

# **Independent Evaluation of the World Bank Global Road Safety Facility (WB GRSF)**

Final Report

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## Executive Summary

### 1) Background and Scope

Universalialia is pleased to present this report on the Independent Evaluation of the World Bank Global Road Safety Facility (GRSF) to the Facility Implementation Unit (FIU) of the GRSF. In 2004, the World Bank and the WHO jointly released what has become a landmark report: *The World Report on Road Traffic Injury Prevention*.<sup>1</sup> The joint report, which was a watershed in global efforts to stem this serious development problem, was rapidly followed by a series of United Nations (UN) Resolutions.<sup>2</sup> In late 2005, the World Bank in conjunction with several key partners established The World Bank Global Road Safety Facility as the first purpose-built platform among multilateral bodies and international financial institutions to address the situation. It began operations in early 2006.

This evaluation, which constitutes the first major external review of the platform, provides an opportunity to review some two and a half years of work and translate the lessons of past performance into recommendations for its future. The purpose of the evaluation was to review the Facility's relevance, effectiveness, and efficiency. More specifically, the evaluation's objectives were to:

- Review the alignment and relevance of the Facility's mission, goals, and objectives with global, regional, and country demand and related partnerships for improved road safety outcomes in low and middle income countries.
- Review the scope and adequacy of the Facility's initial growth phase program, in accordance with its mission, goals, and objectives.
- Review the adequacy and sustainability of the Facility's donor funding base and ongoing fund raising efforts for the proposed growth phase period to 2010.
- Review the efficiency and effectiveness of the Facility's:
  - grant eligibility criteria;
  - country knowledge transfer and investment leveraging strategy;
  - governance arrangements; and
  - administrative procedures.
- Make recommendations to improve Facility performance and strengthen the business case for increased and sustained Facility donor support.

### 2) Two Overarching Issues

Two overarching issues are of prime importance to the detailed findings of the evaluation: The first is whether on balance the GRSF is “making a difference” in relation to its mandate; the second is the apparent lack of willingness of traditional bilateral partners to make investments in road safety related issues. The first key question cuts across all of the questions set out in the ToR and the evaluation matrix as a whole. Our answer to it is a qualified ‘yes’. The GRSF has made a difference given the resources that have been available to it. Our review of the GRSF's program initiatives shows clear evidence that, even at this early stage, the GRSF has made a

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<sup>1</sup> Peden. M. et al. eds, 2004. *The World Report on Road Traffic Injury Prevention*, WHO, Geneva

<sup>2</sup> United Nations General Assembly Resolutions 58/289, A/60/L.8 and A 62/244.

discernable difference and is attaining its mandate. The detailed findings in this report explore these and other areas in depth, but here it may be useful to set out some highlights:

- Knowledge transfer by means of: Support for the development of new resource materials that had widespread distribution in targeted medium and low income nations; training and orientation programming in target nations; support for the work of partners such as the WHO and Global Road Safety Partnership; support for IRAP reviews; and support for cutting edge research into road safety.
- Increased awareness of and acceptance of road safety as a global, regional, and national problem by means of: Support for IRAP safety reviews; country capacity reviews; support for regional conferences and workshops which have resulted in plans of action or declarations.
- Acceptance of the desirability to integrate Second Generation principles into national solutions for road safety concerns.
- Leverage of resources so as to increase the overall level of investment in road safety related issues: Commitments to add new road safety elements as an element of larger transport sector loans; catalytic in securing private sector financial and in kind support in Central and South America; evidence of leverage with new partners, most notably the WHO in relation to their 2007 grant from the Bloomberg Foundation.

These generally positive affirmations must be considered in the light of the level of GRSF resources – about \$16 million since it commenced operations three years ago – in comparison to the magnitude of the potential GRSF funding required to address the global challenge, which has been estimated to exceed some \$300 million.

The second question speaks to the degree to which road safety is perceived to be a global priority, notwithstanding UN General Assembly or regional resolutions or declarations. We have viewed it as an “Illusive Global Priority”. While more is being said about road safety, very little in terms of traditional donor investment seems to have transpired, not only in relation to the WB GRSF but also with respect to the other globally-recognised multilateral partner, the WHO. Managers confirm that the WHO has not been successful in attracting extra-budgetary support from member states and, in particular, from the most significant member states who are traditional development partners in public health related matters.

In discussion with some key donor stakeholders we asked why there seems to be this disconnect between the growing awareness of the increasing severity of the global road safety crisis and the apparent lack of direct intervention on the part of traditional donors. We were advised that while some decision-makers recognized that road safety constituted both a public health and a development risk, and while it had been recognized by the international community as a priority, the hard reality has been that among a set of development priorities, road safety is not seen as among the most pressing. Several respondents noted that the link between road safety and the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) is perceived as somewhat tangential, and that there is a tendency to focus on higher profile public health/ MDG challenges such as HIV/AIDS, malaria and tuberculosis. Several informants working in the public health areas remarked that their managers tended to view road safety as a function of “building safer roads” and not in the sense of the Second Generation model that drives both the UN resolution as well as the GRSF itself.

We now turn to whether the GRSF has been able to make a difference in relation to traditional donor/ partners participating in the GRSF. In this regard we have examined how the GRSF has attempted to reach out to bilateral donors, the ones who traditionally populate analogous World Bank-hosted initiatives such as The Cities Alliance (which has nearly two dozen donors), the Water and Sanitation Program (which has 12 bilateral donors/participants), and the Public

Private Infrastructure Advisory Facility which has a similar number. Given the level of resources available to the GRSF, we came to the conclusion that GRSF activities in this regard constituted a credible effort, given the overall roll-out strategy that the GRSF's Executive Board ratified. The apparent lack of "uptake", therefore, appears to lie primarily with the donor community itself and its perception of the urgency of the road safety crisis.

### **3) Overall Strengths and Challenges**

#### **Strengths**

When taken together, the four major strengths of the GRSF confirm its usefulness and long-term viability as a global force for road safety.

#### **a) The Flexibility of the WB GRSF Model**

The GRSF model is highly flexible and holds out the prospect of being a major contributing factor in the attainment of global goals. The flexibility of the GRSF model and its range of instruments have enabled it to develop a sensitive, albeit significantly resource-constrained, response, which would not be possible with a more narrow traditional approach. The range of instruments that the GRSF has deployed – long term support for core partners to develop invaluable capacity building, knowledge sharing tools, targeted national level interventions to promote the uptake of the Second Generation model, and advocacy instruments that have raised global acceptance of both the model as well as the urgency of the crisis – confirm the contribution that the GRSF has made.

#### **b) The Capacity to Effect Positive Change at the National Level**

One of the most significant achievements of the GRSF has been its ability to effect positive change at the national level. GRSF support for country capacity reviews and International Road Assessment Program (IRAP) safety reviews have made a difference in the nations that have participated to date.

#### **c) The Capacity to Lever Investment**

Another of the strengths of the GRSF has been its ability to lever investment. To date, such leverage has been largely in relation to the extent to which national level activities have led to World Bank lending for distinct road safety initiatives or elements of large transport loans. GRSF support to some of its partners like the WHO also have resulted in vary degrees of actual cash investment, with the large contribution to the WHO by the Bloomberg Foundation being identified as a major collective success story.

Success in longer term leverage will depend to a great degree on the ability of the World Bank and other development banks to ensure that road transport lending gives an overall higher priority to road safety, and that any such lending is based on an analytical process that integrates to the highest degree possible the principles that underpin the GRSF's Second Generation model.

#### **d) The Capacity to Improve Knowledge Transfer**

Another of the major achievements of the GRSF has been the degree to which its work has promoted knowledge transfer. It has done so though a model of intermediation where the GRSF has worked with well recognized institutional partners or prestigious academic bodies. This has been a highly cost effective mechanism that has not required the GRSF to establish its own research or technical support arms. The more recent forays of the GRSF to support IRAPs in several nations have had the effect of both translating knowledge and building local capacity.

## Challenges

The above strengths are to some degree counterbalanced by three significant challenges that face the GRSF and which may have long term implications for its sustainability and relevance.

### **a) The Limited Resources Available to the WB GRSF in Comparison to the Scope of Its Mandate**

The first challenge is that the level of internal resources available to the GRSF has been, and continues to be, inadequate to meet to the scope of its mandate. On a proportionate basis, GRSF resources are far below those made available to similar global platforms such as the Cities Alliance or the Public Private Infrastructure Advisory Facility (PPIAF). Overall, the level of resources available to the GRSF (about \$16 million since its inception) have now effectively been expended or allocated, with the GRSF facing increased demands on all fronts.

The internal resource limitations have weakened the ability of the GRSF to develop a management infrastructure commensurate with a maturing global multi-donor and semi-autonomous body. The present staffing level of the GRSF is inadequate in comparison to its mandate and proportionately less than that of analogous bodies. This leads to the second dimension of resource limitations. While the GRSF is already resource challenged, it is facing ever growing demand for its services.

Turning to the overall adequacy of what has been the discretionary spending base of the GRSF, the GRSF has been able keep up with requests in its initial phase. However, its planned annual expenditures of \$12 million per year in the medium term may not be enough to meet growing demands

### **b) The Adequacy of WB GRSF Planning and Administrative Systems**

A number of specific findings noted gaps in the management and planning infrastructure of the GRSF that in large part have been the result of the FIU being under-resourced. The GRSF is emerging from its inception phase where there was a natural tendency to push toward the testing and acceptance of the basic model. It has done so admirably. Now, however, the GRSF faces long-term challenges in moving into its next phase, in essence, exploiting its initial success. To do so, it will require a much more robust administrative, planning and reporting architecture – which will require additional resources.

### **c) The Seeming Lack of Enthusiasm for Road Safety as an Investment Priority**

The evaluation noted what appears to be a growing paradox – the increased acceptance of the severity of the road safety crisis and the need to respond to it on one hand, and a seeming lack of interest on the part of the traditional donor community to invest.

The first three years of the GRSF have been an inception phase and a testing of the model. This was only possible with the steadfast support of the founding members, now including Australia. However, testing is now at an end and the GRSF and the World Bank face the challenge of developing strategies that more actively and aggressively seek out donor support. While the FIU's efforts at donor mobilization have been admirable, given the amount of resources available, the challenge of resource mobilization is much larger than the FIU and will require concerted leadership and intervention at the highest levels.

#### 4) Recommendations

The recommendations of the evaluation include three overarching recommendations that speak to issues that cut across the GRSF and which affect its long term viability, and eight specific recommendations to strengthen the relevance of the GRSF and increase the effectiveness of the FIU.

- 1: We recommend that the current donors and members of the WB GRSF recommit themselves to future support for a period of not less than three years and at levels equal to or greater than those provided between 2006 and 2009.
- 2: We recommend that the World Bank, inspired by the commitment made in its Transport Sector Business Strategy “Safe, Clean and Affordable” undertake a special campaign at the highest executive and state to state levels to increase the level of membership in the GRSF.
- 3: We recommend that the GRSF convene at an early opportunity an informal briefing and liaison session to coordinate the activities of all key partners in relation to fund raising and resource mobilization in general.
- 4: We recommend that the GRSF undertake a medium term mandate review to align the GRSF to changing trends in the level of demand and to the likely level of available resources.
- 5: We recommend that GRSF target areas of work where the possibility of increased investment leverage is highest.
- 6: We recommended that the GRSF more tightly target its capacity building and knowledge transfer activities towards the needs of lower and middle income nations, especially in Africa, Latin America and the Caribbean, and Asia.
- 7: We recommend that the GRSF immediately develop and distribute formalized selection criteria in the form of a manual or application forms, including a review capacity for its resource decision-making.
- 8: We recommend that the GRSF develop a resource mobilization strategy that focuses on increasing traditional bilateral donor support for national initiatives and increasing philanthropic support for cross national/regional global activities.
- 9: We recommend that the GRSF broaden its Core Advisory Group to include representatives of major partners, other development banks, and other interested parties in order to use the CAG in the future as the GRSF’s principle sounding board and a vehicle for cross-coordination.
- 10: We recommend that the GRSF gradually moves towards a results-based approach to contracting and reporting.
- 11: We recommend that GRSF allocate more resources to strengthening its internal systems and capacities for planning, monitoring and evaluation, data systems harmonization, and communications.

#### 5) Summation

The evaluation findings demonstrate that the GRSF has successfully accomplished its initial goals in its inception and developmental phase. There are some limitations to the degree of success achieved by the GRSF, largely due to the level of resources at its disposal. In summation, we urge the World Bank, the traditional bilateral donor community, and the community of concerned philanthropies, to re-double their efforts so as to ensure that this vital platform has the resources at its disposal to be able to exploit a growing global commitment to combat the crisis of road safety.





## A c r o n y m s

APEC	Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation Forum
ASEAN	Association of South East Asia Nations
AUSAID	Australian Aid
CAG	Core Advisory Group
DGF	Development Grant Funding
EBRD	European Bank for Reconstruction and Development
FIA	Fédération Internationale de l'Automobile
FIU	Facility Implementation Unit
GRSF	Global Road Safety Facility
GRSP	Global Road Safety Partnership
IFI	International Financial Institutions
IRAP	International Road Assessment Program
M&E	Monitoring and Evaluation
MDGs	Millennium Development Goals
MDTF	Multi Donor Trust Fund
ODA	Overseas Development Assistance
PAHO	Pan American Health Organisation
QAG	Quality Assurance Group
SIDA	Swedish International Development Agency
TB	Tuberculosis
TOR	Terms of Reference
UN	United Nations
WB	World Bank
WHO	World Health Organization



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## 1. Background

Universalialia is pleased to present this report on the Independent Evaluation of the World Bank Global Road Safety Facility (GRSF) to the Facility Implementation Unit (FIU) of the GRSF.

Road traffic injuries have reached epidemic proportions, especially in lower and middle income nations. They claim the lives of more than 1.2 million people and injure around 50 million annually. Authoritative studies from the World Health Organization (WHO) and the World Bank suggest that traffic deaths will soon surpass the numbers for several well-recognized communicable and vector-borne diseases. The economic costs of this issue are enormous.

In 2004, the World Bank and the WHO jointly released what has become a landmark report: *The World Report on Road Traffic Injury Prevention*.<sup>3</sup> The joint report, which was a watershed in global efforts to stem this serious development problem, was rapidly followed by a series of United Nations (UN) Resolutions.<sup>4</sup> In late 2005, the World Bank in conjunction with several key partners established The World Bank Global Road Safety Facility as the first purpose-built platform among multilateral bodies and international financial institutions to address the situation. The GRSF began operations in early 2006, towards the end of the 2006 fiscal year of the World Bank.

This evaluation, which constitutes the first major external review of the platform, provides an opportunity to review some two and a half years of work and translate the lessons of past performance into recommendations for its future.

The evaluation process was managed by the GRSF FIU. Universalialia was selected to carry out the evaluation through a competitive bidding process. (The Terms of Reference for the evaluation are presented in Volume II, Appendix I).

The purpose of the evaluation was to review the Facility's relevance, effectiveness, and efficiency. More specifically, the evaluation's objectives were to:

- Review the alignment and relevance of the Facility's mission, goals, and objectives with global, regional, and country demand and related partnerships for improved road safety outcomes in low and middle income countries.
- Review the scope and adequacy of the Facility's initial growth phase program, in accordance with its mission, goals, and objectives.
- Review the adequacy and sustainability of the Facility's donor funding base and ongoing fund raising efforts for the proposed growth phase period to 2010.
- Review the efficiency and effectiveness of the Facility's:
  - grant eligibility criteria;
  - country knowledge transfer and investment leveraging strategy;
  - governance arrangements; and
  - administrative procedures.
- Make recommendations to improve Facility performance and strengthen the business case for increased and sustained Facility donor support.

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<sup>3</sup> Peden. M. et al. eds, 2004. *The World Report on Road Traffic Injury Prevention*, WHO, Geneva

<sup>4</sup> United Nations General Assembly Resolutions 58/289, A/60/L.8 and A 62/244.

The evaluation report is presented in two volumes. Volume I is organized as follows:

- Section 1 presents the background to and the objectives of the evaluation;
- Section 2 introduces the methodology used to conduct the evaluation;
- Section 3 presents a profile of the GRSF and overarching issues that it presently faces;
- Section 4 presents an overview of WB GRSF from 2005 until 2008;
- Section 5 provides the evaluation findings;
- Section 6 discusses the key strengths and challenges facing the GRSF;
- Section 7 presents overarching and specific recommendations; and,
- Section 8 presents the conclusion.

Volume II presents appendices, which include: the terms of reference, the evaluation framework, data collection instruments, the evaluation data sheet, the list of documents reviewed, and the list of people consulted.



## 2. Methodology

### 2.1 Overview

The methodology for the Independent Evaluation of the GRSF was based on 8 key review questions contained in the Terms of Reference. The methodology consisted of a mix of qualitative and quantitative techniques that included document review, individual and group interviews and field visits. The instruments developed for data collection (surveys, interview protocols, focus group protocols) are presented in Volume II, Appendix III.)

The study was carried out by a team of specialists in program and organizational assessment and in urban policy and development. A list of the team members is included in the evaluation data sheet in Volume II, Appendix IV.

The Terms of Reference for this assignment which were released as part of the selection process and which were finalized in July/August 2008, contemplated the assignment in relation to a series of eight questions. They were:

Are the Facility mission, goals and objectives aligned with global, regional and country demand and related partnerships for improved road safety outcomes in low and middle income countries? If not, how can improvements be made?

Does the Facility initial growth phase program adequately address the Facility mission, goals and objectives? If not, how can improvements be made?

Are the Facility fund raising efforts for the proposed growth phase period to 2010 adequate? If not, how can improvements be made?

Are the Facility grant eligibility criteria well specified and applied? If not, how can improvements be made?

Is the Facility country knowledge transfer strategy and investment leveraging strategy well specified and applied? If not, how can improvements be made?

Are the Facility governance arrangements well specified and applied? If not, how can improvements be made?

Are the Facility administrative arrangements efficient and effective? If not, how can improvements be made?

### Document review

The evaluation team analyzed a series of corporate documents and reviewed project-level information. More general reference documents were also reviewed in the course of the study. A complete list of documents reviewed is presented in Volume II, Appendix V.

### Interviews and focus groups

Interviews and focus groups were conducted in the course of the study. (A complete list of individuals consulted is provided in Volume II, Appendix VI.) The key approaches to stakeholder consultation included:

- Individual and small group interviews conducted in London and Serbia
- Face-to-face or telephone interviews with representatives of GRSF Board members, as well as other stakeholders.

#### Types of stakeholders interviewed during field visits

GRSF staff  
 GRSF Board members  
 Member of donor agencies  
 World Bank staff  
 Key partners/service delivery agents  
 IFI partners  
 Selected bilateral ODA partners  
 Specialists in Road Safety

### Field mission

A field mission in Serbia was carried out.

## 2.2 Considerations

As with any early stage formative evaluation of an entity such as the WB GRSF, there were a number of considerations that affected the assignment. Some were procedural and some were methodological.

A major procedural consideration was the fact that the WB GRSF is evolving and growing at a tremendous pace. For example, since we began data collection, the scope of its activities has increased considerably, and its governance apparatus and internal administrative systems have grown in fairly significant ways over the past six months. Therefore, a retrospective formative process that was fixed in time could not accurately assess this highly fluid entity. That is not to say that such growth and fluidity is a major concern, as they occur in virtually every formative process. However, in this instance, the fluidity left us with the challenge of attempting to analyze a “moving target.” While we viewed the evaluation as somewhat strategic in nature (i.e., not a compliance review), this dynamic of a rapidly evolving GRSF required us to “back check” frequently to ensure that our findings reflected as current a picture of the state of affairs as possible. To that end, the findings we present largely reflect the conditions of the WB GRSF during in the final months of 2008 and are amplified in some instances by references to more recent (early 2009) developments.

There were also some methodological considerations that affected the evaluation. The evaluation matrix, which was approved by the GRSF in September 2008, was based on some assumptions about the general availability of data and the availability of data from project recipients themselves. This proved to be problematic in key areas that might have assisted our work in addressing first level outcome considerations to a certain degree – and specifically to be able to address the short-to-medium term positive differences that the projects may have made.<sup>5</sup> We therefore had to rely to some extent on testimonial data and did not have consistent means to triangulate such testimony.

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<sup>5</sup> The term “first level outcome” is used in the context of logical framework analysis to define the immediate consequences of a program. It is defined by the DAC as “the likely or achieved short-term and medium-term effects of an intervention’s outputs.” (DAC, Glossary of Key Terms in Evaluation and Results Based Management).

### 3. The Nature of the WB GRSF

#### 3.1 Introduction

The environment in which the GRSF operates is not well understood, largely because it is quite new. Moreover, as we proceeded with the evaluation, we came to the conclusion that neither the eight questions laid out in the Terms of Reference (ToR) nor the evaluation matrix can adequately address what we perceive to be two overarching issues that are at the heart of any comprehensive yet early stage review of an entity like the GRSF. To set the stage for the evaluation findings and recommendations that follow, we have chosen to commence the discussion of GRSF with a situational assessment of the GRSF and a discussion of these key issues which affect many of its activities, and which in our view have had a considerable impact on the overall global challenge related to the road safety crisis.

First, however, we present a brief profile of the GRSF.

#### 3.2 GRSF Profile

The World Bank's Global Road Safety Facility was launched in November 2005 and commenced formal operations in April 2006.

The GRSF is a direct response to the global call for action on road safety by United Nations General Assembly Resolutions in 2004 and 2005, and a World Health Assembly Resolution of 2004. A United Nations (UN) General Assembly resolution in March 2008 acknowledged the GRSF's unique role as the first funding platform established to address the road safety crisis and encouraged further donor support.

##### Key Milestones of For the WB GRSF

- Founded in late 2005 at the World Bank, it began operations in early 2006 and produced its first Strategic Plan
- Published and more widely disseminated its Strategic Plan in 2007 and underwent an internal early stage Quality Assessment
- Its role was recognized and augmented by the UN General Assembly in early 2008
- In 2008, the World Bank's Transport Business Strategy recognized the centrality of road safety

The GRSF is a semi-autonomous body<sup>6</sup> housed in the World Bank's Energy, Transport and Water Department, which is part of the Sustainable Development Network. The GRSF is governed by an external Executive Board which is assisted by a Core Advisory Group.

The GRSF is supported by two funding mechanisms:

- Development Grant Funding from the World Bank, which in 2006 provided some \$5 million, in essence matching a similar contribution made by the *Fédération Internationale de l'Automobile* (FIA) Foundation for the Automobile and Society, a strong advocate for road safety considerations since its inception in 2001.
- Two multi donor trust funds (a Global Multi-Donor Trust Fund and a targeted Africa Multi-Donor Trust Fund) which have secured three additional partners to date: Sweden, the Netherlands, and Australia. These partners are thus entitled to join the World Bank and the FIA Foundation on the Facility Executive Boards.

<sup>6</sup> Other semi-autonomous bodies include the Cities Alliance, the Water and Sanitation Program, and the Public-Private Infrastructure Advisory Facility.

In total the GRSF has secured a funding base of some \$ 15.9 million since its inception in November 2005. (See Part 4 for details on investment/spending patterns.)

### Some Implications of GRSF Mission, Goals and Objectives

The GRSF developed a comprehensive strategic plan for the years 2006 to 2015 including its mission, goals and objectives (see Exhibit 3.1 below).

**Exhibit 3.1 GRSF Mission, Goals and Objectives**

GRSF Mission	GRSF Goals	GRSF Objectives
<p>The Global Road Safety Facility will generate increased funding and technical assistance for global, regional and country level activities designed to accelerate and scale-up the efforts of low and middle-income countries to build their scientific, technological and managerial capacities to prepare and implement cost-effective road safety programs.</p>	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li>1. Strengthen global, regional and country capacity to support sustainable reductions in road deaths and injuries in low and middle-income countries.</li> <li>2. Catalyze increased levels of road safety investment in low and middle-income countries.</li> <li>3. Accelerate safety knowledge transfer to low and middle-income countries.</li> <li>4. Promote innovative infrastructure solutions to improve the safety of mixed traffic, mixed speed road environments in low and middle-income countries.</li> </ol>	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li>1. Facilitate and accelerate the implementation of the recommendations of “The World Report on Road Traffic Injury Prevention” in low and middle-income countries.</li> <li>2. Support the implementation of the United Nations General Assembly Resolutions 58/289 and A/60/L.8 (“Improving global road safety”), and World Health Assembly Resolution WHA 57.10 (“Road safety and health”).</li> <li>3. Harmonize, scale-up and strengthen the road safety activities of the UN, multi-lateral and bi-lateral agencies, and the Global Road Safety Partnership.</li> <li>4. Strengthen road safety management capacity and catalyze increased road safety investment in low and middle-income countries.</li> </ol>

There are some clear implications arising from this table about the nature of the GRSF:

- The GRSF is largely a facilitating entity with catalytic and synergistic aspirations that must operate in conjunction with other groups.
- It is not a one-stop funding platform for all road safety initiatives within the World Bank Group or elsewhere, and is not the sole agent for global cooperation and coordination on road safety. The UN General Assembly conferred in 2004 a coordinative mandate on the WHO in relation to UN system organizations.

These broad implications have guided how we approached specific evaluation issues.

### 3.3 Two Overarching Issues

#### 3.3.1 Introduction

As noted above, there are two overarching issues that are of primal importance to the detailed findings that follow. The first – whether on balance the GRSF is “making a difference” in relation to its mandate – provides a platform on which to examine specific issues related to effectiveness, efficiency and relevance. The second issue – apparent lack of willingness of traditional bilateral partners to make investments in road safety related issues – affects the GRSF in an immediate sense and, more crucially, the overall global objective of increasing investment to combat the road safety crisis.

#### 3.3.2 Has the GRSF Made a Difference?

This key question cuts across all of the questions set out in the ToR and the evaluation matrix as a whole. It asks simply:

*On balance has the WB GRSF made a difference over the past three years in relation to the overall attainment of its mission / goal and objectives?*

Our answer is a qualified ‘yes’. The GRSF has done so, given the resources that have been available to it. Our review of the GRSF’s program initiatives shows clear evidence that, even at this early stage, the GRSF has made a discernable difference. The detailed findings in this report explore these and other areas in depth, but here it may be useful to set out some highlights of how the GRSF has made a difference:

- Knowledge transfer by means of:
  - Support for the development of new resource materials that had widespread distribution in targeted medium and low income nations;
  - Training and orientation programming in target nations;
  - Support for the work of partners such as the WHO and Global Road Safety Partnership and others who leveraged GRSF resources to promote increased knowledge transfer;
  - Support for IRAP reviews that not only demonstrate road safety changes but which also have resulted in increased national capacity to address the issues identified;
  - Support for research into road safety as exemplified by initiatives such as the Road Traffic Injuries Research Network, and the Global Knowledge Management Framework for Monitoring Road Traffic Injuries.
- Increased awareness of and acceptance of road safety as a global, regional and national problem by means of:
  - Support for the International Road Assessment Program (IRAP) safety reviews that have highlighted the inter-connected nature of road safety challenges;
  - Country Capacity Reviews that have shown both the scope of the problem at the national level as well as the ability of a nation to respond in a coordinated, cross-government fashion—the hallmark of the Second Generation approach on which the GRSF was founded;
  - Support for regional conferences and workshops which have resulted in plans of action or declarations in support of more aggressive action to address the road safety crisis.

- Acceptance (qualified) of the desirability to integrate Second Generation principles into national solutions for road safety concerns:
  - Country Capacity Reviews which have begun to galvanize some nations to develop domestic integrated solutions along the lines envisaged by the Second Generation approach;
  - Support for regional conferences in Asia, the Americas and Africa.
- Leverage of resources so as to increase the overall level of investment in road safety related issues:
  - As a result of GRSF project support, some countries in Europe have committed to add new road safety elements as an element of larger transport sector loans. In other instances in Central and South America GRSF support has been identified as catalytic in securing private sector financial and in kind support for national road safety initiatives;
  - There is evidence that some of the GRSF's partners have been able to lever contributions from new partners, most notably the WHO in relation to their 2007 grant from the Bloomberg Foundation.
- Increased domestic capacity:
  - In addition to knowledge transfer, there is evidence that GRSF initiatives have increased national capacity to address road safety issues.

These generally positive affirmations must be considered in light of the level of GRSF resources – about \$16 million since it commenced operations three years ago – in comparison to the magnitude of the potential GRSF funding required to address the global challenge, which has been estimated to exceed some \$300 million. This estimate has gained a high degree of credence among international sources since its advancement in the Commission for Global Road Safety's "Make Roads Safe".

We are not as able to point to such a degree of "making a positive difference" in relation to the GRSF's ability to influence global investment patterns – "catalyze increased level of road safety investments in low and middle income countries". This leads to our second cross-cutting issue – the apparent lack of willingness of traditional bilateral partners to invest in road safety related issues. This issue affects not only what the GRSF has done, but its future sustainability and long-term relevance, and more importantly, the nature of the global response to road safety as a whole.

### 3.3.3 Road Safety – an Illusive Global Priority

The road safety crisis is no longer a matter of debate or conjecture. International conferences have affirmed the severity of the crisis in both human and economic development terms, and resolutions have been promulgated and ratified at regional conferences on several continents, donor meetings, at UN specialized agencies, and at the UN General Assembly itself. All have called for concerted and coordinated action and many have called for considerable investment.

In its 2006–2015 Strategic Plan, the GRSF articulated a mandate to promote catalytic action, investment and increased commitment at three levels (mission, goals, and objectives). The evaluation questions in the ToR for this assignment address what was called "fund raising", which can in one light be interpreted as the ability to attract additional funding. We have amplified this notion into a somewhat more holistic and comprehensive question that speaks to investment challenges that include, but are not limited to the GRSF:

*Have Facility efforts resulted in increased leverage and overall increased investment in road safety programming, including, but not limited to increased support for the GRSF itself?*

The UN General Assembly Resolution A/62/244 on “Improving Global Road Safety” (March 31, 2008), specifically encourages more financial contributions to the GRSF to support its capacity-building and technical support role at the global, regional and country levels. However, as the GRSF faces the need to replenish its resources, its funding partners remain its founders (the World Bank, the FIA Foundation, Sweden, and the Netherlands) and Australia, which joined in late 2007.

One might tend to conclude that the GRSF has failed in a key mandate area – mobilization of resources for itself – if using a somewhat traditional benchmark (i.e., the ability to increase the number of parties that have joined the GRSF and thus to increase this size of its multi-donor trust fund). That however, would not be a full picture of the work of the GRSF and more importantly the environment in which it operates.

Our work over the last six months has uncovered a seeming paradox: While more is being said about road safety and more global development interveners are evincing support, very little in terms of investment seems to have transpired. One example can show the nature of this paradox. In 2004 a UN General Assembly resolution mandated WHO to coordinate road safety activities among UN system bodies, “...within their own resources, as well as voluntary financial assistance from concerned stakeholders....” However, WHO managers and staff interviewed for this evaluation reported that WHO road safety interventions are generally funded by extra-budgetary resources, and confirmed, for example, that GRSF funding was critical in enabling WHO to obtain a \$9 million grant from the Bloomberg Foundation to undertake a variety of road safety initiatives. (Respondents also noted that most of WHO’s programming for non-communicable conditions relies heavily on extra-budgetary support.)

It should be noted that some non-traditional development partners have made commitments to road safety over the past several years:

- The FIA, a founding member of the GRSF, is continuing its ongoing support to the GRSF. An examination of its annual reports for 2007 and 2008 shows that the FIA Foundation, in addition to its annual contribution of \$750,000 to GRSF, has expended at least \$5 million per year in direct support of road safety initiatives. The FIA Foundation and the GRSF have collaborated in support of IRAP and some regional road safety catalytic activities in Central and South America.
- The contribution made by the Bloomberg Foundation to the WHO (\$9 million over two years) has refreshed the WHO program base.
- The contribution made by the Global Road Safety Initiative (GRSI) partners to the Global Road Safety Partnership (\$10 million over five years).

Yet WHO managers confirm that they have not been successful in attracting extra-budgetary support from WHO member states and, in particular, from the most significant member states who are traditional development partners in public health related matters.

This issue also has affected one of the GRSF’s institutional partners, the Global Road Safety Partnership (GRSP) which operates under the umbrella of the International Committee of the Red Cross and Red Crescent. Discussions with GRSP managers confirmed a pattern similar to that which has confronted the WHO, lack of substantive and on-going support from traditional development interveners. While the GRSP’s business model differs from classic development agencies in that it contemplates a broad base of support (from the private sector, local communities and international bodies), examination of their records shows scant support from bilateral aid-providing agencies with the exception of Sweden which has made a significant contribution in supporting the GRSP Geneva office and the United Kingdom (to a limited extent). It should be noted that the GRSF continues to support the GRSP and has been one of its major sources of funding support as well.

In discussion with American, British and Canadian governmental stakeholders (from both aid-giving bodies as well as those responsible for road safety as a policy consideration) we asked why there seems to be this disconnect between the increasing importance of the global road safety crisis and the apparent lack of direct intervention on their part. We were advised that internally while some decision-makers recognized that road safety constituted both a public health and a development risk, and while it had been recognized by the international community as a priority, the hard reality has been that among a set of priorities related to public health, road safety is not seen as among the most pressing. Several respondents noted that the link between road safety and the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) is perceived as somewhat tangential, and that there is a tendency to focus on higher profile public health/ MDG challenges such as HIV/AIDS, and combating malaria and Tuberculosis (TB). Several informants working in the public health areas remarked that their managers tended to view road safety as a function of “building safer roads” and not in the sense of the Second Generation model that drives both the UN resolution as well as the GRSF itself.

Has the GRSF done enough to address these challenges not only to its own sustainability, but to the future of the global commitment to combat the road safety crisis?

To put our answer in context, we must first highlight that the GRSF’s unique funding role was only formally acknowledged in the third UN General Assembly Resolution of March 2008 and that by late June 2008 it had hosted a first-time collective discussion with IFI representatives in parallel with the July 2008 European Bank for Reconstruction and Development (EBRD) sponsored forum on road safety. Our discussions with IFI representatives have shown that while there may have been interchanges before, the new UN-conferred mandate will likely result in more collaborative action, recognizing of course, the autonomy of each of the development banks themselves. Thus, in our estimation, the fulfillment of this new coordinative mandate lies in the future, and subsequent elements of this evaluation will address it in more detail.

Turning to the issue of the mobilization of resources from others, we would wish at this point to highlight that, setting aside the role of the FIA Foundation, WHO and GRSP managers were unanimous in stating that GRSF support has been very important in acquiring additional support (most notably the large contribution from the Bloomberg Foundation) and from other non-traditional sources. This, in our estimation, is a confirmation that the GRSF is contributing to increased road safety investment, albeit in a somewhat non-traditional fashion, which we will discuss in more detail later in this evaluation.

We now turn to whether the GRSF has been able to make a difference in relation to traditional donor/ partners participating in the GRSF. In this regard we have examined how the GRSF has attempted to reach out to bilateral donors, the ones who traditionally populate analogous World Bank-hosted initiatives such as The Cities Alliance, the Water and Sanitation Program (which has 12 bilateral donors/participants), or the Public Private Infrastructure Advisory Facility. Given the level of resources available to the GRSF, a subject that will figure largely throughout this evaluation, we came to the conclusion that GRSF activities in this regard constituted a credible effort, given the overall roll-out strategy that the GRSF’s Executive Board ratified.

The apparent lack of “uptake”, therefore, appears to lie primarily with the donor community itself and its perception of the urgency of the road safety crisis.



### 3.3.4 Implications for This Evaluation

What are the implications of these two overarching issues that will guide the detailed findings and recommendations of this evaluation?

The first issue – that the GRSF has made a difference in a space of less than three years and within the parameters of the resources at its disposal – leads us to examine its relevancy, efficiency and effectiveness with a pragmatic balance between what has been done and how it has been done given the resources available.

The second issue – a lack of uptake on the part of the traditional development community that participates in analogous bodies, or on road safety as a whole – leads us to review the work of the GRSF as a catalytic body to mobilize global support not so much in linear terms (e.g., number and type of interventions versus results) but rather in a more holistic fashion (e.g., what more might have been done in terms of mobilization? or what could have been done differently, given the resources available?) More importantly, the apparent lack of uptake will affect the range of specific and overarching recommendations that will be presented.

## 4. Overview of WB GRSF from 2005 until 2008

### 4.1 Introduction

In order to better situate the detailed findings that follow, we present a snap shot of the GRSF in terms of its finances, programs, and geographic distribution.

### 4.2 Financial Overview

Since its inception in the final months of 2005, the GRSF has secured some \$15.9 million from a small cadre of sources. The following table illustrates the investment / contribution pattern.

**Exhibit 4.1 Investment / Contribution Pattern (US\$'000)<sup>7</sup>**

SOURCE		FY2006	FY2007	FY2008	FY2009		FY2010
		RECEIPTS	RECEIPTS	RECEIPTS	DONOR PLEDGE	RECEIPTS	DONOR PLEDGE
Global Fund MDTF	AusAid	–	–	222.15	220.00	–	440.00
	FIA Foundation	1,999.98	499.98	999.96	1,000.00	–	500.00
	Netherlands	–	331.77	363.93	–	–	–
Africa Multi- donor Fund	Sida supplement	–	–	–	250.00	–	–
	SIDA	–	1,457.09	822.84	736.00	–	–
	Netherlands (Africa)	–	–	–	765.83	–	–
World Bank	DGF Grants	1,000.00	1,000.00	3,000.00	–	–	–
	World Bank budget	200.00	400.00	–	–	–	–
<b>Total</b>		<b>3,300.00</b>	<b>3,588.84</b>	<b>5,408.88</b>	<b>2,971.83</b>	<b>–</b>	<b>940.00</b>


This table differentiates the three different directions of contributions:

- DGF funding approved by the World Bank Group, which is fairly unrestricted,
- A Multi-Donor Trust Fund which is similarly unrestricted but has somewhat more stringent granting requirements; and,
- An African Multi-Donor Trust Fund, which is restricted to Africa.

The above table also illustrates that the GRSF has at the present a very limited membership, only three state parties, one major philanthropy, and the World Bank. Exhibit 4.2 shows the relative contribution of each of these donors/members.

<sup>7</sup> Source : GRSF Annual Reports

**Exhibit 4.2 FY06-FY10 GRSF Donor Contribution**




Source: GRSF Annual reports

This chart clearly emphasizes that the funding partnership between the FIA Foundation and the World Bank, via its Development Grant Funding and its small start up support, constitutes two-thirds of the resources that the GRSF has been able to secure.

In terms of expenditures of the GRSF, Exhibit 4.3 shows the level of annual expenditure since inception with the three dimensions of funding illustrated.

**Exhibit 4.3 FY06-FY10 GRSF Expenditure by Fiscal Year (US\$'000)**



Source: GRSF Annual Reports

The cumulative effect of this expenditure pattern, as noted in Section 3, is that as the GRSF enters calendar year 2009, it has effectively allocated or spent all the resources at its disposal. The GRSF confirms this spending pattern in a document sent to participants of the April 2009 Transport Sector Donors' Conference. *"Available donor funding has been effectively allocated to achieve this mission and estimate of effective demand for Facility support indicates that additional and sustained donor support is required..."*

### 4.3 Programmatic Overview

Exhibit 4.4 illustrates how the nearly \$16 million in funding has been allocated across a broad set of programmatic categories. It may be useful first however, to recall the delineation of these types of program expenditures that the GRSF has established. The following is taken from a December 2008 version of The World Bank Global Road Safety Facility – Facts and Figures, Draft version 5. Notes:


- *Capacity building* includes funding country road safety management capacity reviews, country advisory services to assist the preparation of road safety investment operations, and the development of a global traffic safety police network to engage and strengthen institutional leadership and processes for road policing in country police agencies.
- *Program delivery* includes funding activities of the Global Road Safety Partnership and the World Health Organization in their focus countries.
- *Infrastructure safety* includes funding the International Road Assessment Program for the development and application of infrastructure safety rating tools and the International Roads Federation for country training courses in road infrastructure safety.
- *Research and development* includes funding the Road Traffic Injuries Research Network to support country-based research and the Harvard Initiative for Global Health to improve Global Burden of Disease estimates of country road deaths and injuries and associated health losses.
- *Advocacy* includes funding the Global Road Safety Forum for initiatives in the Latin America and Caribbean region and the second Global Stakeholders' Forum in Geneva, and supporting regional participation in the UN Global Road Safety Collaboration.
- *Training and workshops* includes funding safety management training initiatives with Sub-Saharan Transport Policy Program member countries and country-based workshops supporting the preparation of road safety investment programs and projects.
- *Facility Implementation Unit* includes funding staff and administrative activities associated with supporting Facility operations.
- *Facility governance* includes funding Facility Executive Board and Core Advisory Group meetings and the conduct of an independent evaluation of Facility operations.

Exhibit 4.4 Programming Allocations (US\$'000)<sup>8</sup>

Type of project	All funding sources			
	Allocation	Disbursed FY06 – FY09	Projected FY09 – FY10	Percentage
Capacity building	3,789	897	2,892	24%
Program delivery	3,405	2,690	715	22%
Infrastructure safety	2,266	1,174	1,092	15%
Research & development	1,619	650	969	11%
Advocacy	1,542	1,294	248	10%
Training & workshops	1,447	200	1,247	9%
Facility Implementation Unit	898	368	530	6%
Facility governance	439	171	268	3%
<b>Total</b>	<b>15,405</b>	<b>7,444</b>	<b>7,961</b>	<b>100%</b>

Exhibit 4.5 presents the above data in a rolled up fashion. What is most important to note from this table is the limited degree of expenditure on the Facility Implementation Unit (FIU), in the range of six percent. While this may show prudence, it also may be illustrative of decisions that were taken that have had an implicit impact on the capacity of the FIU and its staff.

Exhibit 4.5 Allocation per category of projects



Source: GRSF Annual Reports and documents

<sup>8</sup> Sources: GRSF Annual Reports and documents

## 4.4 Geographic Overview

Exhibit 4.6 shows the geographic distribution of the work of the GRSF over the last three and a half years. It categorizes programming on a regional basis and identifies some of GRSF's work as "global" in nature. The information was compiled from budget and expenditure data provided to us in late 2008. We categorized some expenditures (e.g., IRAP) as global and did not break them down by regional allocations in order to emphasize their global role.

**Exhibit 4.6 Geographic spread of GRSF activities and projects (US\$'000)<sup>9</sup>**

YEAR APPROVED	AFRICA	EUROPE	LAC	ASIA PACIFIC	CROSS REGIONAL/GLOBAL
2006	Ethiopia Advisory Services: \$120.0	Bosnia & Herzegovina Road Infrastructure: \$75.0		Bangladesh Advisory Services: \$58.1 China Advisory Services: \$23.1 Indonesia Advisory Services: \$25.7 iRAP Vietnam Inspections: \$405.734	Global Roads Safety Facility (IFRC/RCS): \$250.0 Afr./South Asia Advisory Services: \$16.9 Global Road Safety Facility (TFCSD): \$310.0 Global Road Safety Facility (WHO): \$440.0 Global Road Safety Facility (TFCSD): \$250.0 Global Road Safety Facility (WHO): \$500.0
2007		Serbia Transport Rehab: \$75.0 Bulgaria Road Infrastructure Rehab: \$75.0		Hubei Provincial Road Safety Center Project: \$500.000	Global Road Safety Forum (TFCSD): \$650.0 Harvard Initiative for Global Health Research Project: \$500.0 Monash University China Sea Belt: \$49.3 Police Traffic Network: \$134.5 iRAP: \$1,000.0 Global Road Safety Facility (IFRC/RCS): \$650.0
2008		Montenegro Capacity Review: \$85.0 Kazakhstan Capacity Review: \$80.0	Argentina Capacity Review: \$100.0 Brazil Capacity Review: \$100.0	Nepal Capacity Review: \$75.0	Global Forum for Health Research: \$545.0 Global Road Safety Facility (WHO): \$600.0 Universalia Management Group: 100.0\$ (for this evaluation)

<sup>9</sup> GRSF Annual Reports and documents

## 5. Evaluation Findings

### 5.1 Effectiveness

#### 5.1.1 Introduction

The assessment of effectiveness focuses on whether an organization has undertaken what it set out in its planning architecture as its plans of action. It can be conceptualized as follows:

- Has GRSF conducted the activities it planned?
- Has GRSF achieved the planned outputs?
- Has GRSF achieved the planned outcomes?

With respect to outcomes, given the early stage of the GRSF and its performance management and reporting paradigms (which we will discuss in subsequent findings), we are able only to report on what would be classically identified as initial or first level outcomes. Our focus, therefore, will be on the two levels of objectives and goals.

#### 5.1.2 Goal / Objective Attainment

**Finding 1: There is some ambiguity in the GRSF results hierarchy and there appears to be overlap between some of its objectives and goals.**

We begin this review of the effectiveness of the GRSF with a finding that addresses the nature of the hierarchy of planning that the GRSF set down in its Strategic Plan. Three levels are set out: "Mission, Goals and Objectives.

**Exhibit 5.1 GRSF Mission, Goals and Objectives**

GRSF Mission	GRSF Goals	GRSF Objectives
The Global Road Safety Facility will generate increased funding and technical assistance for global, regional and country level activities designed to accelerate and scale-up the efforts of low and middle-income countries to build their scientific, technological and managerial capacities to prepare and implement cost-effective road safety programs.	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li>1. Strengthen global, regional and country capacity to support sustainable reductions in road deaths and injuries in low and middle-income countries.</li> <li>2. Catalyze increased levels of road safety investment in low and middle-income countries.</li> <li>3. Accelerate safety knowledge transfer to low and middle-income countries.</li> <li>4. Promote innovative infrastructure solutions to improve the safety of mixed traffic, mixed speed road environments in low and middle-income countries.</li> </ol>	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li>1. Facilitate and accelerate the implementation of the recommendations of "The World Report on Road Traffic Injury Prevention" in low and middle-income countries.</li> <li>2. Support the implementation of the United Nations General Assembly Resolutions 58/289 and A/60/L.8 ("Improving global road safety"), and World Health Assembly Resolution WHA 57.10 ("Road safety and health").</li> <li>3. Harmonize, scale-up and strengthen the road safety activities of the UN, multi-lateral and bi-lateral agencies, and the Global Road Safety Partnership.</li> <li>4. Strengthen road safety management capacity and catalyze increased road safety investment in low and middle-income countries.</li> </ol>

In our estimation, there is some ambiguity between the goals and objectives.

The first objective mixes a modality (“Facilitate”) with a desire for positive change (“Accelerate the implementation”) that is more akin to the way the GRSF’s goals have been articulated, while the second objective speaks more to modalities of action (“Support implementation”). Furthermore, as we examined GRSF programming, almost every activity could be cited as contributing to Objectives 1 and 2, combined or individually. For example, the six major recommendations of the World Report on Road Traffic Injury Prevention are so broad as to encompass all the current programming modalities of the GRSF. Likewise, the series of UN Resolutions are equally encompassing.

The last two objectives could just as easily be cast as goals, as in both cases the desire is to effect a positive change. Objective 3 (“Harmonize, Scale Up and Strengthen...”) could be subsumed under the first goal of “Strengthen global, regional and country capacity...” We will, in essence, transfer it to our discussion of goals as a “new” goal because it targets a particular set of programming activity. The fourth objective, “Strengthen road safety management capacity and catalyze increased investment...”, is, in effect, a re-articulation of all four existing goals combined. To that end, we have set it aside.

This results in the following set of revised goals, which will form the basis of our assessment of the effectiveness of the GRSF.

- Strengthen global, regional and country capacity to support sustainable reductions in road deaths and injuries in low and middle-income countries.
- Catalyze increased levels of road safety investment in low and middle-income countries.
- Accelerate safety knowledge transfer to low and middle-income countries.
- Promote innovative infrastructure solutions to improve the safety of mixed traffic, mixed speed road environments in low and middle-income countries.
- Harmonize, scale-up and strengthen the road safety activities of the UN, multi-lateral and bi-lateral agencies, and the Global Road Safety Partnership.

**Finding 2: Given the resources available to the GRSF, and recognizing its early stage of development, there is evidence that GRSF programming has made a discernable contribution to the overall attainment of its five goals.**

This finding speaks to the question raised earlier, “Has the WB GRSF made a difference over the past three years?” First and foremost, we need to lay out what “making a difference” means. Given the level of the monitoring and evaluation capacity of the GRSF and also its very youth as a Facility, it is not reasonable to search for long-term outcomes. Therefore, we are examining data that speaks to the activities undertaken, the outputs, as well as some initial indications of first level outcomes which we will describe in a subsequent finding related to performance measurement.

Given the resources at its disposal, the GRSF programming portfolio has been directed to the attainment of its now five goals. While much of the GRSF’s programming is multi-dimensional and contributes to the attainment of more than one goal, Exhibit 5.2 presents examples of GRSF programming and their consequences categorized by goals. (See Section 4.3 for programming details.)



Exhibit 5.2 Examples of GRSP Goal Attainment

GOAL	PROGRAMMING EXAMPLES	CONSEQUENCES
<p><b>1) Strengthen global, regional and country capacity to support sustainable reductions in road deaths and injuries in low and middle-income countries</b></p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Use of road safety capacity assessment at the national level</li> <li>• Support for IRAPs (many times accompanying a capacity assessment)</li> <li>• Core and targeted support of the WHO</li> <li>• Core and targeted support for the GRSP</li> <li>• Activities of major service delivery partners like the Global Road Safety Forum</li> <li>• Support for the development and distribution of new practice guides and manuals</li> <li>• Support for research activities and the building of research networks</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Evidence of increased acceptance of the Second Generation Model in Asia, Eastern Europe and Latin America</li> <li>• Increased domestic capacity in all nations where IRAPs have been supported</li> <li>• Increased numbers of manuals and guides - helmets, alcohol usage, speed moderation, seat belts.</li> <li>• Increased distribution of statistical and research data</li> <li>• The extent to which the work undertaken by Harvard University and Monash University is being distributed</li> <li>• Evidence of new networks being facilitated by these research activities</li> <li>• Evidence that the Forum has brought together new actors in events that it has facilitated such as the conferences in San Jose and elsewhere</li> <li>• Madrid, Accra and San Jose Declarations and follow-on commitments</li> </ul>
<p><b>2) Catalyze increased levels of road safety investment in low and middle-income countries</b></p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Use of road safety capacity assessments as catalysts to promote the acceptance of the Second Generation <sup>10</sup> model and the acceptance of road safety elements in subsequent World Bank lending</li> <li>• Use of IRAPs to reinforce national willingness for acceptance of larger road safety lending</li> <li>• Use of technical assistance programming to do the same</li> <li>• Activities of service delivery partners like the Global Road Safety Forum</li> <li>• Support for the WHO and GRSP</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Acknowledgement by WHO and Global Road Safety Forum of the centrality of GRSP support to lever additional investment and in particular, the investment of \$9 million by the Bloomberg Foundation and an investment in the range (in cash) of \$1 million by the Forum</li> <li>• In principle, acceptance by national authorities in Eastern Europe and Latin America for the inclusion of road safety elements in upcoming comprehensive World Bank road transport lending packages (with the provision that the Bank's lending pipeline may be time-consuming)</li> </ul>

<sup>10</sup> The term 'Second Generation' is introduced the Strategic Plan and is an evolution of the concepts initially set out in Transport Safety Note #1. It promotes a learning by doing approach and anchors country capacity building efforts in systematic, measurable and accountable investment programs. It also implies a horizontal and systems base approach that recognizes the interconnectivity of factors.

GOAL	PROGRAMMING EXAMPLES	CONSEQUENCES
<b>3) Accelerate safety knowledge transfer to low and middle-income countries.</b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Support for the preparation of new best practice guides/manuals/etc.</li> <li>• Regional seminars such as that held in Addis Ababa and elsewhere</li> <li>• Road safety capacity assessments</li> <li>• Specific technical support to nations</li> <li>• Workshops and seminars (Nigeria, Ethiopia , Bangladesh)</li> <li>• Pilot programming such as the Hubei Provincial Road Safety Centre</li> <li>• Support for the Police Traffic Network</li> <li>• Support for research via projects like the Harvard Institute and others</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Probably the most difficult to ascertain in actual consequence because of the reporting disconnect between the activities, like the production of materials and the conducting of workshops, and any information on the consequences of the interventions</li> <li>• Road safety capacity assessments reports point to “uptake” in virtually every nations involved</li> <li>• GRSP workshops in India which resulted in new commitments at the regional level</li> <li>• Increased numbers of manuals and guides - helmets, alcohol usage, speed moderation, seat belts.</li> </ul>
<b>4) Promote innovative infrastructure solutions to improve the safety of mixed traffic, mixed speed road environments in low and middle-income countries</b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Road safety capacity assessments</li> <li>• Support for IRAPs</li> <li>• Specific technical support to nations</li> <li>• Manual and practice guides</li> <li>• Regional technical seminars/workshops</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Evidence of the “take up” of the second generation model in Asia, Latin America and especially in Eastern Europe</li> <li>• Evidence that GRSF supported IRAP activities are resulting in new systematic road safety programs and long-term future investment ( Serbia, Peru, Argentina)</li> <li>• Evidence that workshops (in Africa in particular) have resulted in increased awareness and acceptance of the benefits of the Second Generation model</li> </ul>
<b>5) Harmonize, scale-up and strengthen the road safety activities of the UN, multi-lateral and bi-lateral agencies, and the Global Road Safety Partnership</b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Advocacy support for additional UN Resolutions</li> <li>• Outreach to other development banks</li> <li>• Core and specified programming support for the GRSP</li> <li>• Core and specified programming support for the WHO</li> <li>• Support for regional forums such as San Jose and Accra</li> <li>• Participation in UN Global Road Safety Coordination activities</li> <li>• Outreach to bilateral development cooperation agencies</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Regional declarations: Accra, San Jose, Madrid ,</li> <li>• Initial liaison session with development banks</li> <li>• Conference participation</li> <li>• Project-based outputs of the GRSP and WHO</li> </ul>

**Finding 3: The GRSF goal to “Catalyze increased levels of road safety investment in low and middle income countries” has been the most difficult to quantify in terms of demonstrating actual investment.**

While much work has been done by GRSF in encouraging investment in road safety (as shown in Exhibit 5.2 above), the actual level of increased lending activity remains somewhat ambiguous. This is due, in large part, to the lengthy World Bank lending pipeline and the various levels of authorization, both at the World Bank and within national government authorities, through which a consolidated road transport loan must wend its way. It also reflects the need to discriminate between and track two different types of lending: one for direct loans to road safety projects (e.g., planning projects in Iran and Vietnam), and one for larger transport sector loans with embedded road safety elements such as those for some Eastern European nations.

We do not consider this to be a significant detraction from our overall positive assessment of the work that has been done by the GRSF. Rather, it points to the need for the GRSF to expand its internal mechanisms for tracking and follow-up as part of a new approach to performance management that would more closely track “what happened next”. This also would imply the need for the GRSF to work more closely with World Bank Task Team Leaders (TTLs).

Turning to other sorts of investment, the GRSF’s ability to catalyze other types of investment is clearly evident in the support GRSF provided the WHO and in the nature of its contract with the Global Road Safety Forum which resulted in both in-kind and cash contributions.

**Finding 4: GRSF programming at the national level has been able to translate GRSF support into more tangible positive changes and “take up”.**

There is evidence, both direct and indirect, that GRSF’s national level programming activities have resulted in positive change and take up, particularly in the areas of capacity building, improving infrastructure, acceptance of the Second Generation model, and acceptance of the inclusion of road safety elements in road transport lending. In our opinion, IRAPs, national-level road safety capacity assessment, and targeted national technical support constitute the best examples of highly effective GRSF national-level programming.

This is not to say that GRSF’s other global and regional initiatives have not had value – far from it. These have played a major role in setting the stage, building international acceptance, and broadening information and understanding. However, many of these broader initiatives reflect what we perceive to be an early stage need to catalyze opinion and to promote and sustain the fledgling support for UN Resolutions.

As the GRSF moves towards its next stage of life, and given the increased demands that it faces from individual nations, no matter what level of resources are at its disposal, it will face a prioritization challenge.

### 5.1.3 The Fostering of a Global Commitment

**Finding 5: The GRSF has made credible efforts, given its resource base, to alter the political consensus related to the centrality of road safety as a crucial issue for low and middle income nations, albeit without catalyzing increased investment.**

While there is a broad-based international recognition of the severity of the road safety crisis, there has been little actual political consensus to address it. One of the GRSF’s major roles, therefore, has been to build a stronger political consensus. They have done so in a credible fashion and via a number of means.

The financial support that the GRSF has provided to the Task Force on Child Survival, operating as the Global Road Safety Forum (one of its major service delivery partners), was instrumental in galvanizing political leadership in Central America, resulting in the San Juan Declaration that affirmed the centrality of road safety to the region. The support provided in 2007/08 has been credited as essential in the campaign to secure an additional resolution from the United Nations General Assembly.

The GRSF in Africa has also been credited directly as instrumental in raising awareness among African decision-makers, and in the ensuing Accra Declaration which confirmed the centrality of road safety as both a public health and development issue of major concern to African nations.

The commencement of the GRSF liaison function with respect to international financial institutions can be seen as a key step in forging a broader consensus. Materials provided by the FIU chronicle the level of direct outreach to a number of potential new partners. While we may have some minor variances with respect to individual liaison tactics, we are generally comfortable in saying that the GRSF, within its resource base, has undertaken all that could be expected in terms of national liaison. This funding also implicitly ratified the GRSF's decision to participate in the variety of regional conferences of experts as a mechanism to increase awareness and galvanize support.

While GRSF's efforts to raise political awareness and foster consensus have been successful with the level of resources available, its ability to mobilize resources from political sources (the second characteristic of mobilizing political consensus) has been less positive. This issue is discussed in a subsequent finding about the GRSF and its trust fund. At this point, however, it should be noted that since the release of the World Report in 2004 and in the face of a series of UN General Assembly resolutions on road safety, the traditional donor community has not yet responded to these challenges. According to the records of the GRSP and the WHO, aside from a handful of long-time traditional bilateral partners like the Netherlands and Sweden, few if any G7 members have made more than token investments in road safety.

**Finding 6: GRSF initiatives have made visible contributions to forging new partnerships, especially with non-traditional global partners.**

GRSF has fostered new kinds of partnerships and especially new kinds of funding partnerships. The most apparent new global partnership that the support provided by the GRSF has made possible is that between the Bloomberg Foundation and the WHO, wherein the Foundation provided the WHO with a grant of \$9 million over two years. A WHO spokesperson confirmed that this large contribution (one which was a \$5 million allocation made by the FIA to the GRSF) could be attributed to the GRSF's long-term support for the WHO.

The Global Road Safety Forum also reported that, as a result of the support it received from the GRSF, it was able to mobilize some \$500,000 in financial contributions from philanthropic sources for road safety in Latin America as well as "in kind" contributions/support from business and the financial industry. In one instance, however, a planned direct cash contribution was unable to be released due to changing political conditions in Venezuela. The Forum acknowledged that these partnerships would not have been possible with the support of the GRSF.

A second large philanthropic grant, which could have been attributed to the GRSF support given to the Forum, was in the range of \$700,000. However, for administrative reasons, the philanthropy and the World Bank were unable to craft a suitable contribution agreement. Nevertheless, this demonstrates that some philanthropies may be willing to support road safety, while many of the traditional development cooperation agencies seem not to be so inclined at this time. The GRSF has begun to experiment with a variety of alternate ways of galvanizing new partnerships beyond the traditional model of support through a multi-donor trust fund.

Turning to other approaches to increased partnership, the programmatic work of the GRSF has also served to build new awareness and partnerships. For example, the African nations that participated in a fairly early-stage workshop in Addis Ababa reported that the workshop not only increased their knowledge but also their capacity. The workshop served to strengthen the commitment initially set out in the Accra Declaration.

**Finding 7: Most members of the traditional donor community have yet to translate commitment into increased levels of funding for either the GRSF or other road safety initiatives.**

In Section 3 of this evaluation, we noted the lack of support afforded to the GRSF and road safety in general by the traditional donor community – namely national development cooperation agencies or other elements of national governments. This finding explores the motivations that have influenced the lack of increased membership in, and financial contributions to, the GRSF and to road safety in general. It also speaks to some extent about the effectiveness of the GRSF’s fund raising strategy, one of the eight questions in the Terms of Reference and the evaluation matrix.

Our discussions with representatives from three G7 nations (not members of the GRSF and not significant donors in other fora for road safety) highlighted the following key issues.

- First, there was acceptance that injuries and fatalities related to vehicular incidents constituted both a major public health risk and a major deterrent to economic development in low and middle income nations. There was also a consensus that the trend lines were likely to increase in severity to overtake traditional communicable and vector-borne conditions like TB and malaria. Nevertheless, these representatives stated that, as a public health issue, road safety had yet to acquire a sense of global urgency among key decision-makers, both bureaucratic and political.
- Second, among decision-makers within these national development cooperation agencies, road safety is seen largely in terms of an infrastructure / transport issue, and not in the holistic sense that characterizes the “Second Generation” as espoused by the GRSF and by extension by UN General Assembly resolutions.
- Third, several of these representatives questioned the extent to which road safety is considered a global priority among the donor community and even among multilateral bodies. The observation that the WHO, which was issued a global mandate by the General Assembly over four years ago, has yet to set aside any of its regular budget for the support of the ground-breaking work it performs was cast in the archetypal sense “If the WHO does not even support itself, why should we?”

This leads us to analyze whether the GRSF and its fundraising strategy has had any impact on this situation. While some of the methods used to approach potential G7 donors may not have been sufficiently sensitive to the prevailing organizational culture of certain development cooperation bodies, the GRSF made very credible albeit unsuccessful efforts to attract new investment in its two multi-donor trust funds, given the level of resources available to it.

Our view therefore, is that the GRSF fundraising strategy was based on optimistic assumptions about donor willingness. Looking towards the future, and in light of the funding gap that confronts the GRSF, we will present recommendations that speak to the three primary detracting factors noted above.

## 5.2 Efficiency and Governance

### 5.2.1 Introduction

The following set of findings speaks to the evaluation questions related to the efficiency of GRSF, including its human and financial resources, and its governance model.

### 5.2.2 The Resource Base of the WB GRSF

**Finding 8: The level of resources available to the GRSF as a whole has not been sufficient to respond fully to the demands placed upon the Facility.**

This finding, related to the GRSF resources, has three dimensions, all of which impact on the future of the GRSF as a whole:

- The GRSF does not have sufficient human resources to execute its mandate as set down in the Strategic Plan, and this gap is exacerbated by the recent upturn in demands on the FIU.
- The FIU, due to lack of resources, has been unable to put into place the management systems that are required for the long-term sustainability and good management of a multilateral coordinative and catalytic body, as well as those required to plan and manage for results.
- The GRSF has insufficient financial resources to undertake its mandate in this early growth stage.

These three dimensions are intertwined. For example, the lack of people has resulted in the difficulties in shaping management systems that are commensurate with a multi-donor platform.

### Human Resource Shortfalls

During the period examined by this evaluation the GRSF has been operating with a very small professional staff in comparison to the breadth and scope of its work. For the majority of its short lifespan to date, it has had only one and a half full time professionals, one of whom is the manager of the FIU as well as the sectoral road safety expert for the World Bank's Transport Sector. We noted the "tug and pull" placed on this one individual, who not only must lead GRSF, via the FIU, but also be the Transport Sector's sole road safety professional. In 2008, with the decision to expand the GRSF to support IRAP-related activities, the FIU engaged a road assessment specialist and received in-kind support from SIDA in the form of a professional to address African issues.

The FIU has been unable to secure the professional staff for robust and sustainable communications and information distribution systems, although this may be addressed to some extent in early 2009. In this regard, useful tools like regular newsletters and standardized contact lists have not been forthcoming, nor have some key planning documents. For example, mandated annual reports have been replaced at this time by a single multi-year report (effectively biennial given the very limited degree of activity during the final months of FY 2006).

As well, the FIU, which shares common administrative services with other elements of the World Bank's Transport sector, lacks dedicated administrative personnel to carry out its mandate.

Among stakeholders we contacted, there was recognition that the two-person staff has been challenged by the scope of the task at hand. Some World Bank respondents observed that the FIU had some difficulty in following up on a capacity assessment, largely if not exclusively due to the few personnel available. Other stakeholders in multilateral bodies and among international partners also pointed out that the FIU's limited team of personnel between its inception and 2008 limited its ability to follow up to some degree.

Based on the above, we are of view that the GRSF might have had more capacity to follow up or to undertake more substantive outreach and performance management if it had a somewhat larger professional cadre, supported by an administrative and contract management team.

## **Systems Gaps**

Subsequent findings discuss what we perceive to be systems gaps in areas such as performance management. The root cause of these gaps, in our estimation, is the combination of the lack of personnel and the decision of the FIU to roll out actual programming to establish a presence and begin to fulfill its transformative and catalytic role. We recognize the quandary that the FIU faced. On one hand, there are (and were) strong pressures to focus on programmatic work, on the other, the Strategic Plan envisaged a fully-fledged coordinative body that had the planning, managerial, and reporting infrastructures that are commensurate with a multi-donor semi-autonomous body.

The FIU relies on the standard World Bank systems of financial management, but has not yet been able to set up an integrated database. However in early 2009 it is beginning to explore the design of such a system and has recently begun to augment its communications capacity.

## **The Level of Financial Resources Available**

We approach this dimension of the resource shortfall that faced the GRSF in its inception and early growth stage with some reservations. It is all too easy to conclude that more money could have been used to good ends. What is more difficult to conclude, given human resource constraints noted above, is whether more disposable funds would have increased the ability of the GRSF to fulfill its mandate.

We have come to the conclusion that, given the human resource limitations that have been present throughout most of the FIU's existence, additional discretionary spending on projects would have resulted in increased pressure on an already disproportionately small internal human resource base. We base this judgment on the remarks of World Bank staff who have reported some instances of delay in 'uptake' of projects conditionally approved.

Turning to a more strategic consideration, the question could be asked whether the level of resources available as a whole – about \$16 million – were sufficient in the first place for the GRSF to fulfill its mandate during a two to three year inception / launch phase. Clearly, had far more been available, and given our findings as to the positive degree of efficacy of what was at hand, it is likely that more could have been done. However, this judgment is predicated on two assumptions:

- That more staff would have been available not only to manage projects but also to build organizational infrastructure.
- That any increase would have been of such a size as to enable the FIU to better balance the "back office" with active program delivery.

In our view, a modest increase of \$3-4 million in overall funding (the net effect of three or four more nations joining the GRSF at the minimum membership level, as was the case with Australia) probably would have resulted in disproportionate pressures on already limited staff levels, unless some of the additional resources had been used to augment the FIU.

## Comparisons

To situate the level of internal resources available to the GRSF, some examples of comparable bodies, especially ones that are housed by the World Bank Group, might be useful to examine. In making this comparison, however, we recognize that the GRSF's founding donors set these levels at the outset and thus the FIU has had to operate within them.

The Cities Alliance, which currently has annual expenditures in the range of \$9 million, has some dozen professional staff including a full time manager, a communications professional, program, information technology and financial management specialists, and several full time urban development specialists. They also have a team of full time administrative support personnel. The Public Private Infrastructure Advisory Facility (PPIAF) has four regional sub-offices staffed by professionals. Given that the GRSF currently expends somewhat more than half the sum of the Cities Alliance, it would seem that from a staffing perspective, it is under-strength.

In terms of budgets for administration, as we have noted earlier, the GRSF operates in the range of 6% of overall expenditures. By contrast, the PPIAF operates with total program administration costs in the range of 15 -18%. Multilateral / multi-donor organizations outside the ambit of the World Bank Group also tend to allocate more to program administration costs. For example, the International Development Legal Organization, with annual expenditures in the \$7 million range, allocates some 12% for program administration cost and has about ten full time managerial / administrative professionals, with corresponding numbers of support staff. This again points to the conclusion that the GRSF does not possess sufficient program administration resources.

## Implications

The lack of resources available to the FIU has implications for the future of the GRSF as a whole. We have noted plans that forecast expenditures in the range of \$12 million per year over the next two to three World Bank fiscal years. In our estimation, and based on the feedback and information we have gathered, for such plans to be viable, the GRSF will have to contemplate an increase in staff size (and likely the diversification of staff responsibilities), along with additional funds for program administrative costs.

**Finding 9: The GRSF faces a resource shortfall which may affect its overall sustainability and future relevance due to the level of prior commitment of its resources combined with the limited increase in donor support.**

At the time of writing, the WB GRSF has effectively allocated all of the DGF and virtually all of the Trust Fund resources that it has amassed since its inception in late 2005/ early 2006.

Yet, with the exception of Australia's commitment (roughly equivalent to the basic annual minimum membership contribution of \$ US 250,000 per year), the GRSF has received no additional membership support. From one perspective therefore, the funding strategy has not been successful. Furthermore, planning documents provided by GRSF management show projected annual expenditures for the next two to three years in the range of \$12 million per year.

For these plans to be viable, the GRSF will have to attract more contributions than those initially made by its founders. But, again with the exception of Australia, no new members have come forward and it appears that no decisions have been taken by either the World Bank itself, or the FIA Foundation, the two largest donors to the GRSF as to the future. To some extent, the future of the GRSF rests in the hands of the World Bank and the FIA Foundation, both of which made matching \$5 million contributions to launch the GRSF. Without prejudice to any eventual decision of the World Bank or the FIA Foundation, it is difficult to envisage the medium term



sustainability of the GRSF in the absence of substantial levels of funding from these two members.

In addition, the limited resource base of the GRSF, while in part a factor of a lack of new donor support, is also a conscious product of GRSF management. In short, resource allocations have had the effect of committing the entire resource base in the absence of its renewal, especially the Trust Fund allocations.

While there is clearly an argument to be made that the GRSF had no choice but to expend resources at what today might seem to be an unsustainable level so as to create initial momentum, visibility, and demonstrate its intrinsic worth, there is an equal argument that some degree of fiscal prudence might have been warranted. For example, on a hypothetical basis, were the World Bank and the FIA Foundation not to provide the same or greater levels of support in the future, it would seem unlikely that key partners like the WHO and IRAP could expect to receive the extent of the support they have enjoyed in the past. For that matter, the plans for increased national level presence in two upcoming fiscal years would have to be reviewed.

We are aware of the challenge that faced the management and governing members of the GRSF as a whole. This situation is further complicated by the fact that, while additional traditional donors have yet to come forward in numbers, non-traditional donors such as foundations and private corporations have come to the forefront in some cases, although not to support the GRSF itself. The \$9 million contribution by the Bloomberg Foundation shows that acceptance and willingness are present, but not necessarily as yet among the donor pool that traditionally populates analogous World Bank supported semi-autonomous facilities, and in some way possibly not in relation to a willingness to support the GRSF as a semi-autonomous entity of the World Bank Group.

### 5.2.3 The Consistency and Adequacy of the Governance Model

**Finding 10: The current governance model of the GRSF reflects the anticipated structures and roles and responsibilities as set down in the inaugural Strategic Plan.**

The WB GRSF's governance paradigm consists of three inter-connected elements:

- A **Facility Implementation Unit**, hosted, staffed and managed by the World Bank, possessing a broad range of managerial and decision-making powers including the power to take disbursement decisions.
- A **Facility Executive Board** composed of the formal members of the GRSF (three nations, the FIA Foundation and the World Bank) that have made a sustained financial contribution to the GRSF. The Board has largely advisory functions and a series of envisaged global facilitative functions such as donor coordination, resource mobilization, etc.
- A **Core Advisory Group (CAG)** which is appointed by the FIU (and not the Board) comprised of technical experts whose mandate is to provide expert advice and, to some degree, an outreach capacity. The CAG can be augmented by special purpose sub-committees called Thematic Advisory Groups (TAG) to address specific issues.

These three groups appear to function as planned, although there have been some limitations:

- The CAG was launched only recently (mid 2008).
- Some Board functions, such as mobilizing resources and support for the GRSF, do not appear to have borne fruit.

- The Board function to review annual reports and semi-annual plans has been somewhat constrained by the fact that some of these documents have not been produced on the basis of the anticipated cycles.

This leads to a more subtle observation related to the governance model. The model as laid out in the Strategic Plan would seem to envisage a much larger population for the GRSF and for its governance arms in particular. For example, it speaks of issue-specific TAGs in the context of CAG, yet none as yet have been constituted. It envisages annual donor forums as well as an annual consultative meeting. While the slow take up of membership and the slow growth of advisory functions could be seen as indications that the GRSF had not fully rolled out its governance framework, we believe it was appropriate for the Strategic Plan to have planned to accommodate a growing population.

**Finding 11: The Core Advisory Group (CAG) was slow in being established and has yet to actively reach out to stakeholders in lower and middle income nations or to a wider network of potential institutional partners.**

The GRSF's Strategic Plan places great stock the Core Advisory Group's roles, especially its ability to reach out to lower and middle income nations (and in particular, African nations). It was given a mandate to conduct studies and address thematic issues.

While the CAG was not established until mid 2008, it now appears to be moving toward full functionality. As set out in the Strategic Plan, the CAG will meet at least twice a year. As of February 2009, the CAG had met twice formally – in an inaugural session in October 2008 and a follow-on in January 2009 – and plans to conduct a third meeting at the same time as the planned March 2009 Executive Board session.

In terms of membership, at the October 2008 session, only three external representatives had been appointed, but it is anticipated that two more experts will be joining the CAG, including one from Africa who has a background in African safety and road safety issues. While a new member with an African orientation marks the commencement of reaching out to lower and middle income nations, lack of representation from other regions such as Central or Latin America may somewhat limit the outreach capacity of the CAG.

As well, in reviewing the design for the CAG, we noted a stipulation that it might contain representation of key partners. In this light, while we recognize that some of the current (or putative) members of the CAG represent major road safety research institutions in both Europe and Australia, we are of the view that “partner” in this context may be best understood to be organizations like UN Agencies and other multilateral bodies.

It should be noted that the CAG is not the sole mechanism that the FIU has to reach out to lower and middle income nations. In this regard, the extent to which FIU personnel represent the World Bank as a whole and the GRSF regionally, such as that in Ghana or Madrid which resulted in the Accra and Madrid Declarations, should be noted.

**Finding 12: While Facility selection of projects for support (DGF and/or Trust Fund) appears to be in accord with the goals, objectives, and eligibility criteria as set out in the Strategic Plan, the FIU has yet to promulgate and publish formal selection documentation that is characteristic of a more mature global funding program.**

As part of our review of the administrative and decision-making systems and procedures of the FIU, the evaluation team asked whether selection criteria had been formalized, codified and made widely available as is the case with other global funding platforms. We were advised that they had not and were assured that the selection criteria which were used in essence assessed the congruence between the project and the GRSF's mission, goals and objectives as set out in the Strategic Plan. We also observed that, save for a very brief link on the GRSF's web site

providing a general point of contact with the staff, there is no mention of what kind of funding may be available, how it may be accessed, and the details of criteria .

While we recognize that it may be early days as yet for the WB GRSF in some contexts, the lack of codified application and selection documentation, beyond a basic test for congruence with funding principles, again illustrates a capacity/resource challenge that has confronted the FIU since its outset. From one perspective, this situation can be seen as another confirmation of the insufficient level of human resources allocated to administrative services and communications. Conversely, it can also be portrayed as an example of the FIU and the Board's decision to roll out a programming base, as opposed to building a fully fledged infrastructure.

An additional performance-related issue impacts on the absence of codified application and selection criteria which characterizes a more mature funding platform. Subsequent findings will explore the evolving performance model of the GRSF. It is sufficient at this point to highlight that detailed application and selection criteria traditionally constitute a starting point to move beyond selection on the basis of inputs/outputs and can place a higher focus on "results". For example, PPIAF and Cities Alliance application and selection material require at a minimum a basic approach to results-based program logic that links anticipated outcomes with indicators of performance and more results-driven program reporting requirements.

In our estimation, the need for such a codification of application and selection criteria is growing. Documents prepared by the GRSF for the April 2009 Transport Donors' Forum state that demand for GRSF support has exceeded its supply, and also note that three nations in South East Asia are likely to have sufficient internal capacity to warrant programming. In short, this issue is more than an administrative matter – it is rapidly emerging as a risk to the Facility in that the absence of formalized, published and predictable funding criteria can call into question the transparency and objectivity of the GRSF as a whole.

## 5.3 The Relevance of the WB GRSF

### 5.3.1 Introduction

The following findings speak to issues related to the relevance of the WB GRSF. They focus on its ability to assess needs and whether the programming offered meet the needs of the clientele.

### 5.3.2 The Ability to Assess Needs

**Finding 13: The current programming mix of the GRSF places priority on the delivery of technical assistance and catalyzing support/increased commitment; it does not sufficiently emphasize developing systematic and regularized long-term mechanisms to ascertain needs and strategic relevance.**

This finding is directly based on the availability of human resources to undertake longer range strategic planning with the GRSF. Put simply, the GRSF, due to the interplay between decisions to maximize immediate programming and the level of overall resources available, does not appear to have the planning and policy analysis resources at hand to refresh its planning architecture on a regular basis.

According to information provided to us in early 2009, the GRSF is contemplating an internal review of its Strategic Plan (which is now some three years old) in line with the direction contained in its Strategic Plan. While we conclude that the plan remains relevant, it is becoming evident that for the long-term sustainability and relevance, the GRSF will need to contemplate an early review of the strategic assumptions on which it was based.

The Strategic Plan appears to have been based on positive assumptions about donor take up, both in terms of the GRSF itself and with respect to global support for road safety as a whole.

For the past three years, these assumptions have yet to come to pass, although there is some early indication that in the coming years other traditional donors may be contemplating increased participation in programming related to road safety.

The GRSF has yet to develop a formalized forward planning capacity or an observatory capacity. We recognize that the relevance of the basic Second Generation model of the GRSF has been confirmed by organizations as prestigious as the OECD in their 2008 report, "Towards Zero". What we have not found is whether the GRSF has considered the implications of an expansion of interest in, and support for, second generation road safety in the many upper-middle income nations of Central and Eastern Europe that may be occasioned by the OECD report; and how to accommodate and balance such likely European demands in the face of the mandated need to focus on low and middle income nations generally; and the overarching global commitment to the "bottom billion".

Indeed, when we examined the proposed spending plans of the GRSF, we noticed a somewhat notional future needs assessment of allocating future resources on a formula of "two per World Bank region, one per region," etc. While we recognize the notional nature of this needs assessment, and while we can conclude that there is probably sufficient absorptive capacity on a regional basis to fulfill this approach, we have some concerns in that it appears not to take into account to a sufficient degree, the global focus on African development.

**Finding 14: Notwithstanding the above, the GRSF’s country capacity assessment mechanism represents an excellent and cost-effective mechanism to assess country capacity and needs, which enhances its relevance.**

The country capacity reviews that the GRSF has funded probably constitute one of its most cost-effective/ efficient tools to promote the attainment of its goals. More importantly, these capacity reviews constitute an effective mechanism to assess future needs, aggregated at a national level, and thus ensure long-term relevance of the GRSF’s programming base. To date there have been 10 such reviews (completed or underway) in the following nations: Serbia, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Bulgaria, Montenegro, Nepal, Brazil, Uganda, Nigeria, Kazakhstan and Argentina.

These \$75-80,000 allocations are administered by a process of the GRSF transferring the funds to a World Bank Task Team Leader for a particular nation who then, with the assistance of the GRSF, secures a qualified consultant to undertake the review. The reviews are quite direct and appear to take between 4-6 months to complete. Their range is illustrated by the following

textbox extracted from the final report of the review for Serbia.

**Elements of the World Bank safety management capacity review**

Effective safety management of the road traffic system is characterized by three key strategic elements: effective institutional management functions, structures and processes, a comprehensive framework of integrated interventions across the system, long term goals and clearly defined safety performance targets for the interim which are challenging but achievable (See Annex 2)

The ‘system’ capacity review appraises road safety management along the three international best practice dimensions: institutional management functions, structures and processes, interventions and results management.

The ‘effectiveness’ capacity review aims to assess where the country is in terms of its road safety development. It requires consideration of the social cost densities of networks, and where the greatest concentrations of crashes and related deaths and injuries occur, because it is in these corridors and areas that the most potential for accelerating effectiveness occurs. The first phase involves a slow accretion of capacity and the second phase sees capacity improving rapidly which broadly coincide with 1<sup>st</sup> and 2<sup>nd</sup> Generation projects. 1<sup>st</sup> Generation Projects are usually part of a road construction project. 2<sup>nd</sup> Generation are usually stand-alone projects.

The ‘diagnosis’ of a country safety management system and its effectiveness represents professional appraisal of the state of readiness in a country to move from 1<sup>st</sup> Generation Projects to 2<sup>nd</sup> Generation Projects.

Task Team Leaders have uniformly advised us that the capacity review process has been instrumental in both analyzing and subsequently galvanizing national support for both the Second Generation approach (albeit with some limitations) and the inclusion, immediate or longer term, of Second Generation road safety projects in larger World Bank transportation loan activity. Examples include Serbia, Montenegro, Argentina (at an early stage), and Peru.

To that end they play a very positive multi-functional role. They not only promote long term relevance but also promote increased leverage of road safety investment, at least within the context of the World Bank's overall portfolio.

It would not be an exaggeration therefore to conclude that capacity reviews are one of the success stories of the GRSF.

**Finding 15: The GRSF has taken strong initial steps to capitalize on the March 2008 UN General Assembly resolution that reinforced its role among international financial institutions.**

While the 2008 UN General Assembly resolution did not explicitly confer on the GRSF an oversight/coordinative mandate with respect to its sister development banks, it can be interpreted as such. By late June/early July 2008, the GRSF had begun to explore increased levels of cooperation among development banks. The inaugural session, held in parallel with the EBRD road safety conference in early July 2008, marked the commencement of a very important aspect of the entire mandate of the GRSF and its role as a coordinative funding platform. We also noted with interest the early 2009 meeting between Lord Robertson of the Commission for Global Road Safety ("Make Roads Safe") and Mr. Robert Zoellick, President of the World Bank.

In early 2009 the GRSF launched an infrastructure safety practices review with participating development banks, and intends to have a follow on session in mid- 2009 leading to the anticipated meeting of ministers in Moscow in November 2009. Given the funding issues that GRSF faces, we believe there would be considerable benefit in accelerating liaison with other development banks, especial about harmonization of lending activities so as to promote synergies.

### 5.3.3 The Comparative Advantage/ Niche of the WB GRSF

**Finding 16: While the goals and objectives of the GRSF clearly are aligned with UN resolutions, there remains some ambiguity about specific roles and responsibility among some partners.**

Our review of the mandate, goals and objectives of the GRSF, in comparison to UN resolutions shows a near complete concordance. The GRSF therefore has a unique and valuable role that is not duplicated by the efforts of others, including the WHO.

The WHO mandate, which predates the formation of the GRSF by nearly two years and which predates the 2008 UN General Assembly resolution that recognizes the role of the GRSF as a funding platform, speaks to the WHO's coordination role across UN system bodies. The WHO does not have as broad a mandate as the GRSF. Turning to other actors such as the Global Road Safety Partnership or the Global Road Safety Forum, while valuable interveners in their own right, neither has a formally recognized mandate of roles and responsibilities. Nor for that matter does the Commission for Global Road Safety that is in large part funded by the FIA Foundation.

There appear, however, to be some ambiguities among some partners as to specific programmatic roles and responsibilities, and the degree of coordination varies from formal to informal.

First, while the GRSF and the WHO have different and complementary roles, the level of practical coordination between the two may not be as extensive as desired. We encountered a very active Pan-American Health Organization (PAHO) presence in the road safety community in Latin and Central America. PAHO has a full time road safety specialist who was aware of the GRSF, but indicated that her organization was not linked to it, save for informal coordination that might occur at hemispheric events. It should be noted that this PAHO specialist is the sole exclusive regional road safety specialist among the WHO family. In other regions, experts are assigned dual or triple responsibility (road safety, injury, violence prevention, etc), although the WHO has on occasion retained road safety specialists at the national level, for example, in Vietnam and Mexico.

We have learned that the GRSF and the WHO have had substantial discussions about their formal interface. Documents from the UN Road Safety Collaboration note that information was being shared by all parties, but the sense of a coordinated effort is difficult to ascertain. While discussions about complementarities may have ensued, what is absent is a formal bilateral mechanism between the WHO and the GRSF to promote increased levels of harmonization. This may be especially relevant given that the WHO is not only the UN systems coordinator, it is also one of the largest recipients of GRSF support and has recognized that its overall work could not have been undertaken in the absence of GRSF support.

Turning to the non-formal major actors like the Global Road Safety Partnership and the Global Road Safety Forum, both of which are major recipients of GRSF support, we did not find evidence of any formal coordination, but recognize that informal mechanisms may have been used. The impact of the apparent lack of formal coordinative mechanisms with major partners and service deliverers can be seen in the following example. In 2008, the GRSF granted the Task Force on Child Survival (operating under the modality of the Global Road Safety Forum) some \$650,000 for a variety of advocacy and coordinative programming. By contrast, the entire amount of direct contributions received by the Task Force from all its donors totaled about \$1.4 million for all its many activities, of which road safety is only one, albeit probably one of the largest. While we did not uncover any direct overlaps between the Task Force's entire road safety portfolio and the work of the GRSF, it would seem that an opportunity for leverage and the promotion of mutual synergies may have been lost. We recognize that the Task Force and the GRSF have had a long, fruitful and highly positive relationship and our finding does not detract from the work of the Task Force. It is simply an observation that the GRSF does not appear to have the present capacity to lever synergies and higher levels of interaction/ collaborative efforts among a nucleus of key actors who are to a large degree reliant on the GRSF for their own sustainability.

We now turn to the question of whether the GRSF may in fact be competing with some of its own recipients for funding.

As noted earlier, GRSF's current set of donors, including both traditional bilateral development cooperation agencies and non-traditional donors like philanthropies, are few in number with the FIA Foundation and the Bloomberg Foundation being the largest of all donors worldwide. We were advised by the GRSF that during the early stages there was a potential risk that a small circle of major players, including the above noted bodies, might end up competing for limited resources. This risk may have receded to some degree, now that the GRSF has a more explicitly recognized role as a funding platform, compared to some others who are largely more service delivery agents.

In the absence of new donors emerging, we are of the view that this remains a legitimate concern. Given the coordinative mandate of the GRSF and its role as a funding platform, it is incumbent on it, for its long-term survival, to develop mechanisms with its key partners, and especially the WHO, to formalize an approach to programming coordination and to address issues of resource mobilization, especially in instances where the GRSF provides core support to others who in turn engage in resource mobilization.

We would also be remiss not to emphasize that the mandate, goals, and objectives of the GRSF are in accord with the strategic direction of the World Bank Group as a whole as set down in their recent Transport Business Strategy, “Safe Clean and Affordable”.

This strategy lays out a solid case for increased investment in road transport as a whole and for increased investment in road transport safety considerations. This new strategy, we feel, is an important “force multiplier” for the GRSF in that it signals to recipient nations the increased importance of road safety and the likelihood that road safety elements will become far more frequent components of broader surface transportation activity.

For the GRSF, this strategy may have some aspects of a double-edged sword. If road safety becomes a more integral part of overall transport lending activity, the World Bank will require a cadre of road safety experts to target, prioritize, and execute increased lending. While the current network of informal regional focal points may have been suitable for a less intensive era, the fact that the Transport sector has only one road safety specialist (who also leads the GRSF FIU) tends to imply that there may be a road safety capacity gap at the World Bank itself. While the GRSF is housed at the World Bank, and naturally works closely with it, there may be a risk in seeing the GRSF as an asset of the World Bank Group rather than as a global multilateral platform.

**Finding 17: The products and services of the GRSF are uniformly welcomed by potential recipients as adding considerable value, raising knowledge, and building consensus, and are also seen as unique in not duplicating the work of others.**

A key consideration with respect to relevance lies in whether the products and services of an entity are useful and have long-term value to their recipients. Our examination of various sources of data leads us to conclude that the range of GRSF products and services are uniformly well-designed and uniformly well received.

In terms of broad base support for its three or four major partners, there is no doubt that without the GRSF, they would not have been able to undertake their range of activities. In terms of direct financing of projects, seminars, and workshops, GRSF’s services are considered unique and highly “value adding”. And, according to World Bank internal reports and discussions with Task Team leaders, we have concluded that the country assessments, as noted earlier, are low cost and have had considerable positive impact in galvanizing the uptake of the second generation model.

**Finding 18: The GRSF’s primary “Second Generation” model is recognized by its institutional partners such as the WHO, other development banks and the Global Road Safety Partnership as transformational and vital to the global campaign to combat the road safety epidemic.**

One of the reasons for being of the GRSF was the propagation of the Second Generation model for road safety which has recently acquired full confirmation in the OECD’s 2008 report, “Towards Zero”. Based on a literature review, we came to the conclusion that the prime driving force for the Second Generation model over the last three years has been the World Bank and in particular, the GRSF.

Virtually all major partners and World Bank staff alike reported that the Second Generation model was transformational and had made a significant difference in conceptualizing road safety in a more “systems”/cross-government light. Specific reference was made by World Bank staff to the growing awareness and acceptance of the implications of the Second Generation model among potential national borrowers, especially those nations that had undergone a capacity review or were doing so.

There was, however, one note of caution in this largely positive review. Some World Bank staff working in Africa and parts of Latin America reported that the cross-government implications of the Second Generation model may pose some difficulties in terms of practical public administration. They noted that in discussions with some African nations that had participated in the Addis Ababa workshop, while there was a willingness to accept the cross-government implication, a broader review of the overall public sector capacity indicates some limitations in the ability to absorb horizontal initiatives. These remarks were echoed in relation to several South American nations, with Argentina being cited as one where horizontality had some practical difficulties at the outset, but where due to concerted efforts the Second Generation model now has been embraced fully.

This note of caution on the part of some World Bank staff who are involved actively in lending portfolio management should not be interpreted as a rejection of the Second Generation model. Rather, it points to the need to carefully assess the potential overall public sector capacity in the nation in question to absorb the level of transformation implied by the Second Generation model – even before committing to a road safety capacity assessment. This might imply, for example, a “pre-capacity review” rapid diagnostic, and also may indicate the need for more analytical capacity at the FIU.

### 5.4 Performance Measurement

This set of findings addresses the performance measurement model of the WB GRSF. These findings were developed in response to the Quality Assurance Group (QAG) Report’s remarks regarding the adequacy of GRSF practices.

**Finding 19: The GRSF’s present approach to performance measurement complies with DGF and other WB procedures related to fiduciary and programmatic reporting of activities. Yet, the approach is not sufficiently results-based.**

The 2007 QAG Report, in a largely positive review of the inaugural months of the GRSF, noted that additional efforts could be made to strengthen monitoring and evaluation (M&E) capacity. As a result of this particular advice, we expanded the evaluation to address the performance management model of the GRSF.

First, all of GRSF’s periodic programming reports that we reviewed comply with minimum fiduciary and programmatic reporting requirements as set down by the World Bank. Beyond that, however, some degree of variance begins to arise. One major issue that is common to all bodies analogous to the GRSF that largely engage in facilitative and/or catalytic programming, is their limited ability to assess whether the programming has actually made a difference.

In our review of GRSF-supported programming, we examined the contractual documents that provided support for a number of different projects, including: IRAPs, omnibus support for major partners like WHO, targeted project support for others, and the contracts that provided for the transfer of funds to World Bank Task Team Leaders to finance the country capacity reviews. We noted a general tendency among all types of contracts to concentrate reporting requirements on input/output and fiduciary data, with few if any stipulations for the recipient to follow-up or address even the short term consequences of the project (immediate outcomes). One exception



was the follow-up reports on country capacity reviews done by World Bank Task Team Leaders (TTL), which embodied many of the features of assessing immediate or first level outcomes (see sidebar).

We consider GRSF's inconsistency in reporting and results architecture to be a current performance gap, and the absence of even a minimal logical framework (at least in many past contracts) to be a barrier to performance

measurement as a whole – a conclusion supported by the 2007 QAG report which urged the adoption of a more rigorous approach to M&E.

Our review of project reporting yielded more mixed results. In some instances, and especially in reporting provided by TTLs, reports address some of the first level outcomes and provide a degree of credible information – not simply assertions. By contrast, the reports provided by several of the larger multi-project partners and service providers tend to be output-based and sometimes contain remarks that do not appear to be supported by evidence. The range of reporting is likely influenced by factors noted earlier in this report – i.e., GRSF has been preoccupied with delivery rather than establishing procedures and has not had enough time or people to develop a comprehensive approach to performance planning and reporting.

In light of the QAG recommendation regarding M&E, there may have been alternatives open to the GRSF's management in relation to assessing organizational performance – although we recognize that these alternatives might have slowed the pace of disbursement, due to time and human resources required to strengthening stewardship. We also recognize that introducing program logic planning and reporting can be somewhat new to a number of potential recipients, but the introduction of multi-level program logic should not be an onerous requirement for major international partners and service providers.

In March 2009, the GRSF advised us that they have begun to explore strengthening their overall approach to Monitoring and Evaluation (M&E). They have begun to enter into discussions with some analogous but somewhat more mature bodies such as the Cities Alliance.

#### First Level Outcomes

For the GRSF, first level outcomes would address questions such as: What happened next as a result of an intervention? Did public authorities adopt the "lead ministry" concept that is at the core of the Second Generation model? Did loan pipelines include prospects for increased direct lending for road safety or additional road safety components? Was new legislation or regulatory presented by public authorities?

This focus on first level outcomes highlights a long-standing issue of the interplay between the results of an intervention and external factors. For example, the fact that road safety legislation may not be enacted, even if it is introduced, may be the result of external political considerations that are beyond the scope of a road safety initiative supported by the GRSF.

## 6. GRSF's Overall Strengths and Challenges

### 6.1 Introduction

In this section, we present a summary of the strengths of the GRSF and the challenges it faces as a growing global platform. We have identified four major strengths of the GRSF, strengths that when taken together confirm its long-term viability as a global force, and three challenges that, if left unchecked, could impede both the GRSF in terms of its long-term mandate, and the attainment of broader global road safety objectives.

### 6.2 Strengths

#### 6.2.1 The Flexibility of the WB GRSF Model

Our findings related to the relevance and effectiveness of GRSF confirm that the GRSF model is highly useful and holds out the prospect of being a major contributing factor in the attainment of global goals for road safety. The range of instruments that the GRSF has deployed – long term support for core partners to develop invaluable capacity building, knowledge sharing tools, targeted national level interventions to promote the uptake of the Second Generation model, and advocacy instruments types that have raised global acceptance of both the “model” as well as the urgency of the crisis – confirm the contribution that the GRSF has made.

More importantly, the flexibility of the GRSF model and its range of instruments have enabled it to develop a sensitive response that would not be possible with a more narrow approach. For example a model that was highly focused on galvanizing regional and global commitment would have missed highly valuable opportunities at the national level to actually make a difference on the ground.

#### 6.2.2 The Capacity to Effect Positive Change at the National Level

One of the significant achievements of the GRSF has been its ability to effect positive change at the national level. We have reported how in particular the country capacity reviews have made a difference in the nations that have participated to date.

However, road safety cannot be considered in isolation from the overall capacity of a government to adapt to new ways to thinking about governance. We are of the view that the alternative – a return to a purely civil engineering paradigm (i.e., to “fix” what have come to be known as “black spots”) – would not reflect the growing body of world opinion that road safety requires a more holistic approach. To that end, it becomes implicit that the GRSF in its choice of national interventions over the coming years may wish to analyze not only transport-related phenomena, but also the capacity of national public services to integrate horizontal measures. This implies that the GRSF may require an increase in staff and budget to build more long range capacity, as well as increased contact with other elements of the World Bank Group that are responsible for overall public sector modernization.

#### 6.2.3 The Capacity to Lever Investment

Another strength of the GRSF has been its ability to lever investment, largely in relation to the extent to which county capacity subsequently results in World Bank lending that has distinct road safety elements. GRSF support to some of its partners like the WHO and Global Road Safety Forum have resulted in varying degrees of actual cash investment, with the large contribution to the WHO by the Bloomberg Foundation being identified as a GRSF success story.

However, success in longer term leverage will depend to a great degree on the ability of the World Bank and other development banks to ensure that road transport lending gives an overall higher priority to road safety, and that any such lending is based on an analytical process that integrates to the highest degree possible the principles that underpin the GRSF's Second Generation model.

#### 6.2.4 The Capacity to Improve Knowledge Transfer

Another of the major achievements of the GRSF has been the degree to which its work has promoted knowledge transfer. It has done so through a model of intermediation where the GRSF has worked with recognized partners (e.g., the WHO, the GRSP, Harvard University) to develop material or to conduct and disseminate research. This has been a highly cost effective mechanism that has not required the GRSF to establish its own research or technical support arms. As well, the more recent forays of the GRSF to support IRAPs in several nations have had the effect of both translating knowledge and building local capacity.

### 6.3 Challenges

The above strengths are to some degree counterbalanced by three challenges that face the GRSF and which may have long term implications for its sustainability.

#### 6.3.1 The Limited Resources Available to the GRSF in Comparison to the Scope of Its Mandate

The first challenge is that the level of resources available to the GRSF was, and continues to be, inadequate to meet to the scope of its mandate. This limitation has weakened the ability of the GRSF to develop a management infrastructure commensurate with a maturing global multi-donor and semi-autonomous body. At present the staffing level of the GRSF is insufficient to support the mission, goals, and objectives of the Facility.

This leads to the second dimension of resource limitations. While the GRSF is already resource challenged, it is facing ever growing demand for its services. In reviewing the anticipated spending plans of the GRSF for the next two years we are concerned that these plans may face a degree of risk of over-commitment if the GRSF's internal resource base is not augmented.

Turning to the overall adequacy of what has been the discretionary spending base of the GRSF, the GRSF has been able keep up with requests in its initial phase. However, its planned expenditures of some \$12 million per year in the medium term may not be enough to meet growing demands.

The GRSF may need to re-evaluate its spending patterns to better balance anticipated national demands (which can be levered towards supportive World Bank lending) with the level of support provided by some of its long-standing partners and service providers. Although the GRSF has been a major funder of some of these bodies, it is not realistic to assume that it will be able to continue as such for the foreseeable future. This may also lead the GRSF to review how it works with such partners and to develop a new approach to resource mobilization.

### 6.3.2 The Adequacy of WB GRSF Planning and Administrative Systems

A number of specific findings noted gaps in the management and planning infrastructure of the GRSF. On balance, while we understand the decision to roll out programming, greater attention to building systems for planning, reporting, and performance measurement would have given the GRSF more tools to better confront the funding challenge that it may face with ever increasing demands.

The GRSF is emerging from its inception phase where there was a natural tendency to push toward the testing and acceptance of the basic model. It has done so admirably. Now, however, the GRSF faces long-term challenges in moving into its next phase, in essence, exploiting its initial success. To do so, it will require a much more robust administrative, planning and reporting architecture – which will require additional resources.

In considering the GRSF's current governance model in a more holistic way, we believe that the likely increased demand for GRSF services points to the need for GRSF to reconsider its governance model, especially as it relates to the ability to coordinate. The CAG, which was somewhat slow in its establishment, probably offers the greatest opportunity to meet this need, if it is crafted less as a purely technical advisory group about road safety issues in a narrow sense, and as more of a coordinative body. The possibility to establish subgroups of the CAG (i.e., the anticipated Thematic Advisory Groups) might enable the GRSF to institutionalize its coordinative functions with other development banks and to play a role in the better coordination of the gamut of multilateral activities, while at the same time respecting the roles conferred upon the WHO and the UN Road Safety Collaboration.

### 6.3.3 The Seeming Lack of Enthusiasm for Road Safety as an Investment Priority

The first three years of the GRSF have been an inception phase and a testing of the model. This was only possible with the steadfast support of the founding members, now including Australia. However, testing is now at an end and the GRSF must engage in developing strategies that more actively and aggressively seek out donor support. While philanthropic support and potentially corporate support should be welcomed, we are also of the view that to reach 2015, the GRSF as an entity within the ambit of the World Bank will have to construct a broader base of support within the framework of increased national membership.

## 7. Recommendations

### 7.1 Introduction

In this section we provide both overarching and specific recommendations to strengthen the capacity of the GRSF as it moves from its inception phase to a period of consolidation, integration of lessons learned, and exploitation of anticipated opportunities.

The first three recommendations, which speak to the broad challenges that the GRSF faces, respond to the two overarching issues identified in Section 3 of this evaluation. They address the long-term sustainability of the GRSF and its role among IFIs and other key partners. While these recommendations may go beyond the formal limits of our mandate, the rectification of the issues that underlie these recommendations may determine the overall future of the GRSF.

The eight specific recommendations that follow correspond to the key evaluation questions set out in the TORs, with an additional recommendation with respect to performance measurement.

We have chosen to craft fairly broad enabling recommendations as it would be difficult to craft precise advice in the absence of an understanding of the scale of resources that may be available to the GRSF over the next two years.

### 7.2 Overarching Recommendations

**Recommendation 1: We recommend that the current donors and members of the WB GRSF recommit themselves to future support for a period of not less than three years and at levels equal to or greater than those provided between 2006 and 2009. (Corresponds to Findings 2, 7, 8, 9)**

The future of the GRSF lies in the hands of its current membership and especially the combination of Development Grant Funding (DGF) and support from the FIA Foundation (the largest single global supporter of road safety).

The GRSF has set out a tentative expenditure plan of about \$12 million per year over two years to begin this next phase of its work, with planned increases to approximately \$20 million. Without at least the current level of participation by founding members, these targets will be unattainable and it is unlikely that the GRSF would be able to achieve the goals and objectives set out in its Strategic Plan.

**Recommendation 2: We recommend that the World Bank, inspired by the commitment made in its Transport Sector Business Strategy “Safe, Clean and Affordable” undertake a special campaign at the highest executive and state to state levels to increase the level of membership in the GRSF. (Corresponds to Findings 7, 9)**

This recommendation speaks to the responsibility of the World Bank Group and by implication, the responsibilities conferred on the World Bank Group by the UN General Assembly in 2008. While it is obvious that the DGF support in the range of \$ 5 million was effectively a precondition for the establishment of the GRSF, it may now be time to go beyond and to more actively seek out membership for the GRSF.

We have reviewed documents and discussed with GRSF personnel, their outreach and recruitment efforts. We are also aware of the prior efforts of senior World Bank management and the recent meeting between the President of the World Bank and the chair of the Commission on Global Road Safety. However, the present situation requires a strategic re-

doubling of World Bank Group efforts at the highest level and will require the active and sustained participation of WB senior management and technical specialists. The World Bank and the GRSF will have to consider the appropriate level of technical and managerial resources for the GRSF in order to secure sufficient capacity to actively prosecute an extended high-level orientation and recruitment campaign.

As increased support for road safety as a global development priority has yet to reach a sufficient critical mass, especially among G7 member states, it would be difficult for the GRSF to sustain another funding cycle without substantial augmentation in its membership..

**Recommendation 3: We recommend that the GRSF convene at an early opportunity an informal briefing and liaison session to coordinate the activities of all key partners in relation to fund raising and resource mobilization in general. (Corresponds to Findings 2, 7, 9)**

This recommendation speaks to what we perceive to have been a conceptual gap in the way that the GRSF has liaised with its partners. As the GRSF moves into a new phase, in our estimation, it is incumbent, given its “funding platform role”, that it actively coordinate with its key partners (including other development banks), key service providers and UN system agencies – and to be explicit, key partners and service providers such as the WHO, the Global Road Safety Partnership and the Global Road Safety Forum that have been highly dependent in the past on the GRSF for their programmatic continuation. In the spirit of the series of UN resolutions, and in anticipation of the World Bank undertaking an aggressive outreach campaign, it would therefore seem valuable to begin to establish a more coordinated approach among the long-standing partners of the GRSF.

The inclusion of other development banks in this effort might enable them to find opportunities to begin to provide more direct immediate support and to contemplate how to integrate road safety considerations more directly into their long-term transport sector lending activities.

We recognize that some of the GRSF’s long time partners may now feel less reliant on it given their accessing other philanthropic sources. That however, does not obviate the spirit of the UN resolutions. In short, this recommendation is designed to combat the risk of a “competitive environment” with respect to the solicitation of increased investment.

This recommendation in no way overlaps the mandate of the UN Road Safety Collaboration. Rather, in our estimation, and given the acknowledged role of the World Bank, it is an inaugural step in this second phase of the life of the GRSF.

### 7.3 Specific Recommendations

#### 7.3.1 With Respect to the GRSF’s Mandate, Goals, Objectives

**Recommendation 4: We recommend that the GRSF undertake a medium term mandate review to align the GRSF to changing trends in the level of demand and to the likely level of available resources. (Corresponds to Findings 1, 13, 18)**

While the QAG report of 2007 commended the GRSF on its strategic plan for 2006 until 2015, the plan may have been based on somewhat optimistic projections as to the availability of global resources and the extent to which the GRSF could begin to evolve toward a platform somewhat analogous to Cities Alliance, the Water and Sanitation Program, and the Public-Private Infrastructure Advisory Facility. In our estimation, the strategic plan may need to be refreshed

and targeted for the next two to three years. We also have noted that the Strategic Plan contemplates a mid-term review.

The expenditure plan that the FIU has promulgated for the next two years suggests a program focus on national level activities that require a more explicit statement of intent. We noted that such a course of action is likely to be both cost-effective and capable of leveraging increased investment in road safety through the loan portfolios of the World Bank and other development banks.

The implication of this recommendation is that the planning architecture of the GRSF has a gap in relation to the medium term horizon. Our recommendation, therefore, is not so much to review the plan as a whole but to forecast a medium strategy that reflects the lessons of the initial development phase and the likely prospects for augmentation and exploitation. In making this recommendation, we are acutely aware that the FIU, as it is presently constituted, has insufficient human resources to develop a more sensitive planning framework.

### 7.3.2 With Respect to The GRSF's Anticipated Work Program

**Recommendation 5: We recommend that GRSF target areas of work where the possibility of increased investment leverage is highest. (Corresponds to Findings 4, 13)**

This recommendation in many ways echoes the one immediately above, but targets the work program that the FIU has proposed. We recommend that the FIU more tightly focus the work of the GRSF in areas activities where there is a direct nexus between technical assistance and the strong possibility of levered investment, in large part, loan investment by the World Bank or other development banks. In this regard, we consider that the country capacity reviews (and attendant technical assistance programming) combined with IRAPs probably constitute the most effective means of translating GRSF resources into real investment.

Turning to what has been a major share of GRSF support, namely: advocacy, knowledge transfer, and the core support of the work of others, we have come to the conclusion that unless additional resources become available, such activities may result in competing demands, against what appears to be an increased national level acceptance of road safety in lower and middle income nations. The implication of this advice is that, in some respects, the work with the key partners who benefited from in excess of 1/3 of overall GRSF resources, may have reflected the "early going" where there was a need to build awareness and acceptance. The volume of the national demand now confronting the GRSF shows that the awareness has been built to a great degree and therefore challenges the capacity of the GRSF to respond to these actual demands.

The GRSF program direction may be somewhat different in Africa where there has been somewhat slower uptake of GRSF services to date. In view of the global priority for development in Africa, and the establishment of an African multi-donor trust fund, the GRSF may wish to engage more directly in African sensitization and advocacy measures. To that end, it is likely that an African-related work program would be more oriented to what we have referred to as "early stage" activities. In mid 2009 the GRSF has planned a number of events in conjunction with others, including a major event in Tanzania, which may serve as catalysts for future action.

In addition, the proposed work plan for the next several years may need to be reconsidered, particularly in terms of the notion of equality of service delivery across World Bank regions (e.g., two country assessments per region) as this could detract from the centrality of African and lower income nation's development as a global priority.

### 7.3.3 With Respect to its Knowledge Transfer Strategies

**Recommendation 6: We recommended that the GRSF more tightly target its capacity building and knowledge transfer activities towards the needs of lower and middle income nations, especially in Africa, Latin America and the Caribbean, and Asia. (Corresponds to Findings 4, 13, 14)**

While there is no doubt that the knowledge materials and knowledge transfer mechanisms that the GRSF has supported for the last three years have had a major impact, in this next phase, there may be a need to target more precisely the challenges that face lower income nations. This is not to say that good practice manuals and guides are not applicable in lower income nations, but rather to emphasize that knowledge transfer and primary capacity building are preconditions for more substantive national level initiatives that can lead to direct investment in road safety lending.

### 7.3.4 With Respect to Its Selection Criteria

**Recommendation 7: We recommend that the GRSF immediately develop and distribute formalized selection criteria in the form of a manual or application forms, including a review capacity for its resource decision-making. (Corresponds to Finding 12)**

Although the GRSF ensures that project selection is congruent with its Strategic Plan, the absence of formal selection criteria constitutes a growing risk to the GRSF in the face of increased demands. Above, we have recommended a medium term review and a partial redirection of efforts. In our view, these must be accompanied by transparent and accessible selection criteria that will enable the global community and interested nations to see how the GRSF chooses among various competing priorities. Such a process also would enable the GRSF to build into all applications enhanced performance planning and measurement criteria.

In our discussion of national capacity, we highlighted some of the concerns that World Bank Group staff raised about national public sector capacity to absorb horizontal initiatives and the interface between that capacity and the Second Generation model. Explicit selection criteria, and criteria that would assess national level capacity for public sector horizontal renewal as a precondition, would considerably augment the GRSF. This, of course, implies a somewhat different approach to project identification and decision-making, and implies a horizontal approach within the World Bank Group itself. It also implies additional managerial, planning and technical resources.

We have recommended a review of capacity with respect to selection criteria. Although the FIU has decision-making power with respect to funding decisions, and both the Board and the CAG have advisory capacities, we are of the view that if the CAG were to be enlarged (as we suggest below) there would be considerable benefit in having a selection advisory panel to assist the FIU and to create a stronger bond between the GRSF and lower and middle income nations. Such a panel could easily provide collective advice through a virtual environment and need not physically convene. Any additional minor delays would be considerably offset by the benefits of sensitive advice and direction from a panel largely representing lower and middle income nations' interests. Again, such a review capacity would require additional managerial and planning resources over the coming years.



### 7.3.5 With Respect to Its Overall Resource Mobilization and Fund Raising Strategies

**Recommendation 8: We recommend that the GRSF develop a resource mobilization strategy that focuses on increasing traditional bilateral donor support for national initiatives and increasing philanthropic support for cross national/regional global activities. (Corresponds to Findings 7, 8, 9)**

This recommendation suggests that the GRSF take a two-pronged approach in reaching out to increase its base.

First, we recommend that the GRSF increase its outreach to philanthropies by directing them toward global or regional challenges with highly tangible deliverables where the philanthropy can have a closer interface with the results of its donation. Developing new knowledge tools, promoting knowledge transfer, and galvanizing opinion would seem to be areas where this nexus might be clearest.

Second, following high-level intervention by the World Bank Group, the GRSF could target its efforts with bilateral development cooperation agencies in ways which are more akin to these agencies' own operating modalities, namely, national or possibly regional level priorities. One G7 stakeholder, not currently a member of the GRSF, candidly remarked that the denominator in his/her nation was the country level program. Such an approach to outreach with traditional donors has two benefits. First, it may increase unrestricted contributions to either of the multi-donor trust funds. Second, it may result in follow-on national programming that is sponsored directly on a bilateral level. For example, a country capacity review and an IRAP could be augmented by a bilateral intervention to support a specific capacity gap in the recipient nation.

### 7.3.6 With Respect to the WB GRSF's Governance Model

**Recommendation 9: We recommend that the GRSF broaden its Core Advisory Group to include representatives of major partners, other development banks, and other interested parties in order to use the CAG in the future as the GRSF's principle sounding board and a vehicle for cross-coordination. (Corresponds to Finding 11)**

While the governance model of the GRSF has been rolled out adequately and according to plans, the membership-driven Board does not provide an active voice for lower and middle income nations (i.e., the "voice of the poor") and the CAG is only beginning to reach out these nations who are their prime audience. The GRSF's long term effectiveness and relevance will depend largely on its responsiveness to the needs of these nations.

The governance model envisages a CAG that could be multi-disciplinary. We strongly urge the GRSF to rapidly build a multi-dimensional CAG structure that goes beyond technical specialization and that allows for direct input of regional and national voices from lower and middle income nations. For example, we noted the presence of a regional road safety specialist in PAHO, which is only one example of the sort of expansion we would contemplate.

The CAG structure could also be used to institutionalize liaison among development banks. While the primary meeting held in late June in London marked the beginning of this liaison, in our view, it needs to be institutionalized. In many respects, the above suggestions might be accomplished by forming a long-term Thematic Advisory Group (TAG).

Earlier, we recommended that the GRSF convene a primary partners' meeting in order to lay out the course for the next several years. We would suggest that the CAG/TAG structure is suitably broad to provide for similar kinds of on-going coordination among the GRSF's major organizational partners and major service delivery partners.

We recognize the resource implications of these proposals. However, the long term effectiveness and especially the relevance of the GRSF is a balance between its actual program delivery and the perceptions of its utility and responsiveness among low and middle income nations.

### 7.3.7 With Respect to Performance Management

**Recommendation 10: We recommend that the GRSF gradually moves towards a results-based approach to contracting and reporting. (Corresponds to Findings 19, 20)**

At this stage of its cycle, the GRSF should adapt a results-based management approach and develop standardized reporting formats that will emphasize, to the greatest extent possible, the attainment of first level outcomes.

The GRSF has begun to gather more results-based data, for example in relation to the follow up undertaken in relation to country capacity assessments. In our view, the GRSF must go beyond and move to develop a performance management model wherein clear selection criteria contain the requirement for the articulation of a results framework and accompanying indicators of performance which will then become mandatory reporting requirements. There is sufficient expertise within the World Bank Group, for example through the Independent Evaluation Group (IEG) to assist the GRSF in incorporating result-based criteria that can capture first level outcome data .

What we are proposing is a more contemporary approach to monitoring that enables GRSF management to better assess the short to medium term consequences of program decisions. It does not imply the need to build in longer term impact assessment capacity, which is an evaluation role rather than a monitoring role. However, sometime over the next three years, the GRSF might consider a global evaluation of a particular aspect of its programming portfolio (e.g., IRAP or country capacity reviews) to more deeply explore results, efficiencies, and alternate ways of delivery.

We recognize, again, the resource implications of strengthening performance management. It will require in the first instance recasting contractual documents and developing mutually acceptable performance standards that move at least toward identifying first level outcome performance. And, more importantly, it will require the personnel to manage a new results-based performance model.

### 7.3.8 With Respect to the GRSF's Administrative and Managerial Systems

**Recommendation 11: We recommend that GRSF allocate more resources to strengthening its internal systems and capacities for planning, monitoring and evaluation, data systems harmonization, and communications. (Corresponds to Findings 16, 19, 20)**

Throughout the evaluation findings we have noted many ways in which lack of human and financial resources has affected the performance of the GRSF. Overhead expenditures, which are approximately 6% of its budget, are well below the level allocated by analogous bodies like PPIAF or Cities Alliance. We noted the staff shortages, the absence of some management

systems, and we noted the impact that these shortages may have had on overall programmatic fulfillment.

In our view, the FIU must be considerably augmented if it is to be able to attain the GRSF's goals over the medium term, and especially given the increased level of demand placed on it. We recommend that the FIU expand its professional and administrative staff well above current levels, even if the GRSF does not increase its expenditure levels. Based on our observations and lessons from other platforms, the GRSF requires a full time manager, a separate full time senior road safety specialist, a planning and research officer, a contract management and performance measurement officer, as well as staff for communications, knowledge transfer and management systems. We also recommend that the contract officer working with IRAP and the officer on loan from SIDA to focus on African issues be retained for the foreseeable future.

We have learned that some of these positions may have been filled in early 2009.

Some of these new resources could be directed towards greater outreach within the World Bank itself. For example, additional planning or performance management capacity could be used to work with TTLs and others in the World Bank and other development banks to increase their awareness of the Second Generation model – a form of internal capacity building. Others could be used to more actively liaise with personnel involved in overall public sector renewal and public health programming so as to better situate GRSF activities within broader World Bank strategies.

The suggested increase in the professional staff of the FIU implies that it will also require an increase in administrative staff, preferably several full-time administrative personnel who are not cross-posted with the Transport Sector.

The above augmentation would result in an FIU with about five or six professional staff and a commensurate level of support personnel. These resources would not duplicate the capacity of partner organizations, but rather fill the noted gaps in the FIU for planning, performance management, communications and knowledge transfer, and coordination and management.

Should the GRSF receive the level of support to realize annual expenditures in the range of \$10-12 million or more, additional professional and support personnel would be required to meet what would be in effect a doubling of the current work program.

## 8. Conclusion

We entered into this evaluation process in early June 2008, cognizant that the GRSF was a rapidly evolving entity operating in an equally rapidly changing global environment.

The fact that a first global Ministers' conference is scheduled to be held in Moscow in the latter months of 2009 underscores the fact that road safety as a global priority appears to be on the brink of moving from commitment in the form of resolutions to realized action on the part of both the global community and state parties. This conference, albeit not a formally sanctioned international meeting, will have the de facto effect of being one. It is therefore essential that the GRSF, one of two globally sanctioned coordinative bodies and platforms (along with the WHO), be in a position to forcefully galvanize global support for road safety in general, and specifically in lower and middle income nations. This conference will allow the global community to move from talking about the issue of road safety to the formulation of effective and coordinated strategies to do something about it.

“Towards Zero” is not only the title of the OECD's recent report. It exemplifies what should be a global objective in public health and human development that is as compelling as those for public health that are set down in the Millennium Development Goals. Estimates conclusively show that challenges such as malaria and TB will soon recede in severity, while the carnage in terms of human life and economic fallout of traffic injuries and fatalities will increase in global severity. Can the road safety epidemic be halted? The answer to this question is a firm “yes” but with the proviso that doing so will involve a re-dedication on a scale proportionate to the efforts that have been directed toward a number of communicable and vector-borne challenges.

The evaluation findings have demonstrated that the GRSF has successfully accomplished its initial goals in its inception and developmental phase. There are some limitations to the degree of success achieved by the GRSF, limitations which, in our view, are largely due to the level of resources at its disposal.

The WB GRSF is in a unique position of being probably the most diverse and effective agent to translate commitment to road safety into action for lower and middle income nations. It therefore, must be in a position to do so.

In summation, we urge the World Bank, the traditional bilateral donor community, and the community of concerned philanthropies led by the FIA Foundation and the Bloomberg Foundation, to re-double their efforts so as to ensure that this vital platform has the resources at its disposal to be able to exploit a growing global commitment to combat the crisis of road safety.

## Appendix I List of Findings

- Finding 1: There is some ambiguity in the GRSF results hierarchy and there appears to be overlap between some of its objectives and goals.
- Finding 2: Given the resources available to the GRSF, and recognizing its early stage of development, there is evidence that GRSF programming has made a discernable contribution to the overall attainment of its five goals.
- Finding 3: The GRSF goal to “Catalyze increased levels of road safety investment in low and middle income countries” has been the most difficult to quantify in terms of demonstrating actual investment.
- Finding 4: GRSF programming at the national level has been able to translate GRSF support into more tangible positive changes and “take up”.
- Finding 5: The GRSF has made credible efforts, given its resource base, to alter the political consensus related to the centrality of road safety as a crucial issue for low and middle income nations, albeit without catalyzing increased investment.
- Finding 6: GRSF initiatives have made visible contributions to forging new partnerships, especially with non-traditional global partners.
- Finding 7: Most members of the traditional donor community have yet to translate commitment into increased levels of funding for either the GRSF or other road safety initiatives.
- Finding 8: The level of resources available to the GRSF as a whole has not been sufficient to respond fully to the demands placed upon the Facility.
- Finding 9: The GRSF faces a resource shortfall which may affect its overall sustainability and future relevance due to the level of prior commitment of its resources combined with the limited increase in donor support.
- Finding 10: The current governance model of the GRSF reflects the anticipated structures and roles and responsibilities as set down in the inaugural Strategic Plan.
- Finding 11: The Core Advisory Group (CAG) was slow in being established and has yet to actively reach out to stakeholders in lower and middle income nations or to a wider network of potential institutional partners.
- Finding 12: While Facility selection of projects for support (DGF and/or Trust Fund) appears to be in accord with the goals, objectives, and eligibility criteria as set out in the Strategic Plan, the FIU has yet to promulgate and publish formal selection documentation that is characteristic of a more mature global funding program.
- Finding 13: The current programming mix of the GRSF places priority on the delivery of technical assistance and catalyzing support/increased commitment; it does not sufficiently emphasize developing systematic and regularized long-term mechanisms to ascertain needs and strategic relevance.

- Finding 14: Notwithstanding the above, the GRSF's country capacity assessment mechanism represents an excellent and cost-effective mechanism to assess country capacity and needs, which enhances its relevance.
- Finding 15: The GRSF has taken strong initial steps to capitalize on the March 2008 UN General Assembly resolution that reinforced its role among international financial institutions.
- Finding 16: While the goals and objectives of the GRSF clearly are aligned with UN resolutions, there remains some ambiguity about specific roles and responsibility among some partners.
- Finding 17: The products and services of the GRSF are uniformly welcomed by potential recipients as adding considerable value, raising knowledge, and building consensus, and are also seen as unique in not duplicating the work of others.
- Finding 18: The GRSF's primary "Second Generation" model is recognized by its institutional partners such as the WHO, other development banks and the Global Road Safety Partnership as transformational and vital to the global campaign to combat the road safety epidemic.
- Finding 19: The GRSF's present approach to performance measurement complies with DGF and other WB procedures related to fiduciary and programmatic reporting of activities. Yet, the approach is not sufficiently results-based.

## Appendix II List of Recommendations

- Recommendation 1: We recommend that the current donors and members of the WB GRSF recommit themselves to future support for a period of not less than three years and at levels equal to or greater than those provided between 2006 and 2009. (Corresponds to Findings 2, 7, 8, 9)
- Recommendation 2: We recommend that the World Bank, inspired by the commitment made in its Transport Sector Business Strategy “Safe, Clean and Affordable” undertake a special campaign at the highest executive and state to state levels to increase the level of membership in the GRSF. (Corresponds to Findings 7, 9)
- Recommendation 3: We recommend that the GRSF convene at an early opportunity an informal briefing and liaison session to coordinate the activities of all key partners in relation to fund raising and resource mobilization in general. (Corresponds to Findings 2, 7, 9)
- Recommendation 4: We recommend that the GRSF undertake a medium term mandate review to align the GRSF to changing trends in the level of demand and to the likely level of available resources. (Corresponds to Findings 1, 13, 18)
- Recommendation 5: We recommend that GRSF target areas of work where the possibility of increased investment leverage is highest. (Corresponds to Findings 4, 13)
- Recommendation 6: We recommended that the GRSF more tightly target its capacity building and knowledge transfer activities towards the needs of lower and middle income nations, especially in Africa, Latin America and the Caribbean, and Asia. (Corresponds to Findings 4, 13, 14)
- Recommendation 7: We recommend that the GRSF immediately develop and distribute formalized selection criteria in the form of a manual or application forms, including a review capacity for its resource decision-making. (Corresponds to Finding 12)
- Recommendation 8: We recommend that the GRSF develop a resource mobilization strategy that focuses on increasing traditional bilateral donor support for national initiatives and increasing philanthropic support for cross national/regional global activities. (Corresponds to Findings 7, 8, 9)
- Recommendation 9: We recommend that the GRSF broaden its Core Advisory Group to include representatives of major partners, other development banks, and other interested parties in order to use the CAG in the future as the GRSF’s principle sounding board and a vehicle for cross-coordination. (Corresponds to Finding 11)
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