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| Institutional Partnerships Program |
| Evaluation Phase 1  The Report: Part A |

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| **Date** |  | **Document** |  | **Authors** |
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About the QTAG

The QTAG provides strategic, advisory, review, and quality assurance capability and services to support the delivery of Australia’s aid program in Papua New Guinea. It is designed to assure both governments that the agreed development objectives are being addressed efficiently and effectively and that development outcomes are emerging.

The goal of the QTAG is to improve the quality and performance of the Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade (DFAT) and GoPNG programs that support stability and inclusive growth in Papua New Guinea.

The objective of the QTAG is to enable DFAT and the GoPNG to make more informed decisions and exercise greater accountability for the performance and quality of agreed strategies and selected projects.

The QTAG is implemented by Oxford Policy Management (OPM) Australia.

Executive summary

Introduction

The Australian Government Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade (DFAT) funded Institutional Partnerships Program (IPP) commenced on 1 July 2017. The total budget envelope for IPP is AUD$63 million, from 2017 to 2020.

In July 2018 the DFAT Australian High Commission (AHC) Program Strategy and Gender Team commissioned the Papua New Guinea Quality and Technical Assurance Group (QTAG) to implement the first of a series of evaluations for IPP.

This is Report Part A, the overall report[[1]](#footnote-2) for the evaluation, which draws on case studies (provided in Report Part B) of three sample partnerships between:

* the Australian National Audit Office (ANAO) and the Auditor-General’s Office of Papua New Guinea (AGO);
* the Attorney-General’s Department of Australia (AGD) and the Papua New Guinea Office of the Public Prosecutor (OPP); and
* the Australian Taxation Office (ATO) and the Internal Revenue Commission (IRC) of Papua New Guinea.

Purpose and use

The **purpose** of the evaluation is to demonstrate progress toward intermediate and end of program outcomes for individual partnerships and the overall partnership; and answer the reflective questions ‘*Did we get it right? Was our thinking about the way in which change would occur accurate? Were our assumptions sound*?’

The evaluation will be used to inform continuous improvement for each individual institutional relationship; inform continuous improvement for the overarching program; and influence the application of a performance linked funding policy.

Process

Prepared in the period December 2018 to April 2019, the case studies and the overall evaluation report have drawn evidence from interviews conducted by the evaluation team with important stakeholders, 52 women and 71 men, in 64 interviews, which took place in January, February and March 2019 in Australia and Papua New Guinea. The evaluation team also reviewed 140 relevant documents. The evaluation focused on what is working well.

Findings and recommendations (refer Sections 4 & 6 of this report for full detail)

**Finding 1: While some teething issues remain, early evidence indicates that implementation of IPP is on the right trajectory:** Building on predecessor programs, the new form of IPP is settling and new management arrangements are stabilising. There are many actors and relationships encompassed within IPP, all of which have knowledge and experience to share. Effective communication and considered engagement must be designed and supported by DFAT IPP managers, in collaboration with partners, to achieve effective coordination, knowledge sharing and collaboration.

**Recommendation 1:** The DFAT IPP management team should urgently develop a communication protocol and engagement plan, in collaboration with the Australian agencies and the IPP DSS team, so that all parties know who is communicating with whom, for what reason, and when. This would also assist information arriving to intended recipients in an appropriate sequence.

***Recommendation 2:*** *IPP coordination activities in both Canberra and Port Moresby should be designed, in part, to enable better collaboration and knowledge-sharing between agencies.*

**Finding 2: There is strong buy-in to the individual partnerships but the value, or concept, of the broader whole-of-government ‘partnership’ is only partially articulated at this point of implementation:** The concept of the broader whole of government partnership is more strongly held by Australian agencies while Papua New Guinea agency senior officials are by necessity more focussed on their own core business.

**Recommendation 3:** It would be useful for DFAT to develop a succinct communication product, including an appropriate diagram, that explains the concept of the broader partnership between the governments of Australian and Papua New Guinea and how the individual institutional partnerships theoretically contribute. This could be updated regularly to include a list of the current active partnerships. This communication product could be distributed and explained, to high level officials in all participating institutions so that they are better able to understand the bigger picture of which they are an important part.

Ensuring partner participation in the development and operationalisation of the IPP monitoring and evaluation framework, as well as encouraging mutual accountability in analysis of data collected to inform the framework and co-development of findings and recommendations, at an annual partner learning forum could go some way to deepening collective understanding of the broader partnership.

**Finding 3: There is concern about the lack of clarity about high-level IPP governance arrangements:** While IPP governance arrangements were specified in the design, implementation in practice had not been achieved at the time of the evaluation. This was a concern to some sampled Australian agencies.

**Recommendation 4:** Details about the IPP in-Papua New Guinea governance arrangements, or a plan to progress their consolidation, should be communicated to senior officials in Australian partner agencies as soon as possible.

**Recommendation 5:** An arrangement should be put in place for senior-level Australian partner agency officials to regularly (suggest annually) engage with DFAT senior officials about the concept of the whole-of-government partnership with the Government of Papua New Guinea generally and specifically for IPP. This would be an information-sharing and strategy-setting dialogue, rather than a governance mechanism, with an emphasis on the mutual benefits that will underpin the program.

**Finding 4:** **The authorising environment in each Papua New Guinea agency is critical for an effective partnership:** Only one of the three Papua New Guinean institutions sampled had a permanently appointed agency head in place. This had been the case for some time. The presence of a permanently appointed agency head for Papua New Guinea agencies is important for introduction of new individual partnership governance and design documentation, such as Memoranda of Understanding or Joint Expressions of Interest, capacity diagnostics and Agency Support Arrangements.

**Finding 5: The strategic alignment of individual partnerships needs to be joined up with Australia’s other same sector investments and opportunities for collaboration need to be explored:** **IPP will be most effective if IPP support is situated within the broader sectoral and strategic engagement between the two governments.**

**Recommendation 7:** IPP needs to be situated within broader sector programs and strategies, and opportunities for collaboration between different implementing actors need to be explored. This should include an explicit focus by AHC teams on the contribution that IPP can make to their broader sector programs.

**Finding 6: There have been some good outcomes achieved across the three case studies but institutional capability development is a complex process and takes time: Considered through an organisational development framework, where drivers of change are identified, it is clear that each of the sampled partnerships is contributing to achieving appropriate and real outcomes for different aspects of organisational development, in relation to where activities are conducted within the Papua New Guinea agencies and the level of investment available to support activities. Only one of the partnerships is contributing to development across the entirety of the Papua New Guinea agency partner and this opportunity has diminished with budget reductions.**

**Recommendation 6:** IPP implementation needs to be responsive to specific and emerging issues around each partnership’s authorising environment and will likely require flexibility on the part of DFAT, as the overall ‘program owner’, including in terms of budgets, results and the timing and achievement of milestones. This could include several actions:

* Implement regular communication, as scheduled in agreed communication protocols, between DFAT IPP managers and sector leads, and the Australian agencies, with agencies requested to escalate advice to DFAT, and vice versa, about any emerging issues in their authorising environment, and consequent possible implications for the achievement of agreed outcomes.
* DFAT IPP management to review program guidance materials to provide pathways for adjusting agreed workflows in the case of increased risk in operational circumstances.

**Finding 7: There are some common factors that are working well across the three partnerships:** These include recruiting the right people for long and short, term deployments, careful design and management of secondments to Australia, including the right mix of activities in workplans that relate to the agencies own strategy and paying careful attention to relationship management.

**Recommendation 8:** Discussion about common success factors should be a regular focus of collaboration between all IPP partners. This discussion should be facilitated by DFAT in Canberra at the interdepartmental meetings and in Port Moresby at team leader’s meetings.

**Finding 8:** **Gender equality and social inclusion (GESI) is not yet formally enabled by IPP but is core business in some Papua New Guinea partner agencies:** There are good examples of gender equality practices and outcomes in the three partnerships examined and it is noteworthy that the Australian agencies involved are not the prime mover for these approaches; rather, they are led by the Papua New Guinea institutions.

**Recommendation 9:** Early lessons of successful initiatives to support gender equality, disability and social inclusion should be identified and shared across all IPP partners so that GESI can gain increased and early traction. These examples should be also used to inform the development of the GESI strategy and associated practice-based toolkit as soon as possible.

**Finding 9:** **The IPP Deployee Support Services (DSS) unit is valued. New opportunities for monitoring and evaluation and capacity development support are also valued by Australian agencies but need to be fit for purpose.** Note:The performance of the IPP DSS is not a subject for this evaluation but aspects could be considered in future reviews.

The evaluation questions

The specific evaluation questions are briefly answered here, throughout discussion in the report and in more detail in Annex 1. Note, the evaluation team recommends that evaluation questions be re-visited and simplified for the next phase of the evaluation

1. *To what extent has the partnership contributed to agreed outcomes, or yielded benefits, to Australian and Government of Papua New Guinea institutions, including improvements in the capability of Government of Papua New Guinea institutions?*
   * *What factors have supported or inhibited progress in capacity building?*
   * *To what extent are the capacity building approaches that are being applied being designed to enable sustainable change?*

* Each of the sampled partnerships has contributed, mostly to a considerable extent, to agreed outcomes through past programs, previous and current workplans. These outcomes clearly include improvements in the capability of sampled Government of Papua New Guinea institutions in delivering their legislated purposes.
* Factors that have supported progress in capacity building include recruiting the right people for long, and short, term deployments, careful design and management of secondments in Australia, and intelligent design of the right mix of activities in workplans.

1. *What is working well in each partnership?* 
   * *What are the factors that are contributing to effectiveness that could be potentially applied in other situations?*
   * *What could be done differently to improve the quality and effectiveness of the partnership?*

* Factors that contribute to effectiveness include a commitment to real time monitoring and evaluative thinking for continuous improvement, strong buy-in to the partnership by senior officials in both the Australian and Papua New Guinean agencies, a commitment to relationship management by Australian agencies at a senior and operational level and those mentioned above. Attention to these factors in the context of the operating environment in Papua New Guinea, will contribute to improved quality of partnerships

1. *To what degree have institutional relationships become stronger as a result of Australia’s investment?*
   * *What is the level of ownership and engagement of the Government of Australia and Government of Papua New Guinea agencies?*
     + *To what extent is there senior level buy-in, strategic engagement, and appropriate levels of resourcing?*
   * *To what extent does each government partner agency in each partnership value the opportunity of having Australian Government officers working closely with Papua New Guinean Government officers?*

* The level of ownership and engagement of the Australian and Papua New Guinean agencies was variable for each partnership. Factors affecting this included the personal and institutional interest of senior level officers in Australia and, at the time of interviews, the current appointment status of agency heads in Papua New Guinea institutions.
* All sampled institutions, at the individual participant and institutional level, largely expressed appreciation for the experience of Australian Government officers working closely with Papua New Guinea officers.

1. *To what degree is IPP supporting the development of institutional relationships in areas of shared economic and strategic significance for the governments of Australia and Papua New Guinea?*

* The three partnerships sampled are all highly important in areas of shared economic and strategic significance for both governments. The AGO and IRC are core agencies in public financial management architecture, underpinning economic governance and public sector accountability. The OPP is a vital justice institution with a strong influence in adherence to the rule of law, and thus national and international security.

1. *To what extent is each institutional relationship (and each agency support arrangement/work plan) explicit about gender equality programming? What gender equality outcomes have been achieved?*

* While at this stage IPP has not provided advisory or programming support for gender equality and social inclusion, there are example of good and great practice, and some outcomes. These are summarised in Finding 7, and have been, in some cases, led by the Papua New Guinea agency.

Conclusion

Based on the evidence gathered so far, the early implementation of IPP appears to be on the right trajectory. There is evidence of valuable achievements at the individual partnership level and there appears to be an early, emerging appreciation of the contribution that the partnerships can make to the overarching economic and strategic partnership between the two governments. The value of the government-to-government partnerships should be celebrated.

However, there is room for improvements in the way individual partnerships are implemented, as well as further clarity around the governance and communication pathways for the overall IPP.

None of the recommendations made have significant resources implications, rather they recommend different ways of working.

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# Introduction

In July 2018 the DFAT AHC Program Strategy and Gender team commissioned the Papua New Guinea Quality and Technical Assurance Group (QTAG), through Tasking Note IPP-updated 2.310718, to prepare for and implement the first of a series of evaluations for the DFAT-funded Institutional Partnerships Program (IPP), which had been identified in the approved design of the program.

In August 2018 the QTAG prepared a concept note describing the potential series of evaluations, for review by the AHC and IPP partner agencies. The AHC selected a sample of partnerships for the first evaluation. QTAG prepared an evaluation plan, which was socialised and refined through November and December 2018 with all stakeholders.

The task was to undertake an evaluation of three institutional partnerships in 2019, collecting evidence for outcomes achieved in these partnerships, and then describing the contribution of the partnerships to higher-level IPP outcomes. The evaluation was defined by a set of evaluation questions that were negotiated and agreed with DFAT.

It was not the task of this evaluation[[2]](#footnote-3) to provide an in-depth review of the quality of services provided by IPP DSS, including deployee logistics, monitoring and evaluation support or frameworks, or capacity development support and frameworks. These could be the subject of separate reviews further down the track.

This document is Part A of the overall report for the first evaluation, which effectively commenced in September 2018.

The report is comprised of three components:

* Part A: Evaluation Phase 1: The evaluation report;
* Part B: Case studies: The case studies prepared for each of the three partnerships identified for sampling; and
* Part C: the Evaluation Process Report.

# Institutional Partnerships Program

There is a long history of government-to-government linkages between Australia and Papua New Guinea[[3]](#footnote-4). Although some institutional relationships commenced more than 100 years ago, a broad program of development support for government-to-government institutional relationships through Australian official development assistance commenced with the Enhanced Cooperation Program (2004–2008), followed by the Strongim Gavman Program (SGP) (2009–2016).

IPP continues this support for long-term institutional relationships between Australian and Papua New Guinea government entities. IPP funds a broad range of capability development support (for both individuals and organisations) from Australian Government entities to Papua New Guinea partner agencies, including long- and short-term deployments of Australian Government officials, who provide peer-to-peer mentoring, coaching, and ‘learning on the job’ opportunities; formal training; study tours; and supported attendance at regional and international conferences by Papua New Guinea government officials. Australian and Papua New Guinea institutional relationships also facilitate joint and complementary strategic and technical operations.

IPP commenced on 1 July 2017 after the conclusion of SGP. The total budget envelope for IPP is AUD$63 million, from 2017 to 2020. Funding for the final two years of the program is AUD$21 million per year. However, both governments are committed to a program of this nature continuing beyond 2020, subject to budgetary opportunities.

The transition from SGP to IPP was undertaken rapidly to ensure minimum disruption to the institutional relationships supported under both programs. However, it was recognised that a range of conceptual and operational issues raised in the Mid-Term Review of SGP had not been resolved, and work continues on those matters. Furthermore, the 2017 Foreign Policy White Paper urging whole-of-government engagement with Papua New Guinea increased the impetus to strengthen the design and implementation framework for IPP.

# Evaluation purpose, intended use, questions, and approach

IPP is a unique program within the broader partnership between Australia and Papua New Guinea. In planning for this evaluation, it was observed that much of the evidence underpinning the program was untapped, and learning had not been captured in a systematic way.

It is important for DFAT and the future of the program that the approach applied for evaluating IPP will, over time, collate a body of evidence that distils lessons and potential pathways for improvement for individual partnerships, and for the program as a whole.

**Purpose:** The IPP design document sets out the purpose of the longitudinal evaluation process, which is summarised as:

* to collect evidence to demonstrate progress toward intermediate and end-of-program outcomes; and
* to progressively build evidence to answer the questions *‘Did we get it right? Was our thinking about the way in which change would occur accurate? Were our assumptions sound?’*

**Use:** The investment design indicates that the evaluations will be used to:

* inform and guide continuous improvement for each individual institutional relationship;
* inform and guide continuous improvement for the overarching IPP; and
* influence the application of a performance-linked funding policy.

Overall, understanding effectiveness and informing learning and improvement remain key purposes and uses of the evaluations as they are completed over time.

**Questions:** Evaluation questions were agreed with DFAT to frame the evaluation. They are answered in depth in Annex 1.

**Approach:** The evaluation has taken a case study approach, which is described in the Evaluation Implementation Plan of December 2018. This involved preparing a case study for a selected sample of three partnerships (see Report Part B). Also refer to Table 1. The overall evaluation has drawn on each of the three case studies, as well as additional evidence, to inform this overall evaluation report.

Table 1: 2018/19 IPP partnerships selected for evaluation

|  |  |
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| Government of Papua New Guinea institution | Government of Australia institution |
| Office of the Auditor-General (AGO) | Australian National Audit Office (ANAO) |
| Office of the Public Prosecutor (OPP) | Attorney General’s Department (AGD) |
| Internal Revenue Commission (IRC) | Australian Taxation Office (ATO) |

The case studies and the overall evaluation report have drawn on interviews conducted with important stakeholders, 52 women and 71 men, in 64 interviews, between 21 January and 1 February 2019 in Australia, 4 and 14 February 2019 in Papua New Guinea, and late February / March in Australia. The evaluation team also reviewed 140 relevant documents, mostly provided by the participating Australian agencies. Other observations were made in two IPP collaboration events, one in Canberra and one in Port Moresby. The evaluation process is documented in Evaluation Report Part C.

# Evaluation findings

This section documents the principal findings of this evaluation based on evidence collected for, and synthesised in, the set of case studies, and additional sources. It should be noted that this is the first synthesis report by QTAG under IPP and is based on only three case studies. As such, the findings will likely evolve and deepen over time as further case studies are undertaken.

Finding 1: While some teething issues remain, early evidence indicates that implementation of IPP is on the right trajectory.

The early implementation of IPP has been shaped to a significant degree by the experience of predecessor programs, particularly SGP and other partnerships that existed outside of SGP. The often, but not always, positive history and legacy from those programs provides the context for the opportunities that are now available through state-to-state relationships. Furthermore, the IPP design responded to the Government of Papua New Guinea’s concerns about sovereignty.

The transition from SGP to IPP was further influenced by budget cuts for the 2018/19 funding year, particularly as these came after detailed work planning had been negotiated between partner agencies. The cuts were also not well communicated to those impacted by them. This is acknowledged by Australian and Papua New Guinean agencies alike as having caused damage to relationship capital.

DFAT’s management of IPP in both Canberra and the AHC became more settled during the period of the evaluation itself. The appointment of a dedicated full-time program manager, located in Canberra, partnered with a new part-time program officer located in the Office of the High Commissioner in the AHC in Port Moresby, is already being appreciated by Australian agencies. They acknowledge the value of this new arrangement, particularly the resulting increased level of certainty around overseas conditions of service and better communication. Confidence is being re-built and relationship capital renewed between DFAT and the Australian agencies.

However, there are many actors and relationships under IPP: two national governments, 10 Australian agency partners, 19 Government of Papua New Guinea agency partners, and the IPP DSS of Abt Associates, the DFAT contracted manager of the Australia - Papua New Guinea Governance Partnership facility. This makes effective communication and engagement challenging to achieve. For example, we heard of deployees in Port Moresby being advised by DSS about important matters before their home agencies had been able to communicate information to them and what it meant in their agency context.

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| **Recommendation 1:** The DFAT IPP management team should urgently develop a communication protocol and engagement plan, in collaboration with the Australian agencies and the IPP DSS team, so that all parties know who is communicating with whom, for what reason, and when. This would also assist information arriving to intended recipients in an appropriate sequence. |

#### Collaboration and coordination

Coordination meetings in Canberra through an Interdepartmental Committee (IDC) process are perceived to be improving at a working level, with some complicated conditions of service discussions now resolved and the shock of budget cuts managed. However, these quarterly meetings are still focused on the operational level. Their value would increase if they were used to share ideas and identify collaboration opportunities across agencies, and to leverage each agency’s comparative advantage.

Australian agency quarterly team leader meetings in Port Moresby are currently being convened by the IPP DSS team. The meetings are necessarily operational in their focus but appear to be delivered in an information-transfer format[[4]](#footnote-5). The meetings would have more value if they were better designed to enhance collaboration and information sharing by all participants.

Some Australian agencies which participate in IPP also support partnerships under the Prospera (Australia Indonesia Partnership for Economic Development) Economic Facility in Indonesia that commenced around the same time as IPP. Several interviewees suggested that DFAT IPP management could look for opportunities for applying approaches consistently with Prospera, including identifying the better practice approaches applied by either investment. It is acknowledged, however, that there are likely to be some limitations to this given the different country context, different program intent, and different contracting arrangements.

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| **Recommendation 2:** IPP coordination activities in both Canberra and Port Moresby should be designed, in part, to enable better collaboration and knowledge-sharing between agencies. |

Finding 2: There is strong buy-in for individual partnerships but the value or concept of the broader whole-of-government ‘partnership’ is only partially articulated at this point of implementation.

The concept and value of the broader partnership between the two countries is recognised at the ministerial level. The 26th Papua New Guinea – Australia Ministerial Forum Joint Communique stated[[5]](#footnote-6):

‘Ministers emphasised the value of strong partnerships between Australian and Papua New Guinean institutions, and committed to ensuring effective working arrangements between respective government agencies. Building on a broad range of institutional partnerships across government, including the arrangement between Papua New Guinea's Department of Prime Minister and National Executive Council and Australia's Department of the Prime Minister and Cabinet established since the 25th Australia-Papua New Guinea Ministerial Forum, Ministers signed a joint letter on building an institutional partnership between Papua New Guinea's Department of Foreign Affairs and Australia's Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade.’

Furthermore, the DFAT Aid Program Performance Report 2017–18 Papua New Guinea makes many mentions of the contributions made by various partnerships, and states: ‘*By the time of the 2019 Ministerial Forum, the Governments of Australia and Papua New Guinea will develop new development priorities which will contribute to broader economic and strategic partnership objectives*.’

However, at the institutional level, the visibility of the program’s contribution to the overarching Government of Australia to Government of Papua New Guinea partnership is mixed.

That said, at both a senior contracted Papua New Guinea national adviser level in the Department of Prime Minister & National Executive Council (PM&NEC) and at the bureaucratic level in the Department of National Planning and Monitoring, there was a clear articulation of how the program fits with the overarching partnership. There were also positive views expressed about being part of the development of a new way of framing the partnership. The voice of the bureaucratic overall owners of IPP in the Government of Papua New Guinea, PM&NEC, was unfortunately missing in evidence collected.

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| **Recommendation 3:** It would be useful for DFAT to develop a succinct communication product, including an appropriate diagram, that explains the concept of the broader partnership between the governments of Australian and Papua New Guinea and how the individual institutional partnerships theoretically contribute. This could be updated regularly to include a list of the current active partnerships. This communication product could be distributed, and explained, to high level officials in all participating institutions so that they are able to understand the bigger picture of which they are an important part.  Further, ensuring partner participation in the development and operationalisation of the IPP monitoring and evaluation framework, as well as encouraging mutual accountability in analysis of data collected to inform the framework and co-development of findings and recommendations, at an annual partner learning forum could go some way to deepening collective understanding of the broader partnership. |

Finding 3: There is concern about the lack of clarity about broader IPP governance arrangements.

Drawing on their experience under SGP, senior officials in some Australian agencies expressed the desire for early clarity around the governance arrangements to be put in place between the Australia and Papua New Guinea governments, to guide the implementation of IPP. They felt the lack of clarity around these shared governance arrangements posed the risk of repeating some of the failings of SGP, including Government of Papua New Guinea oversight and involvement in broader governance arrangements. At the same time, the higher-level governance arrangements in Papua New Guinea between the Governments of Australia and Papua New Guinea are evolving quite rapidly and overtaking arrangements set out in the original design.

It is apparent that the concept of the Joint Oversight Mechanism as described in the design is unlikely to be realised given questions over its appropriateness or need, given that it would only apply to just one, relatively small, program. In discussions at the AHC, it was mooted that overarching governance for IPP could take place through current sectoral mechanisms, such as the Transport Sector Coordination Monitoring and Implementation Committee, or the National Coordination Mechanism for the law and justice sector, both of which are long-running governance and sectoral information exchange mechanisms. However, not all sectors have such a mechanism, which would result in some orphan partnerships. Another possible arrangement being explored is through a new Government of Papua New Guinea cross-agency technical working group, being convened by the Deputy Secretary of PM&NEC in collaboration with the Deputy Head of Mission. This may well have progressed since the evaluation team were in the country.

Whatever eventuates regarding the negotiation and consolidation of appropriate arrangements, the actual governance arrangements for IPP need to be communicated to senior officials in the Australian home agencies, and likely to the Papua New Guinean agencies as soon as they take shape.

It appears that the current IDC meetings convened in Canberra function more as an interdepartmental working group for IPP, rather than as a formal interdepartmental committee. More senior whole-of-government dialogue about the whole-of-government aspects of IPP among Australian agencies appears to be missing. To strengthen and clarify the whole-of-government partnership intent it would be timely if the in-Australia whole-of-government management arrangements included a more senior-level focus, possibly through an annual dialogue. This would be an information-sharing and strategy-setting dialogue, rather than a governance mechanism.

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| **Recommendation 4:** Details about the IPP in-Papua New Guinea governance arrangements, or a plan to progress their consolidation, should be communicated to senior officials in Australian partner agencies as soon as possible.  **Recommendation 5:** An arrangement should be put in place for senior-level Australian partner agency officials to regularly (suggest annually) engage with DFAT senior officials about the concept of the whole-of-government partnership with the Government of Papua New Guinea generally, and specifically for IPP. This would be an information-sharing and strategy-setting dialogue, rather than a governance mechanism, with an emphasis on the mutual benefits that will underpin the program. |

Finding 4: The authorising environment in each Papua New Guinea agency is critical for an effective partnership.

Only one of the three Papua New Guinean institutions sampled had a formally appointed agency head in place, and that individual had been recently re-appointed. Of the other two agencies, one had a formal acting agency head and the other was without a formal acting appointment. Both of these agencies had been without a formally appointed head for at least six months.

The presence, or absence, of a formally appointed agency head is a critical consideration in the design and implementation of IPP-funded workplans. At the individual partnership level, Australian agencies need to be able to engage effectively to ensure that workplans are owned by the Papua New Guinea agency. This is even more the case with the new suite of partnership governance and design framework documents and concepts, which are expected to be applied under IPP.

Beyond the Records of Understanding that each sampled Australian agency has in place with DFAT there is expected to be:

* a Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) or Joint Expression of Interest (JEI) in place between the Australian and Papua New Guinean partner agencies, which expresses the long-term intent of the partnership and the intent to work together;
* a capacity diagnostic undertaken in the near term (originally scheduled for April 2019 in the design implementation plan) to assess the development needs of each Papua New Guinea institution; and
* an Agency Support Arrangement, based on the capacity diagnostic, agreed between the two agencies, detailing the forms of support the Australian agency will offer, within the available budget.

These documents will be important in time, as they will define the form of, and lend authority to, each partnership. However, their introduction needs to be managed with care, enabling authentic buy-in from both partners in each partnership. The quality of the dialogue that enables the development of each document is as important as the document itself. The status of each sampled partnership in relation to these documents is summarised in Table 2, along with the 2018/19 investment.

Table 2: Status of each sample partnership in relation to IPP partnership governance and management documents

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| Partnership  Document | ANAO–AGO | AGD–OPP | ATO–IRC |
| Authorising environment | Weak – moderate  AGO has an Acting Auditor-General | Strong | Weak  The IRC is currently without a formally appointed, or acting, Commissioner-General |
| MOU / JEI | ANAO intends to initiate development of a JEI in the near future | AGD has an MOU with the OPP, signed 6 December 2018 | ATO has an MOU with the IRC, signed 4 May 2018. This was signed by the Commissioner-General before her retirement |
| Capacity diagnostic | AGO initiated its own assessment in 2015 against the Performance Management Framework for supreme audit institutions | Not yet carried out | Not yet carried out, but IRC is planning an assessment against the Tax Administration Diagnostic Assessment Tool soon |
| Agency Support Arrangement | Not yet in place | Not yet in place | Not yet in place |
| 2018/19 budget allocation | AUD$700,000 | AUD$1,650,000 | AUD$500,000 |

Each of these IPP processes or steps will depend on a high level of trust between both partners, including a reasonable degree of budget certainty. The process of rolling out ‘capacity diagnostics’ is discussed in more detail in a later section.

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| **Recommendation 6:** IPP implementation needs to be responsive to specific and emerging issues around each partnership’s authorising environment and will likely require flexibility on the part of DFAT, as the overall ‘program owner’, including in terms of budgets, results, and the timing and achievement of milestones. This could include several actions:   * Implement regular communication, as scheduled in agreed communication protocols, between DFAT IPP managers and sector leads, and the Australian agencies, with agencies requested to escalate advice to DFAT, and vice versa, about any emerging issues in their authorising environment, and consequent possible implications for the achievement of agreed outcomes. * DFAT IPP management to review program guidance materials to provide pathways for adjusting agreed workflows in the case of increased risk in operational circumstances. |

****Finding 5:**** The strategic alignment of individual partnerships needs to be joined up with Australia’s other same sector investments, and opportunities for collaboration need to be explored.

**IPP is a small program, with very specific investments targeted to some 16 individual agencies, designed to both build agency-level partnerships and contribute to a broader, overarching partnership between the Papua New Guinea and Australian governments. A senior AHC official described IPP as an input into a broader strategic investment. IPP will only be effective if IPP support is situated within the broader sectoral and strategic engagement between the two governments. It is certainly the case that senior staff at the AHC are aware of this issue and give considerable attention and focus to it.**

However, the extent to which the three individual partnerships looked at in this evaluation are strategically aligned with AHC sector strategies and work practices is best described as variable:

* It was very evident and understandable that Papua New Guinea’s immediate focus on mounting a successful hosting of APEC in 2018, and Australia’s concentration on supporting Papua New Guinea in doing so, occupied the full attention of both the ATO and the IRC. However, discussions with staff from the Economic Governance and Inclusive Growth Workstream Partnership, the ATO, and the AHC indicated that underpinning this there was a reasonable degree of alignment between the ATO–IRC partnership and the broader sectoral engagement in the finance sector.
* The alignment of the AGD–OPP partnership within the broader law and justice sector could be stronger. There are certainly good examples of joined-up activity: Justice Services and Stability for Development Program being encouraged by the AHC to reach out to the OPP; combined AFP/OPP work on detective training; and broader engagement in FSV. But from an adviser and project perspective, much of this joined-up activity came about more through informal networks, rather than clearly articulated strategy. Better alignment could sensibly draw on the ongoing role of the Minister-Counsellor Legal, possibly as the coordinator in a joining up role with the Minister Counsellor Development, within the AHC.
* There was no clear alignment of the AGO–ANAO partnership with any broader sectoral strategy. AHC staff confirmed that the AGO was not really on the horizon in consideration of the public financial management architecture for PNG, even in the medium or longer terms, while the long-term deployee in AGO reported very little engagement with the broader sector or with AHC staff. This, however, may be more an indication of the space that audit functions occupy in both Papua New Guinea and Australia: outside of, but parallel to, government administration and reporting directly to parliament.

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| **Recommendation 7:** IPP needs to be situated within broader sector programs and strategies, and opportunities for collaboration between different implementing actors need to be explored. This should include an explicit focus by AHC teams on the contribution that IPP can make to their broader sector programs. |

Finding 6: There have been some good outcomes achieved across the three case studies, but institutional capability development is a complex process and takes time.


**Institutional capability development needs to be understood within a framework that identifies and links factors that drive sustainable change. The Burke-Litwin model**[[6]](#footnote-7) **identifies the various drivers of change for an organisation and ranks them in terms of importance (the most important at the top, with lower layers becoming gradually less important). The model proposes that all the factors are integrated (to greater or lesser degrees) and that a change in one will eventually affect all other factors.**

**Figure 1 attempts to use this model to map the areas in which the ANAO, AGD, and ATO are supporting their respective partners.**

**Each case study documents the outcomes achieved through both previous programs and the current investment for each partnership.** Each of the sampled partnerships has contributed, at least to some useful extent, to agreed outcomes through past programs, and previous and current workplans. These outcomes clearly include improvements in the capability of Government of Papua New Guinea institutions:

* Case Study 2019 – 1: The ANAO–AGO partnership has contributed significantly to the capability of individuals, work groups, and the wider AGO institution.
* Case Study 2019 – 2: The AGD–OPP partnership has contributed significantly to the capability of individual lawyers and their specialist prosecution units in the OPP. Along with complementary learning and practice opportunities funded through the DFAT Justice Services and Stability for Development Program, the effectiveness of the OPP has been enhanced.
* **In both the AGO and OPP there is now a cohort of vibrant future leaders and technically capable officers, who have clearly benefited from the support provided.**
* Case Study 2019 – 3: T**he ATO–IRC partnership has contributed to pockets of valuable outcomes, but little sign of broader institutional change. It is important to note, however, that the IRC is now a large institution (with some 600 officers), compared with the AGO (just over 100 officers) and the OPP (less than 100 officers). The scale and scope of any investment relative to organisational size will clearly influence any change that can be achieved.**

Figure 1: ****Where the sample of Australian agencies are working in their partner Papua New Guinean agency, mapped against the Burke-Litwin model of organisational change****



The utility of this model will be explored further in subsequent case studies.

Case by case, we mention additional aspects of each partnership:

* Case Study 2019 – 1: The ANAO–AGO partnership is strongly supported at the highest level in the Australian institution, with a commitment to the value of audit institutions being important features in modern democratic societies. Strongly supported by a committed and capable program management team, the suite of activities in the workplan have been tested and adapted over time to meet the needs of developing a modern audit institution. The partnership could largely only be improved by matters beyond the control of the ANAO. This partnership has had a 34% budget reduction in this financial year. The workplan makes the best use of the available resources. The AGO officers valued being able to work with ANAO and Queensland Audit Office (QAO) officers in Australia, and with the long-term deployee in the AGO. The ANAO and QAO officers like working with AGO officers when they are on secondments. They learn culturally and think about different ways of doing things that might work in the AGO.
* Case study 2019 – 2: The AGD–OPP partnership is not only strongly supported at the highest level in the Australia institution for broader strategic reasons, but also in the Papua New Guinean institution, with a focus on the effective performance of lawyers in court. Again, the workplan and approach has been tested and adapted over time to meet the emerging technical needs of a prosecution office that works for Papua New Guinea. It could be potentially enhanced, through leveraging other resources, by ensuring better strategic alignment and collaboration with Australia’s other justice sector investments. The OPP lawyers greatly value working with the AGD prosecution advisers and the Office of the Director of Public Prosecution Queensland officers when on secondment to the Queensland offices.
* Case study 2019 – 3: The ATO–IRC partnership is supported at a high level in the Australian institution but is missing that strong ownership in the Papua New Guinean institution without a Commissioner-General. The previous way of working under SGP has been discarded and a new workplan of specific, focused activities for meeting technical needs is in the process of being tested. We hope that ATO is able to mobilise ATO officers with the right capabilities to deliver these activities. This partnership will benefit from a greater focus on outcomes through a better program logic, reporting that relates to outcomes, and an early focus (right now) on deeper relationship re-building. IRC officers value working with some ATO officers. Some ATO officers appreciated the opportunity to work with IRC officers during their short-term deployments.

Finding 7: There are some common factors that are working well across the three partnerships.

#### Recruiting the right people

It is clear that selecting the right person (or people) to deliver adult learning and facilitate institutional development strategies is essential to successful individual and organisational capability development. This is regardless of whether it is a long- or short-term deployment in Papua New Guinea, or a secondment visit to an Australian institution by Papua New Guinean officials. Where the evaluation found evidence of outcomes, we also found evidence of the right type of people supporting those changes. The best people have been, and still are, culturally competent, technically capable, able to motivate their counterparts, able to deliver appropriate approaches for adult learning, skills and knowledge searching and or transfer, and for building of confidence.

In the ANAO–AGO and AGD–OPP cases, both the ANAO and AGD were able to describe the significant effort they allocate to ensuring rigorous processes for recruitment, starting at the point of quality terms of reference for the position, engaging their partner agency in decision-making, through to reconnaissance visits to understand what the deployment looked like on location. The ATO–IRC case study describes outcomes that resulted from having the right people.

#### Careful design and management of secondments to Australia

Australian agencies managing short-term and longer-term (for example, nine months for graduates to the ANAO) secondments to their home agencies described robust processes for bringing Papua New Guinean officials to Australia and looking after them while they are on secondment. These processes included both looking after the person and taking care to provide a quality and tailored technical opportunity.

With regard to looking after the person, the ANAO and QAO described good human resource management approaches, such as regular check-ins, access to a psychologist if needed, consideration of appropriate accommodation, including taking care to mobilise and accommodate women with women, and men with men, where possible, to prevent isolation, and the provision of access to social and cultural opportunities.

With regard to technical opportunities, the ANAO and QAO described processes for identifying the secondees’ (not the institution’s) expectations of secondment, testing those expectations throughout the secondment, end-of-secondment evaluation processes, access to suitable information technology, matching the secondee to the right sort of audits, based on their home agency role, and going the extra mile. Young lawyers in the OPP described how they had been technically and emotionally encouraged by their OPP-based prosecution advisers while on secondment to the bar practice course in Queensland, which they found quite challenging due to working in Australian law. This is going the extra mile.

#### Including the right mix of activities in workplans

The ANAO–AGO workplan provides a mix of activities that covers the breadth and depth of the AGO institution. This mix of activities was carefully tailored over time, with new activities introduced along the way to meet emerging needs (see Figure 1).

The AGD–OPP workplan principally provides long-term deployed prosecution advisers. To gain breadth and depth across the institution, the workplan is matched by a set of complementary activities, which are funded through the Justice Services and Stability for Development Program.

The current ATO workplan principally targets technical activities, to areas of medium-term revenue strategy identified and international compliance need, for skill and knowledge development. Ultimately, it is assumed that the right mix of activities for each partnership will reflect the overarching agreements between the institutions (MOUs) and whichever needs analysis is applied for the institutions, as well as being structured in relation to the available budget.

#### Getting the relationship management right

The form of support provided must match the needs of the Papua New Guinean institutions, the capability of the Australian institution to meet those needs, and the budget. The view was expressed to the evaluation team that partnerships are at greater risk without a long-term deployee to manage and hold the relationship with the Papua New Guinean institution on a day-to-day basis. There are other ways of maintaining the relationship, with the most critical factors being the presence or absence of a formally appointed agency head who is committed to the partnership and the right person (trusted and able to inspire respect) as the Australian relationship manager. We are confident that a partnership can be maintained effectively without a long-term deployee, but it requires a commitment to a higher frequency of visits and contact from the Australian relationship manager, as well as a broader strategy of informal relationship building.

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| **Recommendation 8:** Discussion about common success factors should be a regular focus of collaboration between all IPP partners. This discussion should be facilitated by DFAT in Canberra at the interdepartmental meetings, and in Port Moresby at team leader’s meetings. |

Finding 8: Gender equality and social inclusion (GESI) is not yet formally enabled by IPP but is core business in some Papua New Guinea partner agencies.

There are good examples of gender equality practices and outcomes in the three partnerships examined and it is noteworthy that the Australian agencies involved are not the prime mover for these approaches; rather, they are led by the Papua New Guinea institutions.

In the AGD–OPP partnership, the Public Prosecutor is committed to a gender-balanced team of lawyers. Currently, there are around 46 lawyers in total (20 women and 26 men), out of a total staff of 83 (44 women and 39 men). AGD–OPP have gender equality programming as core business through the purposeful support provided to the Family and Sexual Offences Unit of the OPP, which has been present for over at least nine years. The outcomes of this work include an increasing number of effective prosecutions, by the FASOU prosecutors, for family and sexual violence offences. Furthermore, the OPP have recently started participating in the Law and Justice Community of Practice for GESI, which supports implementation of Papua New Guinea’s own 2013 GESI Policy.

In the ANAO–AGO partnership, the ANAO workplan has mostly focused GESI through requiring equal opportunity as a criterion for the selection of men and women for learning and development opportunities. So far, this has been strong, as noted in the aggregate participation data: 36 (56%) men and 28 (44%) women overall. The women and children program has enabled the participation of mothers of young children in learning and development opportunities, which may not have been possible under the other programs.

In the ATO–IRC partnership, the evaluation team observed that the IRC is strongly committed to GESI, supporting implementation of Papua New Guinea’s own GESI policy. This was evidenced by: advice that GESI-messaged shirts are worn by all staff every Thursday, as part of their daily uniform code; a Commissioner is a member of the PNG Male Advocacy Network; and a woman Commissioner-General has been in place for an extended period of time until recently, leading transformation of the institution. The ATO acknowledge that they seek to reflect a balanced view of their own workforce in delivering their activities. Historically at least, however, the majority[[7]](#footnote-8) of long-term deployees have been men.

Perhaps not surprisingly, progress on broader social inclusion, and particularly in terms of disability, has not yet been fully considered in the three partnerships, although the ANAO has put some thought into how they could mobilise ANAO officers living with disabilities for support roles, and AGO officers living with disabilities. There is potential for working with national representative bodies for people living with disabilities.

At this early stage of IPP implementation there would be value in seeking to share experience across the partnerships of approaches that are emerging or already working (for example, the women and children program). This sharing could sensibly occur in both Papua New Guinea (via cross-sectoral learning through the AHC) and in Canberra via the enhanced coordination proposed discussed under Finding 1.

It is understood that the development of a GESI strategy for IPP is underway, and that there is access to GESI advice through the broader Governance Partnership.

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| **Recommendation 9:** Early lessons of successful initiatives to support gender equality and social inclusion should be identified and shared across all IPP partners so that GESI can gain increased and early traction. These examples should be also used to inform the development of the GESI strategy and associated practice-based toolkit, as soon as possible. |

Finding 9: The IPP Deployee Support Services unit is valued. The new opportunities for monitoring and evaluation, and capacity development support, are also valued by Australian agencies but must be fit for purpose.

It is not the task of this evaluation[[8]](#footnote-9) to review in-depth the quality of services provided by IPP DSS, including deployee logistics, monitoring and evaluation support and frameworks, nor capacity development support and frameworks.[[9]](#footnote-10) This section provides some brief comments on some aspects of IPP DSS work.

#### IPP DSS

IPP DSS is engaged through Deed of Amendment Dated: 1 September 2018, between the Commonwealth of Australia, represented by DFAT, and Abt Associates Pty Ltd, for Institutional Partnerships Program Deployment Support Services (Papua New Guinea), originally contracted 6 May 2016, which sets IPP DSS management arrangements, core management services, support services for deployees, and minimum service standards.

There was a high level of appreciation expressed in interviews by both long-term deployees and their home Australian agency teams, for the services provided by IPP DSS overall. This appears to be after a prior period of difficultly and a high level of dissatisfaction among some long-term deployees about their overseas conditions of service (OCOS), over which IPP DSS has no control. However, these appear to have been settled by DFAT under overarching Australian Government directions for OCOS.

#### IPP monitoring and evaluation support

A monitoring and evaluation adviser was mobilised in the latter half of 2018 to provide monitoring and evaluation support to individual partnerships and for the IPP overall. The adviser is also responsible for the design and operationalisation of a fit-for-purpose monitoring and evaluation framework for IPP (building on that provided in the design) that would meet the information needs of all information users.

Most Australian agencies interviewed expressed appreciation for the monitoring and evaluation support provided to date in reviewing draft six-month reports, developing new partnership logics, or refining existing ones, and developing brief case studies.

In principle, we suggest that new approaches to monitoring and evaluation for individual partnerships need to be fit for purpose, meet the needs of all high priority information users (typically DFAT, home agencies, and Government of Papua New Guinea partners), focus on describing feasible outcomes, and represent the voice of the Papua New Guinea partner. Furthermore, they need to reflect the scale of the investment and not be overly complicated. Individual partnership program logics should also demonstrate how they fit with the overarching IPP logic.

Finally, reporting should be driven by broader usefulness, not just the DFAT Aid Quality Check. It would be of value to see a synthesised IPP Annual Report. Such a product could also contribute to the wider understanding of IPP purpose and achievements, with the audience including both Australian and Papua New Guinean participating agencies.

#### IPP capacity development support

A capacity development adviser was engaged in the second half of 2018 to provide capacity development advice to implementing partners, including facilitation of the sharing of knowledge on good practice, and to facilitate the implementation of a series of ‘capacity diagnostics’ as needed in partner agencies to form the basis of agency support arrangements.

The AGD advised that they had supported implementation of a ‘capacity diagnostic’ in the Department of Justice and Attorney-General, through their partnership with that institution. This process was initiated by the minister and thus had a high degree of institutional buy-in. It was implemented by a Papua New Guinean consultant. The then Auditor-General initiated his own fit-for-purpose ‘diagnostic’ for the AGO in 2015, which reported in 2016. This diagnostic took the form of a review against the Performance Management Framework for supreme audit institutions and was led by the Pacific Association of Supreme Audit Institutions, with a team including some of the AGO’s own officers. This also enabled a learning experience for those officers involved.

Some comments regarding the impending potential pipeline of ‘capacity diagnostics’:

* ‘Capacity diagnostic’ is an unfriendly term. A more engaging term should be considered – perhaps institutional needs analysis? The term ‘capacity diagnostic’ starts the process off as being problem-focused, rather than appreciative and strengths-based. Appreciative inquiry[[10]](#footnote-11) can be a valuable approach in understanding what is working in an organisation and could be woven into most forms of needs analysis.
* While the AHC sees ‘capacity diagnostics’ as a vehicle for a partnership conversation, the need for such an assessment must be strongly owned and authorised by the Papua New Guinea institution.
* Any engagement around the topic would require careful assessment of likely interest, timing, and overall readiness.
* The assessment framework applied needs to be fit for purpose and to suit the particularities and core business of that institution.
* Finally, such an assessment needs to be en-gendered: that is, implemented through a gender lens.

# Conclusion

Based on the evidence gathered so far, the early implementation of IPP appears to be on the right trajectory. There is evidence of valuable achievements at the individual partnership level and there appears to be an early, emerging appreciation of the contribution that the partnerships can make to the overarching economic and strategic partnership between the two governments. The value of the government-to-government partnerships should be celebrated.

However, there is room for improvement in the way individual partnerships are implemented, as well as further clarity around the governance and communication pathways for the overall IPP.

# Summary of recommendations

The recommendations made throughout the findings, for program improvement, are summarised here:

* **Recommendation 1:** The DFAT IPP management team should urgently develop a communication protocol and engagement plan, in collaboration with the Australian agencies, so that all parties know who is communicating with whom, for what reason, and when. This would also assist information arriving to intended recipients in an appropriate sequence.
* **Recommendation 2:** IPP coordination activities in both Canberra and Port Moresby should be designed, in part, to enable better collaboration and knowledge-sharing between agencies.
* **Recommendation 3:** It would be useful for DFAT to develop a succinct communication product, including an appropriate diagram, that explains the concept of the broader partnership between the governments of Australian and Papua New Guinea and how the individual institutional partnerships theoretically contribute. This could be updated regularly to include a list of the current active partnerships. This communication product could be distributed, and explained, to high level officials in all participating institutions so that they are better able to understand the bigger picture of which they are an important part.   
    
  Further, ensuring partner participation in the development and operationalisation of the IPP monitoring and evaluation framework, as well as encouraging mutual accountability in analysis of data collected to inform the framework and co-development of findings and recommendations, at an annual partner learning forum could go some way to deepening collective understanding of the broader partnership.
* **Recommendation 4.** Details about IPP in-Papua New Guinea governance arrangements, or a plan to progress their consolidation, should be communicated to senior officials in Australian partner agencies as soon as possible.
* **Recommendation 5.** An arrangement should be put in place for senior-level Australian partner agency officials to regularly (suggest annually) engage with DFAT senior officials about the concept of the whole-of-government partnership with the Government of Papua New Guinea generally, and specifically for the IPP. This would be an information-sharing and strategy-setting dialogue, rather than a governance mechanism, with an emphasis on the mutual benefits that will underpin the program.
* **Recommendation 6**. IPP implementation needs to be responsive to specific and emerging issues around each partnership’s authorising environment and will likely require flexibility on the part of DFAT, as the overall ‘program owner’, including in terms of budgets, results, and the timing and achievement of milestones. This could include several actions:
  + Implement regular communication, as scheduled in agreed communication protocols, between DFAT IPP managers and sector leads, and the Australian agencies, with agencies requested to escalate advice to DFAT, and vice versa, about any emerging issues in their authorising environment, and consequent possible implications for the achievement of agreed outcomes.
  + DFAT IPP management to review program guidance materials to provide pathways for adjusting agreed workflows in the case of increased risk in operational circumstances.
* **Recommendation 7:** IPP needs to be situated within broader sector programs and strategies, and opportunities for collaboration between different implementing actors, need to be explored. This should include an explicit focus by AHC teams on the contribution that IPP can make to their broader sector programs.
* **Recommendation 8:** Discussion about common success factors should be a regular focus of collaboration between all IPP partners. This discussion should be facilitated by DFAT in Canberra at the interdepartmental meetings, and in Port Moresby at team leader’s meetings.
* **Recommendation 9:** Early lessons of successful initiatives to support GESI should be identified and shared across all IPP partners so that GESI can gain increased and early traction. These examples of success should be also used to inform the development of the GESI strategy and associated practice-based toolkit, as soon as possible.

None of the recommendations made have significant resources implications, rather they recommend different ways of working.

Acknowledgements

The QTAG evaluation team would like to express their appreciation to:

* All of the Papua New Guinean agency officials from the AGO, the OPP, and the IRC, who freely expressed their views and vision for the future of their nation throughout our interviews.
* The Australian agency long-term deployees and home-based teams, who were open to the concept of being part of the evaluation and who also freely shared their views and passion for their work and put in considerable effort collating and sharing documents and being organised for the evaluation.
* The DFAT AHC and Canberra teams, for being organised and speaking frankly.
* Our evaluation team DFAT observer and IPP Program Manager, Christine Evans, in Canberra and Papua New Guinea, and Mary Vagi, at the AHC in Port Moresby, for complicated scheduling.
* Mrs Ruby Zarriga, for representing the Government of Papua New Guinea and providing her wise Papua New Guinea observations.
* The IPP DSS team, for being so hospitable in Port Moresby, freely sharing ideas, and putting a considerable amount of effort into supporting the agencies to be prepared for the evaluation.

We hope this is a useful report and process.

Annex 1 Answering the evaluation questions

Based on the evidence in this report, and the three case study reports, this section provides specific answers to the set of evaluation questions, which are answered more fully through reading Report Parts A and B.

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| 1. To what extent has the partnership contributed to agreed outcomes, or yielded benefits, to Australian and Government of Papua New Guinea institutions, including improvements in the capability of Government of Papua New Guinea institutions?    * What factors have supported or inhibited progress in capacity building?    * To what extent are the capacity building approaches that are being applied being designed to enable sustainable change? |

Each of the sampled partnerships has contributed, at least to some useful extent, to agreed outcomes through past programs, and previous and current workplans. These outcomes clearly include improvements in the capability of Government of Papua New Guinea institutions to deliver their legislated purpose.

* Case Study 2019 – 1: The ANAO–AGO partnership has contributed significantly to the capability of individuals, work groups, and the wider AGO institution.
* Case Study 2019 – 2: The AGD–OPP partnership has contributed significantly to the capability of individual lawyers and their specialist prosecution units in the OPP. Along with complementary learning and practice opportunities funded through the DFAT Justice Services and Stability for Development Program, the effectiveness of the OPP has been enhanced.
* Case Study 2019 – 3: The ATO–IRC partnership has contributed to pockets of capability development in the IRC, which is a significantly larger institution than either the OPP or AGO.

Factors that have supported progress in capacity building are discussed in Finding 6, and include recruiting the right people, careful design and management of secondments in Australia, and including the right mix of activities in workplans. Factors that have inhibited progress in capacity building are recruitment of people without cultural competence and adult learning skills, and managers in Papua New Guinea institutions who do not support officers to apply new skills. This results in reduced motivation.

Capacity building approaches being implemented are generally being designed to ensure sustainable change, as much as can be controlled for (refer to Finding 6). The Australian agencies have applied intelligent design, and have adapted their approaches over time, based on real-time monitoring of what does and does not work, to deliver high-quality adult learning that can be sustainable if the Papua New Guinea institution does its part.

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| 1. What is working well in each partnership?    * What are the factors that are contributing to effectiveness that could be potentially applied in other situations?    * What could be done differently to improve the quality and effectiveness of the partnership? |

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| 1. To what degree have institutional relationships become stronger as a result of Australia’s investment?    * What is the level of ownership and engagement of the Government of Australia and Government of Papua New Guinea agencies?      + To what extent is there senior level buy-in, strategic engagement, and appropriate levels of resourcing?    * To what extent does each government partner agency in each partnership value the opportunity of having Australian Government officers working closely with Papua New Guinean Government officers? |

In addition to the answers to the previous questions, there are a lot of things that are working well in the partnerships, and there are very, or reasonably, strong institutional relationships in place.

Case by case, we mention the following additional factors:

* Case Study 2019 – 1: The ANAO–AGO partnership is strongly supported at the highest level in the Australian institution, with a commitment to the value of audit institutions being important actors in modern democratic societies. Strongly supported by a committed and capable program management team, the suite of activities in the workplan have been tested and adapted over time to meet the needs of developing a modern audit institution. The partnership could largely only be improved by matters beyond the control of the ANAO, such as the formal appointment of an Auditor-General, the attitudes and behaviours of some middle managers in the AGO, and sufficient budget to re-introduce some of the important elements of the workplan to increase coverage of relevant technical matters and the number of AGO officers who can be included in the experiences available. This partnership has had a 34% budget reduction in this financial year. The workplan makes the best use of the available resources. The AGO officers valued being able to work with the ANAO and QAO officers in Australia, and with the long-term deployee in the AGO. The ANAO and QAO officers like working with the AGO officers when they are on secondments. They learn culturally and think about different ways of doing things that might work in the AGO.
* Case Study 2019 – 2: The AGD–OPP partnership is not only strongly supported at the highest level in the Australia institution for broader strategic reasons, but also the Papua New Guinean institution, with a focus on effective performance of lawyers in court. Again, the workplan and approach have been tested and adapted over time to meet the emerging technical needs of a prosecution office that works for Papua New Guinea. The partnership could be potentially enhanced, through leveraging other resources, by ensuring better strategic alignment and collaboration with Australia’s other justice sector investments. OPP lawyers greatly value working with the AGD prosecution advisers and the Office of the Director of Public Prosecution Queensland officers when on secondment to the Queensland offices.
* Case Study 2019 – 3: The ATO–IRC partnership is supported at a high level in the Australian institution but is missing that strong ownership in the Papua New Guinean institution, without a Commissioner-General. The previous way of working under SGP has been discarded and a new workplan of specific, focused activities for meeting technical needs is in the process of being tested. We hope that the ATO is able to mobilise ATO officers with the right capabilities to deliver these activities. This partnership will benefit from a greater focus on outcomes through a better program logic, reporting that relates to outcomes, and an early focus (right now) on deeper relationship re-building. IRC officers value working with some ATO officers. Some ATO officers appreciated the opportunity to work with IRC officers during their short-term deployments.

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| 1. To what degree is IPP supporting the development of institutional relationships in areas of shared economic and strategic significance for the governments of Australia and Papua New Guinea? |

The three partnerships sampled could all be considered important in areas of shared economic and strategic significance for each government. The AGO and IRC are core agencies in a public financial management architecture, which underpins economic governance and accountability. The OPP is a vital institution as part of the justice system, with a strong influence on adherence to the rule of law, and thus national and international security.

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| 1. To what extent is each institutional relationship (and each agency support arrangement/work plan) explicit about gender equality programming? What gender equality outcomes have been achieved? |

At this stage no additional GESI advisory or programming support has been provided to the partnerships. However, there are examples of great and good practice, and outcomes have been achieved. These are summarised in Finding 7, and briefly here:

GREAT: Case Study 2019 – 2: AGD–OPP has gender equality programming as a core business, through the purposeful support provided to the Family and Sexual Offences Unit of the OPP, which has now lasted over at least nine years. The outcomes of this work include an increasing number of effective prosecutions, by the FASOU prosecutors, for family and sexual violence offences.

GOOD: Case Study 2019 –1: ANAO–AGO has included specific programs that enable the participation of mothers of young children, which would not be otherwise possible.

NOT STARTED: Case Study 2019 – 3: ATO–IRC has no visible gender equality programming, nor any outcomes.

1. Some elements of this report have been modified for publication. [↑](#footnote-ref-2)
2. Refer to the Evaluation Plan and the evaluation questions in Part C. [↑](#footnote-ref-3)
3. Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade (2018) Institutional Partnerships Program Investment Design Document – Volume 1, April 2018, Australian Government p8 [↑](#footnote-ref-4)
4. Based on observation of one meeting. [↑](#footnote-ref-5)
5. DFAT (2018) ‘26th Papua New Guinea - Australia Ministerial Forum – Joint Communique’. Point 33. 6 April 2018. Accessed 20 February 2019, https://dfat.gov.au/geo/papua-new-guinea/Pages/26th-australia-papua-new-guinea-ministerial-forum-joint-communique.aspx [↑](#footnote-ref-6)
6. Burke-Litwin model, in Burke, W.W. (2018) *Organisation Change, Theory and Practice*, Fifth Edition, Sage Publications, California, USA. pp. 225–229. [↑](#footnote-ref-7)
7. This is not based on a full list of long- or short-term deployments, but rather a review of names mentioned in reports. [↑](#footnote-ref-8)
8. Refer to Evaluation Plan and questions. [↑](#footnote-ref-9)
9. This could be the subject of a separate review further down the track when new areas have had time to consolidate. A different approach would be required for such a review. If required, individual frameworks for monitoring and evaluation and capacity development could be reviewed for quality by QTAG, on request. [↑](#footnote-ref-10)
10. ‘Appreciative inquiry is the process of facilitating positive change in organisations. Its basic assumption is uncomplicated: every organisation has something that works well. Appreciative inquiry is therefore an exciting generative approach to organisational development. At a higher level, it is also a way of being and seeing.’ (Serrat, 2008) Accessed 4 April 2019. [www.adb.org/sites/default/files/publication/27558/appreciative-inquiry.pdf](https://www.adb.org/sites/default/files/publication/27558/appreciative-inquiry.pdf) [↑](#footnote-ref-11)