT |
| R22: To ensure transparency, mutual accountability and shared understanding, agreed formal management and governance meetings should supplement less formal stakeholder engagement. | \*\*\* | DFAT with GoI |
| R23: A lessons learned review should be undertaken of the 2014/15 transition process in DFAT’s Basic Education Unit and other Development Cooperation sections in the Embassy in Jakarta to inform DFAT policy and programing. | \* | DFAT Jakarta and Canberra |
| R24: Consideration should be given to the necessary DFAT and MC staff skillsets required to deliver the new aid paradigm and the need to adjust recruitment plans accordingly. | \*\* | DFAT, Implementing Partners |
| R25: Separate Gender and Disability Action Plans should be developed as part of an overall Social Inclusion Strategy for DFAT’s Education Forward Program. | \*\* | DFAT |

NB: Red (\*\*\*) - high urgency; Orange (\*\*) - medium urgency; Green (\*) - low urgency



Introduction, Approach and Methodology

# Introduction

## The Education Partnership

The Government of Australia (GoA) has invested in Indonesia’s basic education sector for a number of years, most notably through the flagship AUD 395m Australia Indonesia Basic Education Program (AIBEP) (2006-2011) and now through the Australia’s Education Partnership with Indonesia (EP): a five-year, AUD 368.8m[[4]](#footnote-5) program that started in 2011 and which will finish in 2016/17.

Through the EP, Australia supports the Government of Indonesia (GoI) to achieve its policy goals in relation to access, quality and governance of basic education (defined as primary and junior secondary education). The EP’s vision is to improve education service delivery in Indonesia. To achieve this, it focuses on three goals:

* To increase participation in Junior Secondary Education (JSE) schooling.
* To improve the quality of education in public and private schools, including Madrasah.
* To improve sector governance through increased use of evidence for decision-making.

The EP recognizes that these goals are aspirational and are influenced by a multitude of factors, many of which are outside the control or even direct influence of the Partnership. As such, the EP focuses its effort on the attainment of four End-of-Partnership-Outcomes (EOPOs):

* Enrolment in JSE in participating districts increases (Component 1).
* Management of schools and Madrasah improves in participating districts (Component 2).
* Quality of Madrasah service provision improves (in line with National Education Standards) in targeted districts (Component 3).
* ACDP evidence is incorporated in relevant education sector policies, regulations, plans and budgets (Component 4).

These EOPOs describe the highest level of change over which the EP has significant influence (see the current[[5]](#footnote-6) EP logic architecture in Annex I). The EP uses various modalities to deliver its support, e.g. earmarked budget support (Components 1 and 2), project delivery (Component 3), and technical assistance to GoI agencies (Components 1-4). From late 2013 to the end of 2015, the majority of expenditure in Components 1 and 2 was made through government systems.

## The Annual Partnership Performance Report

### Objective

The EP remains Australia’s largest ever bilateral program. It is important that the program generates significant ‘developmental return’, that implementation is carefully scrutinized, and that results and lessons are captured, shared and fed into decision-making processes. The EP Performance Oversight and Monitoring (POM) team is charged with generating timely evidence and actionable recommendations so that the Australian Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade (DFAT) and its partners can safeguard Australia’s investment in the EP; improve EP management and implementation; strengthen education policy dialogue with the GoI; and guide future Australian investment in the Indonesian education sector.

The Annual Partnership Performance Report (APPR) provides an objective assessment of program achievements, weaknesses, opportunities and challenges. As such, it speaks to DFAT’s aid scrutiny objectives, whilst also seeking to inform program management decisions and strategic dialogue between the Governments of Australia and of Indonesia about sector performance and emerging priorities.

The 2015 APPR – POM’s fourth, full APPR of the EP – reports on and analyses program performance in 2015. It seeks to deliver:

* A clear, concise and evidence-informed picture of achievements over the year.
* A clear and concise commentary about concerns and possible challenges in 2016 and beyond.
* A set of action-oriented recommendations.

With Components 2 and 3 closing in June 2016, Component 1 expected to close at the end of 2016[[6]](#footnote-7) and Component 4 concluding in mid-2017, the emphasis of the 2015 APPR differs a little to that of previous years. Where appropriate, the APPR is angled to measures that should improve the efficiency of the EP. That is particularly the case insofar as Component 4 is concerned. However, elsewhere the emphasis shifts to informing GoI/GoA on the performance of the EP and to identifying recommendations that should ensure optimal effectiveness, impact and sustainability. Equally, POM has sought to capture lessons that have relevance to DFAT’s Forward Program[[7]](#footnote-8), particularly in relation to its design, delivery, management, governance and performance appraisal.

This report is POM’s last APPR of the EP. In the second half of 2016 POM will prepare an Independent Completion Report of the EP. The upcoming Independent Completion Report will pay particular attention to lesson sharing.

### Approach

POM’s analysis of EP performance draws on the OECD’s DAC criteria of relevance, efficiency, effectiveness, impact and sustainability. As such, it also speaks to the requirements of GoA’s Investment Quality Reporting (IQR) and the associated Aid Quality Checks (AQC). Annex II explains the APPR interpretation of the DAC criteria and the Rating Scale used in this APPR is presented in Annex III.

The performance of each EOPO is scored, using the same system and guidelines contained within GoA’s Independent Completion Reporting (ICR) framework. Scores from the 2013 and 2014 APPRs are also presented such that the reader can see the evolution of component performance.

In 2013, POM believed it was too early to provide defensible scores in some cases, particularly in the case of *impact*, i.e. long-term change. For the last two years POM has sought to score all criteria, though in some cases, such as for impact and sustainability, the score and the narrative speak to probability or likelihood. In all cases POM has scored the component and not the performance of individual implementing partners working within the component.

### Methodology

The APPR assessment process was conducted in January-April 2016. It contained eight key steps:

* **Step 1: A critical appraisal and revision of the EP Analytical Framework** (see Annex V).
* **Step 2: A desk review and screening** of key reports related to EP performance that was submitted or received by POM in 2015 (see Annex IV).
* **Step 3: Semi-structured interviews with key stakeholders**, with a view to further developing and testing POM’s understanding of key matters. Lines of enquiry drew on insights gleaned from the desk review (see Annex VI for a list of persons consulted and those approached but unavailable).
* **Step 4: An internal POM APPR workshop** in February 2016 during which POM staff identified and discussed key findings, messages and implications.
* **Step 5: A series of half-day Component and Program Oversight meetings with key representatives of institutional and implementing partners** between 03 March and 16 March 2016 during which emerging findings were presented and discussed.
* **Step 6: Circulation of draft Component** **chapters to Component Managers** during week commencing 04 April 2016 for review, and specifically to correct any factual inaccuracies[[8]](#footnote-9).
* **Step 7: Production and submission of the Draft APPR to DFAT on 11 April 2016.**
* **Step 8: Submission of the Final APPR to DFAT** following factual corrections on basis of comments received from DFAT.

### Caveats and limitations

Every effort has been made to present credible, robust and evidence-informed findings and recommendations. Nevertheless, there are always limitations. Of particular note is the absence of EP-wide performance data that speak to the content of the EP Performance Milestone Framework (PMF). This is particularly the case for Component 4, though it is noteworthy that Component 2 data are typically available to POM about two months after the event and sometimes with gaps.

## Report structure

The layout of the APPR seeks to present information in a succinct and logical manner. Guidance on the contents of the report has been taken from the Monitoring and Evaluation Standards developed by the DFAT-Jakarta Evaluation Capacity Building Program (ECBP). More specifically, this report includes, as Annex VII, an assessment of its compliance with the proposed features listed in ‘Standard 3: Initiative Progress Reporting’.

The APPR is divided into three parts:

* Part A focuses on component-by-component performance: it considers the context in which the component operates; it highlights the achievements of the past year; it analyses progress and performance in relation to the DAC criteria of relevance, efficiency, effectiveness, impact and sustainability; and it proposes recommendations for action in light of that analysis.
* Part B examines program oversight, and specifically how the management and governance of the EP has affected individual component performance.
* Part C describes conclusions and presents a consolidated set of recommendations.

Each recommendation in the APPR is accompanied by a nominated stakeholder who is assigned prime responsibility for implementation. Recommendations are presented using a colour-coded system that indicates the relative immediacy of the issue.

Footnotes and endnotes are utilised throughout the document: footnotes are employed to provide clarification on a point; endnotes are employed to reference a source.



Part A:

Component performance

# Component 1: School Construction

## Introduction

### The EP investment

The Government of Australia is supporting the Government of Indonesia to build up to 1,155 new junior secondary schools (USBs) and one-roof junior secondary schools (SATAPs), creating up to 160,000 new student places between 2011 and 2016[[9]](#endnote-1). The resulting increase in available student places in participating districts (EOCO) is expected to lead to an increase in enrolment in Junior Secondary Education (JSE) in participating districts (EOPO).

The supply of new JSE places is expected to provide (prospective) learners with improved physical access to JSE. The closer proximity of schools to households is also expected to reduce financial barriers to enrolment (costs of student transportation and/or lodging) and therefore enable continued and improved participation[[10]](#endnote-2). Within participating districts, the investment is expected to have an impact on JSE enrolment and retention rates, and rates of transition of students from primary to junior secondary school.

The GoA seeks to focus its EP investment on districts with low junior secondary enrolment rates[[11]](#footnote-10) in order to reduce inter-district disparities in enrolment rates. In doing so, it aims to make a contribution to the GoI target of increasing the percentage of districts with a JSE Gross Enrolment Rate (GER) of 90% or greater, to 85% by 2014 from 75% in 2011[[12]](#endnote-3). It also expects to assist GoI to deliver on its 2010-14 *Renstra* targets by improving access to nine years of basic education for boys and girls, and children with physical disabilities, in un-served and under-served areas of the country[[13]](#endnote-4).

Component 1 does not expect to deliver systemic change[[14]](#footnote-11) in government policy, planning and service delivery, although indirect benefits may accrue. The primary output is the construction of new schools and the additional places they offer learners, with the expectation that increased enrolment (the expected EOPO) and sustained participation (the expected goal) will follow.

All schools are expected to be fully operational within six months of completion of construction, and be capable of delivering effective formal and non-formal education services[[15]](#endnote-5). This expectation requires that the schools be fully staffed and equipped (e.g. with laboratory equipment and books), and have accessed the necessary GoI operational funds to run and maintain the schools[[16]](#endnote-6). The Grant Agreement between GoA and GoI provides for the SATAPs to receive an initial “start-up” grant upon school completion to ensure smooth initial operations; the USBs do not have the same entitlement.

### The delivery mechanisms and support provided by the EP

Support provided through Component 1 is delivered through a combination of technical assistance and budget support to MoEC[[17]](#endnote-7). Technical assistance and training are provided by the managing contractor that holds the School Systems and Quality (SSQ) contract. Funding for school construction is channelled through GoI systems. Consequently, overall responsibility for the construction process lies with MoEC.

Given that context, GoA provides:

* AUD 156m of grants[[18]](#endnote-8) to fund the community-based JSE school construction.
* Technical assistance and training to MoEC, School Construction Committees (SCCs) and District Education Officials (DEOs) concerning site selection and subsequent monitoring of school construction.
* Training in School-Based Management (SBM) for principals, school committees, DEOs and community members through the New School Induction Program (NSIP). NSIP training was limited to the first two cycles of the program (2011-2014).
* Support to the establishment and implementation of a MoEC-managed Complaints Handling System (CHS).
* Financing for supplementary independent audits.

## Context

The context in which C1 operated during 2015 was a changing one. The reformulation of GoA’s overseas aid framework – the so-called ‘new aid paradigm’ – signalled a shift away from Working in Partner Systems (WiPS) and direct service provision. While policy changes did not seek to adjust the basis of existing WiPS-based programs such as C1, arrangements were subjected to intensified risk analysis to enhance the accountability of overseas aid spending in line with policy[[19]](#footnote-12).

The operating context was also affected by staffing changes on both sides of the Partnership. The Embassy’s Basic Education Unit experienced a number of staffing changes, which included the departure of staff with significant institutional knowledge of C1. On the GoI side, 2015 saw the implementation of structural reforms introduced by the new Minister of Education and Culture (appointed in 2014). For C1, these reforms had significant implications, not least of which was the appointment of new senior officials, including the Head of the Directorate of Junior Secondary Education.

The sectoral priorities of MoEC underwent some modification with the issuance of a new Strategic Plan or *Renstra* for 2015-2019. The central platform of ‘access to education’ (particularly JSE) was replaced with that of ‘quality improvement’. Targets related to JSE access were repositioned from being an end in themselves (i.e. developing Indonesia’s basic education sector or grades 1-9) to one of support for the expanded agenda of 12 years of universal education. Nevertheless, the focus on quality improvement in the new *Renstra* did not affect C1 activities. On the contrary, quality improvement strategies have the potential to significantly augment the effectiveness of EP investments. A key conclusion of POM’s *EOPO 1 Endline Evaluation Study* (2015) was that community perceptions of school quality (as opposed to availability/proximity) are a critical influence upon household decisions about education.

## Achievements

By December 2015, 996 schools – 587 USB and 409 SATAP – had been completed in 240 districts in 29 provinces. Construction of these new schools has led to the creation of 4,749 new classrooms[[20]](#footnote-13) and an additional 151,968 student places[[21]](#footnote-14). Of the 1,005 schools planned in the first three cycles, only nine were incomplete at the end of 2015 (<1%).

The support provided by the SSQ team to MoEC has been wide-ranging and instrumental in securing strong construction outcomes. This support has included[[22]](#endnote-9):

* Site verification and review of school proposals for compliance analysis of school sites[[23]](#footnote-15).
* Training of School Construction Committees (SCC) and Construction Management Consultants (CMC).
* Monitoring of school construction quality and progress.
* Identification of issues in the field and support for the resolution of such issues.

One of the key achievements in 2015 was the development of an audio-visual package of construction guidelines. These were provided to SCCs and construction workers as an alternative to the existing package of printed text. GoI, DFAT and SSQ C1 have singled out the new package as a critical stimulus for improvements in construction quality in Cycle 4. While no changes were made to the content of the guidelines, the medium by which information was conveyed (e.g. posters and videos), was more accessible and understandable for the SCCs and workers than the technical descriptions used in the original guideline package. While the achievement is clearly a positive one, it must also be asked why it has taken more than ten years of school construction activity to produce visual materials for workers who are known to have low levels of literacy.

National GER figures passed an important milestone in the past year. The ESSP Joint Results Framework set a target of 85% of districts with GER over 90%. For the year 2014/15, MoEC data show that 91.2% of districts had surpassed this target. While the outcome cannot be fully attributed to C1, the EP school construction program has contributed to this impressive result (see Section 2.4.3 below).

## Analysis

### Relevance

Despite the shift in *Renstra* priorities from access to quality improvement, C1 investments in school construction remained relevant to GoI in 2015. One indication of this was an increase in MoEC spending on school construction over the past two years. In 2016, MoEC’s Directorate of Junior Secondary Education committed to the construction of up to 400 schools and the provision of grants for the purposes of upgrading 9,000 facilities (e.g. classrooms) in existing schools.

For the GoA, revisions to its aid framework (seeSection 2.2 above) signalled the declining relevance of the C1 WiPs-based approach. A clear indication of this was its recommitment to the scheduled program closure of June 2016 despite predictions that not all Cycle 4 schools would be completed by this date[[24]](#footnote-16). The heightened focus on safeguarding Australian aid money also prompted interventions in Cycle 4 site selection processes in order to minimise risks associated with school construction in locations that had a lower likelihood of timely completion.

The internal relevance of Component 1 is a measure of how well program outputs relate to the EOPO. In the case of C1, this refers to the extent to which the construction of schools in appropriate sites is a relevant formula for increasing JSE enrolment in targeted districts. It is POM’s view that the internal relevance of the program remains unchanged in 2015. However, the introduction of a very small number of USBs with three classrooms may improve the internal relevance of the component since this initiative has resulted in a broader suite of options for school construction (i.e. school design better able to accommodate user demand[[25]](#footnote-17)).

### Efficiency

The efficiency of C1 is the measure of how economically (in relation to time and cost) inputs are converted to constructed schools and the creation of additional places. C1 performance against 2015 Performance Milestone Framework (PMF) targets presents a positive story. Cycle 4 schools were located in sites with more potential students than was the case for Cycle 3, and there was a significant improvement in the number of schools that were not located within a 6km radius of existing JSS. While the percentage of schools located in sub-districts with adequate demand declined, this indicator was influenced by DFAT’s decision to minimise the number of Cycle 4 schools in locations that presented risks in terms of possible overrun on construction schedules.

Strong results against PMF targets reflect incremental improvements in program management and implementation. The impact of a new audio-visual package has already been noted. The speed of management responses to independent monitoring visits and recommendations also showed improvements in 2015. For example, recommendations on septic tank sizing, the safety of school furniture for children, and better finishing works were quickly adapted and integrated into construction guideline materials[[26]](#endnote-10). The speed of management responses to concerns forwarded via the Complaints Handling System (CHS) also showed improvements in 2015.

In regard to site selection, efficiency gains were realised via the better use of ICT. Freely available Google-Map technology was used to create more accurate site maps. The ongoing development of a database for processing new school proposals was enhanced by the inclusion of MoEC education statistics in order to improve the speed and clarity of the site selection process[[27]](#endnote-11).

From an audit perspective, the results of the 2015 SCC compliance review for Cycle 3 show no suspected fraud at the sampled sites occurred during the year – an improvement on earlier years (see Table 1). This may be attributed to improved implementation processes, i.e. better CHS implementation, a stronger focus on training for SCS and revisions to guidelines and manuals. The frequency of non-compliance cases was similar to previous years. To an extent, a degree of non-compliance in areas of procurement and financial reporting is an inevitable outcome of the use of a community-based construction model in marginal areas.

Table 1: Incidence of Suspected Fraud and Non-Compliance

| **Risk** | **SCC Compliance Review - Cycle 1**  **2012/2013** | **SCC Compliance Review - Cycle 2**  **2013/2014** | **SCC Compliance Review – Cycle 3**  **2014/2015** |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |
| Sampled Sites | 90 of 451 (20%) | 63 of 316 (20%) | 24 of 238 (10%) |
| **Fraud Issues** | 9 | 1 | 0 |
| **Non-compliance** | | | |
| Procurement and Inventory Related Issues | 12 | 8 | 8 |
| Financial Related Issues | 27 | 12 | 12 |
| Reporting Related Issues | 4 | 5 | 3 |
| Construction Management Issues[[28]](#footnote-18) | n/a | n/a | 3 |

Source: SCC Financial Compliance Review Report 2012, 2013 and 2014

All of the above points speak to improved efficiency for specific managerial tasks (e.g. complaint handling, site selection) and the long-term savings on investments that will accrue from the improved construction quality of Cycle 4 schools. Ironically, however, the improving efficiency of discreet mechanisms within C1 occurred against a larger picture of DFAT’s diminishing investments in school construction during 2015. In other words, the more efficient the program has become, the fewer schools it has built (See Table 2).



Table 2: School construction per cycle (as of December 2015)

|  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
| **Cycle** | **SATAP** | **USB/ Small USB** | **Total** | **Incomplete Schools** |
| **1 (2012/2013)** | 340 | 111 | 451 | 2 USB |
| **2 (2013/2014)** | 150 | 166 | 316 | 1 SATAP |
| **3 (2014/2015)** | 107 | 131 | 238 | 2 SATAP and 4 USB[[29]](#footnote-19) |
| **4 (2015/2016)** | 80 | 59/11 | 150 | In progress |
| **TOTAL** | 677 | 467/11 | 1,155 |  |

Source: SSQ APR and biweekly updates

The number of schools constructed by the end of 2015 is far smaller than the original target of 2,000: a reflection of the reduction to C1’s budget and the increasing unit costs for school construction. However, questions continue to linger about whether the completion rate for the revised target of 1,155 schools will be met by the scheduled closure of C1 in June 2016. Current projections suggest that just over 40 schools will remain incomplete because of various administrative delays, with progress being slower than in Cycle 3 (see Figure 1)[[30]](#footnote-20).

Figure 1: Comparison of school construction progress of Cycle 3 and Cycle 4



Overall

Progress

Weekly

Progress

Source: SSQ Component 1 biweekly updates

Most significant in this respect was the delayed disbursement of the second tranche of funding. This had an impact upon almost all sites. On a more limited scale, but also critical, were delays associated with revisions of school sites and replacement of sites and SCC teams[[31]](#footnote-21).

While C1’s commitment to make incremental improvements to program management and implementation has been excellent, it is nonetheless unfortunate that the efficiency dividends stemming from such improvements are being paid out in the smallest cycle of the current program (in terms of the number of schools constructed). The best means of off-setting the declining returns on an increasingly well-run program is to ensure the transfer and integration of effective procedures and processes into GoI forward programs for school construction.

### Effectiveness

The effectiveness of C1 is an assessment of how successful the program has been in increasing enrolment in JSE in targeted districts. Previous APPRs have provided somewhat cautious assessments due to the absence of enrolment and evaluation data. That changed in 2015.

PMF data show that there were at least 79,996 students enrolled in EP schools in 2015[[32]](#footnote-22)[[33]](#endnote-12). This figure is well above the 2015 milestone of 55,224 students[[34]](#footnote-23). This strong result is, however, partly due to a discrepancy in the calculation of PMF enrolment targets and realities in the field. PMF targets were based upon the assumption that schools would only enrol students in Grade 7 once construction was completed, and growth would be based on the sequential opening of subsequent grades. However, it was common for some schools - usually SATAPs - to simultaneously enrol students for Grades 8 and 9 using existing classroom facilities[[35]](#footnote-24). As a result, the number of enrolled students in 2015 includes student cohorts that were not factored into target calculations. As such, the position stated in the 2014 APPR must be reiterated: an unequivocal assessment of how many students have been enrolled in C1 schools cannot be produced until 2019 by which time all three grades of Cycle 4 schools will have been operating for three full years.

The production of the *EOPO 1 Endline Evaluation Study* in 2015 does, however, enable POM to estimate the impact of C1 school construction on enrolment rates in targeted districts. The evaluation was based upon a comparative survey of approximately 5,000 households and 100 new schools[[36]](#footnote-25). Analysis of enrolment data showed that there was a 1.6% increase in JSE enrolment across the catchment areas of the sampled schools. This 1.6% increase represents the percentage of ‘new enrolees’ – not transferees – brought into the JSE system on account of new school construction[[37]](#footnote-26). This increase is summarised and disaggregated by gender in Table 3, below.

Table 3: Increase in enrolment in Cycle 1 schools catchment area

|  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
| **Sub-category** | | **JSE enrolment** | |  |
| **2012/2013** | **2015/2016** | **Change (%)** |
| **Gender** | Female | 93.8% | 94.1% | 0.3 |
| Male | 91.7% | 93.2% | 1.5 |
|  | **Overall** | **92.8%** | **94.4%** | **1.6** |

Source: EOPO 1 Evaluation Study Endline Survey

While enrolment data from the *EOPO 1 Endline Evaluation Study* showed a positive increase in the sampled catchment areas, at DFAT’s request additional analysis was undertaken to assess the estimated impact of school construction on the GER of participating districts. A process of Propensity Score Matching (PSM) was applied to survey data to construct statistically a series of proxy control districts against which data from the survey could be compared. The results of the statistical treatment indicated that C1-treated districts compared favourably to non-treated proxy districts across a range of key indicators, including GER, length of schooling, completion rates, and primary to JSE transition. For example, the PSM analysis suggests that 9,576 additional children, of which 4,741 (49.5%) are girls, are enrolled in EP districts as a consequence of DFAT investment[[38]](#footnote-27).

Enrolment data generated by the *EOPO 1 Endline Evaluation Study* were restricted to a sample of Cycle 1 schools. Given POM’s view that site selection and construction processes have improved significantly since that cycle, it is probable that the estimated impact of school construction on district GERs has also improved for subsequent cycles.

### Impact

The prospects for long-term benefits are mixed. In the 2014 APPR it was noted that internal and external evaluations had confirmed that EP-funded facilities were considered to be of a high construction standard. Data produced by the more recent 2015 *EOPO 1* *Endline Evaluation Study* survey support this conclusion, with evidence pointing to a generally positive assessment of the quality of school infrastructure. As such, it may be stated that C1 construction processes have ensured the long-term impact of schools *as buildings*.

Build quality has not, however, been matched by the quality of soft infrastructure. Concerns over the volume and quality of teachers assigned to EP-funded schools were raised in the 2014 APPR, albeit with the caveat that more accurate data were required to confirm those concerns. These data have been produced by the *EOPO 1 Endline Evaluation Study* (see Table 4)[[39]](#footnote-28).

Table 4: Number of Teachers (excluding principals) in EOPO 1 Sampled Schools

|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
|  | **USB** | | | **SATAP** | | | **Total** | | | |
| **M** | **F** | **T** | **M** | **F** | **T** | **M** | **F** | | **T** |
| Total number | 148 | 208 | 356 | 335 | 483 | 818 | 483 | 691 | | 1174 |
| * Civil Servant (PNS) Teacher | 44 | 87 | 131 | 87 | 101 | 188 | 131 | 188 | | 319 |
| * Contract Teacher | 104 | 121 | 225 | 248 | 382 | 630 | 352 | 503 | | 855 |
| Percentage of PNS to Total Teacher | 29% | 42% | 36% | 26% | 21% | 23% | 27% | | 27% | 27% |
| Teachers per school (average) | 13 | | | 11 | | | 12 | | | |

Source: EOPO 1 Evaluation Study Endline Survey

The 2015 survey data confirm that the average number of teachers at EP-funded schools (n=12) may be regarded as sufficient[[40]](#footnote-29). This is an important indication of the willingness and ability of district governments to meet a key obligation for new school construction approval. However, almost two thirds of teachers from the survey sample were contract teachers with comparatively little experience. This is an indication of the limited ability of districts to attract or assign more highly qualified and experienced staff to schools in rural, remote, and under-served regions.

Contract teachers are paid out of School Operational Assistance funds (*Bantuan Operasi Sekolah* or BOS funds). According to regulations, such salary expenses are limited to 15% of total BOS funds received. However, on average, Cycle 1 schools spent 24% of BOS funds on contract teacher salaries. In some cases, the figure was as high as 60%. The implications of this pattern were magnified by the fact that about one half of the schools in the 2015 survey (n=51/100), BOS was the only source of routine funding (outside PNS teacher salary expenses). Only 27 of the sampled schools received any funding support from the district (outside salary expenses for PNS teachers[[41]](#footnote-30)).

The above figures have implications for the long-term impact of schools as viable entities and the extent to which they contribute to Goal 2 of the EP, i.e. the improvement of education quality. High utilisation of BOS funds for salaries consequently limits the funds available for the upkeep and development of facilities. In turn, a high proportion of young contract teachers tends to correspond to low levels of experience. This has implications for enrolment numbers and levels of community support in general[[42]](#footnote-31). The net result can be ‘subsistence’ schools that continue to operate, but at a level far below their intended potential.

In 2014, POM’s concerns about the long-term resourcing of C1 schools were ‘tentative’ due to data limitations. To the extent that the 2015 *EOPO 1 Endline Evaluation Study* data are able to address this limitation, the conclusion is that those same concerns are now ‘definite’. This assessment simply brings the status of EP-funded schools into line with well-documented patterns of poor teacher distribution in rural, remote, and underserved regions. As of 2015, the construction-based approach has not been able to surmount the systemic constraints posed by teacher distribution issues and the uneven capacity or willingness of districts to adequately resource new schools.

### Sustainability



POM anticipates that program benefits at the systems level will be sustained after the cessation of GoA support. This is an improvement upon the somewhat cautious view forwarded in the 2014 APPR, in which it was noted that firm GoI commitments were lacking. In 2015, GoI has signalled the following:

* The Field Monitor (FM) system is still unlikely to be carried forward in its entirety by GoI. However, some methods and instruments from this program are being transitioned to new out-sourced entities known as School Construction Consultants (*Konsultan Pembangunan Sekolah* or *KPS*). KPS will have a similar mandate to that of FM, albeit with lower level engagement.
* School construction manuals, guidelines and training modules (including audio-visual versions) will be adopted and ‘generalised’ so that the materials are relevant for all levels of school construction (i.e. not JSS specific). The Director General of Basic and Secondary Education has expressed a firm commitment to establishing the materials as part of the Directorate’s regulatory framework.
* The site selection procedures are to be transformed into a set of generic guidelines that will be provided to: (a) the MoEC site selection committee in order to guide the verification and selection process, and; (b) District Education Offices in order to assist them in preparing better proposals. Once finalised, the guidelines will also be considered as part of the regulatory framework of the Directorate General of Basic and Secondary Education. At a minimum, the Directorate of JSE will continue to use the current EP SSQ site selection guidelines for 2017 construction activities.
* The extent to which the Complaints Handling System (CHS) will be adopted is limited by the fact that MoEC already has an existing system in place. MoEC’s stated commitments are limited to continuing the best practices of the CHS and assuring that staff will be assigned to a complaints handling role for future construction activities.

The sustainability of new schools is linked to the ability of a school to grow. For principals and parents, growth in student numbers is a key index of quality. A failure to grow has a negative impact upon reputation and limits the accumulation of funds (e.g. the size and number of annual parental contributions) that can be used to ‘grow’ a school (e.g. hiring quality teachers, procuring new books and teaching aids).

EP schools show a generally positive growth trend as grade levels have opened up (see Figure 2). However, upon entering the third year of operation approximately one fifth of sampled EP schools in the *EOPO 1 Endline Evaluation Study* had fewer than 12 children per class. Four schools had fewer than five children per class. Such statistics are expected of schools that were located in remote areas where technically ‘inefficient’ schools are the price of providing access to JSE[[43]](#footnote-32). However, not all schools were in this category, with six USB having very small class sizes that indicated that they were operating well below capacity. While this is concerning from an efficiency perspective, a greater worry is whether a USB with less than five children per class (n = 3) can actually be sustained over the long term.

Figure 2: Students/class over time



Source: *EOPO 1 Evaluation Study Endline Survey*

The extent to which EP-funded schools will continue to support improvements in JSE GER, particularly in remote, rural, and under-served regions is limited. All indications are that enrolments will plateau within a few years of school completion as supply-side solutions reach their limit[[44]](#footnote-33). This may be considered a satisfactory outcome in itself, since the program targeted regions that offer comparatively low rates of growth in school age children. However, there are two important contextual factors that may affect the sustainability of existing enrolment numbers in EP schools:

* The emergence of competing schools in the JSE sector.
* The implications that the design of an expanded 12 year schooling system has upon enrolment patterns in EP-funded school jurisdictions.

The EP has little no control over these two important variables. The latter point does, however, speak to the need for an integrated approach in the construction of Senior Secondary Schools in order that existing investments are maximised. One of measures to estimate sustainability of EP schools is to see how schools have grown over the years since first being established.

## Summary and recommendations

A summary table of component performance by DAC criteria is presented in Table 5. The rating scale reflects the requirements of GoA’s Investment Quality Reporting (IQR) and the associated Aid Quality Checks (AQCs), and it is consistent with that used in earlier APPRs. Recommendations for improvement and, in particular, on increasing the likelihood of achieving EOPO 1 are made in Table 6 below. It is recognised that some recommendations relate to ongoing work and that considerable progress in actioning some of the recommendations may already have been made.

Table 5: Component 1 scorecard

|  |  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
| **DAC Criterion** | **Score 2013** | **Score 2014** | **Score 2015** | **Justification** | **Comments** |
| Relevance | 4 | 3 | 3 | * By 2015, both GoA and GoI priorities had shifted from the issue of access to that of quality improvement. GoA policy revisions signalled the decreasing relevance of WiPS and direct delivery modalities. Even so, both governments continue to acknowledge the importance of access and participation. * POM still considers the internal relevance of the program to be constrained by the absence of demand-side activities. The *EOPO 1 Evaluation Study* results showed the limited impact of supply solutions for key target groups (e.g. remote students). | * As the final year of a decade long investment in school construction (AIBEP and EP), it is perhaps somewhat inevitable to see a decline in relevance over time. |
| Efficiency | 5 | 6 | 5 | * Construction support and systems (i.e. site selection, training materials, monitoring, and CHS) showed continuous improvement. * Almost all targeted schools in Cycle 1, 2 and 3 (996 out of 1,005) are complete and operational. * A substantial number of Cycle 4 schools may be incomplete by June 2016, i.e. C1’s scheduled closure point at the time of writing. | * The lower score for 2015 is attributed to the risks associated with a number of Cycle 4 schools not being completed by June 2016. * While POM acknowledges that construction overruns have occurred in all phases, an overrun that would require an actual project extension reflects poorly on delivery efficiency, particularly given the concerted effort in 2015 to choose sites that should not experience delays. |
| Effectiveness | 3 | 4 | 5 | * The *EOPO 1 Evaluation Study* (2015) indicates that C1 attained its EOPO. * The program greatly exceeded key PMF targets and district-level analysis concludes that C1 had an attributable impact upon GER and other key indicators. | * A higher score would require a more rounded menu of approaches to improve enrolment. Endline survey data show that school construction is not an effective means of stimulating enrolment for key target groups. |
| Impact | TE | 4 | 4 | * The prospect for school-level impact is limited by the quality of new school soft infrastructure, particularly experienced teachers. * Omission of NSIP on Cycle 3 and Cycle 4 was possibly a missed opportunity[[45]](#footnote-34). * Impact at systemic level is promising and relevant to GoI priorities (e.g. the take up of C1 construction guidelines). | * While the score for Impact remains on the positive side of the assessment scale), it is held back by concerns that the transfer of valuable knowledge products and practices (e.g. construction guidelines) may not be completed prior to June 2016 coupled with concerns about the availability of quality soft infrastructure in schools. |
| Sustainability | 4 | 4 | 5 | * The physical sustainability of schools has been enhanced by improvements in construction processes. * There are strong signs that key Component 1 processes and systems will be adopted by GoI. | * An increase in the Sustainability score for 2015 is primarily an acknowledgement of achievements in system strengthening. A perfect score is held back by the fact that handovers have not yet taken place. |

Table 6: Component 1 key findings and recommendations

| **Findings** | **Recommendations** | **Level of urgency** | **Prime Responsibility** |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |
| C1 support is currently scheduled to finish in June 2016, by which point a substantial number of schools will be incomplete (see §2.4.2). | R1: Institutional partners should develop and implement a plan to ensure professional completion of Cycle 4 schools. | \*\*\* | DFAT and MoEC |
| C1 has made notable year-on-year improvements to the efficiency of the delivery of school construction. These are directly attributable to the prevalence of enhanced management processes and systems. There is a clear opportunity to institutionalise those enhancements (see §2.4.5). | R2: MoEC and DFAT should continue their efforts to maximize existing investments in systems strengthening (e.g. guidelines, monitoring, CHS, and site selection). | \*\*\* | MoEC and DFAT |

NB: Red (\*\*\*) - high urgency; orange (\*\*) - medium urgency; green (\*) - low urgency

# Component 2: School and District Management

## Introduction

### The EP investment

Component 2 seeks to improve the management of schools and Madrasah in participating districts(EOPO) by supporting the establishment of a new professional development system that should enable principals to apply their improved professional competencies (EOCO)[[46]](#endnote-13). The professional development system (or ProDEP) offers tailored training programs based on an individual’s needs, thereby supporting the implementation of Ministerial Decrees No. 13/2007[[47]](#footnote-35) and 28/2010[[48]](#footnote-36). It is delivered through an ‘In-On-In’ process that involves a period of training, the implementation of new knowledge and practices in the workplace for six months, and then follow-up training to reflect upon and discuss results. It has at its core the Continuous Professional Development (CPD)[[49]](#footnote-37) of principals. ProDEP also includes components on Supervisor Professional Development (SPD)[[50]](#footnote-38), Human Resource Management and Development (HRMD)[[51]](#footnote-39), Strategic Planning and Financial Management (SP&FM), and the Principal Preparation Program (PPP)[[52]](#footnote-40). The Principal Performance Improvement Program (PPIP), a new component that seeks to improve the capacities of underperforming principals, was piloted in 2015. Unlike previous years, no DFAT-financed HRMD, SP&FM, and PPP trainings were implemented in 2015.

With DFAT funding, ProDEP is implemented in 250 of Indonesia’s 514 districts. However, in 2015, MoEC funded roll-out in 16 additional districts and it intends to add a further 24 districts in 2016[[53]](#endnote-14). ProDEP’s main beneficiaries are principals in regular state schools. However, 15% of participants are expected to stem from Madrasah[[54]](#footnote-41).

ProDEP is implemented using four delivery modalities: (i) the so-called ‘direct modality’ in which Units of Learning (UoL) are delivered directly to participants by approved trainers from GoI institutions; (ii) the cluster-based modality in which UoLs are delivered using cluster-level working groups; (iii) the On-Line Learning (OLL) modality, and; (iv) the district modality in which UoLs are delivered by supervisors at a venue provided by the District Education Office. ProDEP UoLs are arranged in three levels, with Level 1 comprising modules that cater for basic skill sets, e.g. administrative and reporting skills. Level 2 and Level 3 modules are targeted at more experienced or ‘advanced’ principals, with content including community engagement and instructional leadership. Level 1 has been provided to principals since 2014 and, more recently, DFAT has supported MoEC’s preparations for the delivery of Levels 2 and 3 through OLL.

### The delivery mechanisms and support provided by the EP

The role of the SSQ Managing Contractor has evolved over the years, from an initial focus on designing, developing and piloting professional development programs, to assisting MoEC from 2014 to implement, monitor, evaluate and quality assure ProDEP[[55]](#endnote-15). Since January 2015, GoI has been responsible for the technical implementation of ProDEP activities. DFAT funding of ProDEP implementation in 2014 and 2015 was provided through the Working in Partner Systems (WiPS) mechanism, with the financing integrated into MoEC’s budget. That required collaboration between not only DFAT, MoEC and MoRA, but also BAPPENAS and MoF. The year 2015 was the last in which DFAT financed the delivery of training activities.

Following an organisational restructure of MoEC in 2015, ProDEP is now managed by the Directorate for Development of Basic and Senior Secondary Education Personnel under the Directorate General for Teacher and Education Personnel[[56]](#footnote-42). It is implemented at a subnational level by a number of Eligible Entities (EEs). The number of EEs involved in the delivery of ProDEP fell from 40 in 2014 to 13 in 2015[[57]](#endnote-16) following MoEC’s restructuring. They currently consist of 12 Centres for Development and Empowerment of Teachers and Education Personnel (P4TK), and the Board of School Principal Development and Empowerment (LPPKS). P4TKs deliver the OLL, direct and cluster-based modalities, whilst the LPPKS is responsible for the implementation of direct and cluster-based modalities only. The 33[[58]](#footnote-43) Boards of Education Quality Assurance (LPMPs), which were EEs until the restructure, are no longer involved in the delivery of ProDEP[[59]](#footnote-44).

## Context

The EP seeks to build Indonesia’s first national system of professional development for education personnel with principals as a key target group. The concept of life-long learning is relatively new to Indonesia. Until ProDEP, training was typically delivered through one-off workshops or through the cascade approach, neither of which necessarily fosters the incremental development of knowledge or facilitates application in the workplace over the long-term.

Full implementation of ProDEP was first rolled-out in late 2014, although piloting started in 2012, and module preparation started in the earlier AIBEP program (2006-2010/11). Since that time ProDEP has had to contend with a range of events and changes to its political, policy and institutional landscape, including the institutional demands associated with the introduction of Curriculum 2013 (particularly in 2014[[60]](#footnote-45)), the effect of the Ministry of State Apparatus and Bureaucratic Reform’s Circulation letter No. 11/2014[[61]](#footnote-46) and the recent restructuring of MoEC (see Section 3.1.2 above).

In line with Australia’s new aid paradigm, DFAT announced in mid-2015 that any future support to ProDEP would be provided in the form of Technical Assistance and not through the direct financing of training provided from 2011-15.

## Achievements

Even though the delivery of Grant Agreement-financed training in 2015 was delayed until October[[62]](#footnote-47), C2 trained 8,473 people in the three months to December 2015 (see Table 7).

Table 7: Participants Trained by ProDEP with Australian financing in 2015

| **Theme** | **Persons trained in 2015** | | | | | | **Annual Total** |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
| **MoEC** | | | **MoRA** | | |
| **Male** | **Female** | **Total** | **Male** | **Female** | **Total** |
| **CPD** | 4,877 | 1,416 | 6,293 | 576 | 159 | 735 | 7,028 |
| **SPD** | 1,028 | 230 | 1,258 | 115 | 36 | 151 | 1,415 |
| **PPIP** | N/A | N/A | N/A | N/A | N/A | 30 | 30 |
| **GRAND TOTAL** | **5,905** | **1,646** | **7,551** | **691** | **195** | **916** | **8,473** |

Source: Data reflecting participation in 2015 received from C2 in April 2016.

Notes: (i) The data are reported as of 29 April 2016 but refer to participants in 2015 because Eligible Entities required time for data collection; (ii) at the time of writing, PPIP participants had not been disaggregated by gender; (iii) the total number includes new as well as former participants. The CPD data include 5,447 participants who participated in 2014 and returned in 2015 to take new UoLs. SPD data include 1,380 participants who participated in 2014 and returned for the refresher course in 2015, and; (iv) there were no DFAT-funded HRMD, SP&FM and PPP activities in 2015. There were HRMD, SP&FM and PPP activities funded by GoI in 2015.

A notable achievement in 2015 was the establishment of the OLL system. This required the provision of training to eight P4TK[[63]](#footnote-48) as well as the conversion of nine CPD UoLs for OLL delivery[[64]](#footnote-49). Additionally, the SSQ Managing Contractor for C2 implemented two phases of the PPIP pilot, and reviewed and updated all Level 1 UoLs based on feedback from those participants who took CPD in 2014.

## Analysis

### Relevance

On 1 July 2015 the Minister of Education and Culture announced that “improving teachers and principals is most urgent on the reform agenda”[[65]](#endnote-17). That view is consistent with OECD’s recent review of Indonesia’s education sector, which stated that “while most of those interviewed by the review team believed that leadership and supervision in Indonesian schools were important, nearly all said that Indonesia’s leadership and supervision practices currently had little impact on student outcomes. The main reason interviewees gave for this was that there had been no increase in the capacity of principals or supervisors to lead and manage their teachers following decentralisation”[[66]](#endnote-18). POM’s recent *EOPO 2* *Baseline Evaluation Study* of the CPD component of ProDEP[[67]](#footnote-50) offered similar findings. It found low levels of effective management practices and even lower levels of effective leadership in its sample of 1,248 schools and Madrasah. Specifically, it found that only 12% of schools/Madrasah displayed effective leadership and only 34% displayed effective management[[68]](#footnote-51).

It is reassuring, therefore, that GoI remains firmly committed to improving learning outcomes and to building the necessary foundations for those improvements to occur. While one of the Minister of Education and Culture’s key priorities is to improve the quality of teaching and teaching personnel, he made a number of statements in 2015 about the importance of school principals and their role within the education “ecosystem”[[69]](#endnote-19). Following his visit to Australia in December 2015, for example, the Minister wrote to the Indonesian President, noting the importance of improving principals’ leadership[[70]](#footnote-52) [[71]](#endnote-20). Equally, and with particular relevance to the SPD component of ProDEP, in December 2015 the Minister spoke about his desire to see supervisors play a stronger role in the mentorship of principals and teachers[[72]](#endnote-21). Such sentiments are reflected in MoEC’s Renstra for 2015-19[[73]](#footnote-53). Beyond MoEC, reference is made to ProDEP in MoRA’s Grand Design[[74]](#footnote-54) where it is stated that ProDEP will be implemented by MoRA’s training centre (*Pusdiklat*)[[75]](#endnote-22). Whilst this commitment is noteworthy, POM is uncertain about the extent of financial pledges, budget availability and the requisite technical capacities to translate the rhetoric into practice.

For DFAT, the aspirations of ProDEP – to see strengthened systems which enable a skilled workforce to apply their competencies for the benefit of school management and education quality – remained in line with the ambitions outlined in the *Strategy for Australia’s aid investment in education 2015 – 2020*[[76]](#endnote-23). However, the WiPS-based model employed for the pursuit of those strategic interests was less consistent with the TA-led aspirations of Australia’s new aid paradigm. The increased premium placed upon the security and accountability of aid funds also challenged the relevance of the delivery model as it imposed additional time and resource constraints on spending. To that extent, DFAT’s conscious efforts in 2015 to scale back its financial commitment – in terms of value and duration – were consistent with its revised aid framework. Yet this scaling back of financial commitments could be viewed, in the larger picture, as symptomatic of the declining relevance of C2 to DFAT more broadly.

From an internal relevance perspective, POM remains of the view that the technical foundations of the ProDEP model are such that it *could* make a significant contribution to the EOCO and the EOPO[[77]](#endnote-24) (see box below).

**ProDEP’s core characteristics**

* Emphasis is placed on supporting visible improvements to performance in key competency areas.
* Training is based on individual needs, with participants receiving core trainings and electives.
* Emphasis is placed on continuous learning instead of a one-off or cascade training.
* Usage of the In-On-In approach allows participants to implement learning in their working environments, to reflect on their experiences and to amend their work practices
* UoLs are revised over time such that they remain relevant.
* Emphasis is placed on a systemic approach whereby supervisors mentor principals rather than treating the groups in isolation.

Overall, therefore, there is widespread consensus that ProDEP remains relevant to the needs and priorities of the Government of Indonesia (and specifically MoEC), that its *ambitions* are well aligned with DFAT policy commitments, and that its technical basis has numerous upsides. As such, the investment rationale remains sound, even if the way in which Australia has financed the delivery of training is now at odds with its new aid paradigm.

### Efficiency

2015 was a somewhat turbulent year for ProDEP, a year in which a range of changes in the institutional landscape created uncertainty and led to delays to implementation. Ministry Regulation No. 11/2015 stipulated that the Board of Development for Human Resource Education and Culture and Education Quality Assurance (Badan PSDMPK & PMP or “Badan”) would be abolished and be replaced by a newly created Directorate General for Teacher and Education Personnel. For ProDEP, the restructuring saw the departure of several senior managers[[78]](#footnote-55) and the appointment of new officials. The state of uncertainty and flux was compounded by the requirements of a new Ministry of State Apparatus and Bureaucratic Reform regulation, which introduced new procedures for the appointment of Echelon 1 and Echelon 2 officials. The consequence was a delay in the appointment of key MoEC personnel, with the new Director General for Teacher and Education Personnel only being appointed in June and the Director for Development of Basic and Senior Secondary Education Personnel being appointed two months later. As such, key decisions concerning procurement, implementation and future direction could only be taken by DFAT and MoEC from August/September 2015 (thus delaying the commencement of training until October 2015).

In parallel, DFAT’s financial commitment to ProDEP was revised downwards several times in 2015 in response to anticipated DFAT budget cuts, MoEC budget planning requirements[[79]](#footnote-56), and the presence of unspent funds in MoEC accounts caused by implementation delays (see Table 8).

Table 8: DFAT’s Budget Allocations to ProDEP

|  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- |
| **Timeframe** | **Budget (2015 to  June 2016)** | **Explanation** |
| First half 2014 | AUD 54 million (a) | * The original budget, i.e. that which assumed that ProDEP would be fully rolled out in 2015. |
| Second half 2014 | AUD 37 million (a) | * DFAT revised the allocation to mid-2016 from AUD 54m to 37m, with the balance to be retained for a no-cost extension to 2017. |
| May 2015 | AUD 23 million (b) | * DFAT opted not to extend the duration of its support to C2. MoEC and DFAT agreed to plan on the basis of money already disbursed to GoI, e.g. AUD 23m. The balance (i.e. AUD 14m) was cancelled. |
| October 2015 | AUD 13.6 million (c) | * A response to the procurement plan submitted by MoEC to DFAT in September 2015, covering the period until December 2015, in which MoEC indicated what could be disbursed until the end of the year. |

Sources: (a) Interview DFAT; (b) DFAT letter to MoEC, 26 May 2015; (c) DFAT letter to MoEC, 30 October 2015.

In light of the delays to the commencement of GA-financed implementation of ProDEP activities, PAF targets were revised downwards in December 2015 (see Table 9)[[80]](#endnote-25).

Table 9: Original and Revised PAF targets for CPD and SPD

|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
| **Versions** | **Key Performance Indicators (KPIs)** | ProDEP is managed and operationalized effectively | Principals, supervisors and district/provincial officials participate in ProDEP | | | |
| **Measures** | 2.5. Number of principals enrolled in CPD through **online learning** | 3.2. Number of new\* **principals** enrolled in at least one **CPD** (annual data) | | Number of new\* **supervisors** enrolled in **SPD** training (annual data) | |
| Original PAF | Targeted levels | SD and SMP | SD and SMP | | SD and SMP | |
| Target | 2,500 | 20,000 (new) | | 4,000 (new) | |
| Modality | Online Learning only | Direct, Cluster, and Online | | Trained by EEs | |
| Revised PAF  (Dec 2015) | Targeted levels | SD and SMP | SMP | SMP | SMP | SMP |
| Target | 1,494 | 7,606 (continuing) | 180  (new) | 1,611 | 36 |
| Modality | Online Learning only | Direct | Cluster | Refresher course | Cluster |

Source: PAF June 2014 and data from C2.

Based on available data at the time of writing, C2 met about 77.27% of its *revised* targets for 2015, i.e. the targets for 2015 set in December 2015 (see Table 10, below).

Table 10: Performance against Revised PAF Targets

|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
| **Performance** | **Key Performance Indicators (KPIs)** | ProDEP is managed and operationalized effectively | Principals, supervisors and district/provincial officials participate in ProDEP | | | | **Total** |
| **Measures** | 2.5. Number of principals enrolled in CPD through **online learning** | 3.2. Number of new\* **principals** enrolled in at least one **CPD** (annual data) | | Number of new\* **supervisors** enrolled in **SPD** training (annual data) | |
| Revised PAF  (Dec 2015) | Targeted levels | SD and SMP (1) | SMP | SMP | SMP | SMP |  |
| Target | 1,494 | 7,606 (continuing) | 180  (new) | 1,611 | 36 | **10,927 (5)** |
| Modality | Online Learning only | Direct (3) | Cluster | Refresher course (2) | Cluster |  |
| Realisation  (Up to Dec 2015) | Trained | 1,406 | 5,447 | 175 (4) | 1,380 | 35 (4) | **8,443** |
| % of revised  PAF target | 94.11% | 71.61% | 97.22% | 85.66% | 97.22% | **77.27%** |

Source: Data reflecting participation in 2015 received from C2 in April 2016.

Notes:

1. In 2015, a large number of primary school principals, previously trained by LPMP are no longer beneficiaries of ProDEP. A smaller number of primary school principals were able to participate through OLL. The exact number of primary school principals trained in 2015 could not be determined at the time of writing due to absence of data.
2. Signifies participants participating already in 2014. The 1,380 supervisors taking SPD are provided with a refresher course
3. The 5,447 principals trained in CPD through the direct modality are participating for the second time in 2015 taking another two UoLs.
4. Signifies new participants in 2015 i.e. those not having participated previously in ProDEP activities.
5. PAF targets do not include PPIP participants.

Upon receipt of full data in Q2 2016, C2 stakeholders will know if the revised targets for 2015 were met. Notwithstanding, the numbers trained will be significantly lower than the initial expectations captured in the original PAF – a consequence of the institutional changes in MoEC and in DFAT in 2015, allied to earlier delays. These factors have hampered the efficiency of C2 and have compromised the timely development and scope of ProDEP.

### Effectiveness

ProDEP offers promise as a *system* to improve school principal leadership and management. However, full roll-out of Phase 1 of CPD only commenced in October 2014, i.e. three years after the EP commenced and with only two years of the Partnership remaining. Implementation proceeded until December 2014 at which point it was postponed again until October 2015. Inevitably, therefore, the total number of persons trained is considerably less than that which was foreseen in the GA PAF of June 2014[[81]](#footnote-57) [[82]](#endnote-26).

In 2015 DFAT opted to postpone implementation of the EOPO 2 midline/endline study to give ProDEP sufficient time and opportunity for results to have been generated[[83]](#footnote-58). As such, the extent to which principals are routinely applying their improved professional competencies and the extent to which this is contributing to improvements in school/Madrasah management are largely unknown. Moreover, the extent to which ProDEP is making a significant contribution to the EOCO of “improved professional competencies of participating principals are applied” will be known once the C2 SSQ Managing Contractor completes its PAF Survey in Q2 2016. However, POM can say with confidence that the EOPO will *not* be achieved by June 2016 simply because there has been insufficient output-level delivery to date to generate the anticipated effects at the level of *participating districts*. As such, the question then becomes one of potential; whether the EOPO may be achieved *in time*.

Four existing sources of evidence point to ProDEP’s potential:

* POM’s *Systemic Literature Review* of 2014 on the role of principals in delivering improved learning outcomes[[84]](#endnote-27), which found that school leadership is second only to teacher quality as the most important school-based driver of improved educational outcomes. Specifically, it found that the two most potent dimensions of school leadership are:
  1. Promoting and participating in teacher learning and development (d=0.91).
  2. Planning, coordinating and evaluating teaching and the curriculum (d=0.74) [[85]](#endnote-28).
* An *evaluation of the CPD pilot program* by C2 SSQ in June 2013[[86]](#endnote-29), which indicated that all principalsapplied some learning and a large proportion of principals applied significant amounts of the learning acquired from training activities.It also noted that supervisors had observed some changes in schools, e.g. in teaching practice and in planning and accountability of expenditure. The evaluation also pointed to an early indication of changes to learning outcomes and increased support for the students’ well-being[[87]](#footnote-59).
* The *EOPO 2 Evaluation Study Baseline* (June 2015) which found that training has a positive effect on leadership and management practices. For example, receipt of training prior to being appointed as principal had a positive effect of 0.121 on effective leadership and 0.134 on effective management (which points to the importance of the PPP component of ProDEP)[[88]](#footnote-60).
* A *rapid desk review of case study material* from the 48 schools sampled in the qualitative component of POM’s EOPO 2 *Evaluation Study Baseline*[[89]](#footnote-61), which suggested that principals in 13 of those 42 schools that had already received ProDEP support were showing signs that they were applying knowledge and skills covered by the Units of Learning.

Based on the available evidence, therefore, POM’s cautious assessment is that, from a *technical perspective*, there is considerable potential for ProDEP to make a significant contribution to the EOPO *over time*. The potential should not be underestimated. Until ProDEP, Indonesia – a country with over a quarter of a million principals and education professionals, and over fifty million students from primary to senior secondary levels[[90]](#endnote-30) - did not have a comprehensive professional development system for education personnel.

ProDEP’s potential to improve the management of schools and Madrasah has seemingly been recognized by GoI. For example:

* In 2015 MoEC financed the “replication” of ProDEP in 16 non-participating districts[[91]](#footnote-62), both increasing the number of trained principals and closing the gap between expected PAF results and actual results. MoEC has also committed to finance implementation in a further 24 districts in 2016, bringing the total number of MoEC-financed ProDEP districts to 40.
* To date, 374 districts have self-financed their participation in PPP[[92]](#endnote-31). While POM remains wary of the potential implications should ‘ProDEP’ be broken into its constituent parts[[93]](#footnote-63), POM also notes the potential for districts to ‘opt in’ to a PD initiative should they see the benefits of doing so, which potentially bodes well for CPD and SPD, i.e. the core elements of ProDEP.
* MoEC officials[[94]](#endnote-32) report that ProDEP contributes to an improving relationship between principals and supervisors that resulted in better school and Madrasah management.

Such positives must be counter-balanced by other realizations. To maximize its effectiveness and impact, it is inevitable that the system will need to evolve. For example, the *EOPO 1* *Evaluation Study Baseline* suggests that the current content, delivery and structure of ProDEP would benefit from review and revision. Specifically:

* With regards to its *scope*, its adherence with the National Education Standards (NES) and Minimum Service Standards (MSS) means that further evolution of ProDEP is required for it to address all the known drivers of improved school and Madrasah leadership and management (e.g. as identified in international literature).
* With regards to *variation*, different principals and different types of schools/Madrasah have different needs (suggesting need for varied content and delivery modes, including OLL and cluster-based modalities, to facilitate efficient access of all principals to the training program)[[95]](#footnote-64).
* With regards to *targeting*, some principals would secure greater benefit from participation in ProDEP than others (suggesting a need to target resources, with potential upsides in terms of results and value for money).
* With regards to *support*, the level and quality of supervisory support provided for principals is variable (suggesting a need to strengthen the ongoing ‘support’ system for ProDEP).

From a technical perspective, it is positive that ProDEP is tailored to the performance appraisal system and that it provides academic credits[[96]](#footnote-65) for successful participants for their career progression as civil servants[[97]](#endnote-33). However, it is likely that a range of context-based drivers will have bearing on the future potential of ProDEP. The processes by which supervisors are appointed and fulfil their mandates are likely to have bearing on the extent to which ProDEP activities will contribute to their intended aims[[98]](#endnote-34). Any interference in the merit-based nature of ProDEP is likely to compromise its effectiveness and impact. Furthermore, cuts to DFAT’s budget, coupled with the loss of LPMP as an Eligible Entity because of MoEC’s restructure in 2015, meant that a large number of primary school principals could not be accommodated in 2015 and will be omitted from ProDEP in the foreseeable future[[99]](#footnote-66). This will naturally limit the program’s reach across the different tiers of 12 years’ schooling.

While ProDEP lacks a critical mass of trained principals to affect EOPO-level change in participating districts, it is reassuring to see MoEC self-financing replication in non-EP districts. Notwithstanding the need for a further evaluation study to capture the nature and degree of change generated by ProDEP, it remains likely that the technical foundations of ProDEP are sound and, with the right support and investment, it is probable that ProDEP will deliver its EOPO after the closure of the EP in 2016.

### Impact

POM remains of the view that ProDEP has tremendous potential to contribute to the emergence of better quality education. For its potential to be realised, ProDEP must reach a critical mass of trained principals to trigger improvements at district level. This will inevitably require future investment and “champions” i.e. individuals with the necessary influence and authority to embed, develop and sell ProDEP. POM is therefore encouraged to see that elements of ProDEP resonate with the needs and priorities of MoEC. For example, the DG for Teacher and Education Personnel is supportive of OLL and it is therefore timely that Level 2 and Level 3 UoLs are being prepared for on-line delivery[[100]](#endnote-35). Once this occurs ProDEP will be able to cater for and reach a greater number of principals. MoEC is also reportedly examining the possibility of adapting ProDEP for the delivery of CPD for teachers[[101]](#endnote-36) and, with adequate support and investment, ProDEP may be well placed to support school management across all tiers of 12 years of schooling[[102]](#endnote-37). As that might suggest, DFAT’s TA-based Forward Program should be able and willing to respond to needs and opportunities as they emerge.

While prospects exist for long-term benefit in the MoEC environment, the outlook insofar as MoRA and Madrasah are concerned is less positive. This is not a surprise[[103]](#footnote-67). It is estimated that Madrasah principals accounted for about 10% of ProDEP participants in 2015[[104]](#endnote-38), i.e. still below the (perhaps unrealistic) target of 15%. While MoRA officials have stated that their involvement in ProDEP has led to the development of a more comprehensive database for education personnel[[105]](#endnote-39), POM believes that it remains improbable that MoRA will secure ongoing benefit from and be able to participate in a MoEC-led ProDEP in the long-term.

### Sustainability

C2 has laid a number of important foundations, which, when taken together, give rise to a cautious degree of optimism about the future prospects of ProDEP. Of particular note:

* MoEC has demonstrated ownership and commitment. For example, POM has obtained the related special account records that suggest that MoEC originally planned to provide IDR 370 billion in 2015 to expand ProDEP to non-EP districts[[106]](#footnote-68) [[107]](#endnote-40). Furthermore, in addition to having trained 798 participants in the 16 replication districts in 2015, MoEC also completed OJL and In-On-In activities that were to be financed through the GA. Furthermore, its allocation of approximately IDR 100 billion[[108]](#footnote-69) to finance implementation in 24 further districts in 2016 is encouraging[[109]](#endnote-41).
* When MoEC delivered the GoI-financed replication in the 16 districts in 2015 it opted to maintain the whole package[[110]](#footnote-70) [[111]](#endnote-42), therefore safeguarding the integrity of the model.
* PPP is now implemented in over 250 districts with district financing.
* All four ProDEP modalities have been implemented. The direct, cluster based, and OLL modalities have been rolled out with DFAT financing. The district modality is being implemented in MoEC replication districts. Furthermore, during the course of 2015, Component 2 revised Level 1 UoLs based on feedback from participants and to help ensure that the materials remained in line with systemic and individual needs. With all modalities in place, the prospects of ProDEP to reach a broader audience inevitably increase.
* The results of GoI’s teacher competency test (UKG) have become a tool for MoEC and districts to discuss the teaching quality and have created space for an informed debate about a CPD program for teachers. MoEC is currently conducting a principal competency test (UKKS) and this may, in turn, create similar opportunities to discuss the need for and financing of CPD for principals.

## Summary and recommendations

A summary table of component performance by DAC criteria is presented in Table 11, below. The rating scale reflects the requirements of GoA’s Investment Quality Reporting (IQR) and the associated Aid Quality Checks (AQCs), and it is consistent with that used in earlier APPRs. Recommendations for improvement and, in particular, the necessary measures to increase the likelihood of achieving EOPO 2 are provided in Table 12. It is recognised that some recommendations relate to ongoing work and that considerable progress in actioning some of the recommendations may already have been made.

Table 11: Component 2 scorecard

|  |  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
| **DAC Criterion** | **Score 2013** | **Score 2014** | **Score 2015** | **Justification** | **Comments** |
| Relevance | 5 | 5 | 4 | * The Minister of Education and Culture has spoken of the need to improve the quality of principalship and ProDEP is in line with 2016-2019 Renstra targets. * ProDEP is in line with GoA’s broad commitment to adopt a systemic approach to quality improvements but is no longer in line with its preferred support modalities. * The technical foundations remain sound and international evidence suggests that the internal relevance is defensible. |  |
| Efficiency | 3 | 5 | 3 | * Upon receipt of full data in Q2 2016 C2 stakeholders will know if the revised targets for 2015 were met. Notwithstanding, the numbers trained will be significantly lower than the initial expectations captured in the original PAF. * In 2015 implementation was delayed until October because of a range of institutional changes and uncertainties, including MoEC’s restructuring and associated staffing changes. * A series of budget cuts generated uncertainty amongst key decision makers. | * DFAT report that the budget adjustments in themselves did not impinge on C2 efficiency in 2015. |
| Effectiveness | TE | 3 | 3 | * C2 has not generated the critical mass of trained principals that is necessary to trigger change at district level (noting that the EOPO reads ‘Management of schools and Madrasah improves in *participating districts’)*. * The EOPO *may* be achieved at some point after C2 concludes in June 2016. * The existing evidence base points to ProDEP’s potential as a driver of change but understanding of its actual effect is limited because of the absence of a midline or endline to complement the Baseline conducted in 2014 (and reported in 2015). | * ProDEP is still not tailored to principals’ appraisal and career development. |
| Impact | TE | 4 | 3 | * The uncertainty about the actual effectiveness of ProDEP and its limited reach to date inevitably limit any certainty about long-term impact. * MoEC’s apparent interest in sustaining and/or developing, *inter alia*, OLL, quality assurance technology and an on-line complaint handling system is encouraging.   The impact on Madrasah will probably fade in time as MoRA’s participation in a MoEC-led professional development system looks circumspect in the long-term. However, there could be a positive long-term effect should MoRA wish to apply ProDEP lessons in the development of its own CPD system. |  |
| Sustainability | 3 | 4 | 4 | * While GoI-financed ProDEP will not be implemented across 250 or more districts in 2016, it is encouraging to see MoEC finance implementation in 40 districts. * The apparent ability and willingness of districts to finance PPP is also encouraging, though the extent to which this will extend to other components of ProDEP (e.g. CPD, SPD) over time is unclear. * The integrity of the ProDEP model is reflected in MoEC’s replication activities. |  |

Table 12: Component 2 key findings and recommendations

| **Findings** | **Recommendations** | **Level of urgency** | **Prime Responsibility** |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |
| There is insufficient evidence to date of ProDEP’s ability to make significant contribution to improvements to quality of school and Madrasah management (see §3.4.3). | R3: The performance of ProDEP be assessed with due consideration given to the relative merits of its Units of Learning, components (e.g. CPD, SPD), and delivery modalities (e.g. direct, on-line learning) that are particularly applied in GoI financed districts. | \*\*\* | MoEC with DFAT |
| R4: The relevant findings and implications of ACDP’s *Evaluation of Principals Preparation Program* (ACDP 042) for ProDEP be identified and applied. | \*\*\* | MoEC with DFAT and ACDP |
| R5: Light-touch reviews of the GoI-financed ProDEP “replication” in 2016 be undertaken on a frequent and ongoing basis so that real-time learnings are captured and applied, and such that more evidence becomes available about ProDEP’s ongoing relevance and effectiveness. | \*\*\* | MoEC with DFAT |
| Continued uncertainty about the willingness and ability of the sector to adapt or adopt ProDEP (see §3.4.5). | R6: Subsequent to assessing the performance of ProDEP, a revised sustainability plan should be developed that reflects experience to date and emerging opportunities at national and district levels to adopt a properly timed and sequenced ProDEP that is relevant to the needs of the sector and key decision makers. | \*\*\* | MoEC with DFAT |
| R7: Consideration should be given to the provision of DFAT-financed technical assistance in support of the appraisal and, where applicable, further development of ProDEP. | \*\* | DFAT |

NB: Red (\*\*\*) - high urgency; orange (\*\*) - medium urgency; green (\*) - low urgency


# Component 3: Islamic School Accreditation

## Introduction

### The EP investment

Component 3 of the EP seeks to improve the quality of Madrasah service provision in line with National Education Standards (NES) in targeted districts (see Figure 3). Specifically, Component 3 was designed to support the Ministry of Religious Affairs (MoRA) to achieve one of its Renstra targets: that all Madrasah are accredited against the NES, with a minimum of 50% at Level ‘B’, by the end of the 2014-2015 academic year. In turn, the EP is expected to contribute to improvements in the quality of Madrasah education services.

Figure 3: C3 logic architecture



The EP investment is deemed to be important for a number of reasons:

* Madrasah provide education services to an estimated 13.2% of the primary and secondary school age population[[112]](#footnote-71). They are also one of the main providers of education in less advantaged communities.
* There are an estimated 38,315 Madrasah (MI and MTs), of which 92% are private[[113]](#endnote-43).
* There are significant disparities in the quality of education between public schools/Madrasah and private Madrasah[[114]](#endnote-44).
* Only accredited Madrasah are permitted to have students participate in national examinations and provide graduation certificates that enable students to apply for other formal educational opportunities. This factor is of increased significance in the context of current GoI efforts to mainstream 12 years of universal education.

The EP supports the work of the MoRA Directorate General for Islamic Education (PENDIS) through the Directorate for Madrasah Education (PENMA). Program implementation is managed at the provincial level by various contracted Sub-National Implementation Partners (SNIPs).

Component 3 is the only component of the EP that is expected to deliver two distinct results (see Figure 3). The first is the preparation for accreditation of approximately 1,500 Madrasah in 13 provinces (EOCO 3.1). Targeted Madrasah receive technical assistance and support from contracted SNIPs in each province, in addition to financial support in the form of Block Grants of AUD 10,000. A smaller number (n = 132) of additional *non-targeted* Madrasah have also been incorporated into EOCO 3.1 activities. These institutions have been beneficiaries of SNIP training and technical assistance only (i.e. they did not receive Block Grants). The selection of non-targeted Madrasah was at the discretion of SNIP and based on the condition that they met requirements for support (i.e. passed the verification assessment conducted during scoping exercises), and exhibited sufficient capacity and independence to respond positively to a ‘training-only’ support package.

The second result expected of C3 – approved in early 2014 during a revision of the EP logic architecture – is the strengthening of systems for the purposes of expanding and sustaining improvements in the quality of Madrasah service provision (EOCO 3.2). EOCO 3.2 requires a program of work that tests and promotes a system-wide model for strengthening Madrasah quality. This has included the promotion of district government funding mechanisms for private Madrasah, support to MoRA in the design of scaled-up accreditation programs funded through the state budget, and the promotion of the C3 SNIP-Mentor- Madrasah ‘system’ of continuous quality improvement.

### The delivery mechanisms and support provided by the EP

C3 activities are managed and implemented by the SSQ managing contractor in close collaboration with the Directorate for Madrasah Education and relevant sub-directorates, the Bureau of Planning, , and the Provincial (*Kanwil*) and District (*Kandep*) Offices of MoRA. Block Grants are transferred directly to SNIPs and targeted Madrasah by the SSQ managing contractor. Technical assistance is provided by the SSQ managing contractor directly to MoRA (national, provincial and district) and to the contracted SNIPs. SNIPs facilitate the delivery of training programs and provide technical assistance, primarily in the form of mentoring to Madrasah.

## Context

The context in which C3 operated was relatively unchanged in 2015. The program remained largely unaffected by a significant reformulation of GoA’s overseas aid framework and related reductions in spending on Indonesian programs (see Section 6.3).

The GoI continued to support C3 activities throughout 2015. The new MoRA Strategic Plan (*Renstra*) for 2015-2019 was developed during 2015. The plan includes ongoing commitments to private Madrasah accreditation[[115]](#footnote-72). The *Renstra* also included targets for MDC[[116]](#footnote-73) development, thereby opening the way for these provincial level entities to receive routine funding from the state budget upon the finalisation of implementing regulations.

The context for C3 activities at the provincial level also exhibited a strong degree of continuity in 2015. Four of the seven SNIPs engaged for Phase 3 (October 2014 – December 2015) had participated in one or two of the preceding phases of the program. This previous experience resulted in improved levels of SNIP efficiency during Phase 3[[117]](#endnote-45). This, in turn, created space for the allocation of additional assistance for new SNIPs in Riau, in West Java and in West Kalimantan and for refresher programs for Phase 2 Madrasah that were scheduled for assessment visitations in 2015.

The Grand Design has not yet significantly affected the MoRA landscape in terms of its strategic priorities. The original expectation was that the Grand Design would inform the design and content of the 2015-2019 *Renstra*. With the *Renstra* preceding the Grand Design in order of production, the latter was repositioned as a ‘road-map’ for *Renstra* implementation. At the time of writing, the question of how the Grand Design road map might shape *Renstra* implementation was still the subject of ongoing discussions between MoRA and DFAT[[118]](#endnote-46).

## Achievements

### With regards to EOCO 3.1

To date C3 has supported 1,500 targeted Madrasah and 132 non-targeted Madrasah for accreditation preparation. The final phase of the program involved 416 targeted Madrasah only[[119]](#footnote-74). Accreditation assessment outcomes for the final phase were very high, with 96% of Madrasah attaining an A or B ranking[[120]](#footnote-75). Results were particularly impressive given the fact that changes to BAN-S/M timetables in 2015 had reduced the time available for accreditation preparation training and negotiations with provincial governments for the purpose of securing funds for assessment visitations. While the new assessment schedule potentially compromised the ability of C3 to achieve accreditation targets for Phase 3, the response of the SSQ managing contractor was both timely and appropriate[[121]](#footnote-76).

Table 13: C3 Phases of Support to Madrasah

|  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |
| **Phase** | **Madrasah type** | | **Mentors** |
| **Targeted** | **Non-targeted** |
| Phase 1 (2012-2013) | 565 | 24 | 90 |
| Phase 2 (2013-2014) | 519 | 108 | 102 |
| Phase 3 (2014-2015) | 416 | 0 | 81 |
| **TOTAL** | **1,500** | **132** | **273** |

Source: SSQ Component 3 management team

### With regards to EOCO 3.2

The year saw the realisation of a new Director General of Islamic Education regulation establishing MDCs as components of a nationwide quality assurance system for the Islamic education sector. C3 was heavily involved in the development of this regulation from the point of conceptualisation to final drafting.

MoRA significantly expanded budgetary commitments to its own accreditation programs during 2015. The twin-track *Madrasah Up-Grading Program* saw 153 Madrasah selected for a C3-style support program (track one) and the roll-out of a simplified accreditation support program for 3,000 Madrasah (track two)[[122]](#footnote-77). The scope of these programs represented a 4,000% increase on the number of Madrasah initially targeted for MoRA-financed quality improvement activities in 2015[[123]](#endnote-47). C3 provided technical assistance to both programs in the form of modified training modules, assistance in the formulation of technical guidelines (*juknis*), and MDC training.

At DFAT’s request, C3 also successfully delivered a pilot program for inclusive education in the private Madrasah sector in the final months of 2015. The initiative spoke strongly to draft provisions within the 2015-19 MoRA Renstra concerning inclusive education. Assessments of the program are pending. However, interim outcomes suggest that MoRA counterparts and participating Madrasah were responsive to the initiative[[124]](#endnote-48).

## Analysis

### Relevance

EOCO 3.1 – *targeted Madrasah are ready for accreditation* - remained relevant to GoI in 2015. MoRA Policy and Strategy Guidelines for 2015-2019 include an ongoing technical and financial commitment to accreditation activities in the Islamic education sector. For the Madrasah sector specifically, guidelines evidence a shift from a focus on the *preparation* for accreditation (i.e. getting Madrasah accredited in the first instance) to *improvement* upon existing accreditation rankings[[125]](#endnote-49). The 2015-2019 RENSTRA accreditation benchmarks were raised by 20-30 percentage points. The revised target is for 80% of MI and 70% of MTs and MA/MAK to have a minimum B ranking by 2019 (the previous *Renstra* had set a target of 50%)[[126]](#endnote-50). This revision sees ministerial goals more closely aligned with the achievable outcomes demonstrated by C3 accreditation activities. The continued relevance of EOCO 3.1 was further evidenced by MoRA funding commitments to its *Madrasah Up-Grading Program* (see Section 4.3.2).

The relevance of EOCO 3.2 – *the system for Madrasah quality improvement is strengthened –* was best demonstrated by the drafting and issuance of a regulation to establish MDCs as quality assurance entities for the Islamic education sector. The regulation strengthens the existing provincial MDC network via the allocation of routine funding for permanent secretariats and the establishment of a central coordinating unit[[127]](#footnote-78).

For DFAT, the high degree of autonomy accorded to the SSQ Managing Contractor during 2015 suggests that the component remained relevant in the context of GoA’s new aid paradigm (i.e. there appeared to be no need to intervene and adjust the existing work plan). While the C3 budget was cut by AUD 11 million in 2014 on the basis of changes to the scope of the program[[128]](#footnote-79), no further revisions were made during 2015. In many ways, further revisions would have been at odds with a program that neatly bridged the twin pillars of the new paradigm: private sector engagement and human development. The program was also relevant in terms of the premium that the new aid paradigm placed upon the public diplomacy aspect of aid investments. Interviews conducted for this report revealed a strong appreciation of the goodwill that had been generated within MoRA as a result of C3 activities. This was matched by the strengthening of Australia-Indonesia relationships at the district level via a comprehensive series of closing ceremonies that secured high-level ministerial attendance as well as support from key provincial and district government stakeholders.

The more significant factor underpinning the relative autonomy of C3 operations was the relevance of the component modality during a year when the accountability of aid investments came under increased scrutiny. The managing contractor-SNIP modality of C3 provided a secure framework for the close monitoring of aid spending. Evidence of improved financial management practices in late 2014 enhanced the accountability, and therefore the relevance, of the component.

The internal relevance of C3 investments to the attainment of the End-Of-Partnership Outcome (EOPO 3) - *improved quality of Madrasah service provision* – improved significantly in 2015. As was noted in the introduction to this section, C3 contains two EOCO-level objectives. The second EOCO - *the system for Madrasah quality improvement is strengthened –* was added at the mid-point of the program in response to concerns about the value for money of C3 should it be restricted to supporting approximately 1,500 targeted and non-targeted Madrasah and allied concerns that accreditation preparation activities were unlikely to lead to general improvements in the quality of Madrasah service provision at the district level. For the duration of 2014, progress towards the two EOCOs was unbalanced. In the 2014 APPR, it was noted that activities related to EOCO 3.2 were only producing ‘signs’ of progress[[129]](#endnote-51). By the end of 2015, however, the two component outcomes evinced improved synergy. The success of C3 in producing high accreditation outcomes stimulated ministerial buy-in for more complex activities aimed at strengthening elements of the Islamic education system. The degree of C3 influence upon such activities (e.g. Madrasah upgrading, the formulation of a regulation on MDCs, drafting of the Grand Design) was a function of demonstrated achievements in preparing both targeted and non-targeted Madrasah for accreditation[[130]](#footnote-80).

### Efficiency

From a delivery perspective, the implementation of Phases 2 and 3 has been managed well. Table 14 shows that strong progress was made against 2015 PMF targets. C3 met or exceeded targets for six key milestones.

Table 14: C3 Achievements against PMF Targets to the End of 2015 (cumulative)

| **Output**  **Indicators\*** | **Milestones** | |
| --- | --- | --- |
| **2015 Target** | **Achievement** |
| Number of training sessions provided per year by SNIP to Madrasah | 10,500 | 11,456 (109%) |
| Number of mentoring visits per year provided to targeted Madrasah | 30,000 | 42,510 (142%) |
| Number of Madrasah supported by MoRA with quality improvement activities (other than EP) | 80 | 3,233 (4,041%) |
| Number of provinces in which there is evidence of improvement of networking and relationships between sub-national stakeholders | 13 | 13 (100%) |
| Number of KKM trained by SNIPs in targeted districts | 180 | 202 (112%) |
| Number of targeted Madrasah who improve their overall score by at least one level against accreditation criteria | 1,350 | 1,442 (107%) |

Source: SSQ Managing Contractor

\* Indicators are for targeted Madrasah only.

From a financial perspective, component expenditure came back on track during fiscal year 2014-2015 following an underspend in the previous fiscal year. All Phase 2 grant funds were acquitted by December 2014, and the final tranche of Phase 3 grant funding (AUD4.16 million in total) was dispersed in late October 2015[[131]](#endnote-52). Internal and external audits of Phase 2 spending indicated improving levels of financial management capacity in both SNIP and targeted Madrasah. Internal audits of Phase 3 SNIP and a sample of targeted Madrasah produced a number of minor non-compliance issues that were subsequently resolved[[132]](#endnote-53).

Phase 3 saw an improved efficiency dividend in regard to the selection of targeted Madrasah. The 2013 APPR called for improved selection processes in response to the finding that it required almost four times as many resources to improve a Madrasah classified at a B level during mock assessment[[133]](#footnote-81) than what was required for a Madrasah assessed at the TT or C level[[134]](#endnote-54). By this measure, Phase 3 was the most efficient cycle of the program thus far, with 77% of Phase 3 Madrasah ranking at the TT level during mock assessments and 23% at level C.

MoRA’s expansion of its own accreditation upgrading program for 3,000 Madrasah in 2015 enhanced the VFM of C3 investments. While C3 support to targeted and non-targeted Madrasah has produced clear quality improvements, the high unit costs of the C3 model have limited the extent of sectoral impact, as neither C3 nor MoRA could afford to roll it out to all madrasah in the sector. This could raise questions about the VFM of the Component. While the *Madrasah Upgrading program* will not reproduce the depth of quality realised from C3 interventions[[135]](#endnote-55), the program does carry some of the benefits of the C3 approach to a much larger number of beneficiaries.

Concerns regarding the efficiency of uniform block grants for targeted Madrasah and uniform management fees for SNIP did not result in changes to program support models in 2015[[136]](#footnote-82), though POM acknowledges that opportunities for modifications to existing practices for the final phase of the program were limited[[137]](#footnote-83). POM is pleased, however, to see that recommendations for a differentiated block grant model were included in the Grand Design. This is a positive step away from a standardised model in which Madrasah receive the same level of funding support regardless of their current capacity and needs. The Grand Design calls for a proposal-based block grant system with an emphasis on community and district government cost-sharing arrangements[[138]](#footnote-84). This should result in a more equitable and efficient means of allocating limited budgetary resources. However, the effectiveness of proposal-based models relies heavily on the quality and capacity of verification mechanisms. The Grand Design proposes that this role should be assigned to MDCs. The capacity of MDCs to conduct this critical function is both uneven and untested.

Just as block grants were standardised in C3 the SSQ support model delivered a standardised suite of training modules to Madrasah. Considerable efficiencies in program delivery could have been attained by allowing targeted Madrasah to select preferred training modules from a suite of options. MoRA-funded accreditation programs and examples of SNIP service delivery in non-targeted districts suggest that Madrasah do not always require or desire comprehensive training packages[[139]](#footnote-85). Survey data collected for the *EOPO 3 Evaluation Study* (2015) indicated that elements of the C3 training package were not always aligned well with real conditions within supported Madrasah.

The efficiency of EOCO 3.2 delivery improved in 2015. All Phase 3 SNIPs were MDCs. Evidence of improved SNIP competency in the management of grants and evidence of improved levels of networking capital speak strongly to the future viability of MDCs as a national network of quality assurance agencies. It is anticipated that experienced SNIP actors will transition to various roles of influence within a future MoRA quality assurance and training framework[[140]](#footnote-86).

C3 success in generating external funding for Madrasah quality improvement must also be recognised as a valuable form of system strengthening at the community and district level. Madrasah community and foundation contributions during Phase 3 totalled IDR 4.3 billion, with an additional IDR 2.3 billion in MoRA, district government, private sector, and CSO contributions[[141]](#footnote-87). (At the time of writing this equated to about AUD 450,000 and AUD 235,000 respectively). As a proportion of the Phase 3 budget, the value of these external contributions was modest: equal to 20% of the grant funds dispersed to the 416 targeted Madrasah. However, the real value of external funding initiatives resides in the setting of a precedent and in establishing practices. In this respect, C3 has made significant progress in empowering Madrasah to generate external revenue for years to come.

### Effectiveness

When considering the effectiveness of C3, POM seeks to answer the following question: *to what extent and how has EP support improved the quality of Madrasah service provision in targeted districts?* The EP logic architecture indicates that improved quality of Madrasah service provision in targeted districts (EOPO 3) will be achieved by preparing Madrasah for accreditation (EOCO 3.1) and by strengthening the system for Madrasah quality improvement in targeted districts (EOCO 3.2).

Prior to 2015, the effectiveness of C3 was unbalanced. The efficiency of the program as a vehicle for accreditation preparation was unquestionable, but the sectoral footprint of such activities was small: approximately 1,500 out of an estimated 38,315 private, primary and junior secondary Madrasah. While the addition of non-targeted Madrasah to the work plan was a positive boost to the ‘reach’ of C3 activities, systems that might serve to overcome the design limitation of EOCO 3.1 (limited sectoral impact at the district level) were considered to be ‘uncoordinated’ and too focused on accreditation-related tasks[[142]](#endnote-56).

The story of C3 effectiveness at the conclusion of 2015 is a more balanced one. A variety of C3 strategies matured during 2015 with the result that a key element of the C3 approach – the SNIP-Madrasah-Mentor model – was recognised by MoRA and provincial offices as a proven means of improving the quality of service delivery at the district level.

***Attainment of EOCO 3.1***

C3 accreditation preparation mechanisms were highly organised by Phase 3 of the program. Four of the seven SNIP/provinces engaged in Phase 3 had participated in previous phases of the program. In these provinces, the implementation of activities followed established patterns. As with previous years, significant energies were committed to ensuring the entry of targeted Madrasah on BAP-S/M assessment quotas. While this activity technically exceeded the mandate to merely *prepare* Madrasah for accreditation (i.e. the listing and financing of prepared Madrasah was designed to be a MoRA responsibility), the value-addition gained by ensuring that targeted Madrasah were placed on annual assessment quotas outweighed the costs of additional managing contractor inputs.

Nonetheless, POM considers that successful interventions in approximately 1,500 targeted and untargeted Madrasah are unlikely to stimulate broad improvements in service provision *at the district level (see the EOPO 3 statement).* Private Madrasah are often ‘islands’ within education jurisdictions[[143]](#footnote-88). Findings from the *EOPO 3 Evaluation Study* (2015) showed that they do not possess strong horizontal linkages with other Madrasah (both private and state) or district-level professional associations[[144]](#footnote-89). The C3 team responded well to this concern by intensifying networking strategies during Phase 3 and boosting training activities for cluster-level Madrasah Principal Working Groups or KKM[[145]](#footnote-90). While it is anticipated that these activities may generate district-level effects in certain instances, it is typically the case that participation in voluntary mechanisms dissipates rapidly upon the cessation of program support or the absence of incentives.

***Attainment of EOCO 3.2***

POM’s view of the EOCO 3.2 work stream twelve months ago was that ‘it is unlikely that the EOCO 3.2 work stream has, as of now, made much contribution to the achievement of EOPO 3[[146]](#endnote-57)’. The situation at the conclusion of 2015 is quite the reverse. What were previously ‘signs of progress’ have garnered sufficient momentum to be regarded as important contributions to the achievement of the EOPO. They include:

* Targeted technical assistance to MoRA for the design of MoRA replication initiatives.
* The development of the MDC regulation.
* The adoption or adaptation of C3 practices as components of the MoRA Grand Design.

***Attainment of EOPO 3***

The EP logic assumes that the attainment of the EOCOs is necessary for the achievement of EOPO 3. The position POM adopted in the 2014 APPR was that insufficient progress towards the development of Madrasah quality support systems (EOCO 3.2) compromised the likelihood that EOPO 3 would be attained.

POM’s assessment in 2015 is that improvements in systemic strengthening have led to the attainment of EOPO 3. This verdict has been made on the basis of the following factors:

* The expansion of MoRA-funded accreditation activities increased the critical mass of C3-related quality improvement activities in targeted districts.
* The formalisation of MDCs as state-funded entities created a mechanism by which quality improvement services were no longer *ad hoc* in nature.
* Local financing initiatives expanded the impact of C3 quality improvement activities at the district-level.

POM’s assessment of performance against EOPO 3 was additionally shaped by an awareness that ‘district-level impact’ within the non-decentralised MoRA system is a derivative of provincial level influence. C3 actors successfully cultivated strong working relationships with a range of provincial level entities such as MoRA provincial offices, MDCs, and provincial offices of the National Assessment Agency. These relationships generated possibilities for systematic impacts at the district level, as provincial entities set the agenda for the implementation of activities at the district level in the MoRA system. By contrast, one of C3’s main initiatives to generate district level impact from the bottom up – the promotion of district government financing options – produced highly uneven outcomes. Part of the reason for this was the lack of capacity and authority within MoRA district offices[[147]](#footnote-91). In hindsight, the design of C3 assessment framework would have benefitted from a more acute awareness of the relative points of strength within the MoRA system.

### Impact

By the conclusion of Phase 3 in December 2015, the long-term sectoral impact of C3 had grown substantially. The initial 1,500 Madrasah targeted for accreditation preparation only represented 4% of an estimated 38,315 private MI and MTs[[148]](#endnote-58). However, in 2015, MoRA supported 153 Madrasah for track one of the *Madrasah Up-Grading Program*, and 3,000 Madrasah for the trimmed-down track two variant. Both strategies were supported by C3 with technical assistance and training. Budget commitments were signed-off in 2015 to extend track two support to a further 3,000 Madrasah in 2016. Combined, these figures show that the total number of Madrasah that may be said to have felt the imprint of C3 amount to one-fifth of the estimated number of private Madrasah nationally[[149]](#footnote-92). C3 modules and best practices were additionally disseminated to the Directorate for Religious Teaching in Public Schools (PAIS) for the development of active learning modules for religious teachers[[150]](#endnote-59). The manner in which the program has, contrary to design, contributed to programs that have generated significant critical mass is highly commendable.

It is anticipated that the impact of C3 interventions upon the administrative competency of targeted and non-targeted Madrasah will hold. This is important, as accreditation status must be renewed every five years. Competitive pressures (i.e. competition for students) provide an incentive for institutions to maintain, if not increase, their accreditation ranking.

Interventions designed to build the capacity of targeted and non-participating Madrasah in soliciting external funding (e.g. from district governments) are also likely to have a long-term impact. Here again, there are clear incentives to tap opportunities for additional funding. C3 efforts to clarify the legal avenues available to district governments for the support of private Madrasah should produce long-term outcomes. However, it should be noted that the incentives that drive district government funding are contingent upon the prevailing political context. As such, long term impacts are likely to be uneven and irregular.

It is less likely that training investments in teaching and pedagogy will have a long term impact. Over the course of C3, teachers have generally stood out as the most eager recipients of program support. *EOPO 3 Evaluation Study* (2015) data indicate that PAIKEM[[151]](#footnote-93) training was frequently cited by recipients as a breakthrough in the improvement of classroom practices[[152]](#footnote-94). However, survey data indicated that Madrasah did not commit funds – including block grant funds – to professional development activities. Most teachers had never experienced any form of professional training prior to C3. Participation in professional cluster associations (e.g. KKM, MGMP or KKG) was minimal. In the absence of any pre-existing appetite from Madrasah to support and prioritise teacher training, and the poor integration of private Madrasah teachers into cluster associations, it is unlikely that C3 investments in this area will be sustained.

The long-term impact of ‘locking-in’ MDCs as vehicles for the development of a quality assurance framework for the Islamic education sector has come at the price of excluding proven, effective non-government partners. On a number of key indicators, Al-Maarif, the educational arm of the Islamic organisation Nahdlatul Ulama (NU) was one of the most effective SNIPs for C3[[153]](#footnote-95). The group independently rolled-out Madrasah-Based Management (MBM)[[154]](#footnote-96) training to an additional 1,000 Madrasah within its Madrasah network and was responsible for successfully lobbying a number of district governments to commit funding to the private Madrasah sector (C3 support being instrumental to this process). Al-Maarif and other large Islamic organisations (Muhammadiyah, *Dewan Da’wah Indonesia* or DDI) have a significant presence and status in the private Madrasah sector. However, the lack of stakeholder status accorded to such organisations in the future may serve to undermine the impact of state-driven initiatives.

### Sustainability

C3 contributions to the development of MoRA’s *Education Management Information System* (EMIS) database have been of sufficient weight to provide a sustained benefit to the Ministry’s capacity to accurately map the private Madrasah sector. C3 strengthened the system by supporting the implementation of the Director-General Decree concerning Technical Guidelines for Madrasah Establishment[[155]](#footnote-97). This included the development of a software application for the online registration of Madrasah and supporting operations manuals, and training in the application’s use for MoRA staff. The data produced from the application will be synchronised with EMIS.

The speed with which the Madrasah sector is expanding (which will most likely increase with the introduction of 12 years of universal education[[156]](#footnote-98)) creates a strong imperative for an accurate registration system. The net effect should be the enhancement of MoRA’s capacity to fashion evidence-based policy. C3 initiatives for the synchronisation of EMIS with BAN S/M systems should add value to this process.

The production of a regulation whereby MDCs have been established as quality assurance entities with routine funding is the most visible sustainable outcome of C3. Research conducted in 2015 for POM’s *Comparative Study* of *Madrasah Development Centres* (2015) showed that the absence of routine funding to MDCs had resulted in a ‘project mentality’ whereby levels of activity were solely determined by the availability of *ad hoc* funding[[157]](#footnote-99). As a result, MDC activities were unable to address systemic weaknesses within the Madrasah sector. The provision of routine funding should provide a starting point for more structured and coordinated interventions.

The successful institutionalisation of MDCs is, however, only the first step in a process. POM has a number of concerns about how effectively these institutions can pick up from where SNIPs have left off.

* Closer integration into the MoRA bureaucracy carries the risk that the centres will lose the budgetary autonomy and flexibility that characterised the most successful SNIP under C3.
* There is also no indication of how MoRA will address the uneven capacity of MDCs across the archipelago[[158]](#footnote-100). The flat rate of grant support to SNIP during Phase 3, for example, resulted in a lower standard of service delivery in areas where the money simply did not go as far[[159]](#footnote-101).
* Investments in MDC strengthening at the central and provincial levels have not been matched at the point of service delivery to individual Madrasah. Under C3, individually appointed and trained mentors occupied a pivotal position at the point of service delivery in Madrasah[[160]](#footnote-102). Under proposed schemes, cluster associations such as KKM are scheduled to perform this role[[161]](#footnote-103). The capacity and willingness of these associations to engage with private Madrasah is untested. Anecdotal evidence suggests that they are generally not fit for purpose.

POM’s final concern regarding the sustainability of C3 outcomes relates to the current status of the Grand Design. Various proposals contained within this document advocate for the adoption or adaptation of C3 techniques as core elements of a quality improvement framework. However, the Grand Design appears to have lost momentum. The formation of a steering committee in September 2015 was a positive signal. However, at the time of writing, a meeting of the committee has yet to be convened and no funding commitments have been announced.

## Summary and recommendations

A summary table of component performance by DAC criteria is presented in Table 15, below. The rating scale reflects the requirements of GoA’s Investment Quality Reporting (IQR) and the associated Aid Quality Checks (AQCs), and it is consistent with that used in earlier APPRs. Recommendations for improvement and, in particular, what measures are needed to increase the likelihood of achieving EOPO 3 are provided in Table 16. It is recognised that some recommendations relate to ongoing work and that considerable progress in actioning some of the recommendations may already have been made.

Table 15: Component 3 scorecard

|  |  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
| **DAC Criterion** | **Score 2013** | **Score 2014** | **Score 2015** | **Justification** | **Comments** |
| Relevance | 4 | 5 | 6 | * MoRA significantly expanded its *Madrasah Up-Grading Program* and was active in the development of key C3 system strengthening initiatives (e.g. MDC regulation). * External relevance for GoA was, in some ways, a result of C3’s fortuitous ‘fit’ with the ‘new aid paradigm’. This scenario was effectively leveraged. * Internal relevance improved as the two internal components of C3 – accreditation activities and system strengthening – achieved greater synergy. | * The high score for relevance is warranted on the basis that weaknesses identified in the internal relevance of the program were addressed in 2015. This action encouraged greater MoRA buy-in for C3 initiatives. |
| Efficiency | 5 | 4 | 5 | * Accreditation preparation activities showed increased efficiency in terms of targeting and the component responded well to unexpected changes in the BAN-S/M assessment schedule. * Expenditure was placed back on track and audits indicated improvements in SNIP financial management capacity. * Inefficiencies produced by standardised block grants and training packages persisted. * Tangible results stemmed from EOCO 3.2 activities. | * Previous assessment for this category was held back by a lack of tangible progress in regard to EOCO 3.2. The strong results recorded for EOCO 3.2 in 2015 warrant the improved score. |
| Effectiveness | 4 | 4 | 5 | * The design limitations of EOCO 3.1 in producing district-level results were partially alleviated by C3 support for a scaled-up MoRA accreditation program. * Limited district-level results were ameliorated in part by strong impact in targeted provinces. * The institutionalisation of MDCs as quality assurance bodies speaks to the EOPO that the quality of Madrasah service provision improves. | * The increase in the score reflects the shift from C3 primarily operating as a good ‘mechanism’ for preparing Madrasah for accreditation, to one where various other elements of the assistance package were tied together to form ‘an integrated approach’. |
| Impact | TE | 3 | 4 | * Strong likelihood of positive long-term impacts for the administrative/managerial capacity of targeted and non-targeted Madrasah. Low likelihood that C3 investments in improving classroom practices will take root in the absence of ongoing CPD for teachers and principals. * C3 support to MoRA-funded accreditation programs resulted in a higher degree of sectoral impact than originally anticipated. * The long-term value of C3 investments’ district financing and Madrasah self-financing is a positive story but the impact is highly uneven. * The lack of stakeholder status accorded to mass Islamic organisations with a significant presence in the private Madrasah sector limits the potential impact of quality improvement initiatives and excludes a potentially valuable pool of expertise. | * A large part of the increased effectiveness of C3 was related to system strengthening initiatives. By definition, such activities have enhanced the long-term impact of the program. * A score of 4 reflects the sizeable challenge that remains in improving teacher competency and in establishing productive relationships between newly-empowered MoRA agencies and key stakeholders in the private Madrasah sector (e.g. NU/Al-Maarif). |
| Sustainability | 2 | 3 | 4 | * Investments in the strengthening of MoRA information systems improve future capacity for evidence-based decision making. * Successful strategies to boost external funding for the private Madrasah sector speak strongly to improved sustainability. * C3 investments in SNIP/MDC capacity are sustained by the new MDC regulation. However, benefits are likely to be unevenly distributed as there are no clear mechanisms to provide added support to poorly resourced MDCs. * The capacity and willingness of professional associations at the cluster level to act as agents for service delivery to individual Madrasah is untested. * The extent to which the “Grand Design” will inform MoRA’s strategic priorities over the next five years is unclear. | * An increase in the score for sustainability reflects C3 success in ‘locking-in’ investments in MDCs via the production of a new regulation. C3 assistance in the production of other regulatory products (e.g. technical guidelines) for MoRA programs also sustains technical input investments. * Whilst sustainability outcomes are now viewed as satisfactory, building greater equity into those outcomes requires ongoing work. |

Table 16: Component 3 key findings and recommendations

| **Findings** | **Recommendations** | **Level of urgency** | **Prime Responsibility** |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |
| Various forms of external funding (i.e. local communities, local government, CSR) are available to support quality improvements in private Madrasah (see §4.4.2). | R8: Lessons should be captured about how external funding has been secured for Madrasah quality improvement measures. | \*\*\* | MoRA |
| The extent to which the Grand Design will be adopted as a road map for the implementation of the 2015-2019 is unknown (see §4.4.5). | R9: The first meeting of the steering committee for the Grand Design should be convened at the earliest convenience to identify priorities and forms of further technical assistance that may accelerate implementation of the Grand Design. | \*\*\* | MoRA |
| MDC development strategies lack an equity component. The capacity of MDCs varies significantly between provinces, as does the cost of providing support to Madrasah (see §4.4.5). | R10: The merits of introducing a variable-funding mechanism to improve MDC capacity should be considered under existing financing plans for MDCs. | \*\* | MoRA |
| EOPO 3 evaluation indicated an inconclusive relationship between block grants and quality improvement, but a more conclusive relationship between training and quality improvement (see §4.4.2). | R11: The efficacy and size of block grants as a stimulus for quality improvement should be assessed. Block grants earmarked for training programs are an option that should be investigated. | \*\* | MoRA |
| Service delivery mechanisms for private Madrasah have an impact when they are fit for the purpose (i.e. mentors). There are concerns that cluster-based professional organisations (e.g. KKM) do not meet this description (see §4.4.3). | R12: The suitability and performance of Madrasah Working Groups (KKM) in facilitating MoRA’s Madrasah Upgrading Program should be evaluated. | \*\* | MoRA |
| The madrasah sector appears to be amenable to the incorporation of social inclusion strategies in education policy and programs. | R13: The findings of the social inclusion pilot program should be assessed in order to better understand how the Islamic education section might take a lead in social inclusion strategies. | \* | MoRA |
| MoRA’s uptake of C3 initiatives has sought to bring private Madrasah under the closer supervision of MoRA. Potential exists for resistance from a sector that is defined by its independence from state oversight (see §4.4.4). | R14: Consideration should be given to involving representatives of non-state organisations (e.g. Al Ma’arif) in decision-making about private Madrasah quality improvement. | \* | MoRA |

Legend: Red (\*\*\*) - high urgency; orange (\*\*) - medium urgency; green (\*) - low urgency

# Component 4: Analytical and Capacity Development Partnership

## Introduction

### The EP investment

Component 4 of the EP seeks to promote the use of evidence in the development and implementation of education sector policies, plans and budgets. It does so through the activities of the Analytical and Capacity Development Partnership (ACDP): a facility that seeks to “promote education sector-wide policy research and dialogue”[[162]](#endnote-60). The ACDP responds to requests made by relevant GoI ministries, most notably Bappenas, MoEC and MoRA. It does so through two types of activities[[163]](#endnote-61):

* The delivery of demand-driven research and technical support, e.g. technical studies, reviews and assessments[[164]](#footnote-104); technical papers and briefs[[165]](#footnote-105); and, training[[166]](#footnote-106).
* The organisation of technical meetings, focus group discussions and workshops at the request of GoI stakeholders[[167]](#footnote-107).

These are delivered within three output areas, namely:

* Legislative and regulatory reforms.
* Capacity development and organisational change.
* Information and communication systems.

Participating decision-makers are expected to utilise ACDP analytical work in relevant policy, planning and budgeting processes (the End of Component Outcome) and then incorporate ACDP evidence in relevant education sector policies, regulation, plans and budgets (the End of Partnership Outcome 4). This, in turn, is expected to make a contribution to the three goals of the EP, most notably *Goal 3: Education sector governance improves*.

### The delivery mechanisms and support provided by the EP

The Government of Australia and the European Union (EU) provide a total of €34.6 million[[168]](#footnote-108) to support implementation of the ACDP. The Government of Indonesia provides further contributions to the value of USD 5m in the form of office accommodation, transport, and remuneration and *per diems* for counterpart staff.

The ACDP Technical Oversight Group (ATOG) is co-chaired by the Deputy Minister of Human Resources and Culture in Bappenas, the Head of Balitbang (MoEC), and the Director General of Islamic Education (MoRA). The ATOG is scheduled to meet quarterly and is responsible for, *inter alia*, reviewing and approving ACDP’s annual work plan, approving reports, and organizing technical dialogue between GoI, DFAT and the EU. ATOG membership includes senior officials from MoEC, MoRA, Bappenas, MoF, MoHA, DFAT and the EU.

ACDP’s executing agency is MoEC’s National Office for Research and Development (Balitbang), with its Head acting as Director of the ACDP. The ACDP Program Manager, who is the Head of the Centre for Research and Policy (*Puslitjak)* at the *Balitbang*, is responsible for day-to-day management of the program. This includes preparing the annual work plans and budgets and coordinating dissemination and publication of ACDP reports.

The Asian Development Bank (ADB) is responsible for managing and administering the ACDP on behalf of the *Balitbang*. From 2011 to 2014, the ACDP Secretariat was comprised of an Operational Management Team (OMT) and a Core Advisory Team (CAT). The OMT provided administrative and management support services such that the agreed activities and outputs could be delivered in a timely and professional manner, while the CAT supported the ACDP Program Director and Program Manager with the preparation and implementation of ACDP activities.

Following the Mid-Term Review of October 2014 the ADB restructured the ACDP Secretariat in early 2015 with the aim of improving its efficiency and effectiveness. While the new structure retains the operational and technical streams, the technical function now comprises two teams: a core advisory team and a knowledge management team[[169]](#endnote-62). Until the end of 2015 the Secretariat maintained its earlier leadership structure, i.e. a Team Leader for the technical team and a further Team Leader for its operational team[[170]](#footnote-109).

All contract activities are procured through a competitive bidding process either among prequalified Indefinite Delivery Contracts (IDC) consortia or individually recruited consultants.

## Context

The ACDP started in January 2011 and was scheduled to end on 31 December 2015. The Government of Indonesia requested an extension of ACDP at the ATOG meeting held in July 2014. This was followed up with a formal written request to DFAT and the EU in December 2014. At the ATOG in December 2014, the EU and DFAT confirmed their ‘in-principle support’ for a no-cost extension[[171]](#endnote-63). However, at the ATOG meeting held on 18 March 2015, DFAT stated that it would not be extending its support beyond December 2015 because “the foreign minister [had] not decided on the forward budget or ways of supporting Indonesia”[[172]](#endnote-64). The EU conveyed its continued commitment to a no-cost extension and until such a point that the funds would be exhausted (assumed to be by the end of 2016 or June 2017)[[173]](#endnote-65). The no-cost extension of EU support to ACDP required an amendment to the GoI-EU Financing Agreement followed by an amendment to the EU-ADB Contribution Agreement[[174]](#endnote-66). A formal request was made by the Ministry of Finance to the EU in September 2015.

In November 2015 DFAT opted to support the extension in 2016-17, specifically by not recouping unspent or uncommitted money from its earlier AUD 20m disbursement to the ADB[[175]](#endnote-67). However, it opted not to release its final tranche of AUD 5m, thereby reducing its overall commitment from AUD 25m to AUD 20m. DFAT opted to remain committed to ACDP on the basis that it felt that the performance of both the ADB and the Secretariat had improved during the course of 2015, that the ADB had increased its managerial oversight of the ACDP, that actual and potential results were showing greater promise, and in light of the ‘political upside’ offered by continued involvement[[176]](#endnote-68). There is also a suggestion that in mid-November 2015 the Indonesian Minister of Education and Culture requested a continuation of Australian support to the ACDP[[177]](#endnote-69).

The EU-ADB Contribution Agreement was revised in December 2015, formally signalling the extension to ACDP. DFAT’s support to the 18-month extension was formalised in February 2016[[178]](#footnote-110).

## Achievements

At the end of December 2015 ACDP had completed 34 studies. A further six studies or activities of a similar nature were ongoing[[179]](#endnote-70). Together, these 40 activities constitute about USD 30m of contracted commitments (see Table 17).

Table 17: Status as of 31 December 2015

|  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |
| **Theme** | **Status**  **End 2013** | **Status**  **End 2014** | **Status**  **End 2015** |
| **Value of contracted commitments (USD)\*** | 19,200,137 | 27,637,120 | 30,272,057 |
| **# of person-months consultancy procured** | 687  of which 140 person months (20%) are for international TA and 547 person months (80%) are for national TA | 1,090  of which 223 person months (21%) are for international TA and 867 person months (79%) are for national TA | 1,350  of which 249 person months (18%) are for international TA and 1,101 person months (82%) are for national TA |

\* i.e. in those studies where one or more than one lead agency is named. As such, the totals exceeds 40 studies and 100%

Source: POM calculations based on ACDP’s Six-Monthly Progress Report of mid-2015 and as reviewed by John Virtue (ACDP) in March 2016

With regards to the completion of studies, notable achievements in 2015 included:

* Submission of the final *Overview of Islamic Education Sub-Sector in Indonesia* to MoRA’s Directorate General of Islamic Education in May 2015 (ACDP 021). The study offers a comprehensive overview of the Indonesian Islamic Education system, including strategic issues such as access, quality, management and financing. Study outputs have been used by MoRA to prepare the Islamic Education Strategic Plan 2015-2019. The report was launched and disseminated as a book in Q4 2015[[180]](#endnote-71).
* Successful conclusion of policy research on behalf of the Provincial Coordinating Team for Aceh Education Development (TK-PPA) (ACDP 036). Even though the three policy studies[[181]](#footnote-111) had to be substantially revised and improved in 2015, Aceh Government stakeholders have demonstrated high levels of commitment to the studies and to the consultation processes[[182]](#endnote-72).
* Submission of the *Final Evaluation of ICT in Education in Papua* and associated Policy Briefs (ACDP 045). The report was very well received by the Office of Education, Youth and Sport in the Provincial Government of Papua. ACDP’s support has reportedly led to staff of this office demonstrating greater interest in the role ICT can play in improving access and quality of education in rural and remote areas of Papua[[183]](#endnote-73). The provincial office has since requested that ACDP provide additional support in the establishment of an improved Education Management and Information System at both provincial and district offices[[184]](#endnote-74).

The Mid-Term Review of October 2014 highlighted the need for ACDP to develop a more effective communication strategy; a recommendation that was consistent with POM’s commentaries in its 2013 and 2014 APPRs of the EP[[185]](#footnote-112). In broad terms, therefore, one of ACDP’s biggest achievements in 2015 was the level of participation it secured in its knowledge sharing events. The Knowledge Management Team, which was created in early 2015, established regular Media Sessions (*Kopi Darat*). Since May 2015 the Sessions have been held every two weeks. The fifteen sessions to date have covered a range of issues, including *Teacher Management* (#1), *21st Century Teacher Skills* (#4) and *Realizing Excellent and Moderate Islamic Education in Indonesia* (#15). A total of 393 people have attended the events, with the number of participants steadily increasing over time. Additional reach has been created by related radio slots on Radio Republik Indonesia[[186]](#footnote-113). In 2015, the events generated 293 media articles, again with an upwards trend from May to December[[187]](#endnote-75).

A number of additional learning events have been conducted during 2015. Of particular note was the Teacher Policy Forum of 5-6 August 2015, a major policy dialogue which was opened by the Minister of Education and Culture and at which the Minister and a number of Director-Generals spoke. Approximately 400 people attended the two-day event.

Increased investment in knowledge sharing has had a positive effect on the numbers of events held by ACDP and the numbers of stakeholders involved: a 61% and a 70% change respectively over the 13 months to December 2015 (see Table 18).

Table 18: Levels of participation in ACDP activities

|  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
|  | **From 2011 to 30 Nov. 2014** | | **From 2011 to 31 Dec. 2015** | |
|  | **Events held** | **Stakeholders involved** | **Events held** | **Stakeholders involved** |
| **Activity-stream #1: Research work/studies** | 79 | 2,639 | 122 | 4,566 |
| **Activity-stream #2: Meetings, FGDs, workshops** | 71 | 2,887 | 119 | 4,851 |
| **TOTAL** | 150 | 5,526 | 241 | 9,417 |

Source: John Virtue (ACDP) 04 March 2016 and the 2014 APPR

## Analysis

### Relevance

From an external relevance perspective, ACDP continues to perform well. Indeed, its relevance to both governments increased over the course of 2015. There is consensus that GoI’s appetite for policy-relevant research and analysis remains strong. In the second half of 2015, for example, the Minister of Education and Culture established the PASKA with a view to receiving timely, credible and useful evidence and analysis that might inform decision-making. The ministry actively solicited ACDP support for this initiative, with ACDP responding by, *inter alia*, conducting three seminars on policy analysis for PASKA and developing a Policy Analysis Toolkit. ACDP studies drew the attention of the Minister of Education and Culture in 2015 and the value of ACDP’s role was strongly endorsed by both his visit to the Secretariat on 23 July 2015 to discuss cooperation and his presentation at the Teachers’ Policy Forum in early August 2015.

The objective of ACDP remains consistent with Australia’s policies and steering instruments, such as the *Strategy for Australia’s Aid Investment in Education* and the *Aid Investment Plan for Indonesia* (both of which were released in 2015). The former, for example, points to DFAT’s desire to support policy dialogue and reform, evidence-based decision making, and effective partnerships, all very much aligned with ACDP’s mandate. More broadly, ACDP’s ambition to facilitate the incorporation of ACDP evidence within GoI’s policy, planning and budgeting processes is consistent with DFAT’s move towards using aid investments as a vehicle to improve political access and to generate political capital, and to support the emergence of evidence-informed policy and programs in the Indonesian education sector[[188]](#footnote-114). As such, ACDP offers DFAT both an important outlet to pursue such ambitions and an important test case from which programing lessons can and should be learned.

In earlier APPRs, POM expressed concern that ACDP’s strong external relevance was not matched from a design perspective. While the existing deliverables provided a necessary foundation for the pursuit of evidence utilisation (i.e. the EOCO) it argued that the design and approach adopted by the Secretariat was inappropriate in order to facilitate the attainment of the EOPO. While the design remains unchanged it has become apparent that, since 2014, the Secretariat has sought to add greater value by moving beyond a role centred largely on knowledge production – something that is discussed at more length in the following sections (e.g. Section 5.4.3, below). As such, POM believes that the internal relevance of ACDP has increased in 2015.

### Efficiency

Two key tests of efficiency are the extent to which the output and EOCO-level milestones are being achieved on time and in accordance with agreed budget envelopes, and the extent to which the same quality and quantity of deliverables and the same level of change/results might have been achieved with less investment. To an extent, evidence-informed commentary is constrained by the absence of output and EOCO-level milestones and targets[[189]](#footnote-115) and because ACDP’s six-month reports offer a rolling commentary rather than an explicit assessment of progress against the expectations set out in its workplan[[190]](#footnote-116). Consequently, POM’s analysis focuses on several themes for which there is evidence: year-on-year trends in the number of studies commissioned and completed; year-on-year trends in the value of commitments and disbursements; variations to particular activities (e.g. in terms of budget, personnel and timeliness), and; any key changes to the make-up of ACDP’s portfolio of work.

2015 witnessed a sharp decline in the number of new studies commissioned by ACDP, reversing a trend of year-on-year increases from 2011 to 2014 (see Table 19). To an extent, the change could reflect a conscious effort on behalf of the ACDP and its Secretariat to diversify its product offering from the reliance on large-scale studies that characterised much of its first three years of operation. More likely, the Secretariat’s ability to discuss, finalise and tender particular studies was compromised by GoI’s turnover of key Echelon 1 and Echelon 2 staff in 2014 and 2015. Without doubt, however, the protracted extension discussions and the delays to the processing of the extension request (see Section 5.2, above) had a considerable impact, delaying the approval of ACDP’s workplan for 2015 and preventing the ADB from awarding contracts that would extend beyond 31 December 2015, i.e. its original, official end date up until December 2015, at which point it was extended to June 2017.

Table 19: Studies commissioned/year

|  |  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
|  | **2011** | **2012** | **2013** | **2014** | **2015** |
| **Total number of research activities started** | 7 | 8 | 10 | 12 | 4 |
| **USD value of research activities started** | 4,210,072 | 4,480,039 | 5,505,823 | 6,050,438 | 2,037,772 |
| **Average USD value of the research activities** | 601,439 | 560,005 | 550,582 | 504,203 | 509,443 |

Source: POM calculations based on ACDP’s Six-Monthly Progress Report of mid-2015 and as reviewed by John Virtue (ACDP) in March 2016

While ACDP’s rate of commissioning declined sharply in 2015, it did bring a number of studies to a successful conclusion. In fact, it concluded more studies in 2015 than in either of the two previous years (see Table 20). Moreover, no studies experienced major delays and nor were there instances of significant under-performance. On the contrary, where contracts were extended, it was typically at the request of GoI, for example so that ACDP could assist with the communication of findings or related documents[[191]](#footnote-117), prepare additional deliverables[[192]](#footnote-118), or widen the scope of the fieldwork or the coverage of the report[[193]](#footnote-119). Some studies are regarded by ACDP and/or GoI as being of particularly high quality. For example, the *OECD Indonesia Education Sector Review* (ACDP 017) was launched by the Minister of Education and Culture at a special event on 26 March 2015 and it has since been used as a basic reference and as an importance resource for a number of other ACDP studies[[194]](#endnote-76). Equally, support to *Early Childhood Education Quality Assurance Systems Development* (ACDP 022) and *Support to Centre for Education Assessment (Puspendik)* (ACDP 029) were acknowledged by MoEC as having contributed new understanding and of being of particularly high quality[[195]](#endnote-77).

Table 20: Studies completed/year

|  |  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
|  | **2011** | **2012** | **2013** | **2014** | **2015** |
| **Total number of research activities completed** | 0 | 11 | 4 | 9 | 11 |

Source: POM calculations based on ACDP’s Six-Monthly Progress Report of mid-2015 and as reviewed by John Virtue (ACDP) in March 2016

Given comments in previous APPRs about ACDP’s “mixed” record insofar as responsiveness is concerned, the flexible manner in which ACDP has sought to respond to partner requests during 2015 is a positive development. Nevertheless, it is equally noteworthy that a range of (senior) GoI stakeholders have continued to express concerns about the delays associated with procurement and mobilisation. This raises questions about the extent to which the recommendations made in the MTR of October 2014 have been fully internalised by the Secretariat and/or the ADB. While the Secretariat is changing (see Section 5.4.3, below), the evolution should be regarded as the early stages of an ongoing journey rather than a wholesale shift.

Ultimately, a key measure of the efficiency of C4 must be its success in turning funds into products that represent a strategic and timely contribution to EOPO 4. Figure 4 (below) contrasts the value of ACDP contracted commitments between 2011 and 2015 against the value of disbursements. The rate of funding disbursement in 2015 increased steadily in accordance with trends over the previous two years. The value of disbursements in 2015 was comparable to that of 2014 due to the high number and value of commitments contracted in 2014 (see Table 18, above). However, the value of contracted commitments dropped sharply in 2015.

Figure 4: Value of contracted commitments and disbursements per year (USD)

Source: Rooswanti ‘Ocha’ Soeharno (ADB), 18 March 2016

POM acknowledges that ACDP is less suited to annual performance appraisal by virtue of the fact that its core activities are typically scheduled over a longer period and therefore an assessment based solely on contracted commitments versus disbursements is too crude. Nonetheless, the picture does tell a story. To a limited extent, the decline in commissioning probably reflected a conscious change to the Secretariat’s approach to its work, i.e. a rebalancing of the weighting placed on studies vis-à-vis the smaller, more flexible TA-based product offerings. However, as noted above, the primary cause for the drop was the uncertainty ensuing from the turnover of GoI staff and the impact of the delayed extension process. The latter, in particular, had a significant impact and the institutional partners may have done more to manage the risk and to avoid the eventuality for ultimately this occurred at a time when demand for facility outputs has reached a new high.

### Effectiveness

ACDP’s six-monthly and annual reports only provide a detailed commentary on one of its two delivery arms, i.e. that of research activities and studies. The reports make comparatively little reference to the nature, role and results associated with its second activity-stream, i.e. that of facilitating meetings, focus group discussions and workshops that are not directly linked with the research activities. As such, it is difficult for POM to comment about the effectiveness of the external meetings. The benefits (or otherwise) of the Teachers’ Policy Forum of August 2015 is a case in point but the same might be said about the effect of the seemingly popular and well regarded *Kopi Darat* events. POM remains of the view that a set of metrics by which to better track outcomes of ACDP’s second activity-stream is important. Investments in the appropriate expertise to pursue this objective would have improved ACDP’s own reporting and tracking of results.

By contrast, there is increasing (albeit external) evidence about the effectiveness of ACDP’s first activity-stream. An evaluation of the impact of ACDP studies was undertaken by POM between August 2014 and December 2015. The evaluation was conducted as an iterative case study comprised of five ACDP studies (see Table 21).

Table 21: EOPO 4 Evaluation case studies

|  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |
| **Case Study** | **Name of study (and primary client)** | **Implementation period** | **Budget**  **(USD)** |
| 1 | School and Madrasah Principals and Supervisors Competencies Baseline Study (MoEC) | Dec 2011 – Mar 2013 | 1,330,000 |
| Evaluation of the Principal Preparation Program (PPP) (MoEC) | Jan 2014 – Dec 2015 | 1,437,000 |
| 2 | Support to the Education Sector Review (ESR) (Bappenas) | Mar 2013 – Jun 2015 | 2,529,152 |
| 3 | Support for strategic planning of rural and remote education in Papua (Provincial Government, Papua) | Sep 2012 – Sep 2014 | 343,238 |
| 4 | Madrasah Financing Study (MoRA) | Nov 2011 – Oct 2012 | 181,170 |

The evaluation found that the extent to which ACDP-generated evidence has been incorporated in relevant education sector policies, plans, and budgets to be largely positive and successful. While the *Evaluation of the Principal Preparation Program* (Case Study 1) has not had sufficient time to demonstrate outcomes, the other four have. Of these, there have been high levels of uptake and use on two studies, namely *Support to the ESR* and *Support to Rural and Remote Education Papua*. Specifically:

* The *Support to Rural and Remote Education Papua* led to the province’s first evidence-based strategic plan for the use of mother tongue in teaching and learning; a financial commitment by the provincial government to implement a pilot program, and; inclusion of mother tongue into policy at the national level. The evaluation found ACDP’s contribution to be “significant”, noting the high level of additionality generated by ACDP’s investment.
* The *Support to the ESR* generated comprehensive evidence in 12 key policy areas that helped guide and shape: the National Mid Term Development Plan (RPJMN); the Education Strategic Plans (Renstra) of MoEC and MoRA, and; policy statements about ‘12 years of schooling’, ‘higher education’, ‘early childhood education’ and ‘examinations and graduation’. The evaluation found ACDP’s contribution to be “important”, noting the existence of other important contributory factors.

By contrast, the *Competency Baseline*, which cost USD 1,330,000, has generated less uptake and use (though it is important to note that the evaluation team and the ACDP Secretariat have different views on what was expected of the study and therefore have different views on the degree of success attained to date). The *Madrasah Financing Study* showed no signs of uptake between 2012 and 2015. However, MoRA’s renewed interest in Madrasah financing during 2015 has resulted in study evidence being used to inform the recently revised 2015-19 MoRA Renstra and, in 2015, detailed discussions on Madrasah financing between MoRA, MoHA, MoF and the national parliament. Consequently, there is a more positive outlook now than before in terms of the necessary policy, regulation and systems development changes required. This is an example of how a seemingly ineffective study can be reinvigorated when the context changes (so long as the opportunities are identified and exploited).

ACDP’s contribution to the attainment of expected outcomes varied across individual studies. The strongest contribution was found in the two successful studies, particularly in the case of *Support for Rural and Remote Education Papua*. There ACDP provided resources, skills, and capabilities that were not otherwise available; it supported the development of a comprehensive, integrated plan to replace previous *ad hoc* approaches; it accelerated policy uptake, and; it led to a spillover into national policy. While not the primary contributor to the *ESR*, ACDP nonetheless made an important contribution to deepening policy-makers’ understanding of key issues; broadening stakeholder engagement, and; enhancing Knowledge-to-Policy (K2P) processes undertaken by Bappenas.

The question remains about the extent to which the findings of POM’s evaluation might be extrapolated across the larger population of ACDP studies. While the findings are consistent with what might be realistically expected from an investment portfolio (i.e. a mix of successful and less successful performers), it is notable that the five activities evaluated by POM were commissioned in 2011-13, i.e. during the first half of ACDP’s five-year existence. POM suspects that some of the studies ACDP has conducted since 2014 may have greater prospects for evidence utilisation and incorporation, in part because the EOPO 4 evaluation indicated that ACDP is now placing an increased emphasis on:

* Linking activities thematically in order to better support strategic priorities within GoI.
* Conducting more rapid response-style studies that address emerging GoI needs and policy issues.
* Targeting communications to particular stakeholders.

The creation of the Knowledge Management Team in 2015 should make evidence more accessible to key decision-makers and external stakeholders, such as the media. Equally, the Secretariat has demonstrated that it is seeking to respond to the evolving political and policy context by, for example, supporting the newly formed PASKA and by providing support to GoI actors working on ‘burning issues’ such as the Indonesian Qualifications Framework (2014-) and student assessment reform (2015-).

Ultimately the effect of these changes is somewhat unknown but the promise is there. Nevertheless, it is noteworthy that with change and promise comes the ever-greater need to capture, assess and report the results accruing from the investment. Moreover, with improved evidence of what works, when, how and why comes the opportunity to review and revise approaches to activity design, implementation and follow-up. ACDP’s ongoing limited investment in M&E continues to be a source of concern. While it did appoint an (intermittent) ACDP M&E Advisor in September 2015, this step was taken five years after program commencement and nearly 12 months after the MTR recommended that ACDP “invest in a core advisor with proven M&E expertise and experience” to capture its outcomes[[196]](#endnote-78).

### Impact

POM remains of the view that should evidence be provided at the right time, in the right format, and to the right people, there is tremendous potential for activities to deliver long-term benefits (see the 2013 and 2014 APPRs). With improved effectiveness the prospects for greater impact inevitably grow. By way of example, critical evidence contained in *Overview of Islamic Education Sub-Sector in Indonesia* (ACDP 021) should help to create space for a motivated and informed discussion about the need for improved Madrasah financing models. Equally the return on the USD 819,450 invested in the *Support to Centre for Assessment (Puspendik)* (ACDP 029) could be significant should MoEC introduce improved assessment frameworks which improve student learning outcomes.

There remains, however, an important caveat to the emerging sense of optimism, one that should have particular resonance for DFAT as it seeks to support the emergence of more evidence-informed policy and programs. A degree of realism is required about the nature and degree of change to which an aid investment can contribute. Equally, there must be a degree of clarity about what success looks like in certain occasions. Policy ‘wins’ may not necessarily take the form of new legislation. In some circumstances major success may take the form of greater awareness of a policy constraint or it may take the shape of greater public and/or policy-maker engagement about specific issues. In that respect, the Secretariat’s concerted efforts in 2015 to better communicate its evidence base are laudable. And potentially impactful, not least if they help generate better understanding of ACDP’s ‘back catalogue’[[197]](#footnote-120). However, communication alone is insufficient (as ACDP appreciates). Emphasis must also be placed on engagement that is tailored and tactical and which acknowledges and understands prevailing interests, incentives and motivations. Here there are valuable lessons as DFAT finalises the design of its Forward Program.

### Sustainability

POM remains of the view that while there is potential for activities to deliver considerable impact, there is a risk that (some) benefits may not be sustained at an institutional level[[198]](#footnote-121). Disappointingly, that risk might have been mitigated in 2015. The MTR of October 2014 recommended that ACDP should “develop a sustainability strategy for what happens beyond December 2015”[[199]](#endnote-79); a view that was broadly consistent with POM’s position in the 2014 APPR, namely that legacy planning was required because, at that time, the “prospects for institutional sustainability may go unrealised so long as limited attention is paid to defining and pursuing any institutional legacy”[[200]](#endnote-80). The calls for sustainability or legacy planning appeared to secure some traction, with the subject being an item of discussion at the ATOG in March 2015[[201]](#endnote-81). Three months later ACDP produced a Draft Sustainability Strategy[[202]](#endnote-82).

Regrettably, interest in sustainability appeared to wane in the second half of 2015. The reasons are unclear but it is possible that the Strategy was developed partially to satisfy an EU requirement for the extension and/or that the aforementioned delays associated with the extension process hindered implementation of the Strategy. Equally, the donors’ commitment is uncertain. To an extent, it is of greater concern to POM that there remains no real consensus about ACDP’s expected or anticipated legacy despite the consultations that underpinned the development of the Draft Sustainability Strategy in Q1-2 of 2015. Points of divergence centre on two key considerations. The first is the extent to which ACDP should look to sustain activity-related benefits over institutional benefits, e.g. the sustained benefits that would accrue should the Madrasah financing study contribute to a real shift in financing arrangements vis-à-vis the sustained institutional benefits should ministries, departments or agencies (MDAs) be better able to deliver their mandates. The second is the focus of capacity building efforts. While some propose that ACDP should prioritize measures that would enable MDAs to better deliver their *technical* mandate (e.g. in respect to early childhood education or assessment), others argue that ACDP should focus on building the capacity of knowledge producers and users to commission, interpret and present policy-relevant evidence.

Inevitably any uncertainty about what it is that should be sustained compromises clarity about how this might be done, why and when, and therefore what is needed to realise these intentions. In reality, the choices are not mutually exclusive but ambitions must be clarified, priorities should be set and then investments be made. While momentum was seemingly lost in the second half of 2015, opportunities remain. ACDP has a new Director and Manager, and the 18-month extension has ‘bought’ the Secretariat more time. Furthermore, some ACDP stakeholders point to the emergence of PASKA as a potential outlet; not as a rival to *Puslitjak* but as another institutional user and provider of policy-relevant research and analysis within MoEC. In addition to these new opportunities, earlier or ever-present opportunities remain, namely the potential for ACDP to have more frequent conversations with like-minded K2P programs such as the DFAT-funded Knowledge Sector Initiative (KSI) and the Empowering Indonesian Women for Poverty Reduction (MAMPU): something that both POM and the ACDP MTR have spoken to in the last 18 months but which seemingly have not materialised to date.

## Summary and recommendations

A summary table of component performance by DAC criteria is presented in Table 22, below. The rating scale reflects the requirements of GoA’s Investment Quality Reporting (IQR) and the associated Aid Quality Checks (AQCs), and it is consistent with that used in earlier APPRs. Recommendations for improvement and, in particular, what measures are needed to increase the likelihood of achieving the EOPO 4 are provided in Table 23 below. It is recognised that some recommendations relate to ongoing work and that considerable progress in actioning some of the recommendations may already have been made.

Table 22: Component 4 scorecard

|  |  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
| **DAC Criterion** | **Score 2013** | **Score 2014** | **Score 2015** | **Justification** | **Comments** |
| Relevance | 4 | 4 | 5 | * Increased external relevance, not least to Australia. ACDP is consistent with DFAT’s development policies and priorities, e.g. as set out in the Strategy for Australia’s Aid Investment in Education and the Aid Investment Plan for Indonesia. * The external relevance of ACDP to GoI remains high, i.e. there remains appetite for policy-relevant research and analysis. This is reflected in the creation of PASKA in 2015. * Changes to the Secretariat’s operation have led to improved internal relevance albeit with continued calls from GoI for rapid, flexible and more responsive support. | * On the basis of ACDP’s increased relevance (and the improved prospects for effectiveness) it was right for DFAT to continue its support to mid-2017 (albeit noting that no further disbursements will be made and therefore DFAT’s total financial commitment has in fact fallen from the original AUD 25m to AUD 20m. As such it is a ‘reduced-cost extension’). |
| Efficiency | 3 | 3 | 3 | * A year of mixed efficiency. While disbursement increased from 2014 to 2015, the number and total value of commitments in 2015 fell sharply, largely because of the protracted extension process and the operational delays associated with the turnover of key GoI personnel, e.g. within the Balitbang. * Activities conducted in 2015 were well managed, with the Secretariat demonstrating a willingness and ability to respond to GoI requests during the course of implementation. | * The institutional and implementing partners – GoI, the EU, DFAT and ADB – could and should have avoided the protracted extension process. The associated impact on the Secretariat’s ability to commence planned studies justifies a downgrade in C4’s Efficiency score from a 3 to a 2. However, the Secretariat’s successful completion of a range of studies and its timely organisation of new, relevant and potentially effective events (e.g. Kopi Darat) justify maintaining the 2014 score. |
| Effectiveness | 4 | 4 | 5 | * The 2015 chapter of ACDP’s effectiveness story is the strongest so far, with operational changes in 2014-15 providing an important platform for evidence incorporation to occur. * The EOPO 4 Evaluation points to a broadly positive picture, with evidence of both utilisation (EOCO) and incorporation (EOPO), particularly in the Papua and ESR case studies. * While the effectiveness score has increased since the 2014 APPR, there is inadequate discussion of the sufficiency of ACDP’s results. | * The scores refer to the outcome – the EOPO – statement used by the EP, not that used by the ADB. The question of expectation is central to any evaluation of ACDP’s success. POM continues to regard that framing of the ACDP outcome and the absence of suitable performance indicators and targets as cause for concern. * The upturn in ACDP’s effectiveness is welcomed because of the size and duration of the investment. |
| Impact | TE | 3 | 4 | * A successful ACDP portfolio continues to offer tremendous potential for long-term change and there is evidence of potential at activity-level, e.g. in Papua and possibly through the Madrasah financing study. * That necessarily requires an agile, responsive ACDP; one that wishes and is able to respond to opportunities. In this regard, the restructuring of the Secretariat and its increased investment in knowledge sharing (e.g. the Kopi Darat events) should generate dividends. | * It remains incumbent on the Secretariat to articulate the nature and sufficiency of its results. * Detailed analysis and discussion is hindered by the poor alignment between the EP theory of change and that provided in the ACDP M&E Strategy; the absence of suitable outcome-level indicators and targets in the ACDP M&E Strategy; the absence of results tracking and reporting, and; untapped opportunities to share experience with other K2P programs, such as the KSI. |
| Sustainability | 4 | 2 | 2 | * The initial enthusiasm in late 2014 and early 2015 to discuss sustainability and pursue an institutional legacy waned as the year progressed. * There remains a lack of consensus or clarity about the expected institutional legacy. | * The opportunities posed by the extension must be embraced. |

Table 23: Component 4 key findings and recommendations

| **Findings** | **Recommendations** | **Level of urgency** | **Prime Responsibility** |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |
| The ACDP’s tracking and reporting of high level results remains weak despite the appointment of a part-time M&E advisor in September 2015 (see §5.4.3). | R15: ACDP should invest in full-time, dedicated M&E resources to improve reporting and to facilitate learning, continuous improvement and the strategic management of its portfolio. | \*\*\* | ACDP with ADB |
| A range of (senior) GoI stakeholders have continued to express concerns about the delays associated with procurement and mobilisation (see §5.4.2). | R16: ADB’s procurement processes should be reviewed and subsequently revised to ensure that they facilitate the timely delivery of required services so that the Secretariat can meet GoI’s expectations. | \*\*\* | ADB with ACDP |
| Prospects for institutional sustainability remain unclear in 2015. There continues to be limited attention being directed to the definition and pursuit of any institutional legacy (see §5.4.5). | R17: The draft Sustainability Strategy prepared in the first half of 2015 should be reviewed, finalised, and then implemented. | \*\*\* | ACDP |
| The impact of ACDP research upon policy and practice has been strongest when K2P activities have been an adequately resourced component of the design (see §5.4.3). | R18: The ACDP should facilitate evidence utilisation and incorporation by ensuring that the K2P component of activities is sufficiently resourced and implemented. | \*\* | ACDP |

B: Red (\*\*\*) - high urgency; orange (\*\*) - medium urgency; green (\*) - low urgency



Part B:

Program Oversight

# Program Oversight

## An introduction

Having presented and discussed Component performance in 2015, focus now turns to program oversight, and specifically the management and governance of the EP investment. The discussion that follows largely focuses on DFAT because it is the *de facto* manager of Australia’s aid investment. Stepping back, the analysis has broader relevance because the recent history of the EP represents a microcosm of the effects of changes in Australian aid policy on the implementation and oversight of DFAT’s investments.

The discussion that follows seeks, first, to describe how management and governance structures of the EP sought to respond to the changing context concerning both Government partners. It then describes how those related decisions have affected the performance of the EP, specifically in relation to the DAC criteria of relevance, efficiency, effectiveness, impact and sustainability. It concludes with a brief commentary about matters arising for the management of DFAT’s Forward Program.

## Delivery and oversight arrangements

The EP is delivered through a blend of aid modalities, including earmarked budget support (C1, C2), project support (C3), and a financial contribution as part of multi-donor support (C4). At a day-to-day level, the EP is managed by the Australian Embassy in Jakarta.

An EP Governance Oversight Group (GOG) is mandated to meet at least once every six months. It is responsible for aligning the program with emerging sectoral priorities; monitoring performance against the targets set in the ESSP Joint Results Framework (JRF)[[203]](#footnote-122); facilitating GoI, DFAT and EU involvement and support for ESSP monitoring and evaluation processes; and, providing high level strategic responses to monitoring reports so as to guide program direction.

In addition to the GOG, four Technical Oversight Groups[[204]](#footnote-123) (TOGs) have been established, one under each of the four EP components. They are responsible for approving workplans and procurement plans; the coordination and approval of major technical reports; and, ongoing management, monitoring and oversight of the delivery of the EP. The TOGs are scheduled to meet every three months.

## Context

2015 was a year of some flux and uncertainty for both governments and, by extension, the Implementing Partners. While there were fewer major changes to GoI’s sectoral, policy and political environments in 2015 than in 2014, the nature of change since 2014 has created (and continues to create) a range of challenges to the governance, management and delivery of the EP. To a large extent, 2015 was a year of interpretation, a period in which staff sought to interpret new policy and political statements *and* the related needs and expectations of their line managers. For DFAT, attention focused on the interpretation of Australia’s new aid paradigm and the associated budget cuts, both globally and in Indonesia. For Indonesia, the aid budget announcements of May 2015 saw a 40% reduction to the financial value of Indonesia’s country program. Inevitably, the Education Partnership was affected (see Table 24, below).

Table 24: Financial allocations to the Education Partnership

|  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
|  | **Revised Budget**  **(2014)** | **Revised Budget**  **(by end of 2015)** | **Change** | **Change**  **(%)** |
| **C1** | $239,000,000 | $179,300,000 | $59,700,000 | -25% |
| **C2** | $179,726,512 | $106,400,000 | $73,326,512 | -41% |
| **C3** | $48,426,296 | $36,600,000 | $11,826,296 | -24% |
| **C4** | $25,000,000 | $20,000,00 | $5,000,000 | -20% |
| **Support** | $31,847,192 | $26,500,000 | $5,347,192 | -17% |
| **Total** | **$524,000,000** | **$368,800,000** | **$155,200,000** | **-30%** |

Source: Email communication from Sri Novelma (DFAT), 11 March 2016

Outwardly and in parallel, DFAT (along with MoEC, MoRA and Bappenas) sought to respond to the emerging clarity about GoI’s high-level aspirations and priorities and the restructuring and re-staffing of the main GoI counterpart ministry, MoEC. The installation of new MoEC Director-Generals in June 2015 and, subsequently, new Directors in the month that followed, generated new expectations and resulted in variable levels of understanding of the EP investment[[205]](#footnote-124). New relationships had to be developed and aspirations understood. While C1 and C3 were comparatively sheltered, the institutional changes and associated uncertainties had considerable impact on C2 and C4, the two components with numerous government stakeholders and arguably the loftiest aspirations.

## Analysis

The changing context inevitably initiated responses from the EP management. POM has identified the responses as follows: increased stakeholder consultation; budget adjustment; change in programing approach and the rise of political capital; staffing adjustments, and; increased focus on safeguarding Australian funds. This section analyses each of these responses in turn.

### The response to the changing context

*Increased stakeholder consultation*

A core feature of DFAT’s approach to its current and upcoming sector investment portfolio is its strong commitment to consult with a broad range of stakeholders about opportunities, expectations and needs. While the most obvious manifestation of this increased effort was the sharp increase in the volume of high-level meetings between the two governments (e.g. between the Embassy’s Counsellor/Advisor and various Director-Generals in GoI), there was notable effort in 2015 to adopt a ‘whole of team approach’ to the management and implementation of the EP, one that would extend from DFAT to managing contractors and to their advisors. By consequence, the Embassy made a conscious effort to increase the frequency, quality and volume of information it shared with Implementing Partners, e.g. about the content of meetings between Embassy and GoI officials.

The Embassy was conspicuously successful in its ambitions to increase the quantity of high level engagement between institutional partners, and most notably with MoEC. The Embassy’s efforts in that regard are well recognized by GoI, and POM is confident that the consultation will produce dividends as the Embassy shapes and commences its Forward Program. Insofar as the EP is concerned, however, there is less evidence that the dialogue resolved critical issues that will impinge on the potential effectiveness, impact and sustainability of key EP investments, particularly as related to ProDEP and the ACDP[[206]](#footnote-125). Moreover, while GoI acknowledges the efforts taken to keep them informed of what were often fluid and uncertain changes (e.g. related to budget allocations), there also remains a view that GoI might have been more actively involved as an Institutional Partner in decision-making processes, particularly where the outcomes could have had serious ramifications for both individuals and units.

The decline in appetite for ToG and GoG meetings reduced opportunities for such active involvement. It is important to preface this point by noting that the absence of ToG meetings for much of 2015 was partially a consequence of organisational restructuring in GoI and the associated turnover of key staff in Q2-3[[207]](#footnote-126). It is also possible that the decline in formal governance meetings reflected concerns about the utility of quarterly TOG meetings. Nevertheless, formal governance fora, such as ToG and GoG meetings, do provide a platform for managers to discuss and share the rationale for key decisions, with associated minutes providing an accessible record of agreed actions. Reliance on less formal interaction without associated record-keeping and communication does increase the possibility of misinterpretation.

The integration of AusAID into DFAT in 2014 and the release of a series of headline policies and political statements created an environment in 2015 in which the Development Cooperation Section of the Embassy was required to interpret and anticipate the needs and aspirations of senior decision-makers, both in Canberra and at Post. This scenario was replicated in varying degrees amongst staff and Implementing Partners as they sought to align current and future activities with this changing policy environment and interpretations of it. The net result was conditions in which uncertainty sometimes emerged. The Embassy’s Basic Education Unit was cognisant of this and its appointment of a Change Management Advisor in early 2015 reflected the Unit’s desire to bring the EP to a successful conclusion and to facilitate a professional and smooth transition to its Forward Program. The aspirations were sound, though in practice the Embassy itself may have secured greater benefit from the inputs than EP stakeholders.

*Budget adjustment*

Given the direction of DFAT’s aid and geographical priorities in late 2014 and early 2015, budget revisions for the Indonesia program were inevitable. To that extent, all EP parties – from senior GoI officials and the Embassy’s Basic Education Unit to the Managing Contractors and their contracted advisors – recognise that changes to political priorities and their associated policy shifts and budget changes are a reality of public sector financing. What is critical in such circumstances is how change is managed and communicated.

The degree, timing and frequency of budget changes varied across the Components[[208]](#footnote-127) and the basis and associated evidence for specific budget revisions was occasionally unclear. The Grant Agreement for C1 was reduced by AUD 60m (see Table 23, above), a decision taken by the Embassy in early 2015 in response to its (accurate) reading of DFAT’s sharp decline in interest in school construction and WiPs-based approaches to aid investment. As such, the decision was taken prior to the 2015 national budget (*Anggaran Pendapatan dan Belanja Negara* - *APBN*), which allowed senior GoI officials to amend its financial allocations with little effect on individual and unit spending targets. By contrast, DFAT’s allocation to C2 was revised several times in 2015, with the last change occurring after finalisation of the national budget amendment (APBN-P). This placed senior MoEC officials in an uncomfortable situation as they remained committed to expenditure targets recorded in the amended budget.

*Change in programing approach and the rise of political capital*

The EP was conceived at a time when aid budgets were rising and when aid/development effectiveness largely shaped programing decisions. The final year of the EP was one of transition towards a new investment portfolio, one that will be delivered and managed in a very different political, policy and institutional environment. As the Embassy’s recent Education Sector Investment Plan indicates, DFAT’s aid investments in the Indonesian education sector are transitioning from costly investment programs (e.g. see C1, C2) towards a leaner program of technical advisory support. This is characterised by a shift away from the direct financing of service delivery and implementation (e.g. see school construction through WiPs) to a focus on measures that can assist GoI in maximising the value from their own spend.

In addition to the shift in modes of delivery, Australia’s aid program now places a more explicit focus on the achievement of political gains. This is a somewhat inevitable consequence of AusAID’s integration into DFAT and is similar to the moves taken by many leading international donors. The Embassy’s Basic Education Unit has sought to embrace this change in approach by placing increased emphasis on the visibility of its aid investments and by seeking to build strong people-to-people linkages with senior GoI officials. In that regard, the EP has generated useful dividends, with C3 and C4, for example, producing strong public diplomacy returns and opportunities to secure and develop relations with key personnel in MoRA, MoEC and Bappenas.

It is POM’s view that EP stakeholders broadly understand and agree with the rationale to the programing changes which stem from DFAT’s policy announcements, in part because they reflect the intent to nurture a more mature relationship between the two G20 partners. Moreover, stakeholders acknowledge the Embassy’s desire to influence policy and to work politically. Nevertheless, there appeared to be a level of discomfort across much of the Partnership – beyond and sometimes within the Embassy – about *how* to work politically, how to do it most effectively and what it means for the day-to-day management and delivery of aid investments such as the EP[[209]](#footnote-128). To some extent, development-focused personnel are inappropriately skilled to “work politically” and future recruitment will need to take this into account. In addition, future programing will need to be clear on the expected political gains to be secured through the aid program to allow monitoring and evaluation systems to correctly assess progress and achievements.

*DFAT staffing adjustment*

Budget cuts to Australia’s aid program in Indonesia in 2015 saw continued adjustments to the staffing profile of the Embassy’s Basic Education Unit (see Table 25, below).

Table 25: Basic Education Unit staffing 2014 - 2015

|  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- |
| **Point in time** | **Total Staff Nos** | **Weighted Staff Nos\*** |
| 30 June 2014 | 19 | 56 |
| 31 December 2014 | 13 | 38 |
| 30 June 2015 | 11 | 35 |
| 31 December 2015 | 9 | 26 |

Source: Total staff numbers provided by Sri Novelma (DFAT), 11 March 2016

\* Weighted staff numbers presents a rudimentary assessment of the experience of the Basic Education Unit based on a scoring of: Program Officer = 1; Program Manager = 2; Senior Program Manager = 3; Unit Manager = 4; Counsellor/Advisor = 5

As the number and experience profile of the Unit‘s staffing resource declined in 2015, much of the EP’s institutional memory and technical expertise came to lay within its Implementing Partners. Moreover, many of the political-institutional networks required by or of use to the Embassy resided with its Implementing Partners, not least for SSQ-C3 for MoRA and, to a lesser extent, the ACDP Secretariat (C4) insofar as parts of MoEC and Bappenas were concerned.

Over the course of the year and as the Embassy’s staffing profile became more settled and networks were developed, DFAT’s stock of ‘social capital’ in MoEC recovered and therefore the dependence upon Implementing Partners to provide/secure access somewhat dissipated. Leading up to that time, however, pragmatic decisions were taken as the Embassy and others sought to navigate a complex period of transition. For example, the Embassy’s judicious use of MCs to appoint short-term or intermittent advisors produced timely input on matters that spoke strongly to the maximization of existing EP investments. Equally, a decline in the Embassy’s micromanagement of MC-managed components was viewed as a sensible response to the thinning of institutional expertise with the Basic Education Unit itself.

Looking to the Forward Program and the Embassy’s intention to move away from large, multi-year investments to a more flexible support model based upon the provision of TA, the Embassy will become ever more reliant on both its own staff being able to set the development and political agenda with key GoI counterparts and then having confidence in the judgement of its Implementing Partners and its advisors to support implementation of the agenda and to operate within an agreed framework. That requires strategic clarity – something that was identified as a weakness in the Development Policy Centre’s Australian Aid Stakeholder Survey of 2015[[210]](#footnote-129) [[211]](#endnote-83); a finding which was mirrored in consultations for this APPR. Clarity in Jakarta should emerge as the EP closes, as the Education Sector Investment Plan is implemented and as the Basic Education Unit grows increasingly confident in their reading of both DFAT policy and the needs of key decision-makers. Nevertheless, there will be challenges. For example, the Embassy will need to continually assess the extent to which its staffing profile, which somewhat reflects the contract management requirements of AusAID, is suited to the new way of working required by DFAT. Equally, the Unit may wish to reflect on the extent to which the institutional culture at DFAT is prepared to relinquish certain decision-making responsibilities to contracted advisors.

*Increased focus on safeguarding Australian funds*

In accordance with GoA’s domestic political agenda to ‘safeguard’ the tax payer’s dollar, the Embassy’s Basic Education Unit bolstered its oversight of EP auditing processes in 2015. This step reflected a necessary response to new DFAT policy commitments[[212]](#footnote-130) and the unique position of Indonesian aid money within domestic political discourses. The interpretation of precisely how aid funding was best secured within the Indonesian aid program held important implications for the performance of the four EP components during 2015. First, it reduced the Embassy’s risk appetite and increased uneasiness with WiPs approaches. It is perhaps not coincidental that C3, C4 and POM, all of which are managed by a multilateral agency or an MC, were relatively sheltered from budget cuts in 2015, whereas the budgets of C1 and C2 – the two components that receive grant funding – were cut by over AUD 130m in 2015 (see Table 23, above)[[213]](#footnote-131). Second, there was a marked adjustment of audit functions away from a capacity building agenda (i.e. assisting GoI bodies to properly control and account for expenditure) towards one of identifying instances of misuse and securing means of restitution.

To a large extent, the Basic Education Unit’s commitment was consistent with the rhetoric and practice in many donor environments, particularly where aid commitments were being made in periods of austerity and increased external scrutiny (and aid scepticism).

### Influence of M&G on EP performance


With 2015 providing a challenging management and governance environment for the EP, it is pertinent to reflect on the extent to which management decision-making enhanced or disadvantaged the EP’s performance with respect to the DAC criteria.

In terms of **relevance**, the Embassy’s management decisions were largely shaped by the spirit and intent of Australia’s new aid paradigm, coupled with intent to support implementation of key reform priorities in the Indonesian education sector and an associated strategy to cultivate close people-to-people relationships with the Minister of Education and Culture and his Director-Generals. While the relevance of particular aid modalities (e.g. WiPs in C1 and C2) to GoA policy sharply declined in 2015, Components became neither more nor less relevant because of decisions taken by management. The only exception may be C4 because its networks proved highly relevant to the Embassy’s people-to-people agenda.

The **efficiency** of EP delivery experienced an overall downturn in 2015, with only C3 showing year-on-year improvement from 2014 to 2015. In some areas the drivers of the downturn were associated with changes in GoI, with the effect of the restructure to and staffing changes within MoEC on C2/ProDEP being a case in point. However, in other areas the Embassy’s uncertain and evolving management positions regarding the completion of Cycle 4 schools (C1), the unpredictable budget flows to ProDEP (C2) and a reversal of DFAT’s decision regarding the extension to ACDP (C4) compromised the firm, predictable foundations upon which management decisions could be taken by GoI and/or Implementing Partners. Notwithstanding what was undoubtedly a challenging management environment for the Embassy’s Basic Education Unit, a number of EP stakeholders expressed concern about the uncertainty and confusion fostered by what were sometimes regarded as being *ad hoc* and fragmented management decisions. These realities are not unique to Jakarta. The Development Policy Centre’s Australian Aid Stakeholder Survey of 2015 found that funding predictability and strategic clarity were viewed as considerable weaknesses of Australian aid in the period following the integration of AusAID into DFAT[[214]](#endnote-84).

The EOPOs remain relevant to both government partners and the Education Unit believes that the four EOPOs have become entrenched in its ‘psyche’. Nevertheless, a number of Implementing Partners or their advisors expressed concern that there was little management and governance focus in 2015 on matters that might influence the **effectiveness** of the EP investments. While decision-making within the Embassy may have been informed by the EP’s high-level aspirations, the Embassy’s approach to key management decisions, such as the duration and financial value of its continued support to ProDEP and its decision in late 2015 to reverse its earlier decision not to extend its support to ACDP, were frequently articulated without a clear, consistent rationale or an explanation of the evidence that informed such decisions. In that regard, realities in Jakarta are seemingly consistent with concern among Australian aid stakeholders about perceived downturns in transparency and performance management (see Figure 5, below).

Figure 5: Attributes of DFAT’s aid program, 2013-2015



Source: Wood, T, Burkot, C, Howes, S, 2016, Australian aid: signs of risk – the 2015 Australian aid stakeholder survey, The Development Policy Centre, Canberra

Figure notes: In both 2013 and 2015, respondents were asked to rate, as strengths or weaknesses, 17 attributes that are important for aid program effectiveness. The ratings are normalised from zero (great weakness) to one (great strength) with 0.5 being a neutral rating. If the dots lie below the blue line, the rating has worsened since 2013. Blue dots show an improvement, orange dots a moderate decline, and red dots a large decline (20 per cent or more than the average decline).

Any downturns in or lingering uncertainties about effectiveness will inevitably have an adverse effect on the potential for intended, positive long-term **impacts** to accrue over time. ProDEP stands out somewhat uncomfortably in that regard and it is important that the actual effectiveness of ProDEP be tested and lessons learned should GoI and DFAT be interested in sustaining the investment and/or adapting it to other stakeholder groups, such as teachers. More positively, however, the Basic Education Unit’s concerted drive to utilize SSQ’s Social Inclusion Advisor to help instigate inclusive education pilots in C3 and to participate in a range of social inclusion-related fora is praiseworthy (see Text Box over the page). The investment is probably cost-effective and the Unit’s efforts in 2015 go some way to addressing areas of concern[[215]](#footnote-132). Nonetheless an EP-wide investment, underpinned by strategic clarity about intent and focus, would have generated a greater return. The ongoing absence of a clearly defined, shared and articulated social inclusion framework inevitably limit the EP’s contribution to DFAT policy commitments and, looking to the Forward Program, it is imperative that the Embassy develop appropriate frameworks within which all Implementing Partners, advisors and other stakeholders understand DFAT’s expectations and are expected to make an active and meaningful contribution to associated targets.

**Gender mainstreaming in the EP**

The EP supports a range of activities that promote gender equality. For example, it promotes measures that seek to ensure equal participation of men and women in EP-financed training opportunities (e.g. see ProDEP), the M&E system collects sex-disaggregated data, and ACDP has conducted gender-focused analysis of sector challenges (e.g. see its Review of a Decade of Gender Mainstreaming in Education in Indonesia and the Policy Brief on Gender Equality in Education in Indonesia, both from 2013). POM was also tasked by DFAT in 2015 to conduct analysis of career progression pathways for female principals. In addition, and in direct response to concerns raised in the AQC about the EP’s approach to gender equality, a Social Inclusion Adviser was appointed by SSQ. The adviser oversees a range of ad hoc initiatives under Components 1, 2 and 3.

While all these initiatives are valuable, the EP might have achieved more through the application of a more structured approach. Australia’s Aid Policy of 2014 establishes gender equality and women’s empowerment as a priority for development. It also required that 80% of Australia’s aid, regardless of objectives, perform effectively in promoting gender equality. Ultimately it is unclear if the EP investments are making a significant and expected difference to gender equality and the empowerment of women and girls. While gender equality is not an explicit objective of the EP investment, opportunities to frame expectations and to identify and manage risks to gender equality and equity have not been grasped. Specifically, opportunities to produce a social inclusion framework that would sit within the governments’ policy frameworks for gender equality and women’s empowerment and which would outline resourced strategies and actions to pursued agreed objectives have been eschewed in favour of activity-by-activity investments, often at particular points in time.

The Embassy’s emphasis in Q1-2 of 2015 on **sustainability** was commendable and necessary but momentum was lost as the year progressed, with minimal interest being applied to the implementation and oversight of sustainability plans. Despite the initial rhetorical commitment to a smooth closure or transitioning of EP investments to the Forward Program, a number of stakeholders voiced concern about the Embassy’s apparent desire to conclude its investment as quickly as possible and to shift to the new suite of investments. Perhaps by default, attention seemingly shifted to how best to handover responsibility (e.g. of construction guidelines, school construction completion, ProDEP financing). The political, policy and institutional incentives and motivations that might have shaped such a mindset are clear but the Embassy needs to remain sensitive to the dangers of downplaying the relevance and results of its investments to 2015/16.

## Looking ahead

Implementing Partners and key GoI figures are generally supportive of the Embassy’s shift to a leaner, more agile program. Equally, there is an acceptance that new aid investments must go further to blend the attainment of developmental outcomes with the Embassy’s political needs and aspirations. To that extent, the Basic Education Unit could rightly argue that its implementation of DFAT’s policy commitments to be led by local priorities and to forge close people-to-people relationships is fully consistent with GoA’s desire to transition its relationship with Indonesia from that of donor-aid recipient to that of a mature relationship between two G20 neighbours.

In time, it is distinctly possible that the Forward Program will constitute a stronger “partnership” between the two governments than what was seen in the Education *Partnership* of 2011-16/17. Nonetheless, as the Embassy transitions from the EP to its Forward Program, it must ensure that it sets a clear strategic direction, that it clearly communicates what it wants from its investments and those implementing them, and that it invests in appropriate capacity building measures such that key actors possess the understanding, the capacity and the capability to meet the Embassy’s more political expectations of its aid program.

## Recommendations

Recommendations for improvement in the oversight of the EP and for consideration in DFAT’s Education Forward Program are provided in Table 26, below. It is recognised that some recommendations relate to ongoing work and that considerable progress in actioning some of the recommendations may already have been made.

Table 26: Program Oversight key findings and recommendations

| **Findings** | **Recommendations** | **Level of urgency** | **Prime Responsibility** |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |
| There is support for the shift to a leaner, more agile development program that more accurately reflects both the economic status of the two countries’ and recognition of the position of the aid program as a tool in Australia’s foreign affairs agenda (see §6.4.1 – Change in programing approach). | R19: A clear description of both the development and political outcomes expected from future investments under the DFAT Education Forward Program should be provided not least to facilitate program design, implementation, monitoring and evaluation. | \*\*\* | DFAT |
| R20: Clearer guidance should be provided to DFAT staff and Implementing Partners about the Basic Education Unit’s expectations for achieving political outcomes and how these might be achieved. | \*\* | DFAT |
| R21: Regular (six-monthly) reviews should be undertaken related to the achievement of the high-level outcomes expected in DFAT’s Education Forward Program, coupled with an identification of opportunities to improve the return on DFAT’s investment. | \*\*\* | DFAT |
| Due to the relatively transitory nature of both Governments’ EP-related staffing during 2015, management and governance has necessarily been characterised by an increased volume of less formal stakeholder consultation coupled with a reduced number of formal governance meetings (see §6.4.1 – Increased stakeholder consultation). | R22: To ensure transparency, mutual accountability and shared understanding, agreed formal management and governance meetings should supplement less formal stakeholder engagement. | \*\*\* | DFAT with GoI |
| Several of the challenges to the performance of the EP’s management and governance arrangements are consistent with the findings of the Development Policy Centre’s Aid Stakeholder Survey (2015) (see §6.4.2). | R23: A lessons learned review should be undertaken of the 2014/15 transition process in DFAT’s Basic Education Unit and other Development Cooperation sections in the Embassy in Jakarta to inform DFAT policy and programing. | \* | DFAT Jakarta and Canberra |
| Budget cuts saw continued adjustments to the staffing profile of the Embassy’s Basic Education Unit. (see §6.4.1 – DFAT staffing adjustment). | R24: Consideration should be given to the necessary DFAT and MC staff skillsets required to deliver the new aid paradigm and the need to adjust recruitment plans accordingly. | \*\* | DFAT, Implementing Partners |
| The EP could have secured greater social inclusion-related benefits should it have had a related strategy and performance framework to which all Implementing and Institutional Partners were expected to contribute (see §6.4.2). | R25: Separate Gender and Disability Action Plans should be developed as part of an overall Social Inclusion Strategy for DFAT’s Education Forward Program. | \*\* | DFAT |

NB: Red (\*\*\*) - high urgency; orange (\*\*) - medium urgency; green (\*) - low urgency



Part C: Conclusions

# Conclusions

The end of 2015 represents a critical point in the lifetime of Australia’s Education Partnership with Indonesia. The individual components are at differing stages of development. While it is probable that DFAT will extend the duration of its support to C1 until the end of the year to better ensure the successful completion of those schools yet to be fully constructed by June 2016, the spotlight is placed on the effect, long-term impacts and sustained benefits of increased access afforded by a school construction program that stretches back over the better part of a decade. With six months of Australia’s contribution to C2 and C3 remaining, attention moves away from issues of relevance and efficiency and on to how best to cement the gains secured to date and what needs to be done to generate further, sustained improvement in education quality. With C2 in particular, there is a feeling that much work remains if the expected benefits are to accrue. C4 is a little different. With the EU and DFAT extending their support to mid-2017, identified opportunities to improve efficiency and, consequently, the long-term return on the 6-7 year investment must be seized.

Of course the policy, political and institutional environments within which Institutional and Implementing Partners find themselves in 2015/16 is very different to that when the EP was conceived in 2009/10 and commenced in 2011. However, change is constant. Notwithstanding the extent of institutional change experienced in 2014-15 (particularly in DFAT), uncertainty and flux are not unusual and change offers both challenges and opportunities. Against that backdrop, this year’s APPR offers a timely assessment of progress to date, an analysis of existing challenges and opportunities as we look beyond the horizon of Australian funding to the EP, and as the Embassy’s Forward Program starts to take shape.

Table 27, below, provides a summary of each component’s performance against the five DAC criteria, coupled with mean scores for each DAC criterion. The APPR scores from 2013 and 2014 are also presented so that readers can see how performance has evolved over time.

Table 27: Combined scorecard

|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
| **DAC Criterion** | **C1 Score** | | | **C2 Score** | | | **C3 Score** | | | **C4 Score** | | | **Mean EP Score** | | |
| **2013** | **2014** | **2015** | **2013** | **2014** | **2015** | **2013** | **2014** | **2015** | **2013** | **2014** | **2015** | **2013** | **2014** | **2015** |
| **Relevance** | 4 | 3 | 3 | 5 | 5 | 4 | 4 | 5 | 6 | 4 | 4 | 5 | **4.25** | **4.25** | **4.50** |
| **Efficiency** | 5 | 6 | 5 | 3 | 5 | 3 | 5 | 4 | 5 | 3 | 3 | 3 | **4.00** | **4.50** | **4.00** |
| **Effective.** | 3 | 4 | 5 | TE | 3 | 3 | 4 | 4 | 5 | 4 | 4 | 5 | **3.66** | **3.75** | **4.50** |
| **Impact** | TE | 4 | 4 | TE | 4 | 3 | TE | 3 | 4 | TE | 3 | 4 | **TE** | **3.50** | **3.75** |
| **Sustain.** | 4 | 4 | 5 | 3 | 4 | 4 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 4 | 2 | 2 | **3.25** | **3.25** | **3.75** |

The broad investment themes of the EP – improved access, improved service delivery, more evidence-based policy - remain **relevant** with respect to the national policies and priorities of the Governments of Indonesia and Australia, albeit with weighting moving away from access to quality. In fact, the mean score for relevance has edged up from 2014 (Score 4.25) to 2015 (Score 4.5) despite the declining relevance of WiPs approaches as a delivery modality for Australian aid. The improved score is chiefly because improvements to the external and internal relevance of both C3 and C4 in 2015, which, statistically at least, off-sets concerns within C2 about the relative importance of principal CPD (vis-à-vis teachers).

Overall, the improvements made to EP **efficiency** from 2013 (Score 4.00) to 2014 (Score 4.50) were reversed in 2015 (4.00). While C3 performed very well and C4’s performance continued to be mixed, concerns about the extent to which EP managers might have better handled the projected delays to the completion of Cycle 4 schools and the long delays associated with the commencement of Grant Agreement-financed ProDEP delivery in 2015 combined to pull the mean score down (though it is noteworthy that C1’s Efficiency Score of 5 remains high).

Whilst overall comparison between the 2013, 2014 and 2015 scores for **effectiveness** is compromised to some degree by a number of TE (or “Too Early” to judge) scores in 2013, it is satisfying to note that mean scores for effectiveness have increased over time, reaching a very good score of 4.50 in 2015. To an extent, this reflects the greater availability of evaluation evidence in 2015 and therefore the confidence with which POM can form an informed judgement. Nevertheless, it also reflects the extent to which some Components, most notably C1, have met or exceeded the EOPO-level targets for 2015. While this is praiseworthy, POM remains of the view that should the investments have been conceived solely as vehicles to achieve the stated End-of-Partnership-Outcome targets then the cost-effectiveness of the EP investment is worth some scrutiny, perhaps particularly in the case of C1.

POM distinguishes in its assessment of long-term benefits between those accrued at an individual level and those at an institutional level. In so doing, POM assesses the prospects for long-term **impact** at an individual school, student or principal level to be relatively strong, reflecting an increased score from the 2014 APPR. POM believes the outlook in terms of institutional legacy is mixed, though it is encouraged to see the sustained interest in measures that will facilitate systems strengthening, not least in C3. The improved outlook in terms of the effectiveness of both C3 and C4 investments inevitably generate greater confidence about the potential for long-term impacts (therefore the Impact scores for both have risen to 4 in 2015). By contrast, the absence of a critical mass of participants in C2 and the continued uncertainty about the extent to which the technical credentials of ProDEP have or will translate to change in the quality of school management, create inevitable uncertainty about the potential for long-term impacts to accrue from the investment in C2. Importantly, POM is *not* saying that there will be no long-term effects and neither is it saying that the ProDEP is either ineffective or not worthy of continued investment. Rather, it is pointing to the need for continued commitment until its effectiveness is established and at which point (and assuming it is worthy of continuation) lessons need to be applied, advocacy undertaken and measures to further adapt and sustain the CPD system be adopted.

Overall, POM is more optimistic about the prospects for **sustainability**, at an institutional level, in 2015 (Score 3.75) than in 2014 (Score 3.25). MoEC’s apparent interest in adopting school construction guidelines is particularly positive and, should this occur, the benefits could be long-standing and far-reaching. Equally, MoEC’s interest in OLL learning and its financing of ProDEP replication in 40 non-EP districts in 2015-16 is noteworthy, even if it is unclear if that will be sufficient to generate the interest and appetite for broader interest in and commitment to the fledging ProDEP initiative. Moreover, the ongoing lack of clarity about what, if any, institutional legacy might be available to ACDP (C4) and how partners might wish to pursue those opportunities is cause for ongoing concern (Score 2).

Overall, the EP made progress in 2015 under challenging circumstances and the emerging evidence of a broadly effective EP is very encouraging. With Components 2 and 3 closing in June 2016, Component 1 probably being extended until the end of 2016 and Component 4 concluding in mid-2017, emphasis must now shift to undertaking those measures that will cement the gains secured to date, generating additional gains where possible and sustaining those benefits over time, i.e. the effectiveness, impact and sustainability of EP investments.



Annexes

Annex I: EP Logic Architecture



Annex II: Interpretation of DAC Criteria

|  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- |
| **Relevance** | | The extent to which the investment is suited to program goals and objectives and to the policies and priorities of the GoI and GoA |
| **Headline questions** | * To what extent are EP interventions appropriate to the Indonesian education sector? (External) * To what extent are the EP interventions in line with Australian development policy and priorities? (External) * To what extent are the activities and outputs consistent with the attainment of EOCOs and EOPOs and goals? (Internal) | |
| **Efficiency** | | A measure of how economically (in relation to time and cost) inputs are converted to outputs (and EOCOs) |
| **Headline questions** | * To what extent are the output- and EOCO-level milestones being achieved on time? And in accordance with agreed budget envelopes? * Could the same quality and quantity of deliverables and the same level of change/results have been achieved with less investment? | |
| **Effectiveness** | | The extent to which an investment attains its end-of-partnership targets |
| **Headline questions** | * To what extent and how has JSE enrolment in public schools increased in EP targeted districts? * To what extent and how have EP-funded professional development initiatives improved the management of schools and Madrasah? * To what extent and how has EP-funded support improved the quality of Madrasah service provision? * To what extent is systemic change occurring within C3’s targeted districts (and elsewhere, and what is the EP’s contribution to the same? * To what extent and how is ACDP evidence that relates to the EP incorporated in relevant education sector policies, regulations plans and budgets? * To what extent has the EP delivered or contributed to unforeseen results that could be deemed to be on a par with EOCOs and EOPOs? * Is there evidence that the EP has generated unforeseen costs and are they deemed to be at an acceptable or unacceptable level? | |
| **Impact** | | The overall *long-term effect* produced by an investment. This includes positive and negative changes produced by a development investment (directly or indirectly, intended or unintended). |
| **Headline questions** | * To what extent have EP interventions contributed to student participation in JSE? (Goal 1) * To what extent have EP interventions contributed to the improvement of the quality of education in public and private schools? (Goal 2) * To what extent have EP interventions contributed to increased use of evidence for education sector decision making? (Goal 3) | |
| **Sustainability** | | The extent to which the benefits are likely to continue after DFAT funding to the EP has been withdrawn |
| **Headline questions** | * To what extent will the key benefits be sustained once GoA’s investment ceases? * Is there evidence of partners adopting, adapting, taking to scale and financing the outputs, approaches, tools, etc. implemented in the EP? * Do beneficiaries have sufficient ownership, capacity and resources to maintain the benefits after GoA funding has ceased? | |

Annex III: APPR Rating Scale

|  |  |
| --- | --- |
| **Rating scale** | |
| Less than satisfactory | Satisfactory |
| 1: Very poor; does not satisfy criteria in any major area | 4: Adequate; on balance satisfies criteria; does not fail in any major area |
| 2: Poor; does not satisfy criteria in several major areas | 5: Good; satisfies criteria in almost all areas |
| 3: Less than adequate; on balance does not satisfy criteria and/or fails in at least one major area | 6: Very good; satisfies criteria in all areas |
| TE: Too early to rate | |

*Based on DFAT’s Investment Quality Reporting and the associated Aid Quality Checks (AQC)*

Annex IV: List of Key Documents Reviewed

This annex lists key reports reviewed by POM relating to EP performance as Step 2 of the APPR preparation process (see Section 1.2.3).

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| **Report** |
| **Government of Indonesia (GoI)** |
| Anies Baswedan, Letter to the President, 22 December 2015 |
| Strategic Plan 2014 – 2019, Ministry of Education and Culture |
| *Arah Kebijakan dan Strategi Pendidikan Islam Tahun 2015 – 2019*, MoRA, 2016 (*http://pendis.kemenag.go.id*) |
| *Profil Direktorat Jenderal Pendidikan Islam Tahun Anggaran 2012/2013*, Ministry of Religious Affairs (MoRA) |
| **Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade (DFAT)** |
| An Agreement for Grant Financing Junior Secondary School Construction and Expansion through Australia’s Education Partnership with Indonesia. A contribution to the Government of Indonesia’s Education Sector Support Program, AusAID Agreement No. 60472 |
| Education Partnership Theory of Change, Version 12, 2013 |
| EP Program Logic, May 2014 |
| Procedures Manual National System of Professional Development for Education Personnel, June 2014 |
| Management Response: Education Partnership Annual Partnership Performance Report 2014 |
| Making Performance Count: Enhancing the Accountability and Effectiveness of Australian Aid, 2015 |
| Strategy for Australia’s Aid Investment in Education 2015 -2020, September 2015 |
| Performance Assessment Framework (PAF) Update, presentation by Murray O’Hanlon, First Secretary, Development Cooperation February 2016 |
| ESSP Governance and Oversight Group Minutes of Meeting 2015, December 2015 |
| Various Weekly and Fortnightly Updates |
| Wood, T, Burkot, C, Howes, S., Australian Aid: Signs of Risk – the 2015 Australian Aid Stakeholder Survey, The Development Policy Centre, Canberra, 2016 |
| **Analytical and Analytical and Capacity Development Partnership (ACDP)** |
| Six Monthly Progress Report, Mid-2014, 2014 |
| Six Monthly Progress Report, End-2014, 2015 |
| Six Monthly Progress Report, Mid-2015, 2015 |
| ACDP 001 – Early Childhood Development Strategy Study, 2013 |
| ACDP 004 – General Senior Secondary Education Financing in Indonesia, 2013 |
| ACDP 007 - School and Madrasah Principals and Supervisors Competencies Baseline Study, 2013 |
| ACDP 013A – Support to Textbook Development, 2013 |
| ACDP 015 – Mid-Term Review of the Education Renstra 2010 – 2014, 2013 |
| ACDP 015A – Support to Development of MoEC Renstra 2015 -2019, 2013 |
| ACDP 016 – Linking National Plans for Acceleration and Expansion of Economic Development to programming in the Education Sector, 2013 |
| ACDP 020 – Evaluation of International Standard Schools, 2013 |
| ACDP 021 – Overview of Islamic Education Sub-Sector in Indonesia, 2013 |
| ACDP 022 – Final Report on the Development of Quality Assurance for Early Childhood Education, 2013 |
| ACDP 034D – Paper on MSS and the Quality of the Learning Environment, 2014 |
| ACDP 034F – Paper on Higher Education Governance and Management, 2014 |
| ACDP 037 – Capacity Building for Evaluation of Education Policies, Strategies and Programs Through Overseas Course and Workshop, 2014 |
| Minutes of Roundtable APPR Discussions on POM’s Draft Findings of ACDP, November 2014 |
| Minutes of ACDP Technical Oversight Group Meeting, March 2015 |
| Various Weekly and Fortnightly Updates |
| **School System and Quality (SSQ)** |
| Annual Progress Report, 2014 |
| Annual Progress Report, 2015 |
| ME011: Evaluation of Component 3 Phase 1, 2013 |
| New School Induction Program (NSIP) School Visits Reports, 2014 |
| A Strategy To Establish A Continuous Program of Madrasah Quality Improvement: the “Grand Design”, 2015 |
| Various Weekly and Fortnightly Updates |
| **Performance Oversight and Monitoring (POM)** |
| Annual Sector Monitoring Report, 2013 |
| Annual Partnership Performance Report 2013 |
| Thematic Literature Review for Component 2, 2014 |
| Annual Partnership Performance Report, 2014 |
| Interim Critical Issues Report, 2014 |
| EOPO 1 – Evaluation Study Baseline Report, 2014 |
| EOPO 2 – Evaluation Study, 2015 |
| EOPO 3 – Evaluation Study: Endline Report, 2015 |
| EOPO 4 – Evaluation Study (Draft), May 2016 |
| Comparative Study of Madrasah Development Centres, 2015 |
| Performance Milestone Framework (PMF) Report, 2015 |
| **Others** |
| Education in Indonesia: Rising to the Challenge, OECD |
| Media Indonesia, “*Pengawas Sekolah Harus Ubah Paradigma*”, 10 December 2015 |

Annex V: EP Analytical Framework 2015

| **Section 1: Context and Headline Results** | | | |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |
| **1.1** | **Context** | | Key sectoral changes from June 2011 to date, particularly in the last calendar year |
| **Headline questions** | | * Have there been notable changes to the sectoral, policy, political and staffing contexts, particularly in the last 12 months? | |
| **1.2** | **Results** | | Planned and actual results |
| **Headline questions** | | * What anticipated results have been realized to date at output, EOCO and EOPO level? * What anticipated results did we expect to realize at output, EOCO and EOPO level by this time? * What anticipated results do we expect to see at output, EOCO and EOPO level by the end of the EP? * What anticipated results do we expect to see at output, EOCO and EOPO level beyond the lifetime of the EP? * Is there clarity and consensus about anticipated results? | |
| **1.3** | **Additional change** | | Unanticipated changes/results |
| **Headline questions** | | * Is there evidence of unanticipated changes/results arising from the EP investment? | |

| **Section 2: Performance against the DAC criteria** | | |
| --- | --- | --- |
| **2.1** | **Relevance** | The extent to which the investment is suited to program goals and objectives and the policies and priorities of the GoI and GoA |
| **Headline questions** | * Is this still the right thing to do? (AQC) * To what extent are EP interventions appropriate to the Indonesian education sector? (External) * To what extent are the EP interventions in line with Australian development policy and priorities? (External) * To what extent are the activities and outputs consistent with the attainment of EOCOs and EOPOs and goals? (Internal) | |
| **AQC ‘tests’** | * The investment aligns with the purpose of the aid program, to promote Australia’s national interest by contributing to sustainable growth and poverty reduction. * The investment contributes to the Government’s Economic Diplomacy Agenda. * The investment is important for the partner government/s and aligns with their development priorities. * There is a clear link between what the investment plans to deliver and objectives outlined in an Aid Investment Plan or similar document. * The investment is in an area of Australia’s comparative advantage. Australia’s value-add is clear. * Changes to the economic, social or political context have not affected the relevance of the investment. | |
| **2.2** | **Efficiency** | A measure of how economically (in relation to time and cost) inputs are converted to outputs (and EOCOs) |
| **Headline questions** | * Is the investment making appropriate use of Australia’s and our partners’ time and resources to achieve outcomes? (AQC) * To what extent are the output- and EOCO-level milestones being achieved on time? And in accordance with agreed budget envelopes? * Could the same quality and quantity of deliverables and the same level of change/results have been achieved with less investment? | |
| **AQC ‘tests’** | * Activities and outputs are delivered on time and in a cost-effective manner. * Predicted budgets compare well to actual expenditure. * The investment's planned funding and timeframe are sufficient to achieve the intended outcomes. * There is sufficient staff (both DFAT and partners) with the necessary skills to manage the investment. * The investment modality and implementation arrangements are appropriate and proportional to the outcomes sought. * Implementation arrangements are well harmonised with other donors. * Implementation arrangements are aligned with partner government systems. | |
| **2.3** | **Effectiveness** | The extent to which an investment attains its end-of-partnership targets |
| **Headline questions** | * Are we achieving the results that we expected at this point in time? (AQC) * To what extent and how has JSE enrolment in public schools increased in EP targeted districts? * To what extent and how have EP-funded professional development initiatives improved the management of schools and Madrasah? * To what extent and how has EP-funded support improved the quality of Madrasah service provision? * To what extent is systemic change occurring within C3’s targeted districts (and elsewhere, and what is the EP’s contribution to the same? * To what extent and how is ACDP evidence that relates to the EP incorporated in relevant education sector policies, regulations plans and budgets? * To what extent has the EP delivered or contributed to unforeseen results that could be deemed to be on a par with EOCOs and EOPOs? * Is there evidence that the EP has generated unforeseen costs and are they deemed to be at an acceptable or unacceptable level? | |
| **AQC ‘tests’** | * The investment has clear and realistic outcomes, supported by a robust logic and theory of change. * The investment is on-track towards achieving its expected outcomes. * The quality of the investment's key outputs and activities is as expected. * Policy dialogue is used effectively to influence partners and support the investment's outcomes. * Intended beneficiaries are satisfied with the investment's results. | |
| **2.4** | **Impact** | The overall *long-term effect* produced by an investment. This includes positive and negative changes produced by a development investment (directly or indirectly, intended or unintended). |
| **Headline questions** | * To what extent have EP interventions contributed to student participation in JSE? (Goal 1) * To what extent have EP interventions contributed to the improvement of the quality of education in public and private schools? (Goal 2) * To what extent have EP interventions contributed to increased use of evidence for education sector decision making? (Goal 3) | |
| **AQC ‘tests’** | * [None identified] | |
| **2.5** | **Sustainability** | The extent to which the benefits are likely to continue after DFAT funding to the EP has been withdrawn |
| **Headline questions** | * Will the benefits last? (AQC) * Is there evidence of partners adopting, adapting, taking to scale and financing the outputs, approaches, tools, etc. implemented in the EP? * Do beneficiaries have sufficient ownership, capacity and resources to maintain the benefits after GoA funding has ceased? | |
| **AQC ‘tests’** | * There is evidence that benefits of the investment will continue after Australia's funding completes. * The investment uses local systems and processes and strengthens the capacity of local institutions. * The investment has a high level of ownership amongst developing country partners and beneficiaries. * Local, private sector or other non-ODA sources of funding are used to support the investment's outcomes. * The investment is resilient to the impacts of natural disasters and changing climatic conditions. * There is a clear exit strategy, with risks to sustainability being appropriately managed. | |
| **2.6** | **Lessons** | The lessons that DFAT might/should apply as it implements its Forward Program |
| **Headline questions** | * What approaches to aid design, delivery, management and governance worked well during the EP and why? * What approaches to aid design, delivery, management and governance did not work well during the EP and why? * How might proven successes be applied/embraced in the FP? * How might pitfalls be avoided in the FP? | |

| **Section 3: Program oversight** | | |
| --- | --- | --- |
| **3.1** | **Program delivery** | The ways in which the investment is delivered |
| **Headline questions** | * Have the most appropriate implementation arrangements, modalities and/or delivery mechanisms been utilised to maximise results? | |
| **3.2** | **Program management** | The formal and informal arrangements and processes by which the EP is managed by the partnership. |
| **Headline questions** | * Is there evidence that management arrangements are effective? * Is there evidence to suggest that the program is managed in the spirit of the “partnership”? * Are there alternative views, especially as they concern important, controversial or disappointing findings? | |
| **AQC ‘tests’ (selected)** | * Risk management and safeguards   + The risk profile of this investment has not significantly changed during the last 12 months.   + The controls and treatments for the management for the identified risks are effective.   + The investment has appropriate and effective measures in place to prevent, detect and deal with fraud and corruption. * Innovation and private sector   + The investment's M&E system is collecting `real-time' data and using this information to adapt the investment during implementation. | |
| **3.3** | **Program governance** | The formal and informal arrangements and processes by which the EP is governed by the partnership. |
| **Headline questions** | * Is there evidence that governance arrangements are effective? * Is there evidence to suggest that the program is governed in the spirit of the “partnership”? * Are there alternative views, especially as they concern important, controversial or disappointing findings? | |
| **3.4** | **Cross-cutting issues** | * The immediate beneficiaries of EP investment, e.g. the eligible entities in C2, the SNIPs in C3, and those making requests of ACDP in C4. * The intermediate beneficiaries, e.g. the principals and supervisors securing PD (C2) and the Madrasah receiving support from the SNIPs in C3. * The ultimate beneficiaries, i.e. the students. * VFM, i.e. ensuring the best results possible are obtained from the money spent |
| **Headline questions** | * Disadvantaged groups   + Is the investment making a difference to gender equality and empowering women and girls? (AQC)   + To what extent was the promotion of equality between men and women a principal or significant objective of this investment? (AQC variant)   + How have EP interventions affected different beneficiaries?   + Do targeting measures exist and, if so, are these applied and have they been successful? * Broader developmental agenda   + VFM:     - Has the holistic and long-term value of the EP been adequately articulated?     - How much has been spent to achieve the results described?     - Is there evidence to suggest that the EP (and its individual components) offers Value for Money?   + Innovation and private sector     - To what extent does the investment reflect DFAT’s interest in supporting innovation and engaging the private sector? * Are there alternative views, especially as these views concern important, controversial or disappointing findings? Broader developmental agenda | |
| **AQC ‘tests’**  **(selected)** | * Beneficiary-related:   + The investment actively involves disabled peoples’ organisations in planning, implementation and monitoring and evaluation.   + The investment identifies and addresses barriers to inclusion and opportunities for people with disability, indigenous peoples and/or ethnic minorities.   + Analysis of gender equality gaps and opportunities substantially informs the investment.   + Risks to gender equality are identified and appropriately managed.   + The investment is making progress as expected in effectively implementing strategies to promote gender equality and women's empowerment.   + There is sufficient expertise and budget allocation to achieve gender equality related outputs of the investment.   + As a result of the investment, partners increasingly treat gender equality as a priority through their own policies and processes. * Innovation and private sector-related:   + The investment is results-based (i.e. DFAT pays only on delivery of an agreed set of outputs).   + The investment is applying a new approach to aid delivery that has not been used in this region/country or sector previously.   + The investment is trialling, adapting new technologies that, if successful, offer clear potential for improved cost effectiveness, achieving impact at scale.   + The investment is a new collaboration / partnership between DFAT and the private sector (excludes standard commercial supply contracts).   + The investment has potential to be scaled-up and/or replicated if successful.   + The investment engaged with the private sector in its design, delivery, governance or evaluation. | |

Annex VI: List of Persons Consulted

| **Name** | **Title** | **Date of  Consultation** | **POM Staff Present\*** |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |
| Supriano | Director for the Development of Junior Secondary Education, Ministry of Education and Culture (MoEC) | 22/01/16 | **JD,** IV |
| Didik Suhardi | Secretary General, Ministry of Education and Culture (MoEC) | 26/01/16 | **JD,** IV |
| Susetyo Widiasmoro | Head of Sub-Directorate of Institutions, Facilities and Infrastructure Unit, Ministry of Education and Culture (MoEC) | 29/01/16 | **JD,** IV |
| Rob Kingham | Islamic Education Specialist, School Systems and Quality (SSQ) | 02/02/16 | **SM,** NC, IV |
| Basilius Bengoteku | Deputy Program Director, INOVASI (DFAT) and former Lead Advisor, Analytical and Capacity Development Partnership (ACDP) | 03/02/16 | **SM,** NC |
| Garti Sri Utami | Director for the Development of Basic and Secondary Education Personnel, Ministry of Education and Culture (MoEC) | 03/02/16 | **PK**, NC |
| Yudi Herman | Head of Planning Section, Ministry of Education and Culture (MoEC) | 03/02/16 | **PK**, NC |
| Budi Suprayitno | Staff for Development of Basic and Secondary Education Personnel, Ministry of Education and Culture (MoEC) | 03/02/16 | **PK** |
| Yaya Kardiawarman | Component 2 Manager, Education Quality, School Systems and Quality (SSQ) | 03/02/16 | **PK**, NC |
| Kerri Amos | Operations Manager, School Systems and Quality (SSQ) | 03/02/16 | **NC,** SM |
| Aryanti Savitri | Unit Manager, Basic Education Unit, Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade (DFAT), Jakarta | 04/02/16 | **PK**, IV |
| Julie Hind | EOPO 4 Evaluation Consultant, Performance Oversight and Monitoring (POM) | 05/02/16 | **SM,** NC |
| Rohmat Mulyana | Deputy Director of Institutional Unit, Madrasah Education Directorate, Ministry of Religious Affairs (MoRA) | 05/02/16 | **IV,** BN |
| Ratna Fitriani | Social Inclusion Advisor, School Systems and Quality (SSQ) | 09/02/16 | **NC**, SM |
| Sri Novelma | Senior Program Manager, Basic Education Unit, Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade (DFAT), Jakarta | 09/02/16 | **IV**, BN, PK |
| Totok Suprayitno | Head of Balitbang, Ministry of Education and Culture (MoEC) | 09/02/16 | **SM,** NC |
| Nizam | Head of the Centre for Education Assessment, Ministry of Education and Culture | 09/02/16 | **SM,** NC |
| Jihad Saad | Component 1 Manager, School Construction, School Systems and Quality (SSQ) | 10/02/16 | **IV,** BN |
| Jason Court | Assistant Director, Indonesia Human Development Section, Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade (DFAT), Canberra | 10/02/16 | **SM,** NC |
| Meliana Istanto | Site Selection Coordinator, School Systems and Quality (SSQ) | 10/02/16 | **IV**, BN |
| Suluh Adiwibowo | Senior Infrastructure Advisor, School Systems and Quality (SSQ) | 10/02/16 | **IV**, BN |
| Greg Pearson | Monitoring and Evaluation Advisor, School Systems and Quality (SSQ) | 10/02/16 | **NC**, SM |
| Achmad Zufar | Consultant at Directorate of Junior Secondary Education Management, Ministry of Education and Culture (MoEC) | 10/02/16 | **IV,** BN |
| Jerry Strudwick | Lead Education Specialist, Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade (DFAT), Jakarta | 11/02/16 | **NC,** SM |
| Awalia Murtiana | Program Manager, Basic Education Unit, Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade (DFAT), Jakarta | 11/02/16 | **IV,** BN |
| Kidup Supriadi | Head of Unit of Curriculum and Evaluation, Ministry of Education and Culture (MoEC) | 11/02/16 | **PK** |
| Tjipto Prakosa | Data Analyst & Training Advisor, School Systems and Quality (SSQ) | 11/02/16 | **PKing**, IV |
| Luluk Farida Muchtar | Sub-National Implementing Partner Advisor, School Systems and Quality (SSQ) | 11/02/16 | **PKing**, IV |
| Abdul Munir | Component 3 Manager, Madrasah Accreditation, School Systems and Quality (SSQ) | 11/02/16 | **PKing**, IV |
| Sarah Lendon | Counsellor, Scholarships, Alumni and Education, Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade (DFAT), Jakarta | 11/02/16 | **NC**, SM |
| Nina Sardjunani | Former Co-Chair of the Analytical and Capacity Development Partnership (ACDP) and Former Deputy Minister for Human, Community, and Cultural Development, Ministry of National Development Planning (Bappenas) | 12/02/16 | **SM**, NC |
| Benita Chudleigh | Senior Program Manager, Basic Education Unit, Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade (DFAT), Jakarta | 12/02/16 | **PKing**, IV |
| Diah Pratiwi | Program Manager, Basic Education Unit, Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade (DFAT), Jakarta | 12/02/16 | **PKing, IV** |
| Hendarman | Head of the Centre for Policy Research, Ministry of Education and Culture (MoEC) | 12/02/16 | **NC**, SM |
| Muktiono Waspodo | Head of Staff Education and Training, Ministry of Education and Culture (MoEC) | 15/02/16 | **PK** |
| Nurzaman | Head of Research and Education Centre, Ministry of Education and Culture (MoEC) | 15/02/16 | **PK**, NC |
| Mokhamad Iksan | Senior Islamic School Accreditation Advisor, School Systems and Quality (SSQ) | 16/02/16 | **PKing**, IV |
| John Virtue | Education Sector Governance & Capacity Development Advisor, Analytical and Capacity Development Partnership (ACDP) | 16/02/16 | **SM**, NC |
| Kamaruddin Amin | Director General of Islamic Education, Ministry of Religious Affairs (MoRA) | 16/02/16 | **PKing**, NC, IV |
| Destriani Nugroho | Project Officer, European Union (EU) | 22/02/16 | **SM,** NC |
| Pierre Destexhe | Program Manager, European Union (EU) | 22/02/16 | **NC,** SM |
| Graham Dawson | Education Consultant, School Systems and Quality (SSQ) | 22/02/16 | **PK,** NC |
| Totok Amin Soefijanto | Indonesia Education Knowledge Management Specialist, Analytical and Capacity Development Partnership (ACDP) | 23/02/16 | **SM,** NC |
| Admir Meko | Senior Program Manager, Basic Education Unit, Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade (DFAT), Jakarta | 25/02/16 | **NC,** BN |
| Subandi Sardjoko | Deputy Minister for Human, Community, and Cultural Development, Ministry of National Development Planning (Bappenas) | 29/02/16 | **SM**, NC |
| Siswandari | Director of Institute for Development and Empowerment of the School Principals (LPPKS) | 02/03/16 | **PK** |
| Fasli Jalal | Sr. Education Advisor (Consultant), Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade (DFAT) | 06/03/16 | **PK** |
| Rooswanti Soeharno | Social Sector Officer, Asian Development Bank (ADB) | 18/03/16 | **SM** |
| Hamid Muhammad | Director General for Basic and Secondary Education, Ministry of Education and Culture (MoEC) | Intended\*\* |  |
| Norman Larocque | Principal Education Specialist, Asian Development Bank (ADB) | Intended\*\* |  |
| David Harding | Lead Adviser for Education and Knowledge Management, Analytical and Capacity Development Partnership (ACDP) | Intended\*\* |  |
| Tania Dora Warokka | Monitoring and Evaluation Leader, School Systems and Quality (SSQ) | Intended\*\* |  |
| Furqon | Rector of Universitas Pendidikan Indonesia (UPI) and former Co-Chair of the Analytical and Capacity Development Partnership (ACDP) | Intended\*\* |  |
| Abi Sujak | Director of SEAMEO SEAMOLEC, Indonesia | Intended\*\* |  |
| Abdul Malik | Education Sector Research, Information & Accountability Advisor, Analytical and Capacity Development Partnership (ACDP) | Intended\*\* |  |

\* POM Staff: NC = Nick Clinch; JD = Joanne Dowling; PK = Paskal Kleden; PKing = Phillip King; SM = Simon Milligan; BN = Budi Nugroho; IV = Ingga Vistara (POM staff identified in bold led the interview)

\*\* Meetings were scheduled with these key informants but, for reasons beyond POM’s control, the consultations did not take place.

Annex VII: ECBP M&E Standards: Standard 3: Initiative Progress Reporting

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| **No** | **Feature of Progress Report** | **EP-APPR Compliance** |
| 3.1 | There is an executive summary that communicates the key information required for QAI reporting | See Executive Summary. |
| 3.2 | The relevant aspects of the context are adequately described | Each component section and the program oversight section have an individual section on Context. |
| 3.3 | There is a reflection on the continuing relevance of the expected end-of-program outcomes | Each component section has an individual section on Relevance. |
| 3.4 | An assessment of the adequacy of progress toward sustained end-of-program outcomes is described | Assessment of progress against DAC criteria are scored for each component. Specifically, sections on Effectiveness consider adequacy of progress towards EOPOs. |
| 3.5 | The quality, reach and coverage of key outputs or deliverables for the reporting period are described | Achievements are listed for each component. |
| 3.6 | The adequacy of progress implementing the annual plan is described | n/a (implementing partners provide reporting against annual plans). |
| 3.7 | A reflection on the adequacy of planned inputs to meet the expected end-of-program outcomes is provided | Assessment of progress against DAC criteria are scored for each component. Specifically, sections on Efficiency consider adequacy of planned inputs to meet EOPOs. |
| 3.8 | The adequacy of progress against the budget is assessed | Adequacy of EP progress against budget is considered in Program Oversight, Section 6.3. |
| 3.9 | The efficiency and effectiveness of key management or implementation system is assessed or demonstrated | Each component section has an individual section on Efficiency and Effectiveness. In addition Management and Governance of the EP are considered under Program Oversight, Section 6. |
| 3.10 | The report achieves a fair balance between reporting of positive or negative issues or achievements | The report is prepared in an independent manner and focuses on both positive and negative aspects of performance. |
| 3.11 | The report provides credible evidence of claims made | Considerable evidence is presented and referenced to justify claims |
| 3.12 | Important lessons are summarised | Findings and associated recommendations are summarised in each section and in the Executive Summary. |

F:\WORK\EPOS\REPORT & STATIONARY\emf\Red stripe.emfAustralia’s Education Partnership with Indonesia

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Australian Aid – managed by the Palladium Group on behalf of the Australian Government

1. Madrasah are Islamic schools which teach the national curriculum in addition to providing extra religious instruction. Madrasah are regulated by the Ministry of Religious Affairs. [↑](#footnote-ref-2)
2. At the time of writing C1 was still scheduled to close on 30 June 2016 but POM understands that discussions are underway to extend the Component until December 2016. [↑](#footnote-ref-3)
3. DFAT’s [Education] Sector Investment Plan articulates a vision of demonstrating affordable and sustainable mechanisms to raise learning outcomes and by which Indonesia can improve the effectiveness of its education spend. The proposed program consists of four closely related investments operating at both sub-national and national level. [↑](#footnote-ref-4)
4. The original budget for the Education Partnership was AUD 500m. A minute was signed by the Director General of AusAID on 23 April 2013, increasing the value of the EP from AUD 500m to AUD 524m. Budget revisions in 2014 and 2015 saw the budget reduce to AUD 368.8m. [↑](#footnote-ref-5)
5. As at end of March 2016. [↑](#footnote-ref-6)
6. At the time of writing C1 was still scheduled to close on 30 June 2016 but POM understands that discussions are underway to extend the Component until December 2016. [↑](#footnote-ref-7)
7. DFAT’s [Education] Sector Investment Plan articulates a vision of demonstrating affordable and sustainable mechanisms to raise learning outcomes and by which Indonesia can improve the effectiveness of its education spend. The proposed program consists of four closely related investments operating at both sub-national and national level. [↑](#footnote-ref-8)
8. Timeframes were tight and SSQ-C2 was unable to respond in time. [↑](#footnote-ref-9)
9. Email from DFAT: Subject: *Official wording: new school building targets*, 8 December, 2014. [↑](#endnote-ref-1)
10. AusAID, *The Education Partnership Theory of Change (Draft).* [↑](#endnote-ref-2)
11. Districts with low junior secondary enrolment were initially defined as districts with a JSE-GER of <90%. This was subsequently revised in 2013 to <95%. [↑](#footnote-ref-10)
12. An Agreement for Grant Financing Junior Secondary School Construction and Expansion through Australia’s Education Partnership with Indonesia. A contribution to the Government of Indonesia’s Education Sector Support Program, Schedule 1. AusAID Agreement No. 60472. [↑](#endnote-ref-3)
13. An Agreement for Grant Financing Junior Secondary School Construction and Expansion through Australia’s Education Partnership with Indonesia. A contribution to the Government of Indonesia’s Education Sector Support Program, Schedule 1. AusAID Agreement No. 60472. [↑](#endnote-ref-4)
14. i.e. a change in practice and/or relationships which create better performance, e.g. in terms of the services received by end users. [↑](#footnote-ref-11)
15. An Agreement for Grant Financing Junior Secondary School Construction and Expansion through Australia’s Education Partnership with Indonesia. A contribution to the Government of Indonesia’s Education Sector Support Program, Schedule 1. AusAID Agreement No. 60472. [↑](#endnote-ref-5)
16. An Agreement for Grant Financing Junior Secondary School Construction and Expansion through Australia’s Education Partnership with Indonesia. A contribution to the Government of Indonesia’s Education Sector Support Program, Schedule 1. AusAID Agreement No. 60472. [↑](#endnote-ref-6)
17. An Agreement for Grant Financing Junior Secondary School Construction and Expansion through Australia’s Education Partnership with Indonesia. A contribution to the Government of Indonesia’s Education Sector Support Program, Schedule 1. AusAID Agreement No. 60472. [↑](#endnote-ref-7)
18. Email from DFAT: Subject: Signed sa amend 3 FINAL, 27 April, 2016. [↑](#endnote-ref-8)
19. e.g. see DFAT (2015). Making performance count: enhancing the accountability and effectiveness of Australian aid. See http://dfat.gov.au/about-us/publications/Documents/framework-making-performance-count.pdf [↑](#footnote-ref-12)
20. The number of classrooms is obtained by multiplying the number of USB by 6, and by multiplying the number of SATAP by 3. [↑](#footnote-ref-13)
21. The number of additional student places is calculated by multiplying the number of classrooms by 36 (Minimum Service Standards). [↑](#footnote-ref-14)
22. SSQ. *Annual Progress Report 2014*, p.3. [↑](#endnote-ref-9)
23. These processes were initiated by SSQ from Cycle 2 onwards at DFAT’s request. [↑](#footnote-ref-15)
24. At the time of writing, the Embassy was reviewing its decision and it has signalled its intent to extend support to December 2016. [↑](#footnote-ref-16)
25. The ‘mini-USB’ may, for example, be a means of addressing trends whereby SATAP type schools are by-passed by potential users in favour of attending a stand-alone JSS. [↑](#footnote-ref-17)
26. SSQ. *Annual Progress Report 2015*, p.10. [↑](#endnote-ref-10)
27. SSQ. *Annual Progress Report 2015*, p.14. [↑](#endnote-ref-11)
28. Construction management issues was only reviewed in Cycle 3 only. [↑](#footnote-ref-18)
29. As of February 2016, five of these six incomplete schools were already completed. [↑](#footnote-ref-19)
30. The projection is based on two facts: (a) by June 2015, 44 Cycle 3 schools were incomplete (18% of total Cycle-3 schools), and; (b) with a progress lag of 10% lag in Cycle 4 (see Figure 1), it is probable that 28% or 42 Cycle 4 schools will be incomplete as of June 2016. [↑](#footnote-ref-20)
31. As of November 2015, construction had not commenced at six of the 150 sites due to land issues (four sites) and the replacement of SCC teams due to local conflict (two sites). Construction at two of these six sites only started in December 2015. [↑](#footnote-ref-21)
32. The figure reflects the total number of students retrieved from DAPODIK website. It covers 727 of the 1,005 schools constructed in Cycles 1, 2, and 3. [↑](#footnote-ref-22)
33. POM. *Performance Milestone Framework 2015 Report.* [↑](#endnote-ref-12)
34. Correct as of January 2016 and based on the 1st semester of the 2015/16 academic year. [↑](#footnote-ref-23)
35. This is made possible by utilising existing SD facilities to house SMP classes. [↑](#footnote-ref-24)
36. The *EOPO 1 Endline Evaluation Study* randomly sampled 100 of 451 school construction sites. The sampling of the study can be considered as representative of all Cycle 1 sites. [↑](#footnote-ref-25)
37. New enrolees are defined as prospective students who would not attend JSE schooling if the EP school was not constructed. The decision not to attend JSE schooling was for various reasons (e.g. no accessible JSE schooling, insufficient funding for transport costs, etc.). These new enrolees will have a direct effect on GER. Transferees are defined as prospective students who would attend JSE schooling even if EP schools had not been constructed, albeit attending existing JSE schooling would be more expensive. These students will not directly increase GER of the districts. Nevertheless these students may result in improved GER as it is assumed that they are less likely to drop out of school. [↑](#footnote-ref-26)
38. For the period 2011/12 to 2014/15, the analysis draws on several data sources: MoEC enrolment data for Junior Secondary Education, 2011/12 to 2014/15 (for comparative purposes); BPS SUSENAS data, 2014 (for propensity matching); and the list of schools constructed by C1 (to identify participating and non-participating districts). [↑](#footnote-ref-27)
39. While the data is based on a sample of Cycle 1 schools, it is POM’s view that it represents a condition typical of schools constructed in subsequent cycles. [↑](#footnote-ref-28)
40. NSIP survey data collected in 2014 presented a far lower figure of only 3 teachers per school. In retrospect, it is likely that this was a case of under-reporting part-time contract teachers. [↑](#footnote-ref-29)
41. The ‘subsidy’ represented by the PNS salary payments was low by national standards due to the low ratio of PNS teachers in EP-funded schools [↑](#footnote-ref-30)
42. The 2014 AIBEP Study, for example, showed that parental perceptions of teacher quality were often based on status (PNS or not) and experience. While young teachers are often popular with students because they are ‘fun’, parental assessment of teaching quality frequently highlights the importance of discipline. [↑](#footnote-ref-31)
43. Indeed, the ‘inefficiencies’ of such small schools is offset by the strong likelihood that enrolled children are ‘new-enrolees’, thus contributing to improvements in GERs. [↑](#footnote-ref-32)
44. Data collected during the 2015 Endline survey indicate that supply-side solutions have reached the limit of effectiveness in stimulating enrolments from key target groups. School construction had limited or no effect on changing enrolment patterns for remote students or students from households with low levels of educational attainment. Other variables that influence JSE enrolment and completion rates (marriage, opportunities in local labour markets) would likewise be more effectively treated with investments in strategies to stimulate demand for JSE. [↑](#footnote-ref-33)
45. In the absence of an independent assessment of NSIP impact, it cannot be definitively stated that new schools were poorer for the loss of the program. [↑](#footnote-ref-34)
46. DFAT, EP Program Logic, 26 May 2014. [↑](#endnote-ref-13)
47. Ministerial Decree No. 13/2007 on the *Standards for School / Madrasah Principals* identifies the need for skills in the following areas: (i) personality; (ii) management; (iii) entrepreneurship; (iv) supervision; (v) social. [↑](#footnote-ref-35)
48. On the *Appointment of Teachers as Principals at Schools / Madrasah*. [↑](#footnote-ref-36)
49. The CPD is provided to improve the knowledge, skills, competencies and professionalism of principals. [↑](#footnote-ref-37)
50. The SPD is provided to prepare supervisors to better mentor those principals participating in the CPD. [↑](#footnote-ref-38)
51. The HRMD and SP&FM are provided to District Education Offices and MoRA provincial offices to allow them to better plan human and financial resourcing. [↑](#footnote-ref-39)
52. The PPP trains teachers to become principals. [↑](#footnote-ref-40)
53. Interview Garti Sri Utami, 3 February 2016. [↑](#endnote-ref-14)
54. Madrasah are Islamic schools in which the teaching of the national curriculum is augmented with additional religious instruction. They are regulated by the Ministry of Religious Affairs (MoRA). [↑](#footnote-ref-41)
55. SSQ. Annual Progress Report 2013, p.22. [↑](#endnote-ref-15)
56. Previously it was managed by *Pusbangtendik* under MoEC’s Board of Development for Human Resource Education and Culture and Education Quality Assurance (Badan PSDMPK & PMP or “Badan”). [↑](#footnote-ref-42)
57. SSQ, Annual Progress Report 2014, p.83. [↑](#endnote-ref-16)
58. The relatively new province of North Kalimantan does not yet have an LPMP. [↑](#footnote-ref-43)
59. Because they are now under the authority the Directorate General for Basic and Senior Secondary Education whereas responsibility for ProDEP resides with the Directorate General for Teacher and Education Personnel, a different arm of MoEC. A number of LPMP personnel are now hired by Eligible Entities on an individual basis. [↑](#footnote-ref-44)
60. This required EEs to shift their attention away from ProDEP because Curriculum 2013 was considered to be a national priority and that required EEs to provide training to teachers and principals. [↑](#footnote-ref-45)
61. The letter prohibited the use of hotels as training venues for government activities. While the decision was later annulled, it led to implementation being put on hold for some time. [↑](#footnote-ref-46)
62. A GoI official indicated to POM in February 2016 that activities had been expected to start in February 2015. [↑](#footnote-ref-47)
63. The eight P4TK are: (1) P4TK Early Childhood and Special Needs, Bandung; (2) P4TK Science and Technology, Bandung; (3) P4TK Business and Tourism, Jakarta; (4) P4TK Agriculture, Cianjur; (5) P4TK Machinery and Information Technology, Bandung; (6) P4TK Art and Culture, Yogyakarta; (7) P4TK Electronics and Automotive, Malang; and (8) P4TK Building and Electrics, Medan. [↑](#footnote-ref-48)
64. The nine CPD UoLs are: (1) School planning; (2) Financial management; (3) Academic supervision; (4) Curriculum management; (5) New student management; (6) Facilities and infrastructure; (7) Teacher and staff management; (8) Mentoring; and (9) Coaching. [↑](#footnote-ref-49)
65. Presentation to Reinventing Education in the 21st Century, Paramadina University. [↑](#endnote-ref-17)
66. OECD/ADB. 2015. Education in Indonesia: rising to the challenge. OECD, p.263. [↑](#endnote-ref-18)
67. The Baseline draws on 44 indicators of effective leadership and management practices derived from a review of international literature conducted by POM consultant, Prof. Caldwell. *See Thematic Literature Review for Component 2. Th*e evaluation focuses on Phase 1 of CPD support only. [↑](#footnote-ref-50)
68. Against a set of indicators derived from NES and POM’s aforementioned review of international literature by Professor Caldwell. [↑](#footnote-ref-51)
69. For example, see the Presentation by Anies Baswedan at the National Gathering for Education, April 2015. It should be noted that principals straddle the two categories, as they also have an obligatory weekly teaching load. [↑](#endnote-ref-19)
70. Priorities described in the letter include: (1) improving the quality of teachers and principals; (2) improvement of vocational education; (3) reinforcement of educational curriculum and assessment system; (4) reinforcement of Indonesian language learning in Australia. [↑](#footnote-ref-52)
71. Anies Baswedan, Letter to the President, 22 December 2015. [↑](#endnote-ref-20)
72. Media Indonesia, “*Pengawas Sekolah Harus Ubah Paradigma*”, retrieved from <http://www.mediaindonesia.com/news/read/9555/pengawas-sekolah-harus-ubah-paradigma/2015-12-10> [↑](#endnote-ref-21)
73. GoI officials believe that ProDEP should make a contribution to the achievement of a number of Renstra targets, including: (1) the number of professional school principals reaching at least 95% by 2019. The definition of “professional principals” is not clear to POM at the moment, (2) an increase to the average score of knowledge and skill competence of educators and education personnel to 8.0 by 2019. [↑](#footnote-ref-53)
74. The purpose of the Grand Design is to provide a roadmap for improving the quality of madrasah education over the next five years. [↑](#footnote-ref-54)
75. MoRA and DFAT, A Strategy to Establish a Continuous Program of Madrasah Quality Improvement - the ‘Grand Design’”, October 2015, p.8. [↑](#endnote-ref-22)
76. DFAT, *Strategy for Australia’s aid investment in education 2015 – 2010,* September 2015, p.12. [↑](#endnote-ref-23)
77. POM, Annual Partnership Performance Report 2014, p.23. [↑](#endnote-ref-24)
78. The former Head of Badan became the Rector of the State University of Medan (Unimed) and the former Secretary of Badan was appointed as Head of SEAMEO SEAMOLEC. The former Head of Division for the Development of Non-Teacher Technical and Functional Staff at Pusbangtendik was moved to the Training Center for MoEC officials. [↑](#footnote-ref-55)
79. Specifically, MoEC’s preference not to have donor financing lodged in its annual budget implementation registration form (DIPA). [↑](#footnote-ref-56)
80. SSQ C2, Finalized PAF 10 June 2014, p.9 and p.12. [↑](#endnote-ref-25)
81. A target of 40,000 principals trained by 2015 compared to a result of 17,697 (16,434 participants trained in 2014 plus 1,263 newly trained principals in 2015). [↑](#footnote-ref-57)
82. SSQ C2, Finalized PAF 10 June 2014, p.12. [↑](#endnote-ref-26)
83. Should such a study now be implemented it will be undertaken after the end of the existing POM contract. [↑](#footnote-ref-58)
84. See Caldwell, B. 2014. Thematic Literature Review for Component 2. POM. The review examined ‘credible’ research reports from 1994 – 2014, with particular emphasis given to meta-analyses and the findings of quantitative studies, especially those which included or which were based on randomised trials. Over one hundred articles were cited in the report. [↑](#endnote-ref-27)
85. The *d values* refer to the ‘effect size’ of the strategies. An effect size of *d=1.00* indicates an increase of one standard deviation on the outcome, usually indicated by level of student achievement. According to John Hattie, a world-leading authority on synthesising meta-analyses, a *d value* higher than 0.40 is considered to lie in the ‘zone of desired effects’. [↑](#endnote-ref-28)
86. SSQ, An Evaluation of CPD Pilot Program, June 2013. [↑](#endnote-ref-29)
87. It should be noted that POM treats the findings of this report with some caution. [↑](#footnote-ref-59)
88. Correlation is statistically significant at confidence level of 95% (p=0.05). [↑](#footnote-ref-60)
89. 40 schools and eight Madrasah on top of which 1,200 schools/Madrasah featured in the quantitative survey. [↑](#footnote-ref-61)
90. Enrolment data for school year 2013/2014, sourced from: <http://dapo.dikdas.kemdikbud.go.id/exreport/>. [↑](#endnote-ref-30)
91. The sixteen districts are located across eight provinces, they are: (1) Karo district; (2) Simalungun district; (3) Cirebon city; (4) Indramayu district; (5) Jepara district; (6) Kudus district; (7) Pasuruan district; (8) Pasuruan city (9) Lebak district; (10) Serang district; (11) Minahasa district; (12) Manado city; (13) Takalar district; (14) Makasar city; (15) Konawe district; (16) South Konawe district. [↑](#footnote-ref-62)
92. Informal discussion with Siswandari, 2 March 2016. [↑](#endnote-ref-31)
93. See a fuller discussion in the 2014 APPR. [↑](#footnote-ref-63)
94. Interview Yudi Herman, 3 February 2016 and interview Nurzaman 15 February 2016. [↑](#endnote-ref-32)
95. The emphasis placed on OLL in 2015 is therefore reassuring, albeit the geographical limitations of OLL modalities must always be considered. [↑](#footnote-ref-64)
96. All hours of ProDEP training contribute credit points for principals’ promotion, with 30-60 training hours equalling one credit point. [↑](#footnote-ref-65)
97. Email Graham Dawson, 28 April 2015. [↑](#endnote-ref-33)
98. See POM, Annual Sector Monitoring Report, 2013; ACDP, School and Madrasah Principals and Supervisors Competencies Baseline Study, 2013. [↑](#endnote-ref-34)
99. Before MoEC’s restructuring, LPMP acted as an eligible entity, providing training to primary school principals. As a consequence of its budget cuts, DFAT opted to focus on junior secondary school principals and all three modalities rather than a larger number of principals but fewer modalities. [↑](#footnote-ref-66)
100. Comment by Kerri Amos during preliminary feedback session on Management & Governance. [↑](#endnote-ref-35)
101. Interview Aryanti Savitri, 4 February 2016. [↑](#endnote-ref-36)
102. Interview Gatri Sri Utami, 3 February 2016. [↑](#endnote-ref-37)
103. For example, see POM’s Annual Sector Monitoring Report of December 2013 and the APPRs of 2013 and 2014. [↑](#footnote-ref-67)
104. Interview Yaya Kardiawarman, 3 February 2016. [↑](#endnote-ref-38)
105. Interview Kidup and Mustofa Fahmi, 11 February 2016. [↑](#endnote-ref-39)
106. The plan itself was discussed since 2014. However, the initiative was apparently wrongly recorded by MoEC’s Planning Bureau. Instead of being classified as APBN funding, the figure was registered under the special account (foreign aid) and was submitted to MoF. Finalisation of the 2015 budget and its approval by the Parliament meant that the decision was irreversible. POM has obtained the related special account records. [↑](#footnote-ref-68)
107. Also note phone conversation with Fasli Jalal, 6 March 2016. [↑](#endnote-ref-40)
108. The exact figure is IDR 98,409,236,000. [↑](#footnote-ref-69)
109. MoEC, ProDEP replication budget, obtained from MoEC, March 2016. [↑](#endnote-ref-41)
110. The CPD is preceded with the training of DEO officials in HRMD and SP&FM and preparing supervisors through SPD. [↑](#footnote-ref-70)
111. Interview with Yudi Herman and Budi Suprayitno, 3 February 2016. [↑](#endnote-ref-42)
112. 10.2% at the primary level and 22.4% at the junior secondary level. See ACDP 021 (2014). *Overview of the Islamic sub-sector in Indonesia* (draft), p. 21. [↑](#footnote-ref-71)
113. MoRA. ‘*Profil Direktorat Jenderal Pendidikan Islam Tahun Anggaran* 2012/ 2013’. [↑](#endnote-ref-43)
114. DFAT, *Education Partnership Theory of Change* (2013 Version 12), p.5. [↑](#endnote-ref-44)
115. At the time of writing, MoRA’s *Renstra* for 2015-2019 had not been officially launched. [↑](#footnote-ref-72)
116. The development of the new regulation on MDCs stipulated a change in the title for these entities. They are now formally titled *Pusat Pengembangan Madrasah* or PPM. In the interest of maintaining consistency with previous APPR reports, the acronym MDC is retained for this report. [↑](#footnote-ref-73)
117. SSQ, *School Systems and Quality Annual Progress Report 2015*, p.33. [↑](#endnote-ref-45)
118. Interview, MoRA, February 2, 2016. [↑](#endnote-ref-46)
119. Non-targeted Madrasah were not included from Phase 3 on the basis that it had become increasingly difficult to identify candidate institutions that met the basic criteria for participation. This was partly a consequence of the targeting of more marginal institutions in the first instance. The expansion of MoRA’s *Madrasah Up-Grading Program* also encompassed Madrasah that may otherwise have been drawn into the program as ‘non-targeted’ participants. [↑](#footnote-ref-74)
120. Of the remainder, 3.7% attained a C ranking, and 0.3% (4 Madrasah) were yet to be assessed. Prior to Phase 3, the cumulative average was 90.7% of targeted Madrasah ranked at A or B. See *School Systems and Quality Annual Progress Report 2015*. p. 25. [↑](#footnote-ref-75)
121. Responses included changes to training schedules in order to frontload modules that are most critical in terms of meeting assessment requirements, and intensive negotiations with provincial MoRA and BAN-S/M offices in order to secure the inclusion of supported Madrasah in accreditation quotas. [↑](#footnote-ref-76)
122. MoRA financial commitments for these programs were Rp. 60 billion. *SSQ Weekly Report,* March 20, 2015. [↑](#footnote-ref-77)
123. POM, *Performance Milestone Framework Report 2015*. [↑](#endnote-ref-47)
124. School Systems and Quality Annual Progress Report 2015. p. 35; Interview, SSQ Staff, 14 February, 2015; Interview, DFAT, 12 February, 2016. [↑](#endnote-ref-48)
125. *Arah kebijakan dan strategi pendidikan Islam tahun 2015-2019*. See, [http://pendis.kemenag.go.id/  
     index.php?a=artikel&id2=strategipendis#.VuSwL\_l96Cg](http://pendis.kemenag.go.id/index.php?a=artikel&id2=strategipendis#.VuSwL_l96Cg) [↑](#endnote-ref-49)
126. MoRA and DFAT, A Strategy to Establish a Continuous Program of Madrasah Quality Improvement - the ‘Grand Design’”, October 2015, p.29. [↑](#endnote-ref-50)
127. The Islamic Education Quality Assurance Centre (*Pusat Penjamin Mutu Pendidikan Islam*) will be located in MoRA central at the Echelon 2 level. *SSQ Weekly Report*, 5 June, 2015. [↑](#footnote-ref-78)
128. The cuts were based on a 2013 decision to limit the provincial reach of the program and deepen activities in provinces with large numbers of madrasah. Correspondence, SSQ Management Team, 5 April 2016. [↑](#footnote-ref-79)
129. POM, *Annual Partnership Performance Report 2014*, p.44. [↑](#endnote-ref-51)
130. It is unlikely, for example, that SNIPs would have been granted the same degree of input into discussions on the draft MDC regulation had they not proven to be such efficient mechanisms for accreditation preparation over the first two phases of the program. [↑](#footnote-ref-80)
131. SSQ, *School Systems and Quality Annual Progress Report 2015*, p.32. [↑](#endnote-ref-52)
132. SSQ, *School Systems and Quality Annual Progress Report 2015*, p.33. [↑](#endnote-ref-53)
133. All supported madrasah were technically at the TT or unaccredited level. However, selection processes for inclusion in the program included ‘mock assessments’ in order to determine which institutions were most in need of assistance. [↑](#footnote-ref-81)
134. SSQ, *ME011 - Evaluation of Component 3, Phase 1*, p.36. [↑](#endnote-ref-54)
135. Interview, SSQ staff, 16 February, 2016. [↑](#endnote-ref-55)
136. The need to assess appropriate levels of block grant support were listed as Recommendation 15 for C3 in the 2014 APPR, p. 45. [↑](#footnote-ref-82)
137. Evidence to support changes was a product two studies conducted in mid-2015. These were the POM-produced *EOPO 3 Evaluation Study: Endline Report* and the *Comparative Study of Madrasah Development Centres*. [↑](#footnote-ref-83)
138. SSQ’s success in demonstrating the possibilities for cost-sharing at the district level must be credited for the inclusion of this proposal. [↑](#footnote-ref-84)
139. MoRA’s primary accreditation program (track two or *replikasi*) is based upon for a condensed package of modules aimed at boosting Madrasah managerial and administrative capacity. Al-Maarif, the Central Java SNIP for Phase 2, elected to focus on providing Madrasah Based Management (MBM) training to 1,000 of its Madrasah for the purposes of independent accreditation preparation and general quality improvement. Independent capacity building activities carried out by the East Java SNIP have also been modelled on a system whereby Madrasah select training packages that are felt to best meet individual needs. [↑](#footnote-ref-85)
140. In the case of SNIPs that were MDCs, individuals may take up formal roles within the revised MDC structure. Alternatively, they may position themselves to provide a range of services as subcontractors. The Grand Design contains a range of recommendations in regard to training that cater strongly to individuals with SNIP experience. [↑](#footnote-ref-86)
141. *SSQ Annual Progress Report 2015*, p. 34. Updated data for the full calendar year was provided by the SSQ Management Team in April, 2016. . External funding support for Target madrasah consisted of Rp. 8.9 million from madrasah communities, Rp. 300 million from local governments, and Rp. 3.9billion from MoRA.The budget allocation for 3,000 Madrasah participating in the replikasi program for 2015 was Rp. 54.6 billion from MoRA, and Rp. 2 billion from local government. These updated figures have not been verified by POM. It is recommended that a more complete assessment of external funding initiatives be conducted as a part of the Independent Completion Review. [↑](#footnote-ref-87)
142. POM, *Annual Partnership Performance Report 2014*, p.43. [↑](#endnote-ref-56)
143. Not only are private Madrasah outside of the mainstream MoEC district education system, they frequently reside at the fringes of the MoRA system as well. [↑](#footnote-ref-88)
144. These associations include Madrasah Working Groups (*Kelompok Kerja Madrasah* or KKM); Elementary Teachers Working Groups (*Kelompok Kerja Guru* or KKG); and Junior & Senior Secondary Teachers Subject Matter Associations (*Musyawarah Guru Mata Pelajaran* or MGMP). [↑](#footnote-ref-89)
145. By the end of 2015, 202 KKM had received training from the SSQ managing contractor. This figure was 12% higher than the PMF target for the year. See *Performance Milestone Framework Report 2015*. POM, p. 53. [↑](#footnote-ref-90)
146. POM, *Annual Partnership Performance Report 2014*, p.40. [↑](#endnote-ref-57)
147. Unlike the case with MoEC, MoRA district offices are relatively poorly resourced implementing units. [↑](#footnote-ref-91)
148. Estimate made in ACDP 021: Overview of Islamic Education Sub-Sector in Indonesia (2015). [↑](#endnote-ref-58)
149. The real figure is most-likely higher, as leading SNIP were active in delivering a range of C3-based services in non-target districts. SNIP Central Java and SNIP East Java were particularly active in rolling out modified C3 activities to Madrasah in a number of non-targeted districts. The exact number of Madrasah touched by such activities has not been verified. [↑](#footnote-ref-92)
150. SSQ Weekly Report, 24 April, 2015. [↑](#endnote-ref-59)
151. PAIKEM: Pembelajaran Aktif, Inovatif, Kreatif, Efektif, dan Menyenangkan (Learning which is active, innovative, creative, effective, and enjoyable). PAIKEM was a specific training module delivered as a part of the assistance package for targeted and non-targeted Madrasah. [↑](#footnote-ref-93)
152. The assessment category of *Learning, Curriculum, and Instruction* recorded the highest average increase in the prevalence of practices that support quality service provision in the EOPO 3 Endline study. Analysis also showed that the impact of interventions in stimulating improvements in classroom practices was very high. See *EOPO 3 Evaluation Study: Endline Report*. POM, 2015, pp. 15, 32. [↑](#footnote-ref-94)
153. *Comparative Study of Madrasah Development Centres.* POM, 2015, p. 25. [↑](#footnote-ref-95)
154. Madrasah-Based Management was one of the training modules delivered by the managing contractor. [↑](#footnote-ref-96)
155. Keputusan Direktur Jendral Pendidikan Islam Nomor 1385, tahun 2014. [↑](#footnote-ref-97)
156. It is anticipated that private institutions will play an important role in the expansion of senior secondary services under this new program. See ACDP 004. *General Senior Secondary Education Financing in Indonesia*, ACDP, 2013, p. 30. [↑](#footnote-ref-98)
157. *Comparative Study of Madrasah Development Centres.* POM, 2015, pp. 20-23. [↑](#footnote-ref-99)
158. *Comparative Study of Madrasah Development Centres.* POM, 2015, p. 30. [↑](#footnote-ref-100)
159. In Riau, the SNIP contract was amended so that mentors were only obligated to visit a school once per month, as opposed to the standard two visits. This was due to higher transportation and time costs. If well-funded and managed SNIP had to reduce service standards in areas where service costs were high, it may be anticipated that the pattern will be reproduced under the new MoRA scheme. [↑](#footnote-ref-101)
160. Analysis showed that the impact of training activities at the cluster level was dramatically boosted by the frequency of mentor follow-up visits to individual Madrasah. *EOPO 3 Evaluation Study: Endline Report*. POM, 2015, p. 36. [↑](#footnote-ref-102)
161. The Grand Design assigns a key role to KKM as intermediaries between individual Madrasah and MoRA training and quality assurance entities. [↑](#footnote-ref-103)
162. ACDP, Six *Monthly Progress Report, Mid-2014, September 2014* (Revision), p.1. [↑](#endnote-ref-60)
163. Education Sector – Analytical and Capacity Development Partnership Indonesia. Mid-term Review. [↑](#endnote-ref-61)
164. For example, *Teacher Absenteeism Study* (ACDP 011); *Overview of the Islamic Education Sector* (ACDP 021); *Rural and Remote Area Education Strategic Planning for Tanah Papua* (ACDP 039); *Evaluation of Principals Preparation Program* (ACDP 042). [↑](#footnote-ref-104)
165. For example, Policy Briefs on *Teacher Absenteeism in Indonesia, University-Government-Industry Partnership for Economic Development in Indonesia* and *Gender Equality in Education in Indonesia.* [↑](#footnote-ref-105)
166. For example, policy analysis support to MoEC’s new Center for Policy Analysis and Synchronisation (Pusat Analisis dan Sinkronisasi Kebijakan or PASKA) and *Capacity Building for Evaluation of Education Policies, Strategies and Programs through Overseas Course and Workshop* (ACDP 037). [↑](#footnote-ref-106)
167. For example, *Support to Textbook Development* (ACDP 013A). [↑](#footnote-ref-107)
168. Each donor provides funding in their own currency and so the total funds available will depend on exchange rate variations. [↑](#footnote-ref-108)
169. ACDP, *Six Monthly Progress Report, Mid 2015*, 12 August 2015, p.68. [↑](#endnote-ref-62)
170. From 01 January 2016 the team was unified under one Team Leader. [↑](#footnote-ref-109)
171. ACDP, *Six Monthly Progress Report, Mid 2015*, 12 August 2015, p.68. [↑](#endnote-ref-63)
172. Minutes of the ATOG Meeting, 18 March 2015 (Sarah Lendon). [↑](#endnote-ref-64)
173. ACDP, *Six Monthly Progress Report, Mid 2015*, 12 August 2015, p.68. [↑](#endnote-ref-65)
174. ACDP, *Six Monthly Progress Report, Mid 2015*, 12 August 2015, p.68. [↑](#endnote-ref-66)
175. Interview with DFAT staff member, February 2016. [↑](#endnote-ref-67)
176. Interviews with two DFAT staff members, February 2016. [↑](#endnote-ref-68)
177. Interview with an ATOG Co-chair, 12 February 2016. [↑](#endnote-ref-69)
178. Based on an Exchange of Letters between the ADB and DFAT. [↑](#footnote-ref-110)
179. Email from John Virtue (ACDP), 04 March 2015. [↑](#endnote-ref-70)
180. ACDP, *Six Monthly Progress Report, Mid 2015*, 12 August 2015, p.33-34. [↑](#endnote-ref-71)
181. i) Improving the Quality and Relevance of Senior Secondary Vocational Education in Aceh; ii) Improving Teacher Workforce Planning and Management in Aceh, and; iii) Evaluation of the Use of Special Autonomy and Oil & Gas Funds for Education in Aceh. [↑](#footnote-ref-111)
182. ACDP, *Six Monthly Progress Report, Mid 2015*, 12 August 2015, p.54-55. [↑](#endnote-ref-72)
183. ACDP, *Six Monthly Progress Report, Mid 2015*, 12 August 2015, p.36-37. [↑](#endnote-ref-73)
184. ACDP, *Six Monthly Progress Report, Mid 2015*, 12 August 2015, p.36-37. [↑](#endnote-ref-74)
185. For example, in the 2013 APPR POM noted that ACDP should “ACDP should consider options to better bundle findings, i.e. so evidence is provided by theme and not just by report-by-report” (Table 12, p. 39). In the 2014 APPR POM recommended measures that “maximise the potential of its ‘back catalogue’” (Table 24, p. 59). [↑](#footnote-ref-112)
186. From September 2015. [↑](#footnote-ref-113)
187. Emails from Daniella Situmorang Subject: *Questions Re. ACDP Kopi Darat*, 22 and 23 February 2016. [↑](#endnote-ref-75)
188. As reflected in the draft Aid Investment Plan Performance Assessment Framework (February 2016), which includes the following indicator: “The number of significant instances where DFAT support has resulted in improved policy”. [↑](#footnote-ref-114)
189. Unlike Components 1-3, ACDP does not participate in the EP Performance Milestone Framework process, in large part because ACDP adheres to its own M&E Strategy which is, in places, inconsistent with the EP logic (see the 2013 and 2014 APPRs for a fuller commentary). [↑](#footnote-ref-115)
190. This is not a criticism of a ‘rolling commentary’ *per se*: POM recognises that reflections on the relevance and results of earlier studies are both necessary and welcomed. Rather it is comment about the difficulties associated with interpreting progress against workplan intentions. [↑](#footnote-ref-116)
191. e.g. in the case of *Support to Development of MoEC Renstra 2015-19* (ACDP 015A). [↑](#footnote-ref-117)
192. e.g. see *Linking National Plans for Acceleration and Expansion of Economic Development to Programming in the Education Sector* (ACDP 016). [↑](#footnote-ref-118)
193. e.g. 22 *Early Childhood Education Quality Assurance Systems Development* (ACDP 022) and *Overview of the Islamic Education Sector* (ACDP 021) respectively. [↑](#footnote-ref-119)
194. ACDP, *Six Monthly Progress Report, Mid 2015*, 12 August 2015, p.31. [↑](#endnote-ref-76)
195. ACDP, *Six Monthly Progress Report, Mid 2015*, 12 August 2015, p.33 and p.55 respectively. [↑](#endnote-ref-77)
196. Education Sector – Analytical and Capacity Development Partnership Indonesia. Mid-term Review, p33. [↑](#endnote-ref-78)
197. See the 2014 APPR. [↑](#footnote-ref-120)
198. See the 2014 APPR. [↑](#footnote-ref-121)
199. Education Sector – Analytical and Capacity Development Partnership Indonesia. Mid-term Review, p36. [↑](#endnote-ref-79)
200. POM, *2014 Annual Partnership Performance Report*, Table 24, p.59. [↑](#endnote-ref-80)
201. See Minutes of ACDP Technical Oversight Group Meeting 18 March 2015. [↑](#endnote-ref-81)
202. ACDP, *Six Monthly Progress Report, Mid 2015*, 12 August 2015, p.76. [↑](#endnote-ref-82)
203. The EP represents Australia’s contribution to the Joint EC-DFAT Education Sector Support Programme (ESSP). The ESSP supports Indonesia's strategic plans for the education sector. [↑](#footnote-ref-122)
204. Infrastructure Technical Oversight Group (C1); Staff Development Technical Oversight Group (C2); Islamic School Accreditation Technical Oversight Group (C3); and the Analytical and Capacity Development Technical Oversight Group (C4). [↑](#footnote-ref-123)
205. Key MoRA officials remained unchanged in 2015. [↑](#footnote-ref-124)
206. It is noteworthy that ProDEP and ACDP are complex institutional and systems strengthening initiatives. It is also noteworthy that POM is concerned about the current effectiveness and projected impact of ProDEP, and the sustainability of ACDP-related investments. [↑](#footnote-ref-125)
207. The absence of C1 ITOG and C2 SDTOG meetings are cases in point. ToGs and GoGs were held on the following dates: C2 SDTOG, 13 February 2015; C3 MTOG 6 February 2015; C4 ATOG, 18 March 2016; GOG 15 December 2015. The last ITOG was held on 13 May 2014. Source: email from Diah Pratiwi (DFAT), 18 and 20 January 2016. [↑](#footnote-ref-126)
208. C3 was largely unaffected because the decision to trim its budget in 2015 was taken in the preceding year. DFAT’s allocation to C4, by contrast, was amended from AUD 25m to AUD 20m but money was not cut *per se* in 2015. Rather, DFAT chose not to release the final tranche to ADB in 2016. POM’s budget remained unchanged. DFAT chose to bring to an early conclusion the EP Education Partnership Outreach Services contract, bringing forward its end date from June 2016 to June 2015. [↑](#footnote-ref-127)
209. This is not to say that Implementing Partners do not work politically when pursuing development outcomes. They are often acutely aware of the prevailing political economy and the role that incentives, networks and influences can play in shaping program implementation and success. [↑](#footnote-ref-128)
210. The 2015 Australian Aid Stakeholder Survey is the second such survey of Australian aid experts and practitioners undertaken by aid think-tank, the Development Policy Centre, based at The Australian National University. The first survey was held in 2013, prior to the integration of AusAID and the large aid cuts. The second survey was carried out in the second half of 2015. [↑](#footnote-ref-129)
211. Wood, T, Burkot, C, Howes, S., Australian aid: signs of risk – the 2015 Australian aid stakeholder survey, The Development Policy Centre, Canberra, 2016, [↑](#endnote-ref-83)
212. e.g. see *Making Performance Count*, 2014. [↑](#footnote-ref-130)
213. While ACDP’s forward budget was cut by AUD 5m this will only effect its extension to mid-2017. [↑](#footnote-ref-131)
214. Wood, T, Burkot, C, Howes, S, 2016, Australian aid: signs of risk – the 2015 Australian aid stakeholder survey, The Development Policy Centre, Canberra [↑](#endnote-ref-84)
215. e.g. the EP’s poor gender and social inclusion performance as identified in DFAT’s own AQC of 2015 and POM’s APPRs of 2013 and 2014. [↑](#footnote-ref-132)