**Investment Design Title: Building Community Engagement in PNG Program (BCEP)**

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**Concept approved by: Concept endorsed by AGB:***Bruce Davis, High Commissioner, Port Moresby*3 March 2020 *Gerald Thomson, FAS Pacific Bilateral* (PAGP Deconstruction Concept)

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**Acronyms**

|  |  |
| --- | --- |
| ABCID | ABC International Development |
| AHC | Australian High Commission  |
| ANGO  | Australian Non-Government Organization |
| BCEP | Building Citizen Engagement in PNG  |
| CFC | Coalitions For Change |
| CIMC | Consultative Implementation and Monitoring Committee |
| CPP | The Church Partnership Program |
| CSO | Civil Society Organization |
| CSEP | Comprehensive strategic and economic partnership  |
| DCP | Decentralisation and Citizen Participation |
| DFAT | Department of Foriegn Affairs and Trade  |
| DfCDR | Department for Community Development and Religion |
| DIRD | Department of Implementation and rural development  |
| DLP | Developmental Leadership Program |
| DNPM | Department of National Planning and Management |
| DSIP | District Services Improvement Program |
| GESI | Gender Equality and Social Inclusion |
| GoA | Government of Australia |
| GoPNG | Government Of Papua New Guinea |
| ICAC | Independent Commission Against Commission  |
| INGO | International Non-Government Organisation  |
| JAS | Justice Accountability and Security (AHC) |
| LLG | Local Level Governments  |
| MDI | Media Development Program  |
| MEL | Monitoring, Evaluation and Learning |
| MC | Managing Contractor |
| MIS | Management Information System |
| NGO | Non-government organisation |
| NSA | Non-State Actor  |
| PAF | Performance Assessment Framework |
| PHA | Provincial Health Authorities  |
| PWD | People with Disabilities |
| QAG | Quality Assurance Group |
| QTAG | Quality Technical and Assurance Group |
| SIP  | Service Improvement Program  |
| ToC | Theory of Change |
| VFM | Value for Money  |
| WASH  | Water Sanitation and Health  |

**Glossary of key concepts**

|  |  |
| --- | --- |
| **Concept** | **Definition applied in this design document** |
| **Adaptive management** | A systematic management approach for responding to situations of high uncertainty and rapid change. The approach provides an alternative to either giving up trying to plan in such situations, or trying to use tools and processes intended for more well understood, stable and predictable contexts. The management approach goes beyond just changing the details of ***how*** activities are implemented, to include changes to the ***types*** of activities, the ***strategies*** and even the ***intended outcomes*** and how the ***theory of change*** is understood. It uses an iterative process of adaptation that is informed by indicative theories of change and contributes to revising them. Collaboration and learning are essential features for success.[[1]](#footnote-1)  |
| **Coalitions for Change** | The core of the approach for implementing “issues-based projects” under Component 1. Coalitions bring together sufficiently powerful actors around a common understanding of a problem to explore and test approaches to solve the problem. Successfully facilitating coalitions is difficult – they do not exist naturally, and there is no set recipe for success. However, three basic ingredients are essential: first, choosing the right partners to create a powerful coalition; second, effective coordination once the coalition is formed; and third, the provision of effective support for the delivery of influential outputs. Each of these functions needs to be informed by a deep and ongoing analysis of the politics and power around any given issue. (See section E.1) |
| **Demand-side initiatives** | Broad term for citizen-led initiatives for engaging with, and holding to account, the suppliers of public goods and services (including the government executive and bureaucracy, and its delegated suppliers).  |
| **Gender Sensitive** | Gender sensitive approaches respond to the specific needs of individuals based on their gender. |
| **Gender Transformative**  | A gender transformative approach is one that addresses the root causes of gender inequality by transforming unequal gender norms, and aims to change structural power and social relations. |
| **Gender Continuum** | A continuum**[[2]](#footnote-2)** of development approaches that move from ‘gender negative’ at one end, where work actually reinforces damaging stereotypes, to ‘gender transformative’ at the other end, where programmes seek to change the socio-cultural and economic structures and norms which reinforce and perpetuate gender inequalities (for application of this tool on BCEP see Section F.2).This chart visuals a 'gender continuum' depicting a series of development approaches which move from ‘gender negative’, where work actually reinforces damaging stereotypes, to ‘gender transformative’ where programmes seek to change the socio-cultural and economic structures and norms which reinforce and perpetuate gender inequalities.  |
| **Intersectionality** | Intersectionalityrefers to the interconnections between various social variables such as gender, ethnicity, class, age, and sexuality, that in combination create structures and systems of discrimination or disadvantage.  |
| **Non-state Actors** | Broad term used to cover all organisations formed on a voluntary basis, independent of the State, including: non-governmental organizations (NGOs), civil society organizations (CSO) or networks, research or academic institutions, community or faith-based organizations, media outlets[[3]](#footnote-3), worker representative bodies (eg. trade unions), private sector organisations and business associations (eg. Chambers of commerce). |
| **Social accountability** | A process in which informed citizens hold governments to account for delivering quality public services and resources. Social accountability refers specifically to the relationship between those who manage and provide public services (for example, health or education) and citizens who use these services. Social accountability is different from what are defined as ‘higher level’ accountability relationships that focus on national level policy making or election cycles. Social accountability is therefore locally experienced: it is a relationship that is most relevant to the daily life of citizens at the community level who are concerned with getting access to local government officials, monitoring local budget spending and discussing the quality of services.Those supporting social accountability believe that when citizens engage with service providers – for example, through participating in planning local services, attending public meetings to improve quality or involvement in oversight bodies – their views are more likely to be heard and to influence government policy and practice leading to better quality services. Critics of social accountability however point to an ‘accountability trap’ in which the contribution to improved services remains localised and short-lived if social accountability initiatives are not part of a more strategic intervention in policy making[[4]](#footnote-4). |
| **Social Norms** | Social norms are rules of conduct or models of behaviour expected by a society or social group. These are rooted in customs, traditions, and value systems that develop and change over time. Social norms do not necessarily uphold ethical, fair, or inclusive values or behaviour. |
| **Supply-side initiatives** | Broad term denoting initiatives to strengthen institutions that supply public goods and services. This includes initiatives in social sectors (eg health, education, water etc) economic sectors (eg business regulations) as well as support for political and bureaucratic accountability mechanisms (eg Electoral Commission, Ombudsman, Auditor General etc). |
| **Thinking and Working Politically** | An approach to international development, particularly in relation to governance work, that recognises that effective development requires programing that does more than simply understand the political realities on the ground but is able to effectively engage with these realities to achieve tangible outcomes. The original term “Thinking and working politically” was developed by group of leading development practitioners that formed a Community of Practice in Delhi in 2013 to develop this approach[[5]](#footnote-5). The approach has been continuously developed into a number of practice variations[[6]](#footnote-6) and successfully applied on DFAT programs, particularly Coalitions for Change in the Philippines and the Pacific Leadership Development Program. Across the various strands of practice, Rogers and Macfarlan (2020) identify four common elements of a Thinking and Working Politically approach: * Attention to political analysis and engagement at multiple levels
* Adaptation to local conditions and local ownership
* Framing work around problem solving
* Adaptation to changing conditions and new information
 |

1. **Executive Summary**

**A.1 Strategic Context**

**Australia and Papua New Guinea recently renewed their shared commitment to strengthening PNG’s growth as a stable and secure democracy.** Papua New Guinea (PNG) has developed its own form of democracy since Independence, but long-standing governance challenges remain and have been exacerbated by recent developments in the domestic and international spheres. The most pressing are PNG’s current public health crisis triggered by the global Covid-19 pandemic and the country’s worsening macro-economic position, both of which Australia is supporting PNG to address (see sections B and C).

**Yet, amid these immediate challenges, positive domestic trends are also emerging, presenting new opportunities for addressing the root causes of PNG’s governance problems**. The Marape Government has made commitments to combat corruption. The PNG [*Medium Term Development Plan III* (*MTDP III*)](https://pacificdata.org/data/dataset/medium-term-development-plan-iii-2018-2022-volume-1e5684104-d2a9-4feb-a637-f3db49278f06) places good governance centre-stage. A small but influential urban middle-class and an increasingly youthful population are eager for change (section B.1). The **Building Community Engagement in PNG Program** (**BCEP**) will grasp these opportunities by widening participation in solving development problems – it will contribute to the longer-term process of nation and state building.

**The concept of a “social contract” between state and citizen is foreign to most in PNG.** In a fragmented society, many PNG policy makers are accountable to, and inclusive of, only *a narrow segment of the population*, usually those with whom they share clan and kin ties. As a result, policies have contributed to narrow and unequal economic growth that fuels instability. It also results in weak service delivery and some of poorest human development outcomes in the Pacific (section B.1).

**PNG’s formal accountability institutions operate but from a position of weakness—practical problem solving can have impact.** Confronting corruption head-on or seeking to achieve system-wide reforms is likely to yield limited returns. Some Civil Society Organisations (CSO’s) have, however, started to make headway with approaches that solve PNG citizens’ real-life problems in a way that builds in greater transparency (section B.2). These collective action approaches, bringing together different interests to solve a shared problem, align with the international evidence that “coalitions for change” are needed to tackle deep-seated governance issues of the kind confronting PNG. Governance programming must move beyond being overly reliant on technical capacity building and adopt more politically informed approaches to practical problem solving (section B.3).

**Harmful gender norms** **underpin an inequality that extends deep into PNG’s formal and informal institutions.** PNG has gone backward in terms of the number of women in parliament, going from four elected in 2012 to none in 2017, making the country one of three in the world with no women in parliament. Women are rarely involved in national, provincial, district or village level decision making. A significant consequence of, and contributor to, the inequality is the high level of violence against women and girls (section B.1).

**BCEP strongly aligns with the *PNG-Australia Comprehensive Strategic Economic Partnership (CSEP)***

**BCEP supports three objectives of the CSEP.** The emphasis on collective action, coalitions and establishing new gender norms is strongly aligned with Pillar 1: *Strong Democracies and Stable Future*. By facilitating policy dialogue between private and civil sector actors and decision-makers the program will support the *Economic Partnership for Prosperity.* The focus on solving real-life development problems and building the transparency and accountability of PNG’s institutions will contribute to *Social and Human Development*. The program will also support the aims of *Partnerships for recovery: Australia’s COVID-19 Development Response*, by helping to promote better government understanding of their citizen’s needs.

**DFAT’s past support for governance programs in PNG ideally places it to forge links between actors and to drive the adoption of innovative approaches to increasing accountability.** For example, the Media Development Program (MDI) has worked with a relatively free media and a capable public broadcaster. The Church Partnership Program (CPP) has supported PNG’s churches, which have wide reach and high legitimacy. Whilst PNG is relatively underserved by accountability CSOs there has been innovation in social accountability, including by CARE International and the Budget Tracking Initiative. DFAT also continues to support the Department of Implementation and Rural Development (DIRD) to make funding flows more transparent. Taken together, this large pre-existing Australian investment provides a platform for future programming.

**BCEP adds value to the overall Australia-PNG development cooperation program**

**The BCEP primarily works with NSAs on the “demand-side” but as the need or opportunity to promote citizen-government engagement arises, those NSAs will be encouraged to work with other parts of the Australia-PNG development cooperation program that are supporting initiatives on the “supply-side” (see glossary).** In this way, BCEP will help maximise returns from DFAT’s broad supply-side work, particularly at the sub-national level.

**The Program’s focus on working with PNG citizen groups and coalitions fills a gap in other development assistance to accountability.** In support of the Marape government’s commitment to tackle corruption, a number of donors are providing discrete programs of technical support to formal accountability institutions. The European Union is providing one of the largest programs of support to help PNG set up an Independent Commission against Corruption (ICAC). NSAs supported through BCEP will link with and add value to these initiatives enhancing the overall contribution towards sustainable change in PNG’s accountability landscape.

**BCEP is not a “traditional” accountability demand-side program**

**BCEP is seeking to positively influence accountability and governance but not through blunt approaches in which NGOs make strident public demands for less corruption or better performance (as occurs in some “demand-side” international development work)**. In PNG, the language of better governance and accountability generally meets with a negative reaction particularly when associated with foreign funding. Moreover, substantial international evidence[[7]](#footnote-7) shows that such confrontational approaches are often counter-productive. Far more effective are approaches that build constructive engagement between communities and government and its delegates through a common focus on addressing tangible development problems. These approaches will be effective if and when they:

* Embed greater transparency and accountability as part of building improved community-government relations.
* Strengthen community-government links in a way that changes the balance of power so that decision-makers are incentivised to explain their policies and account for their actions.
* Bring women and other marginalised groups into decision-making processes in ways that enables PNG to draw on the talents of all its citizens.

As a part of building community engagement with government, BCEP will strengthen links between social groups that do not normally or constructively interact with each other, despite shared interests. Building fresh connections is particularly valuable in the context of PNG’s fragmented society: this is a central element of program’s strategy to contribute to sustainable long-term change.

**A.2 Goal and Outcomes**

**The BCEP goal is *to strengthen citizen-government engagement for improved service delivery and provision of public goods*.** BCEP’s central governance issue is the weak interaction between state and non-state actors in the design and implementation of policy. By tackling issues on which elites and less powerful actors have interests in common – usually practical improvements to how government provides services – BCEP will make a direct difference to people’s lives. In doing so it will demonstrate how collective action and coalitions can change how PNG is governed. Two mutually reinforcing End of Investment outcomes will contribute to this goal: (1) “Selected State and Non-State actors collaborate effectively to tackle targeted development problems” and (2) “Targeted PNG decision-makers explicitly integrate gender equality and inclusive social norms into efforts to tackle targeted development problems”.

**The BCEP intermediate outcomes are:**

* PNG NSA partners better represent all their constituents and develop interventions to influence change on targeted development problems;
* Citizens are empowered to access and act on increased and better quality information on service provision, and their rights and responsibilities;
* Women’s and other marginalised citizens’ groups engage more effectively to influence positive changes in targeted services and policies; and
* The PNG Government is more capable of generating more reliable and transparent information and engaging with community stakeholders on key delivery areas.

**The BCEP represents a significant investment in, and ambition for, gender equality and the inclusion of marginalised groups, particularly people with disabilities.** BCEP will integrate gender and social inclusion approaches across all program activities, working towards transformative change that addresses the root causes of gender inequality and social exclusion. The Program will also explicitly focus on strengthening the voice and agency of women through strengthened women led coalitions. The Managing Contractor (MC) will have earmarked GESI resources, staff and funds for realising this increased ambition.

**A.3 Adaptive Delivery Approach**

**BCEP consists of five distinct, but inter-related thematic components to be managed as an integrated whole.** DFAT will procure a Managing Contractor (MC) to implement the program. The MC will apply an adaptive programming approach to draw the five components together and leverage synergies with complementary Australian and other relevant development initiatives (see section D.3).BCEP’s modus operandi of building community engagement to solve real-life policy and delivery problems with government through an adaptive delivery approach distinguishes the Program from, and adds value to, PNG’s development landscape.

**BCEP’s five** components consist of different types of partners, each with distinct contributions to make toward the BCEP goal, as follows:

1. **PNG Coalitions for Change:** This is the most innovative element of the program with significant potential for achieving impact at scale. This component builds on DFAT’s current partnerships with two energetic, young PNG CSOs, and draws on lessons from Australia’s successful Coalitions for Change program in the Philippines. The primary purpose is to identify and support PNG CSOs to build coalitions around issues of national or subnational significance. The key to success lies in selecting social or economic issues where there is the greatest potential to form coalitions of influential actors, including program partners from the media and the Churches.
2. **Media Partnerships**: The media perform a vital accountability role as the “fourth estate”. This component builds on DFAT’s work over several years to strengthen the capacity of the national broadcaster and private media under the MDI. This component will continue support to develop the PNG media to act as a watchdog over government and give voice to citizens, as well as help program partners understand how to better engage the media (including the digital and “new” media) in advocacy and in mass civic education programs, such as for changing harmful gender norms.
3. **Social Accountability partnerships**: Recently described as one of most significant opportunities for strengthening accountability in PNG[[8]](#footnote-8), this component will develop and support social accountability in service delivery programs (health, education, water and sanitation, roads, nutrition, etc). DFAT is already exploring Social Accountability (SA) interventions in PNG with two well-established, PNG-based, International Non-Government Organisations (INGOs). Given PNG’s limited experience with social accountability, this component will initially work with CSOs/INGOs with a track-record of implementing SA initiatives. These partnerships will deliver results at local and national levels, feeding evidence and innovation from one into systemic improvements in policy and practice in the other. The experience and learning from this component will influence how the Churches take these approaches to scale with government agencies and in improving their own service delivery performance in education and health. The approach will leverage DFAT’s significant sectoral investments to build social accountability into government systems.
4. **Church Partnerships:** will build on the work of DFAT’s long-running Church Partnership Program (CPP). The CPP supports Churches to better coordinate and implement their development programs as well as to conduct policy influencing in areas such as health and education, where the Churches provide roughly half of the services available in PNG. The CPP brings together PNG’s seven “mainline” Churches[[9]](#footnote-9) representing 70% of the population, with their Australian-based, faith-based NGO counterpart organisations[[10]](#footnote-10). The DFAT team is currently leading a mini-review to reorient the structure, roles and funding approach for CPP (as well as a revision of the Results Framework), in line with broader CSEP objectives around greater church linkages and collaboration. This review is due for completion by program start and will provide the strategy for support to Churches under BCEP.
5. **GoPNG Partnerships:** this component will work with selected GoPNG departments interested in improving their transparency and citizen engagement, beginning with the government’s key central agency for coordinating development assistance, the Department of National Planning and Monitoring (DNPM); the agency responsible for coordinating with the Churches and promoting gender equality and social inclusion, the Department of Community Development and Religion (DfCDR); and the agency responsible for monitoring key subnational government finance flows, the Department for Implementation and Rural Development (DIRD). Initially the Program will take over a current project of support to DIRD, with programs of support to the other two departments to be developed in the inception phase. The purpose of the current project is to strengthen DIRD’s program management system so that it can effectively oversight the allocation and expenditure of constituency development funds in districts and provinces (ie. Service Improvement Program funds (SIPs), and measure the impact of these investments.

**The MC will work closely with DFAT to build a balanced program portfolio and put in place processes to ensure collaboration across components to realise the complementarities between interventions.** This will include processes and practices for “Thinking and Working Politically,” structured learning, and maximising the participation and inclusion of women and other marginalised groups (see D.3).

The MC will also set up distinct component-level implementation arrangements that best promote the different partners’ comparative advantages to contribute toward the BCEP goal. In particular, Coalitions for Change (Component 1) and Social accountability (Component 3), will require a highly adaptive approach to be successful. In the other components a more conventional approach to management is appropriate (particularly Component 4, Church partnership), but even in these flexibility will be required to capitalise on the available synergies. The contracts to manage the sub-components will incorporate incentives and targets for collaboration.

The BCEP will also provide significant opportunities to promote engagement with the private sector. Private sector representative organisations will be members of coalitions, particularly those dealing with issues of economic growth; they will engage with and be beneficiaries of improved services through the social accountability component; private sector companies will be partners in the media program.

**A.4 Expected results, risks, and value for money**

In an adaptive program of the nature of BCEP predicting results with precision in advance is difficult. However, it is possible to state with confidence that **coordinated delivery by the components will lead to the following range of tangible impacts**:

* Solving local development problems, such as repairs to local infrastructure, through collaboration between communities, businesses and government and/or service providers.
* Improvements to service delivery, ensuring more responsiveness to the users’ needs and providing for community engagement in ongoing monitoring and support to delivery.
* Improving sub-national government resource allocation and project implementation, targeting community priorities, to solve widely recognised problems.
* Resolving national policy blockages on carefully chosen issues, where there is potential for change – issues can be chosen based on social accountability interventions and/or the evidence from coalitions of state and non-state actors, including other DFAT programs.

**BCEP’s central value for money proposition derives from**:

* **Bringing five components together in an integrated program portfolio that combines large, well-established initiatives alongside small and innovative initiatives (in CfC and SA)**. A strong MC management function will drive enhanced coordination, delivering both operational efficiencies and strategic effectiveness. The strong potential complementarities under an overarching ToC provides a basis to realise synergies in a way that would not be possible in a programs with disparate components and a less tightly focused objectives.
* **Adoption of CFC and SA approaches, which require less input from international experts than traditionally TA-heavy sectoral programs**. Local leadership, management, and implementation are central to CfC and SA. They are TA light approaches by design. This has been central to the CfC and social accountability initiatives that have worked in PNG and elsewhere
* While still new for DFAT’s work in PNG, **CfC and SA approaches have been developed over several years in international development and have been effectively applied in PNG**. For SA work, BCEP will start working with INGO’s with relevant experience, partly because PNG CSOs struggle to jump over DFAT’s high due diligence standards. But INGOs will be required to build the capacity of local CSOs to enter into direct funding relationships with DFAT, over time. For CfC, BCEP will draw on the conceptual frameworks and ‘how to’ guidance that has been developed over the last ten years. Rather than rely on CfC international TA expertise, which runs counter to CfC’s learning by doing ethos, BCEP requires the MC to form mentoring partnerships between international organisations who have successfully deployed this approach. For example, DFAT has facilitated a relationship between the Asia Foundation office in Manila and the Voice Inc. that has included a trip to Manila and ongoing review and input into their start-up planning.

There are a number of significant challenges in weighing the benefits of a program such as BCEP against its costs including: predicting the number of beneficiaries; assigning a monetary value to benefits; and the fact that BCEP funding will often be a contribution to change alongside other processes and expenditure. Notwithstanding these constraints, the international evidence from several countries indicates that relatively low cost interventions to empower communities to take collective action together with service providers can lead to results of high individual value. In aggregate, these results will be of significant value, particularly when they incorporate better accountability arrangements that sustain the improvements. There will also be significant added value from high-level policy changes for which the local level action helps provide the foundation (including by establishing the authority to engage on policy debates). The
benefit-to-cost ratio of such policy changes have proven to be high in similar programs.

Program level economy and efficiency indicators will be set during inception (in the PAF) when program outputs are finalised. Efficiency indicators will include links between the achievement of outputs and levels of expenditure, the quality of grant management process and of financial management. As program resources are committed, the MC will develop a set of effectiveness indicators based on the planned intermediate results and outcomes of the interventions to be supported.

A number of risks arise in relation to new SA and CfC programming in the PNG context. DFAT and the MC will monitor whether the context in which the program operates remains conducive to CSOs working collaboratively with government. The MC’s Political Economy Analysis and adaptive management capacity will be a critical factor in managing risk at this level. DFAT will monitor and manage the MC’s implementation of fraud and risk control measure in accordance with DFAT’s internal fraud and risk management policies.

The MC will develop risk identification and mitigation measures in accordance with DFAT’s Risk Management Guide for Aid Investments, giving DFAT a clear line of sight and decision-making authority over all program interventions. The MC will develop robust operational processes during the inception phase to ensure that DFAT policies are adhered to, including environment and social safeguards, fraud control, child protection and prevention of sexual abuse and harassment, gender equality and social inclusion and health and safety.

**A.5 Note on design process**

This design has been developed by DFAT JAS in the Australian High Commission working closely with a team from Oxford Policy Management. The design team consisted of governance, gender and program design specialists working closely with PNG professionals, based in Port Moresby. The design was developed in several stages over the period from September 2020 to March 2021. In the Covid-19 context, the design team conducted most interviews remotely.

Key issues from reviews of DFAT governance programming and lessons learned internationally were tested in more than 40 consultations with stakeholders to determine their applicability in the current political-economy context and given stakeholder interests and incentives.

To test the feasibility of the CfC component the PNG design team in consultation with DFAT conducted a pilot selection and analysis process as presented in D.3.

1. **Development Context and Situational Analysis**

Since independence in 1975, PNG’s economic growth has been low and development outcomes have fallen below expectations. PNG’s economic growth has not kept pace with a rapidly increasing population, despite enormous natural resource endowments and a geo-strategic location on the doorstop of the fastest growing region of the globe. Governance problems lie at the heart of the country’s development under-performance. [[11]](#footnote-11)

Whilst PNG’s governance problems are deep-seated and difficult to address, there are several promising trends on which to base a program to build citizen engagement and accountability. One is the PNG policy context which includes recent pledges from the Government of PNG (GoPNG) to combat corruption, including in PNG’s current Medium Term Development Plan III (MTDP III), which places good governance – in particular the achievement of fairness, women’s economic empowerment and civic participation – centre-stage (see section C). A second relates to PNG’s changing demographics, with an increasingly youthful population eager for change and a small but influential middle class. Steadily improving connectivity and internet access is enhancing the ability of these groups to access information and to organise. For example, Facebook captures 10% of the population but the groups on Facebook are influential and the site is a prominent platform for political discussions. These trends have the potential to change the relationship between the state and society.

This section is set out as follows: First (at B.1) it analyses PNG’s development problems and governance context, highlighting opportunities for a DFAT program to achieve change. Second (at B.2) it presents lessons from previous PNG programming. Third it presents lessons from international practice, which has informed the design of the proposed new program.

**B.1 Development Problem/Issue Analysis**

In almost 50 years of independence, PNG has developed its own form of democracy and political settlement. It is characterised by the often-uneasy coexistence of a huge array of micro social and political identities. A unified nation state is yet to emerge. Indeed, many of PNG’s micro-groups, do not recognise the authority of the PNG state as legitimate. The western concept of a social contract between the state and the individual remains severely underdeveloped in PNG.

Consequently, the core development problem is that government in PNG is accountable to, and inclusive of, only a narrow segment of the population, usually those with whom a MP shares clan and kinship ties and usually not women. There is **weak interaction between state and non-state actors in the design and implementation of policy[[12]](#footnote-12)**. Policy making is largely the product of political contests driven by personalities and patronage rather than debate on how the best policy or ideology to address PNG’s development issues. This creates an accountability deficit, which has resulted in poor development outcomes. This includes narrow economic growth and inequality (benefiting the political class and urban elites); national instability and inter-communal violence; and weak service delivery resulting in some of poorest human development outcomes in the Pacific.

*To address this core development problem BCEP will need to widen the basis of participation in the policy arena – and strengthen community and citizen engagement. Through achieving this, the program will contribute to nation and state building.*

Other aspects of PNG’s development and governance challenges which have been considered in the design of BCEP include the following:

* **Weak public service delivery:** In the latest UN Human Development Index, PNG is assessed as having “low human development” with a ranking of 155 out of 189 countries. It has a gender index ranking of 161.[[13]](#footnote-13) Despite some improvements over the last 10 years, service delivery still fails to reach many citizens. Poor education and health outcomes and a lack of access to clean water and sanitation remain significant problems. The problem is not the design of government institutions, but the way these institutions are “used, and in some cases abused.”[[14]](#footnote-14) Australia is making major supply-side investments to address problems in the health and education sector, as well as supporting economic growth and security alongside assistance from the multilaterals[[15]](#footnote-15). The BCEP will generate pressure for performance and practical solutions that will help maximise returns from this work. *The implication for BCEP is the need to focus strategically on issues and areas that complement these supply side programs with an emphasis on tangible improvements in public services which matter to local communities. By that means, Australia’s investments will build confidence in communities that the PNG state can deliver improvements in their lives.*
* **Entrenched gender inequality:** Male-dominated social relations based on kinship ties remain strong. This manifests itself in several ways. In most parts of PNG, control of land and other resources is vested in men. Within PNG’s formal institutions men dominate power positions (PNG is one of only three countries in the world with no women in parliament). Few women have senior management roles in the public sector, only 18 per cent of senior management roles and 7 per cent of executive roles were held by women.[[16]](#footnote-16)  The under-representation of women in decision making extends to the churches. There are high levels of violence against women. This status quo is perpetuated by social and political norms which discourage women’s leadership and engagement in decision making at all levels. Other disadvantaged groups, including the disabled, and youth, also have little political voice. *The implication for BCEP is a need to explicitly focus on addressing the normative environment which influences decisions.* Violence against women and girls in PNG has gained increasing attention since the National Haus Krai to highlight violence against women in 2013 and recurring high-profile incidents. This public response demonstrates the potentialto address harmful norms through collective action. *By adopting a politically-informed, coalition approach, BCEP could make a real difference in this area*.
* **Long-term erosion of constitutional checks and balances:** The executive has accumulated power whilst the legislature continues to be dysfunctional with a weak party system and MPs focused narrowly on maintaining control over budgets. Both parliament and the executive are inherently unstable, rarely lasting a five-year term[[17]](#footnote-17). Other formal accountability institutions, such as the Auditor-General, have been subject to political interference and starved of funds. One exception is the judiciary, particularly the Supreme Court, which provides some checks on executive authority, although even in the legal system politicians and public servants often avoid accountability by dragging out investigations against them. *The implications is that Australian development assistance is not well placed to influence change in a long-term trend of worsening accountability, and tackling corruption head-on is likely to yield limited results.*
* **New government commitments to improve accountability and combat corruption need carefully coordinated donor support.** Since coming to power in 2019, the Marape Government has passed a raft of new measures to strengthen public accountability, and is receiving significant support from a range of donors. The most significant measures include:
	+ Whistle-blowers Act (unanimously passed by Parliament in February 2020): enables and protects employees for reporting suspected improprieties in the workplace[[18]](#footnote-18).
	+ National Anti-Corruption Plan of Action 2020-2025 (endorsed by Cabinet in October, 2020)
	+ Independent Commission Against Corruption (ICAC) Act (unanimously passed by Parliament in November 2020): streamlines investigative and prosecuting processes to strengthen measure for keeping government and politicians accountable. While there are some concerns with the ICAC law,[[19]](#footnote-19) the government has promised ICAC will be fully operational by September.

A number of donors are providing discrete programs of technical support to different formal accountability institutions. The European Union has just commenced a substantial program of technical assistance to strengthen accountability, the centrepiece of which is support to set-up ICAC. New Zealand and the UNDP are providing much needed support to strengthen PNG parliamentary committees with a focus on improving the budgeting process, and building political party capacity to support women candidates. Sister Australian programs are providing support to critical oversight agencies such as the Ombudsman and the Auditor General[[20]](#footnote-20) that generate accountability pressures from the “supply-side”. *BCEP’s focus on working with PNG citizen groups and coalitions, from the “demand-side”’ fills a gap in these other development program****.***

* **Importance of sub-national government power:** The formal structures of the state are still relatively centralised, but there is a long-standing trend toward decentralisation. On the one hand, the devolution of responsibility for delivery of key public services such as health and education remains partial. For example, the Provincial Health Authorities (PHAs) retain a strong reporting line to the central ministry. The discretionary constituency development funds that are available at sub-national level are controlled by national MPs who have created a swathe of ineffective infrastructure investments under the District Services Improvement Program (DSIP). On the other hand, most meaningful power, and interactions between most citizens and any form of ‘government’, is localised. Moreover, the importance of sub-national polls of power, such as Bougainville’s referendum in favour of independence and a strengthening of Provincial government (particularly in some areas), represent a noteworthy evolution of the PNG political settlement. Correspondingly, while some commentators point to more coherent political party formation, most emphasise a continued lack of central control. *The implications for BCEP include the need to acknowledge the political nature of DSIP in the context of these decentralisation trends. The program will need to seek to incrementally change the rules of the game by strengthening the influence of communities.*
* **A growing, urban middle-class with access to information:** Whilst kinship ties endure, the small but growing urban middle class are most likely to identify as citizens of the PNG nation-state. This middle class also has reasonable access to information.[[21]](#footnote-21) The PNG media is relatively free and robust despite political pressure and intimidation.[[22]](#footnote-22) The strengths include: a relatively capable public broadcaster with national reach; a legislative environment supportive of free media; and a relatively diverse media market.[[23]](#footnote-23) Many MPs and public service leaders, such as the Police Commissioner, are active on social media and this is changing the way some elected officials communicate with the electorate. *The implication for**BCEP is the importance of leveraging the capacity built during 15 years of Australian investment in the media sector. It is important to move beyond capacity building to supporting civil society partners engage the media strategically.*
* **The importance of the churches:** The churches enjoy great legitimacy with influence from the parish up to national level. [[24]](#footnote-24) 96% of the population strongly identify as Christian. They also deliver around 50% of PNG’s health services and run 40% of schools. Whilst it is generally accepted that church run services are better than government provided services, there are challenges. For example, there is still a need to ensure resourcing by government to maintain services, and the extent to which churches themselves are held to account is limited. The centrality of the churches in PNG life puts them in a uniquely strong position to demand accountability of government. While they are likely to exercise caution in doing so, this represents an opportunity for BCEP. *The implication for BCEP is that while churches are unlikely to innovate, they will be pivotal if BCEP is to take effective accountability interventions to scale.*
* **Weak formal CSOs:** With some exceptions, formal CSOs are weaker in PNG than in other countries at a similar stage of development. They lack ties to networks of power[[25]](#footnote-25). The informality of the associations that do possess that kind of power, and the fact that they often act for narrow sectional kinship interests, making them difficult partners for donors.[[26]](#footnote-26) Adding to the case for a stronger CSO cadre is the Consultative Implementation and Monitoring Committee (CIMC), a formal government sanctioned policy engagement mechanism almost unique to PNG. Despite the potential to become the prime means for CSOs and businesses to engage with government, it’s potential remains largely untapped (although some committees are making progress). A forthcoming change in CIMC’s institutional home might present new opportunities. *The implication for BCEP is that developing a cadre of organisationally robust CSOs with the capacity to engage in a politically adept way, is the most likely route to tap into these networks of power.*

**B.2 Lessons from Past PNG Programming**

The immediate predecessor to BCEP is the Decentralisation and Citizen Participation (DCP) program within the PNG-Australia Governance Partnership. The DCP was different in significant respects to BCEP, with support for PNG’s decentralisation agenda a central element. However, there are still lessons to be drawn. Lessons can also be drawn from other DFAT programs and from the work of other donors:

* **Insufficient co-ordination and synergies between projects:**  The range and depth of DFAT supported programs in PNG offers a rare opportunity to ensure effective co-ordination and synergies between different projects. DCP’s ability, however, to achieve this effective co-ordination was constrained by having to integrate pre-existing projects with their pre-established objectives and programs. This led to a missed opportunity with DCP not “adding up to more than the sum of its parts”. *The implications for BCEP are twofold: first the program’s design must allow for effective co-ordination across different partners; second it will have to make careful choices about which elements of pre-existing programs fit with the new theory of change. This design incorporates an extended inception phase to enable that process to be managed.*
* **The need for a more explicit and outcome-oriented approach to Gender Equality and Social Inclusion (GESI):** [[27]](#footnote-27)Mainstreaming gender equality through focal points embedded in partnerships with no dedicated resources was unsuccessful. Instead, a senior position with the authority to secure resources from programs was required. In addition, previous programming was insufficiently focused on the social norms underpinning how policy and decisions are made. *Implications for BCEP include a need to target efforts on the root causes of inequality. This should include incorporating a focus on supporting networks of women and other marginalised groups to organise and speak up. At the same time BCEP needs to acknowledge that gender intersects with other social factors such as age, disability, marital status, gender identity and that these intersections must also be considered. Building on lessons from Pacific Women, particulalry around gender transformative approaches[[28]](#footnote-28) is strongly recommended.*
* **Attempts to build informal coalitions to solve problems in restricted areas were ineffective:** Attempts to make DSIP investments more effective through the Kina plus Kina (K+K) matched funding initiative met with limited success. Embedding transparency and accountability objectives into projects over which MPs had significant control proved challenging. However, the DCP subnational advisers have made progress in building informal coalitions to solve locally important problems[[29]](#footnote-29). For example, the Morobe Village Empowerment Program focusses on supporting villages to organise their own leadership and governance structure, and motivates the community to collectively address its own issues. This involves the management of community funds, and implementation and reporting on community projects against collective output-based plans. *The implication for BCEP is expanded use of coalitions for change, which seeks to bring together interested parties around a shared problem. This culturally sensitive and politically adept approach aligns with emerging good practice (see below) and represents an alternative to standard capacity building based approaches.*
* **Building effective coalitions requires skilled and sustained facilitation:** Since 2011 DFAT has supported the Disability Coalition that draws together CSOs and government agencies in PNG. It has achieved progress in raising the salience of the issue with revised legislation in progress and some high-profile outcomes, such as sign language on TV. In addition, DFAT’s Pacific Women Program (2012-22) has substantial recent experience in support of different types of coalitions in PNG and across the Pacific[[30]](#footnote-30). The learning generated is consistent with international experience, in particular that successful coalitions require skilled and sustained facilitation and significant management input. Formal coalitions may not always be the best solution and sometimes less structured, time limited and looser coalitions can be effective and better value for money. *Implications for BCEP are twofold: first, working through coalitions requires sufficiently skilled and resourced facilitation; and second there is a need to adopt a model of more informal arrangements of loosely linked actors whilst leaving open support to some formal coalitions.*
* **Social accountability interventions hold considerable promise:** A number of INGOs have successfully used a range Social Accountability tools in PNG —including community scorecards, public expenditure tracking, and citizen participation and engagement—leading to results in relation to: improved service delivery (in health, education and WASH)[[31]](#footnote-31), more inclusive education sector governance, and increased citizen participation in ward development planning processes[[32]](#footnote-32). Key lessons include the importance of understanding the local political context; that working through existing governance structures is more likely to yield a response from service providers; of the need tread carefully in exposing leadership shortcomings to avoid unrest[[33]](#footnote-33); and that there are barriers to women’s active participation in PNG[[34]](#footnote-34). This experience highlights the importance of skilled staff to facilitate and moderate social accountability processes. Without safeguards, the risk is that these processes reinforce the dominance of elite males (see Annex 6 for literature review of how to avoid the risk of applying these processes in a way which excludes women). *The implications for BCEP include needing to ensure that the work is initially led by experienced CSOs part of whose remit is to transfer skills and methods to other CSOs and through CPP, to churches. Working through organisations that have a long-term commitment to PNG will enhance the prospects of sustainability.*
* ***Wantok* groupings have enormous social influence and are important to engage with to promote change. Innovative strategies are required, given the informal nature of these groupings make engagement through a conventional development assistance program difficult**. This was the finding of the DFAT commissioned CSO scoping study of 2020[[35]](#footnote-35). *Wantoks* are informal groups, or loose associations of elite actors, whose values and interests are imperfectly aligned with those of an official aid program. They may also not have the organisational structures in place that would allow direct funding. Nevertheless, working through PNG-led coalitions provides an opportunity to tap into these groups to leverage their significant social influence on specific issues.

**B.3 Lessons from international practice**

This design of BCEP is also informed by the recent convergence of international development thinking about effective governance programming. This thinking and experience from other contexts reinforces some implications listed in the previous section. There has been an increased focus, internationally, on more politically informed programs which work on specific issues to achieve tangible outcomes. Key themes emerging from the evidence base include:

* **Focus on achieving tangible results**: There is usually little political incentive for governments to implement ‘broad or system-level accountability reforms’ or to directly ‘fight corruption’. Instead, governance changes – or changes in the ‘rules of the game’ and how power is distributed and how it flows – occurs when tangible results are achieved. Often these will be incremental and small-scale changes, but by carefully selecting an issue on which change is politically and practically possible programs can demonstrate how improved governance can achieve tangible results.
* **Networks and coalitions can be used to drive policy change:** The key insight here is that change happens when a sufficiently powerful group of organisations, interests and individuals come together in support of that change. This is a highly political approach to thinking about how change and improved governance outcomes occur. While policy challenges always have a ‘technical’ aspect to them – Is there a workable solution? Does the government have the necessary money? – policy change is inherently political. As DFAT’s Developmental Leadership Program (DLP) explains “… coalitions are individuals or groups that come together, formally, or informally, to achieve goals they could not achieve on their own … coalitions are part and parcel of everyday politics, everywhere, nationally and sub-nationally and in all sectors and issue areas. They are also central to the inner politics that shape political settlements and help to solve collective action problems.”[[36]](#footnote-36) This thinking increasingly underpins a generation of development programs. By focusing on issues that are of importance to a range of influential actors and around which coalitions can form, change is possible. (Examples of outcomes achieved in other coalitions for change/issues-based program are provided in Annex 7).
* **More effective policy influencing can achieve impact but it requires skilled non-state actors:** At present there is very weak interaction between state and non-state actors in the design and implementation of policy in PNG. International experience suggests a need to build ‘policy influencing skills and capacities’ amongst civil society actors. The appropriate policy influencing strategies and approaches are highly context and issue specific. They will also be different for different types of partner - whether churches, CSOs, NGOs, membership associations, policy think-tanks or dialogue platforms. In some instances, change happens by non-state actors exerting pressure on policy makers. It is likely, however, that in PNG there will be an onus on promoting more constructive joint state-citizen engagement: as David Booth states, “Governance challenges are not fundamentally about one set of people getting another set of people to behave better”. Progress is more likely by actors finding ways “to act collectively in their own interests”.[[37]](#footnote-37)
* **Social accountability initiatives can effectively influence policy when they are linked with other policy influencing programming to enable engagement of multiple actors at multiple levels:** A strategic approach combines demand from the community with pressure from the national government level and/or from external allies (including public oversight bodies with ‘teeth’). Improving citizen access to information and relying on demand alone is much less likely to work.
* **Supporting or facilitating coalitions and working alliances is a smart way to shift incentives:** This is a complex undertaking that involves altering power relations. Development actors need strong processes for understanding, testing and learning, often with a focus on incremental and small-scale reforms at first. The emphasis should be on continual analysis to understand the changing political context and make politically informed decisions. This is typified in ‘Everyday political analysis’, a bare bones framework to help frontline staff make politically informed decisions. Working politically is often operationalised through adaptive management.[[38]](#footnote-38)
* **Importance of understanding the power dynamics that marginalise women in decision-making:** We mustensure that interventions are carefully designed to be genuinely inclusive, including moderating women and men’s engagement in decision-making arenas to enable women’s voices to be heard.[[39]](#footnote-39) If that is not done interventions such as social accountability may merely embed privilege and power (see Annex 6). International evidence also shows the importance of explicitly including gender and social inclusion approaches into accountability work. This can be achieved by: (i) Paying explicit attention to the needs of women in their diversity and to the needs of other marginalised groups and to the power relations which enable or hinder their full participation in decision making; (ii) ‘Moving away from tactical technical inputs, such as one-off report cards, towards strategic approaches that build coalitions for change, work across society, state and the economy, and challenge informal political and social norms that benefit elites and undermine inclusive, sustainable growth’; and (iii) focusing on building women’s meaningful engagement in decision making and leadership, as well as that of other marginalised groups and on policy advocacy on gender equality and social inclusion issue.
1. **Strategic Intent and Rationale**

**C.1 Strategic Setting and Rationale for Australian/DFAT Engagement**

The PNG-Australia Comprehensive Strategic and Economic Partnership recognises the two countries’ “shared interests in a secure, stable, peaceful, prosperous and democratic region; one in which safeguarding the sovereignty of each state is of critical importance”. BCEP is a key mechanism for delivering on Australia and PNG’s mutual commitment to the PNG-Australia Comprehensive Strategic and Economic Partnership, in particular Pillar 1 – Strong Democracies for a Stable Future. The first statement of CSEP Pillar 1 is “Papua New Guinea and Australia share strong traditions of participatory democracy reflecting broader shared values. We recognise and respect our sovereignty, and the fact that our democratic institutions, which are free from coercion and interference, form the foundations of our security and stability”.

In a regional environment subject to the increasing spread of authoritarian influence, this is a strong commitment by PNG and Australia to protecting key features of our participatory democracies. This commitment reflects our mutual concerns with the efforts of authoritarian third parties to undermine democratic processes and further corrode public and private sector probity. The BCEP’s emphasis on collective action, coalitions and establishing new gender norms is also closely aligned to Pillar 1.

The PNG Government outlines its aspiration to improve and protect its democratic institutions in the *Medium Term Development Plan III* (*MTDP III*). The *MTDP III* promotes “robust scrutiny of results in improved public sector performance and the tackling of corruption”. It also calls for the strengthening of monitoring and evaluation, accountability, and transparency initiatives.

Australia’s support to PNG’s governance efforts is articulated in the governance strategy *Engaging with PNG’s Institutions: a Strategic Framework,* which directs the development program to: increase our investments in building public demand for accountability and transparency through civil society, private sector and citizen engagement. The BCEPis a mechanism to deliver the strategic objectives that are detailed in these documents.

Central to achieving these objectives is the promotion of a key feature of participatory democracy: a constructive two-way relationship between state and society, wherein elected officials deliver on their electoral mandate to constituents through policy making that reflects constituent wishes, and oversight of effective delivery of the government services that are funded by taxpayers. In a participatory democracy, this social contract is monitored by the media and a diverse range of civil society organisations that seek to keep the public informed, contribute to policy making, and hold elected officials accountable. It is this relational state-citizen aspect of democratic accountability that is the focus of the BCEP. While the BCEP does not currently include Australia’s electoral support to PNG, this is largely for operational reasons concerning the timing of the next national election in 2022 and aspects of electoral support (currently administered under a separate program) may be incorporated in the future.

Recognising that female under-representation in the political process is particularly acute in PNG (as outlined above), the BCEP includes a specific End-of-Investment Outcome aimed at addressing this: *PNG decision-makers explicitly promote gender equality and inclusive social norms*.

Finally, the BCEP also takes into account the particular development context in which it will be established in 2022. DFAT’s *Partnerships for recovery: Australia’s COVID-19 Development Response*recognises the need for continued advocacy for human rights and for maintaining space for an active civil society even as countries bring in measures to control and recover from the pandemic. The BCEP will contribute to this by enhancing transparency and accountability of funding and support for recovery interventions. Through the focus on gender equality, it will help deliver on the Recovery Results Framework targets for enhanced participation and empowerment of women and people with disability.

**C.2 Innovation, Gender, and Private Sector Engagement**

The Program’s approach to Gender Equality and Social Inclusion is aligned with GoPNG MTDP III, the National Public Sector GESI Policy (2012); DFAT’s Gender Equality and Women’s Empowerment strategy (2016) Development for All; Disability Inclusion Strategy (2015-20). It will help achieved the aims of CSEP & Foreign Policy White Paper (2017), particularly those relating to enhanced participation and empowerment of women and people with disability; and women’s leadership role and gender-based violence. It also aligns with the Partnerships for Recovery Performance Assessment Framework (PAF); it will provide evidence towards relevant indicators within that framework. The GESI approach in this design is consistent with the OECD/DAC minimum criteria which scores the program as ‘significant’. See Annex 4 for further details.

The international lessons section (B.3) discusses how coalitions of actors can drive change. Key to CfC work is finding issues on which the interests of influential actors overlap with those of less powerful groups. The design of BCEP envisages strong private sector engagement in coalitions at national and local levels. With a strong media component and an intent to engage with private sector representative bodies BCEP will have the means to help stimulate that demand. The media component will support the private media houses develop content that will drive sales and improve commercial prospects. BCEP will incorporate lessons learned from the Regional Balance of Power programme once these are generated, particularly its efforts to influence perceptions of women’s legitimacy as leaders through more balanced media reporting.[[40]](#footnote-40)

# D. Proposed Outcomes and Investment Options

This section begins by presenting the overall program theory of change (D.1) and then explains the goal and the outcomes in more detail (D.2). Indicators for these, as well as for program outputs, are provided in the M&E matrix in Annex 1. The last part of this section (D.3) outlines the approach for delivery of the program and achievement of outcomes.

**D.1 Logic**

The BCEP logic is represented in the theory of change Diagram 1 below and explained in the following text.

**Diagram 1: BCEP Theory of Change** 

**Under CSEP, the Governments of Australia and PNG have committed to working together to build a more stable and secure PNG democracy that better delivers for its people.**

**The ultimate cause of PNG’s instability is a fluid and shifting political settlement with a weak social contract between the state and its citizens.** The incentives for state elites are to preserve their power through disbursing patronage to narrow client groups over the short-term; rather than the more difficult and long-term task of developing and implementing better policy that delivers public goods and services for the majority. The social contract is also weakened by a set of deeply embedded social norms that exclude women and other marginalised groups from all levels of decision-making, further entrenching inequality and disadvantage across PNG society.

**The long-term goal of this program is strengthened citizen-government engagement. If** the program can facilitate a more open and inclusive interaction, **then** the balance of incentives facing PNG decision-makers will shift towards the delivery of public goods and services for the majority. These are the building blocks for a more inclusive and accountable government and a stronger and more stable PNG democracy.

**This goal will be achieved by two mutually reinforcing End of Investment Outcomes**

**1:** *Selected State and Non-State actors collaborating effectively to tackle targeted development problems*

**2:** *Targeted**PNG decision-makers explicitly integrate gender equality and inclusive social norms* *into efforts to tackle targeted development problems*

The logic for EoI 1 is that

**If** the Program identifies and works with non-state actor partners with the willingness and intention to:

* Represent citizens interests and ensure that citizens have access to information on rights and responsibilities;
* Work in a politically-informed way and, in particular, select issues on which progress is clearly possible;
* Build networks and coalitions with diverse and influential PNG actors;
* Learn from experience and adapt their strategies to better achieve change outcomes

and **if** the program focuses on well-chosen issues (with the potential for change), **then** collective action to solve development critical development problems will be achieved. If collective action is achieved the program will deliver results from local to national level.

The programme is premised on the assumption that an accountable democracy considers and responds to the needs of **all** its citizens and that this has not been the case to date, with women and persons with disabilities being largely excluded from decision making .

Therefore, EoI 2 explicitly tackles those gender and social norms which perpetuate inequalities applying the following logic

* **if** those non-state actors are also selected for their willingness and intention to address gender inequality and social exclusion and
* **if** the Program strengthens partners’ capacity through coaching and mentorship and incentivises the formation of coalitions and
* **if** women and men as PNG citizens can access information about the gender dimensions of development supported by mass media and other information channels eg DIRD and
* **if** women led groups, and groups of persons with disability are supported to voice their own issues collectively

**then** coalitions of non-state actors will influence national, provincial and community leaders to pay increased attention to gender equality and social norms as critical both politically and developmentally leading to services that are more inclusively designed and delivered and that lead to better outcomes across society.

When both EoIs are achieved, government and civil society engagement will be strengthened.

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| **Box 2: The five Program Components - More than the Sum of their Parts** The selection of the five program components reflects the analysis of the PNG context, lessons from previous DFAT programming, and international lessons. There is a case for proceeding with each on its own. For example, the media play an important role in PNG and there is large sunk DFAT investment in the sector. The Churches are key service providers and potentially important policy influencers. Social Accountability programming and Issue-based projects reflect good practice internationally. However, whilst each would make sense as an individual investment, it is by implementing the five components in a mutually reinforcing way that the maximum impact will be achieved. There are many potential synergies and links between strands. Illustrative examples include: (i) the Churches strand identifies an opportunity to engage with government on health service funding/delivery where a media engagement amplifies their argument; (ii) a Coalition for Change is identified on gender based violence – this could include some of the Churches as members whilst working with the media component to make the argument to the wider public; and (iii) the social accountability work generates insights at a sub-national level into a labour market issue feeding into the implementation of a Coalitions for Change project.  |

The achievement of four intermediate outcomes will trigger the two end-of-investment outcomes: EO1) Selected State and Non-state actor collaboration to solve development problems and EO2) Targeted PNG decision-makers explicitly promote gender equality and inclusive social norms.

**D. 2 Expected Outcomes**

**Program Goal**

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| ***Goal:***  | *To strengthen citizen-government engagement for improved service delivery and provision of public goods.* |

The BCEP goal addresses PNG’s central governance problem: an unproductive interaction between state and citizens in the design and implementation of policy: the elite in PNG retain power by rewarding their own narrow group rather than delivering services for the wider population[[41]](#footnote-41). This problem is both a cause and a result of the absence of a social contract and the weakness of government accountability to most of its citizens[[42]](#footnote-42). (See B.1 above.)

The interaction between state and citizens in PNG is shaped by institutions/rules that reproduce power imbalances. These institutions are both formal (the constitution, laws, policies and regulations) and informal (social and cultural norms, relationships, and interests). BCEP cannot on its own change the ‘rules of the game’ in a wholesale way. But by being smart about the actors it engages with and the processes it supports, by finding issues on which elites and less powerful actors have interests in common, it can start to change the equation.

In most cases the common interest will lie with practical and tangible improvements to how PNG’s government provides services. The goal is intentionally stated in broad terms to give the implementers the flexibility to identify the best opportunities to mobilise coalitions within this broad framing. The discussion of Intermediate Outcome 1 elaborates on the kinds of development issues and coalitions this program will support.

## **End-of-Investment Outcomes**

The Program has two end-of-investment outcomes that address distinct elements of the governance problem. Under end-of-investment outcome 1 (EOI 1), the program will support state and non-state actors to work together to tackle critical development problems at national and local levels. Under End-of-investment outcome 2 (EOI 2), the program will address the norms that perpetuate the exclusion of women and other marginalised groups by working with key partners to influence change in the attitudes and behaviours of decision-makers. The EOIs are mutually reinforcing: EOI 1 focuses on non-state actors engaging with state actors in coalitions to achieve change; while EOI 2 focuses on changing the attitudes and behaviours of decision-makers to explicitly acknowledge and promote the rights and responsibilities of women and marginalised people as citizens of PNG and take policy actions based on this.

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| ***End-of-Investment outcome 1:***  | *Selected State and Non-State actors collaborate effectively to tackle targeted development problems****.*** |

This outcome targets the problem of PNG’s highly fragmented social and political order by focussing on practical development issues. To address these problems, BCEP will undertake advocacy to influence policy and programs, and facilitate coalitions to take collective action.

As with the goal statement, EO1 is pitched broadly to enable the program to select those issues around which actors will coalesce and on which there is the greatest political traction for change. The CPP has already developed collective action processes through which they have acted on a range of issues, including for example working with the government to accredit an adult literacy curriculum that widens further education opportunities. BCEP will encourage the churches to continue to engage in this manner, but in broader coalitions and on more diverse issues. Through a range of other partners, BCEP will ensure non-state actor engagement with government on issues such as:

* Tackling local development problems through collaboration between communities, the private and civil sectors, and government departments and/or service providers.
* Improvements to how agencies and staff organise and conduct service delivery so that they are more responsive to the needs of the user and which allow for community engagement in ongoing monitoring and support to delivery.
* Improving government resource allocation and project implementation so that they reflect the priority needs of communities.
* Resolving national policy blockages as identified through social accountability interventions and/or the generation of evidence by coalition members.

The make-up of actors in the coalitions will be determined by the nature of the issue. DFAT has substantial coalition facilitation experience on which to draw including the Philippines’ Coalition for Change Program and the DLP in the Pacific (see IO1 below). The key to success is that the program takes an adaptive, politically informed approach that allows PNG actors to take the lead (see D.3).

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| ***End-of-Investment Outcome 2*** | *Targeted PNG decision-makers explicitly integrate gender equality and inclusive social norms into efforts to tackle targeted development problems* |

This outcome focuses on promoting an environment which enables the meaningful participation of women and persons with a disability in citizen engagement programmes. It will influence leaders to recognise the benefits of wider participation in decision-making and to actively promote gender equality and social inclusion. The leaders targeted, will include those from community to national level from a range of influential organisations, including GoPNG , churches, the media and NSAs.

Women represent 50% of the population and persons with disability an estimated 15%; failure to include them in problem solving undermines accountability to PNG citizens. This outcome statement builds on international evidence that shows[[43]](#footnote-43) that for gender norms to change, inequality and exclusion need to be explicitly addressed (see Annex 6). The logic being that this in turn will lead to increased accountability with benefits for these groups *and* for other citizens.

There is a significant and vocal section of PNG society who wish to see change. For example, the continued existence and advocacy of the bipartisan Coalitions of Parliamentarians Against GBV, which comprises male members of Parliament who are equally strong in their pursuit of ending violence against women and support for women in parliament, is a good indication of high-level support for change. DFAT regularly advocates for locally owned measures to increase the number of women in parliament and other leadership roles through interactions with current members of parliament and other influential actors. Through the Pacific Women program, DFAT supports partners working on women’s leadership and influence with a view to longer-term normative change that is needed to ensure women’s leadership is recognised and supported at all levels of PNG society. BCEP will pursue gender transformative approaches tackling root causes of inequality.[[44]](#footnote-44) It will build on and promote constructive gender norms to realise inclusive governance processes learning lessons from Pacific Women and the regional Balance of Power program.[[45]](#footnote-45) The approach to structuring management and operations to ensure this happens is explored in succeeding sections.

The logic of the design is that GESI objectives are most effectively served by taking a cross-cutting approach, where GESI is an integral part of program components. The Program will have earmarked GESI resources: staff and funds. These will be used to ensure that the needs of different social groups are considered in the design and implementation of all interventions, and that the voices of women and excluded groups count.

## **Intermediate outcomes**

These two end-of-investment outcomes will be achieved through a coordinated portfolio of targeted interventions to be delivered by program partners. Together these interventions will deliver the following four intermediate outcomes:

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| ***Intermediate outcome 1*** | *PNG non-state actor partners better represent all their constituents and develop interventions to influence change on targeted development problems* |

This first intermediate outcome will increase the capacity of non-state actor partner organisations to develop and implement effective policy influencing and access to information initiatives, a current gap in PNG’s accountability landscape (see CSO scoping study 2020). The BCEP will work with organisations across the spectrum of PNG’s non-state actors, including churches, media, civil society organisations, NGOs[[46]](#footnote-46), membership associations, policy think-tanks and dialogue platforms. The PNG lead organisation will determine the issues on which coalitions engage with support from the DFAT and managing contractor, in particular, in ensuring that an assessment of the context indicates good prospects for reform.

The program will support two main types of policy influencing interventions: Social Accountability (SA) interventions and Coalitions for Change activities. The media component will play an important part in this work. While respecting media independence (the program will not seek to be an arbiter of content) implementers will seek support to amplify the voice of communities, of women and persons with disability, and to encourage replication of successes. The support to transparency through DIRD has an important role in providing facts and figures in support of accountability.

The program will support SA interventions in the health, education and WASH sectors. Within those broad sectoral choices the mode of intervention will enable communities to decide the issues on which they will engage government. That will generate evidence on government service provision at the local level for use in policy advocacy at the national level. The program will not support SA interventions that seek to blame service providers for failings. Instead, the aim is to facilitate joint action to co-produce appropriate responses to problems and in the process bring to life latent processes for collaboration which already exist in PNG society. This approach will strengthen the capacity and confidence of communities and the organisations that represent them in working with government. Identifying issues that are common across many communities will provide evidence for national level engagements on critical and practical areas of policy improvement.

BCEP will work with non-state actors with the strongest social accountability track records in PNG. This means the initial primary partnerships will be with well-established CSOs, including PNG-based INGOs. The agreements with these organisations will have specific aims to develop the capacity of smaller organisations to take forward and sustain the interventions. As implementation progresses, BCEP will draw in the churches to share in the experiences gained - with their reach, churches could be the most effective actors to take this work to scale.

The other main type of influencing initiative supported by BCEP will be the Coalitions for Change (CfC) projects. Under this approach, issues will be carefully selected to draw a range of partners into an engagement with government. These initiatives have the greatest potential for driving BCEP’s most transformative impacts. Moreover, as the most adaptive, politically informed part of the program, CfCs are well equipped to work together with other BCEP partners (eg. churches, the media, social accountability etc) and other DFAT development programs. In particular, with extensive networks into PNG’s emerging leaders in government, business and civil society, the PNG Australia Alumni Association could be a powerful ally in CfC work.

The CfC approach would represent an important potentially high impact innovation in PNG. It has been tried and tested elsewhere with impressive results.[[47]](#footnote-47) The risks associated with this form of programming can be managed through politically smart implementation. Section E.1 outline a suggested CfC process highlighting how these risks will be managed.

To understand how this CfC process could be applied in the PNG context, the Design Team conducted a mock CfC selection and design exercise (see Annex 7). First, the team developed a long list of 10 issues, based on initial conversations with PNG stakeholders. Second, a short-list of three issues were selected for more detailed scoping and analysis. Third, from this analysis, two quite different issues were selected as having potential in terms of coalition formation and producing results with real social or economic benefits: 1) *Sorcery Related Violence Against Women* and 2) *Tariff Reform (see Annex 7).*

There is considerable international experience with issues-based approaches[[48]](#footnote-48). That evidence, together with the potential of the issues explored during design, indicates that leveraging the power of coalitions could achieve demonstrable impact in PNG.

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| ***Intermediate outcome 2*** | *Citizens are empowered to access and act on increased and better quality information on service provision, and their rights and responsibilities.* |

Through the second intermediate outcome, better quality information will be available to citizens, and they will be empowered to access and use this information in their engagement with government for improved services and public goods.

Citizens need an improved information flow to support an engagement with authorities and hold them accountable and to build coalitions to solve development problems. Whilst it faces number of challenges, the support from MDI over the last 17 years has enabled the PNG media to act as a watchdog on government. By constructively engaging with the media, BCEP can build on the work of MDI, and further strengthen the role of the media while increasing citizens’ access to information.

**Building on MDI’s successes**:

MDI has helped deliver improved media capacity to investigate issues and pursue a government response on which BCEP can build. Recent examples include:

* At the end of 2020, MDI facilitated a session at which journalists questioned the Secretary of the Treasury on the next national budget. The Secretary invited all participating journalists to future budget workshops and expressed an interest in developing a podcast to answer frequent questions asked about GoPNG’s budget and policy work. This is the second year that MDI has facilitated these discussions.
* At the launch of awards by Transparency International in May 2021, the TIPNG Board Chair, Peter Aitsi, with the firm backing of PNG Media Council President Neville Choi, stated:

“The media’s role in exposing cases of corruption and malpractice simply cannot be understated. And while we have had a few notable victories over the years, we know that a strong, ethical and consistent investigative reporting culture in PNG media can also be a strong deterrent and a powerful tool for ensuring that those in power do not abuse that power”.

**Media: opportunities and challenges**

Reflecting international trends, the PNG media is having to adapt to the arrival of digital platforms. These changes have not altered PNG citizens demand for “news”, but they are beginning to change the way in which people consume it, albeit relatively slowly outside urban areas[[49]](#footnote-49). The *PNG Citizen Perceptions of Governance and Media Engagement Report 2019* found the most popular forms of media are radio, followed by television and then newspapers. Although over “half of PNG (53%) read the newspaper weekly” the report notes that “apart from cost, low levels of literacy continue to challenge greater newspaper consumption”. The survey also found that citizens’ trust in the media was high.

The growing use of digital media presents opportunities to increase citizens’ access to information. It also carries the significant risk of an increasing volume of misinformation and disinformation. That is best countered by making news available that has been processed by trained journalists. In the PNG context the need for accurate information that is gathered and tested in a professional way, and packaged so it’s relevant (and able to used) by the target audience, remains high.

**Strategic approach**

The end-of-investment outcome will be achieved by:

* Strengthening media's role by ensuring journalists have the skills to be able to investigate, report accurately and serve the needs of information users.
* Supporting media organisations to build their audiences and seek to reach unserved communities through a range of platforms to ensure they can play a role in 'nation-building and values-building'.
* Supporting the media to have strong editorial processes, including moderation of social media comments, to avoid being captured by reactionary agendas and address misinformation and disinformation.
* Supporting program partners understand how to better engage with the media in advocacy and in mass civic education programs, such as changing harmful gender norms.

BCEP will address one of the key findings of the recent Media Development Initiative Review: that a more strategic approach is required to derive the maximum benefit from the support to media. The program will build the editorial and journalistic capacity of diverse media houses, covering traditional media (including the national broadcaster and Church media) as well as digital media (such as bloggers and social media).  In parallel, the program will adopt a *media engagement approach* to enable non-state actors and church partners achieve their objectives. The media component will support non-state actors across the program to work with the media effectively as part of their policy influencing strategy.

BCEP will also leverage the relative strength of the PNG media *to provide mass information to citizens* on their rights, entitlements and responsibilities, including for women and other
under-represented social groups. Reaching a general audience will require engaging with PNG’s most extensive means of information dissemination (such as TV, National Radio and National Newspapers) and presenting information in a way that it can be easily understood and used. The content will be consistent with government pronouncements and messaging on these topics.

The ability of BCEP to coordinate interventions will be a distinct advantage in achieving increased access to information and supporting citizens to use that information to take action to achieve higher-level outcomes. Coordinating messaging on rights and responsibilities from a range of sources from the pulpit through to social media offers a better prospect of actually changing behaviour. This is particularly the case regarding harmful gender norms.

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| ***Intermediate outcome 3*** | *Women’s and other marginalised citizens’ groups engage more effectively with decision-makers to influence positive change in targeted services and policies****.*** |

Intermediate outcome 3 is focussed on increasing the agency of women and other marginalised citizens. It will empower them to lead coalitions and to express their voice and engage in coalitions and with non-state actors, as well as to directly engage with and influence
decision-makers at all levels from community to national. This IO is premised on the fact that the Program **does not** assume that women and marginalised groups will be well-represented by non-state actor partners or automatically engaged in coalitions or in social accountability initiatives.

An explicit focus on these groups is required to support them to overcome PNG’s entrenched social norms and create the environment where they can engage effectively. For instance, the approach to SA interventions will ensure engagement of women and other marginalised groups is carefully moderated giving them space to think through the issues they want the community to address. The facilitating CSOs will build the capacity of women to argue their case and to ensure they have a role in decision-making. The process for selecting CfCs will ensure the differential benefits to women and other excluded groups is explicitly considered. The role these groups can play in advancing an issue will be analysed and their capacity built to participate effectively (using the earmarked funds where necessary). The media interventions will be tailored to empower these groups and to promote constructive gender roles. The analysis of data on government services will be disaggregated to lend power to advocacy for more effective targeting.

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| ***Intermediate outcome 4*** | *Government capable of generating more reliable and transparent information as well as engaging with stakeholders on key delivery areas* |

The three intermediate outcomes above largely assume that the government has the basic systems in place to monitor and track key program delivery and expenditure, enabling authority holders to engage with and respond to citizens on these issues. The weight of evidence suggests otherwise. Government systems are often opaque, with limited, if any, functionality.

Under this intermediate outcome four, the BCEP will continue current DFAT support to develop the database of the Department of Implementation and Rural Development (DIRD) into a fully functional program management system that provides reliable, inclusive and transparent information on GoPNG’s constituency development fund, the Service Improvement Programs (SIPs)[[50]](#footnote-50) under which some PGK1.2 billion[[51]](#footnote-51) is annually allocated for Provinces and Districts. It will also provide District and Province data and analytical capability to measure the impact of these significant public investments.

Other components will exploit this information source, where possible collaborating with DIRD. For example, information extracted from the database and made accessible to citizens will be a powerful element of the SA work, exposing to communities the resources that could be available to address their problems if well utilised. At a national level, analysis of the data will be used by partners to work with government, and those MPs who support change, on systemic reforms to make the funds more effective. The largest stream of non-earmarked funding in PNG is potentially a matter of intense public interest and one on which the media component will focus. This intervention is closely aligned with the mandate of the Department of National Planning and Monitoring (DNPM) to ensure that the country’s capital investments deliver real value for money. As well as of the Department for Community Development and Religion (DfCDR) which is responsible for gender equitable and socially inclusive programming. The Program will also have the capacity to support efforts to improve the openness and transparency of processes in these and other government department as interest and opportunities emerge.

**D.3 Delivery structure and approach**

The Program will be delivered by a portfolio of implementing partners working on targeted interventions under five program components. This section first outlines the components before presenting the approach for building synergies between them to deliver an integrated program.

## **Component structure**

BCEP’s five components are:

1. **Coalitions for Change Projects:** The management of coalitions in a politically informed way requires a skill set that is not readily available amongst PNG CSOs. DFAT and the MC will identify up to three national CSOs with the potential to do this work and build their capacity to do so. The partners will be selected based on the level of existing competence, financial control capacity and the alignment of their mission with BCEP outcomes. The existing DFAT partnership with *The Voice* will be incorporated alongside other Think Tanks and mission-focussed organisations. This component will not deliver a program of generic capacity building, maintaining instead a tight focus on the competencies required to deliver the CfCs. In the main, this will be on-the-job training or highly tailored mentoring to support a ‘learning by doing’ approach which is more likely to lead to effective capacity improvements. BCEP will seek to pair these PNG organisations with specialist international partners with CfC (or Issues Based Working) expertise. If this approach proves successful in the PNG context, an assessment will be made of the value of adding additional lead partners.
2. **Media Partnerships**: builds on the MDI, under which strong relationships with PNG media houses, particularly the National Broadcasting Corporation, have been established. In line with the MDI Review, the management arrangements for this component would remain largely unchanged, but the mix of technical support would be altered as follows:
	* *Media* *development*: building media houses editorial and journalistic capacity, including to report on government performance. This work builds on an area of major focus under MDI. Existing initiatives for promoting direct engagement between citizens and government such as through talkback radio and other program formats will be continued and expanded.
	* *Media**engagement*: substantial expansion of support for non-state actors and church partners to effectively engage with the media to help achieve their policy influencing objectives.
	* *Media for mass citizen access to information*: for example, to provide information on citizen rights and entitlements, or to promote positive models of gender and disability inclusion.
	* Development of campaign to counter-disinformation to help maintain the standard of public discourse
3. **Social Accountability Partnerships**: This component will initially work with CSOs/INGOs with a track-record of implementing SA initiatives. Delivering to a high standard requires a demanding range of competencies: some organisations in PNG are executing programs to those standards[[52]](#footnote-52) but they are few in number (see section 3.2 b). The program will comprise up to five separate multi-year grants to mature organisations with both SA experience and the capability to meet the due diligence and financial control requirements. Recipients will be required to build the capacity of PNG partners (including in the areas of operational and financial management), often local community-based organisations, who will progressively take responsibility for implementation.

Through this Component technical assistance will be provided to churches to deploy social accountability approaches to improve their own service delivery performance in education and health. However, CSOs are expected to be able to move more quickly and will contribute the majority of social accountability results in the early stages of the program.

The component will also leverage DFAT’s significant sectoral investments to build social accountability into government systems. There is also potential for the CIMC[[53]](#footnote-53) to be a means for testing how the evidence generated by social accountability can be deployed to influence policy.

1. **Church Partnerships** will take forward the work of CPP, aligning it closely with broader CSEP objectives around greater church linkages and collaboration. A design update led by DFAT will consider an updated structure, roles and funding approach for CPP, as well as the ongoing relevance of key recommendations of the 2019 Mid-Term Review of CPP including: a deeper engagement with the PNG Council of Churches for policy influencing; a tighter focus to collective action interventions; ensuring that CPP leadership represents the voices of PNG women; and the development of Churches strategy for social accountability. The update will produce a revised CPP program structure, and draft Results Framework and Theory of Change.
2. **GoPNG Partnerships:** This component will work with selected GoPNG departments interested in improving in measures transparency and citizen engagement, beginning with DNPM, DfCDR and DIRD. Initially the Program will take over a current project support DIRD, with programs of support to the other two departments to be developed in the inception phase:
	* As a central government agency, the DNPM is a vital partner in promoting citizen government engagement. The DNPM leads PNG’s work under the Open Government Partnership, which includes measures in public participation, freedom of information, fiscal transparency and extractive resources transparency. They have also have responsibility for funding the CIMC. This is a unique formal arena for citizen engagement with government on policy, with significant, though yet to realized, potential for accountability and transparency[[54]](#footnote-54).
	* The DfCDR are important counterparts for BCEPs work with the Churches and cross-cutting work on gender equality and social inclusion.
	* The purpose of DFAT’s current contract with the Catalpa consulting firm is to strengthen DIRD’s program management system to better oversight constituent development grants to districts and provinces for service delivery (ie. SIPs) and ensure they are spent in accordance with guidelines. This complements social accountability work by improving data tracking so that the community is better able to monitor service delivery[[55]](#footnote-55). The intervention will help promote a integrated approach to development and service delivery monitoring at both the national and district level through integrated information management systems.

## **Adaptive delivery approach**

DFAT will appoint a Managing Contractor (MC) to deliver the Program.Reporting to the JAS, the MC’s central responsibility will be to manage BCEP as an integrated whole. It will deploy adaptive management approaches to promote coordination and collaboration across the program’s components and to test and learn what works in strengthening citizen-government engagement in PNG (see E.1 for MC’s specific responsibilities).

The core elements of BCEP’s adaptive delivery approach are:

1. Application of Thinking and Working Politically practices alongside structured learning processes.
2. Building a portfolio of interventions that promote synergy and achieve a balance of risk across the components.
3. Developing NSA PNG partners (including churches) capacity in to deliver interventions through support for implementation of their interventions.
4. Building linkages with DFAT’s wider program and relevant other donor initiatives.
5. Maximising participation and inclusion of women and other marginalised groups.

These elements will enable the Program to support a diverse range of partners to implement change strategies within a balanced portfolio, as represented in Diagram 2. Each of these elements is elaborated in more detail below.

**Diagram 2: BCEP’s Adaptive Delivery Approach**



1. **Thinking and Working Politically**

The program will take a problem-focused, politically informed, adaptive approach with potential to deliver some of the transformative changes needed on critical issues that hold back PNG’s development. It will be locally led, tapping into the understanding of PNG people to focus where there is the potential for achieving change and on which coalitions are likely to form. A specific function of the MC will be to support partners across the program with Political Economy Analysis techniques and to capture and share that developing understanding.

To be able to respond to the developing understanding of the context, an adaptive management approach will be supported by a robust Monitoring, Evaluation and Learning (MEL) system. Quick feedback loops and rapid learning will enable program management to make informed choices about when to adapt, expand or exit. Ongoing processes of shared learning and reflection will provide lessons that enable more effective implementation and the identification of synergies.

1. **A balanced portfolio aligned with the Theory of Change:** To maximise the potential for achieving end-of-investment outcomes while minimizing risks, BCEP will build a balanced portfolio. The building blocks of the portfolio will be the existing work of Church partners through CPP, the media partners through MDI, and the DIRD program management system project.

The process of adding SA interventions and CfCs will consider how to achieve synergies across the full portfolio whilst ensuring alignment with DFAT sectoral geographical priorities. The work of existing partners will be reviewed during the Inception Phase to achieve alignment with the ToC. The aim will be to develop a portfolio[[56]](#footnote-56) that contains a balanced mix of:

* Lower risk initiatives with more predictable results as well as higher risk initiatives with the potential for more transformative results;
* Smaller and quicker initiatives to pilot and test new approaches as well as initiatives that have demonstrated success and are ready to be taken to scale; and
* Initiatives with long-term policy advocacy goals as well as initiatives that can deliver ‘quick wins’ of more immediate and tangible results.

Section F describes the processes by which learning is shared across the components. Those program level events will adopt the Strategy Testing[[57]](#footnote-57) process, developed by The Asia Foundation with DFAT support that will be used in the Coalitions for Change Projects. By developing a shared analysis the implementers will align their interventions with the program ToC, to suggest how that theory should be modified, and to identify areas for collective action between components.

1. **Capacity building to support NSA partner’s delivery**

BCEP is an ambitious program that requires a significant departure from the way many NSAs in PNG have become accustomed to working. That is particularly true for the CfC component. The PNG Civil Society Scoping Study of 2020 describes a sector in which capacity has weakened over the last few years in some respects, partly as a consequence of curtailed external support. It is therefore essential that whilst BCEP will not be a conventional CSO capacity building program, a significant level of support will be needed to enable partners to work effectively on this agenda.

The capacity support for each component will be as follows:

* Twinning arrangements will be developed between the NSAs leading on the delivery of the CfC projects and organisations with international experience of Issues Based Approaches (The Asia Foundation would be one example of a suitable mentor). The emphasis in these partnerships will be on-the-job training in adaptive management and coalition facilitation with standard organisational capacity building featuring only insofar as that is needed to deliver on the projects. The Managing Contractor lead contractor will manage these arrangements with specific budget lines built into grant agreements with the PNG NSA.
* The Social Accountability component will in the first instance be managed by INGOs. Their grant agreements will incorporate targets at three levels: to develop community capacity to engage with the relevant service providers; to develop the capacity of PNG CSOs to progressively take on the facilitation of the process; and to develop the capacity of service providers to engage with communities and to plan appropriate responses.
* In the media component the capacity approaches developed in MDI will largely continue with the significant addition that the component lead will develop capacity of NSA partners across the program to engage effectively with the media
* CPP incorporates partnerships between PNG churches and Australian NGOs. Those relationships will be continued into BCEP with the priorities revised in line with the review of CPP.
* The existing contract to support DIRD develop its MIS capacity incorporates capacity building.
1. **Build linkages with DFAT’s wider program and relevant other donor initiatives**

Guided by DFAT, the BCEP will develop a portfolio of interventions that strategically aligns with DFAT’s priories and complements DFAT’s supply side programs, as summarised in the table below. Similarly, BCEP will seek to identify and exploit opportunities for engaging with the supply-side accountability work of other donors. Throughout implementation, linkages with other relevant programmes will be developed in areas where there is potential to maximise impact.

**Table 1: DFAT’s Supply-side program and relevant other donor initiatives**

|  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- |
| **Donor** | **Programs**  | **GoPNG Partners** |
| DFAT | * Pacific Women
* Justice Services and Stability for Development (JSS4D)
* Australia-PNG Economic Development Partnership
* Institutional Partnerships Program (IPP)
* PNG Australia Transition to Health
* Education for Prosperity
 | * Parliament
* Ombudsman Commission
* Law and Justice Sector
* Department of Finance
* Internal Revenue Commission
* Department of Treasury
* National Statistics Office
* Auditor General
* Elections Commission
* Department of National Planning and Monitoring
* Department of Health
* Department of Education
 |
| European Union | * EU-PNG Partnership for Good Governance
 | * Law and Justice sector ( including establishing ICAC), Parliament
 |
| United Nations  | * Provincial Capacity Building & Enhancement Programme
* Anti-Corruption for Development Effectiveness
 | * Department of Finance
* Department of Treasury
* Department of Provincial and Local Affairs
* Department of Prime Minister and National Executive Council
 |
| World Bank/IFC | * IFC PNG Partnership
* IMPACT
* Rural Service Delivery Project
 | * Bank of PNG
* Internal Revenue Commission
* National department of Health
 |
| Asian Development Bank | * Improving Financial Access and Entrepreneurship Development Project
* Health Services Sector Development Program
 | * Bank of PNG
* Department of Finance
* Department of Treasury
* Department of Health
 |
| MFAT | * New Zealand Electoral Commission support
 | * PNG Electoral Commission
 |

1. **Gender Equality and Social Inclusion:** The promotion of Gender Equality and Social Inclusion are core to the program. There will be two distinct approaches to GESI: work towards gender equality will focus on transformative ways of increasing women’s and men’s equality addressing the root causes of inequality and empowering networks led by women, while the Social Inclusion work will focus on Disability Inclusive Development, in the first phase. The program will develop a GESI strategy which is nested in BCEP ToC (see Section G) built on current evidence which identifies the key barriers to participation for women and marginalised populations (eg. gender based violence, economic dependence, lack of education, social stigma) and which describes in detail gender equality and disability inclusive development objectives.

To ensure there is a common approach to GESI issues, the gender strategy will be developed with the full participation of the key organisations in each component at inception beginning with analysis of the current status of gender equality across each partnership. The strategy will inform the annual plans of components and grantees and identify areas of intervention that cut across the program. This strategy will be iterative and where other social inclusion efforts emerge as critical for example youth inclusive development it will be adapted accordingly.

BCEP will adopt the gender continuum (Annex 6 and MERL) as a learning tool to assist partners in mapping where their current approaches sit on a continuum from ‘gender negative’, where work actually reinforces damaging stereotypes, to ‘gender transformative’ where programs seek to change the socio-cultural, political and economic structures which reinforce and perpetuate gender inequalities. Frank discussions on gender equality outcomes, and where they fit on the continuum, will enable teams to consider ways in which they might be more ambitious and how they might be able to adapt or improve their programming to move further along the continuum. Gender transformation is the ultimate aim but that this may take many years. In that case the short-term shifts are more likely to be achieved between gender neutral and gender responsive approaches. Incentives may be considered (for example weighting of proposals) to encourage action towards gender transformation.

# E. Implentation Arrangements

**E.1 Governance and Management Arrangements and Structure**

The primary design consideration underpinning BCEP’s governance and management structure is the achievement of collaboration between implementing partners and synergy between interventions across the portfolio. The program-level processes will support learning and adaptation and the proactive management of risks to achieve outcomes. This will include development of fraud control strategies which meet DFAT contractual requirements. The MC will develop robust operational procedures during inception with training, communication and screening a central part of formalised sub-contracts and grants. The management arrangements at the component level will be tailored to the types of organisation involved. The arrangements for some components, such as media, churches and GoPNG (components 2, 4 and 5) build on well-established processes already in place. For the CfC and SA components flexible arrangements will facilitate an adaptive management approach.

## **E.2 Program level arrangements**

BCEP’s overall, program-level governance and management structure is represented in Diagram 3 below.

**Diagram 3: BCEP Management Structure**

 

By function, the key elements of this structure are:

1. **Oversight of program performance: Steering Committee**. The Governments of Australia and PNG will be represented on the Steering Committee through the Minister-Counsellor, AHC, and the Secretary of the Department of National Planning and Management (DNPM). Consistent with the importance of gender equality and social inclusion, the churches and CPP in BB, the Secretary of the Department for Community Development and Religion (DfCDR) will sit on the Steering Committee. The Committee will convene on a bi-annual basis to review the Program’s performance, manage program-wide risks, set strategic direction and approve the reports, plans and other key documents (eg Mid-Term Review).
2. **Operational oversight and direction: DFAT**. DFAT’s responsibilities include review and approval of BCEP’s operational and risk processes, documents, and decisions, including partner and issue selection. DFAT will also regularly engage with implementing partners through the program’s cross-cutting learning processes. The MC will have the direct responsibility for partner and grant management. DFAT will meet the MC at least monthly, more frequently during the Inception Phase. To support DFAT manage program implementation and provide advice on relevant policies and contextual issues, a full-time governance advisor, to be based at the Australian High Commission, will be independently engaged.
3. **Program management, coordination, learning and adaptation:**  DFAT will appoint a Managing Contractor (MC) to perform this role.Reporting to DFAT, the key responsibilities of the MC include developing and managing cross-cutting processes in: M&E and learning (see section F); gender and social inclusion (see section G); and thinking and working politically. The MC will be responsible for developing the program’s implementation of DFAT’s fraud control requirements. This will include processes for management of fraud across the program’s activities, a framework for reporting fraud risk to DFAT and how these policies will be communicated to all stakeholders.

The MC will be responsible for implementation of program coordination, grant and financial management, and DFAT’s risk management and fraud control requirements. The MC will develop grant agreements that incorporate the technical support required for the partner to deliver. The MC will be responsible to monitor and manage partner performance. It will provide technical advice on social accountability, coalition facilitation, and policy advocacy and research, and where necessary help the partner source additional expertise.

The MC will provide an in-country team of professionals to manage the program. Given the nature of the program, PNG nationals are preferred where available. Where international expertise is needed the MC will develop a plan to eventually localise the positions.

To facilitate the engagement with program partners, most of which will be Non-State Actors (e.g. Churches, media and CSOs), the MC will not be co-located inside a GoPNG department or the AHC but will set up a nearby office that is lean, self-sufficient and suitable to facilitate engagement with PNG partners and stakeholders.

1. **Scrutiny and Quality Review: A Quality Technical and Assurance Group (QTAG) will be established following the model of the review unit in currently place over the Governance Partnership’s.** DFAT will appoint to this group professionals with expertise across the five components and Gender Equality and Disability Inclusion to perform an ongoing part-time role as a ‘critical friend’ to the Program. Reporting to DFAT, they will review key program documents, conduct field review missions with DFAT and GoPNG counterparts, and provide formal advice to the Steering Committee on program performance in specified areas. The QTAG will also have an important role supporting program learning and adaption processes.

**E.3 Component arrangements**

1. **CfC Partnerships:** In the Inception phase, the MC will may assume management of over one possible grant agreement between DFAT- a CSO for CfC projects. In close collaboration with DFAT, they will identify up to two additional potential partners. On DFAT approval they will conduct due diligence including siting financial accounts and processes and negotiate grant agreements including provisions and clauses relating to fraud control in line with the Head Contract.

The MC will proactively manage risk at each step of the CfC project development process and ensure DFAT has a clear line of sight on progress. The MC will develop a structured CfC governance oversight and risk management process during the Inception Phase, identifying key decision-points for DFAT review and approval. This includes a Fraud Control Plan in the first month of inception. An indicative process is outlined in box 3 below.

In the Program Inception Report, the MC will develop a work-plan for the first year of implementation with indicators and targets (see indicative M&E matrix in Annex 1). The MC will also document the CfC development process in the Program Procedures Manual.

**Box 3: Indicative CfC development process**

The Design Team tested a mock selection process leading to the assessment of issues presented in Annex 7. DFAT is currently supporting one PNG CSO to develop a CfC proposal. The following three staged development process is based on that experience and on the practices developed with DFAT support in The Philippines. At each stage, the level of oversight will be proportionate to the risk. The three stages are:

**1. CfC Issues scoping and selection**: Supported by the MC, the CfC partner will conduct research to identify a pipeline of potential issues for scoping that align with: a) Australia-PNG development priorities (as communicated by DFAT), b) the emerging sectoral/geographic focus of the BCEP, as well as c) the partner organization’s mission and areas of strength. The pipeline will be screened by DFAT after which the CfC partner will conduct detailed scoping on approved concepts. The scoping will, in particular, assess the potential to assemble a coalition of sufficient influence to drive change and who stands to benefit if the projected outcomes are achieved. It will examine the likely outcomes for women and other excluded groups and the role they could play in the coalition.
A first round of scoping will be conducted during Inception Phase. That will build on the experience gained through the partnerships currently being developed by DFAT with the scale of scoping taking account of the funds committed to those projects. The MC and lead CSO partners will score and rank the issues and make a recommendation to DFAT on which should proceed to stage 2.Risks at this stage are managed by: i) rigorously assessing the potential for change on an issue, including drawing heavily on local PNG political and technical insights; ii) limiting the number of issues worked; iii) selecting issues where there is confidence that in the PNG context there are sufficient local partners, including those being supported through other strands of BCEP iv) identifying the potential of the issue to promote gender equality and social inclusion. The Inception Phase report will detail the approach to future project scoping.

**2. CfC Strategy development**: With MC support, the lead partner will develop a theory of change and lay out a process to assemble a coalition and the advocacy tactics to be adopted. The coalitions will take a range of forms depending on the nature of issue, and could include: i) Short-term and temporary: responding to a time-bound specific opportunities or threats; ii) Longer-term but still quite informal alliances; and iii) Long-term strategic coalitions: more formal, structured including with a secretariat. The strategies for CfC projects will be approved by DFAT and reviewed by the Steering Committee in annual program planning processes.
Risks at this stage are managed by: i) Setting a high bar in the approval process with only a limited number of projects proceeding to implementation; ii) Working with a range of coalition types

**3. CfC implementation**: the MC monitors the CfC partner’s coordination of coalition partners and delivery of the initiative according to the strategy. Using the strategy testing tool, the MC will facilitate regular reviews of the project’s progress against the theory of change.
The MC will include DFAT in CfC reviews where the risks are high with formal reporting on at six-monthly cycle. The MC will immediately notify DFAT if there any changes to project risks levels.
Risk at this stage are managed through: i) Building coalition facilitation skills in the lead CS partners, with the potential for twinning with international organisations assessed in inception phase; ii) Close monitoring of project progress; and iii) proactive identification

1. **Media Partnerships:** This component will be managed by ABC International Development (ABCID) under a grant agreement with the MC. The management arrangements will be largely similar to those for the preceding MDI. The team will include a Technical ABCID Director with ultimate responsibility to the MC for the management and reporting on the component and an In-country Team Leader with day-to-day management responsibility, reporting to the MC and the Technical Director. GESI expertise will also be included In this team.

During the inception phase, in collaboration with the MC, ABCID will develop an overall approach for the full implementation phase as well as a detailed year 1 work-plan for a) further strengthening the PNG media and b) and support to BCEP program partners to better engage with the media in meeting their policy influence objectives. A ToC that nests within the Program ToC will be developed alongside a Component M&E framework.

1. **Social Accountability Partnerships.** In the Inception phase, the MC will assume responsibility for the existing grant agreements between the DFAT and two INGOs to design and deliver social accountability initiatives. The MC will develop criteria and a process for adding other organisations to create a balanced portfolio of up to five partners. With only a few CSOs possessing the relevant expertise in PNG, a challenge fund type process would yield few benefits and carry reputational risks by raising expectations. Rather, BCEP will adopt a purposive selection process that minimizes the administrative burden on candidate organisations. The criteria will emphasize organisational track-record in social accountability (rather than quality of a single proposal),willingness to address gender and social inclusion issues, and willingness to work collaboratively as part of the program and, over time, ensure transition of implementation and management to local CSOs. The MC will manage each partner organization in accordance with their grant agreement and provide technical support as required to ensure delivery.
2. **Church Partnerships:** DFAT is currently leading a design update to reorient the structure, roles and funding approach for CPP (as well as a revision of the Results Framework), in line with broader CSEP objectives around greater church linkages and collaboration. The management arrangements will be broadly consistent with those outlined in the most recent CPP Charter (January 2021). This includes: a) high-level governance committee by senior representatives from Church partners, DFAT and GoPNG, and b) a management body sitting under the PNG Council of Churches with dedicated support provided through the MC.

The MC will be responsible for working with these governance and management bodies to ensure that the work of the Churches partners is integrated into the program. Church partners will contribute their experience to program-wide learning initiatives. As with existing operational arrangements. the MC will enter individual grant agreement with the ANGO partners of the PNG churches. The ANGO will be responsible to ensure funds are managed in accordance with DFAT requirements and to provide technical support and quality assurance. PNG Church partners will become eligible for direct funding if they meet DFAT’s due diligence requirements (as assessed by the MC); ANGOs will continue to provide capacity development support to facilitate the transition in funding arrangements where all partners wish to proceed in that direction.

In the Inception phase, the CPP Management (currently known as the Senior Operations Group) with support from the CPPCO and the MC will develop an implementation plan and finalise the Theory of Change and Results Framework that maximises coordination with the other components. Gender Equality and Social Inclusion expertise will be an important element of CPP.

1. **GoPNG Partnerships:** The MC will assume responsibility for DFAT’s current sub-contract with Catalpa International to deliver the DIRD program management system project. Current management arrangements will be continued. These include the DIRD Executive having responsibility for project oversight, with an internal Secretariat taking an overall coordination and decision- making role. Management arrangements for future projects with other government departments as required, including DNPM and DfCDR will be discussed and agreed with these stakeholders.

**E.4 Early Activities**

The program will be delivered across two phases, each of four years duration. The continuation of the program into Phase 2 will be subject to performance and ongoing utility of the BCEP and will be initiated solely by DFAT approval.

Phase 1 will consist of an Inception stage which will last 6 months, followed by a Delivery stage for the rest of the four-year period. During the first year, the MC will submit quarterly reports to DFAT on progress, which will be change to six monthly reports for the remaining live of the program.

Phase 1 activities and deliverables are:

|  |  |
| --- | --- |
| Activity/deliverable | Month due |
| 1. Program office set-up and team mobilisation
 | Month 1 |
| 1. **Inception Phase Plan**, including:
	1. Plan for transition of legacy projects into BCEP by month 3 (and novation of existing contracts to the MC including due diligence, review of partner financial and operational policies and statements and compliance with DFAT safeguards and financial policies)
	2. Plan for developing the Inception Report/Program Plan and Program Procedures Manual
	3. Fraud control plan in accordance with DFAT’s Fraud Control Toolkit for Funding Recipients
 | Month 1 |
| 1. **Stakeholder Engagement and Communications Plan**
 | Month 3 |
| 1. **Political Economy Mapping and Analysis** of the drivers for accountability in PNG

NOTE: this is expected to be a desk-based process, with some consultations to tailor the analysis to the specific of BCEP. It will include analysis of the current status of gender and social inclusion in relation to key partners. The purpose is to draw together relevant analysis as it relates to the Program ToC to inform BCEP’s adaptive management/thinking and working politically approach. The analysis will serve to build up common understanding across the team of the political economy situation in PNG and how the program will adapt in response to it; as well as provide a baseline at the start of the program for reference in regular tam reflection on the ToC in the future. The document should propose how the analysis will be regularly updated over the life of the program and used to inform decision-making  | Month 5 |
| 1. **Program Inception Report and Plan**, covering:
	1. Program progress against the Inception Plan
	2. Program Background: summary of PE analysis and lessons-learned from legacy projects
	3. Overall program approach to deliver the ToC through and adaptive programming approach. This will identify the specific sector and geographic focus (including rural and urban). Tthis focus is to be discussed and agreed with DFAT based on where best BCEP can complement existing Australian initiatives.
	4. Component approaches (NOTE; as mentioned above, the plans for some components, such as CPP, will be in place at program start and will not need to be developed other than to confirm how they will deliver their work as an integrated part of the overall program. The approaches for other components such as MDI will need to be developed.
	5. Learning and Collaboration approach
	6. Performance Assessment Framework, including VFM measures
	7. Gender Equality and Social Inclusion Strategy
	8. Governance and management arrangements
	9. Program Year 1 Work Plan and Budget
 | Month 6 |
| 1. **Program Operations and Procedure Manual**
 | Month 6 |
| 1. **Year 1 Quarterly Program Progress Reports**
 | As approp. |
| 1. **Years 2 to 4: Six Monthly Program Progress Reports**
 | As approp. |
| 1. **Years 2 to 4: Program Annual Work Plans (June to July**
 | As approp. |

**E.5 Policy Dialogue**

Given that this is a new, more explicit and coordinated approach to supporting state-citizen relations in PNG, a portfolio of relevant policy issues will need to be identified in consultation with the PNG Government. There are inherent sensitivities concerning state-citizen relations, and any policy dialogue will need to be carefully calibrated to take this into account. This will occur through the development of a policy dialogue matrix during the first six months of the program as part of the Joint Steering Committee’s initial agenda. The Joint Steering Committee itself will constitute a vehicle for policy dialogue.

Issues that we expect the program to explore include:

* Effective mechanisms to increase the responsiveness of policy makers to citizen interests
* How to promote collaboration between communities, the private and civil sectors, and government departments and/or service providers
* Improving government resource allocation and project implementation in line with community priorities.
* The role of churches in policy making, particularly in relation to delivery of essential service programs
* Promoting women’s representation and leadership
* Addressing data paucity for improved transparency

**E.6 Profile and Public Diplomacy**

The BCEP will play a central role in influencing public support for PNG and Australia’s mutual efforts to protect and promote democratic values, as outlined in the CSEP.

Four of the five components of the BCEP will have a broad audience and generate significant public diplomacy opportunities for PNG and Australia. In particular, the Church Partnerships Program, Social Accountability, Media Development and GoPNG Partnership components will generate a steady stream of public diplomacy opportunities. The Coalitions for Change component will be more removed from Australia’s public identity, and is not expected to generate significant public diplomacy opportunities.

A communications plan will be developed by the new managing contractor during the program’s inception phase, in close consultation with DFAT. This will include the usual array of media engagement opportunities for GoPNG and GoA Ministers, and events linked to capacity development and project launches; use of media, including social media and digital content; signage, and branding.

**E.7 Sustainability**

The challenges involved in achieving sustainable developmental change in the PNG context are well documented and widely accepted, including within DFAT. The changes BCEP seeks to achieve are ambitious and will only be achieved over the long-term. Australia’s commitment to PNG’s development is also of a long-term nature – in that context taking an innovative approach to surmount those challenges makes sense.

More specifically, BCEP will promote sustainable change in the following ways:

1. **Addressing deep-seated social norms**. By ensuring women and other marginalised groups are meaningfully engaged in coalitions and collective action BCEP will address the informal rules of the game that exclude these groups from decision-making processes. That will be of direct benefit of these groups **and** society as a whole.
2. **Replicating success**. BCEP will demonstrate that institutional change can be achieved by tackling tangible development problems. The program’s engagement with the media will enable it to publicise these successes creating pressure on leaders to sustain the changes and to replicate them in other locations and sectors.
3. **Behaviours and capabilitie**s. BCEP will empower PNG individuals and organisations through capacity building and by changing incentives in favour of constructive engagement. By tackling specific issues BCEP will build enduring capacity as follows:
	* The media (public and private, ‘new’ and ‘traditional’) to provide better quality and more inclusive and accessible information that reaches a larger PNG market,
	* The government to provide more transparent and reliable information and to engage with citizens more openly and constructively
	* Citizens and communities to access and make use of better-quality information to collectively act, voice their interests and constructively engage with government, particularly women and other marginalised groups.
	* Private sector understanding and capacity for how to constructively work with civil society and government to achieve policy change
	* Churches and other NSAs to better understand the interests and needs of citizens and communities (particularly women and other marginalised groups) and to act as effective intermediaries.

Churches and other NSAs to have their “own houses in order” in terms of being internally accountable for their performance and being able to build the capacity of partner PNG community-level partners.

1. **Processes**: BCEP will build enduring processes for community-government engagement, which are currently limited and opaque and are not serving PNG’s participatory democracy. These processes include building:
* formal spaces for constructive engagement such as the CIMC,
* capacity in methods for citizen-government engagement like those contained in social accountability tools, and
* informal skills for building relations with different social groups and facilitating negotiations between power holders and citizens.

By delivering through Papua New Guinean led coalitions and organisations BCEP will embed the new approaches to achieving change. The program is well positioned to take this approach leveraging off DFAT’s two long-running programs, CPP and MDI, which are managed by teams that are primarily or completely staffed by PNG nationals. The MC for BCEP will be encouraged to identify a management team that is similarly dominated by PNG nationals and/or develop a localisation plan to enable the program to transition to this situation by the end of phase 1. The intention is that over phase two, capacity in, and the success of, these process will lead to their adoption by other Australian development programs.

# F. Monitoring and Evaluation

To achieve outcomes, the program needs to be flexible and adaptive to the changing political context. Whilst important for the whole program, this orientation is particularly fundamental to the success of the CfC component. To meet these needs, the program requires robust but uncomplicated Monitoring, Evaluation, and Learning (MEL) systems. During inception the MC will develop an understanding of the strengths and weaknesses of existing approaches to MEL and work with partners to achieve an efficient and effective system that maximises common processes.

The central purpose of the MEL system is to generate information to track progress toward high-level outcomes and help the program understand why and how change is being influenced or not. To understand the reasons behind performance in changing governance dynamics requires a MEL system that brings together qualitative information with quantitative.

Annex K.1 provides a draft BCEP Performance Assessment Framework (PAF), which will be revised by the MC as a key deliverable in the Inception Phase. The draft PAF uses the template that DFAT has recently developed for facilities[[58]](#footnote-58) with adaptions for BCEP’s program approach. The PAF is designed to enable consistent assessment of BCEP performance both as an individual investment and as part of DFAT’s portfolio of similar, large-sized investments. The design of the PAF is adapted from the Balanced Scorecard model for assessing strategy and performance and comprises four components: 1) development result ; 2) stakeholders and partnerships; 3) operations; and 4) learning and adapting. The draft PAF contains an indicative set of result or performance expectations for each of these components with indicators and processes for data collection.

The remainder of this section outlines the Program’s overall approach to monitoring, evaluation and learning processes and resourcing requirements.

**F.1 MEL Approach**

MEL processes will be delivered at Program and component levels:

**Program MEL**: The main purpose of the program MEL system is to aggregate results from program components and partner interventions. This will enable an analysis of the extent to which the portfolio as whole is progressing toward outcomes and whether the assumptions underpinning the ToC are holding. Program MEL processes will provide information to support DFAT/MC decision-making on portfolio balance.

In the Inception Phase, the MC will work with component implementors to ensure that cross component alignment and cohesion is supporting the theory of change and is reflected in a detailed results framework to be developed during the inception phase. **Component MEL**: With its own stakeholders and implementation arrangements, each component requires distinct objectives. Whilst this diversity is a strength of the program, it will require a careful balance to ensure that MEL processes meet the specific needs of the component whilst delivering information on the progress of the overall program.

|  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
| **Component** | **Existing relevant M&E framework in place?** | **Level of aggregation** | **Resp.** | **M&E Approach** |
| 1. CfC
 | * 1 possible CfC partner: refine & continue frameworks
* New CfC partners: develop new frameworks
 | Individual partners M&E: results feed directly into Program M&E | Partners develops; MC quality assures | adaptive |
| 1. Media
 | * Media component: develop new M&E framework to replace MDI framework
 | Component level M&E: component results aggregation | ABCID develops; MC quality assures | Mix of adaptive & conventional |
| 1. SA
 | * 2 current SA partners: continue & refine
* New SA partners: develop new frameworks
 | Individual partners M&E: results feed directly into Program M&E | Partners develops; MC QAs | adaptive |
| 1. Churches
 | * CPP M&E framework to be completed by program start: refine & continue
 | Component level M&E: component results aggregation | CPP Manage-ment develops; MC QAs | Mix of adaptive & conventional |
| 1. GoPNG (DIRD)
 | * DIRD Project M&E framework in place: refine & continue
 | Component level M&E: component results aggregation | Catalpa Manage-ment develops; MC QAs | conventional |

**F.2 MEL Tools**

**Conventional tools**: Conventional M&E tools will be applied where problem and solutions are reasonably well-defined, and it is possible to identify predictable outcomes at the start of the intervention. These tools will be applied, for instance, to the technical interventions supporting DIRD implement a new program management system.

**Innovative tools**: More innovative M&E approaches are appropriate for interventions addressing complex problems, where an understanding of context is critical to success, and where the program needs to adapt as is more learned. This will be case across components 1 to 4, but particularly so in CfC projects. For these components qualitative information that reveals why and how change is happening is required. The MC will assess the following tools in inception:

* **Outcome Mapping**[[59]](#footnote-59): a planning, monitoring and evaluation approach that captures changes in the behaviour and relationships of key actors, and has been used extensively on social accountability initiatives.
* **Strategy Testing**[[60]](#footnote-60): developed by The Asia Foundations for their DFAT-funded coalitions for change work across South East Asia and successfully applied in PNG under DCP. The tool involves a four step process. The first step t is developing a working theory of change (with strategies and activities) which sets out the team’s ‘best guess’ about the nature of the problem and the most likely path to change. Second, after a short period of implementation the team reviews the ToC to see if it is still relevant to the context. Third, as appropriate, the expected outcomes and implementation strategies are revised. Fourth, the team documents how and why the ToC has been revised and identify any related programmatic, operational or budgetary implications. This process is regularly repeated.
* **The Gender Continuum[[61]](#footnote-61).**

The Gender continuum describes a series of development approaches which move from ‘gender negative’, where work actually reinforces damaging stereotypes, to ‘gender transformative’ where programmes seek to change the socio-cultural and economic structures and norms which reinforce and perpetuate gender inequalities. This will be applied as a monitoring tool to generate discussion on program interventions, where they fit on the continuum and what steps are needed to move further along the continuum towards gender transformation. All of these approaches force implementers to think strategically. Moreover, tracking progress in this way produces evidence in support of claims of contribution to the results observed. If too many obstacles are encountered during implementation and objectives are reviewed downwards, there may be good value-for-money reasons to scale-back investments or lose the intervention concerned. Minimum standards will be applied to all grant proposals to avoid investments in gender negative or gender-neutral approaches and targets may be developed over the lifetime of the program as an incentive for increased attention to gender sensitive and transformative work.

Providing information to inform management decisions on whether to continue or stop a project is an important purpose of MEL, especially for the CfC projects, where the instinct of implementing teams will often be to continue implementation regardless of the challenges being faced. The BCEP MEL processes will supply the Steering Committee with the information they need to make these decisions – doing so will enable the regular replenishment of the portfolio of CfC projects. Analysis by QTAG will support that decision-making process.

**Results database:** A database will be developed which will record qualitative and quantitative results tied to financial information. The data will be coded according to different criteria to allow comparative assessment. The database will generate reports on performance of the portfolio and will use infographics to present the data in a usable format, which can both communicate results, provide advocacy tools and support partners’ learning.

**F.3 Evaluation**

QTAG will conduct annual assessments of the overall program as well deep dives into one of the BCEP components. A comprehensive, independent Mid Term Review (MTR) will be also conducted by the QTAG team after two years of implementation. This will assess

* overall program effectiveness, efficiency, and the likelihood of achieving program outcomes by the end of the second phase.
* the specific value for money of BCEP’s three most innovative components, CfC (Component 1, SA (Component 2), and the DIRD Program Management System element of Component 5, to determine the value of scaling up funding to these components in the final two years of phase.
* the sustainability prospects of different components by the end of year four.

DFAT will use the findings of the MTR to determine whether the program is to be continued into a second phase.

In addition, the Quality Review and Learning function (critical friend) will have an important ongoing role in bringing evaluative thinking to support program reflection in key areas, such as applying strategy testing.

**F.4 Research**

BCEP will have the management capacity and resources to commission research studies to support program learning and adaption. This will include political economy and other studies to assess the feasibility of potential issues for CfC projects. Many of these projects will involve a degree of research to underpin policy solutions. Broader research will be undertaken to increase understanding of the complex and uncertain contexts where BCEP interventions are being implemented, case studies into BCEP partners’ work for effective dissemination and learning both within the program and outside, investigations of the program’s learning questions (see F.5), as well as action research led by PNG partners working alongside external researchers.

**F.5 Learning Processes**

In a challenging and unpredictable political and economic context, BCEP will pilot and learn from a range of interventions. Collective learning will be a fundamental driver of the success of the program.

Collective learning processes will be facilitated at program and component levels to address the different learning needs at each of these levels:

* **Program Learning**: focusses on learning between components to build coordination and synergy and breakdown silos. The MC and DFAT will proactively identify opportunities for learning and building linkages across the program. As the program evolves, learning opportunities to promote coordination with other Australian sectoral investments in which accountability of service providers is an important factor (e.g PATH, JSS4D, PW) will be developed. A structured series of program learning events will be conducted to examine specific problems and themes of relevance to a range of partners. These events will provide an opportunity for DFAT to track progress toward outcomes.
* **Component Learning**: focusses on learning between partners within a component, with a greater focus on the effectiveness of implementation. The MC will also plan a series of learning events for each component across the year.

The Inception Report will develop the detail of the learning approach (linked to the MEL framework) identifying learning objectives, questions and topics and how these are expected to contribute toward effectiveness). The contribution of program learning to outcomes will be measured in the PAF (see Annex 1). As outlined in F.4, the MC will have capacity to commission applied research to support learning objectives

**Examples of learning questions**

|  |  |
| --- | --- |
| **ToC level** | **Examples of Learning questions** |
| Goal | * Who benefits from improved citizen-government engagement?
* What do the beneficiaries value?
 |
| EIOs | * To what extent has the program brought diverse actors together to address agreed challenges?
* To what extent has the program enabled discriminatory gender and social norms to be addressed in policy and practice?
 |
| IOs | * How is CfC workstream including marginalised citizens and issues of equality and inclusion?
* How and in what ways are young people engaged?
* To what extent have women and other marginalised groups engaged with decision makers?
* How have coalitions supported by the program addressed women’s access to economic resources and or enhanced services?
* How has the program enhanced the voice of women and marginalised groups particularly persons living with disability?
* To what extent have churches improved their engagement with government
 |
| Outputs | * How GESI transformative are BCEP Partners and their programs?
 |
| Activities | * How are partners learning? What motivates them to learn?
 |
| Inputs | * Is BCEP identifying and partnering with the right organisations?
 |

**F.5 MEL Resourcing**

The overall cost for MEL is expected to be at least 10-12 % of the total program management budget. The MC will include a dedicated MEL Lead who will work closely with the Team Leader to support the adaptive management approach. In addition, the staff leading each of the five components will have MEL expertise. Additional short-term specialist facilitation to support learning processes will be deployed as required. In recognition of the limited expertise in MEL in PNG, the MC will take steps to provide professional development and build a cadre of national experts. At the component level, the legacy components will require their own dedicated MEL professionals while the new components will be supported by the MC.

# G. Gender, Disability and Other Cross Cutting Issues

**G.1 Gender Equality**

PNG is ranked 161 in the latest Human Development Report’s Gender inequality index[[62]](#footnote-62). This is based on an extremely high estimated maternal mortality ratio (145), women’s share of seats in parliament (0), low rates of women’s participation in the labour force (46%) and low rates of girls achieving at least some form of secondary education (10%).

PNG is one of only three countries in the world[[63]](#footnote-63) with no women in parliament; although their representation in decision making in the public sector is improving it remains low: a recent report estimates[[64]](#footnote-64) that women occupy just 36% of total public service positions at the end of 2019, while they continue to be significantly under-represented in leadership positions, with women occupying just 25 per cent of senior positions at the end of 2019 (Public Service Levels 16 - 20).

Furthermore, high levels of gender based violence present significant barriers to women in all aspects of life from travel, to employment to accessing services or participating in civic affairs.

Existing data[[65]](#footnote-65) suggest that 65.5% of women in rural and urban areas are affected by domestic violence and 62% of sexual abuse cases have involved children. This has economic consequences as well as presenting a serious barrier to access and delivery of services. In 2015 a study of three businesses operating in PNG showed that female staff subjected to gender-based violence lost an average of 8.3 work-days a year. One company estimated the cost in lost staff time as three million kina or 9 % of the total salary bill. Given that GBV is understood to affect a third of all women in PNG there is good reason to assume the same impact will be felt in all aspects of life[[66]](#footnote-66) .

These data suggest that little attention has been afforded to government’s accountability for the wellbeing, social and economic status of PNG women. This is in large part a result of the socio-political context of PNG which is essentially patriarchal (albeit with some matrilineal communities) and the social norms which this promulgates.

International evidence shows[[67]](#footnote-67) that for gender norms to change, inequality and exclusion need to be explicitly addressed and that some sectors have greater roles to play than others: the health sector (ensuring women have control over their fertility); education (ensuring girls and children with disability can safely access education and have equal opportunities with boys to access vocational and opportunities); justice (ensuring that women and girls are safe from GBV and where they are survivors have access to justice; governance (ensuring women and persons with disability enjoy the same civic and human rights as men); and economic sectors (ensuring women are economically empowered).

BCEP will work closely with all these sectors which already benefit from Australian investment as well as with Pacific Women Lead, a dedicated gender program whose experience of social normative change and gender transformative work will be a valuable resource for BCEP.

Sectoral collaboration for gender equality will be part of all five workstreams as appropriate: through CPP the Gender Equality Theology will be a key entry point, as will the new charter’s focus on enhanced participation of women. The SA workstream will draw on experience from these sectors and will contribute to them through their own local level learning adding value to existing investments. The MDI offers excellent opportunities to promote positive social norms and constructive gender role models both through entertainment programs as well as through debates. Work with DIRD will focus primarily on promoting the collection of disaggregated data regarding allocation of resources in order to enhance the evidence base for gender equality.

A gender strategy will be developed as a part of the Inception Report and Program Plan, based on the ToC and built on current evidence which identifies the key barriers to participation for women (e.g. GBV, economic dependence, lack of education, disability, social stigma) and which describes in detail gender equality objectives. These will include targeted areas of action under each IO as well as activities integral to all workstreams.

The percentage of activities which effectively address gender equality and disability inclusion will be tracked and this will be underpinned by a financial tracking system with spend targets for gender equality building on the experience of the current governance partnership.

Gender and disability disaggregated data will be collected wherever possible.

The BCEP OECD DAC marker is ranked as ‘Significant’ as it has both a dedicated End of Investment and Intermediate outcome targeting gender equality. Recognising the importance of gender to the program, the management team will included a dedicated GESI Lead as the Deputy Team Leader well as GESI specialist attached to each of the Components.

**G.2 Climate Change**

There is a growing international literature on climate change and increasing pressure on governments to respond[[68]](#footnote-68) The Pacific is already experiencing the impact of climate change particularly through extreme weather events such as drought, floods and cyclones which are adversely impacting livelihoods, critical infrastructure and productive industries. Evidence shows how important it is to ensure equitable and inclusive citizen engagement in climate change discussion to drive change and it is becoming clear that although women often suffer the consequences of climate change most for example where subsistence crops and sanitation systems are compromised, they are rarely consulted on climate policy.[[69]](#footnote-69)

The BCEP response to climate change is consistent with the goal of Australia’s ‘Climate change action strategy 2020-25’[[70]](#footnote-70) which states “We aim to support the goals of the Paris Agreement to address climate change and strengthen socially inclusive, gender-responsive sustainable development in our region, and beyond.” In addition, the strategy promotes social inclusion and gender equality, with a clear focus on the most vulnerable communities, especially women and girls, people with disability and indigenous peoples

The BCEP offers many opportunities to contribute to the climate change debate for example through its work with MDI and CPP as well as to support collective action both in responding to the impacts of climate change and ensuring these are equitable, and in reducing the risks of climate change through its SA and CfC approaches.

**G.3 Disability Inclusiveness**

Consultations with networks of persons with disability (PWD)[[71]](#footnote-71) concur that PWD have very limited access to decision making processes at any level. There has been no prevalence study on disability to date but the WHO global estimate of 15% of the population is generally accepted with only an estimated 2% receiving services[[72]](#footnote-72). This suggests that more than a million people in PNG are living with some form of disability or impairment. A recent citizen perception survey commissioned by the DCP found that PWD are less educated, under greater financial hardship and more likely to be reliant on subsistence farming. In addition, PWD have limited opportunity to contribute to decision-making and poor access to services.

In many areas cultural and traditional norms have a great influence over lives of people with disabilities often excluding them from community life, education or employment and attaching shame to their families. A new Disability Authority Bill is currently awaiting endorsement and seeks to ‘*break barriers that prevent Persons with Disability from enjoying equal rights to every aspect of political social economic and cultural life, and creating opportunities for their equal access to health, education and other services’*.

Women and girls with disabilities are at greater risk from all forms of violence than are those without disabilities and disability is both a cause and consequence of gender-based violence.[[73]](#footnote-73)

BCEP is aligned with the connection of the rights of persons with disabilities[[74]](#footnote-74) and will build on the successes of DCP in supporting legislative reform and on the recent Guidance procedures Disability Inclusion in PNG programs (2021). Particularly pertinent are the principles of ‘supporting an active and pertinent role for people with disabilities’, ‘nothing about us without us’ and ‘taking into account the interaction between gender and disability and improving the inclusion of a diverse range of people with disabilities’.

The focus of the BCEP in the first phase will be on ensuring that networks of persons with disability are supported to develop their voice and agency and to contribute to development policy and decision making. This is articulated under Objective 1 of the guidance note and aligns with the PNGADP strategy ensuring that the issue of disability inclusive development will remain a key advocacy issue. Furthermore, the collection of disaggregated data will be critical to the program’s MEL approach at the program level but also through the DIRF component; ensure that PWD can access consultations and learnings for example through the availability of signing services for the deaf at annual learning for specific attention to including PWD networks through calls for proposals and in targeted capacity building for example around coalition building.

**G.4 Private Sector**

The private sector will be important partner for BCEP in particular being an important player in the coalitions for change component. In general the incentives to engage on economic development issues are strong making these central to the CfC component. The program will engage across the range of PNG’s different private sector actors as relevant to the issue identified.

In component 2, private media houses (across traditional and digital platforms) will be BCEP partners alongside the public broadcaster. The social accountability work in component 3 is expected to include engagement with private sector organisations where they are engaged by government to deliver services. A major private sector IT contractor will be engaged to deliver the government’s new MIS system under component 5.

In addition, the Program will seek to develop relationships with the private sector to promote program learning and innovation. For example, there are many more successful women in the PNG business world than in the public sector - BCEP will learn from business on the promotion of gender equality.

**G.5 Innovation**

BCEP’s adaptive programming approach, which integrates components in CfC and SA with more long-standing and conventional programs, and includes a focus on transforming gender norms, is highly innovative. The adaptive programming approach is new for DFAT, and BCEP will be among Australia’s largest and most ambitious such initiatives in PNG or elsewhere. While DFAT has implemented CfC and SA programs with success elsewhere, BCEP represents Australia’s most significant and purposeful investment in these approaches in Papua New Guinea[[75]](#footnote-75). Moreover, the inclusion of well-established initiatives (in CPP and MDI) in a program with these new approaches is designed to (a) influence these initiatives and contribute to elevating their level of performance while (b) minimizing the risk for DFAT of investing in new initiatives. The program draws on latest thinking and learning on gender development in PNG and elsewhere to ambitiously focus on transforming gender as a part of promoting citizen-government engagement. The program includes strong evaluation and learning processes to continuously assess how the new components and approaches are working and why.

# H. Budget, Resources and Value for Money

**H.1 Budget**

The budget allocation for BCEP across the eight years (four plus four) of implementation is up to
$187.7 million, with up to $87.7 million for the first four years of programming. The estimate for the MC includes program personnel and their support costs, operational costs, MEL and QTAG. Current estimates have MEL related inputs (including significant inputs from MC senior management covered in the core team and operations budget) at 11% of the budget. The MC has been designed to provide management support across all components, however some components have their own management resources which are subsumed under the component budget (this is for the Media and DIRD components of GoPNG Partnerships).

One of the hallmarks of good adaptive program management is the willingness to reallocate resources within and between components in a portfolio to achieve value for money and predictability in aggregate spend. Accordingly, the allocations in the table below are provisional. They allow in particular for a measured expansion or scaling back of interventions in those areas where experience is most limited, including CfC and SA in the second half of phase one, subject to outcomes from an assessment of performance in the Mid-Term Review. Component 4 represents the largest budget line which does not include CPPCO’s management costs which are covered in the MC budget. This will provide some flexibility for the MC to allocate management costs efficiently and maximise coordination between and within components. Detailed budgets for components will be developed during the Inception Phase and will consider any changes in implementation plans for existing investments (it is expected that some of the assumptions used to calculate these budget lines will need revision).

**Table 1: Indicative budget**

|  |
| --- |
| **Four plus four years (in millions)** |
| **Budget by function/component** | **Total** | **Year 1** | **Year 2** | **Year 3** | **Year 4** |
| Program Management (including MEL) | 20 | 5 | 5 | 5 | 5 |
| Component 1: Coalitions for Change | 8.5 | 1.2 | 1.8 | 2.3 | 3.2 |
| Component 2: Media partnerships | 11.2 | 2.8 | 2.8 | 2.8 | 2.8 |
| Component 3: Social Accountability | 6.6 | 1.2 | 1.8 | 1.8 | 1.8 |
| Component 4: Church Partnerships  | 32 | 8 | 8 | 8 | 8 |
| Component 5: GoPNG Partnerships | 9.4 | 3.4 | 2 | 2 | 2 |
| TOTAL | **87.7** | 21.6\* | 21.4 | 21.9 | 22.8 |

\*Year 1 includes funding for investments to be novated from the existing program. The existing investments under Component 5 (the development of DIRD’s MIS) are expected to be completed in Year 1, which is why the budget for this line drops at beginning of Year 2

**H.2 Resources**

The MC’s chief function is to realise collaboration and coordination across the five components. They are responsible for: core program and operational management including GESI, political expertise, risk and safeguard management (including fiduciary risk) and MEL. The core management team will include long-term and short-term personnel needed to manage the program and their support costs. The team’s leadership will bring together experience in managing large and complex development initiatives with knowledge and skills in adaptive management, demand side accountability programming, MEL and GESI Recruitment in BCEP will give preference to PNG nationals in the management team, where suitable is expertise is available, and/or have a plan to localise positions over the life of phase 1. A strong team of PNG nationals is a necessary condition for supporting BCEP’s decision-making processes presented in the effectiveness section below, and to achieve VFM more widely.

The MEL function is vital to the success of the program. This function will require international expertise to support the development of the MEL system (including the database required to implement and manage the system) and enable facilitation of the six monthly (or more) reflection cycles required for effective adaptive management as well as a capacity to bring together more traditional frameworks in a coherent and efficient way. As a part of the MC’s localisation plan, the program will provide resources towards increasing the capacity of locally engaged MEL professionals towards localisation of BCEP’s MEL services over phase one. The MEL function will also include capacity in research and communications and knowledge management to facilitate internal and external learning and coordination.

Notwithstanding localisation objectives, sourcing relevant expertise in PNG in MEL, as well as CfC and SA, is expected to be challenging. The MC will need to explore innovative arrangements such as offshoring and remote work with periodic in country presence to attract highly qualified international personnel to inputs and support, particularly in the beginning years.

The QTAG provides resources as outlined in section F above, and includes funding for a full-time Governance Adviser position based in the AHC to support the DFAT-JAS team’s engagement with the MC and oversight of program implementation.

**H.3 Value for Money**

BCEP’s central value for money proposition derives from bringing five components together in an integrated program portfolio that combines large, well-established initiatives alongside small and innovative initiatives. A strong MC management function will drive enhanced coordination, delivering both operational efficiencies and strategic effectiveness. In the predecessor
PNG-Australia Governance Partnership, economies of scale were achieved at an operational level. However, the disparate nature of the interventions under a facility three times the size of BCEP, presented severe coordination challenges. In contrast, BCEP is a smaller program that brings together components with strong complementarities under an overarching ToC that provides the basis for realising synergies and maximising strategic effectiveness.

**Expected program benefits**

BCEP will provide benefits through a range of interventions within a balanced portfolio. The precise benefits will be identified once the Program determines implementing partners and the issues of focus. However, the benefits will take the form of intermediate results in the areas in such as improved performance by service delivery agents through social accountability interventions. These will contribute in aggregate to medium-term outcome level results associated with institutional changes such as improved transparency and reduced corruption. This will in turn help to deliver sustained material results in the longer term.

Table 3 summarises potential program benefits under two broad headings:

* the benefits associated with more responsive government and stronger democratic processes which include: better access to information; increased levels of citizen engagement; better legislation and policy;
* tangible benefits to citizens from: better use of public sector resources; improved access to services; and improved economic opportunities and livelihoods.

**Table 3: Summary Benefits**

|  |  |
| --- | --- |
| **Benefit Area** | **Summary of potential benefits** |
| **1. Government is more responsive and accountable** |
| Improved access to information. | * More citizens have knowledge and understanding of important issues allowing them to in particular to engage with sub-national government authorities to improve expenditure allocations or to prevent misuse of funds.
* More citizens have the skills to use the information they acquire, through local level action.
 |
| Increased levels of citizen engagement  | * More citizens feel informed and empowered enough to:
	+ raise complaints about service delivery;
	+ express views through social media, letters to editors etc.; and
	+ track government expenditure at local levels.
* All of which is expected to improve service delivery with associated welfare improvements.
 |
| Better regulation, legislation and policy, including on the needs of marginalised groups | * Better legislation and policy to, for example, increase the transparency on how public services are delivered
* Better policy and regulation of markets to create an environment for more inclusive growth.
 |
| Strengthened rule of law. | * Developers, for example in the extractives sector, abide by environmental legislation, avoid pollution, compensate neighbouring communities and pay the appropriate taxes (dependent on the choice of issues in the CfC component).
 |
| **2. Tangible benefits to citizens** |
| Public sector budgets are more responsive to needs of poor or marginalised groups | * Money re-allocated to high priority expenditure including basic services, and infrastructure.
* Plans are transparent.
* Money is spent according to plans.
* Funds which have been misused are recovered and further waste prevented.
 |
| More people have better access to improved basic services | * More people have affordable access to clean water.
* Girls and boys in school have access to teaching and materials required to improve education quality.
* More people have reliable access to essential medical supplies and drugs.
* People are able to access services which should be free, without need for payments.
 |
| Improved economic opportunity and better livelihoods | * Better profits for properly regulated businesses, plus better tax and export revenue earnings.
* Poor people secure improved job opportunities and higher incomes as a result of better functioning markets.
* More poor people, including women and young people, are able to secure land rights or secure livelihoods through sustainable use of natural resources.
 |

**The balance of costs and benefits**

There are a number of significant challenges in weighing the benefits of a program such as BCEP against its costs.

* Although it is possible to identify in broad terms how the program will provide benefits (as in table 3) it is very difficult to specify benefits in detail for an adaptive program of this nature at this stage when it is not clear exactly how resources will be committed.
* Whilst previous programs have achieved results there is limited evidence in terms of the number of beneficiaries and the monetary value of benefits (this design allows for the development of a database of results so that a rigorous analysis of BCEP will be possible).
* Some of BCEP’s benefits, such as increased empowerment of communities and more effective participation in democratic processes, cannot be easily quantified or monetised to compare against costs.
* In many instances BCEP funding, will be a contribution to change (alongside other processes and expenditure) and the scale of this contribution is very difficult to isolate.

Notwithstanding these constraints, the international evidence from several countries indicates that relatively low-cost interventions to empower communities to take collective action together with service providers can lead to results of high individual value. For instance the construction of primary school facilities (such as classroom blocks), the deployment of additional staff in schools and health facilities; improvements in the availability of drugs; timely opening of health centre and clinics; and the completion of important development projects funded from public resources. In aggregate, these results will be of significant value, particularly when they incorporate better accountability arrangements that sustain the improvements. A UK FCDO investment in a Malawi accountability program of similar design and scale to BCEP, calculated that an improvement in the efficiency in the use of SIP type grants and other local level public expenditure flows of just 2.5% represented the break-even point for the investment.

That calculation excluded the significant added value from high-level policy changes for which the local level action helps provide the foundation (including by establishing the authority to engage on policy debates). The DFAT supported Coalitions for Change Program in Philippines provides one such example. Work undertaken through program was instrumental in the introduction of the first ever sin tax on cigarettes. The tax was directly earmarked to increase the number of Filipinos eligible for free health care. This reform resulted in billions of dollars being allocated annually, benefitting hundreds of thousands of families. The total cost of the CfC reform was less than AUD 250,000. There are other similar examples of high benefit: cost ratios from FCDO CfC style interventions in Zambia, Rwanda and Malawi.

**Measures to assess and secure value for money through the procurement and implementation process**

DFAT will manage and secure VfM in the implementation of BCEP through:

* a competitive process for selection of a MC to deliver the program and the subsequent development of a measures of VfM within the BCEP PAF;
* the inclusion of VfM indicators in grant agreements, including for the CPP for the first time;
* a competitive process for the selection of service providers to deliver support to CfC partners and subsequent agreement on indicators to assess the VfM of projects supported under this component.

Under each of these areas, the specification of VfM measures will depend upon the specific interventions. However, there are some general indicators that could be developed as part of the PAF and applied across the portfolio of interventions. These include some mandatory PAF indicators, as summarised against each of DFAT’s four VfM categories and eight principles:

|  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |
| **Economy**  | **Efficiency** | **Effectiveness** | **Ethics** |
| 1. Cost consciousness
2. Encouraging competition
 | 1. Evidence based decision making
2. Proportionality
 | 1. Performance and Risk Management;
2. Results Focus
3. Experimentation and innovation
 | 8. Accountability and transparency |

***Economy***

The core program management costs, stripping out technical assistance and capacity building, will be an important indicator of the economy being delivered by the MC. The contractor’s performance will be measured against a target ratio of management costs to total expenditure to be set in Inception, with remedial actions being agreed between DFAT and the MC if the performance falls short of that benchmark. This provision will be built into the contract with the MC.

The quality of MC’s procurement processes, including the use of realistic benchmarks to control costs, will be an additional economy indicator. The need to ensure the appropriate levels of input quality, including of program staff and technical assistance, will be factored into the assessment of this indicator.

When providing grants the partners overhead and management costs will be closely assessed and their procurement procedures rigorously tested, as part of the decision-making process.

***Efficiency (including Ethics****)*

Program level efficiency indicators will be set when the program outputs are finalised in inception phase. Noting the DFAT mandatory efficiency indicators already included in the PAF. For each component, they will include links between the achievement of outputs and levels of expenditure.

Efficiency indicators are likely to capture:

* the efficiency of grant management processes for example the transparency and speed of grant making, the time absorbed in grant management, the numbers of organisations reached and the communities they work with, the quality of monitoring and the response to poor performance;
* the quality and timeliness of reporting;
* accuracy in forecasting and disbursing annual budgets.

***Effectiveness (including Ethics)***

As program resources are committed, the MC will develop a set of effectiveness indicators based on the planned intermediate results and outcomes of the interventions to be supported. This will apply in particular to CfC projects where decisions can be subject to ex ante cost benefit analysis. Criteria to support decision-making in this component will be agreed in the inception phase along with the appraisal processes such as political economy analysis. These criteria may be used for investments in other components and could include:

* Has the investment considered the power of relevant interests, including the “blockers” and “supporters” of change?
* Does the investment create confidence that a positive balance of power in favour of change is achievable?
* Are the proposed solutions technically feasible (can it be delivered, and will it address the problem)?
* Have the political winners and losers from the proposed solution been considered?
* Are the risks manageable?
* Will the project lead to greater accountability of leaders and decision-makers?
* Will the project lead to a more positive engagement between groups in society?

All interventions will be assessed for their impact on women, girls and excluded groups in line with the principles presented in section F.2. In general proposals for all investments will be expected to provide a plausible account of expected results linked to implementation plans.

Effectiveness indicators will include beneficiary numbers. They might also include measures that capture the value of public resources that as a consequence of programme interventions are being used more effectively as well as benefits to poor people from increased employment and/or incomes. Disaggregation will focus on effectiveness in reaching women and girls and other vulnerable groups. The MCwill be required to put in place MEL arrangements to capture and aggregate results. DFAT will assess its performance in doing so.

# I. Procurement and Partnering

DFAT will procure a MC to implement the BCEP through a competitive open tender process. The MC will be engaged through one contract to deliver the services outlined in the Statement of Requirements which will include establishment of the primary management mechanism. The MC will be responsible for effective management of a novation of a number of existing investments, including CPP, DIRD and MDI as stand-alone components and integration of existing activities. The MC will have the capacity to implement the broad range of delivery mechanisms required across the components including more flexible, adaptive approaches, the capacity to think and work politically within PNG to effective grant management, adhering to DFAT policies. The Management Contractor’s team will be competent in monitoring and evaluation for continuous improvement and have the capacity to coordinate both across the components, DFATs broader accountability portfolio and other donor funded investments.

# Risk Management and Safeguards

Fraud risks are high in PNG and the MC is required to maintain a rigorous fraud control and risk management regime in accordance with DFAT’s requirements including as outlined in DFAT’s Fraud Control Toolkit for Funding Recipients and Risk Management Guide for Aid Investments. The following assumptions in particular will require close monitoring by the MC in close cooperation with DFAT:

* That the operating environment for civil society is sufficiently conducive for collaboration with government and other stakeholders to yield opportunities for reform and influence.
* That CSOs can be persuaded that collaboration on commonly agreed issues is in their interest and that of their members and beneficiaries.
* That GoPNG partners can similarly be persuaded that collaboration is in their interests and that the weaknesses in capacity and will to be engage openly can be overcome.

Risks that may impact on the delivery of the contract include:

* Sub-contractors and grantees fail to plan and implement institutional strengthening activities needed to improve performance and ensure accountability.
* Sub-contractors and grantees financial, risk and operational management systems are not fit-for-purpose to meet contractual and accountability obligations.
* Operating context is impacted by the COVID-19 pandemic with implications on: health and safety of personnel, travel restrictions inhibit movement of personnel both within and to Papua New Guinea with an impact of capacity to mobilise international expertise and more broadly on the development of relationships with stakeholders; and stakeholders capacity to engage with the program is decreased due to pandemic response activities.
* Management of internal and external communications does not address a lack of understanding regarding the more innovative nature of some components (CfC and SA) leading to a lack of engagement and impacting increased uptake of the approach.
* Sub-contractors and grantees do not adequately address the monitoring, evaluation and learning system in their own organisations, so there is incomplete or insufficient evidence to influence policy and practice, or to report on achievements.
* Insufficient resources or authority is given to the MC to enable their critical convening, partnership building and CSO empowerment role, and other functions such as supporting civil society partners to meet financial, risk management audit and other obligations (child protection, anti-corruption, terrorism safeguards).

To manage these risks, the MC will develop fraud control and risk identification and mitigation measures in accordance with relevant DFAT guidelines. , DFAT will maintain a clear line of sight and decision-making authority over all program interventions. DFAT will ensure that the MC is assessing and managing risk according to DFAT’s requirements through a range of mechanisms including inclusion of fraud provisions and clauses in relevant agreements and contracts, and active management by DFAT of MC governance frameworks. These requirements will be stipulated in the head contract and assessed on a regular basis.

The MC will develop robust operational processes during the inception phase to ensure that DFAT policies are adhered to, including environment and social safeguards, fraud control, child protection and prevention of sexual abuse and harassment, gender equality and social inclusion, and health and safety. MC staff and sub-contractors/grantees are to receive appropriate training on implementation of these policies and tools to ensure adherence throughout implementation. Obligations regarding understanding and adherence to policies are to be built into sub-contractor/grantee agreements, with the MC responsible for monitoring and reporting compliance and ensuring communication and training. Auditing and reporting requirements outlined in these policies are to be included in operational procedures including regular updates to DFAT’s Risk and Safeguard Tool and compliance reported six-monthly through the PAF. The MC will have experience in the effective management of fiduciary risk and fraud control to DFAT requirements and report to DFAT on a regular basis as outlined in the head contract.

This will include oversight of partner compliance with operational policies, requiring expertise at the operational level, in particular to review partner financial reports and undertake additional due diligence and risk processes to ensure compliance with safeguards and financial policies. The Program’s reliance on PNG partners to deliver high-level outcomes, makes achievement of these outcome more difficult but also more sustainable. In addition, this approach serves to mitigate Australia’s potential reputational risks as DFAT’s engagement in the program remains at arm’s length from day-to-day delivery. To manage these risks the MC and DFAT will ensure regular communications regarding the risks to delivery of the program using the DFAT Risk and Safeguards tool as a basis of discussion.

# Annexes

**Building Citizen Engagement in**

**Papua New Guinea (BCEP) Program**

**Investment Design Document Part 2:**

**Section K—Annexure**

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## Indicative Performance Assessment Framework

The Performance Assessment Framework (PAF) outlined below is indicative. Reviewing and revising this document is one of the MC’s key Inception Phase deliverables. Following DFAT’s current guidance, the indicative PAF below provides performance measures in the following four categories:

1. Development Results: What are the prospects that the end of investment outcomes (EIOs) will be achieved?
2. Stakeholders and Partnerships: How is the program engaging stakeholders and partners and meeting their needs?
3. Operations: How is the program managing and delivering key operations?
4. Learning and Adapting: How is the program adapting to opportunities and improving?

The Development Results and indicators (category 1) have been tailored specifically to BCEP. The indicators under categories 2 to 4 are taken from the DFAT PAF template. In the Inception Phase, all indicators, but particularly those under categories 2 to 4, need to be closely reviewed. The number of indicators could also be rationalized.

The information under the four categories is presented in accordance with DFAT’s “Minimum M&E requirements” template for designs. This template contains the same information as DFAT’s PAF template but presents the information in a slightly different form.

#### **Development Results**

#### **End of Investment Outcomes**

|  |
| --- |
| **Goal** |
| **Desired result** | **Indicator** | **Data collection method & frequency** | **Risks** | **Who will collect and analyse the data** | **Baseline** | **Target** | **Use** |
| **To strengthen citizen-government engagement for improved service delivery and provision of public goods** | 1. Extent of government effectiveness**1**
2. Extent of civil society and media effectiveness/ diagonal accountability**2**
3. Extent of political inclusion/social group equality**3**
 | 1. World Bank World-wide governance indicators
2. Varieties of Democracy (V-Dem) Index
3. V-Dem Index
 |  |  |  |  |  |

**Notes: Goal**

* + - 1. **Extent of government effectiveness:** composite indicator which measures expert assessments and popular perceptions of the quality of public services, the competence of the civil service and its independence from political pressure, the quality of policy formulation and implementation (including the efficiency of revenue mobilization and budget management), and the credibility of the government’s commitment to stated polices**.**
			2. **Extent of civil society and media effectiveness/ diagonal accountability**: composite indicator measuring the actions and mechanisms that civil society organizations (CSOs) and independent media use to hold government accountable
			3. **Extent of political inclusion/social group equality**: composite indicator measuring the scope of equal protection in regards to civil liberties\* across social groups (ethnicity, religion, caste, race, language and region). Such political inclusion largely reflects the commitment on the part of government to provide equal protection to civil liberties for all of its citizens, and more broadly assesses a country’s commitment to include and protect marginalized social groups

\*Civil liberties are understood to include access to justice, private property rights, freedom of movement and freedom from forced labor.

|  |
| --- |
| **End of Investment Outcomes** |
| **Desired result** | **Indicator** | **Data collection method & frequency** | **Risks** | **Who will collect and analyse the data** | **Baseline** | **Target** | **Use** |
| **1. Selected** **State and Non-State actors\* collaborate effectively to tackle targeted development problems**\*“**Non-state actors**” includes: a) Social groups (ethnic groups, marginalised groups—women, people with disabilities, youth etc.) b) individual businesses & business associations; c) NGOs, CSOs, community-based organisations, and d) Government departments (national, provincial, local)  | * 1. Number (and description) of instances where BCEP NSA partners and associates facilitate collective action, meeting at least 2 of the following quality criteria:
	2. the priorities and participation of excluded groups has been integrated into the work of the coalition;
	3. the participation of actors with the power to influence decision-makers has been integrated into the work of the coalition;
	4. groups that would not normally work together do so in a constructive fashion.
	5. Number (and description) of instances where BCEP supported coalitions contribute to the polices that are reformed/developed, implemented and sustained beyond Australian assistance, meeting at least 1 of the following quality criteria:
	6. Resources for local development are allocated in a more transparent and equitable manner;
	7. Providers deliver service at a local level in a more transparent and fair manner;
	8. A national level policy change or commitment that provides more transparent and enabling business or human development environment;
	9. A change to policies rules or guidelines that will formalize the participation of the appropriate range of actors in future decision-making processes (citizens, CSOs, private sector, government)
 | BCEP Partner Reports provide description of instance showing how criteria were met (instance recorded on the program database) Annual collectionNB The standards/criteria for **instances** finalised in Inception Phase | Documentation of instances is not collected, and achievement of indicator cannot be supported (This can be mitigated by M&E tools to include means for collection of qualitative information) | BCEP partner collects dataPMT aggregates and analyses data at a program levelQTAG verifies a sample of results/reports  | * 1. No baseline needed. (not comparing with the past)
	2. As for 1.1
 | To be developed annually in inception phase, once BCEP partners have been selected |  |
| **2. Targeted PNG decision-makers7** **explicitly integrate gender equality & inclusive social norms into efforts to tackle targeted development problems****“Decision-makers”** includes: Elected Government officials (all levels); Appointed officials (all levels); Church officials (all levels); Community leaders | * 1. Number (and description) of polices that NSA partners have helped to reform/develop, implement and sustain beyond Australian assistance to have a **strengthen impact** on gender and inclusion issues
	2. Number (and description) of **instances** where decision-makers have actively promoted gender equality and/or inclusive social norms related to BCEP interventions.
	3. Number of women promoted to leadership roles (at government, Church or community levels) related to BCEP interventions.
 | As above (for EO1)In Inception Phase, standards and criteria set for what is meant by ‘strengthened impact’ set with reference to the gender continuum\*\*NB The criteria for “significant instances” finalised in Inception Phase | As above (for EO1) | As above (for EO1) | 2.1 No baseline needed2.2 No baseline needed2.3 No baseline needed2.4. No baseline needed  | To be developed in inception phase. To be based on the degree of progression along the gender continuum eg measuring % of reformed policies which move from gender negative to neutral; gender neutral to parity; gender parity to responsive; gender responsive to transformative. |  |

**\*\*Note:** The gender continuum defines behaviours and attitude that range from negative, at one end, to positive/transformative at the other end as follows:

* Negative: discrimination promoted
* Neutral: no recognition of discrimination
* Gender parity: eg. Public presentation on gender issues (Discriminatory nature of discrimination is acknowledged & there is a commitment to focus on parity of participation in policy processes)
* Gender responsive: Action is taken to meet the needs of different groups. Eg dedicated resources allocated to GESI activities; GESI strategy developed
* Gender transformative: Action is taken to challenge and address root causes of inequality high (Eg women promoted to leadership roles; discriminatory policies and practices changed)

| **Intermediate Outcomes** |
| --- |
| **Desired result** | **Indicator** | **Data collection method & frequency** | **Risks** | **Who will collect and analyse the data** | **Baseline** | **Target** | **Use** |
| 1. **NSA partners better represent all their constituents and effectively engage with decision-makers on targeted development problems**
 | * 1. Number (and description) of social accountability processes carried out by BCEP partners with the community, meeting quality criteria
	2. Number (and description) of policy engagements based on social accountability evidence at national and provincial levels. (disaggregated by delivery partner – Churches, INGOs, CSOs)
	3. Number (and description) of Issues-based projects implemented, meeting quality criteria
	4. Number of pieces of evidence produced and disseminated, meeting quality criteria
	5. Extent to which BCEP GESI strategy is implemented
	6. All policies/laws/practices (number and description) that BCEP partners intend to work on **reviewed** for their impact on gender and inclusion issues
 | BCEP Partner Reports (as recorded on the program database) Bi-annual collection | Program provides M&E tools that are too complicated, onerous for application at community levels.  | BCEP partner collects data PMT aggregates and analyses data at a program levelQRG verifies a sample of results/reports  | * 1. No baseline needed
	2. No baseline needed
	3. No baseline needed
	4. No baseline needed
	5. No baseline needed
 | Number of studies and other evidence pieces that are specifically gender or social inclusion related |   |
| 1. **Citizens’ are empowered to access and act on increased and better-quality information on government services, rights and responsibilities**
 | * 1. Number of citizens (general audience) reached through most extensive means of information dissemination (general Information): TV, National Radio, and National Newspapers.
	2. Number of citizens (targeted audience) reached through dissemination of tailored information: Local & Church Radio, large print runs of publications, outreach through community meetings, Church sermons, bill-boards, website hits, You-tube downloads
	3. Percentage of people whom are more aware and better understand their rights to access informaion
 | Bi-annual collection* 1. Measured by collating the total number of people reached by mass media by MDI partners
	2. Measured by collating the total number of people targeted to receive information (including training information) by BCEP partners. Disaggregated by age, gender and location (rural/urban)
	3. Annual PNG Citizen Perceptions of Governance and Media Engagement Survey (ABCID)
 | Companies to measure the audience for different media in PNG could have weak capacity. | * 1. MDI and MDI partners
	2. BCEP partner

PMT aggregates and analyses data at a program levelQRG verifies a sample of results/reports | * 1. No baseline needed
	2. No baseline needed
 | Targets for both indicators to be set in Inception |  |
| 1. **Women’s and other marginalised citizens’ groups\* engage more effectively with decision-makers to influence positive change in targeted services and policies**

**\*Citizen groups** can be formal or informal entities | * 1. Number (and description) of instances where BCEP supported women’s group engage effectively with decision makers at national & local levels, meeting quality criteria
	2. Number of instances where BCEP supported groups for other marginalised people engage effectively with decision makers at national & local levels, meeting quality criteria
	3. Number of citizen groups for people with disabilities utilising newly learned skills for policy engagement
 | 3.1 Bi-annual collectionStandards and criteria for quality to be developed during inception phase.To be collected using qualitative tools such as outcome mappingMedia articles; reports; key agendas (DDC, LLG etc)National disability day/AIDS reports day/international women’s day; 16 days of activism | As above | BCEP partnerPMT aggregates and analyses data at a program levelQRG verifies a sample of results/reports | No baseline needed | Targets s to be set in Inception |  |
| 1. **The PNG Government is more capable of generating more reliable and transparent information and engaging with community stakeholders on key delivery areas**
 | * 1. Number of reports DIRD produces and makes publicly available providing information
	2. Quality of dissemination of DIRD reports to the public
	3. Quality of gender and disability data disaggregation and analysis
 | DIRD’s Integrated SIP MS and the DIMS | As above | * 1. BCEP partner
	2. BCEP partner
	3. BCEP partner

PMT aggregates and analyses data at a program levelQRG verifies a sample of results/reports | No baseline needed | Targets s to be set in Inception |  |

1. Quality criteria for these indicators to be develop during Inception Phase. Quality criteria for evidence generation and dissemination to include gender data disaggregation and responsiveness of analysis to gender equality and inclusion issues.

| **Outputs (To be full developed in Inception Phase)** |
| --- |
| **Desired result** | **Indicator** | **Data collection method & frequency** | **Risks (of data collection)** | **Who will collect and analyse the data** | **Baseline** | **Target** | **Use** |
| 1. Church Partners work collaboratively together to successfully deliver CPP’s collective action and other policy advocacy initiatives; and engage with other BCEP NSA partners to contribute to the broader BCEP program
 | To be revised in accordance with the new CPP M&E Framework currently being developed. Below is based on implementing the MTR recommendations: 1. The **CPP Secretariat** facilitates **Church partners to share, and benefit from, learning with fellow BCEP partners** (in other components) and **participate in joint BCEP partner actions across program components**
	1. Number of BCEP learning events and/or learning products Church partners contribute to;
	2. Number of collective actions/ networks/ coalitions facilitated by PNG CSO partners in which Church partner participate
2. The **CPP Secretariat** provides support to Church partners **to facilitate collective implementation** of the CPP Program in the following key areas:
	1. Number of **MTR recommendations** successfully implemented**;**
	2. Development and implementation of strengthened **CPP MEL framework,** that is based on past/ongoing lessons learned from the CPP program and is aligned with the BCEP MEL
	3. Number of **CPP collective actions** developed and implemented to quality criteria
	4. Number of **CPP collective actions** developed and implemented with a stronger gender and social inclusion approach to quality criteria
	5. Number of CPP women in leadership initiatives implemented
3. The **CPP Secretariat** provides support to **individual Church partners** to implement individual programs under the CPP in the following key areas:
	1. Number of Church partners supported to develop their capacities in financial management, and programmatic and financial reporting, up to quality standards
	2. Number of Church partners supported to develop and implement strengthened individual MEL frameworks that contribute to the CPP MEL framework, and are informed by past/ongoing lessons learned
 | Six monthly CPP Six monthly reportsNOTE Each individual Church partner collects data under their own MEL frameworks and submit reports to the CPP Secretariat; CPP Secretariat reviews reports and aggregate results for reporting to PMT.  | In aggregating data from 7 sources, important information is lost (as the data becomes more generalised)  |  | 1. Rest to be taken from CPP logframe

#instances where Women in Leadership capacity is built#new appointments in church administration/mgt/bodies middle mgt and above which are given to women—KB is this more appropriate at outcome level?? |  |  |
| 1. PNG CSO partners have increased capacity to lead policy advocacy, particularly by working through networks and coalitions
 | * 1. standard and criteria;
	2. Selected PNG CSO partners, with **increased capacity in** in the following skills as assessed against agreed standards and criteria:
	3. Scoping of issues for potential CfCs
	4. Development of change strategies for issue selected
	5. Identification of actors to form change coalitions; and brokering of coalitions
	6. Implementation of change strategies
	7. Lead/facilitate change coalitions/networks
	8. Number and percentage of BCEP PNG CSO partners better using information from their **MEL systems**, including lessons learned internally and from other BCEP partners, to inform the design, implementation and adaptation (as appropriate) of their programs.
	9. Number and percentage of all BCEP NSA partners better incorporating **Political Economy Analysis** into the design, implementation, and adaptation (as appropriate) of their programs
	10. Number and percentage of BCEP NSA partners with strengthened organisational capacity to effectively address issues of **gender and social inclusion** in their programs
 | AnnualIn Inception Phase, a rubric, with standards and criteria for different levels of capacity in all indicators (left), to be developed.NSA to be assessed at the beginning of the grant and assessed against this baseline on annual basis | NSA Partner views the MA as biased in assessing their capacity Mitigation: transparent assessment & Verification by QTAG | NSA Partner reports on progress in implementing their program & makes self-assessment of performance MC reviews NSA report and meets with NSA to verify and discuss progress MC rates NSA partner performance against the rubric measurement tool. \*Measurement tool requires collection of qualitative data to support assessment \* QTAG verifies a sample of NSA partner assessments each year | Upon selection of NSA partner, MC assesses the standards of individual partners’ capacity against the rubric measurement tool (and records on database) Targets to be aggregated at the Program Component level.  | Target for individual partners, as relevant to their baseline, to be discussed and agreed with each partner on an annual basis.Targets to be aggregated at the Program Component level.  | MC to use to inform program learningPNG NSA partner touse to improve performance |
| 1. Media partners generate & disseminate better quality & inclusive information & reporting on citizens’ rights/responsibilities, and government performance
 | * 1. Dissemination of information on citizen rights and responsibility, including the right of women and other marginalised citizens.
	2. Capacity building of media houses (indicators to be drawn from components M&E framework)
	3. Capacity for media engagement of actors in other program components built
 |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| 1. Social accountability initiatives designed and delivered
 | * 1. Partners selected to deliver high quality social accountability initiatives at local level (disaggregated by delivery partner – Churches, INGOs, CSOs)
	2. Partners supported to develop the capacity of national CSOs to deliver social accountability initiatives
	3. Performance of delivery partners monitored
	4. Extent and quality of collaboration with other components: coordination on geographies, sectors, shared learning
 |  | and Service providers. 2.XX grants generate evidence on 1 sector of national relevance per year. |  |  |  |  |
| 1. Government is better able to collect and make publicly available quality information on its allocation of resources, spending and performance at sub-national levels
 | The support to DIRD is managed in accordance with the agreed M&E framework: * 1. The project conducts six monthly formal reviews of the progress of the Program and upgrades of the Platform completed to DFAT’s approval
	2. The project supports DIRD to regularly report and brief national government stakeholders on project progress including the PSC, Districts and Provinces
	3. The project team is in place and their performance is managed
	4. The project team implements the project against work plan
	5. The project team collaborates with other BCEP components (e.g participates in learning events and other shared
 | Definitions:DIMS = District Information Management SystemSIP MS = Services Improvement Program Management System |  |  |  |  |  |

#### **Key Policy Priority Outcomes**

**To be developed in Inception Phase**

####

#### **Stakeholders and Partnerships**

#### **Governance Mechanisms**

|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
| **Performance Expectation** | **Indicator** | **Data collection method & frequency** | **Who will collect and analyse the data** | **Baseline** | **Target** | **Use** |
| Governance arrangements clearly delineate stakeholders’ roles and contributions - in particular between DFAT and the Program in terms of governance, strategic and operational decision-making.  Stakeholders meet their commitments in an appropriate and timely manner, fostering a culture of trust and openness. | Satisfaction with governance arrangements/ mechanisms:• Partner government• DFAT• Program management | Six monthly;Program to develop a formal feedback process with stakeholders that allows a numeric score to be estimated (e.g. From 1 to 5, See guidance) | Program  |  |  |  |
| Governance mechanisms, including external oversight functions (e.g. TAGs, SATs), are clear, efficient, consistently operated and add value for all stakeholders. Appropriate participation by stakeholders is a feature, as is effective support by the Program.Annual workplans provide assurance to stakeholders about the strategic coherence of the Program’s activities and articulate support for prioritized and sequenced reforms. | % and utility of routine strategic oversight meetings (DFAT & Program)% and utility of routine operational oversight meetings (DFAT & Program) | Six monthly;As above (feedback process to be developed) | Program |  |  |  |
| Clear criteria and processes are established to inform decisions regarding the inclusion of new activities. Criteria reflect key DFAT policy priorities and the Program priorities with respect to the End of Program Outcomes (EIOs). | # of new requests/proposals approved in period% (cumulative) new approvals exceeding appraisal criteria thresholds | Six monthly;As above (feedback process to be developed) | Program |  |  |  |
| DFAT clearly communicates its risk appetite for different aspects of the Program’s work and the Program and DFAT have effective processes in place to enable DFAT to fulfil its responsibilities to monitor/manage Program risk. | # of critical risks materialising in period and utility of risk management systems | Six monthly;As above (feedback process to be developed) | Program |  |  |  |

#### **Communications**

| **Performance Expectation** | **Indicator** | **Data collection method & frequency** | **Who will collect and analyse the data** | **Baseline** | **Target** | **Use** |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
| The Program communicates adeptly, providing a clear, compelling narrative about its objectives and strategies to its stakeholders and partners, to build interest and influence and sustain stakeholder support.The Program helps build DFAT’s understanding of the context and relationships with key actors. | Delivery of agreed routine contributions to DFAT information products to time and quality (% and utility) | Annual; (Timeliness and quality to be agreed with DFAT) | Program |  |  |  |
| The Program is responsive to stakeholders’ information needs, providing concise, timely, appropriate information products. | # of instances and significance of responsiveness to extra-routine requests for information | Annual; Program to define how they will count 'instances' on a consistent basis.  | Program |  |  |  |
| Where appropriate, the Program helps to promote visibility of Australian aid and advance public diplomacy objectives | # of instances and significance of public diplomacy events/ instruments launched | Annual | Program |  |  |  |

#### **Collaboration and Engagement**

| **Performance Expectation** | **Indicator** | **Data collection method & frequency** | **Who will collect and analyse the data** | **Baseline** | **Target** | **Use** |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
| The Program engages other actors (other DFAT programs, civil society, partner government, private sector and other donors) to build solid relationships, networks and partnerships that advance the Program’s objectives and/or increase efficiency (sharing cost or risk). Where appropriate, the Program plays an active role promoting sector coordination, and contributes to sector wide policy reform.DFAT supports the Program by connecting it to other DFAT investments and partners as appropriate. | # of instances and significance of activities that involve collaborations with: • other DFAT programs•other donors• civil society • private sector• Australian organisations" | Annual; (Timeliness and quality to be agreed with DFAT) | Program |  |  |  |
| The roles of the Program and DFAT in policy engagement are clear and both regularly review progress and the need for any adjustment to engagement strategies.With DFAT support, the Program leverages relationship and facilitates high quality policy dialogue to support achievement of EFOs (e.g. sector reforms, budget allocations, resource mobilisation), drawing on DFAT's political positioning and representation as appropriate.  | % of engagements with partner Government agencies rated 'high' for quality of policy dialogue | Annual; Program to develop a rubric for the rapid appraisal of the status of dialogue/relationships with key government decision-makers. The rubric captures different stages of development. Only those rated 'high' quality are counted in this assessment. | Program |  |  |  |

#### **Operations**

**NOTE: DFAT’s mandatory indicators are in bold.**

#### **Contract and Delivery Management**

|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
| **Performance Expectation** | **Indicator** | **Data collection method & frequency** | **Who will collect and analyse the data** | **Baseline** | **Target** | **Use** |
| For procurement, grants and sub-contract management for new activities, the Program adheres to Commonwealth Procurement and Grant Rules and Guidance, demonstrating competition, cost-consciousness and equity (inclusion). | # of new contracts/grants and % that subject to VFM assessment and approvals process\*Management/Overhead costs as a % of expenditure | Six Monthly;  | MC reviewed by DFAT |  |  |  |
| The Program is responsive in establishing clear, timely and transparent contracts with sub-contracted/grantee delivery partners and manages these relationships well and flexibly, with the focus on shared interest in delivery of intended outcomes. Where contracts impede flexibility to deliver on Program intent, impediments are swiftly rectified. | **"% of major contracts / grants issued within 45 day limit (from need identification to signature)\*****% of international staff mobilised within 40 day limit from appointment \* "** |  | MC reviewed by DFAT |  |  |  |
| Contracts and grants in the Program’s supply chain are monitored and VFM risks actively managed. | **% of new grants/contracts (by value) in period issued to local organisations/ individuals \*** |  | MC reviewed by DFAT |  |  |  |
| Annual Plans and Annual Reports clearly articulate how activities/outputs contribute to intermediate outcomes and EFOs.  | # of days between submission and sign off of annual plans and reports as meeting DFAT standards |  | MC reviewed by DFAT |  |  |  |
| Program outputs/milestones are delivered on time, on budget and to a good quality. Variations from plan are in response to deliberate adaptations and are well-controlled and documented. Unexpected variations are identified early and addressed.  | "% of MC milestones delivered as planned in the period% of milestones in the Program's supply chain delivered as planned in the period"# and significance of annual plan variations |  | MC reviewed by DFAT |  |  |  |

#### **Financial and Resource Management**

| **Performance Expectation** | **Indicator** | **Data collection method & frequency** | **Who will collect and analyse the data** | **Baseline** | **Target** | **Use** |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
|  |  | Annual; (Timeliness and quality to be agreed with DFAT) | MC reviewed by DFAT |  |  |  |
| "Financial systems produce accurate budget forecasts.  | % variance of expenditure vs. budget in the period | Annual | MC reviewed by DFAT |  |  |  |
| The Program monitors and reports expenditure against EIOs (results-based budgeting), and Value for Money assessments are made regularly as part of routine monitoring.  | # of instances and significance of budget or staff reallocations to better deliver on Program outcomes.  |  | MC reviewed by DFAT |  |  |  |
| Technical and finance/operations teams coordinate effectively to enable flexible programming and implementation in a controlled and managed manner.Budget implications of adaptation / variation from plan (including grantees/sub-contractors) are managed efficiently. Program leadership flexibly deploys staff and resources to areas where they are most needed to deliver on EFOs. Administration costs (including those of sub-contractors and grantees) are clearly identified and monitored/managed. | **Cumulative % supply chain costs (direct delivery)** **Cumulative % supply chain costs (indirect delivery)** **Cumulative % administration costs \*****Cumulative % spend \*****% non-performance-based fee payments to date \*****% performance-based fee payments to date\*****% procurement fee payments to date \*****% management (non-procurement) fee payments to date \*** |  | MC reviewed by DFAT |  |  |  |

#### **High quality leadership and teams**

| **Performance Expectation** | **Indicator** | **Data collection method & frequency** | **Who will collect and analyse the data** | **Baseline** | **Target** | **Use** |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
| Leadership (DFAT and Program) have the requisite levels of development and management expertise to flexibly manage the Program toward delivery of agreed EFOs. Leadership promotes an open and cooperative performance culture in their respective teams. | % respondents that agree or strongly agree that DFAT consistently demonstrate behaviours required to flexibly manage Program outcomes% respondents that agree or strongly agree that Program Leadership Staff consistently demonstrate behaviours required to flexibly manage Program outcomes |  | MC reviewed by DFAT |  | Annual; (Timeliness and quality to be agreed with DFAT) | Program |  |  |  |
| High quality Program staff efficiently recruited and mobilised to fill vacancies, with preference to locally engaged personnel and ensuring gender balance (including in leadership). | # of key positions that remain unfilled for > 30 days and signficance of unfilled positions**% of Project Support Staff locally recruited\*****% of Technical/Management (non-PSS) staff locally recruited\*"**% of female staff (including % in leadership positions); % of locally engaged staff (including % in leadership positions) |  | MC reviewed by DFAT |  | 80% Local Project Staff33% Local Technical Management Staff35% female (25% of leadership team female)75% LES (10% of leadership team LES) |  |
| Program staff incentivised and empowered to: 1 deliver on intermediate outcomes (not activities/outputs), 2. work closely with counterparts, Program staff and DFAT on iterative problem identification and resolution; 3. Raise and flexibly respond to opportunities and constraints to furthering delivery of outcomes; 4. Proactively share learning. | % of Program staff achieving average rating of 4 or above on adviser performance assessments |  | MC reviewed by DFAT |  |  |  |

#### **Learn and Adapt**

#### **Coherent and joined-up**

|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
| **Performance Expectation** | **Indicator** | **Data collection method & frequency** | **Who will collect and analyse the data** | **Baseline** | **Target** | **Use** |
| DFAT and the Program share a common understanding of the end-of-Program outcomes (EFOs) and understand the linkages between the different work areas of the Program and DFAT’s other investments. The Program avoids narrowly focused, internally-siloed approaches. It shares and uses expertise and learning from across all its staff to inform the direction of existing and new interventions.The Program works beyond conventional single-sector positions and develops holistic/coherent approaches to cross-cutting and ‘wicked’ problems, including working across central and line agency issues, addressing bottlenecks, constraints and opportunities for reform. Potential synergies between different activities/teams are identified and actively exploited to maximise its overall influence and effectiveness. In pursuing its End of Program Outcomes (EFOs), the Program is ‘more than the sum of its parts’." | # of instances and significance of cross-team lesson sharing and joint coordination |  | MC reviewed by DFAT |  |  |  |
| # of instances and significance of cross-team lesson sharing and joint coordination with respect to DFAT Key Policy Priorities |  | MC reviewed by DFAT |  |  |  |

#### **Flexible and adaptive**

|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
| **Performance Expectation** | **Indicator** | **Data collection method & frequency** | **Who will collect and analyse the data** | **Baseline** | **Target** | **Use** |
| The Program has established clear strategies and intermediate outcomes to achieve it EIOs. It regularly reviews and updates the strategies using robust processes.  Strategies and management decisions are informed by active knowledge management: the Program learns effectively from its own activities and monitors and interprets changes in the external environment, to identify opportunities and threats for its EF\IOs.The Program is responsive to opportunities that emerge but DFAT and the Program maintain a clear line of sight to its EIOs. Likewise, it transitions out of ineffective activities efficiently but in respectful ways. The Program actively experiments and advances new and adapted approaches/solutions. DFAT provides the necessary license to enable the Program to operate in this manner. The Program implements agreed adaptations efficiently and in a timely manner. | # of instances and significance of adaptation to strategies in light of new learning | Annual; (Timeliness and quality to be agreed with DFAT) | MC reviewed by DFAT |  |  |  |
| # of instances and significance of new experiments sponsored by the Program |  | MC reviewed by DFAT |  |  |  |
| # of instances and significance of well-managed transitions out of ineffective activities |  | MC reviewed by DFAT |  |  |  |

#### **Continuous improvement**

|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
| **Performance Expectation** | **Indicator** | **Data collection method & frequency** | **Who will collect and analyse the data** | **Baseline** | **Target** | **Use** |
| Key business processes are benchmarked, tracked and lessons actioned to improve effectiveness and efficiency. Improvements/efficiency gains are quantified where possible. The Program encourages the identification and testing of innovative approaches to improve its effectiveness (including application of new technology) The Program is responsive to recommendations from evaluations/reviews" | # of instances and significance of improvements to key business processes (quantified where possible) | Annual; (Timeliness and quality to be agreed with DFAT) | MC reviewed by DFAT |  |  |  |
| # of suggestions for improvements to key business processes offered by Program staff |  | MC reviewed by DFAT |  |  |  |

## [Risk and Safeguards Tool](https://dfat.gov.au/about-us/publications/Pages/risk-and-safeguard-tool.aspx) including the risk register;

Separate document

## Indicative Budget

|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
| **No.**  | **Items** | **Year 1** | **Year 2** | **Year 3** | **Year 4** | **Total** |
| **1** | **Program Management Costs** |   |   |   |   |   |
| Program Management Team: Personnel/Adviser Support Costs | 2,000,000 | 2,000,000 | 2,000,000 | 2,000,000 | **8,000,000** |
| MERL Unit Costs: Personnel/Adviser Support Costs, Meeting and IT related costs | 1,250,000 | 1,250,000 | 1,250,000 | 1,250,000 | **5,000,000** |
| Learning Quality and Review Costs: Personnel/Adviser Support costs | 500,000 | 500,000 | 500,000 | 500,000 | **2,000,000** |
| Operational Costs: Personnel/Adviser Support Costs and office costs | 1,400,000 | 1,200,000 | 1,200,000 | 1,200,000 | **5,000,000** |
| **Sub-total** | **5,150,000** | **4,950,000** | **4,950,000** | **4,950,000** | **20,000,000** |
| **2** | **Component One: Coalitions for Change** | **1,200,000** | **1,800,000** | **2,300,000** | **3,200,000** | **8,500,000** |
| **3** | **Component Two: Media Partnerships** | **2,800,000** | **2,800,000** | **2,800,000** | **2,800,000** | **11,200,000** |
| **4** | **Component Three: Social Accountability** | **1,200,000** | **1,800,000** | **1,800,000** | **1,800,000** | **6,600,000** |
| **5** | **Component Four: Church Partnerships** | **8,000,000** | **8,000,000** | **8,000,000** | **8,000,000** | **32,000,000** |
| **6** | **Component Five: GoPNG Partnerships** | **3,400,000** | **2,000,000** | **2,000,000** | **2,000,000** | **9,400,000** |
|  | **Total** | **21,600,000** | **21,400,000** | **21,900,000** | **22,800,000** | **87,700,000** |

**Cost Assumptions**

* The costs shown are indicative. It is expected that the Contractor will develop a budget reflecting costs of the operative approach and annual planning for each component at the time of implementation
* Personnel costs are inclusive of fees and any non-fee element to the employment negotated (ie suport costs)
* Operational costs include operations focused personnel and costs associated with implementation including office costs and vehicle running costs, this does not include activity-based costs such as meeting costs which are covered against each component or in the MEL budget
* The CPP is inclusive of funding to church partners. Resources to manage the component are reflected in the program management costs
* Management costs for the Media Partnerships and some exsisting activities (including the DIRD support provided through the GoPNG Partnerships component) are included as part of the component budget
* The costs for the GoPNG Partnerships is an estimate, ongoing negotiation is required to refine this budget figure
* Budgets for Component One and Three are phased with budgets expected to increase over time reflecting an increase in identification of recipients of funds and opportunities to take activities to scale
* Component based budgets for Component One and Two are expected to cover activity costs, grants to recipient organisations and any short term personnel engaged support implementation for component activities. Contractor management of these components is included in program management costs
* Component 5 is larger in the first year to cover the final year of the current support to DIRD Management Fee and support costs are higher in year 1 because of higher costs associated with mobilization and inception phases including operational costs

## PNG Accountability Context

**The PNG Government is currently accountable and responsive to *only a narrow segment of the* PNG population**. This is both a product of, and results in, development policy that produces:

* narrow economic growth that drives inequality (benefiting the political class and urban elites at the expense of the rural grassroots);
* national instability and inter-communal violence, further fueled by high levels of social and political fragmentation; and
* poor service delivery resulting in weak human development outcomes.

**The design and implementation of PNG’s development policies can be seen as the result of bargaining processes between different state and non-state actors[[76]](#footnote-76)**. These processes are guided by a mix of formal and informal rules (or institutions) that are shaped by power. ‘Formal’ rules include laws, policies and regulations. ‘Informal’ rules include social and cultural norms, relationships, interests and incentives. This section examines how these formal and informal rules interact to constrain accountability and inclusiveness of the policy bargaining process; and contribute to development policies that lead to unequal economic growth, political instability, and weak human development outcomes.

**This paper is broken into three sections.** The first section examines PNG’s broader social and historical context, which informs how the country’s institutions operate. The second section analyses PNG’s informal institutions, and the third considers the formal institutions. Both sets of informal/formal rules and processes intersect to limit accountability and inclusion, and create binding constraints on PNG’s economic, political and human development.

#### **4.1 PNG Background**

The key structural factors underpinning PNG’s development challenges and opportunities include:

**A remote and rugged geography rich in natural resources.** Natural resource endowments include the world’s second largest rainforests and abundant oil, gas and mineral resources.

**A small but rapidly growing population of more than 8 million people widely disbursed across a large country.** The population is very young, with 60% under the age of 25. Some 75% of the population lives in rural areas on land owned by their kinship or clan groupings. Given the rugged terrain, transport infrastructure connecting the different parts of the country is very limited.

**A nation-state made up of thousands of small-scale, subsistence-based societies with enormous linguistic and cultural diversity.** PNG is said to be the home to a quarter of the world’s languages (850), though three provide the country’s lingua franca (English and the ‘trading languages’, Tok Pisin and Hiri Motu). PNG has a deep pre-history, with human occupation going back as long as indigenous people have occupied Australia (60,000 years).

**Western democratic and economic institutions established in the colonial period.** Economic development in the colonial era was minimal and mainly focused on the coastal and islands’ regions and contact with the more densely populated highlands interior only began in the 1930s. After WWII, there was greater economic development focused on commercial agriculture (particularly oil palm), which included the opening-up of the highlands (coffee). PNG became an independent, democratic nation-state in 1975, but without the kind of unifying, independence movements that characterized decolonization in much of Africa and Asia. The new nation inherited many laws and formal institutions from Australian states, and a constitution based on Westminster traditions. The plan was for the economy to be supported by the massive new open-cut copper mine on Bougainville but Australia also committed to 25 years of budget support.

**Difficulty of integrating large numbers of disparate social and political identities into an effective nation-state.** This has been a problem since Independence when Bougainville threatened to secede. The situation on Bougainville led to 10 years of armed conflict from 1988 to 98. In late November and early December 2019, 97.7 % Bougainville voters voted for independence in a nonbinding referendum. The vote was mandated as part of a 2005 agreement that ended the civil war. Papua New Guinean and Bougainville leaders are expected to formulate a response to the result in 2021. This result could lead to pushes for secession from other parts of the country that have regularly voiced this desire (e.g. East New Britain, New Ireland and Enga etc.).

**Strong influence of Christian Churches across the nation-state. In the 2011 Census, 96% of PNG’s population reported as Christian.** There are 150 different Christian Churches operating in PNG. The seven ‘mainline’ PNG churches are the largest, representing 73% of Christians, but new protestant Pentecostal Churches are the fastest growing.

**Low economic growth since independence that has not kept pace with rapid population growth.** The economy is heavily dependent on two sectors, extractive and renewable natural resources; the latter including agriculture, fisheries and forestry. The extractives sector is considered relatively efficient (World Bank). But reliance on this sector, which is capital intensive and creates few jobs, distorts the rest of the economy and has inhibited the growth in agriculture, fisheries and forestry, where there are greater income-generating opportunities for the general population. Moreover, reliance on resources means that government spending, including in critical service delivery areas, is vulnerable to the boom and bust cycles of this sector. The most recent commodity price boom started in 2004 and finished in 2014.

#### **4.2 Informal Rules and actors**

Many of the informal rules that guide social and political interaction in PNG derive from the ‘traditional’ sphere of life in the village, but these social norms are also rapidly changing. Key rules relate to:

**Established social relations based on kinship ties that are anchored in the rural village and involve notions of reciprocity**. Clans or tribes are made up of multiple kinship groupings, normally with a common language. Kinship ties endure despite increasing urbanisation and modernisation. Indeed, kin ties can be reinforced through engagement in the formal political and economic sphere, from which resources and power are pulled back into the ‘informal sphere’ to meet kin obligations and build social status.

**New social relations across kin and clan groupings in cross-cultural, urban settings, as denoted by the *Tok Pisin* term *wantok,*** **also based on notions of reciprocity and mutual obligations like those of blood relations**[[77]](#footnote-77).

**Kinship groupings are highly gendered and male dominated**. In most parts of PNG, kinship groups are patrilineal, meaning that leadership, decision-making and control of land and other resources is vested in men. Even where matrilineal kinship groups exist, in some coastal and island regions of PNG (including Bougainville), power is still mostly vested in men, though in these places women are considered to have greater influence. The dominant position of men is reinforced through each clan groups’ distinct cultural or *kastom* practices. While such gender norms are held by some to underpin the high levels of violence against women and children that exists across contemporary PNG, others argue that the levels of violence are much higher than in the past and that such levels are a modern phenomenon[[78]](#footnote-78). By current estimates more than two thirds of women in PNG experience domestic violence (with international rates estimated at one third).

**Access to land is secured through clan and kinship ties. In the pre-colonial past, clan groupings competed for control of land often leading to conflict, particularly in the densely populated highlands regions.** Clan ownership of land is protected in the PNG Constitution, with 97% of the PNG mainland and islands under clan ownership. With increased pressure on land from population growth, commercial investments (e.g. mines and plantations), and climate change, subsistence economies have become more vulnerable, leading to increasing incidence of hunger in some parts of the county and helping to fuel clan fighting in the highlands.

**The traditional ‘big-man political system’ continues to underpin how men rise to positions of power and influence in the modern sphere**. These are systems where men from relatively equal kinship groupings compete with other men to win the support of their clan members by distributing economic resources (gifts) or providing security.[[79]](#footnote-79) These norms inform contemporary politicking for government positions ranging from national Members of Parliament (MP) to Local Level Government and Ward Councillor positions and help explain why PNG currently has no female national MPs.

**Urban PNG includes a small but influential middle class elite.** This middle-class consists of educated, westernised Papua New Guineans who occupy positions in the PNG public service (and business) as well Chinese Papua New Guineans and Australians that run local and international business. Most urban Papua New Guineans still have some connections with rural places of origin but these are fading, as there are now four generations of town-dwellers. The urban dwellers are disproportionately influenced by global cultural and economic trends and tend to value western notions of individualism and independence in contrast with communal attitudes that typify rural villages. This is the population most likely to identify as citizens of the PNG nation-state. The middle-class elite are often compared with a PNG ‘grassroots’. These are poor people living in the town or village who remain connected to/ dependent on their rural places of origin.

#### **4.3 Formal rules and actors**

The actions of state and non-state actors are informed by the informal rules (norms and interests) interacting with formal western democratic and civil institutions, many of which were set up during the colonial period.

**Papua New Guinea is rated Partly Free In the 2020 Freedom House global study of political and civil liberties.** The central finding is that:

…Papua New Guinea is a democracy in which elections are held regularly, but the polls have often been marred by irregularities and violence. Party allegiances are unstable, and only two governments have survived for a full term since independence in 1975. However, since the turn of the century, a boom in mineral resources extraction has helped successive incumbent governments to consolidate control. The judiciary retains significant independence, and the media are mostly free to criticize the government. Corruption remains a serious problem.[[80]](#footnote-80)

The state and non-state institutions and agencies central to accountability in PNG are analysed below.

#### **State**

**The PNG constitution provides the legal basis for PNG’s system of parliamentary democracy. However, many of the checks and balances provided for under the constitution have been eroded since independence.** The constitutionestablishes multiple bodies to enforce constitutional and other statutory provisions designed to provide transparency and accountability. However, the constitution also gives the Executive authority over most of these bodies through powers to appoint key officials and determine budgets. In the absence of strong parliaments able to hold them to account, since independence successive Executives have used this authority to weaken these provisions. The exception is the Judiciary, whose budget is protected under the constitution, and, as Freedom House notes, has continued to perform its independent constitutional role and has increasingly challenged and opposed the Executive.

**The constitutional separation of powers between the executive, legislature, and judiciary has been weakened. The key features include:**

1. **Executive power is unstable and government rarely lasts a five year term.** Moreover, most MPs only last one-term in parliament and expect to lose their seats at the election. This constant churn in MPs creates a volatile parliament. The incentive for the executive is to seek to dominate parliament in order to secure their power. PNG has a unicameral parliament consisting of 111 MPs, with 5-year terms.[[81]](#footnote-81) Most MPs are elected by a very small percentage of their constituency (their clan group and allies) and are not returned at the next election. For most MPs, the main incentive for seeking elected office is to accumulate wealth (to disburse to their clan and allies) and are therefore antithetical to transparency and accountability. At the last national election, more than half of incumbent MPs (52%) lost their seats. The constant of churn of MPs further militates against transparency and accountability.[[82]](#footnote-82)
2. **A weak Parliament does not provide effective scrutiny of the executive.** The PNG Parliament has gone through different phases of instability and stability. *The Parliament was highly unstable from the 1980s to early 2000s*. The incentive for MPs to seek positions in the National Executive Council (to accumulate wealth through access to government resources) led to MPs regularly attempting to change the government through votes of no-confidence. This incentive was further enabled by PNG’s weak party system.

The *stability of the parliament has been greater since 2012* (under the previous O’Neal and the current Marape governments) for two reasons. One is that the role of parties appears to have strengthened, (though the number of parties contesting elections continues to be large, e.g. 45 in 2017). The second and primary reason relates to use of the electoral development funds under the *District Services Improvement Programs (DSIP)*. Under these schemes each district receives annual funding of K10 million and each province is provided with K5 million for each of the districts in their province. The relevant MP has a high amount of influence (bordering on *de facto* control) over the implementation of these funds. The Executive has discretion over the amount MPs actually receive and the timing of their release. According to a past Vice-Minister for Provincial and Local-Level Government Affairs this potent mix was the reason why multiple attempts to change the Prime Minister during the O’Neal Government were unsuccessful: “The reason is because DSIP is there that’s why we will be in the government and support the O’Neill-Dion government. It’s not about the number of qualifications you have to lead the government, so long as you have the money, you will master the numbers.”[[83]](#footnote-83) (see below)

1. **An independent and robust judiciary that is openly critical of the Executive.** The Supreme Court has been openly critical of the government, taking what has been described as an activist approach on constitutional issues. The Supreme Court argues that this approach is necessary to make up for the inefficiencies of Parliament, but others argue that the Court has gone too far[[84]](#footnote-84).

The PNG court and legal system still face several challenges. PNG has been described as one of the most litigious societies in the world,[[85]](#footnote-85) and the Court system is clogged with cases. Politicians and public servants exploit the system to stymie legitimate investigations against them. PNG judges are also criticised for inconsistent judgements, unnecessary interventions, persistent delays, and conservative interpretations of the law[[86]](#footnote-86).

**The national public service is inhibited by political interference and widespread abuse of procedures, especially in procurement.** Increasingly since the 1980s public officials have operated in ignorance, or actual abuse, of a raft of laws intended to provide transparency and accountability in the use of public money, and checks and balances have eroded.[[87]](#footnote-87) This has been enabled by a long-standing trend of politicisation of appointments to head agencies and statutory bodies. In their 2003 study, Transparency International (TI) (PNG) documented extensive abuse of PNG’s public procurement, at the local level through collusion with local business and at the national level through collusion with multinational corporations. The exposure of corruption in the health sector by the Public Accounts Committee in 2019 (see below) provides one of the most recent examples of the continued abuse of procurement.

**Sub-national government has limited power and resources and is not meeting service delivery responsibilities.** Since independence, successive sub-national government reforms have been pursued for the ostensible purpose of improving service delivery. However, in most parts of the country, service delivery performance has declined. The political motivation behind the reforms has been to (a) mollify secessionist movements by devolving a minimal amount of autonomy to provincial areas; while (b) retaining as much power as possible at the national level. In health and education responsibility for delivery has, in effect, been deconcentrated to structures that answer primarily to the relevant national level body rather than to a devolved government. The latest reforms have also tended to side-line provincial politicians and given open MPs significant and increasing resources that gift them a level of control over their districts not normally associated with a legislative branch of government. The system in turn helps secure the power and dominance of the national executive over parliament.

**The most recent subnational government reform introduced in 2015 further devolved powers to the local level on the rationale of improving service delivery outcomes but has created new accountability and transparency challenges**. This reform established District Development Authorities (DAAs) with responsibility for local planning as well as delivery of important services. The DDAs are governed by a board which is chaired by the national MP, effectively giving the MP control over decisions on how resources are allocated. Moreover, by far the largest source of discretionary funding at the local level is from the *Services Improvement Programs (see above)* which dwarf recurrent budgets controlled at the local level. By one assessment, the total budget for local government (DDAs and LLGs) in the 2019 budget was K231.3 million, which was 1.4% of the total government budget (K16,133.5 m)[[88]](#footnote-88); whereas the total budget for SIPs in 2020 was K2.573 billion.[[89]](#footnote-89) Through their role as the chair of the DDA board, the MPs tend to direct resources toward infrastructure (e.g. new health clinics, classrooms or other facilities) to win support among voters. Hence, the SIPs budgets are often referred to as “MP funds” or “slush funds.”[[90]](#footnote-90) The new facilities place additional burden on already stretched recurrent budgets and often cannot be supported.

The Department of Infrastructure and Rural Development (DIRD) is responsible for monitoring SIPs to ensure funds are spent in accordance with the SIPs guidelines. However, The Auditor-General’s 2019 report found that DIRD had failed to hold any leaders accountable for non-compliance with the SIPs guidelines and from 2013 to 2016 had only visited three provinces and 16 districts[[91]](#footnote-91). To try to shift the incentives of MP more in favour of achieving improved service delivery, one suggested approach from researchers[[92]](#footnote-92) is to create positive competition among provinces/districts by combining:

* Strengthened top-down monitoring of performance in service delivery (by DIRD); with
* Community monitoring of services, using social accountability tools.

**PNG has multiple horizontal accountability institutions, which have been subject to political interference and starved of funds. Nonetheless, some have continued to perform their accountability roles reasonably well and the government has committed to set up a new institution by September 2021.**The main institutions and there performance are:

1. **The Auditor-General’s Office (AGO) of PNG has for many years had problems performing its mandated role**. The AGO produces few annual audit-reports and those completed are late. In 1997, the World Bank found 46% of audited government bodies had not submitted financial statements and only some 20% of AGO audits had been completed.[[93]](#footnote-93) In January of 2019, the AGO submitted seven reports to the Public Accounts Committee, which the QTAG review judged as progress from past years. The review also noted that the AGO had received a budget cut in 2019 of 28% compared with the 2016 budget. Overall, the review found that “*there was some way to go before the AGO was fully effective in financial audits, including in having oversight over the outsourcing of financial audits*”[[94]](#footnote-94). However, the AGO has produced some quality audit-reports that have been effective in strengthening accountability such as the recent review of the SIPs program 2013-16, mentioned above.
2. **Ombudsman Commission has been reasonably effective in performing its mandated role, despite acute budget constraints**. The role of the Ombudsmen Commission is wide-ranging and includes: a) investigating complaints about the administrative actions of governmental bodies and agencies; and b) administering the Leadership Code (outlined in the Constitution) by conducting investigations into the actions of Leaders. [[95]](#footnote-95) The OC has developed a reputation for vigorously enforcing the Leadership Code, leading to a push in 2010 from politicians to reduce the OC’s legal mandate in this area. The push was rebuffed by the OC through a coalition of support from civil society coalitions.[[96]](#footnote-96)
3. **The Office of the Public Prosecutor has operated relatively independently but faces challenges of insufficient resources, low capacity and threats of political interference**. The OPP is appointed as one of the Law Officers of Papua New Guinea under the Constitution. The OPP has been the recipient of Australian government support for many years through DFAT justice sector programs and relationships with the Commonwealth Attorney General’s Department (AGD). The AGD’s support to the OPP is principally in the technical area of preparing for, and conducting, prosecutions and managing a prosecution office. There has been a priority focus on family and sexual violence, fraud and corruption and supporting provincial prosecutions work. The most recent QTAG review (2019) of the AGD’s work found that the OPP has a growing cohort of capable junior and mid-level lawyers that are now moving into leadership positions and represent almost a critical mass for organisational change. However, the organisation is still five years away from becoming a more sustainable organisation, assuming sufficient allocation of resources from the GoPNG.
4. **The Independent Commission Against Corruption (ICAC) is PNG’s newest institution, which the government has promised will be fully operational by September 2021, with significant support to be provided the European Union**. The law to establish the institution was passed unanimously by Parliament 96-0 in November 2020. This was the end of a long campaign, led by Transparency International and others, that commenced in 1997 (if not earlier) when a draft bill was first submitted to parliament and rejected. Since then, the bill has slowly progressed through PNG’s political system. In 2007, the government unanimously voted in favour of amending the constitution to allow for the establishment of an ICAC. In 2011, new draft legislation was developed. In 2014, the PNG constitution was amended to enable the creation of ICAC and in 2015, the Organic Law on an ICAC was tabled in Parliament. There are several concerns with the law, including that the definition of “corruption” is ambiguous; that the institution is set up to duplicate the functions of the Ombudsman Commission and Police; and that its funding allocation in the national budget is uncertain. There is also concern that in recent years, PNG government’s funding of anti-corruption agencies has followed a “boom and bust pattern” that is a feature of other anti-corruption reforms around the world.[[97]](#footnote-97)

**Lack of integrity in elections processes, particularly at the national level, makes election results problematic and contributes to national instability. The PNG Elections Commission is under intense political pressure and faces extensive challenges in administering elections.** These challenges include: funding and capacity to deliver elections; election delivery logistics; problems with the integrity of the electoral roll; lack of cohesive voter awareness strategies and limitations in capabilities to drive electoral reform.[[98]](#footnote-98) After the 2002 national election, widely considered to be PNG’s most problematic, the electoral system was changed from first-past-the-post to limited preferential voting (LPV), giving voters three preferences instead of one. The aim was to strengthen elected MPs legitimacy by increasing winning candidates’ share of the vote’ which had dropped to an average of 20% (of the electorate) by 2020 (and much lower for many candidates). From 2007 to 2017, this increased to average 33%. However, the number of candidates contesting elections continued to increase in most elections, rising from 878 in 1977 to 3,335 in 2017 (or a 280 percent increase in 40 years). In tandem, the voter share for each candidate has dropped from 12% to 3% on average, a reflection of PNG’s fragmented political and social structure. While political parties remain weak, there is a trend of established parties becoming stronger, with more candidates choosing to run with them partly because of the growing cost of campaigning.[[99]](#footnote-99)

**PNG National Statistics Office faces many challenges in delivering its mandate.** The first of the United Nations fundamental principles of official statistics states: ‘*Official statistics provide an indispensable element in the information system of a democratic society, serving the Government, the economy and the public with data about the economic, demographic, social and environmental situation. To this end, official statistics that meet the test of practical utility are to be compiled and made available on an impartial basis by official statistical agencies to honour citizens’ entitlement to public information’*. A recent QTAG review concluded r:

[The NSO] is under-funded, its staff profile is ageing, its infrastructure is run down and its theoretical remit remains large (including at provincial and local government levels). At the same time, it has had to operate without clear and permanent leadership and without the institutional and political weight to hold its own with other government departments and stakeholders.[[100]](#footnote-100)

The PNG NSO is currently without a permanently appointed National Statistician. This has

been the case since early 2018, with three individuals performing as Acting National Statisticians, amidst significant controversy (i.e. accusations of impropriety in the appointment of these positions).[[101]](#footnote-101)

**On coming to power, the new Marape government made several commitments to combat corruption.** The government has passed laws to protect whistle-blowers and set up set-up a commission of inquiry into the UBS loan scandal (which began earlier this year). Civil society, led by TI PNG also led public pressure on the Prime Minister to pass laws to set up an Independent Commission against Corruption (ICAC). TI advocated for this body for 20 years. Whilst the 2020 passing of the ICAC law is a positive sign it is worth noting that the O’Neal government also made similar commitments upon coming to power (including to the ICAC bill) to increase funding for accountability agencies in the first year of his government, before this funding then fell away in following years. **[[102]](#footnote-102)**

#### **Non-state**

**The PNG media**[[103]](#footnote-103) **is relatively free and robust but is still subject to political pressure and intimidation**[[104]](#footnote-104)**.** The strengths of PNG’s media landscape includes: a relatively capable public broadcaster with national reach that has been well supported by Australian Broadcasting Commission International Development (ABCID) over 15 years; a legislative environment supportive of free media; and a relatively diverse media market[[105]](#footnote-105). The weaknesses include: lack of funding and resources for investigative journalism resulting in “copy and paste” practices; limited pool of qualified journalists; social incentives against journalists questioning those in authority; and external editorial influence on the traditional media.

**The sources of information PNG citizens most trust are the churches (whom own TV, radio and print media), followed by newspapers, radio, and television is last**. While two thirds of the PNG population now live in areas with at least a 2G mobile signal, only 10% of the population report using the internet on a daily basis (overwhelmingly through phones). Cost is a major factor limiting access[[106]](#footnote-106). The connection to an undersea cable will, over time, provide a major boost in connectivity to the internet.

**Among those able to regularly access the internet, mainly those living in urban areas, social media is very popular, as in other parts of the world**. The number of Facebook accounts in PNGs is equivalent to 10% of the population (i.e. equivalent to all the people with regular access). Many MPs, and public service leaders, such as the Police Commissioner are highly active on social media and there is evidence that it is changing the way elected officials communicate with the electorate (for example over recent social protest marches that emerged in urban PNG and among the PNG diaspora in response to cases of gender-based violence publicised over social media)[[107]](#footnote-107).

**The Christian Churches in PNG have been described as “*the only actors in civil society that enjoy legitimacy and support from broad sectors of community*”**[[108]](#footnote-108). It has also been argued that: “*there is no greater medium for speaking to and for the grassroots of Papua New Guinea than the churches, mainly because the media does not have the capacity to reach large areas of the population. Airtime at the pulpit cannot be bought, but is priceless. The Papua New Guinea mainline churches are fiercely policy independent* “[[109]](#footnote-109).As mentioned in section 5.1, there are 150 different churches, but seven mainline Churches dominate (with their parishioners making up more 70% of the population). Churches provide development services and promote social justice for PNG communities. This includes approximately 50% of PNG’s health services, 40% of primary and secondary school services, and support to vulnerable communities. They are also heavily involved in social and political issues that include advocating for good governance (anti-corruption), human rights, the environment, literacy, health care and HIV and AIDS. The Churches have natural a constituency at the local level, operating in many remote, rural areas where the government is not present. They also have national networks (e.g. PNG Council of Churches) but have been less effective operating at this level, competition between different Churches being a reason for this.

**Non-church civil society organisations (CSOs) are disbursed and disconnected reflecting PNG’s social fragmentation**.[[110]](#footnote-110) There are three broad types of these organisations. The first are grassroots community-based organisations located in the villages and the towns. These are formed around local issues such as water supply associations and literacy groups. Women’s and youth groups are particularly strong in the villages and less so provincially and nationally. The second type are landowner / environmental groupings. Over the last 15 years, coinciding with the commodities boom, some of these groupings have benefitted from resource royalties and have become economically and politically powerful. For example, the new Hilton Hotel in Port Moresby is a joint venture between three PNG landowner groups, Mineral Resources Star Mountain (MRSM), Mineral Resources Ok Tedi (MROT), and Petroleum Resources Kutubu (PRK). The third major form of CSO are national organisations and peak bodies. Most of the major Australian-based INGOs, most with DFAT funding, also have been established in PNG for a long-time (e.g. Oxfam, CARE, World Vision)

**National PNG CSOs are generally weak**. **There are few capable national CSOs that work in service delivery or policy advocacy and most CSOs lack basic organisational and political engagement capacity**. Exceptions include The Voice Incorporated, which been successful engaging in advocacy on youth issues over the last 10 year, and TI PNG, which has been a vocal voice for transparency and accountability for more than 20 years and has its own sources of revenue (which includes PNG subscribers). The dominance of Churches in service delivery may partly explain the absence of CSOs from service delivery (compared with other parts of the world) and limited donor funding may be another factor (particularly to explain comparatively limited CSO involvement in policy research and advocacy). However, there are several examples from the recent past of CSOs mobilising networks to voice opposition to government actions. One example, is the Community Coalition against Corruption, which emerged under the leadership of TI PNG in the early 2000s and, critically, included the Churches and the media. The coalition successfully opposed attempts by the government to pass two bills: the first aimed to raise the level of MPs’ discretionary funds by one million kina each, and the second provided for the exemption of MPs from dismissal for breach of the Leadership Code. They successfully mobilised again in 2010 to oppose another attempt to change legislation to weaken accountability of MP’s to comply with the leadership code. However, the coalition was unable to stop the O’Neal government’s later increase of discretionary funds (DSIP); and have to date not been successful in advocacy for ICAC. The coalition finally disbanded in 2016 (though there are now attempts to revive it). Most other networks and coalitions have been formed in response to donor-funded initiatives.

**National social movements have periodically and organically emerged in PNG. These often involve students from the universities drawing in the urban poor from surrounding settlements, public servants, and the overseas diaspora through social media**. A recent example are the social protest marches that emerged in 2020 in response to cases of gender-based violence (see above and case study in Annex A).

**The Consultative Implementation and Monitoring Committee is a unique formal arena for citizen engagement with government with significant, but under realized, potential for accountability and transparency**. The CIMC was established through a National Executive Council (NEC) decision in 1998 to provide a platform to enable PNG’s civil society and business community to engage proactively with government on socio-economic policy formulation and implementation issues. The CIMC has been heavily reliant on donor funding and is yet to deliver on its potential. The government’s lack of interest in CIMC is further indicated by the fact that they have cut its budget by 50%. The CIMC has also tended to stray beyond its mandate by engaging in policy development, alienating line Ministries. Recent discussion about creating a new home for the CIMC under DNPM hold promise of re-focussing the body as a much-needed policy arena for citizen-government engagement.

## **PNG development support**

This section provides tables which map the current PNG development support to state and non-state actors to help identify the strategic niche for BCEP.

#### **5.1 State**

|  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |
| **PNG State actor** | **Donor, budget, duration** | **Relevant Focus** | **Relationship with Accountability Program** |
| Executive | None |  |  |
| Parliament | UNDP/MFAT (Pacific Parliamentary Effectiveness Program), DAFT: Pacific Women transitioning to Pacific Women Lead (ends 2022, AUD 320 million- regional program) | * Technical capacity building of Public Accounts Committee
* Training potential female MPs
 | Engage/complement (through issue-base working) |
| Judiciary | DFAT: JSS4D (pervious phase ended Dec 2019, AUD 100 million- new design approved and phase two underway), EU-PNG Partnership for Good Governance (EUR26.9m) | * JSS4D: Organisational development support focused on increasing accountability of L&J agencies (including DJAG various twinning relationships between Australia Commonwealth and State offices)
* Justice sector strengthening (including village courts and DJAG), establishment of ICAC, capacity building od parliament and policy reform supporting anti-corruption
 | Engage/complement- possible dependent on issues. |
| National public service: core agencies | DFAT: Australia-PNG Economic Development Partnership (2022 – 2029 AUD 200 million)IFC PNG Partnership (2017 – 2022) (various)UNDP: Provincial Capacity Building & Enhancement Programme (PCaB E) (2008 – 2022 Anti-Corruption for Development Effectiveness (2012 – 2030)Extractive Industries and Sustainable Human Development(USD 12.8 million- UNDP Democratic Governance Program)ADB Private Sector Development Initiative (PSDI) (2016 – 2024 USD 60.83 million (for first three phases) and Improving Financial Access and Entrepreneurship Development Project (2022- TBC) USD 15 million | * Technical capacity building of Departments of Treasury, Finance, Tax and statistics
* Bank of PNG partnership on financial inclusion: regulatory reform.
* Tax reform
* Improve public financial management skills at the provincial level
* Business legal reforms (including SoE reform)
* Support to the PNG Financial Management Improvement Program
* Supporting the National Anti-Corruption Strategy (DPMNEC)
* Policy reforms on translation of wealth to human development
* Development of the finance and banking sector to increase economic development/finaancial inclusion
 | Engage/complement (through issue-base working |
| National public service: health | DFAT, PATH (2020 – 2025, AUD 183 million)) including PPF grants (health- end 2022 AUD 45.2 mil) ADB: Health Services Sector Development Program (ends 23, AUD 50 mil)World Bank (various) including IMPACT (2020 – 2026, US 30 million) | * Health sector reform including increasing capacity of PHA’s in equitable service delivery
* Increasing transparency and efficiency of health financial management (TA) and national level health service delivery
* Increase capacity of NDOH and provinces in health service delivery
 | Engage/complement (through demand social accountability work) |
| National public service: education | DFAT: Education for Prosperity (PAPE)- TBC,  | * Technical capacity building at basic and tertiary level
 | Engage/complement (through demand social accountability work) |
| Subnational government | DFAT: DCP (end 2022)Through DCP: DIRD Support (ends 2022, AUD 7.5 million)World Bank, Rural Service Delivery Project (ends 2022, US 23 million) | * Increase capacity of national and subnational governments to achieve improved service delivery and to widen economic opportunity: local solutions, empowerment voice and accountability and policy support (including CPP and MDI)
* TA improving transparency of SIP and constituency funds.
* Improve communities’ access to basic infrastructure and services in targeted rural areas, using inclusive, participatory planning and implementation
 | Direct SupportEngage/complement |
| Auditor-General | DFAT: IPP (IPP ends 2022, MoU worth AUD 6.9 million) | * TA improving PNG audit capability
 | Direct support |
| Ombudsman Commission | DFAT, JSS4D | * TA, training and resource support to increase capacity of investigations into complaints
 | Direct support |
| Elections Commission | DFAT: Supporting Elections in PNG: (ends 2024, AUD 20 million) MFAT: New Zealand Electoral Commission support (ends 2022) | * TA and systems strengthening focused on the election in 2022, including voter awareness programs.
* TA increasing capacity to conduct free and fair elections.
 | Complement |
| National Statistics Office | IPP (IPP ends 2022, MoU worth AUD 1.5 million) | * TA improving capability in independent, current and valid statistics upon which government decisions are made.
 | Direct support  |

#### **5.2 Non-State**

|  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |
| **PNG Non-state actors** | **Donor, Program title, Budget, Duration** | **Focus** | **Relationship with Accountability Program** |
| Churches | DFAT CPP (DCP end 2022, AUD 7million annually) Various grants  | * TA increase capacity/service delivery, community resilience and advocacy
* Gender based violence, health and education service provision etc.
 | Direct support |
| Civil Society | DFAT: ANCP funding, grants (GP and Incentive fund), Pacific WomenMFAT: Collaboration Pacific (small scale grants) | * Funding INGOs working in governance and accountability including World Vision, Oxfam, CARE. Including work in WASH in Western Province and support to Provincial Health Authorities
* Grants through GP and other funding INGOs and local CSO partners (including funding a proposal to increase capacity of NGO: the Voice) working in governance, gender/empowerment, service provision etc.
* Funding to INGOs working in governance and accountability of leadership.
 | Direct support /Complement |
| CIMC | DFAT (future funding options being considered) | * Platform for PNG’s civil society and business community to engage proactively with government on socio-economic policy formulation and implementation issues
 | Direct Support  |
| Media | DFAT: funding of the Tanim Graun television program through ABC ID | * Supporting an increase of social accountability content in PNG media
 | Direct Support |
|  Business | DFAT: MDF (ends 2022, total regional program AUD 78 million), Markets Economic Recovery and Inclusion (MERI) ProgramEGIG (Inclusive Growth) (ends 2022), PHAMA Plus (and MFAT) (ends 2022, AUD 32 million)IFC PNG Partnership (2017 – 2022) (various)ADB Private Sector Development Initiative (PSDI) (2016 – 2020) USD 60.83 million (for first three phases)World Bank: Extractive Industry Accountability and Governance Enhancement Project  | * Inclusive growth: advocacy of private sector
* Women’s economic empowerment (BCFW)
* Strengthening administration of marketplaces to promote community development and inclusivity
* Business enabling environment/ regulatory environment.
* Supporting accountability in the extractive industry including through the Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative
 | Engage/complement (through issue-base working |

## Review Accountability & Gender in the Literature

**There is currently little interface between gender literature and accountability literature**: much of the international accountability literature is ‘gender blind’ that is, it does not take into account the power differentials between women and men which influence types and quality of participation and engagement as citizens.

Where governance programmes do address gender inequality the focus tends to be on increasing **access to information** and **participation** in governance processes with women as beneficiaries. There are fewer examples of efforts to build **power and agency** which focus on women as decision makers.

**Gender is *only one* dimension of exclusion and intersects with other social stratifiers**, such as race, class, ability, age, education to create different experiences of vulnerability. Approaches which acknowledge these intersections are needed when developing accountability programs.

**Structural changes such as gender responsive policies, laws or quotas** can promote government’s accountability for gender equality.

**Accountability literature with a sectoral focus particularly health and education and livelihoods tend** to have more to offer in terms of strategies to overcome inequalities. This resonates with the ‘issues based’ approach to accountability.

Evidence from international literature which concords with PNG experience show the following common findings on what is working to achieve gender equitable accountability and governance programmes:

**Public Private Partnerships are influencing workplace policy and practice** and enhancing employers’ accountability towards women in the workplace**.**

**Locally led and** **context specific responses** work best especially in PNG with such socio-cultural diversity**.**

**Coalitions and networks are beginning to gain traction** for social accountability, particularly in the field of gender and sorcery accusation related violence.

**Normative change** must be built in to programmes to achieve meaningful participation of women and build agency.

**Working together with women *and* men** to explore gender inequality and jointly to determine ways of working equitably;

**Building women’s leadership ability** can help constructively to challenge the status quo

the importance of building in **‘Do No Harm’ principles** to program strategies.

**Gender equality is best addressed when an explicit outcome** of accountability work

#### **Lessons from the literature**

**Participation:**

**There is a rich literature on barriers for women’s participation in governance processes in PNG:**

Barriers to inclusion in governance processes in PNG are noted at all levels from individual (literacy and capacity) to structural (access to resources, lack of policies or adequate resourcing of them) to discriminatory social and cultural norms.

The MDI citizen perception survey[[111]](#footnote-111) conducted in PNG in 2019 concluded that ‘*women reported less freedom to voice their opinions, less knowledge across important social issues, and less access to media. The latter point reinforces a greater reported reliance by women on word of mouth sources of information. The survey showed that women have poorer perceptions of governance in PNG than men and are more dissatisfied with government performance at the national, provincial and district levels. In addition to the above, the FGD sessions showed that women find it more difficult than their male counterparts to access education services and police help.’*

The crime perception survey[[112]](#footnote-112) undertaken by JSS4D highlights significant differences between women and men’s perceptions of safety as well as persons with disability.

*‘Gender**differences occurred regularly throughout the different elements of the Project findings. Female respondents reported being more fearful of crime, more affected by the risk of crime, having less confidence in the police, and being less aware and engaged with the various justice sector services.’*

A recent review undertaken by IFES into the engagement of women in political life in 2019[[113]](#footnote-113) Papua New Guinea highlights the interplay between cultural (e.g bride price), social (e.g increased incidence of GBV during elections) and structural (cost of running for election) barriers noting ‘*women are largely limited in their ability to take active roles in decision-making and politics in their communities. Today, PNG is one of four countries globally with zero women representatives in the national legislature* [[114]](#footnote-114)’

A review of women’s participation in the PNG economy, which focused on the public sector[[115]](#footnote-115) summarised the key barriers which women face to achieving greater participation in the public service as: limited opportunities for higher education, scholarships, and professional development; discriminatory practices in recruitment, employment and remuneration; sexual harassment and bullying in the workplace, including inadequate policies and guidelines for reporting and response; gender-based violence in the home and community; safety and security concerns in public spaces including transportation to and from work; high unpaid labour and carer responsibilities to balance with formal employment; and jealousy and suspicion from both male partners and the wives and girlfriends of male colleagues.

An issues paper on barriers to women’s engagement in decentralised governance processes commissioned by DCPP in 2019[[116]](#footnote-116) reiterates these sentiments highlighting the lack of systematic and dedicated resources to equality and social inclusion (GESI) policies and programs; entrenched gender stereotypes which serve to undermine women’s engagement in the public domain and low levels of literacy for many women prohibiting their engagement.

In sum, barriers to engagement for many women in PNG are substantial and need to be addressed as reiterated in the GSDRC summary of social accountability programs ‘*Gender relations must be considered in programming. In PNG there are strong cultural barriers to women’s participation in community meetings; difficulties in ensuring that women’s priorities are reflected in community decisions. Men may also be excluded from speaking e.g. if they are young or lack status. Customary norms are very important, for example only men who are chiefs or seen as leaders speaking in meetings’*.[[117]](#footnote-117)

#### **What works to overcome barriers to participation?**

In seeking to achieve meaningful participation of women in governance processes, evidence is building around the importance of locating gender inequality centrally to programmes.

The DFID funded Implementation and Analysis in Action of Accountability Programme (IAAP)[[118]](#footnote-118)in Somalia found that **careful risk analysis early on, ideally as part of the Political Economy Analysis[[119]](#footnote-119),** can help to develop a nuanced understanding of the incentives and legitimacy of different marginalised or excluded groups. IAAAP shows that engaging with rights-holders substantively from the start, and then bringing duty-bearers into the equation afterwards, has proven successful across several projects.[[120]](#footnote-120) The same review stresses the importance of intersectionality since *there are important differences in perceptions and experiences of accountability among diverse marginalised groups, ranging from varying levels of social media engagement to skepticism around clan leadership across different groups. It is important to move away from a one-size-fits-all approach to civic engagement and recognise a variety of different needs and approache*s.’

This issue is highlighted in the QTAG annual review[[121]](#footnote-121) of the existing PNG Australia Governance Partnership which drew attention to the fact that gender and inclusion outcomes needed to be made more explicit to gain traction.

DFID’s review of Making All Voices Count demonstrates that by engaging with women and men in culturally and contextually appropriate ways engagement with civil society can be expanded to include women’s meaningful participation. In Kenya, Caritas Kitui focused on working with women’s groups, while in Indonesia Suara Kita focused on moderating women and men’s engagement so that women’s voices could be heard[[122]](#footnote-122).

Engaging with various media is an important aspect of voice and accountability work but requires explicit and deliberate **attention to gender and social inequalities from the outset**. The evaluation of DFID’s Making All Voices Count[[123]](#footnote-123)notes that ‘*assumptions of women’s access to technology are over-optimistic and ignore how far this access can be controlled by others in some settings. During a learning event, staff from Making All Voices Count projects working in Pakistan reflected that they had underestimated how far women feared ‘punishment’ for using the Internet. An insight arising from other projects was that when women reported having access to a phone or Internet-enabled device, it was very often not their own, they didn’t have sole use, or their use was controlled by someone else*’.

Shankland et al advise *‘…****context-appropriate qualitative and participatory methods to engage directly with women in seeking to understand the reasons that impede them from using SMS monitoring platforms’*** . These should seek to understand whether women and men use media differently and why. ‘*In sum, the only way to understand the roles played by these different possible factors is by listening to the women.[[124]](#footnote-124)’*

**Gender quotas** in India’s local governments improved community attitudes about female candidates’ ability to win and lead, resulting in women’s greater participation in political or community decision-making. However, this is contested space in PNG, and discussion continues around the value of women’s reserve seats. Progress towards this remains unclear.

While legislation exists in PNG to ensure that LLGs include women’s representation, the results of this stipulation are not clear in terms of the degree to which they empower women or the representativeness of the women selected. Nevertheless, in some fields quotas have worked to increase women’s engagement: in the education sector attention has been paid to ensuring Boards of Management include women with capacity building programmes built in to ensure that women feel able to contribute[[125]](#footnote-125).

**Capacity building is essential**: Women are often ill equipped to engage in public life often lacking the necessary experience or confidence. In India, for example, a study of the impact of female leadership on the governance of a large public programme found more inefficiencies and leakages and vulnerability to bureaucratic capture in village councils headed by women. However, as women accumulated management and political experience, governance improved, and the governance of the programme was significantly better in female headed councils than in other councils[[126]](#footnote-126).

Pacific Women[[127]](#footnote-127) has paid considerable attention to building women’s capacity to participate in accountability work: for example, through Family and Sexual Violence Action Committee (FSVAC), building the capacity of women’s networks and Human Rights defenders to engage effectively with justice and health services; through its annual learning workshops which provide a platform for all partners to share experiences, successes and challenges with relevant public sector representatives for example Department for Justice and Attorney General and Department of Community Development and Religion; through the Young Women’s Leadership project in Bougainville provided training and support for young women to participate in and practice leadership and decision making skills.

Pacific Women also supports the Business Coalition for Women in its efforts to increase women’s participation in the workforce by building women’s capacity and at the same time building employers’ accountability to their staff, particularly addressing harassment and sexual violence in the workplace. This is already paying dividends: an assessment by the International Finance Corporation in 2018 identified that 47 businesses or organisations had implemented at least one substantive change based on the Business Coalition’s services or products. Consistent with global evidence, anecdotal reporting indicates improvements for employers including staff retention, improved awareness of different forms of violence and increased knowledge of where to seek help[[128]](#footnote-128).

**What works to achieve women’s Power and Agency?**

While enhanced participation is key for women and marginalised groups to engage in accountability and governance programs it does not automatically translate into voice or agency. Fox notes ‘the key challenge is how to trigger a mutually reinforcing, reciprocal relationship between participation and accountability: “voice needs teeth to have bite, but teeth may not bite without voice” (Fox 2014: 36). Evidence is emerging that for meaningful participation of women either as rights holders or duty bearers, multi-dimensional approaches are needed which **include directly acknowledging gender and power dynamics.** As Theobold reminds us ‘*while accountability mechanisms can be used to create systems of empowerment, empowerment is a prerequisite for bringing about accountability*[[129]](#footnote-129).

**Normative change**

A recent review on strategies to address women’s agency by the Poverty Lab[[130]](#footnote-130) draws from 160 papers across six Regions. This review found that gender norms surrounding women’s agency moderated the impacts of interventions, and that responses which combined approaches which address power relationships at different levels, household, community, local government and upwards is critical for equitable outcomes. Furthermore, **incorporating intentional gender awareness programming that directly challenges restrictive gender norms** through discussion groups and training seemed promising, including to reduce Intimate Partner Violence, and to expand adolescent girls’ and women’s agency in economic decisions and participation in public life.

The approach of **moderating women and men’s engagement to enable women’s voices to be heard** resonates well in PNG and has been used successfully in PNG by Care International in their Inclusive Governance programme[[131]](#footnote-131) and by Pacific Women in the Family Farm Teams program to ensure that approaches to include women and the marginalised do no harm.

This finding is endorsed in the evaluation of DFID’s Making All Voices Count programme MVC notes that successful projects ‘*focused* ***on challenging the norms*** *by which women were generally not included in such processes, through building knowledge and confidence, legitimating women’s voices, and allowing for prior deliberation outside of formal structures.*’ [[132]](#footnote-132)

Evidence from a maternal health programme in Orissa in India[[133]](#footnote-133) highlights three drivers of success for social accountability for women 1) the generation of demand for rights and better services *through information*, 2) the leverage of intermediaries to legitimise the demands of poor and marginalised women *through dialogue*, and 3) the sensitisation of leaders and health providers to women’s needs *through negotiation*. A key tool engaged in the programme was the process of public hearings where marginalised women were supported to raise concerns and issues relating to maternal health to service providers and managers. The study found that perceptions and attitudes among both marginalised women as well as leaders and service providers played as much of a role in the success or failure of social accountability as any structural barriers. This endorses the fact that normative change is an essential ingredient for success.

This is true too for PNG where perceptions of women and men’s roles determine levels of engagement. There are no women in parliament although there has been an increase in numbers of women standing for election. However, the perception of both women and men voters of ‘politics being men’s business’ plays a significant role in female candidates’ chances of success.

**Women’s leadership**

In PNG there are no women in parliament. In the public sector studies show that women account for 38% of all public sector employees (n=96,986), with representation primarily in the service professions[[134]](#footnote-134). According to one study[[135]](#footnote-135) ‘only 24% of administrative positions are held by women. The number of women rapidly diminishes with seniority, such that women occupy 18% of all senior management appointments and 7% of all executive appointments. Women fare poorly at the provincial level … with very few occupying critical decision-making positions. They currently hold no executive level appointments, only 6% of senior management and 10% of middle management appointments in provincial administrations’.

Analysis of research into women’s leadership and the health systems of three countries (Cambodia, Kenya and Zimbabwe) showed that ‘while health systems depend on women as providers of health care, they rarely lead within the systems they contribute so much to. Where they do lead, they often utilise different styles and set different priorities that are arguably more responsive to health needs of the full spectrum of people women, men, girls, boys and people of other genders’[[136]](#footnote-136).

Pacific Women has paid considerable attention to building women’s leadership potential. The experience of the recent Women make the Change programme suggests that accountability work needs to focus both on building women’s meaningful engagement in decision making and leadership as well as on advocacy for the importance of gender equality and social inclusion as a policy issue.

**Working with women and men.**

Emerging lessons from Pacific Women and ACIAR’s Family Farm Teams[[137]](#footnote-137) project in PNG demonstrate the importance of working with both women and men to address unfavourable gender norms. The collective nature of much of PNG stresses the need for collective approaches to accountability. The Family Farm Teams approach promoted by ANU and implemented by CARE through Pacific Women works with both men and women to ensure the support and engagement of men, who are culturally recognised as the family head. The project focuses on understanding the gender, cultural and regional enablers and barriers faced by farming families and is emerging as an example of good practice in the country.

The CARE Coffee project research found a ten-point increase in women’s empowerment for women participating in the project between 2016 (29 per cent) and 2018 (39 per cent). The strongest improvements were in women’s ownership of assets, followed by an increased role in household decision making and a decreased acceptance of relationship violence and unequal workloads.[[138]](#footnote-138) Although not a social accountability programme per se, this programme demonstrates the importance of mutual accountability at the household level.

**Coalitions and women’s networks have made progress in gaining traction for accountability particularly around GBV and Sorcery Accusation Related Violence in PNG**

Coalitions are emerging as effective strategies especially in response to the issue of GBV and SARV[[139]](#footnote-139). A review of the progress towards the Sorcery Accusation Related Violence action plan highlights the importance of employing ‘soft advocacy’ by harnessing existing networks, for example the Human Rights Defenders Network and ‘shadow networks’ that have been developed to support state departments/bureaucrats in performing their roles. The fact that the movement is PNG owned and not donor led is also cited as critical to its success. More recently, protests in PoM against the highly publicised torture of a young woman have combined with the growing collective demand for government to address Violence Against Women resulting in NCDC developing a strategy to respond to the issue with a specific pillar dedicated to accountable delivery of services with the goal that ‘NCDC’s Agents (programs and contractors) will all become leaders in ending gender-based violence in the City. NCDC will hold them accountable[[140]](#footnote-140).

A study on working politically in PNG revealed that successful coalitions of women had both informal relationships with male power-holders and established ties between elite women who could strategically frame issues so as to circumvent conservative opposition[[141]](#footnote-141)’.

ODI research into women’s voice and leadership in decision making concludes that ‘*Organising with other women can itself build the capacity for voice, such as critical consciousness and confidence. Women’s participation in small community groups set up around economic programmes – such as cooperatives or self-help groups – have created new or strengthened forms of social capital resulting in increased awareness of community politics, avenues to discuss community-related issues around social norms (such as gender-based violence), and contact with local officials’*[[142]](#footnote-142)*.*

Within the public sector coalitions and networks are also influencing positive change. In the Justice Sector, JSS4D has supported individual capacity building and coalition building as a means of supporting women’s empowerment within the law and justice sector. Support to the Royal Papua New Guinea Constabulary Women’s Association Network (RPGNC WAN) for example has resulted in increased visibility of women’s issues both as employees and as clients gender based violence., particularly in relation to has resulted in PNG Judicial Women’s Association (PNG JWA) and the Correctional Services Women’s Network, individual women within the agencies have progressed into positions of leadership while others have been proactive in facilitating improved services for survivors of FSV.

In the private sector, Pacific Women works closely with UN Women to promote accountable market governance and systems that include women’s voices in Wewak, East Sepik and Alotau, Milne Bay Provinces. The Wewak Market Vendors Association has already submitted concerns to local authorities about the safety and hygiene of the markets and treatment of vendors. Members reported that as a formalised association they feel more confident and feel that the local authorities are more likely to listen to their issues and concerns. The vendor association model, tested and demonstrated in Port Moresby by the Safe City project, has been taken up by the Government as a ‘voice strategy’, to and has been incorporated into the draft Informal Economy Strategy and revised legislation. By enhancing women’s and girls’ empowerment and providing opportunities for engagement, the model provides a structural ‘bridge’ for local and national policy and decision makers to listen and respond to women’s concerns. The accountable, inclusive approach to market governance and operations is also being applied in other local markets.[[143]](#footnote-143)

**Digital monitoring approaches for empowerment and agency**

In West Africa the Community Treatment Observatory[[144]](#footnote-144) demonstrates the power of combining community approaches with digital platforms. Groups of people living with HIV are trained to collect data from other service users on accessibility, appropriateness and availability of services and drugs. These data are fed into the national data system and used as a form of triangulation. For populations frequently marginalised this is having powerful results. Not only is the Community Treatment Observatory generating evidence on HIV treatment access trends it has also provided opportunities for People with HIV and key populations to engage duty bearers and key opinion leaders on improving access to quality, uninterrupted HIV treatment. The CTO has demonstrated that a patient-led approach in monitoring HIV services enhances dialogue between service providers and service users on ways to improve care. The Gambia Network of AIDS Support Societies has used CTO data to secure a commitment from the National Assembly Health Select Committee to engage the Ministry of Health and National AIDS Secretariat on performance improvement plans for health facilities.

**Locally led and context specific approaches work best**

Literature and experience is clear that accountability measures must be contextually appropriate to succeed[[145]](#footnote-145). Different cultural and political contexts require different approaches and this is particularly relevant for gender and inclusion work in PNG with its enormous socio cultural diversity.

Together with the lessons emerging from the SARV arena (above) and Care International Inclusive Governance , the Goreku Case Study[[146]](#footnote-146) highlights a collective community effort under the Church Partnership programme that has identified the issue of insecurity and tribal fighting as a barrier to development, and supported by the churches has begun to bring about social change *including ‘a transformation in power relations between men and women, including increased participation of women in public life and decision-making, and a significant reduction in tribal conflict, household violence, and sorcery accusation-related violence’.* This work bases its gender approach on the Theology of Gender Equality.

**Public Private partnerships can help raise visibility for gender equitable accountability programming and policy making.**

Oil Search Foundation (OSF)[[147]](#footnote-147) Wok Bung Wantaim (WBW) works under the PNG Partnership fund together with the Hela Provincial Health Authority to strengthen health systems. A core part of the programme is gender equity. In partnership with the Provincial Council of Women the programme is strengthening women’s role in PHAs, LLGs and DDAs to demand accountability for delivery of health and health related services. Enhanced transparency of progress towards the service level agreement (SLA) outcomes which visualise service allocations, capturing the contributions of Health Function Grants is helping to hold all partners mutually accountable for use of funding, including commitments to Gender Equality and Disability Inclusion.

## Coalitions Programming Case Studies

#### **7.1 Introduction and background**

To help demonstrate how a Coalitions for Change approach could be successfully implemented in the PNG context, the Design Team conducted a mini “issue selection” process.

The purpose of this **illustrative exercise** is to demonstrate two things:

* That there is a potential process & methodology for selecting issues and designing CfC interventions which will manage risk and maximise the potential for change.
* That the Design Team has confidence that a CfC /Issue-Based Programming approach would be possible in the PNG context.

*Issue selection for CfCs: managing risks*

To conduct this exercise, the Design Team drew up a long-list of 10 issues based on initial conversations with PNG interviewees. It then selected three issues to scope a part of this illustrative exercise. In a future potential project, a larger number of issues might be scoped, but three was judged sufficient for the purposes of this exercise.

The method used to assess issues below draws on experience with CfCs in other contexts. It uses a set of questions about the technical and political aspects of an issue to help think through whether change would be possible. See below for the detailed set of question. The key rationale for assessing issues in this way is that *if you select the wrong issue – for example there are powerful political blockers of change or viable solution – then change will not be possible.*

This does not, however, mean that this method is overly time consuming and bureaucratic. For the purposes of this exercise we have used a clear structure to “show the workings” clearly. However, this approach can be flexible. It can help selected not just a range of different issues (health focused, education focused etc?), but also different types of project (short-term and small, longer-term and bigger etc.?): the conclusion from conducting this assessment may be that a long-term CfC with a formal, relatively structured coalition of local partners is necessary. But equally, another possible conclusion would be that a small-scale and short-term project may have the most chance of achieving change. “Coalitions” do not need to be large, formal and long term.

*CfC Programming: maximising impact of BCEP*

The proposal to adopt CfCs should not be thought of as an additional, separate strand of work. Instead, using CfCs would open the opportunity to draw on the other proposed strands of BCEP. CfCs require a range of local partners, they often require the media, and they require partnership with influential groups such as the churches. As such a well-designed CfC could help **draw together other elements of the BCEP program in** **a way which ensures that it adds up to more than the sum of its parts.** By focusing on some well-chosen issues (with the potential for change), and then drawing in partners from across the wider BCEP program to focus on those issues, there is a significantly increased potential for achieving demonstrable impact which goes beyond that achievable in more conventional programming.

Linking CfCs to the wider BCEP program in this way also helps reduce some of the risks with adopting this approach in PNG. It helps ensure that there will be sufficient local partners to join coalitions. Experience from other CfCs also suggests that delivery risks can be managed by carefully considering the *coalition facilitation function*. This is required to both convene a coalition in the first instance, but then to coordinate and manage the delivery of its activities. If this function is adequately resourced this can reduce any risk of non-delivery. The coalition facilitation can be conducted by either (a) a core local partner; (b) the BCEP programme team, or (c) a combination of the two. Different types of issue, working with different forms of coalition, may need a slightly differently constructed facilitation function. But the key point here is that if this function is carefully considered and resourced this will reduce risks for DFAT.

**Box 1: Indicative CfC development process**

The DFAT-JAS- is currently supporting two PNG CSOs to develop CfC proposals. The following three staged development process is based on that experience and on the practices developed with DFAT support in The Philippines. At each stage, the level of oversight will be proportionate to the risk. The three stages are:

**1. CfC Issues scoping and selection**: Supported by the PMT, the CfC partner will conduct research to identify a pipeline of potential issues for scoping that align with: a) Australia-PNG development priorities (as communicated by DFAT-JAS-), b) the emerging sectoral/geographic focus of the BCEP, as well as c) the partner organization’s mission and areas of strength. The pipeline will be screened by DFAT-JAS- after which the CfC partner will conduct detailed scoping on approved concepts. The scoping will, in particular, assess the potential to assemble a coalition of sufficient influence to drive change and who stands to benefit if the projected outcomes are achieved. It will examine the likely outcomes for women and other excluded groups and the role they could play in the coalition.

A first round of scoping will be conducted during Inception Phase. That will build on the experience gained through the partnerships currently being developed by DFAT with the scale of scoping taking account of the funds committed to those projects. The PMT and lead CSO partners will score and rank the issues and make a recommendation to DFAT-JAS on which should proceed to stage 2.Risks at this stage are managed by: i) rigorously assessing the potential for change on an issue, including drawing heavily on local PNG political and technical insights; ii) limiting the number of issues worked; iii) selecting issues where there is confidence that in the PNG context there are sufficient local partners, including those being supported through other strands of BCEP iv) identifying the potential of the issue to promote gender equality and social inclusion. The Inception Phase report will detail the approach to future project scoping.

**2. CfC Strategy development**: With PMT support, the lead partner will develop a theory of change and lay out a process to assemble a coalition and the advocacy tactics to be adopted. The coalitions will take a range of forms depending on the nature of issue, and could include: i) Short-term and temporary: responding to a time-bound specific opportunities or threats; ii) Longer-term but still quite informal alliances; and iii) Long-term strategic coalitions: more formal, structured including with a secretariat. The strategies for CfC projects will be approved by DFAT-JAS and reviewed by the Steering Committee in annual program planning processes.

Risks at this stage are managed by: i) Setting a high bar in the approval process with only a limited number of projects proceeding to implementation; ii) Working with a range of coalition types

**3. CfC implementation**: the PMT monitors the CfC partner’s coordination of coalition partners and delivery of the initiative according to the strategy. Using the strategy testing tool, the PMT will facilitate regular reviews of the project’s progress against the theory of change.
The PMT will include DFAT--JAS in CfC reviews where the risks are high with formal reporting on at six-monthly cycle. The PMT will immediately notify DFAT-JAS if there any changes to project risks levels.

Risk at this stage are managed through: i) Building coalition facilitation skills in the lead CS partners, with the potential for twinning with international organisations assessed in inception phase; ii) Close monitoring of project progress; and iii) proactive identification

*Case Study CfCs*

In the detail of this annex, we set out the three case studies. In the table below we provide an overall illustrative conclusion for each of the case studies showing: (a) the overall nature of the issue, (b) what approach to achieving change could be prioritized – what form of coalition and (b) recommending next steps. The intention here is to demonstrate how this exercise can help make robust decisions about how to take CfCs forward.

In summary:

|  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |
| **Case Study**  | **Nature of Issue** | **Potential Strategy & coalition**  | **Recommendation**  |
| Tariff Reform  | The technical policy solutions here are *relatively* easy, but the politics is hard and power of the “blockers” strong.  | (i) Build a broad coalition of supporters, including consumers & business; (ii) research to address the arguments in favour of the status quo; (iii) focus on *accountability* for the process of setting tariffs. | Proceed. While the political blockers are significant, there is sufficient confidence that change is possible.  |
| Sorcery Related Violence Against Women | Broad potential support for change, but a hard problem to solve – what is the best technical solution?  | (i) need to build confidence that the proposed solution (e.g. public campaign) would work. (ii) work towards a narrow coalition led by the churches, running public campaigning and pressing govt to implement.  | Further information required. What are the potential effective policy responses and what form of public campaign may have impact? Work towards potential church-led coalition.  |
| Electoral Roll and Electoral Related Violence – changing cycle of LLG election.  | Strong political interests in favour of status quo. Moving LLG elections as a solution is potentially challenging.  | A potential strategy would be (i) conduct monitoring work during the 2021 electoral roll development process and then (ii) advocate through an elite level coalition of actors for changing cycle of LLG elections after 2022.  | Don’t take forward. Because other poss. solutions for the 2021 electoral roll are being developed (biometric solutions), and because moving LLG elections is unlikely.  |

These examples are purely illustrative. We do not claim that the Design Team has fully assessed each issue. It, however, demonstrates how this methodology can help identify issues with the potential for change. In addition to helping show how issues can be selected carefully (and some rejected), it demonstrates how different strategies can be developed for different issues. This reflects the point about how effective CfCs will have a portfolio of different projects, using different types of coalition, run over different time periods, and adopting different advocacy strategies.

#### **7.2 Case Study 1: A transparent rules-based system to determine tariffs**

**Summary**

The tables below show the detailed assessment of this issue. The overall conclusion generated from this assessment is that this is an issue which could be taken forward and adopted as an CfC. This is because based on this assessment there is sufficient confidence that there is (a) potential for change and (b) a viable and practical coalition-based approach to achieving that change. It should be stressed that this designed to illustrate the process.

The potential project on this issue would focus on influencing government to put in place a more transparent approach to setting tariffs, leading to balancing of different interests in policy making – including consumers voices.

The technical policy solution is not difficult, but the political challenge is significant. Existing vested interested (parts of the private sector who benefit from current tariffs, and the parts of government protecting short-term revenue collection) will seek to block change.

This project idea would build a coalition which gives voice to the interests which would be pro (i) more transparent tariff setting and (ii) lowering of tariffs – this includes some businesses and consumers (hit by higher prices). Activities that the coalition undertake include, for example, new research on the impact on consumers, “outsider” advocacy towards government pressing for reform, and more constructive direct engagement with policy makers.

|  |
| --- |
| **Case Study: Issue-based project scoping** |
| **Project idea** | **A transparent rules-based system to determine tariffs.** |
| **Project idea outlinedetailed political and policy context: (briefly outline the idea and why it will work)** | **The political context: is there an opportunity for change?** *Overall project idea* The project idea would be to change would be working with influence PNG government departments whose responsibility it is to set tariffs. The aim would be to , to make the process for setting tariffs transparent, and to involve consumers, businesses, and other stakeholders in the process. At present, the Treasury Department determines tariffs and parliament legislates these without public consultation.*Context* PNG has pursued a Tariff Reduction Program (TRP) since 1999 to gradually liberalize trade. Prior to 1999, PNG implemented import bans and tariff rates as high as 125 percent on certain imports, to encourage and support domestic production. As part of negotiations with the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund, and due to its ascension to the World Trade Organization (WTO) in 1996, PNG implemented the TRP. Currently there are three tariff rate categories implemented by the Treasury Department, specified in the TRP: intermediate, protective and prohibitive. Intermediate rates are applied to inputs used in the production processes of various indigenous industries. Protective rates are imposed on imports of final goods for which there are domestic producers. Prohibitive rates are the highest category of tariffs, imposed on goods which are deemed valuable export goods.After an initial reduction in maximum bound tariffs from 100 per cent to 55 per cent (with some exceptions for sugar, wood and fish), it was legislated in 1999 that tariffs would be reduced by 5 per cent at three-year intervals. Most product lines (around three quarters) are zero-rated, with no tariffs put on imported goods which have no domestic competitors. By 2019, it was planned that all tariff categories would be unified at 10 percent.The TRP was suspended in 2018, and again in 2019, when 323 tariff line increases were introduced. The reason for the increases, according to the Customs Tariff Amendment (2019) Act, is to “provide relief to local pioneer industry and existing local manufacturers from cheap imports” or to support infant industries. These tariffs covered a range of products such as: frozen meat, packaged fruit and vegetables, sugar and confectionary, flour, cereals, women’s handbags, various wooden products, garments and fabric, beverages, smoked fish, soap and plywood furniture. The average (unweighted) tariff rate increase in 2018 was 7 per cent, and this doubled to 14 per cent in 2019. Although the 2020 budget did not contain any tariff rate increases, there were no decreases either. In July 2020, the Climate Change Development Authority and the Department of Labour and Industrial Relations imposed levy and fee increases on the certification of boilers, crude palm oil tanks, palm kernel oil tanks, fuel tanks, and pressure vessels.One tariff increase was a 25 percent tariff on milk imports, previously zero-rated, to protect a government joint venture with Innovative Agri-Industries (IAI), an Israeli company. The National government has 20 percent equity in the venture, the Central provincial government has 30 percent equity, and IAI has the remaining 50 percent.A Tariff Review Taskforce established in 2003 to evaluate the effects of reduced tariff rates on PNG’s different sectors found that for the manufacturing sector, the industries that expanded the slowest were those subjected to some of the highest tariff rates, such as tuna and mackerel canneries. High tariffs also had a negative effect on export industries, the taskforce argued, by causing the price of imported inputs to increase. Furthermore, large capital-intensive producers were more adversely affected due to higher input costs, compared to smaller, labour-intensive producers.*Position of consumers: potential supporters of reform* Consumers are worse off, as high tariffs will inevitably result in lower milk imports reducing choice, assuming import volumes do not increase. In addition, standard trade theory predicts the average retail price of milk will rise due to an inefficient industry.*Current policy limitations* Previous studies on trade policy have found PNG do not possess the bureaucratic capability to select winners. This is further worsened when governments, after committing to failing industries, are unable to admit the mistake, and hence continue with trade protection indefinitely in the hope that the industry will become internationally competitive.The PNG government has tried but failed to pick winners (competitive enterprises) in the past, as shown in the cement and sugar industries, resulting in high rates of protection for indefinite periods of timeIt appears that new tariff increases introduced have been ad hoc, and in some instances to protect government joint ventures with foreign companies. The timeframe for these tariffs is not specified, whilst a key test to tell whether the infant industry argument holds is to ask whether the industry is competitive after tariffs have been gradually reduced. The TRP was in many ways a test to see which industries were ‘winners’ and which were not.Need to gather more information on how tariffs are determined within the Treasury department, the Climate Change Development Authority, and the Department of Labour and Industrial Relations. *The political context is complicated for several reasons:*The PNG government has run fiscal deficits in the past 8 years, and has faced funding constraints as a consequence of negative shocks such as the commodity price slump of 2015, and the Southern Highlands earthquake of 2018. Additional sources of revenue are attractive, and the National budget recorded tariffs revenues in 2018 K325.3 million, and in 2019: K399.4 million. This increase in revenue in 2019 reflected more tariff line increases in 2019. In addition to tariff revenue, are the dividends that government stands to gain from its joint-venture investments.*Existing interests will strongly oppose a reduction in tariff rates.*A viable overall change strategy: any windows of opportunity. That there were no additional tariff increases in 2020 reveals government is generally moving away from trade protectionist policy stance, despite the additional tariffs in July. One potential idea would be to make the tariff determination process a more transparent process so that consumers, and various other stakeholders may have a say in these increases. This could be similar to consultation with stakeholders when tax reforms were being considered.The 2018 and 2019 tariff line increases present an opportunity to study tariff effects on consumers, and on businesses. Studies of this nature would inform rules-based transparent tariff determination program. In 2003, the Tariff Review Taskforce outsourced a similar study to the University of Adelaide. Potential institutions that a review could be outsourced to could be the Australian National University’s Development Policy Center, which has done some preliminary work on PNG tariffs already; and the National Research Institute (NRI). *Is there a potentially powerful alliance of supporters?* Although there does not exist a civil society group solely focused on consumer welfare, potential coalition partners include the Institute of National Affairs, the Consultative Implementation and Monitoring Council (CIMC), the National Research Institute (NRI), and the Independent Consumer and Competition Commission (ICCC), Business Council, the Port Moresby Chamber of Commerce and Industry (PMCCI, and the Lae Chamber of Commerce and Industry (LCCI). Other potential supporters would be businesses affected by tariffs in the agriculture and manufacturing sector. PNG also entered into the International Monetary Fund’s Structural Adjustment Program (IMF’s SMP) in February of 2020. Although the current SMP does not address tariffs, working with the IMF to include reforms to tariff determination is possible. |
| **Criteria** | **Score\*** | **Justification** |
| \*Score Rating System: Strong=4; Good=3; Moderate=2; Uncertain=1; Low=0 |
| 1. **The political context: is there an opportunity for change?**
 |
| **POLITICAL: What is the potential political demand for a policy solution from decision makers?**  | 2 | The demand from policy makers is uncertain, however since the Tax Review Secretariat in 2015, no large forums involving public participation has been conducted, with regards to tax and specifically tariff reform. With no additional tariff line increases in 2020, the Treasury department which tariffs are a responsibility, have signaled they may be open to making tariff determination a transparent, and rules-based process. It is still unclear what the desires of the Climate Change Development Authority and the Department of Labour and Industrial Relations are.Having a transparent tariff determination system would likely see less tariff line increases. However, the 2003 tariff review taskforce found that industries with the highest tariff rates were the slowest to expand. Faster growing industries contribute greater corporate income tax, the tax levied on company revenue. Therefore, presenting this argument in favour of less tariff line increases may increase the political demand for a transparent tariff determination system.IMF’s SMP could be leveraged to create political demand through external pressure. |
| **POLITICAL: To what degree is project sufficiently salient or relevant to policy makers, stakeholders and/or public to form the basis of successful advocacy?**  | 4 | Tariff rate increases affect consumers through higher prices, and firms who rely on imported inputs in production processes. Previous studies on PNG trade protection found that the poorest 10th of households paid a 3.2% tax whereas wealthiest tenth of households paid a 0.6% equivalent in tax. Further, the tariffs reduce the different brands of the good being imported. Further studies on whether tariffs are still having a detrimental effect should confirm this.For firms, the tariffs impose a higher cost structure, as the protected industry is now more profitable and can attract more labor and other inputs by higher prices, thus disadvantaging competing businesses. Also, high tariff rates prohibit other firms from entering the industry. Further studies on whether tariffs are still having a detrimental effect should confirm this.It is therefore salient that consumers and companies that may be affected be given an avenue to voice their concerns about proposed tariffs.  |
| 1. **A viable overall change strategy: any windows of opportunity?**
 |
| **POLITICAL: How plausible is the Project idea for building a coalition among “supporters” of change (ie. stakeholders with shared interests & incentives)?**  | 3 | A coalition between grassroots/civil society organizations, business groups, and regulatory authority is possible. A preliminary assessment highlight potential challenges: (1) no civil society groups exist that are focused on protecting consumer welfare; (2) pushback from the companies enjoying protection that have ties with governments and politicians (3) tariffs present government with two revenue streams, first from tariff revenue, and second, dividends from government joint ventures which the tariffs are designed to protect. |
| **POLITICAL: How plausible is the Project idea for overcoming the “blockers” of change (ie. stakeholders with shared interests & incentives to oppose the change)?**  | 2 | The large companies and government joint ventures, and the Treasury department has interest in the status quo. However, the specific ‘in’ to the issue - have consumers pay lower prices and enjoy more variety of products, and to have domestic companies protected from government investment and trade protection on foreign companies that crowd out domestic entrepreneurship – has the potential to develop a strong coalition of partners. |
| **TECHNICAL: How technically feasible are the proposed solutions (can it be delivered, and will it address the problem)?** | 2 | At present, the Treasury department which is responsible for determining tariffs, has not made this process publicly available. The tariffs in 2018 and 2019 appear ad hoc, and follow loosely on government intention to assist the expansion of the manufacturing sector. More information about the current process from the Treasury, the Climate Development Authority, and the Department of Labor and Industrial Relations, is needed before a new/improvements can be made to the existing one. A model would involve vetting companies applying for trade protection around their ability to develop comparative advantage and if the industry will become internationally competitive, and a specific timeframe set for these tariffs.  |
| 1. **Is there a potentially powerful alliance of supporters?**
 |
| **POLITICAL: How confident can we be that a positive balance of power in favour of change can be achieved?** | 3 | The established joint-ventures have power and a keen interest in the status quo. However, the specific “in” to the issue – creating a transparent system of determining how and which industries are awarded tariffs – should unite large group of partners. |
| **TECHNICAL/POLITICAL: Have the political winners and losers from the proposed solution been considered?**  | 4 | The government loses its hold on determining tariff solely, and this could feed in to loss of revenue (tariff revenue and dividend), and the large agriculture companies lose through their investments becoming less profitable. However, consumers win though having their voices heard, and fighting for lower prices and more products; and domestic and rival companies win through lower prices of inputs. Government also wins through favorable foreign relations with trading partners. |
| 1. **Other issues?**
 |
| **OTHER: Are the risks manageable?** | 4 | Related to the investing in a open forum involving consultation with PNG stakeholder on future tariff proposals. |
| **OTHER: Will the project lead to greater accountability of leaders and decision-makers?** | 3 | It will make the Treasury department, and other government departments accountable to domestic consumers and firms by having their concerns factored in, when a list of new tariff line increases is considered. This is achievable in the short to medium-term. |
| **OTHER: Will the project lead to a more positive engagement between groups in society?** | 3 | There will be more positive engagement between business groups and government. It may also lead to the creation of civil society groups with focus of protecting consumer welfare.  |

#### **Case Study 2: Increasing accountability of churches for the prevention of and response to violence from sorcery accusations**

**Summary**

The tables below show the detailed assessment of this issue. The overall conclusion generated from this assessment is that this is an issue which may be taken forward and adopted as an CfC – but some further information would be required. This is because based on this assessment there is sufficient confidence that there a potential coalition of supporters could be created (led by the Church) – however, there are some questions about how to ensure the solution proposed (including a public campaign) would be effective at changing behaviour.

One potential benefit of this proposal is that it could link to the wider BCEP programme, providing a clear issue-based focus for the partnership with the churches, but then drawing in other partners to form an influential coalition.

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| **Title** | **Media Campaign with the Churches against Sorcery Accusation Related Violence** |
| **The issue** | The belief in sorcery is prevalent in most parts of PNG, however, violence because of sorcery accusation occurs more in some parts of PNG than others. The problem of violence arising from sorcery and witchcraft accusations has been recognised as being symptomatic of a range of **social stresses**. These include declining health and education services, increased economic disparities as a result of the extractive industries, weakened local governance mechanisms, stresses on land, and population displacement.Preliminary findings from a four year multi sited and mixed method study[[148]](#footnote-148) into pathways to addressing sorcery accusation related violence has found that victims of sorcery accusations and related violence can be men or women, children or elderly, and wealthy or poor. The gendering of accusations forms distinct patterns in different regions, the research shows Bougainville predominantly has male victims while victims are predominantly female in Enga, and roughly half/half in National Capital District . Overall, it is not possible to say whether Sorcery Accusation Rleated Violence (SARV) is increasing overall in PNG, **but we can conclude it is entering new geographical areas, and expanding to new classes of victims, such as children**. It has been argued that ‘these gendered patterns are cultural and reveal embedded assumptions and fears about women. Children are sometimes accused because their parents have been accused and due to the common belief that sorcery/*sanguma* spirit passes through the bloodline’[[149]](#footnote-149)It is clear that SARV is a sustained and recurrent problem in PNG, although it is characterized by peaks and ebbs in different geographical regions over time (Forsyth et al 2019)[[150]](#footnote-150). The consequences of SARV are far reaching: analysis of cases reported in the national media and by the national courts over 20 years found that in the reported cases almost half the accused were killed (42%), a quarter were wounded (34%) and a third (34%) not physically harmed,. On average, there were more than 30 deaths and 72 victims per year (Forsyth et al. 2017b). Each case often also has multiple secondary victims –families and even clan members of those who have been accused may be dispossessed and rendered homeless, as well as socially stigmatised. Out of 117 SARV incidents, the data shows that in 72 per cent of the incidents the families of the victim were also affected because they felt shamed and in 47 per cent there was psychological harm; suicide as a result of SARV is also reported. In almost a quarter of the SARV incidents the victim’s family had to temporarily relocate; 16 per cent did so permanently.[[151]](#footnote-151) Over the long term, SARV causes significant harm to families and communities in multiple ways. *It destroys social cohesion through eroding trust, and creates contexts in which suspicion and fear fester. It is likely to be a significant cause of urban migration* as people flee to urban areas to escape both SARV and the fear of sorcery. |
| **Project idea outline:**  | **The political context: is there an opportunity for change?** The political will to address SARV in PNG was ignited by public condemnation of the burning of a young woman in Mt Hagen, PNG and death of another woman accused of sorcery in Bougainville in 2013. The publicizing of the death of Kepari Leniata via mainstream and social media was a catalyst for public protest and in turn political recognition that sorcery accusation related violence is a community concern in some parts of PNG. Kepari Leniata’s death sparked widespread protest which included a national Haus Krai (mourning house) within Papua New Guinea and through PNG diaspora communities in places such as Australia and the UK. The haus krai protest called for government action to end violence against women. A petition was handed to the then Prime Minister Peter O’Neill. Concerns were also raised by donor and development partners. In response, the PNG government repealed the Sorcery act of 1971 and amended section 299A of the criminal code which now allows for the maximum penalty for anyone found guilty of murder on account of an accusation of sorcery.Even with the legislative changes, there was still a recognition by both government and civil society that legislative change could not solve the issue of sorcery accusation related violence. There was widespread acknowledgement that a holistic response was needed to address SARV.In December 2013, the Department of Justice and Attorney General, Consultative Implementation and Monitoring Council (CIMC) and partners from State Society and Govrnance in Melanesia (SSGM), ANU and Australian DFAT began consultations to determine the way forward.These consultations resulted in the decision to focus on **breaking the link between sorcery accusations and violence**. This was a pragmatic decision that recognized that violence is the most problematic aspect of the beliefs in PNG today. It was also intended to allow some conceptual separation between the beliefs themselves and the violent responses to accusations of sorcery or witchcraft, although there is considerable debate about the extent to which this separation can in fact be made[[152]](#footnote-152).This led to the development of what is known as the National Action Plan to address Sorcery Accusation violence. The national action plan is intended to bring together the key partners whose work addresses or cuts across the SARV space. This includes the Highlands Human Rights Defenders, Kup Women for Peace, research and academic institutions, the legal policy branch of the Department of Justice and Attorney General, local and international NGO’s, human rights defenders and in some cases the churches. The NAP vision is to have a society that is free of sorcery accusation and violence. The mission of the plan is to1. Stop accusations leading to sorcery related violence
2. To deal with perpetrators of violence and
3. To address the needs of survivors and to restore security to the communities, within the legal policy frameworks and acceptable values and norms.

The plan has five core areas: legal and protection, health, advocacy and communication, care and counselling, and research. The current network is quite law and justice focused at present. The primary reason for this is that the Deparment of Justice is the lead government agency in terms of coordination of the roll out of the plan. Apart from one highly publicised case, there does not seem to be much evidence of the law being fully applied. If anything, the changes in the law has caused confusion among police. The difficulties of policing SARV in remote communities also contributes to low rates of arrest and successful prosecution. Representation from the health and education sector is missing. The research by the NRI, DWU and ANU shows that illness or death is often a catalyst for accusations. Therefore, it is imperative that health workers are aware of the crucial role that they play in ensuring that relatives of sick or deceased persons are informed of medical causes of illness and death. The co-chairs of the national committee (Department of Justice and Family and Sexual Violence Action Committee) will need to be more proactive in ensuring that the components of the action plan that require a non justice response is adequately catered for. This will require better engagement with relevant stakeholders witin the education and health sectors. Members of the committee should request the co-chairs provide updates on efforts to engage with the education and health sector.**A viable overall change strategy: any windows of opportunity.** A coalition of 10 denominations have recently come together under a strategy on SARV ‘*National Churches Strategic Plan to Address Sorcery Accusation Related Violence’ (2019).* This plan reinforces the aims of the NAP but with a faith-based premise. Given the influence of churches in PNG, and their reach into education and health services these institutions could play a larger role in preventing SARV. The readiness for an accelerated response to SARV among churches is indicated by the Catholic church having taken a strong stand against SARV, while in Enga a Lutheran missionary has been rescuing accused women. The churches plan outlines the role of government and civil society in relation to church engagment. The plan includes a communication strategy which will be utilised to disseminate standardised messaging relating to SARV. The communication plan and toolkit should be informed by research and created in partnership with NGO’s and government agencies already working in the SARV advocacy space. The churches strategy prioritises government engagement as a focus of the strategy. This partnership can be further developed and strengthened so that a media campaign about SARV can be clearly articulated, monitored and measured. Monitoring of the media campaign will provide a platform for churches to hold government to account on actions taken to address SARV. Given the role of churches in PNG a led media campaign that is supported by the government and other civil society actors could provide a opportunity for dialogue and proactive community action to address SARV. There are, however, some important questions about how to ensure a public campaign will be effective - achieving behaviour change through such campaigning can be hard. There are questions too about how best to design and target any communications campaign. Finally, there are cost considerations – will a public campaign have sufficient funding to have impact? These questions would require some further scoping. **Is there a potentially powerful alliance of supporters?** There is a potential powerful alliance of supporters to address SARV: the network of organisations and individuals who convened the consultations and developed the NAP include Civil Society, Academia, Govt and to some extent the churches. The work is led by the Department of Justice and the FSVAC. There has been bureaucratic support from within the justice sector and to a smaller extent the social sector (Department of Community Development). 2020 was the first year that the DJAG received funds for the implementation of the plan.  |
| **Criteria** | **Score\*** | **Justification** |
| \*Score Rating System: Strong=4; Good=3; Moderate=2; Uncertain=1; Low=0 |
| 1. **The political context: is there an opportunity for change?**
 |
| **POLITICAL: What is the potential political demand for a policy solution from decision makers?**  | 3 | The demand from policy makers and churches is uneven: while there is now a national action plan against SARV and a church strategy there is frustration that implementation is slow and that the Plans are not properly funded. Nevertheless, the effort put into the development of the plans, the motivation of the key actors (NRI, HRD, DJAG) suggests that there is a potential demand to move the issue forward. |
| **POLITICAL: To what degree is project sufficiently salient or relevant to policy makers, stakeholders and/or public to form the basis of successful advocacy?**  | 4 | There is no doubt that this issue is relevant to policy makers, stakeholders and the public in general, particularly in areas where sorcery is most prevalent. |
| 1. **A viable overall change strategy: any windows of opportunity?**
 |
| **POLITICAL: How plausible is the Project idea for building a coalition among “supporters” of change (ie. stakeholders with shared interests & incentives)?**  | 4 | The vestiges of a coalition already exist in the NAP coordination committee under DJAG, while among the churches 10 denominations have come together to develop the Plan. FSVAC is a common link between the two and can act as a useful catalyst to stimulate action.A positive balance of power can be achieved if government takes ownership to lead with civil society and other partners. The need for government leadership is imperative, given that civil society has largely led an uncoordinated response. By taking the lead in service provision, government can then strengthen church advocacy, especially with messaging and referral pathway options. At present, there is a lot of goodwill but for responses to happen in the province there needs national level political commitment as well as commitments from provincial and local level government, churches and schools. The current network is made up of people who are passionate about the agenda, but the network needs a wider variety of stakeholders such as health and education personnel and community leaders. It is quite law and justice focused at present. Missing from the network are those in the health and education sector. The National Action Plan has a component specifically focusing on health. The research by the National Research Institute , Divine Word University and Australia National University shows that illness or death is often a catalyst for accusations. Therefore, it is imperative that health workers are aware of the crucial role that they play in ensuring that relatives of sick or deceased persons are informed of medical causes of illness and death. The education curriculum should also reflect correct messages regarding sorcery. The Department of Justice has already contributed to the Education department’s most recent curriculum development stakeholder meetings however there is opportunity to engage more with creative modes of learning and awareness raising such as through film or drama.It should be noted too that the EU Spotlight initiative is just beginning in PNG which will also increase momentum for addressing Gender Based Violence in all its forms, remembering that while SARV does not affect women alone, there are gendered dimensions regarding who is targeted. For example, in Enga, 90% of those accused of sorcery are women. Women who are accused are often women who may come from different tribes and are married into the community. They are often sexually violated and tortured. In Bougainville, however, it is mainly men who are accused. In Port Moresby it is both men and women. |
| **POLITICAL: How plausible is the Project idea for overcoming the “blockers” of change (ie. stakeholders with shared interests & incentives to oppose the change)?**  | 2 | Few blockers can be identified except for the glasmen and meri who practice sorcery. |
| **TECHNICAL: How technically feasible are the proposed solutions (can it be delivered, and will it address the problem)?** | 4 | We propose that an innovative communications and advocacy campaign be developed with the churches in collaboration with the FSVAC, church and local media (both mainstream and social media) to promote collective accountability for the prevention and response of SARV through churches. The campaign will focus on the pastoral responsibilities of the church in response to SARV as well as elevating the importance of the health implications of SARV. The campaign could start in provinces where there is known local initiatives such as in Jiwaka and Simbu where by laws already exist. The campaign will build on successful communication approaches already underway, for example the film by Voices in the Wilderness in Bougainville or work undertaken by Father Philip Gibbs and also through the work of QUT in collaboration with Oxfam.This is technically feasible in that the churches have their own media agencies and are not averse to working with other media channels, the churches provide ca 50% of health services and so will have the technical knowledge of the health implications of sorcery.  |
| 1. **Is there a potentially powerful alliance of supporters?**
 |
| **POLITICAL: How confident can we be that a positive balance of power in favour of change can be achieved?** | 4 | The collective of churches involved in the Plan represents a very positive balance of power.  |
| **TECHNICAL/POLITICAL: Have the political winners and losers from the proposed solution been considered?**  | 4 | Ultimately the only losers from this proposal are those who have been benefitting from sorcery related violence; for example, those who gain material benefits from accusations and violence Sorcery accusations. In communities where the belief is still very prevalent, there may be additional fear that communities are not being protected and that the state is choosing to protect sorcerers and not those that are believed to be harmed by sorcerers.  |
| 1. **Other issues?**
 |
| **OTHER: Are the risks manageable?** |  | The risks are manageable if there is strong leadership at the community level and community ownership from the beginning. Communities recognise that this is a problem and craft solutions that are contextual. It may alter the power dynamics of women and men, especially if women know that they can successfully prosecute man who commit violence against them. This may lead to more violence against women. The risk can be mitigated by careful gender responsive messaging and by working closely with FSVAC.  |
| **OTHER: Will the project lead to greater accountability of leaders and decision-makers?** | 3 | It is envisaged that a media campaign will put sorcery accusation violence higher on the political agenda, particularly the churches’, which will lead to greater accountability both pastorally and within the health and education services which the churches deliver. |
| **OTHER: Will the project lead to a more positive engagement between groups in society?** | 3 | There will be a strengthening of the engagement between Human Rights Defenders, academia, justice sector, health sector, education sector and the churches.  |

#### **Case Study 3: Effective monitoring of the Electoral Roll update to ensure that the national elections have an accurate roll**

**Summary**

The problem that this case study focuses on is the electoral roll inflation (and other irregularities).

This case study explored the case for advocating for a specific solution to this problem – moving the LLG elections halfway through the electoral cycle of the National elections. The LLG elections would necessitate a roll update prior to the LLG elections, and two-and-a-half years prior to the National elections. A roll update at this time would be advantageous because the stakes associated winning an LLG seat are much lower than winning at the National elections.

However, this assessment suggests that a schedule change for elections could be thought of as a “sledgehammer to crack a nut” – it is a big change to the democratic processes of the country which should be carefully thought through. This would suggest that it may be preferable to pause and monitor whether the biometric registration trials will help address the problem, rather than moving direct to changing the rhythm of elections.

Hence the decision, for the purposes of this illustrative exercise, would be not to take forward an CfC on this issue.

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| --- | --- |
| **Project idea** | **Effective monitoring of the Electoral Roll update to ensure that the national elections have an accurate roll.** |
| **Project idea outline: (briefly outline the idea and why it will work)** | **The policy context: is there opportunity for change?** The PNG electoral roll has been plagued with problems since at least 1987. Roll inflation has been the most visible manifestation of problems with the roll in PNG, but other issues have also been common, including legitimate voters missing from the roll and people being mis-registered in the wrong locations. In the 2017 elections, the roll was inflated (roll numbers exceeding voting aged, 18+ population) by 13 percent. The PNG Electoral Commission updates the roll a year prior to the elections, and the last update in 2016 was considered unsuccessful. The 2017 elections revealed that the roll was inflated in the Highlands region, whilst an administrative error led to the disenfranchisement of a significant minority of voters in the other three regions (Islands, Momase, and Southern regions).**The political context is complicated for several reasons:**The 2016 electoral roll update process was decentralised to the provinces, with procedural improvements during enrolment and policies for the process of cleansing duplicate or ineligible voter data. The Decentralised Enrolment System, as it was called, was hoped to increase local ownership and encourage legal accountability for the roll update exercise. However, this enabled candidate capture of the roll through bribery and the appointment of election officials, funding shortfalls, and delay in disbursement of funding to provinces and electorates.The roll was put online so citizens could check their enrolment status. This also failed because less than 1 million people had access to 3G mobile network in 2016, whereas there were 5 million registered voters. This makes it difficult for a majority of eligible voters in remote areas to check their voting status. National government has run fiscal deficits in the past 8 years and funding constraints, the K35 million allocated from the 2016 National Budget for the roll update was insufficient and significant errors with the roll persisted including names of deceased and underage persons, the names of voters residing in other electorates, and the an administrative error that led to the deletion of many names, and the disenfranchisement of a minority of voters. |
| **Project idea outline: (** | The National and Local Level Government (LLG) elections utilize the same roll, although the LLG elections are conducted a few months after the National elections. Both elections follow a 5-year electoral cycle. **A viable overall change strategy: any windows of opportunity:** It is proposed that roll update be monitored from beginning to end, in all provinces and districts where the roll update is conducted. This could be achieved through independent oversight at each subnational government level. In addition, the solutions below may be pursued under supervision to ensure the roll problems of previous elections is not repeated.To reduce the issues associated with the roll, the PNG Electoral Commission is piloting biometric technology to facilitate voter registration, through Credence ID. So far, two field trials have been successfully completed, with the use of mobile devices to capture faces, signatures, and all 10 fingerprints. Another possible solution proposed is to hold the LLG elections halfway through the electoral cycle of the National elections. The LLG elections would necessitate a roll update prior to the LLG elections, and two-and-a-half years prior to the National elections. A roll update at this time would be advantageous because the stakes associated winning an LLG seat are much lower than winning at the National elections, hence the roll update would be less susceptible to candidate capture by powerful candidates contesting the National elections. Further, the attendant pressures of preparing for a large National election would be non-existent, thus allowing for the PNGEC to function effectively, and funds to be disbursed easily.A schedule change to the roll update would not require additional funds or resources as the PNGEC is capable and has conducted this exercise prior to each national election. However, a schedule change for elections could be thought of as a “sledgehammer to crack a nut” – it is a big change to the democratic processes of the country which should be carefully thought through. This would suggest that it may be preferable to pause and monitor whether the biometric registration trials will help address the problem, rather than moving direct to changing the rhythm of elections. **Is there a potentially powerful alliance of supporters?** Supporters of solutions to address roll issues include NGOs: Transparency International PNG (TIPNG), National Research Institute (NRI), Constitutional Law Reform Committee (CLRC), Department of Pacific Affairs (DPA) at the Australian National University (ANU), and the Development Policy Centre at ANU.  |
| **Criteria** | **Score\*** | **Justification** |
| \*Score Rating System: Strong=4; Good=3; Moderate=2; Uncertain=1; Low=0 |
| 1. **The political context: is there an opportunity for change?**
 |
| **POLITICAL: What is the potential political demand for a policy solution from decision makers?**  | 2 | Political demand is unclear, but there is demand from various State agencies: Constitutional Law Reform Commission (CLRC), and the National Research Institute (NRI), who have called for improving the roll. It will potentially be unpopular with members of parliament (MPs) who stand to lose the influence of candidate capture of the roll update at its present schedule. The statutory bodies such as the PNG Electoral Commission (PNGEC) and the Integrity of Political Parties and Candidates Commission may have a desire to stick to the status quo. |
| **POLITICAL: To what degree is project sufficiently salient or relevant to policy makers, stakeholders and/or public to form the basis of successful advocacy?**  | 3 | It is salient for various stakeholders such as: Transparency International PNG (TIPNG), the Ombudsman Commission (OC), the Development Policy Center, and the Department of Pacific Affairs (DPA ANU). It will also be salient for voter bases of different candidates and political parties that the roll is monitored so as t o be updated cleanly. |
| 1. **A viable overall change strategy: any windows of opportunity?**
 |
| **POLITICAL: How plausible is the Project idea for building a coalition among “supporters” of change (ie. stakeholders with shared interests & incentives)?**  | 3 | It is possible to unite a range of PNG stakeholders around the issue of a clean roll update, specifically having independent oversight on the different stages of the roll update process. The coalition partners mentioned above, and other independent observers can be used to achieve this. |
| **POLITICAL: How plausible is the Project idea for overcoming the “blockers” of change (ie. stakeholders with shared interests & incentives to oppose the change)?**  | 2 | Current MPs who have manipulated the roll update before are the main blockers. Another blocker would be the PNGEC who would need to alter calendar and operations to accommodate this reform. The specific ‘in’ to this issue – having a clean roll that would reduce election-related violence and improve the quality of the elections – has the potential to bring potential coalition partners together. |
| **TECHNICAL: How technically feasible are the proposed solutions (can it be delivered, and will it address the problem)?** | 4 | Monitoring will be done by independent observers, and the government through the PNG Electoral Commission will not need to expend any resources to aid monitoring. All that will be required is cooperation with PNGEC officials through the roll update. |
| 1. **Is there a potentially powerful alliance of supporters?**
 |
| **POLITICAL: How confident can we be that a positive balance of power in favour of change can be achieved?** | 3 | Much has been written about the quality of the electoral roll, from international election observers, from PNG academics and think tanks, and from NGOs within PNG. These reports, blogs, and policy briefs have been publicized both in mainstream and social media. More media attention can galvanize the popular support that can in turn to ensure biometric technology is rolled out nationally in the roll update; or to persuade parliament to amend the organic law on national and local government elections. A change in roll schedule would occur in the long-term, particularly after the 2022 elections, where the roll update is scheduled for 2021.  |
| **TECHNICAL/POLITICAL: Have the political winners and losers from the proposed solution been considered?**  | 4 | It is in the national interest for a fair election through an honest roll update, and all citizens are winners. The losers are the candidates (including MPs and supporters) who are used to status quo, and who may oppose the reform explicitly.  |
| 1. **Other issues?**
 |
| **OTHER: Are the risks manageable?** | 4 | In relation to getting support around amending the Organic Law on National and Local-Level Government Elections. |
| **OTHER: Will the project lead to greater accountability of leaders and decision-makers?** | 2 | It should involve the voters more closely with the electoral process, and with State agencies (PNGEC) involved.  |
| **OTHER: Will the project lead to a more positive engagement between groups in society?** | 3 | Increase engagement of voters and NGOs with government. |

1. From page 3, Rogers, P. and Macfarlan, A. (2020). What is adaptive management and how does it work? Monitoring and Evaluation for Adaptive Management Working Paper Series, Number 2, September [↑](#footnote-ref-1)
2. https://www.igwg.org/wp-content/uploads/2017/05/FG\_GendrIntegrContinuum.pdf [↑](#footnote-ref-2)
3. In PNG context, and for the purposes of this design, the PNG National Broadcasting Corporation is included as an NSA because it is constitutionally independent from government. [↑](#footnote-ref-3)
4. From ITAD, What works for Social Accountability? Findings from DFID’s Macro Evaluation, Policy Briefing, June 2017 [↑](#footnote-ref-4)
5. ibid [↑](#footnote-ref-5)
6. Types of adaptive, ‘thinking and working politically’ approaches include: “highly responsive, politically informed, iterative, ‘searching’ models of assistance” (TAF, Sidel and Faustino, 2019); ‘supporting development leadership’ (DFAT, Development Leadership Program, 2008-17); ‘re-thinking governance for development’ (World Bank, 2017); ‘doing development differently’ (Wild, 2015), ‘politically smart, locally-led development’ (Booth and Unsworth, 2014), and ‘problem-driven iterative adaptation’ (PDIA, Andrews et al. 2012). [↑](#footnote-ref-6)
7. See: John Gaventa and Rosemary McGee, The Impact of Transparency and Accountability

Initiatives, Development Policy Review, 2013, 31 (S1): s3-s28 [↑](#footnote-ref-7)
8. Abt Blog, Accountability in PNG: Green for Go or Red for Stop? March 22, 2021 By Graham Teskey. [↑](#footnote-ref-8)
9. Catholic, Seventh Day Adventist, Salvation Army, Evangelic Lutheran, Baptist, United, Anglican [↑](#footnote-ref-9)
10. Australian Lutheran World Service, Transform Aid International, Caritas Australia, Salvation Army, Uniting World, Anglican, Seventh Day Adventist. [↑](#footnote-ref-10)
11. See Fukuyama, Francis, 2007, Governance Reform in Papua New Guinea, World Bank; and Fukuyama, Francis, 2012, Observations on State-building in the Western Pacific, Vol.10 October 2012, and International Scientific Researchers. [↑](#footnote-ref-11)
12. The *PNG Citizen Perceptions of Governance and Media Engagement Report 2019* found, in a quantitative survey, that:

At the national level only 39% of people thought they could influence governments’ decisions “a little” or “a lot”.

At the District level this was still below 50% (48%).

In FGDs, the same report concluded: *“the general consensus was that the country is moving in the wrong direction, and that the government has largely failed to deliver on promises to develop the country. Thus, a high degree of mistrust in government policies, programs, and reform systems exists.”* [↑](#footnote-ref-12)
13. http://data.un.org/DocumentData.aspx?q=Gender+Inequality+Index&id=415 [↑](#footnote-ref-13)
14. P, 496. Duncan, Ron, and Banga, Chris, *Solutions to poor service delivery in Papua New Guinea*, Asia Pacific Policy Studies, 5: 495-506. [↑](#footnote-ref-14)
15. This includes: the PNG-Australia Transition to Health (PATH) Program; and the PNG-Australia Education for Prosperity (PAEP) Program; the DFAT-funded, World Bank-delivered, Rural Service Delivery Project; Justice Services and Stability for Development (JSS4D) and ADB and World Bank support for public sector and regulatory reform. [↑](#footnote-ref-15)
16. https://os-data-2.s3-ap-southeast2.amazonaws.com/pngwil/bundle2/women\_in\_leadership\_forum\_summary\_report\_20160229\_v2\_smaller\_file.pdf [↑](#footnote-ref-16)
17. Freedom House in 2020 reported that: …Papua New Guinea is a democracy in which elections are held regularly, but the polls have often been marred by irregularities and violence. Party allegiances are unstable, and only two governments have survived for a full term since independence in 1975. However, since the turn of the century, a boom in mineral resources extraction has helped successive incumbent governments to consolidate control. [↑](#footnote-ref-17)
18. https://www.thenational.com.pg/whistleblower-act-passed/ [↑](#footnote-ref-18)
19. A number of commentators have expressed concerns with the ICAC law including that the definition of "corruption" is ambiguous; that the institution is set up to duplicate the functions of the Ombudsman Commission and Police; and that its funding allocation in the national budget is uncertain (see Annex K.5) [↑](#footnote-ref-19)
20. This support is delivered through various program including Institutional Partnerships Program (Auditor-General) and JSS4D (Ombudsman) [↑](#footnote-ref-20)
21. This draws from Media Development Initiative, Independent Review August 2020, Annmaree O’Keeffe, Will Paxton and Moale Vagikapi, [↑](#footnote-ref-21)
22. https://www.abc.net.au/news/2018-11-26/suspension-of-png-journalist-overturned-after-public-pressure/10556204 [↑](#footnote-ref-22)
23. Including media organisations owned by: international media companies (Win Corporation, News Ltd), a Malaysian logging company (Rimbunan Hijau), and the PNG Churches [↑](#footnote-ref-23)
24. p. 11 Hauck, Mandie‐Filer, and Bolger (2005) [↑](#footnote-ref-24)
25. Ref PNG Civil Society Scoping Study (2020) [↑](#footnote-ref-25)
26. Ibid [↑](#footnote-ref-26)
27. QTAG 2018 Annual Report [↑](#footnote-ref-27)
28. Pacific Women 2021 What works in gender transformative approaches in PNG [↑](#footnote-ref-28)
29. DCPP Case Study “You Have to Bring a Pig” [↑](#footnote-ref-29)
30. See page 17-18, and 48, Pacific Women Shaping Pacific Development Six-Year Evaluation Report February 2020 [↑](#footnote-ref-30)
31. For example, see DFAT’s current WASH social accountability project, being delivered under the DCP in association with UNICEF. [↑](#footnote-ref-31)
32. GSDRC HelpDesk: 2020 Social accountability processes in the Asia-Pacific, Rachel Cooper [↑](#footnote-ref-32)
33. See page 7, Haley, Nicole, Strengthening Civil Society to Build Demand for Better Governance in the Pacific, SSGM Discussion Paper 2008/7 [↑](#footnote-ref-33)
34. ibid, Rachel Cooper [↑](#footnote-ref-34)
35. Whitelum, Parks, Goma. 2020 Civil Society Scoping Study. [↑](#footnote-ref-35)
36. Leftwich, 2012: April [↑](#footnote-ref-36)
37. Booth, 2012:11 [↑](#footnote-ref-37)
38. Pett, J. 2020*. Navigating adaptive approaches for development programs: A guide for the uncertain.* ODI [↑](#footnote-ref-38)
39. Chang et al 2020 [↑](#footnote-ref-39)
40. [https://pacificwomen.org/wp-content/uploads/2020/08/Balance-of-Power\_Brochure.pdf](https://pacificwomen.org/wp-content/uploads/2020/08/Balance-of-Power_Brochure.pdf#sent/_blank) [↑](#footnote-ref-40)
41. Fukuyama, F 2007 Governance Reform in PNG; Teskey, 2021 Accountability in PNG: Green for Go or Red for Stop? [↑](#footnote-ref-41)
42. Citizen is used to refer to both women and men [↑](#footnote-ref-42)
43. Harper, C., Marcus, R., George, R., D’Angelo, S. and Samman, E. (2020) ‘Gender, power and progress: How norms change’. London: ALIGN/ ODI (www.alignplatform. org/gender-power-progress) [↑](#footnote-ref-43)
44. [working\_paper\_aas\_gt\_change\_measurement\_fa\_lowres.pdf (care.org)](https://www.care.org/wp-content/uploads/2020/05/working_paper_aas_gt_change_measurement_fa_lowres.pdf#:~:text=Gender%2Dtransformative%20approaches%20encourage%20critical,others%20in%20the%20community%E2%80%9D%20(Rottach); and Pacific Women 2021. What works in gender transformative approaches in PNG [↑](#footnote-ref-44)
45. Ibid and Balance of Power; <https://pacificwomen.org/wp-content/uploads/2020/08/Balance-of-Power_Brochure.pdf> [↑](#footnote-ref-45)
46. [↑](#footnote-ref-46)
47. For example: DFAT’s Coalitions for Change in The Philippines and the Development Leadership Program (DLP) in Fiji; FCDO’s Pyoe Pin/Sone Sie in Myanmar and Tilitonse (Malawi) Rwanda Multi- Donor Civil Society Support Program, Rwanda and Zambia Accountability Program [↑](#footnote-ref-47)
48. For instance Booth, D already cited. Faustino, J and Siddel J Thinking and Working Politically in Development: Coalitions for Change in the Philippines. 2020 [↑](#footnote-ref-48)
49. Evidence is document in the *PNG Citizen Perceptions of Governance and Media Engagement Report 2019* and the Quality and Technical Assurance Group (QTAG) *Review of Media Development Initiative 2020* [↑](#footnote-ref-49)
50. The administration of this program has attracted controversy because of the lack of transparency around funding decisions, which are seen as influenced by national MPs through their role in the District Development Administrations (see B above). The new information system is designed to provide timely data on SIPs implementation at national and district levels, providing the basis for increased transparency and accountability [↑](#footnote-ref-50)
51. Including constitutional grants. See p. 8, Catalpa, Final DIRD Phase 2 Program Document, February, 2021 [↑](#footnote-ref-51)
52. GSDRC HelpDesk: 2020 Social accountability processes in the Asia-Pacific, Rachel Cooper [↑](#footnote-ref-52)
53. CIMC is another legacy of past DFAT support with significant potential to drive change as a part of the BCEP portfolio. [↑](#footnote-ref-53)
54. The CIMC was established through a National Executive Council (NEC) decision in 1998 to provide a platform for to enable PNG’s civil society and business community to engage proactively with government on socio-economic policy formulation and implementation issues. The CIMC has been heavily reliant on donor funding and is yet to deliver on its potential. The government’s lack of interest in CIMC is further indicated by the fact that they have cut its budget by 50%. The CIMC has also tended to stray beyond its mandate by engaging in policy development, alienating line Ministries. [↑](#footnote-ref-54)
55. Findings from PNG NRI reinforce this opportunity to improve the effectiveness and accountability of DSIP funding by working from the top-down and bottom-up at the same time. See Duncan, Cairns and Banga, 2017, Papua New Guinea’s Service Delivery Framework at Subnational levels, no, 154 [↑](#footnote-ref-55)
56. For example, See the Delivery Strategy: Pacific Women Shaping Pacific Development 2012, page 20 and 24. and ‘ways of working’ (page 24), around scaling interventions and influencing mainstream programs [↑](#footnote-ref-56)
57. Ladner, D. 2015 *Strategy Testing: An Innovative Approach To Monitoring Highly Flexible Aid Programs* The Asia Foundation. [↑](#footnote-ref-57)
58. DFAT, September, 2020, Guidance Note: Performance Assessment Framework for Facilities [↑](#footnote-ref-58)
59. Sarah Earl, Fred Carden, and Terry Smutylo, 2001 Outcome Mapping: Building Learning and Reflection into Development Programs, International Development Research Centre, Canada [↑](#footnote-ref-59)
60. Ladner, Deborah, 2015, “Strategy Testing: An innovative approach to monitoring highly flexible programs”, The Asia Foundation. [↑](#footnote-ref-60)
61. https://www.igwg.org/wp-content/uploads/2017/05/FG\_GendrIntegrContinuum.pdf [↑](#footnote-ref-61)
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63. Ibid [↑](#footnote-ref-63)
64. Gender and Social Inclusion in PNG’s Public service: measuring impact. Draft. Equity Economics Draft Jan 2021 [↑](#footnote-ref-64)
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68. https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/09640568.2018.1428184 [↑](#footnote-ref-68)
69. https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0308597X18300344 [↑](#footnote-ref-69)
70. Austraian Aid 2020 Climate change Action strategy: **Tackling climate change through Australia’s Development Assistance Program 2020–202**5 [↑](#footnote-ref-70)
71. JSS4D, PATH [↑](#footnote-ref-71)
72. WHO World report on Disability 2016 [↑](#footnote-ref-72)
73. UNFPA Global Study on ending GBV and realising sexual and reproductive health rights. 2018 [↑](#footnote-ref-73)
74. https://www.un.org/development/desa/disabilities/convention-on-the-rights-of-persons-with-disabilities.html [↑](#footnote-ref-74)
75. Under ANCPP, Australia has provided individual support to some INGOs to undertake SA work [↑](#footnote-ref-75)
76. Following the framework in: World Bank. 2017. *World Development Report 2017: Governance and the Law*. Washington, DC: World Bank. [↑](#footnote-ref-76)
77. This term has different meanings in different settings. In a mono-cultural village setting, *wantok* may simply refer to a kin relative. In the multi-cultural urban context, the term can refer to a friend from a different culture.. While some have seen *wantokism* as a form of cross-cultural identity, this identity is not yet strong enough to compete with the identities of kin and clan, anchored in the rural village. [↑](#footnote-ref-77)
78. <https://devpolicy.org/buildingc-a-violence-free-society-in-png-20200611/?print=print> [↑](#footnote-ref-78)
79. Marshall Sahlins (April 1963). ["Poor Man, Rich Man, Big Man, Chief; Political Types in Melanesia and Polynesia"](https://web.archive.org/web/20131002170848/http%3A/tapera.info/textos/sahlins%2Chrhp.pdf) . *Comparative Studies in Society and History*. **5** (3): 285–303. [doi](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Doi_%28identifier%29):[10.1017/S0010417500001729](https://doi.org/10.1017/S0010417500001729). Archived from [the original](http://tapera.info/textos/sahlins%2Chrhp.pdf) (PDF) on 2 October 2013. [↑](#footnote-ref-79)
80. <https://freedomhouse.org/country/papua-new-guinea> [↑](#footnote-ref-80)
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84. This assessment was made under the 10-year tenure of Sir Salamo Injia as the Chief Justice. In 2018, Sir Gibbs Salika took over this role. [↑](#footnote-ref-84)
85. Page 9, ibid [↑](#footnote-ref-85)
86. Page 10, ibid [↑](#footnote-ref-86)
87. Eg. Public Finance Management Act, the Public Service Management Act, the Auditor General Act [↑](#footnote-ref-87)
88. In 2017 local government expenditure was estimated to be 1.6% (K227.8 m) of total government expenditure (K13,835 m). Calculated by the Commonwealth Local Government Forum from the figures in table 2a and the 2017 national budget statement [↑](#footnote-ref-88)
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92. This draws from fDuncan, Cairns and Banga, 2017, op cit. [↑](#footnote-ref-92)
93. Page, 22, Transparency International, 2003, National Integrity Systems Country Study Report PNG [↑](#footnote-ref-93)
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95. From: <https://www.ombudsman.gov.pg/about-us/rolesfunctions/> accessed 1/11/2020 [↑](#footnote-ref-95)
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103. This draws from Media Development Initiative, Independent Review August 2020, Annmaree O’Keeffe, Will Paxton and Moale Vagikapi, [↑](#footnote-ref-103)
104. https://www.abc.net.au/news/2018-11-26/suspension-of-png-journalist-overturned-after-public-pressure/10556204 [↑](#footnote-ref-104)
105. Including media organisations owned by: international media companies (Win Corporation, News Ltd), a Malaysian logging company (Rimbunan Hijau), and the PNG Churches [↑](#footnote-ref-105)
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