

**Past reflections…future plans**

**An independent evaluation of AusAID’s support to rural WASH in Timor Leste**

# Australia East Timor Rural Water Supply and Sanitation Program (RWSSP) ‘Bee, Saneamentu no Ijene iha Komunidade’, (BESIK)

Independent Completion Review

# August 2012

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## Aid Activity Summary

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| --- | --- | --- | --- |
| Aid Activity Name | Australia East Timor Rural Water Supply and Sanitation Program (RWSSP) | | |
| AidWorks initiative number | ING002 | | |
| Commencement date | September 2007 | Completion date | September 2012 |
| Total Australian $ | $28.7 million (+ $12 million WSI funding) | | |
| Total other $ | $0 | | |
| Delivery organisation(s) | IDSS | | |
| Implementing Partner(s) | Ministry of Infrastructure (MoI)  Ministry of Health (MoH) | | |
| Country/Region | Timor Leste | | |
| Primary Sector | Rural Water, Sanitation & Hygiene (RWASH) | | |

## Acknowledgements

This evaluation was commissioned and managed by Gerard Cheong (Assistant Director, Infrastructure and Rural Development) at AusAID in Dili, and Lara Andrews (Performance and Quality) at AusAID in Canberra. In-country interviews and logistics were organised by Keryn Clark (BESIK Team Leader) and Faviula Monteiro (AusAID Senior Coordinator). Language interpretation was provided by Isabel Noronha Pereira de Lima, Avito Julio Hendriques, Faviula Monteiro and Keryn Clark. Drivers from AusAID and BESIK facilitated safe transport across more than 1,000 km of dilapidated rural roads.

The evaluators appreciated the constructive stance of the BESIK team, and the congenial and utilisation-focussed approach to program evaluation taken by AusAID.

The time and opinions of more than 250 community, government and NGO stakeholders provided the cornerstone of this evaluation.

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## Executive Summary

This document is an independent completion report (ICR) for the Australia East Timor Rural Water Supply and Sanitation Program (RWSSP), known locally as ‘*Bee, Saneamentu no Ijene iha Komunidade*’, or BESIK. Fieldwork for this evaluation was carried out during the period 6 – 24 August, 2012 and involved interviews with more than 250 stakeholders (35% female).

It is internationally well established that basic sanitation, improved hygiene practices, and safe water for drinking and washing play an important role in preventing disease and mortality. Timor Leste has made progress in improving access to clean water and sanitation in rural areas; however, only 57 per cent of people have access to an improved water supply and 26 per cent have access to improved sanitation. Poor hygiene practices are widespread and rates of hand-washing are low. Australia remains the main bilateral donor in the RWASH sector. BESIK was designed as a 10 year program with initial funding for five years. BESIK supported capacity development within key ministries and other sector partners to deliver improved water and sanitation to communities through technical advisors, budget support, organisational development, policy development, training, construction of water systems in rural districts, and research.

The report is structured in terms of responses to six key evaluation questions: The first three concern the next phase of the program (BESIK II); and the second three concern lessons of wider relevance to AusAID’s other initiatives in Timor Leste.

**Sector coordination, policy development and government leadership of the RWASH sector**

Arguably, many of the positive changes witnessed in the recent past in rural WASH have been fostered by AusAID’s long-term commitment to the sector. The key elements of BESIK’s strategy to strengthen sector leadership and direction included:

* **Capacity development:** there is evidence that BESIK contributed to a strengthening of capacity at multiple levels in the sector through an array of methods.
* **Policy development:** three major policies were developed during the life of BESIK, with one (sanitation) passing through the Council of Ministers, and the other two (water and water resources) in draft form. An area of policy dialogue that should draw particular focus in BESIK II is public financial management (PFM)—particularly as this relates to cashflow bottlenecks and accountability at district level within DNSA and MoH. Ignoring these fundamental PFM challenges could jeopardise the value of all other investments the sector.
* **Sector information:** BESIK made significant investments in the development of a water and sanitation information system (*Sistema Informasaun Bee no Saneamentu*, SIBS) to provide basic knowledge about water system location and functionality. BESIK II will be required to provide considerable on-going support to ensure that the system endures.
* **Sector coordination:** BESIK’s support for coordination of the RWASH sector involved working directly with the MoI and MoH directorates associated with RWASH planning and policy, and coordinating and supporting civil society organisation (CSO) engagement in the sector. BESIK II should invest additional support for inter-ministerial coordination. BESIK supported the establishment of the WASH forum—which is DNSA-led but rarely attended by representatives from MoH. Conversely, a Sanitation Working Group initiated by BESIK has a stronger health focus and MoH leadership. There should also be engagement with MSATM and the Agency for National Development (ADN) to improve inter-ministerial coordination of government water projects.

**Mainstreaming gender and addressing equity**

BESIK employed a dedicated gender and inclusion adviser. Significant effort was made to integrate gender as a cross-cutting issue and ensure it permeated all aspects of the program. BESIK employed four main approaches to promote gender equality in the institutional setting:

* **Policy development:** the success of the policy advocacy measures is evidenced by both the sanitation and the water policies now including clear references to gender.
* **Raising awareness:** the extent to which awareness-raising measures were successful is less clear and will take more time to manifest. BESIK’s work in this area was mostly confined to DNSA/DNSSB, but other ministries with WASH-related functions (e.g. MoH and MSATM) would likely benefit from similar support.
* **Activating GoTL gender focal points (GFP):** the value of appointing GFPs seemed mixed. On one hand, it elevated the gender equality issue, but on the other hand, BESIK’s GESI report described the GFP model as having “failed”. One practical contributor to this was that GFPs have not been allocated resources to perform the function.
* **Recruiting additional female staff:** recruiting an increasing proportion of female staff was beneficial with 24% of 88 sub-district facilitators (SDF’s) being female. There are clear benefits of moving towards gender balance; however, the evaluation team was advised that aspects of the SDF role may be challenging for women—creating personal and workplace pressures. This suggests that women require more proactive institutional support to enable them to develop professionally and respond to unique workplace challenges they face

Beyond the broad institutionally focused approaches, BESIK worked to support gender equality at community level by setting quotas and ensuring inclusion of gender considerations in training materials for Community Action Planning (CAP) and Community Action Plan for Sanitation & Hygiene (PAKSI). A key achievement of the program was the inclusion within the GoTL Rural Water Guidelines of a 30% minimum participation of women in GMFs (and recommended 50%). Despite this progress, it is clear from field visits and BESIK’s Activity Completion Report that women only exerted minor influence on water system design and location. Achieving empowerment beyond basic participation is recognised as a major challenge globally and remains a particular challenge in Timor Leste. BESIK did not attempt to capture evidence of wider changes in gender equality in a systematic way since changes were not expected to manifest during the life of the program. Nevertheless some evidence was discernible: BESIK’s ACR (p 33) reported that 40,000 women benefited from a reduction in time to collect water—from more than 30 minutes down to less than 30 minutes. For BESIK II, a sound impact assessment (including baseline and endline) using in-depth qualitative and quantitative data is needed. BESIK’s focus on inclusion of people with disabilities was reported by sector stakeholders to have been given variable attention, with the main achievement being its inclusion in policy development. Specialist NGOs in this area mentioned that their involvement had been sporadic.

**Piloting of sanitation models**

The link between sanitation and public health is internationally well established. Meeting this objective was challenging, not least because it required concurrent and coordinated efforts to address both demand-side and supply-side factors. Demand creation is a behaviour change process. Among approaches developed globally in recent years is community-led total sanitation (CLTS). Several variations on the CLTS methodology were trialled by BESIK, but since BESIK was not designed or resourced to conduct systematic research it is challenging to retrospectively compare and contrast sanitation models in a rigorous way with the data available. Hence, the evidence base to differentiate between the relative merits of finer ‘variations’ of CLTS trialled by BESIK is not clear. The general finding across all permutations was that CLTS generated action to build simple latrines—provided facilitation was adequate. The ultimate adaption of CLTS by BESIK was ‘PAKSI’. Since PAKSI was implemented very recently, there is not yet clear evidence of the effectiveness of this variation. Key to the success of PAKSI will be securing MoH commitment to take over the support roles in the long term. One issue that severely complicated and retarded the results of CLTS/PAKSI was concurrent use of subsidy approaches by both government and NGOs. There is a tension between the GoTL’s subsidy orientation to assist vulnerable households, and the conceptual underpinnings of CLTS—which argue strongly for a subsidy-free approach.

Raising demand is only one step towards improving the standard of household sanitation across Timor Leste. Without adequate technical expertise and access to relevant technologies (i.e. supply), households are limited to self-built toilets. During field visits on this evaluation households mostly expressed dissatisfaction with what they termed ‘traditional latrines’. It is clear that additional strategies are needed to assist communities to upgrade to more permanent facilities and avoid regression to open defecation. Two key concerns in supporting the supply side are ‘how’ to make sanitation products available, and ‘what’ sanitation products are most suitable. An emerging approach in the WASH sector to assist households to upgrade their sanitation facilities is ‘sanitation marketing’. However, this has mostly been successful in higher density settings—which highlights the need for strengthened analysis of strategies to support market-based solutions. The evaluation team questioned whether the breadth of toilet design options (in particular dry options) and the technical expertise made available to communities was sufficient. Communities expressed strong preferences for water-based toilets—which presents a challenge for locations in Timor-Leste where water is not readily or reliably available year-round. A differentiated approach at community level is required to enable ‘informed choice’ and access to appropriate technical expertise. Some technical expertise was made available to communities through NGOs, but in the long-term, it is envisaged DNSSB will play this role, but without any staff at district or sub-district level, this is difficult to imagine.

**Capacity development work**

BESIK’s core focus was on improving the performance of WASH service delivery throughout rural Timor Leste. This involved significant capacity development investments in government, NGOs and community—with the main emphasis being within DNSA. No explicit theoretical framework underpinned BESIK’s capacity development interventions; but arguably the approach was ‘problem-based’. Some approaches generated immediate improvements in performance; others will yield benefits over the medium-term. BESIK implemented a comprehensive range of capacity development interventions, pitched at multiple levels:

* **Scholarships:** support for 20 Timorese staff to study at the Institute of Technology Surabaya (ITS) was well regarded. As with all scholarships, the initiative represents a concentrated investment in a relatively small number of individuals relative to the populous, with the assumption that wider development outcomes can be realised over the medium term. All alumni interviewed were appreciative of the scholarship opportunity; however, in some cases their return to the workforce was not managed to maximise the benefits.
* **Structured training:** structured training courses were supported by BESIK through CNEFP in Tibar—a local training institution. Participants reported that this training was grounded and had a direct impact on their work performance and confidence. Evidently this investment had the additional benefit of increasing the capacity of the local training institution such that it is now able to offer a wider range of courses.
* **Informal mentoring:** informal mentoring took place in an on-going way at multiple levels of engagement. Self-evidently, the quality of outcomes from mentoring is a function of the relationship between mentor and mentee.
* **Staff resourcing:** the investments in the workforce at district (DTOs and SAS managers) and sub-district levels (SDFs) were especially appreciated. BESIK is widely lauded for conceiving of the SDF role, recruiting and training the individuals, and then supporting their transition into GoTL direction and employment. This was a major investment and carried inherent risks, but appears to have been a successful way to dramatically improve local service delivery: both reach and quality.

A paramount challenge facing BESIK II is how to expand and sustain capacity at community level. The challenge of developing and sustaining community-based capacity is universal. BESIK invested significant resources in the establishment, training and support of GMFs as the structure to carry forward community asset management; however, there is evidence that GMF performance remains constrained in at least three ways:

* **Revenue-raising:** the issue of revenue-raising extends beyond the financial capacity of poor households to pay user fees. Difficulties arise, especially for larger systems, when asset ownership is ambiguous and households question why they must contribute their personal funds to something they perceive should be a service. These complex socio-cultural and financial factors raise questions about the relevance of community-management of assets as an approach, at least beyond a particular scale of system.
* **Technical and managerial capacity:** GMF members generally appreciated the training provided by BESIK and expressed confidence in their ability to perform core functions; but this appreciation was frequently accompanied by requests for further training and support. The issue of maintenance capacity seemed especially important.
* **Bottlenecks in accessing SAS services:** GMF members indicated that it was difficult to engage SAS services to address maintenance and repair issues that were beyond locally available financial and technical capacity.

**Community engagement processes**

BESIK employed three main ways of engaging with communities:

* **For water system development:** BESIK employed a community action planning (CAP) process—regarded by GoTL staff and NGO representatives as a major contribution of the program. The CAP process was initially led by NGOs, but was later implemented directly by government staff (SDFs). The value of the CAP process seems to derive from several factors: i) it fosters full community participation; ii) it is led by government staff, and as such as a credible local identity; iii) it involves the establishment of a dedicated community structure (GMF); iv) it establishes a point of contact between government officers and the community. GMF performance remains variable throughout Timor Leste—especially in relation to operations and maintenance work.
* **For sanitation improvement:** BESIK experimented with variants of CLTS leading to ‘PAKSI’—which although still evolving , appears relatively successful in ‘branding’ a local identity on CLTS. PAKSI is structured for a longer-term and more integrated engagement between GoTL staff and communities than is the norm with CLTS. Irrespective of the merits of CLTS/PAKSI in generating early awareness and motivating fast changes at household level, the extent of regression from ODF and the difficulty of moving households up the ‘sanitation ladder’ persist.
* **For hygiene promotion:** BESIK involved support for community health volunteers (PSFs) carrying out household visits (KUBASA). The program’s support was valued by MoH staff, but PSFs indicated that only around two out of ten hygiene plans that they negotiated with households led to observable changes in behaviour. The challenges may be a function of the pragmatic limitation of a volunteer workforce to effect important changes in communities; but are also likely a function of the recognised fact that hygiene behaviour change is a profoundly challenging domain. Of importance is the need for AusAID to ensure coherence between the approach taken by BESIK II to hygiene promotion, and the agency’s messages and strategies more broadly in the health sector.

**Service delivery versus institutional strengthening**

Development programs such as BESIK encounter a tension between the political/humanitarian need to deliver rapid solutions that improve the welfare of citizens; and the need to generate lasting solutions built on sustainable local capacity. Interventions in Timor Leste have alternately been criticised for drawing on foreign expertise to achieve the former approach; or emphasising the latter approach with little tangible impact realised at community level. Notwithstanding the obvious tension and diversity of perspectives, we formed the view that BESIK had achieved a reasonable balance between the two demands. BESIK delivered a comprehensive range of capacity development interventions at multiple levels in the sector; while implementing significant direct investments in WASH at community level. In many cases, these direct investments were in locations that were under-served or technically challenging; and hence would have likely remained under-served for many years without external assistance. Notwithstanding our judgment about the appropriate balance between direct delivery and institutional strengthening, it was evident that there was no conceptual framework in place to guide decisions in relation to achieving this balance. In the case of BESIK, a strong technical and management team delivered this balanced; which was fortuitous. The current lack of adequate management arrangements to support service delivery and O&M in Timor-Leste are likely to undermine the performance and on-going functionality of water systems—especially the larger pumped systems. Hence short-term wins may become invisible in the medium-term

## Consolidated Recommendations & Lessons

**Recommendations for BESIK II[[1]](#footnote-1)**

[1. **AusAID should commission an update of earlier analysis of the PMF and related governance issues in the RWASH sector to take account of government and contextual changes. Such analysis should provide recommendations on the best methods to address PFM challenges currently faced**. 7](#_Toc341850128)

[**2. BESIK II should engage in policy dialogue to address cashflow and recurrent budget constraints at district level faced by DNSA and MoH (in concert with work by HSSP-SP). 7**](#_Toc341850129)

[3. BESIK II should engage in dialogue with relevant GoTL stakeholders to clarify the purpose and value of a water resources management function in the context of the Timor Leste Strategic Development Plan. This may include reconsidering where DNCQA is located within the ministerial structure to maximise the investments made in DNCQA in BESIK. 7](#_Toc341850130)

[**4. BESIK II should ensure that SIBS is adequately supported in the medium term, both with respect to ‘supply side’ factors (technology maintenance/support and data quality) and ‘demand side’ factors (capacity, incentives and motivation to utilise sector information)**. 8](#_Toc341850131)

[**5. BESIK II should work to support strengthened GoTL leadership of the WASH Forum including ensuring all relevant ministries and directorates are actively involved**. . 9](#_Toc341850132)

[6. BESIK II should ensure close coordination with DNSA’s internal planning for human resource development and new infrastructure projects. 9](#_Toc341850133)

[**7. BESIK II should increase its engagement with MSATM and ADN in relation to the coordination of water supply projects in communities, based on a sound assessment of the most appropriate focus of such engagement—either policy dialogue or direct partnership and capacity building. 10**](#_Toc341850134)

[8. BESIK II should support a Joint Sector Review focused on the rural water supply sector. 11](#_Toc341850135)

[9. BESIK II should facilitate inter-ministerial coordination measures to support school WASH interventions between MoE, MoH, MPW and MSATM. 11](#_Toc341850136)

[10. BESIK II should support formalisation and strengthening of GoTL staff accountability with respect to gender equality across relevant directorates involved in WASH. Advocacy should initially focus on key processes where a focus on gender is critical (e.g. CAP and PAKSI) and on its inclusion in position descriptions. AusAID’s Governance for Development initiative should consider providing focussed support for this agenda. 12](#_Toc341850137)

[11. BESIK II should assist MPW to operationalise gender working groups to address shortcomings of the gender focal point model. 13](#_Toc341850138)

[12. BESIK II should actively collect and share evidence of benefits arising from the employment of female government staff in WASH to give support to the gender equality agenda. 14](#_Toc341850139)

[13. BESIK II should review gender equality training to identify ways to more effectively harness women’s inherent motivation to improve sanitation. 14](#_Toc341850140)

[14. BESIK II should proactively engage in the issue of menstrual hygiene—both in the home and in schools. 14](#_Toc341850141)

[**15. BESIK II should undertake an in-depth gender impact assessment to allow wider gender equality changes to be captured and articulated and to inform gender development strategies in Timor Leste. 15**](#_Toc341850142)

[**16. BESIK II should focus on supporting sectoral knowledge and skills to enable practical implementation of measures to improve WASH access for persons with a disability. 15**](#_Toc341850143)

[17. BESIK II should work with MoH and DNSSB to model the role of NGOs in promoting hygiene and sanitation at household level, and develop a comprehensive plan to best utilise PSFs, NGO staff and the planned sanitarians. 17](#_Toc341850144)

[18. BESIK II should engage in policy dialogue and joint studies with GoTL concerning the best use of public finance to improve rural sanitation. This will require sophisticated methods to ensure that the market is strengthened and vulnerable households are sufficiently supported. 18](#_Toc341850145)

[**19. BESIK II should undertake sophisticated market analysis to identify key limitations and opportunities for various approaches to improving the supply of sanitation products and services. 20**](#_Toc341850146)

[**20. BESIK II should expand the range of toilets promoted to include low-cost options that are appropriate in areas areas with low or unreliable water supply. 21**](#_Toc341850147)

[21. BESIK II should clarify who best should carry responsibility for the provision of technical advice on toilet design to communities and masons, and for facilitation of ‘informed choice’ processes, followed by capacity building support to ensure these aspects are an integral part of the broader sanitation approach. 21](#_Toc341850148)

**Lessons for other AusAID initiatives**

[1. To maximise the investment in scholarships, reintegration of scholars into the workplace requires proactive planning, management and support. 23](#_Toc341850149)

[2. The development ‘return on investment’ in scholarships is a function of the individuals selected, and the extent to which their future performance can impact on the quality of services delivered to community. 23](#_Toc341850150)

[3. Reliance on local training institutions can provide benefits in the form of increased local training capacity, however should be matched with their emerging capacity. 24](#_Toc341850151)

[4. Productive institutional changes can accrue when appropriately skilled mentors develop sound working relationships with relevant and influential mentees. 24](#_Toc341850152)

[5. Investing in sub-district government human resource capacity had a direct and positive impact on the reach and quality of local service delivery. 25](#_Toc341850153)

[6. Newly created roles should benefit from intensive support and direction as part of the institutionalisation process. 25](#_Toc341850154)

[7. More effective ways of establishing shared accountability and communicating shared responsibility for community assets should be developed in order to shore up revenue-raising by community management groups. 26](#_Toc341850155)

[8. Further study is required to identify the scale at which community management of assets/services is unviable in rural Timor Leste. 26](#_Toc341850156)

[9. Parliament may be more likely to allocate resources to asset maintenance if the strategy is pitched as ‘improving services to communities’. 27](#_Toc341850157)

[10. Considerable advocacy is necessary to build broad-based support for government investment in operations and maintenance. 27](#_Toc341850158)

[11. Government-led community consultation processes embodied in CAP help to foster inclusion and ownership of community projects. Such processes should be carried out within a dedicated structure to foster sustainability. 29](#_Toc341850159)

[12. Participatory engagement processes (such as CAP) strengthen initial community engagements, but on their own do not assure sustainability. 29](#_Toc341850160)

[13. Investments in both supply-side and demand-side factors are necessary to achieve meaningful and sustainable behaviour change in household sanitation. 30](#_Toc341850161)

[14. AusAID should clearly explicate points of interface across the program portfolio, align messages and approaches, and define coordination mechanisms. 30](#_Toc341850162)

[15. The mix of direct engagement and institutional strengthening adopted by BESIK could provide a template for other AusAID initiatives aiming to strengthen institutional performance while meeting immediate/urgent community needs. 32](#_Toc341850163)

[16. AusAID initiatives required to achieve a balance between institutional strengthening and direct service delivery should draw on the experience of BESIK to develop a decision framework to make the pursuit of the balance more purposeful. 32](#_Toc341850164)

[17. Infrastructure investments should only be supported in situations were there is a clear commitment and mechanism to enable maintenance on a sustainable basis. 32](#_Toc341850165)

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## List of Acronyms

|  |  |
| --- | --- |
|  |  |
| ACR | Activity Completion Report |
| ADB | Asian Development Bank |
| ADN | National Development Agency |
| AusAID | Australia Agency for International Development |
| BCC | Behaviour Change Communication |
| BESIK | *Bee, Saneamentu no Ijene iha Komunidade* |
| CAP | Community Action Planning |
| CLTS | Community-led Total Sanitation |
| CNEFP | National Centre for Employment and Professional Training |
| CSO | Civil Society Organisation |
| DNCQA | National Directorate of Water Resource Management |
| DNSA | National Directorate of Water Supply |
| DNSSP | National Directorate of Sanitation |
| DTO | District Technical Officer |
| FGD | Focus Group Discussion |
| GESI | Gender Equality and Social Inclusion |
| GFP | Gender Focal Point |
| GMF | *Grupo Maneja Facilidade* (water facility management group) |
| GoA | Government of Australia |
| GoTL | Government of Timor Leste |
| HSSP-SP | Health Sector Strategic Plan-Support Program |
| ICR | Independent Completion Report |
| ICT4D | Information Communication Technology for Development |
| ITS | Institute of Technology, Surabaya |
| JICA | Japan International Cooperation Agency |
| KII | Key Informant Interviews |
| KUBASA | Household environmental health promotion |
| M&E | Monitoring and Evaluation |
| MoF | Ministry of Finance |
| MoH | Ministry of Health |
| MoI | Ministry of Infrastructure |
| MoU | Memorandum of Understanding |
| MPW | Ministry of Public Works |
| MSATM | Ministry of State Administration and Territorial Management |
| NGO | Non-government Organisation |
| O&M | Operations and Maintenance |
| ODE | Office of Development Effectiveness |
| PAKSI | Community Action Plan for Sanitation & Hygiene (CLTS) |
| PDD | *Program Dezenvolvimento Desentrilisado* |
| PFM | Public Financial Management |
| PNDS | National Program for Suco Development |
| PSF | *Promotor Saúde Familiar* (community health volunteer) |
| RWASH | Rural Water, Sanitation and Hygiene |
| RWSSP | Rural Water Supply and Sanitation Program |
| SAS | *Serviço de Águas e Saneamento* |
| SDF | Sub-district Facilitator |
| SEPI | Secretary of State for the Promotion of Equality |
| SIBS | *Sistema Informasaun Bee no Saneamentu* (Water & Sanitation Information System) |
| SISCa | *Servisu Integrado Saude Communitaire* (integrated community health services) |
| SPAD | Strategic Planning Agreement for Development |
| ToR | Terms of Reference |
| USAID | United States Agency for International Development |
| VIP | Ventilated Improved Pit latrine |
| WASH | Water, Sanitation and Hygiene |
| WSI | Water and Sanitation Initiative |
|  |  |

## Introduction

Document Purpose

This document is an independent completion report (ICR) for the Australia East Timor Rural Water Supply and Sanitation Program (RWSSP), known locally as ‘*Bee, Saneamentu no Ijene iha Komunidade*’, or BESIK. BESIK is an initiative of the Australian Agency for International Development (AusAID), implemented by a managing contractor (Auerocon-IDSS) in partnership with the Ministry of Infrastructure (MoI)[[2]](#footnote-2), and the Ministry of Health (MoH)[[3]](#footnote-3). Fieldwork for this evaluation was carried out during the period 6 – 24 August, 2012 and involved interviews with more than 250 stakeholders (35% female). A schedule of interviews is provided in Appendix A.

* 1. Background

It is internationally well established that basic sanitation, improved hygiene practices, and safe water for drinking and washing play an important role in preventing disease and mortality. Timor Leste has made progress in improving access to clean water and sanitation in rural areas; however, only 57 per cent of people have access to an improved water supply and 26 per cent have access to improved sanitation[[4]](#footnote-4). Poor hygiene practices are widespread and rates of hand-washing are low.

Australia has been working in the rural water supply, sanitation and hygiene (RWASH) sector in Timor Leste since before independence and is the lead donor in the sector. In 2007, the Government of Australia (GoA) and the Government of Timor Leste (GoTL) signed a Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) that committed Australia to providing around $28 million over five years through BESIK. A further $12 million was made available through the AusAID Water and Sanitation Initiative (WSI).

Australia remains the main bilateral donor in the RWASH sector. A USAID program (US$16 million) to support rural access to water supply through non-government organisation (NGO) activities in two districts commenced in 2009 and will cease in 2012 with no extension. A number of local and international NGOs (four funded by the European Union) work in the sector with activities that include water system construction, latrine distribution, sanitation behaviour change and hygiene education. The Asian Development Bank (ADB) and Japan International Cooperation Agency (JICA) are the main donors to the urban water sector. A WASH forum and Sanitation Working Group provide mechanisms for sector coordination—BESIK has provided significant secretariat support to these mechanisms.

BESIK’s whole-of-program-life work plan covered the first three years of the program. The plan was updated in 2008 to reflect the GoTL RWASH Sector Strategy, and again in 2010 to take into account the additional $12million WSI funding and changes in the sector—particularly increased capital expenditure by GoTL.

BESIK was the subject of a number of reviews and an Office of Development Effectiveness (ODE) evaluation[[5]](#footnote-5). These reviews confirmed that BESIK successfully delivered water supply and sanitation services to people in rural communities, and assisted the GoTL to develop enabling policy and institutional frameworks.

During 2011 – 2012 AusAID designed a new phase of support to the RWASH sector, scheduled to commence in September 2012[[6]](#footnote-6). The new design responded to key recommendations from the various reviews, namely: (i) giving more attention to the sustainability of water and sanitation systems; (ii) strengthening GoTL leadership in the sector; (iii) enhancing sector coordination; (iv) improving policy dialogue, and; (v) working through government systems.

* 1. Design Overview

BESIK was aligned with AusAID’s corporate objectives and country program objectives[[7]](#footnote-7).

The goal of BESIK was *to improve the health and quality of life of rural people in Timor-Leste*. The purpose was *to increase rural community (including women, men, girls and boys) access to sustainable clean water supplies and adequate sanitation and to improve people’s hygiene and sanitation practices*.

BESIK worked toward three core objectives:

* A more enabling sector environment for sustainable and equitable delivery of RWASH services.
* Sustainable water systems delivered to targeted communities.

Improved hygiene and sanitation behaviour and practices in targeted communities.

BESIK was designed as a 10 year program with initial funding for five years. The program adopted a rolling design to allow evolution through four phases from a standalone project to a program under government direction, leadership and management. BESIK supported capacity development within key ministries (principally the national directorate for water (DNSA) within MoI) and other sector partners to deliver improved water and sanitation to communities through technical advisors, budget support, organisational development, policy development, training, construction of water systems in rural districts, and research.

The BESIK Activity Completion Report summarised the key achievements of the program in the following table.

Figure 1: Summary of key achievements reported by the contractor

Australia’s support to RWASH in Timor Leste has programmatic linkages with several other AusAID initiatives in rural development, health and education.

## Methodology

* 1. Scope

The Terms of Reference (ToR) for the BESIK ICR defined the primary purpose as ‘program improvement’—mainly concerned with the new phase of AusAID’s assistance to the RWASH sector in Timor Leste (BESIK II), but also in relation to other initiatives within AusAID’s Timor Leste program. A secondary purpose of the evaluation concerned AusAID’s accountability requirements for a transparent and independent evaluation of the $41 million initiative.

Priorities for the evaluation in relation to BESIK II included:

* Review of the role of BESIK in **sector coordination**, policy development and transition to government leadership.
* Assessment of **gender and equity** mainstreaming approaches.

Assessment of evidence of effectiveness of **sanitation models** that have been piloted.

Priorities for the evaluation related to other AusAID programs in Timor Leste included:

* Assessment of **capacity development** methods and success factors.
* Assessment of **community engagement** processes with a view to informing community engagement for the National Program for Suco Development (PNDS).

Review of the balance between **service delivery and institutional strengthening** to inform strategies relevant to improving service delivery in the health and education sectors.

A question guide to address these information needs was developed and is presented in Appendix B.

Two independent evaluators were engaged by AusAID: A monitoring and evaluation (M&E) specialist and a gender/WASH specialist. These specialists were supported during fieldwork by AusAID staff members and a representative from GoTL.

* 1. Methodology

The broad methodology used in this evaluation was qualitative, ‘agile’ and gender responsive[[8]](#footnote-8). Data collection involved a range of qualitative research methods:

* **Document reviews:** a comprehensive review of key documents produced by the program and relevant sector literature identified key issues for further investigation in the field and formed the basis for factual data presented in this report.
* **Key informant interviews (KII):** purposively selected individuals provided the backbone of the fieldwork since these interviews enabled probing and triangulation of stakeholder issues and perspectives concerning the program.
* **Focus group discussions (FGD):** FGDs with beneficiaries enabled the evaluation team to rapidly develop a sense of the diversity of views about the program. A purposive sample of locations with both successful and less successful outcomes supported exposure to diverse views.
* **Observation:** general observations during the fieldwork helped to confirm or challenge preliminary conclusions arising from the other methods.
* **Collaborative analysis and feedback:** at several points during the fieldwork, the evaluation team debriefed preliminary findings with BESIK staff, GoTL representatives and AusAID staff. This facilitated a distilling of key themes and further focussed lines of questioning. A formal debrief and presentation of an Aide Mémoire to AusAID and GoTL was undertaken at the conclusion of fieldwork (23 August 2012).
  1. Limitations

The following mix of pervasive and specific evaluation challenges may have influenced this ICR:

* **Timing:** this evaluation took place immediately after elections and in the period when the new government was still forming. Many senior officials were uncertain about their role in the future government, and the ministerial structure was still evolving.
* **Judgements:** this evaluation involved rapid qualitative methods of inquiry, and hence relied on the professional judgement of the evaluators to interpret stakeholder perspectives.
* **Time and resources:** the rigour of the data gathering and analysis processes for this evaluation was constrained by the time available.
* **Access:** the evaluation team was exposed to a relatively small sample of the vast and diverse areas covered by the program. Hence findings are indicative rather than representative.
* **Measurement:** most human changes are amorphous and difficult to measure in an absolute sense. There is no consensus on the units of measurement of phenomena such as ‘capacity’ and ‘gender equality’ that underpin BESIK.

**Attribution:** initiatives such as BESIK are implemented within ‘open systems’ such that multiple factors contribute to and/or detract from the anticipated changes. This renders the definitive attribution of changes to particular interventions challenging at best.

Notwithstanding these limitations, the evaluation proceeded as planned. AusAID provided more than the usual amount of time for fieldwork[[9]](#footnote-9) and data analysis. A constructive and collegiate approach by AusAID and the contractor contributed to a successful mission.

## Findings

* 1. Summary of Key Findings

This evaluation sought to address six key questions arising from the ToR, as outlined in Section 2.1. Three of the questions concerned issues of particular interest for BESIK II; and three concerned lessons of wider relevance to AusAID’s other initiatives in Timor Leste. Findings are reported in the following sections against this structure.

In summary, the evaluation team found that BESIK made significant contributions to RWASH coordination, and strengthened GoTL leadership of the sector. There were notable contributions to improving gender equality and significant progress was made in advancing WASH policy and practice. The quality of community engagement was high and the program achieved a pragmatic balance between delivering WASH services and building institutional capacity. Challenges persist with improving inter-ministerial coordination—especially as this relates to other WASH-related government projects. More sophisticated analysis of the ‘supply side’ of the sanitation ‘market’ is necessary—both in terms of how developing demand can be met, and facilitation of an informed choice of sanitation products. Reconsideration of service delivery models combined with significant additional investment of resources and capacity is necessary to achieve sustainable rural water service delivery.

* 1. Lessons for BESIK II

This section reports lessons that are relevant to BESIK II, specifically:

* BESIK’s role in **sector coordination**, policy development and transition to government leadership of the sector
* The merit of **gender mainstreaming** and equity/inclusion approaches, and
* The quality of evidence in relation to the **sanitation models** that were piloted

Each of these areas is discussed in turn.

To what extent has BESIK successfully supported sector coordination, policy development and government leadership of the RWASH sector?

**Relative strengths & opportunities:**

🗹 Sanitation Policy drafted and passed, Water Policy and Water Resources Policy in draft form.

🗹 Deployment of a Sanitation and Water Information System (SIBS) has potential to drive improvements in planning, budgeting and management of the sector.

🗹 Significant increases in government sector leadership capacity, particularly within DNSA

**Relative weaknesses & contextual challenges:**

🗷 Public financial management constraints within MoH and MoI detracted from performance and undermined the full potential of capacity building investments.

🗷 Need for further policy dialogue to lift the profile and role of DNGRA/DNCQA within government, including endorsement of the draft policy.

🗷 Coordination between DNSAS and other ministries implementing water systems has been problematic resulting in low-quality systems

BESIK supported the RWASH sector during a dynamic period. The implementing team is widely respected by GoTL and NGO representatives, and the program is lauded for significant contributions to rural development in Timor Leste. Arguably, many of the positive changes witnessed in the recent past have been fostered by AusAID’s long-term commitment to the sector. A central tenet of the BESIK design was that support for government ownership and leadership of the sector is a precondition for sustainable service delivery. The key elements of BESIK’s strategy to strengthen sector leadership and direction included:

* Capacity development
* Policy development
* Sector information

Sector coordination

Capacity development is discussed more fully in Section 0; but for the purposes of this section, it is sufficient to report that there is evidence that BESIK contributed to a strengthening of capacity at multiple levels in the sector through an array of methods. The engagement was comprehensive and mirrored approaches taken in initiatives with a dedicated institutional strengthening focus.

The other three elements of the strategy are discussed in turn.

***Policy development***

Three major policies were developed during the life of BESIK, with one (sanitation) passing through the Council of Ministers, and the other two (water and water resources) in draft form. This work alone represents a significant investment of time and focus by the program, and suggests that BESIK staff and advisers have had influence within GoTL—notwithstanding the delays in progressing two of the policies beyond draft stage.

An area of policy dialogue that should draw particular focus in BESIK II is public financial management (PFM)—particularly as this relates to cashflow bottlenecks and accountability at district level within DNSA and MoH[[10]](#footnote-10). The evaluation team noted considerable frustration, especially among District Water and Sanitation Service (*Serviço de Águas e Saneamento*, SAS) managers, with how difficult it is to secure operating cash, and the constraints this imposes on operations. The evaluation team was advised that the Ministry of Finance (MoF) is taking steps to improve fiscal discipline across government departments, and it could be that these measures are not well understood. If this is the case then training and orientation of DNSA staff is necessary to improve their ability to work within the existing institutional arrangements. Equally, it could be that policy advocacy is required to achieve more workable procedures. Irrespective, the issue of recurrent budget allocations for SAS’ role in operations and maintenance (O&M) requires attention. The quantum of funds is significantly below estimates of what is required to achieve a base level of WASH asset maintenance. Ignoring these fundamental PFM challenges could jeopardise the value of all other capacity development investments (and infrastructure investments) in the sector since without resources, improved capacity cannot be borne out in improved services. In fact, within a short timeframe, infrastructure will be inoperable without the necessary commitment of recurrent resources.

Recommendation for BESIK II

1. AusAID should commission an update of earlier analysis of the PMF and related governance issues in the RWASH sector to take account of government and contextual changes. Such analysis should provide recommendations on the best methods to address PFM challenges currently faced.
2. BESIK II should engage in policy dialogue to address cashflow and recurrent budget constraints at district level faced by DNSA and MoH (in concert with work by HSSP-SP).

A second area for further policy engagement in BESIK II concerns water resources management. BESIK invested considerable technical and policy development in the National Directorate of Water Resources Management (DNCQA) resulting in an advanced draft water resources policy and the completion of hydrological studies. However, directorate staff interviewed during this review indicated that there is ambiguity within GoTL concerning the purpose and merit of this work:

*“Water resources management is totally different from the mandate for DNSA. We need help to convince the government about the importance of water resource management over and beyond the provision of water supplies”.*

Notwithstanding the apparent staff morale issues, it seems that the directorate may be misaligned within MPW[[11]](#footnote-11), or at least, there is ambiguity within GoTL concerning the significance of this function. This is a matter beyond the scope of this evaluation, but it was clear that BESIK II should clarify the commitment and focus of GoTL in relation to water resources management before investing further in this domain.

Recommendation for BESIK II

1. BESIK II should engage in dialogue with relevant GoTL stakeholders to clarify the purpose and value of a water resources management function in the context of the Timor Leste Strategic Development Plan. This may include reconsidering where DNCQA is located within the ministerial structure to maximise the investments made in DNCQA in BESIK.

***Sector information***

The truism ‘information is power’ holds for any agenda to improve the quality and coordination of services. Unsurprisingly, without basic information about the number and functionality of water systems, the GoTL was unable to adequately plan system maintenance or development. BESIK made significant investments in the development of a water and sanitation information system (*Sistema Informasaun Bee no Saneamentu*, SIBS) to provide basic knowledge about water system location and functionality. A senior official in DNSA stated:

*“SIBS has dramatically increased our knowledge about the state of the sector and this is very important for us…we have data for every district, suco and aldeia*”.

DNSA has begun publically displaying updated information about water supply functionality in localities across the country to promote discussion and awareness about WASH maintenance.



Figure 2: Publically displayed SIBS data

Self-evidently, providing sector information has helped to improve the capacity of DNSA to implement its core mandate; but arguably a more profound outcome arises from the influence and recognition within GoTL (especially MoF) that comes with the ability to provide relevant sector metrics. The Director of DNSA proudly reported:

“*Before when someone wanted data we didn’t have anything. This is a big change”.*

Notwithstanding the recognised value provided by SIBS at this point, BESIK II will be required to provide considerable on-going support to ensure that the system endures. At the time of this review, the full cycle of data capture, analysis and dissemination had only been running for a few months. The ongoing maintenance and operation of the technology carries obvious risks and challenges in the Timor Leste context. But perhaps greater challenges arise from the need to institutionalise processes that assure the quality and integrity of data; and to institutionalise the *use* of information to inform planning and decision-making[[12]](#footnote-12). Without the reliable supply of accurate and timely data, leadership support for SIBS will wane, and the esteem derived by DNSA managers from having relevant information at their ‘fingertips’ will dissipate. This in turn will squander the significant investment made by BESIK and will reinforce disappointing global experience in the information communication technology for development (ICT4D) sector.

Recommendation for BESIK II

1. BESIK II should ensure that SIBS is adequately supported in the medium term, both with respect to ‘supply side’ factors (technology maintenance/support and data quality) and ‘demand side’ factors (capacity, incentives and motivation to utilise sector information).

***Sector coordination and leadership***

BESIK’s support for coordination of the RWASH sector involved working directly with the MoI and MoH directorates associated with RWASH planning and policy, and coordinating and supporting civil society organisation (CSO) engagement in the sector. Both GoTL and CSO stakeholders spoke favourably of BESIK’s role in this agenda, with appreciation for the practical measures that were introduced. One NGO representative stated:

*“We have had one large actor that has good connections with the central government. This was the main benefit of BESIK to us. They were a one-stop-shop and interlocutor on anything to do with WASH. When I first came to Timor, people just said ‘go and see BESIK’”.*

BESIK instigated and supported a WASH Forum[[13]](#footnote-13) which provided the only mechanism in Timor Leste for all CSO actors involved in WASH to come together and coordinate technical approaches and geographic coverage[[14]](#footnote-14). It also provided CSOs with an impartial point of contact with GoTL on WASH policy issues. Some CSO representatives raised concerns about what might happen to coordination if BESIK was no longer playing a central role, and also pointed out that there would be additional value if MoH was more integrally involved so that the full breadth of WASH issues could be addressed.

Recommendation for BESIK II

1. BESIK II should work to support strengthened GoTL leadership of the WASH Forum including ensuring all relevant ministries and directorates are actively involved. .

The evaluation team formed the view that GoTL leadership and coordination of the sector had improved with BESIK’s support—especially DNSA. An apparent strength of BESIK’s approach appeared to be that support and mentoring of sector coordination and leadership functions did not erode GoTL ownership and legitimacy. Nevertheless, DNSA managers raised some frustrations about coordination with BESIK on key processes such as training, procurement, and engagement of advisers:

*“Sometimes the information about capacity building activities doesn’t come to us, and sometimes it is different to our own training plan. We’d like to know what training is planned so that we can integrate it with our own plan. There is also a lack of coordination on the bidding process. They give us information but sometimes we don’t feel fully involved in the selection of the tenderers—especially for water system developments. We’re not involved with the recruitment of advisers. We don’t know the role of some of the advisers that have come here”.*

Recommendation for BESIK II

1. BESIK II should ensure close coordination with DNSA’s internal planning for human resource development and new infrastructure projects.

A domain in which BESIK II should invest additional support is inter-ministerial coordination. As noted above, BESIK supported the establishment of the WASH forum—which is DNSA-led but rarely attended by representatives from MoH. Conversely, a Sanitation Working Group initiated by BESIK[[15]](#footnote-15) has a stronger health focus and MoH leadership because it was primarily mobilised to draft the sanitation policy. Either/both these forums provide a venue for inter-ministerial coordination on WASH.

The need for stronger inter-ministerial coordination was especially evident in the area of rural water supply development and concerns coordination with Ministry of State Administration and Territorial Management (MSATM) and Agency for National Development (AND). Interviews with SAS staff revealed frustrations with poor coordination of water supply developments between SAS staff and district administration staff—specifically in relation to the government’s Decentralised Development Program (*Program Dezenvolvimento Desentrilisado*, or PDD) funded through the MSATM. The central issue seemed to be that the implementation of PDD water supply projects bypassed SAS technical standards and community engagement processes, thereby eroding the authority of SAS, and more importantly, resulting in poor-quality water supplies with limited ownership that are unlikely to endure[[16]](#footnote-16).

Several stakeholders, including the newly appointed Secretary of State for Water and Sanitation, noted that there would be value in BESIK II engaging with MSATM and the Agency for National Development (ADN) to improve inter-ministerial coordination of water projects:

“*BESIK II should work with both Estatal and DNSA…this is important for future for sustainability of water supplies, particularly given the decentralisation plans*”.

Such efforts should be directed towards improving water supply design and contracting practices, reinforcing the authority of Rural Water Guidelines including community engagement processes, and ensuring that the technical quality of water supply projects is approved by SAS. In BESIK II, engagement with MSTATM and ADN could be through one of two approaches:

* **Policy dialogue:** lobbying to raise awareness of the consequences of poor coordination for government investments and community water supply sustainability.

**Capacity building:** partnership focused on systemic engagement within MSATM and ADN to build capacity and commitment to apply GoTL technical standards and achieve stronger inter-ministerial coordination of community engagements.

Recommendation for BESIK II

1. BESIK II should increase its engagement with MSATM and ADN in relation to the coordination of water supply projects in communities, based on a sound assessment of the most appropriate focus of such engagement—either policy dialogue or direct partnership and capacity building.

In some countries, Joint Sector Reviews involving all relevant Ministries and CSOs, have proved successful in addressing several of the concerns raised in this section, including both inter-ministerial coordination and utilisation of information (now available through SIBS) to support decision-making and planning. A Joint Sector Review was recently undertaken for sanitation, however there is yet to be a Joint Sector Review with a rural water supply focus.

Recommendation for BESIK II

1. BESIK II should support a Joint Sector Review focused on the rural water supply sector.

A further area that will require strong inter-ministerial coordination in BESIK II is the emerging focus on school WASH interventions. This will potentially require the infrastructure unit with the Ministry of Education to collaborate with relevant stakeholders in MoH, MPW and MSATM to align priorities, approaches and resources. Significantly, such coordination must be directed to ensure maintenance arrangements for both new and existing assets are in place and supported.

Recommendation for BESIK II

1. BESIK II should facilitate inter-ministerial coordination measures to support school WASH interventions between MoE, MoH, MPW and MSATM.

How appropriate and successful were approaches to mainstreaming gender and addressing equity under BESIK?

**Relative strengths & opportunities:**

🗹 Gender was included as a cross-cutting issue across all training, implementation, policy and guideline development, and performance monitoring.

🗹 Engagement with SEPI supported GoTL efforts to institutionalise gender equality, and strengthened policy development outcomes.

🗹 Use of quotas for female participation in committees and training was well regarded as a practical way to elevate gender inequality.

**Relative weaknesses & contextual challenges:**

🗷 Awareness-raising activities require further support and consolidation to have lasting impact.

🗷 The gender focal point model generated leadership commitment but did not result in systematic embedding of gender equality values in staff practice.

🗷 Female SDFs would benefit from particular support in their professional development.

🗷 Efforts to address disability require further practical action.

This section focuses first on gender equality followed by equity and inclusion.

BESIK employed a dedicated gender and inclusion adviser[[17]](#footnote-17) to lead implementation of the program’s gender strategy, and to promote shared responsibility among BESIK staff for its implementation. Significant effort was made to integrate gender as a cross-cutting issue and ensure it permeated all aspects of the program, including training, position descriptions, implementation and policy development, rendering BESIK an example of good practice.

The overall theory of change underpinning BESIK’s approach to promoting gender may be depicted as in Figure 3. This theory of change is subject to multiple assumptions, several of which are illuminated in the following discussion.

Figure 3: Theory of change of gender equality work

BESIK worked concurrently to improve gender equality within GoTL at an institutional level, and at community level. The efficacy of BESIK’s methods for each is discussed in turn.

***Institutional level***

BESIK employed four main approaches to promote gender equality in the institutional setting:

* Integrating gender concerns in **policy** development, including engaging the Secretary of State for the Promotion of Equality (SEPI) in policy dialogue process;
* Raising the **awareness** of sub-national staff through training and support for systems/protocols;
* Activating GoTL **gender focal points** within MoI, and;

**Recruiting** additional female staff to improve gender balance.

The efficacy of the first of these approaches is clear. Both the sanitation and the water policies now include clear references to gender, and an articulation of the rationale and strategies to promote gender equality. SEPI staff confirmed that their involvement with BESIK generated mutual benefits: legitimising SEPI’s role and enhancing the quality of gender policy development.

*“SEPI were directly involved in a small committee to support policy development and gave inputs on women’s role in rural areas and decision-making. We gave a presentation to the Council of Ministers as a team”*

The success of the second approach (awareness-raising among subnational staff) is less clear and will take more time—noting that it involves culture change. BESIK’s Gender Equality and Social Inclusion (GESI) Report (2012; p 4) acknowledged that further work is needed to move beyond relying on the individual interests and motivation of staff, to a more institutionalised setting. In addition, BESIK’s work in this area was mostly confined to DNSA/DNSSB, whereas other ministries with WASH-related functions (e.g. MoH and MSATM) would likely benefit from similar support.

Recommendation for BESIK II

1. BESIK II should support formalisation and strengthening of GoTL staff accountability with respect to gender equality across relevant directorates involved in WASH. Advocacy should initially focus on key processes where a focus on gender is critical (e.g. CAP and PAKSI) and on its inclusion in position descriptions. AusAID’s Governance for Development initiative should consider providing focussed support for this agenda.

The third approach involved supporting the GoTL’s policy of appointing ‘gender focal points’ (GFP) to provide institutional leadership for gender equality. The efficacy of this approach seemed mixed. On one hand, it elevated the gender equality issue among senior staff in MoH and the DNSA GFP spoke enthusiastically about the importance of gender equality and demonstrated knowledge of the challenges and potential[[18]](#footnote-18); but on the other hand, BESIK’s GESI report described the GFP model as having “failed”, and pointed to the need for a wider Gender Working Group able to both “influence and implement” (p 29)[[19]](#footnote-19). The evaluation team was also informed by BESIK staff that the GFP role had not led to structured action within the Directorate to embed gender equality in staff culture and work practice. One practical contributor to this was that GFPs have not been allocated resources to perform the function.

Recommendation for BESIK II

1. BESIK II should assist MPW to operationalise gender working groups to address shortcomings of the gender focal point model.

The fourth approach—recruiting an increasing proportion of female staff—was beneficial but also presented new challenges. Of the 88 sub-district facilitators (SDF’s)[[20]](#footnote-20), 24% are female. There are clear benefits of moving towards gender balance, particularly through role-modelling, as recognised by a female SDF:

“*In the community we should not just talk about gender equality, we should demonstrate it*”.

However, the evaluation team was advised that aspects of the SDF role may be challenging for women. There were cases of male SDFs expressing frustration with bearing what they perceive to be an unfair burden of work due to work-place challenges faced by female SDFs:

“*Women recruited have not fully done their role and responsibilities. BESIK supplied a motorbike and training, but only one or two are doing their job*”

A female SDF acknowledged personal challenges:

“*Being an SDF can be overwhelming…it’s a challenge when we have to do field work. The community needs us. When I was single it was okay. But when pregnant, it was difficult to go to the field. And now that I am a mother I have to leave my kids at home with my husband.”*

This suggests that women require more proactive institutional support to enable them to develop professionally and respond to unique workplace challenges they face (e.g. maternity leave, secure travel etc.). Also, some assessments[[21]](#footnote-21) have suggested that female staff require additional capacity building support to meet the demands of their role. Correspondingly, it was acknowledged that women have brought other strengths and benefits to the workplace, and that these should be studied and articulated to challenge arguments that it is simply ‘too hard’ to employ women in such roles.

Recommendation for BESIK II

1. BESIK II should actively collect and share evidence of benefits arising from the employment of female government staff in WASH to give support to the gender equality agenda.

***Community level***

Beyond the broad institutionally focused approaches described above, BESIK worked to support gender equality at community level by setting quotas and ensuring inclusion of gender considerations in training materials for Community Action Planning (CAP)[[22]](#footnote-22) and Community Action Plan for Sanitation & Hygiene (PAKSI)[[23]](#footnote-23).

A key achievement of the program was the inclusion within the GoTL Rural Water Guidelines of a 30% minimum participation of women in GMFs, and a recommended 50% participation. Quotas were also set for women’s involvement in technical training. These tactics produced results, with BESIK reporting 33% female membership of GMFs, and 52% of technical roles occupied by women. Despite this progress, it is clear from field visits and BESIK’s Activity Completion Report (p 19) that women only exerted minor influence on water system design and location. Achieving empowerment beyond basic participation is recognised as a major challenge globally and remains a particular challenge in Timor Leste.

PAKSI training also emphasised gender equality, however, the evaluation team’s discussions highlighted that further work is needed to harness women’s inherent motivation for improved sanitation, and to support this in leading community behaviour change. In this vein, health staff in Venilale stated:

“*Women are motivated [about sanitation], men are not. But traditionally men make decisions, while women are in the kitchen and collecting water.”*

An area that would benefit from greater focus in BESIK II concerns women’s menstrual hygiene needs—as identified by BESIK’s GESI Report (p 33)[[24]](#footnote-24).

Recommendation for BESIK II

1. BESIK II should review gender equality training to identify ways to more effectively harness women’s inherent motivation to improve sanitation.
2. BESIK II should proactively engage in the issue of menstrual hygiene—both in the home and in schools.

BESIK did not attempt to capture evidence of wider changes in gender equality in a systematic way (ACR, p 34)[[25]](#footnote-25) since changes were not expected to manifest during the life of the program. Nevertheless some evidence was discernible through ‘change stories’ and data on water collection times. BESIK’s ACR (p 33) reported that 40,000 women benefited from a reduction in time to collect water—from more than 30 minutes down to less than 30 minutes. BESIK II should consider capturing actual times before and after an intervention to provide finer detail about the degree of changes that follow. Evidently women in Venilale experienced the greatest benefit in this regard with water collection times falling from more than one hour to a few minutes, thereby allowing women use the extra time:

“*We have* *more time with the family, and more time for other work in the house or to weed the garden. Before, we didn’t even have time for breakfast. Now we have time for breakfast*”.

During this evaluation it was challenging to obtain detailed evidence about broader gender equality outcomes[[26]](#footnote-26); although some insights were gleaned by the evaluation team. For example, women in Maina 1 (Los Palos) indicated that the role of women in community decision-making processes was broadening beyond WASH-related issues. In Venilale, one woman observed a positive long-term trend:

“*For generations we had to sit behind the men in meetings. Now it is easier for women to come forward*”.

For BESIK II, a sound impact assessment (including baseline and endline) using in-depth qualitative and quantitative data is needed. Such a study should not be confined to community level, but should also uncover gender equality changes among female and male government staff. An in-depth approach with integrity will likely require skills in ethnographic or anthropological research. The framework presented in Appendix C could be a useful starting point to consider the range of potential outcomes to be explored.

Recommendation for BESIK II

1. BESIK II should undertake an in-depth gender impact assessment to allow wider gender equality changes to be captured and articulated and to inform gender development strategies in Timor Leste.

Beyond gender equality, BESIK’s focus on inclusion was aimed at people with disabilities. This area was reported by sector stakeholders to have been given variable attention, with the main achievement being its inclusion in policy development. Specialist NGOs in this area mentioned that their involvement had been sporadic, and the GESI report (p 4) acknowledges that a stronger emphasis on translation to practical implementation is required. Field visits confirmed this, where a household toilet for a person with a disability was not fitted with simple supports. There could be value in demonstrating simple latrine design modifications for the elderly or disabled.

Recommendation for BESIK II

1. BESIK II should focus on supporting sectoral knowledge and skills to enable practical implementation of measures to improve WASH access for persons with a disability.

How meaningful and reliable is evidence gathered concerning the various sanitation models piloted under BESIK?

**Relative strengths & opportunities:**

🗹 Support for CLTS-based approach to sanitation (PAKSI) within MoH and DNSSB.

🗹 Significant performance information collected, including several in-depth studies.

**Relative weaknesses & contextual challenges:**

🗷 No research ‘design’ to guide trialling of variations on CLTS, meaning that comparative study is not appropriate and potentially misleading.

🗷 Evidence on effectiveness of sanitation marketing is not available as implementation is in very early stages.

🗷 Insufficient breadth of toilet design options offered to support informed choice—especially in dry areas.

🗷 Need for viable source of technical expertise to support upgrading of ‘traditional’ latrines.

The link between sanitation and public health is internationally well established. The documented low standard of sanitation in rural Timor-Leste was the basis for BESIK’s objective to improve household sanitation. Meeting this objective was challenging, not least because it required concurrent and coordinated efforts to address both demand-side and supply-side factors. To develop household demand for improved sanitation BESIK piloted a range of community engagement approaches. Some early work was also undertaken to stimulate the supply-side—developing a selection of sanitation products for commercial sale. Evidence for the efficacy of BESIK’s approaches is discussed below.

***Demand-side***

Demand creation is a behaviour change process. Among approaches developed globally in recent years, community-led total sanitation (CLTS) has been notably successful in stimulating ‘demand’ for sanitation. CLTS uses disgust as a key motivator rather than relying on health messages to motivate behaviour change.

Several variations on the CLTS methodology were trialled by BESIK from 2009 – 2012. The program monitored these trials, with rapid assessments informing subsequent trials. This approach was pragmatic and defensible in the post-conflict context, and given the scale and urgency of the sanitation problem. Given that BESIK was not designed or resourced to conduct systematic research it is challenging to now expect BESIK to retrospectively compare and contrast sanitation models in a rigorous way with the data available[[27]](#footnote-27). Hence, the evidence base to differentiate between the relative merits of finer ‘variations’ of CLTS trialled by BESIK is not clear. The ACR sought to directly compare the results of the different variations, however the differing baselines, timing, and purposive sampling of communities rendered comparative analysis inappropriate[[28]](#footnote-28).

The general finding across all permutations was that CLTS generated widespread action to build simple latrines—provided facilitation was adequate. On this basis CLTS can be argued to be a sound strategy to move households from open defecation to latrine use in Timor Leste. BESIK should be commended for engendering formal endorsement of this approach in the National Sanitation Policy.

The ultimate adaption of CLTS by BESIK was ‘PAKSI’. Since PAKSI was implemented very recently, there is not yet clear evidence of the effectiveness of this variation. The evaluation team made preliminary observations of its success. In Venilale, MoH played a lead role and strong motivation and facilitation skills were evident amongst health staff and a sub-district environmental officer had been freed from other responsibilities to specifically focus on PAKSI. However, in Los Palos, the NGO Fraterna that was contracted to support PAKSI indicated that resources were spread thinly and that the allocation of staff per community was too low to enable adequate follow up:

“*It’s not just a case of talking to them. You need to go every day, motivate them, not telling them, but tapping behaviour change, every day, little by little*”.

Key to the success of PAKSI will be securing MoH commitment to take over the support roles in the long term, and introduce methods to capitalise on the potential of the PSF role in follow-up work at community level. In addition, there remain unresolved issues around monitoring of household sanitation, with unclear responsibilities across MoH (kubasa and health information system) and DNSSB (SIBS).

At the time of this evaluation, plans for Indonesian-style ‘sanitarians’ to be appointed at sub-district level were under discussion; with the expectation that this role might further support CLTS/PAKSI in reinforcing demand for sanitation. However, in practice, even with the more protracted engagement by sanitarians, GoTL health resources are constrained and the extent of actual community contact is likely to remain limited. MoH interviewees indicated an awareness of these constraints and suggested a model of long-term NGO involvement in the sector. However, the scale of NGO involvement required to support sanitarians should also be ascertained.

Recommendation for BESIK II

1. BESIK II should work with MoH and DNSSB to model the role of NGOs in promoting hygiene and sanitation at household level, and develop a comprehensive plan to best utilise PSFs, NGO staff and the planned sanitarians.

One issue that severely complicated and retarded the results of CLTS/PAKSI was concurrent use of subsidy approaches by both government and NGOs. As one NGO implementing CLTS reported:

“*In Parira we did triggering, and after, got commitment from 28 families [to build toilets]. Then 3 families got subsidy and the other 25 refused. The community thought the 3 were not vulnerable. We tried to convince the community through the Chefe Aldeia and DPHO, and convinced 13 families, but 12 have said no*”.

There is a tension between the GoTL’s subsidy orientation to assist vulnerable households, and the conceptual underpinnings of CLTS—which argue strongly for a subsidy-free approach. BESIK has been proactive in attempting to inform past and current government subsidy programs, however strengthened policy dialogue is needed to advocate for ways to use public sector finance to support sanitation market development rather than hand-outs for particular groups. For example in Vietnam output-based incentives have proved successful[[29]](#footnote-29).

Recommendation for BESIKII

1. BESIK II should engage in policy dialogue and joint studies with GoTL concerning the best use of public finance to improve rural sanitation. This will require sophisticated methods to ensure that the market is strengthened and vulnerable households are sufficiently supported.

***Supply-side***

Raising demand is only one step towards improving the standard of household sanitation across Timor Leste. Without adequate technical expertise and access to relevant technologies, households are limited to self-built toilets. During field visits on this evaluation households mostly expressed dissatisfaction with what they termed ‘traditional latrines’, ‘provisional latrines’ and ‘temporary latrines’, and often built them far away from the house due to issues such as smell. As one respondent in Venilale indicated, this also means the toilets are not always used:

“*We are nervous to go to the toilet in the dark, so we go near the house instead*”.

Women in Venilale reiterated this, saying they:

“*Worried about the provisional toilets because they are pits and can fall in. We’re worried about the health impacts because it smells*”.

It is clear that additional strategies are needed to assist communities to upgrade to more permanent facilities and avoid regression to open defecation.

**CLTS in rural East Timor: A case study of when it went wrong**

*Background*

In February 2010 an AusAID-funded NGO carried out Community Led Total Sanitation (CLTS) in a rural community near Laga, in the eastern part of Timor Leste. The community comprised 159 households (835 people) living along a main road. There were no household latrines used. Everyone used open defecation.

*Immediate success*

No one had a problem with the CLTS process. The triggering event was well attended, and no one expressed any concerns about the methodology. One village leader held a particularly strong belief in the health outcomes from ceasing open defecation and urged all households to respond. In a short space of time the community was declared open defecation free (ODF). Around 306 latrines were installed in that community and neighbouring communities within the Suco—an achievement given the hard and rocky ground and the fact that digging a pit required three or four days’ effort if working collaboratively, or one to two weeks if working alone. The Director General of the Ministry of Health (MoH) attended the ODF celebration. The community members were euphoric. The attendance of the MoH representative along with the support received from an international donor contributed to a belief that within a short period, a water supply would follow, and improved latrines.

*What happened next?*

Women preferred using latrines over using the bush—for reasons of convenience, comfort and safety. In that community, after defecating, people like to clean up with water. And provision of water is the responsibility of women—a task that takes up to an hour each day since the source is a stream located about half a kilometre away. In summer, the stream dries up, requiring them to dig a hand-dug catchment pool in the stream bed. Even though the women said they preferred the latrines, the effort associated with carting additional water to support their use made them tired; which in turn became a disincentive to use the latrines.

The soil in that village is very rocky. As a consequence the pits were not very deep, and so they filled quickly. Being very basic ’traditional’ pit latrines they were unventilated and made from poor quality materials, and so they quickly became foul. Some women reported that they were disturbed by maggot infestation in the latrines. This created a further disincentive to use the latrines.

After some time, all but about 25 households returned to open defecation. Some people simply preferred this arrangement. For others, the latrine was full. In these latter cases, even if women were inclined to urge for a new latrine, it is men that make the ultimate decision about construction in the home—and again the stony ground and the time required to dig the pit were disincentives. In any case, some women were disinclined to urge for a second latrine because of the additional effort they knew was required to cart water. Interestingly, all of the 25 households that continued with their latrines reportedly owned local carts to help with carting water.

Arguably, the greatest disincentive to persist with ODF was the disappointment arising from the fact that no water supply or improved sanitation materials were forthcoming from the Government or NGOs. As they saw it, they had not been rewarded for their efforts in relation to attaining ODF. Paradoxically, people believe that the latrine is part of the house, and the house is firmly the responsibility of the family, not the government or donors.

Most people stated that they prefer to use a latrine over using the bush. But the tipping point was the supply of water. The effort to carry additional water to support using a latrine was problematic for women; especially given the preference for a pour-flush design which is dependent on a reliable source of water. Culturally, even pit latrines are dependent on water for post-defecation cleaning—and alternatives for cleaning—such as leaves or corncobs as used in some places—are considered unsanitary in that community. Intriguingly, after open defecation people use stones which are not considered unsanitary.

*Conclusion*

It seems that the community may have been initially motivated to become ODF by extrinsic (i.e. the leader’s instructions) rather than intrinsic (i.e. emotional) drivers of behaviour change. A consequence was that ODF was seen as a means to being rewarded, rather than an end in itself. Further, it seems that the benefits of using a traditional pit latrine represented only marginal value to households (both women and men) beyond open defecation. This meant that the effort of carting a little more water, or the effort of digging a new pit, became barriers to continuing ODF.

*Questions that linger:*

* What could be done to foster intrinsic motivation for ODF?
* What factors might represent significant value to households achieving ODF?
* Would improved (dry) pit latrines be an acceptable way to reduce reliance on water while still managing odour?
* Could other non-water based methods of cleaning up after defecation be considered acceptable?
* Would introduction of a higher standard of latrine represent a stronger value proposition to households, such that they would be disinclined to return to open defecation?
* Why do people believe that latrines are the responsibility of the household on one hand, but expect donor/government intervention on the other?

Two key concerns in supporting the supply side are ‘how’ to make sanitation products available, and ‘what’ sanitation products are most suitable for the context.

***Improving access to sanitation products***

An emerging approach in the WASH sector to assist households to upgrade their sanitation facilities is ‘sanitation marketing’. However, sanitation marketing has mostly been successful in higher density settings than Timor-Leste (e.g. Cambodia, Vietnam). There is no available evidence base for its success in remote rural areas with high transport costs. During this evaluation an NGO-supported private company expressed this issue:

“*We hire trucks but there is a monopoly so transport is expensive*”.

This highlights the need for strengthened analysis of strategies to support market-based solutions. On-going public sector support to address market failure in rural areas may assist. However, robust market analysis is needed to confirm this and identify the most viable mechanisms. There is a need to explore horizontal integration across the supply chain rather than relying solely on a vertically integrated solution[[30]](#footnote-30). Finally, consideration should be given to how to reduce risk associated with new businesses entering this market—including access to finance.

Recommendation for BESIKII

1. BESIK II should undertake sophisticated market analysis to identify key limitations and opportunities for various approaches to improving the supply of sanitation products and services.

***Sanitation product choice, design and technical expertise***

The evaluation team questioned whether the breadth of toilet design options (in particular dry options)[[31]](#footnote-31) and the technical expertise made available to communities was sufficient.





Figure 4: Toilet designs promoted by a local sanitation enterprise

Communities expressed strong preferences for water-based toilets[[32]](#footnote-32). This is a similar situation to other countries, and presents a challenge for locations in Timor-Leste where water is not readily or reliably available year-round. Water-based toilets are also a higher cost option. Installation of water-based toilets in places with unreliable water supply commonly results in lack of use and malfunction, or significant burden for women who cart water. The limited range of sanitation solutions that are cheap and do not require water was presented to communities by the program. Sanitation marketing materials include (i) a traditional unventilated pit, (ii) pour-flush option (off-set) and (iii) pour-flush with water-seal. Ventilated improved pit (VIP) latrines and fossa alterna composting toilets[[33]](#footnote-33) (or related arborloo) were not included or promoted as dry alternatives to upgrade pit latrines. A differentiated approach at community level is required to enable ‘informed choice’ in communities, dependent on whether there is easy access to water or not, with an expanded range of dry toilet options made available in areas that lack adequate water supply.

Recommendation for BESIKII

1. BESIK II should expand the range of toilets promoted to include low-cost options that are appropriate in areas areas with low or unreliable water supply.

A further challenge is that building effective permanent toilets requires technical expertise. PAKSI training materials include a ‘Field Guide for Rural Toilets and Hand-washing’ but it does not provide detailed dimensions and design considerations. Some technical expertise was made available to communities through NGOs conducting CLTS, however the evaluation team noted that this was limited. In the long-term, it is envisaged DNSSB will play this role, however without any staff at district or sub-district level, this is difficult to imagine. MoH’s role at community level is focussed on ‘behaviour change’ rather than provision of design advice, and MoH staff expressed a desire for more support in this area.

Recommendation for BESIK II

1. BESIK II should clarify who best should carry responsibility for the provision of technical advice on toilet design to communities and masons, and for facilitation of ‘informed choice’ processes, followed by capacity building support to ensure these aspects are an integral part of the broader sanitation approach.

**Marketing sanitation products: A case study of when it went wrong**

*Background*

**In February 2010 an AusAID-funded NGO carried out Community Led Total Sanitation (CLTS) in a rural community near Lago, in the eastern part of Timor Leste. In a short space of time the 159 household community was declared open defecation free (ODF), with around 306 latrines being installed in that and neighbouring communities within the Suco. The NGO then trained the village leader and several others in how to fabricate concrete pour-flush latrine pans—assuming that as households realised the benefits of latrines, they would buy the ‘improved’ pans and upgrade the quality of their sanitation facilities. Also, since the community is located along a main road, they believed there was an opportunity to sell pans to the open market. The NGO supplied cement, tools and other material, and worked with the selected community members to make several ‘demonstration’ pans. A small display booth was constructed beside the road and stocked with several examples of the product.

*What happened next?*

Not a single pan was ever sold. Numerous requests for products were received from passers-by, but these ‘customers’ were informed that the pans were not for sale. Four of the ‘demonstration’ pans made with the assistance of the NGO were given for free by the village leader to households that committed to improve their traditional pit latrine.

The village leader stated that he had the knowledge and confidence to make more pans without the help of the NGO, but stated that he could not afford the cement. He indicated that a bag of cement could be purchased locally for $8. He also stated that a latrine pan could be sold for at least $10; and that between 10 – 20 pans could be made from a single bag of cement. He confirmed that commercially available pans sold in local shops for $35 each. He acknowledged that the satellite dish installed on his house had cost $200.

*What was going on?*

The NGO naively believed that investing skills and start-up resources was sufficient to kick-start a viable sanitation enterprise. The individuals involved were conscious that the start-up capital had been provided as a gift ‘to the community’. As such, they were conscious that they could not be seen to derive individual advantage from a NGO ‘community’ donation. In any case, none of the individuals had conceived of the business enterprise on their own, and were passionate enough to carry the concept through to viability. Further, while there was some interest from passers-by, the immediate community regressed from ODF status for more complex reasons, and so none of the anticipated internal sales were realised. Perhaps, there was a sense of shame associated with the latrine pans—a reminder of their failure to maintain ODF status? Or perhaps, latrines are simply not perceived to be a household item that warrants financial investment? In any case, the enterprise would have faced the same challenge to viability that other locally-based enterprises face when they are largely dependent on local markets—what happens when the local market is saturated?

* 1. Lessons of Wider Relevance

This section reports lessons arising from BESIK that may be applicable beyond AusAID’s engagement in the RWASH sector, specifically:

* The success of **capacity development** methods used to improve the performance of rural service delivery
* The value of **community engagement** processes to mobilise collective action (and how this might inform the National Succo Development Program, PNDS)

The appropriateness of the balance between **direct service delivery and institutional strengthening** (and how this might influence work in rural health and education)

Each of these issues is discussed in turn in the following sections.

What aspects of BESIK’s capacity development work may be successful in other situations?

**Relative strengths & opportunities:**

🗹 A comprehensive approach to capacity building, drawing on an array of methods focussed a various levels.

🗹 Utilisation and development of a local training institution that will provide enduring value in Timor Leste.

🗹 Resourcing and supporting of human resources at subdistrict level had a direct impact on the quality and reach of service delivery.

**Relative weaknesses & contextual challenges:**

🗷 The return of scholars to the workplace was not well planned and managed.

🗷 Community capacity to implement operations and maintenance work requires ongoing external support.

🗷 Nascent commitment by GoTL to resourcing operations and maintenance work.

BESIK’s core focus was on improving the performance of WASH service delivery throughout rural Timor Leste. This involved significant capacity development investments in government, NGOs and community—with the main emphasis being within DNSA.

BESIK’s capacity development was well regarded by NGOs, community and government representatives. The Director General of Corporate Services (MoI) stated:

“*The capacity building plans have been aligned with corporate plans within the Ministry of Infrastructure”.*

No explicit theoretical framework underpinned BESIK’s capacity development interventions; but arguably the approach was ‘problem-based’—addressing bottlenecks to improved service delivery in rural areas opportunistically as they emerged. Some approaches generated immediate improvements in performance; others will yield benefits over the medium-term.

BESIK implemented a comprehensive range of capacity development interventions, pitched at multiple levels, consistent with approaches taken by dedicated institutional strengthening initiatives:

* **Scholarships:** 16 DNSA technical staff and 4 NGO staff were sponsored to attend the Institute of Technology, Surabaya (ITS).
* **Structured training:** SAS staff benefited from training in WASH-related skills at the National Centre for Employment and Professional Training (CNEFP) in Tibar.
* **Informal mentoring:** significant informal training and support for individuals and teams, at national and sub-national levels, covering both technical, management and policy domains.

**Staff resourcing:** recruitment, payroll, training and direction of a new workforce of 65 Sub-district Facilitators (SDFs).

Lessons from each of these approaches are reviewed in turn below.

***Scholarships***

The provision of scholarships for 20 Timorese staff to study at ITS was well regarded. A senior MoI official observed:

*The scholarships and training supported by BESIK in Indonesia has been positive. We need more of that kind of support.*

As with all scholarships, the initiative represents a concentrated investment in a relatively small number of individuals relative to the populous[[34]](#footnote-34), with the assumption that wider development outcomes can be realised over the medium term. Risk is a function of the individuals selected, and the extent to which they are likely to provide a ‘return on investment’ by remaining in their employment and performing at a higher standard than previously possible—and that their position allows them to exert influence and utilise their training.

All alumni interviewed were appreciative of the scholarship opportunity and reported increased capacity as an outcome of the investment—both in terms of their technical knowledge and social mobilisation skills. However, in some cases their return to the workforce was not managed to maximise the benefits of the investment or their motivation in the workplace. For example, one SAS Manager returned to a lower position in the organisation after two years of formal study. Also there was some conflict associated with the recognition of the Indonesian certificate by the Public Service Commission, which impacted on the promotion process for the returning scholars.

Lesson

1. To maximise the investment in scholarships, reintegration of scholars into the workplace requires proactive planning, management and support.
2. The development ‘return on investment’ in scholarships is a function of the individuals selected, and the extent to which their future performance can impact on the quality of services delivered to community.

***Structured training***

Structured training courses were supported by BESIK through CNEFP in Tibar—a local training institution. Participants reported that this training was grounded and had a direct impact on their work performance and confidence. BESIK’s engineering advisers provided formal instruction at the institution and advised on content. Evidently this investment had the additional benefit of increasing the capacity of the local training institution such that it is now able to offer a wider range of courses—and in fact will be playing a key capacity development role in other AusAID initiatives. The success of this component may carry a risk of over-extending the training capacity of CNEFP and eroding quality.

Lesson

1. Reliance on local training institutions can provide benefits in the form of increased local training capacity, however should be matched with their emerging capacity.

***Informal mentoring***

Informal mentoring took place in an on-going way at multiple levels of engagement. Community Development Officers and BESIK’s technical staff engaged in WSI projects supported SAS staff and SDFs in their day-to-day work, and also the district administration more broadly. At national level, BESIK’s advisers and Team Leader were heavily engaged in policy development and the evolution of operational procedures and systems. Local NGOs also reported some informal capacity development benefit associated with working under BESIK’s sector coordination, and through oversight provided by the program:

*“BESIK has provided good benefits to us. Before we worked with BESIK we didn’t have much experience in WASH. We’ve learned about toilet construction and BCC…The funding has been a benefit; we’ve been able to employ new skilled staff…Our staff are better able to mobilise the community and we’re better able to manage donor funds”.*

Self-evidently, the quality of outcomes from mentoring is a function of the relationship between mentor and mentee.

Lesson

1. Productive institutional changes can accrue when appropriately skilled mentors develop sound working relationships with relevant and influential mentees.

***Staff resourcing***

The investments in the workforce at district (DTOs and SAS managers) and sub-district levels (SDFs) were especially appreciated. A Director General stated:

*“This project has really done something in rural areas. It is considered very relevant. Previously no one was responsible for water and sanitation at sub-district level, but now we have staff in 65 sub-districts”.*

In a similar vein, senior DNSA officials reported:

*“Before BESIK I did not have any District Technical Officers. Through BESIK we have recruited DTOs that are now doing significant work. Before I had only 4 staff to do all the work in the country”.*

*“We’ve seen a big change at sub-district level. SDFs have made significant impact. We are now using our own directorate staff not just relying on NGOs. We have staff at sub-district level to monitor work. Previously we only had staff at district level. This is very positive”.*

BESIK is widely lauded for conceiving of the SDF role, recruiting and training the individuals, and then supporting their transition into GoTL direction and employment. This was a major investment and carried inherent risks, but appears to have been a successful way to dramatically improve local service delivery: both reach and quality. Remaining challenges for BESIK II include: supporting GoTL to make the SDF role a permanent government position, providing additional training (especially WASH technical) and addressing gender equality issues among SDFs (as discussed in Section 3.2, gender). Further, the evaluation team noted frustration among some SDFs—especially in Baucau where they prepare their own workplans, have had no response to requests for resources and direction, and find accountability lines ambiguous. Some individuals indicated that they were considering seeking other roles. This suggests that newly created positions require exceptional support and direction before become institutionalised.

Discussions are currently underway for AusAID to support ‘sanitarians’ in the health sector—to perform a similar sub-district service delivery function to the SDFs in WASH. Based on BESIK’s experience with the SDFs this should have a positive impact, although there should be caution in relation to the breadth of this role. Arguably, a factor in the success of the SDFs has been their narrowly focussed role.

Lesson

1. Investing in sub-district government human resource capacity had a direct and positive impact on the reach and quality of local service delivery.
2. Newly created roles should benefit from intensive support and direction as part of the institutionalisation process.

A paramount challenge facing BESIK II is how to expand and sustain capacity at community level. The challenge of developing and sustaining community-based capacity is universal; although it may be especially acute in the RWASH sector in Timor Leste. BESIK invested significant resources in the establishment, training and support of GMFs as the structure to carry forward community asset management; however, there is evidence that GMF performance remains constrained due to factors such as:

* Revenue-raising
* Technical and managerial capacity

Bottlenecks in accessing SAS services

These factors are likely to be relevant in any sector in which investments are planned to improve local service delivery reach and quality.

First, the issue of revenue-raising extends beyond the financial capacity of poor households to pay user fees. The pervasive use of mobile phones and satellite dishes in rural areas suggests that resources can be prioritised for assets. However, difficulties arise, especially for larger systems, when asset ownership is ambiguous and households question why they must contribute their personal funds to something they perceive should be a service. The evaluation team attended a meeting in Laga in which a large water supply system had been installed. The GMF reported considerable frustration with trying to collect funds for maintenance and repairs. One leader appealed for a contractor to be installed to alleviate the GMF’s burden of collecting fees from households.

*“Once we attend training we can run the system ourselves. But the problem is always that the tariff is not enough”.*

At the time of the evaluation, no funds had been collected by this GMF for two months. The leaders appealed to AusAID to fund a ‘*tarabandu*’[[35]](#footnote-35) ceremony which they believed would legitimise their role in revenue collection, and enforce compliance with system maintenance. In other areas visited by the evaluation team, GMFs had undertaken fee collection, but had only spent money to “*buy some books…we haven’t paid for repairs*”. These complex socio-cultural and financial factors raise questions about the relevance of community-management of assets, at least beyond a particular scale of system.

Lesson

1. More effective ways of establishing shared accountability and communicating shared responsibility for community assets should be developed in order to shore up revenue-raising by community management groups.
2. Further study is required to identify the scale at which community management of assets/services is unviable in rural Timor Leste.

Second, although GMF members generally appreciated the training provided by BESIK and expressed confidence in their ability to perform core functions; this was frequently accompanied by requests for further training and support. The issue of maintenance capacity seemed especially important, and was borne out in field observations, as depicted in Figure 5.

 

Figure 5: Poor maintenance capacity erodes system functionality and sustainability

Third, a major bottleneck in reliable and sustainable local service delivery arises from constraints faced by government staff at district and subdistrict levels. GMF members indicated that it was difficult to engage SAS services to address maintenance and repair issues that were beyond locally available financial and technical capacity. For example In Maina 1:

“*We waited months and months for them to come.* When *SAS eventually came it was fixed, but the pressure is still low. The tank is big, but not full each day*”.

The Director General of Corporate services indicated an area in which BESIK II could provide further support to improve O&M:

*“We need to present a good plan to convince parliament to resource O&M. At the moment it is hard to get a budget for maintenance. Maintenance plans should come from the district administrations; but we need to create one multi-year plan for the whole country. It would be more acceptable to parliament if O&M budgets were framed as improving services to communities”.*

Lesson

1. Parliament may be more likely to allocate resources to asset maintenance if the strategy is pitched as ‘improving services to communities’.
2. Considerable advocacy is necessary to build broad-based support for government investment in operations and maintenance.

Are there generalisable qualities of BESIK’s community engagement processes?

**Relative strengths & opportunities:**

🗹 CAP involves both a social process that brings about a sense of community ownership of assets and the establishment of a structure with a specified ongoing role.

🗹 The approach taken by BESIK fostered GoTL ownership of CAP and PAKSI.

🗹 Community structures (GMF) benefited at formation from support provided by a local (GoTL) role (SDFs)

**Relative weaknesses & contextual challenges:**

🗷 A mechanism to operationalize ongoing support for GMFs is not well established.

🗷 CLTS/PAKSI focusses on generating demand for sanitation, but offers little support to addressing supply-side issues, or indeed helping households move up the ‘sanitation ladder’

🗷 Unlikely capacity of voluntary (PSF) health workforce to effect significant hygiene behaviour changes

An important lesson from earlier WASH engagements was the need for more meaningful community engagement processes. It was recognised that donor-led WASH projects frequently failed within a short period, and that a lack of community ownership in the projects was a fundamental cause of failure. In response, BESIK adopted more proactive community engagement processes, drawing heavily on NGOs, GoTL staff and volunteers to build community awareness, knowledge, structures and capacity.

BESIK employed three main ways of engaging with communities:

* **For water system development:** BESIK employed a community action planning (CAP) process to build community ownership and foster inclusion and participation within GMF.
* **For sanitation improvement:** BESIK experimented with variants of CLTS to stimulate community demand for improved sanitation.

**For hygiene promotion:** BESIK involved support for community health volunteers (PSFs) carrying out household visits (KUBASA) to motivate hygiene behaviour change.

Each of these community engagement processes is discussed in turn and may offer valuable lessons for other AusAID initiatives that seek to influence changes at the community level.

***Community Action Planning***

The development and rollout of the CAP process is regarded by GoTL staff and NGO representatives as a major contribution of the program. One SAS manager observed:

*“The CAP process draws participation and enables successful outcomes in project communities…it generates motivation for O&M and empowers GMFs to collect funds*”.

The CAP process was initially led by NGOs, but was later implemented directly by government staff (SDFs) who were trained and mentored in participatory methods by BESIK’s Community Development Officers. GoTL staff indicated that their direct involvement was successful owing to the trust that the community had in government officers, and the permanence of their role/function. The development of the CAP process was an area of concentrated effort over many years. Although it evolved with a particular focus on community WASH interventions, it may provide a template for other development initiatives aiming to mobilise community action. The value of the CAP process seems to derive from several factors:

* The process is designed to **foster participation** and inclusion in planning and community asset management in line with participatory development theory[[36]](#footnote-36);
* The process is **led by government staff** that have developed the trust of the community and who play a permanent role;
* The process establishes and supports a **dedicated community structure** (GMF) to oversee the water supply assets delivered by the project; and

The GMF thereafter provides an official **point of contact** between government officers and the community.

Notwithstanding the apparent success of the CAP process, GMF performance remains variable throughout Timor Leste. Several studies have found that only a minority of water supply systems remain functional a year after commissioning, and that the community-based management model has significant limitations in the Timor Leste context[[37]](#footnote-37). BESIK’s ACR reports a more encouraging level of functionality, but also shows that GMF generally remain challenged in terms of core functions such as revenue collection and other determinants of long-term viability. This suggests that while the CAP process shows promise as a way to strengthen community ownership and action in the initial/mobilisation phase, it is not a panacea, and must be supported with a comprehensive and protracted array of investments in capacity building, awareness-raising of recurrent costs, operations and maintenance planning, spare parts supply chain reinforcement, and a more enabling policy environment.

As noted above, a major area for further consolidation relates to the capacity of GMFs to undertake O&M on a sustainable basis (particularly for larger systems); and for SAS to be able to respond to maintenance needs that are escalated by the GMF. Government resources for O&M are currently limited, and GMF’s capacity to respond to more than minor issues is challenged. The demand for new water supplies exceeds the capacity of SAS to maintain existing investments. This experience suggests that community engagements are critical in the initial/mobilisation phases of an intervention, but that the enabling environment for community-led initiatives to endure in the medium term also needs to be established.

Lesson

1. Government-led community consultation processes embodied in CAP help to foster inclusion and ownership of community projects. Such processes should be carried out within a dedicated structure to foster sustainability.
2. Participatory engagement processes (such as CAP) strengthen initial community engagements, but on their own do not assure sustainability.

There could be value in AusAID considering using the CAP process in support of PNDS projects. Perversely, there is a risk that PNDS could unwittingly erode the value of the CAP process promoted by BESIK in establishing GMFs if communities perceive that PNDS funds can be used to ‘rehabilitate’ water systems that have not been adequately maintained by GMFs. This would effectively create a perverse incentive for GMFs to cease revenue collection and maintenance works. A further risk relates to confusion that could arise if there are different and concurrent funding structures operating at village level.

***Community-led Total Sanitation***

As discussed in Section 3.2, BESIK worked with the MoH and a range of partner NGOs to pilot various interpretations of CLTS. Indicative of the degree of acceptance of the approach was a statement by the Director of DNSSB:

“*CLTS is our main mechanism for engaging rural communities in sanitation”.*

As noted previously, the outcome of BESIK’s ‘action-learning’ approach to customising CLTS to the Timor Leste context was ‘PAKSI’—which athough still evolving[[38]](#footnote-38), appears relatively successful in ‘branding’ a local identity on CLTS. This ‘localisation’ appears to have built awareness and ownership within MoH and DNSSB of the process, and there seems to be growing commitment for GoTL to take the approach forward. PAKSI is structured for a longer-term and more integrated engagement between GoTL staff and communities than is the norm with CLTS. MoH staff stated:

“*PAKSI is still a pilot, but it seems to be more successful than CLTS…which is led by NGOs that tend to come and go once a community achieves ODF”*.

The evaluation team noted widespread support for the approach by both MoH and DNSSB:

“*The disadvantage of CLTS was lack of coordination with government and limited community engagement. Once ODF was achieved there was often regression because of lack of government follow-up. PAKSI addresses these issues.*”

Notwithstanding BESIK’s apparent early success in piloting and building ownership for CLTS/PAKSI among GoTL stakeholders, the wider purpose of community engagement in sanitation remains concerning. That is, irrespective of the merits of CLTS/PAKSI in generating early awareness and motivating fast changes at household level, the extent of regression from ODF and the difficulty of moving households up the ‘sanitation ladder’ persist as the key challenges. This suggests that a more comprehensive program of support to communities and households, that addresses both demand-side and supply-side factors in concert is required to achieve sustainable change.

Lesson

1. Investments in both supply-side and demand-side factors are necessary to achieve meaningful and sustainable behaviour change in household sanitation.

***PSFs and the KUBASA***

In the hygiene promotion sub-sector, BESIK has supported the GoTL’s integrated community health services (SISCa); and in particular the work of PSFs in promoting household environmental health (KUBASA). Investments by the program have included a cascade of training[[39]](#footnote-39), financial resources and behaviour change communication (BCC) materials (including creative materials such as quality film and music resources).

The program’s support was valued by MoH staff, but the BESIK ACR indicated that there was variable success in effecting changes in behaviour at household level. During this evaluation, PSFs indicated that only around two out of ten hygiene plans that they negotiated with households led to observable changes in behaviour. The challenges may be a function of the pragmatic limitation of a volunteer workforce to effect important changes in communities; but are also likely a function of the recognised fact that hygiene behaviour change is a profoundly challenging domain.

Of importance is the need for AusAID to ensure coherence between the approach taken by BESIK II to hygiene promotion, and the agency’s messages and strategies more broadly in the health sector. Without adequate coordination, there is a clear risk of working at cross-purposes. This is especially important at the current time with AusAID undertaking a comprehensive design of the health sector engagement. Will AusAID work to address identified particular/critical issues across the health sector, or engage comprehensively/vertically within a defined sub-sector priority? Irrespective, what will be the linkages between the health sector initiative and the hygiene and sanitation work undertaken by BESIK II?

Lesson

1. AusAID should clearly explicate points of interface across the program portfolio, align messages and approaches, and define coordination mechanisms.

What suggests that BESIK appropriately balanced service delivery and institutional strengthening? What can be learnt for other programs?

**Relative strengths & opportunities:**

🗹 A pragmatic balance was achieved between direct investments in community infrastructure and services, and institutional strengthening.

🗹 Engagement in direct delivery provided insights to inform institutional strengthening work.

**Relative weaknesses & contextual challenges:**

🗷 In the absence of a guiding conceptual framework, the balance between direct delivery and institutional strengthening was continent on the quality of management judgements.

🗷 Direct investments in community infrastructure prior to existence of adequate arrangements that assure their maintenance presents an investment risk to AusAID.

It is a pragmatic reality that development programs such as BESIK encounter a tension between the political/humanitarian need to deliver rapid solutions that improve the availability and accessibility of infrastructure and services to citizens; and the need to generate lasting solutions built on sustainable local capacity. Interventions in Timor Leste have alternately been criticised for drawing on foreign expertise to achieve the former approach; or emphasising the latter approach with little tangible impact realised at community level.

During this review, GoTL stakeholders highlighted this tension by emphasising both priorities. For example, a Director General stated:

*“Building human resource capacity is very important. Significant resources should be invested in this…We need to invest today for the skills that we’ll need in 5 – 10 years”.*

While a DNSA manager stated:

*“The focus of BESIK is too broad. Sometimes BESIK cannot focus enough on water and sanitation because of the wider development agenda…it’s my view that we don’t need advisers so much as operational engineers that can be placed in the field”.*

Notwithstanding the obvious tension and diversity of perspectives, we formed the view that BESIK had achieved a reasonable balance between the two demands. As discussed above, BESIK delivered a comprehensive range of capacity development interventions at multiple levels in the sector; while implementing significant direct investments in WASH at community level—most notably water supplies developed through WSI funding. In many cases, these direct investments were in locations that were under-served or technically challenging; and hence would have likely remained under-served for many years without external assistance. Arguably an unintended benefit of this direct engagement was that BESIK was able to develop a nuanced appreciation for human resource/skill gaps, thereby enabling targeted training and mentoring to be delivered. Further, SAS staff informed us that to some extent there had been a ‘cross-flow’ of capacity building from observing the implementation of WSI-funded water system developments in their areas; and from sharing an office with program staff.

While we noted an appropriate balance between the two development agenda (i.e. direct delivery *versus* institutional strengthening), it was evident that there was no conceptual framework in place to guide decisions in relation to achieving this balance. In the case of BESIK, a strong technical and management team delivered this balanced; which was fortuitous. Other initiatives facing this tension would be advised to draw on experiences from BESIK to develop a decision framework that makes the achievement of the balance more purposeful.

A risk that should be acknowledged with respect to BESIK’s approach, and particularly with regard to the WSI infrastructure investments, is that the current lack of adequate management arrangements to support service delivery and O&M in Timor-Leste are likely to undermine the performance and on-going functionality of water systems—especially the larger pumped systems. Hence short-term wins may become invisible in the medium-term. A suggestion for addressing this dilemma is for BESIK II to focus explicitly on adopting such sites as a learning focus for the development of improved service delivery and O&M arrangements.

Lesson

1. The mix of direct engagement and institutional strengthening adopted by BESIK could provide a template for other AusAID initiatives aiming to strengthen institutional performance while meeting immediate/urgent community needs.
2. AusAID initiatives required to achieve a balance between institutional strengthening and direct service delivery should draw on the experience of BESIK to develop a decision framework to make the pursuit of the balance more purposeful.
3. Infrastructure investments should only be supported in situations were there is a clear commitment and mechanism to enable maintenance on a sustainable basis.

## Appendix A: Review Schedule

|  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
| Date | Place | Stakeholder | # female | # male |
|  |  |  |  |  |
| 7-Aug | Dili | AusAID | 2 | 1 |
| 7-Aug | Dili | DG Electricity, Water & Urbanisation |  | 1 |
| 7-Aug | Dili | BESIK delivery team | 2 | 4 |
| 8-Aug | Dili | DNSA |  | 4 |
| 8-Aug | Dili | DNSSB |  | 1 |
| 8-Aug | Dili | MoI Corporate Services & Finance |  | 1 |
| 8-Aug | Dili | Assert (disabled persons organisation) |  | 2 |
| 9-Aug | Dili | DNSC | 3 | 2 |
| 9-Aug | Dili | DG SATM |  | 1 |
| 9-Aug | Dili | Director of Planning & External Relations SATM |  | 1 |
| 9-Aug | Dili | Directorate of Water Resource Managment |  | 2 |
| 10-Aug | Dili | MoE, Infrastructure Unit |  | 2 |
| 10-Aug | Dili | MoH, Directorate of Finance |  | 1 |
| 10-Aug | Dili | Secretary of State, DNSA |  | 1 |
| 10-Aug | Dili | NGO sector | 1 | 8 |
| 10-Aug | Dili | Directors DNSA and DNSSB |  | 2 |
| 13-Aug | Mautara aldeia | Beneficiaries; NGO; PSF; SDF | 1 | 4 |
| 13-Aug | Mautara aldeia | LA intervies | 7 | 1 |
| 13-Aug | Paralentu | Beneficiaries; NGO; PSF; SDF | 13 | 15 |
| 13-Aug | Luarai aldeia | GMF (large group, 2 vocal); DTO |  | 3 |
| 13-Aug | Soleresi aldeia | Beneficiaries; NGO; PSF; SDF | 15 | 12 |
| 13-Aug | Lautem | SAS manager, DTO, CDO |  | 3 |
| 13-Aug | Lautem | LA interview with SDFs | 1 | 6 |
| 13-Aug | Lautem | DHS Director and DPHO |  | 2 |
| 14-Aug | Laga | SD administration, GMF, SDFs | 3 | 14 |
| 14-Aug | Laga | CLTS community | 2 | 6 |
| 14-Aug | Venilale | DHS Director, DPHO, Environmental health officer | 1 | 2 |
| 14-Aug | Venilale | PAKSI female beneficiaries; PSF; NGO | 11 |  |
| 14-Aug | Baucau | SAS manager, DTO, CDO, CWSDO |  | 4 |
| 14-Aug | Baucau | SDFs | 2 | 6 |
| 14-Aug | Talitu | GMF | 2 | 6 |
| 16-Aug | Talitu | Female GMF treasurer | 1 |  |
| 16-Aug | Leubreudo | PLAN CLTS location | 3 | 3 |
| 16-Aug | Aileu | SAS: Urban maintenance; former SAS Manager |  | 2 |
| 16-Aug | Aileu | SDFs |  | 1 |
| 16-Aug | Aileu | DHS: DHO and Vice Chief |  | 2 |
| 16-Aug | Liquica | Prolink: Marcos Da Silva Ramos |  | 2 |
| 17-Aug | Metazau Succo | GMF; CLTS+I beneficiaries; sanitation marketing | 5 | 20 |
| 17-Aug | Metazau Succo | Village walkaround to sanitaiton sites |  | 5 |
| 17-Aug | Metazau Succo | Women's representatives | 5 |  |
| 17-Aug | Liquica | District Administrator |  | 1 |
| 17-Aug | Liquica | DTO and SDF | 2 | 1 |
| 17-Aug | Liquica | DHS Director |  | 1 |
| 17-Aug | Dili | Jeff Prime, AusAID Rural Development |  | 1 |
| 20-Aug | Dili | Jenny Asman, AusAID PFM Adviser | 1 |  |
| 20-Aug | Dili | Cameron; AusAID Governance Manager |  | 1 |
| 20-Aug | Dili | WASH Forum | 3 | 4 |
| 21-Aug | Dili | Education Adviser and Manager, AusAID |  | 2 |
| 21-Aug | Dili | SEPI | 2 | 1 |
| 21-Aug | Dili | Health Director, AusAID | 1 |  |
| 22-Aug |  |  |  |  |
|  |  |  | 89 | 165 |
|  |  |  | 35% | 65% |

## Appendix B: Questions Guide

Issues defined in the ToR were framed as hypotheses to be tested during the evaluation. A limited set of initial open-ended questions are proposed to open dialogue on the issues with stakeholders. Questions are phrased from a ‘strengths-based’ perspective.

Priorities for the evaluation defined in the ToR that are focussed on BESIK II include:

* Assessment of **gender and equity** mainstreaming approaches
* Assessment of evidence of effectiveness of **sanitation models** that have been piloted
* Review of the role of BESIK in **sector coordination**, policy development and transition to government leadership

Priorities for the evaluation defined in the ToR that are focussed on other AusAID programs in Timor Leste include:

* Assessment of **capacity development** methods and success factors
* Assessment of **community engagement** processes with a view to informing community engagement for the National Program for Suco Development (NPSD)
* Review of the balance between **service delivery and institutional strengthening** to inform strategies relevant to improving service delivery in the health and education sectors

### Program improvements for BESIK II:

* Assessment of gender and equity mainstreaming approaches
  + ***Hypothesis:*** *Gender and equity mainstreaming approaches employed within BESIK were appropriate and successful*
    - **What was unique about the way that BESIK achieved gender and equity outcomes?**
    - **How might BESIK’s approaches to improving gender and disability equity be refined or extended for other service delivery programs?**
    - **How might it be possible to strengthen gender equality efforts focused at an institutional level?**
    - **To what extent do you believe changes in women’s participation represents or has led to wider changes in gender equality?**
* Assessment of evidence of effectiveness of sanitation models that have been piloted
  + ***Hypothesis:*** *Evidence gathered in relation to various sanitation models piloted under BESIK is meaningful and reliable*
    - **What leads you to believe that people have confidence in the various sanitation models piloted?**
    - **What do you see as the key factors impacting on the success or otherwise of the sanitation approaches piloted? Based on what evidence?**
    - **What are your views on if and how subsidies for sanitation can be implemented in conjunction with CLTS? Why?**
* Review of the role of BESIK in sector coordination, policy development and transition to government leadership
  + ***Hypothesis:*** *The experience of BESIK in developing a sector and fostering GoTL leadership of the sector has generalizable qualities*
    - **What stands out to you about the way that BESIK influenced changes in the WASH sector?**
    - **What have you observed about the way that BESIK influenced changes in the WASH sector that may support development in other sectors?**

### Program improvements for other initiatives:

* Assessment of capacity development methods and success factors
  + ***Hypothesis:*** *capacity development methods used in BESIK successfully increased the performance of individuals and teams on a sustainable basis*
    - **What evidence suggests that performance has improved among individuals and also at an institutional level?**
    - **What gives you confidence that the improved performance can be sustained?**
    - **What factors do you believe have most significantly influenced performance enhancements at individual and institutional level?**
* Assessment of community engagement processes
  + ***Hypothesis:*** *community engagement processes employed in BESIK successfully mobilised individuals and groups for collective action*
    - **What have you seen that suggests that communities are more engaged in WASH action due to the influence of BESIK?**
    - **Which particular processes particularly motivated community action?**
    - **How successful were strategies to change women’s and men’s attitudes to women’s involvement in WASH?**
    - **What gives you confidence that new community management structures and processes can be sustained?**
    - **Which community engagement processes from BESIK do you believe could be successful in other community development work?**
    - **What have you seen are useful ways to mobilise community action?**
* Review of the balance between service delivery and institutional strengthening to inform strategies relevant to improving service delivery in the health and education sectors
  + ***Hypothesis:*** *Approaches to improving the standard of local service delivery developed under BESIK are applicable in the health and education sectors*
    - **To what extent did people feel that there were sufficient improvements in the quality of WASH services during the program?**
    - **What have you seen that suggests enough was done by BESIK to position institutions to provide WASH services on an enduring basis?**
    - **To what extent did working on service delivery inform institutional strengthening priorities and approaches?**
    - **What leads you to believe that improvements to other local service delivery could be achieved using approaches taken under BESIK?**
    - **What do you believe are key differences between service delivery in WASH and service delivery in health and education?**

## Appendix C: Gender Framework

The following framework was developed based on literature on the gender outcomes of WASH programs Carrard et al., 2012 forthcoming). It may be used as the basis for considering how gender equality outcomes and their measurement might be approached in future.

|  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |
|  | **Private sphere**  *Household and family networks* | **Public arena** | |
| Local public arena  *Social and community networks* | Broader public arena  *Governance institutions and beyond* |
| **Changes in self/individuals**  *Includes changes for women or men*  *Includes changes relating to roles as well as self-perception* | Changes in roles and self-perceptions within the private sphere, related to family networks and domestic roles and responsibilities | Changes in roles and self-perceptions within the local public arena including social networks, community and local government institutions etc. | Changes in roles and self-perceptions within the broader public arena including national and sub-national government institutions, medium to large scale private sector actors etc. |
| **Changes in relationships**  *Includes changes in relationships between women/men and within gender groups* | Changes in relationships within the private sphere, related to family networks and domestic roles and responsibilities | Changes in relationships within the local public arena including social networks, community and local government institutions etc. | Changes in relationships within the broader public arena including national and sub-national government institutions, medium to large scale private sector actors etc. |

1. Priority recommendations are highlighted **bold**. [↑](#footnote-ref-1)
2. National directorates for water (DNSA), sanitation (DNSSB) and water resources (DNCQA). N.B. Following this evaluation the Ministry’s name was changed from the Ministry of Infrastructure (MoI) to the Ministry of Public Works (MPW). [↑](#footnote-ref-2)
3. National directorate for community health (DNSC) [↑](#footnote-ref-3)
4. UNICEF/WHO Joint Monitoring Program 2010 [↑](#footnote-ref-4)
5. Refer to Working Paper 1: East Timor, Independent Evaluation of Australian Aid to Water Supply and Sanitation Service Delivery in East Timor and Indonesia, December 2009. [↑](#footnote-ref-5)
6. AusAID completed a comprehensive in-house design process in December 2011 to determine the priorities and approach for the next phase of support to RWASH (to be called BESIK II). Future investments will build on relationships, policy frameworks, and service delivery approaches developed under the current phase with additional investment in budget support for service delivery (water supply operations and maintenance (O & M), district sanitation and hygiene promotion, establishment of a network of district-based sanitarians, market-based interventions for sanitation products and mass media hygiene promotion campaigns) and management systems at the district and central levels of government. [↑](#footnote-ref-6)
7. In the Australian Governments’ strategy for delivering effective aid, increasing access to safe water and sanitation is the first core objective under the strategic goal of ‘Saving lives’. In Timor-Leste, Australia’s commitment to supporting the RWASH sector is explicit in AusAID’s Timor-Leste Country Strategy and in the Strategic Planning Agreement for Development (SPAD) signed by AusAID and the GoTL. The SPAD commits Australia to work with GoTL to reach rural WASH targets detailed in the Timor-Leste Strategic Development Plan (2011-30). [↑](#footnote-ref-7)
8. In practice this meant: i) taking into account gender in the sampling; ii) seeking to ensure (and recording) the gender balance of evaluation stakeholders; iii) setting up appropriate dynamics to ensure that both women’s and men’s views were heard, including speaking with women and men separately and considering the appropriateness of the timing and location of meetings; iv) using a conceptual framework to inform assessment of gender equality outcomes (see Appendix C). [↑](#footnote-ref-8)
9. Almost three weeks in-country rather than the two-week ICR mission model typically adopted by AusAID. [↑](#footnote-ref-9)
10. In the case of PFM issues within the MoH, BESIK II should coordinate with AusAID’s Health Sector Strategic Plan Support Program (HSSP-SP) which is addressing PFM issues and planning challenges more broadly. [↑](#footnote-ref-10)
11. Water resources and quality may be better located under different ministerial functions, such as agriculture or natural resources. [↑](#footnote-ref-11)
12. Self-evidently, quality data must be complemented by adequate capacity and budget within DNSA to plan new system developments and to support operation and maintenance of WASH assets. [↑](#footnote-ref-12)
13. The first WASH forum was held on 31 July 2009 at WaterAid. [↑](#footnote-ref-13)
14. It was noted that NGOs participate on a voluntary basis, and there are NGOs (including some accessing AusAID funding through the ANCP) that do not participate [↑](#footnote-ref-14)
15. The Director of DNSSB stated:“*BESIK introduced the idea of the Sanitation Working Group which meets monthly. BESIK convenes the meetings and supports us by taking minutes.*” [↑](#footnote-ref-15)
16. The evaluation team was advised of a Prime Ministerial despatch in 2012 stating that PDD projects should follow CAP and other SAS processes, but knowledge of this seemed limited, and the legal instruments by which this should be implemented within a civil law system were unclear. [↑](#footnote-ref-16)
17. The Gender Adviser was engaged full time for two years from June 2009 to June 2012, but was otherwise part-time. [↑](#footnote-ref-17)
18. *“Before, gender equality didn’t exist…it is hard in our culture. For the first time we are encouraging women, separate women and men, and then bringing them together. Women’s participation in GMFs is key [to success]. Now our staff see that women can do this job, whereas before, they thought only men could do it*.” [↑](#footnote-ref-18)
19. It is believed that a working group with shared responsibilities may have greater influence than an individual GFP. [↑](#footnote-ref-19)
20. Sub-district facilitators represent a cadre of government staff that BESIK was integrally involved in the concept, recruitment and training of, and that represent a key achievement of the program since they provide a strengthened interface between government and community. [↑](#footnote-ref-20)
21. A capacity development assessment conducted regarding BESIK community development officer perceptions of male and female SDF skills demonstrated that female SDFs need particular additional support in site supervision, conflict resolution during CAP processes, preparing monthly reports, and facilitating negotiations between GMFs and contractors. [↑](#footnote-ref-21)
22. CAP is a participatory community planning process focussed on establishing ownership of community WASH infrastructure and an institutional structure to manage, operate and maintain services. [↑](#footnote-ref-22)
23. PAKSI is a local variant of Community Led Total Sanitation (CLTS) developed and piloted by BESIK with ownership by MoH. The approach draws on the principles of CLTS but seeks to foster more protracted engagement between communities and the government. [↑](#footnote-ref-23)
24. BESIK’s approach so far has included research, a study tour and inclusion of women’s hygiene needs in the National Basic Sanitation Policy and associated guidelines and PAKSI curriculum sanitation. Whilst these are sound initial steps, BESIK has recognised that further efforts are needed to negotiate this sensitive topic and meet women’s needs in this area. [↑](#footnote-ref-24)
25. This was a methodological decision rather than an oversight, owing to the timeframe within which gender impacts are borne out. [↑](#footnote-ref-25)
26. Interestingly, increased school attendance was not identified as an outcome during the ICR. In general, beneficiaries stated that even though girls collected water (prior to there being a water system) this did not affect their school attendance as the latter was prioritised over collecting water. [↑](#footnote-ref-26)
27. Notwithstanding the absence of ‘research architecture’, BESIK arguably accrued a stronger evidence base than any comparable program. A large amount of performance data was compiled, and focussed reviews were conducted, including an extensive survey that (when analysed) should shed light on sanitation behaviour in Timor Leste. [↑](#footnote-ref-27)
28. For instance, the ACR puts forward CLTS + I as the ‘most effective’, with an 88% success rate in achieving ODF, however this variation was purposefully undertaken in communities with already high coverage as a baseline and conducive conditions, which is not directly comparable given different baselines and sample frames for other variations. [↑](#footnote-ref-28)
29. The use of an output-based aid model providing a ‘rebate’ to women upon verification of a newly installed toilet to a specified standard has been successfully implemented in Southern Vietnam and may be a useful model to explore to promote upgrading. The approach provided a $20 rebate to households following installation of a toilet and septic tank, of a value of about $100.The advantages of the model are incentivising sanitation market development, ensuring quality of design and construction, providing an incentive for households to invest and providing women with some leverage to support household decisions to invest. This model is currently being taken to scale in Vietnam. [↑](#footnote-ref-29)
30. i.e. multiple actors delivering value along the supply chain versus individual integrated actors concentrating value. [↑](#footnote-ref-30)
31. Whilst it is acknowledged that research shows communities respond best with choice of options is purposefully limited, the main concern was that an adequate range of dry toilet options were presented in communities where water access is problematic (either all the time or seasonally). In such communities may be less relevant to offer pour-flush designs, hence the range of options offered can still be small [↑](#footnote-ref-31)
32. Evidence collected by BESIK through marketing research. [↑](#footnote-ref-32)
33. World Vision have been undertaking a trial of fossa alterna composting toilets in Aileu (or which can be developed as arborloos) which should also be reviewed for wider application if successful. [↑](#footnote-ref-33)
34. Notwithstanding that 16 scholarships represented a significant proportion of DNSA staff. [↑](#footnote-ref-34)
35. *Tarabandu* is a traditional religious ceremony that makes a place or natural asset sacred and carries a curse for anyone that does not comply with the bylaws of the tarabandu. [↑](#footnote-ref-35)
36. There was notable success in improving gender equality in participation through the use of quotas. [↑](#footnote-ref-36)
37. Willetts, J. (2012) *A service delivery approach for rural water supply in Timor-Leste: Institutional options and strategy*. Prepared by Institute for Sustainable Futures, University of Technology Sydney for BESIK (Timor-Leste Rural Water Supply and Sanitation Program), March 2012 [↑](#footnote-ref-37)
38. PAKSI has been piloted in three districts over five months. [↑](#footnote-ref-38)
39. MoH staff advised the ICR team that the training cascade had ceased at district level, and that there was an expectation that training of sub-district PSFs would continue. [↑](#footnote-ref-39)