|  |
| --- |
| Local Leadership and Collective Action for Change |
|  |
| Design document submitted to the Australian Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade by The Voice Inc. |
|  |
| **August 2021** |

**Table of Contents**

[Executive Summary 5](#_Toc115858774)

[1. Strategic context and analysis 7](#_Toc115858775)

[1.1. Development context and challenges in Papua New Guinea 7](#_Toc115858776)

[1.2. Public policy and collective action 8](#_Toc115858777)

[1.3 Local Leadership and Collective Action for Change (LLCAC) 10](#_Toc115858778)

[1.4 Lessons learned from other programs 12](#_Toc115858779)

[1.5 Rationale for Australian/DFAT engagement 13](#_Toc115858780)

[1.6 Alignment with GoPNG priorities 13](#_Toc115858781)

[2. Program description 14](#_Toc115858782)

[2.1 Program objective and expected outcomes 14](#_Toc115858783)

[2.2 Project components 15](#_Toc115858784)

[2.2.1 Component 1: Developmental leadership and coalition development 16](#_Toc115858785)

[2.2.2 Component 2: Policy reform and implementation 17](#_Toc115858786)

[2.2.3 Component 3: Spaces for informed public debate 19](#_Toc115858787)

[3. Implementation arrangements 21](#_Toc115858788)

[3.1 Implementation structure 21](#_Toc115858789)

[3.2 Implementation plan 22](#_Toc115858790)

[4. Governance and management 23](#_Toc115858791)

[4.1 Governance and management arrangements 23](#_Toc115858792)

[4.2 Joint Steering Committee 23](#_Toc115858793)

[4.3 Partnership Strategic Advisory Panel (PSAP) 24](#_Toc115858794)

[5. Monitoring, Evaluation, Research and Learning 25](#_Toc115858795)

[5.1 Monitoring system and tools 25](#_Toc115858796)

[5.2 Evaluation and learning 26](#_Toc115858797)

[5.3 Research 26](#_Toc115858798)

[5.4 Communications 27](#_Toc115858799)

[6. Gender, disability and other cross-cutting issues 28](#_Toc115858800)

[6.1 Gender equality 28](#_Toc115858801)

[6.2 Disability inclusiveness 29](#_Toc115858802)

[6.3 Climate change 29](#_Toc115858803)

[6.4 Private sector 30](#_Toc115858804)

[6.5 Innovation 30](#_Toc115858805)

[7. Budget 32](#_Toc115858806)

[7.1 Financial plan 32](#_Toc115858807)

[7.2 Fraud management 33](#_Toc115858808)

[8. Risk Management and safeguards 35](#_Toc115858809)

[8.1 Risk management 35](#_Toc115858810)

[8.2 Environmental and social safeguards 35](#_Toc115858811)

[Annex A: The Voice Inc (TVI) 37](#_Toc115858812)

[Annex B: Public policy reforms 39](#_Toc115858813)

[Annex C: Lessons learned 42](#_Toc115858814)

[Annex D: Problem Tree 48](#_Toc115858815)

[Annex E: Theory of change 49](#_Toc115858816)

[Annex F: Implementation plan 50](#_Toc115858817)

[Annex G: Monitoring, evaluation and learning framework and tools 54](#_Toc115858818)

[Annex H: Budget 57](#_Toc115858819)

**Tables**

[Table 1: LLCAC theory of change 16](#_Toc78577852)

**Boxes**

[Box 1: Common principles of adaptive approaches 12](#_Toc78577845)

[Box 2: Shifting to collective action 15](#_Toc78577846)

[Box 3: TVI's theory of change 17](#_Toc78577847)

[Box 4: Coalition building 18](#_Toc78577848)

[Box 5: Pressing issues 19](#_Toc78577849)

[Box 6: Sample output monitoring questions 27](#_Toc78577850)

[Box 7: Sample outcome monitoring questions 27](#_Toc78577851)

**Figures**

[Figure 1: Adaptive solutions 20](#_Toc78577853)

[Figure 2: LLCAC resources 22](#_Toc78577854)

[Figure 3: Governance arrangements 24](#_Toc78577855)

**Acronyms**

AHC Australian High Commission

CfC Coalitions for Change

CLRC Constitutional Law Reform Commission

CSO Civil Society Organisation

DFAT Department for Foreign Affairs and Trade (Australian)

DJAG Department for Justice and Attorney General (PNG)

FCDO Foreign, Commonwealth and Development Office (UK)

GBV Gender-Based Violence

GDP Gross Domestic Product

GESI Gender, Equality and Social Inclusion

GST Goods and Service Tax

HDI Human Development Index

HR Human Resources

JSC Joint Steering Committee

LLCAC Local Leadership and Collective Action for Change

LNG Liquefied Natural Gas

MEL Monitoring, Evaluation and Learning

MERLA Monitoring, Evaluation, Research, Learning and Adapting

MTDP Medium Term Development Plan

PDIA Problem Driven Iterative Adaptation

PEA Political Economy Analysis

PMT Program Management Team

PNG Papua New Guinea

PSAP Partnership Strategic Advisory Panel

PWD People With Disabilities

SDG Sustainable Development Goals

SNAP Sorcery National Action Plan

STaRs National Strategy for Responsible Sustainable Development

TAF The Asia Foundation

TVI The Voice Inc.

TWP Thinking and Working Politically

UPNG University of Papua New Guinea

# Executive Summary

**Public policy reforms have taken place by successive governments in PNG to address social, economic and environmental challenges faced by the country.** Reforms, however, have been hampered by insufficient ethical, accountable and transparent leadership, a lack of capacity and resource constraints to deliver effective services, and power being captured at the state level by a cadre of elites. These issues have been further compounded by inadequate collective action around critical issues to help achieve national and local development goals. Existing coalitions are unable to catalyse and sustain development changes; there is a lack of developmental leaders to catalyse transformative change; and there is a lack of and low-quality discourse on development issues. The Voice Inc (TVI)[[1]](#footnote-1), in partnership with The Asia Foundation (TAF) and Harvard University, would like to address issues affecting collective action and issues impacting the success of public policy reforms through the Local Leadership and Collective Action for Change (LLCAC) program.

**LLCAC’s end of program outcome is to implement progress in reforms to government policies, rules, guidelines and other written instructions.** Progress refers to the aspiration that the program will adjust incentives to such a degree that development is obtained at some scale and sustainability. To achieve this end of program outcome, the program will have three components aimed at achieving intermediate outcomes. The three components are: developmental leadership and coalition development; policy reform and implementation; and development of spaces for informed public debate. These components build upon TVI’s 14 years’ operating experience and lessons learnt from similar programs overseas, and will utilise TVI’s extensive network of organisations and individuals. In particular the program will work in an adaptive manner, using regular pause and reflect sessions and making amendments to ways of working as need be. An implementation plan has been developed for the program covering five years and will be refined and reviewed throughout the program.

**The LLCAC program will be implemented by a small team, who will follow an implementation plan which will be reviewed six-monthly and developed on an annual basis.** The growth in staffing levels will depend on how successful the team is. The TVI LLCAC implementation team will lead the development, implementation and monitoring of strategies, activities and outputs related to all three project components. LLCAC staff will operate from Port Moresby.

**The LLCAC team will be supported through a partnership with TAF and Harvard University.** TAF will provide mentoring to the team throughout implementation and will share lessons learned from their on-going coalition program in the Philippines. A partnership with Harvard University will also be utilised to strengthen learning on what is working and what isn’t; this learning in turn will lead to changes in programming as needed.

**Operations of the program will be overseen by a Joint Steering Committee (JSC), Partnership Strategic Advisory Panel and Program Management Teams.** The Joint Steering Committee will provide strategic direction and oversight of the program and consists of representatives from DFAT and TVI. It will meet on a six-monthly basis. The Partnership Strategic Advisory Panel (PSAP) is the advisory body to the JSC and will meet on a quarterly basis. Alongside supporting the work of the JSC, the PSAP will review concept notes, workplans and progress reports and will provide advice or inputs of substantive or strategic value to the program. The PSAP will be comprised of four regular members nominated by DFAT and TVI.

**As the program will work in an iterative, adaptive manner, TVI will have a robust monitoring, evaluation, research and learning (MERL) approach in place.** This system will promote the use of regular pause and reflect sessions to ensure that ways of working are amended as needed throughout implementation. Interrogation of the program’s theory of change, and the theory of change for each issue pursued, will be a critical part of the MERL system. Information produced by the MERL system will primarily be used to guide decisions by the Joint Steering Committee and to deliver on component workplans. A performance assessment framework has been drafted for the program and it will be reviewed and amended during the first six months of implementation.

**TVI will promote gender equality as a priority theme throughout LLCAC** by ensuring that gender concerns are either integrated as an important objective within a specific reform issue or that a reform issue itself has some aspect of gender equality as a principal objective. A gender expert will work alongside the team to embed gender-considerations. LLCAC also presents an opportunity for TVI to step up its support for people with disability and climate change.

**The estimated cost of the program, over five years, is PNG Kina 26,951,211.** Component 1 supports building the network and capacities of identified developmental leaders and includes costs such as training fees, development of toolkits, and travel, accommodation and communication associated with networking, and accounts for approximately 16% of the budget. Component 2 funds preparing concept notes and workplans for the identified reform issues and then the implementation of the reform issues workplan. Because the scope, scale and nature of each reform issue is not identified at this stage a lump sum has been allowed on an annual basis. It is anticipated that this Component will be around 35% of the total budget. Component 3 provides opportunities and space for discussion and debate. The activities to be funded include published material and opportunities for face-to-face lectures and dialogue and represents 8% of the budget. The MERLA activities include developing a robust, adaptive system of data collection and reporting and accounts for 16%. Operations includes finance and administration to provide support to the programs and accounts for 20%. An allowance of 5% has been made to cover indirect or central costs. Some key figures to note are total salaries are K8.7m (32% of budget) and for the purposes of the overview are allocated across the Components, MERLA and Operations areas; the program is supported by external consultants in Components 1,2 and MERLA and over the 5 years total approximately K4.8m (18%), total travel is expected to cost K2.4m (9%).

**A risk and safeguards framework has been prepared. Currently all risks listed in the risk matrix are rated medium.** The success of the current program in managing risks through collaboration and open communication between DFAT and TVI. Risks identified in the risk framework will be monitored by the JSC and updated by the program management team in the case that any new or specific risks are identified. The JSC will review critical risks and make decisions on whether proposed mitigation strategies are adequate.

**Given the nature of LLCAC’s design it is unlikely that the program will have any adverse environmental and/or social impacts.** While LLCAC may engage in supporting reforms across a wide range of sectoral issues, LLCAC will not support or provide advice on any specific investments that have the potential for adverse environmental and/or social impacts. As LLCAC will engage with a wide range of stakeholders in different parts of the country, there is some risk that instances of sexual exploitation, abuse or harassment may occur. As part of its risk management and mitigation strategy TVI will review and strengthen its own internal policies to further reduce these risks. The growth of TVI’s operations, including more staff, larger budget and more complex programming will expose the organisation to the risk of fraud. This will be managed by strengthening the fraud policies and procedures, including planning for training and awareness sessions on a regular basis.

# Strategic context and analysis

## Development context and challenges in Papua New Guinea

Papua New Guinea has maintained an unbroken record of democratic government since its independence in 1975. National elections are held regularly, the judiciary has significant independence and the media is free to criticize government[[2]](#footnote-2). However, the lack of strong political parties continues to undermine the strength of the country’s democracy and the quality of debate and accountability on public policy matters.

PNG is a culturally heterogenous society and has autonomous clan or tribal based entities[[3]](#footnote-3) that are isolated and fragmented due to the rugged topography. 85 percent of people live in remote parts of the country. The rugged topography makes it difficult and costly for the provision of basic goods and services to the remote parts. However, the liberalization of the telecommunications market in PNG has connected millions of Papua New Guineans and enabled access to information giving people the ability to participate in dialogue around national issues through various social media platforms.

PNG is endowed with natural resources, biodiversity, flora and fauna. PNG also has large deposits of minerals, oil and gas which provide the majority of the country’s export earnings.[[4]](#footnote-4) Sadly, the revenue from the US$19 billion PNG LNG project and the mining investments have not transpired into sustainable and inclusive development outcomes. Maternal and infant mortality rates are high at 215 deaths per 100,000 and 38 deaths per 1,000 live births respectively[[5]](#footnote-5). 39.9 percent of the population live below the basic needs poverty line and illiteracy rate is growing at an annual average of 14 percent[[6]](#footnote-6). Only 13 percent of the population have access to some form of electricity whilst 87 percent remain in darkness. PNG is 155 out of 189 nations on the Human Development Index. Addressing weak development outcomes requires improvements in public policy, public policy implementation and a stronger relationship between the state and its citizens.

The economy suffered from the impact of a triple crisis - COVID-19 pandemic, an economic contraction and political instability in 2020[[7]](#footnote-7). GDP contracted by 3.8 percent in 2020 (compared to a pre-crisis projection of 2.9 per cent growth) and the non-resource sector is estimated to have declined by 0.2 percent in 2020 (3.3. percent lower than the pre-pandemic forecast). Formal employment and goods and services tax (GST) collections also fell by 14 and 5.9 percent respectively[[8]](#footnote-8). With this context in mind there is a need to address longstanding issues and those exacerbated in 2020.

The weak capacity of the state to institute and implement reforms, political instability, lack of decisive political leadership at the national level are key challenges that impede the effective implementation of public policy reforms and the achievement of sustainable and inclusive development outcomes[[9]](#footnote-9). A highly politicized public service, low administrative capacity and the absence or weakness of interest and lobby groups have contributed to a closed and non-participatory decision-making process. PNG is also currently ranked 142 out of 180 countries on the Transparency International Corruption Perception Index. The ongoing problem of corruption continues to impact on effective service delivery thereby weakening public trust in the institutions of the State. Resources are unequally distributed as they are used for personal gain and political survival. There is also a decrease in the commitment to democratic principles and processes. The regular elections that are held have been marred with violence and widespread corruption. With this context in mind there is a need to mobilize a vibrant social movement of a collective mass in support of necessary change.

Youth unemployment is an increasingly pressing social and economic problem in PNG. Studies suggest that young people under the age of 25 make up anywhere from 58 to 67 per cent of the county’s population. Only 10% finish Grade 12 and 10,000 make it into higher education institutions every year. Moreover, the labour market has not grown fast enough to absorb the increasing number of youth that are available to work, especially those with limited skills and experience. Noting this there is a need to support young people with the attainment of skills demanded by the labour market and to influence public policies to consider the youth ‘bulge’ dimension.

Gender inequality and gender-based violence are ongoing development challenges for PNG[[10]](#footnote-10). Women comprise 48 percent of the population yet they are underrepresented in the formal economy, community leadership and national politics[[11]](#footnote-11). The government has made policy interventions to promote the protection and equality of women however, the issue still remains a critical development challenge for PNG.

## Public policy and collective action

Public policy reforms have taken place by successive governments in PNG to address the challenges outlined in section 1.1. A review of some reforms (see Annex B for details), and discussions with individuals in government, private and development sectors, has helped to develop an understanding as to why some were successful and others were not. Key issues impacting the success of public policy reforms include:

* ***Increased corruption***. Corruption, lack of government accountability to citizens, weak state capacity to deliver goods and services coupled with law-and-order issues has weakened the effective functioning of institutions and processes of democracy.
* ***Lack of capacity and resource constraints*** to deliver effective services has impeded the ability of the state to deliver public goods and services. As a result public trustin state institutions has deteriorated in recent years, due to a highly politicised public service that has weak capability to effectively deliver services.
* ***Lack of developmental leadership.*** To change the institutions (whether formal or informal), the ideas underpinning them must be contested and de-legitimised and alternatives considered. In order for the contestation process to take place, motivated individuals and groups with incentives, values and interests who share a common goal must be able to work together in coalitions to build the necessary political will for reforms.

These issues have been further compounded by inadequate collective action around critical issues to achieve national and local development goals. Three key issues affecting collective action are detailed below. The LLAC program seeks to address issues affecting collective action and issues impacting the success of public policy reforms.

1. ***Existing coalitions are unable to catalyze and sustain transformational change***

Historically, NGOs have played an important role in advocating for change in PNG, especially in relation to specific issues supported by different groups. For instance, family and sexual violence, gender-based violence and sorcery related violence are interrelated issues that several national and international organizations are working on. These efforts, which have typically relied on public information campaigns and coalition building, have resulted in some positive achievements in passing laws and adopting policies. However, in many areas progress has been thwarted by vested interests, lack of funding or frustratingly slow with progress forward followed by regression. The time and financial resources needed to mobilize the public and build the necessary coalitions makes it challenging to keep up with the speed of change in policy making and may not yield outcomes that reflect the substantial accumulated cost of inputs.

1. ***Lack of developmental leaders to catalyze sustainable change***

Developmental leaders are motivated individuals with values, interests, opportunities and experience that enable them to catalyze change. They are a critical element of collective action. Such individuals, if brought together for the common good, can contest and de-legitimise ideas underpinning formal and informal rules that shape the current context. Developmental leaders are required to strengthen the currently weak and politicised public service.

At present, there is an insufficient number of developmental leaders in PNG to help bring about sustainable change. This is, in part, due to the collapse of the higher education system and a youth bulge. More than half of the country’s population is estimated to be less than 25 years old. Research by the Developmental Leadership Program highlights that there is a positive correlation between higher education institutions and developmental leaders[[12]](#footnote-12). Higher education not only builds technical skills but can also influence values and attitudes. Higher education institutions have also been shown to be influential in improving levels of governance through their ability to grow a middle class that is better positioned to hold government to account.

While the majority of young people still face considerable hardship, a growing number of youth are gaining access to educational opportunities at a scale that was not available to previous generations. This is especially true in relation to opportunities to attend tertiary level studies both at home and overseas, in so doing benefitting from exposure to a wider range of knowledge and experience than before. However, despite the considerable potential that young leaders with greater education and knowledge would like to contribute following their studies, opportunities for them to play a role in social and economic life remain limited. This is due to lack of job opportunities, economic inequalities and corruption.

1. ***Limited space and low quality of discourse in developmental issues***

A key feature of active, open, democratic societies is the ability of citizens from all walks of life to engage in debate with their elected and appointed representatives over priority objectives for advancing a country’s growth and development. The quality of such debates relies heavily on the ability of those involved to have access to knowledge informed by science and evidence that is globally recognized and locally relevant. Recent expansion in access to the internet and especially use of social media channels are double-edged—on the one hand they offer the ability to widely disseminate information especially to a more tech-savvy younger generation, but they also raise the risk of increased exposure to misinformation that can be easily shared.

Continuing low levels of education among the majority of the population, high illiteracy rate, limited channels for knowledge exchange beyond the urban upper and middle class, and narrowly determined national and local politics that militate against collective action for a common public cause all continue to undermine the quality of public discourse in PNG, leaving space for less informed or unscrupulous operators to determine the form and content of public conversations. The result of this has been declining trust in public institutions, reduced accountability of elected officials (e.g., through the non-completion of audit reports), and a lack of informed debate on topics of importance for the country’s progress.

## 1.3 Local Leadership and Collective Action for Change (LLCAC)

Considering the development context and collective action problems that are impeding the achievement of national and local development goals, TVI would like to strengthen the work that it has been doing under its new approach of working with local leaders to drive collective action towards public policy reforms for the public good. This builds on the 14 years of work that TVI has done and the extensive network of developmental leaders that it has built (see Annex A for further information).

Learning from research from the Developmental Leadership Program (University of Birmingham), the Building State Capability Program (Harvard University) and the Coalitions for Change (CfC) Program implemented by The Asia Foundation (TAF), TVI has noted development outcomes are shaped by both formal rules and procedures as well as informal and unwritten rules. The formal and informal rules of society that lock in these intractable problems are notoriously ‘sticky’; they resist change therefore Developmental Leadership is key in driving forward reform and change. Depending upon the context, informal rules may compete against formal rules, accommodate them or be a substitute for them. As such, to improve development outcomes, the interplay of formal and informal rules, organizations and individuals must be changed.

LLCAC will be implemented in partnership with The Asia Foundation (TAF) and the Building State Capability (BSC) program at Harvard University. Noting that The Asia Foundation has been implementing a similar approach in the Philippines over many years, the organisation will provide mentoring to TVI throughout implementation. TVI was fortunate to visit Manila to see first-hand how the program works and the impact it is having on the ground; lessons learned from that visit and subsequent discussions have not only fed into the design of this program but will be used to support the successful implementation of LLCAC. Discussions are currently underway with Harvard University to provide training and support on problem-driven iterative adaptation training and action research. The Building State Capability Program at Harvard only works with National and State level governments. However, following discussions and a concept note review, made an exception to partner with TVI noting the innovation and potential for transformational change the proposal can deliver.

LLCAC will seek to think and work politically by becoming a hub to mobilise and build a network of motivated and strategic individuals and organisations with the right incentives, values, interests and opportunities to effect sustainable change through problem driven reforms. The program seeks to support a network of developmental leaders that seek to contest and de-legitimise ideas that shape the current status quo. In the process the program seeks to legitimise alternative ideas that support inclusive growth by equipping these leaders with the right tools to undertake problem driven reform processes that will promote sustainable policy reform processes. TVI currently has over 3,600 alumni from its leadership programs who are now placed in strategic areas of society and contributing to nation building through their careers and community engagement. TVI also has a network of 40 partners from the NGO, private and public sectors that TVI actively engages with on a broad range of issues including youth and development, education and health. Through the Program we will utilize this network as a starting point for this iterative and adaptive process.

A growing body of research also suggests that for transformative change in complex systems to occur a linear plan-and-execute approach is unlikely to work. Adaptive approaches, common in voice and accountability programs, that prioritise listening, learning and reflecting are more likely to be effective as a deeper understanding of the issue is likely to emerge, alongside a wider set of potential solutions. Thinking and working politically (TWP) and problem-driven iterative adaptation (PDIA) are two forms of adaptive working that will be used to support implementation of the LLCAC program. Principles from these schools of thought, and others, that will be considered throughout the program are outlined in Box 2. The LLCAC program will work in an adaptive, iterative manner as opposed to a traditional linear programming approach. This will require regular pause and reflect sessions and amendments to ways of working.

Box 1: Common principles of adaptive approaches[[13]](#footnote-13)

|  |
| --- |
| 1. Acknowledge that the answer is not (and cannot be) known upfront, and that there may not be a single answer.
2. Recognise the importance of the political, social and economic context to understand any given problem or issue.
3. Start with the people you’re building for or working with and encourage participation and listening.
4. Recognise that understanding a complex system or problem requires interacting with it.
5. Start small, with ‘little bets’ that incur low costs for failure.
6. Be intentional about learning, using research and prototypes to test hypotheses.
7. Measure primarily to learn, rather than to report.
8. Have regular junctures for reflection and learning.
9. Work in loops instead of in a straight line, so that planning, implementation and learning are no longer separate processes.
10. Be pragmatic about process; do what’s needed, not what looks best or is considered ‘best practice’.
 |

##

##  Lessons learned from other programs

In designing and applying the LLCAC program, TVI has and will draw on its own organizational experiences and those of other related programs from within PNG and from other countries, notably the Coalitions for Change (CfC) program in the Philippines.[[14]](#footnote-14) Some of the important lessons learnt are highlighted below:

* The CfC program identified that the ability to identify and introduce transformative change is based primarily on a set of principles and practices that include:

The constant testing of a proposed theory of change.

The rapid pace of the ‘analysis-action’ cycle.

The willingness to be challenged and admit mistakes.

The understanding that unexpected events can be opportunities to introduce change.

The ability to harness the power of other leaders, coalitions, and networks.

* For programs like this to be successful, the relationship between the donor and the implementing partner is key. In the case of TAF they have a flexible and responsive relationship with DFAT rather than the traditional contracting agreement. Settling realistic targets with the donor about what can be achieved through a program like this is important. In programs where this has not been the case ongoing funding has been a challenge once the key advocate within the donor leaves.
* Demand and supply forces need to work together. Governments become more accountable and responsive when state-led reform and social mobilisation occur together. This indicates a need to work across the supply and demand sides in alliances and platforms, and to identify issues with the potential to galvanise action across government and civil society.
* Instead of importing ‘best practice’, programs should facilitate space for local problem solving and collective action, building on existing concerns, initiatives and skills. Special attention must be paid towards the integrity, quality and ties to grassroots in selecting civil society partners to work with.
* An entirely training-led approach to building capacity is unlikely to achieve its objectives. Effective capacity building and organizational development is generally best achieved through a combination of learning, coaching, mentoring and implementation support.
* Broaden out from a narrow focus on CSOs and citizens’ voice-to engage with the middle class, business and religious groups who have potentially greater say in what the government does.
* The willingness to acknowledge and admit that a reform may not seem technically sound or is not politically possible at a certain point in time, is a critical element of the success of the program.

TVI has taken these lessons learnt into account whilst designing the proposed program. Additional lessons learnt, from similar programs which have also been considered are captured in Annex B.

##  Rationale for Australian/DFAT engagement

LLCAC will contribute to the objectives of the Papua New Guinea Comprehensive Strategic and Economic Partnership (CSEP) that was jointly signed by the governments of PNG and Australia in August 2020.[[15]](#footnote-15) LLCAC is positioned to contribute to three of the six pillars of CSEP: Strong Democracies for a Stable Future (Pillar 1); Economic Partnership for Prosperity (Pillar 3); and Social and Human Development (Pillar 5).

Pillar 1 includes commitment “to supporting the full participation of all people in our societies, irrespective of gender, ethnicity, disability, religion or belief or any other attribute, consistent with our international human rights obligation” and includes a strong focus on promoting gender equality, and recognition of the fundamental role of accountable institutions for service delivery and good governance. Pillar 3 covers a wide range of economic matters. TVI, in consultation with DFAT, will discuss how LLCAC can best contribute to achieve the objectives presented in Pillar 3. Pillar 5 focuses on strengthening partnerships on education and health – the former being a core strategic focus of TVI’s activities. All three pillars reflect themes that are central to TVI’s strategic plan. Over time and using its unique approach to building coalitions, LLCAC is well positioned to grow into a program that can support and facilitate reforms in key areas that contribute to the shared objectives of CSEP.

Given the flexible design of LLCAC, it can also be considered as a program that can help tackle the social and economic impacts of the COVID-19 pandemic. Within the framework of TVI’s strategic plan, LLCAC can play a role in supporting Australia’s development response to the pandemic as detailed in Papua New Guinea COVID-19 Development Response Plan[[16]](#footnote-16).

As an emerging NGO partner, TVI’s objectives are strongly aligned with DFAT’s NGO engagement objectives, especially promoting effective governance through coalitions for reform, accountability, and inclusive decision making. TVI also seeks to engage communities; promote gender equality; foster effective collaboration, partnerships and multi-stakeholder approaches; and encourage innovation – all objectives reflected in the DFAT’s strategy for its partnership with NGOs[[17]](#footnote-17).

##  Alignment with GoPNG priorities

The design of the program and its components have been shaped by taking into consideration the National Goals and Directive Principles[[18]](#footnote-18) particularly integral human development, equality and participation, natural resources and the environment and Papua New Guineans ways. Activities within each program component will promote all areas of the National Goals and Directive Principles. When informing the approach and development issues that the program will address, particular emphasis will be placed on Papua New Guinean ways and Melanesian forms of consensus building, particularly on bottom-up approaches to problem solving. LLCAC will contribute towards PNG’s development strategies towards sustainable and inclusive economic growth to achieve the overall aim of the Vision 2050 for PNG to be *Smart, Wise, Fair and Happy Society by 2050*. The implementation of the program components will strengthen the key pillars of Visions 2050 around human capital development, youth and people empowerment, institutional development and service delivery, environmental sustainability. These are also key pillars under the Development Strategic Plan and Medium-Term Development Plan.

# Program description

## 2.1 Program objective and expected outcomes

LLCAC is an integral part of TVI’s strategy. TVI’s strategy (2019-2022) has three strategic goals namely: empower our people to realize their full potential, facilitate active involvement of TVI members in sustainable development initiatives and ensure a sustainable organisation that promotes the culture and values of TVI. By the end of 2022, TVI’s strategy (of which LLCAC is one component) aims to have implemented 20 projects driving Clean Generation related social change, 6 Clean Generation issue-based movements or coalitions and to have influenced 6 policies and/or political platforms related to Clean Generation issues. The LLCAC program will ensure that TVI can achieve these indicators of success.

LLCAC builds upon TVI’s experience over the past three years of implementing community-led projects and issue-based coalitions. Community-led projects have highlighted to TVI what issues are most important to young people in PNG, and what issues should be considered under LLCAC. Issue-based networking and dialogue has provided TVI with lessons on what works and what doesn’t in helping to bring about transformative change. TVI wishes to build upon these experiences (detailed in Box 2) and to further expand this approach.

Box 2: Shifting to collective action

|  |
| --- |
| In line with its theory of change, TVI has shifted its focus from individual leadership development programs to an explicit focus on collective action to bring about sustainable change. The list below provides examples of recent work in this regard:* Formation of a youth coalition to work on issues that are of joint concern. The Youth Coalition comprised over 40 organisations. Steering committee was made up of 4 committed organisations who were invested in committing time and resources to coordinate established and regular meetings held at the Hub. The organisations that make up the Youth Coalition consist of Church Groups, NGOs, business groups, Youth Communities (located in both urban and rural communities), TVI Partners State Universities, High Schools, Primary Schools and Provincial Student Groups. These groups cover over 10 Provinces in the country.
* Design and dissemination of a survey by the Youth Coalition to ensure that the views of young people were fed into the call for public submissions by the CLRC for special interest groups in Parliament along with “Review of Laws on Use and Abuse of Alcohol and Drugs” by the Constitutional Law Reform Commission. The surveys were passed through the youth coalition network and within 4 weeks, 12 Provinces were reached with over 900 survey forms completed.
* Surveys carried out on employment pathways for youth in rural communities in the Highlands and in Central Province. This was carried out mostly through paper printed forms and youth leaders travelled from village communities reaching their networks. Youth reached in these communities were over 2,000 young people and the findings of the data presented at youth forums. It was the first time in Nipa-Kutubu, Southern Highlands where this was carried out, for a youth forum to be organised where the young people were able to have their voices heard and speak to employment and work barriers that affected them directly. Representatives from the District, Provincial Offices were present to hear the presentations at both youth forums. The organisations which were included to access the youth network included Churches, Ward Councillors and sports groups which are widely popular in the villages.
* Development of actions on how to tackle gender-based violence and sorcery accusation relation violence on university campuses and community youth groups through discussions with youth coalition members including raising awareness, campaigning through creative platforms like film, arts festivals and photography.
 |

Crucially, over the past couple of years, TVI has seen that there is a real appetite amongst organisations and groups to work together to solve issues however due to resourcing it has been prohibitive for groups or coalitions to form and use resources outside of their own programs for collective action. There has also been, in some instances, mistrust which does not allow for organisations to share ideas and work together. TVI was able to bring youth-related organisations together because of the trust that it has built over 14 years’ of operation and a hub space in Port Moresby. TVI has also learnt that when bringing different groups together it is important that relationships are maintained and that space is given for groups to present on their respective programs. By doing so groups can learn about the works of others and can see where they may be able to add value/support each other. Investing in understanding what each partner does and brings is critical to fostering coalition formation. This learning will feed into implementation of LLCAC.

##  Project components

LLCAC will have three major components aimed at achieving the intermediate outcomes: developmental leadership and coalition development, policy reform and implementation and development of spaces for informed public debate. Table 1 outlines LLCAC’s simplified program theory of change. A problem tree and detailed program theory of change are presented in Annex D and E respectively. For ease of reading and clarity, this document presents three distinct components. In reality the components are however closely intertwined and feed off each other.

In essence, TVI will seek to identify the root causes of the problem through detailed analysis and exploration and then, through supporting and fostering developmental leadership and coalitions, will test, reflect and refine solutions – adapting and learning over-time to bring about reforms. Progress in public policy reforms will come about if individual and organisations’ capacities are enhanced and nurtured, and spaces for dialogue are supported.

Table 1: LLCAC theory of change

|  |  |
| --- | --- |
| **Impact** | Contributing to stable and inclusive economic and social development based on the national goals and directive principles of the Constitution. |
| **End of program outcomes** | Progress in public policy reforms. |
| **Intermediate outcomes** | * Capability increased in TVI, TVI partners and TVI alumni to promote and support application of collective action approach.
* Targeted reforms, particularly around policy implementation, are adopted by relevant agencies.
* Space for informed public debate expanded in prioritized areas.
 |
| **Outputs** | * Capabilities of leaders developed, enhanced and supported.
* Increased level of public awareness about priority development issues.
* Technically sound and politically feasible reforms identified and pursued.
 |
| **Inputs and activities** | * Design and delivery of training and mentoring sessions.
* National and local led dialogues on priority development issues.
* Purposeful meetings and discussions with networks, coalitions and government to identify and work on reforms.
 |

### Component 1: Developmental leadership and coalition development

TVI’s theory of change (Box 3) highlights the importance of developmental leadership and coalitions as the drivers of positive social change. Developmental leadership is seen to involve collective action towards locally owned, inclusive policy and institutional change for the public good. As noted by the Developmental Leadership Programme, developmental leadership is a political process, “involving the legitimacy, authority and ﻿and capacity to mobilise people and resources, and to forge coalitions, in pursuit of developmental goals”.

With this in mind, LLCAC will continue to support developmental leadership and coalition development as a means to enable public policy reforms. As noted by Leftwich and Wheeler (2011)[[19]](#footnote-19), “*local leaderships and coalitions* [are] the key mechanisms for resolving collective action problems by building and reshaping the formal and informal institutions that promote or frustrate sustainable growth, security, political stability and inclusive social development”. This approach has also been shown to be effective in other coalition-focused programs.

Box 3: TVI's theory of change

|  |
| --- |
| TVI identifies developmental leaders who are authorizers in their respective contexts, influencers and partners who share a common developmental goal. TVI nourishes their voice by giving them tools, training and mentoring aimed at supporting them to solve challenges in their spaces of influence. Individuals and groups engage and lead independently in their communities and organisations, becoming more equipped, more connected and more effective. Movements, coalitions and projects driving positive social change emerge and thrive. Individuals and groups have used their ability, power and privilege to create an inclusive society based on principles and values from the Constitution. |

Under LLCAC, TVI will identify and support emerging and established developmental leaders to form coalitions and networks to tackle issues under component 2. LLCAC will build on work carried out by TVI through its Clean Generation movement, a movement focused on inclusive sustainable development. LLCAC will interact with members of the Clean Generation, utilising and building alliances and networks from within the group. TVI will support women and men but will seek to increase the number of women developmental leaders where possible. Individuals are likely to be sourced from within TVI’s network of alumni and partners. Crucially, TVI will support leaders to effectively use adaptive and politically smart programming approaches, informed by PDIA training, to form coalitions and networks. The emphasis of support will *not* be on building individual capabilities but rather on fostering the skills, attributes, and knowledge to foster and sustain coalitions. Experience from the youth coalition work in 2018 demonstrated to TVI that what is needed is support, from a trusted organisation, to bring different groups and individuals together. This type of support has been insufficient in recent years. As required however TVI, through drawing on existing material hosted in the Hub, will also support leaders with their individual leadership needs.

A three-step iterative process will be adopted to support developmental leaders. Firstly, motivated and strategic leaders and organisations with the incentives, values, interest and opportunity to effect sustainable change will be identified and mobilised around issues for reform. Secondly, LLCAC will work with these developmental leaders to equip them with tools to adopt problem driven reform processes and how to think and work politically in the current power structures. Finally, developmental leaders will be able to contest and de-legitimise ideas that underpin the current formal and informal rules and reformulate them to shape sustainable outcomes. Leadership enhancement will be supported through PDIA training, development and use of a reform toolkit on thinking and working politically and mentoring. Learning by doing has been found to be more effective than learning by teaching as means of applying new ideas and practice and TVI will support this approach to capacity enhancement through its support in the formation and sustaining of coalitions and networks.

To support the emergence, focus and sustainability of coalitions and networks to effect change, TVI will use the PDIA approach based on developmental leadership as opposed to a campaign-approach. The PDIA approach provides tools and a framework to work through complex challenges and emphasises the use of adaptive management and entrepreneurial logic to introduce transformative reforms. Box 4 provides information on TVI’s experience in building coalitions to date.

At the end of the leadership and coalition program component, LLCAC hopes to see more leaders, including women, and organisations using politically astute and adaptive principles and practices to build robust and inclusive coalitions. Leaders and coalitions will also be testing, reflecting and learning from actions to bring about change – and adapting as needed. Noting that TVI already has existing leadership development material, and has commenced discussions with the Building State Capability program at the Harvard Kennedy School of Government to use its PDIA material, modest resources are required for this component. However it is a critical step to ensure that motivated individuals and organisations are supported and fostered to act on reform opportunities.

Box 4: Coalition building

|  |
| --- |
| TVI brought 23 youth stakeholders together to form the youth coalition in 2018. Collectively the coalition reached over 165,113 and worked across 10 provinces. Focus areas varied from governance, GBV to health and community development with strategies and programs in several fields including the delivery of training, education and advocacy. The three main reasons organisations came together was that they wanted to gain and share knowledge, create partnerships and increase their political voice for youth issues. The shared purpose was to create a forum to network and share information, space to develop ideas and partnerships and a platform to amplify voices. |

### 2.2.2 Component 2: Policy reform and implementation

In the first year of implementation LLCAC will work on 2-3 public policy reforms. In subsequent years, the number of reforms will increase, utilising lessons learned from year 1. Reforms refer to specific policies, rules, guidelines and other written instructions that by the end of the program are issued and implemented by government. Progress refers to the aspiration that the program will adjust incentives to such a degree that developmental progress is obtained at some scale and sustainability.

LLCAC will support the development, introduction, amendment and implementation of policies that deliver change on economic growth, governance, law and order and social development in PNG through supporting the establishment and/or strengthening of coalitions of individuals, CSOs, government, private sector, churches and other stakeholders. To facilitate progress in public policy reforms, the team will follow an iterative process:

1. Identify and agree with TVI Board and DFAT on a major development problem based on the following criteria:

a. A binding constraint to inclusive development which may be due to issues related to policy formulation, legal framework or implementation.

b. TVI’s ability to identify and secure individuals willing to invest their time to build or support networks to pursue reforms.

c. TVI’S ability to identify and work with key authorizers in government.

d. The development problem is of concern to young people in PNG, the core group that TVI works with.

e. Consistency with PNG’s national goals and directive principles and development priorities outlined in Vision 2020, STaRS and MTDP.

f. Consistency with current and future Australian Aid investment plans in PNG.

Several development problems could satisfy the criteria outlined above and therefore TVI will maintain a list of potential issues that could be pursued and will revisit and amend the list on a rolling basis. Box 5 presents some of the most pressing issues that have already been identified as requiring action. These issues were identified through several surveys, focus group discussions and interviews. During the inception phase of LLCAC, the list will be further refined and one-two areas will be pursued in the first year of implementation.

Box 5: Pressing issues

|  |
| --- |
| Through TVI’s work in the universities two key issues that we would like to focus on are: * Public Safety – focus on issues of public safety both at UPNG;
* Strengthen Governance of Universities - work with a coalition of public universities to strengthen the governance of university student councils.

Through TVI’s partnership with Digicel PNG Foundation and the Education Department we would like to focus on:* Education Implementation Reform – two areas of focus under this (a) Free Education Policy and (b) setting of framework within the education sector for digital education.

Through TVI’s partnership with the Department of Justice and Attorney General (DJAG) we would like to focus on: * Sorcery Accusation and Related Violence National Action Plan (SARV NAP) – develop the digital component for the SARV NAP activities and assist DJAG officers in building capabilities for coordination and governance work in the SARV space. Further work to support the SNAP Committee and the implementation in hot spot provinces.
* Drugs and Alcohol – focus on policing and compliance of regulations around drug and alcohol consumption.
* Child Protection– target effectiveness of child protection in PNG focusing on the implementation of the current Lukautim Pikinini Act and suggest reforms.

During year 1 TVI will also investigate the possibility of building on work with parliamentary committees and gender-based violence.  |

2. LLCAC will conduct initial technical and political analysis (this includes diagnosing policy failure and agenda setting) to understand the interests and incentives that explain the current situation. LLCAC will work with developmental leaders who are motivated and strategic individuals with the right set of incentives, values, interests and opportunities through this process. Team members may come from Clean Generation members, TVI alumni (KommUNITY) and/or outside these groups as appropriate. The analysis, utilising PDIA approaches, will be used to understand the problem and to then develop appropriate solutions.

1. LLCAC partners will present technically sound and politically feasible solutions to allies in civil society, academia and government as appropriate. This will be done through a range of activities such as workshops, informal conversations and roundtable discussions.

1. LLCAC will amend solutions to the issue taking on board feedback and suggestions from those consulted. New solutions may be devised or the root causes of the issue may be reconsidered and re-evaluated. Steps 3 and 4 may be repeated numerous times noting that the answer is not (and cannot be) known upfront and that there may not be a single answer. Figure 1 outlines how this iterative, adaptive way of working will work under LLCAC. As part of this way of working, TVI will develop reform theories of change which will align with the program theory of change and will be utilised during monitoring, evaluation and learning activities.

Figure 1: Adaptive solutions



As LLCAC is a new approach for TVI, The Asia Foundation (TAF) will provide mentoring and coaching support during the first year of operation. TAF have been chosen due to their successful CfC program in the Philippines. In particular, TAF will support TVI to manage and review reform agendas and will provide mentoring on how to think through the reform process.

### 2.2.3 Component 3: Spaces for informed public debate

Spaces for improved public discourse are critical for alternative ideas around solving development problems to be advanced, contested and considered. As noted by Hudson et al, “coalitions' power and effectiveness partly hinges on their ability to contest and de-legitimise one set of ideas and legitimise an alternative set. Through this process of contestation, leaders and coalitions challenge, subvert and reformulate institutions in ways that are perceived as locally legitimate and sustainable”. With this in mind, under LLCAC, TVI will identify where there are already spaces for informed public debate and will support them. For instance, TVI has hosted gatherings at the hub, has dedicated spaces at three universities and has held lectures on university campuses to explore issues with the public.

Where there are insufficient spaces for dialogue, to support components 1 and 2, TVI will consider what needs to be created, paying attention to both content and delivery channels. TVI’s learning management online platform will be drawn upon alongside publishing knowledge products. The online platform will be used to test thoughts and gauge views from members on key issues. In creating spaces for informed public debate TVI will also look to draw upon its new TV channel and social media. WhatsApp groups such as PNG think tank, PNG Lawyers’ groups, provincial development forums and Facebook groups will also be used to help understand where the public discourse is on particular issues and potential solutions. A lecture series may also take place in partnership with the UPNG’s School of Business and Public Policy. The series would be themed around issues of reform that TVI identifies as being critical to build public dialogue around e.g. elections. An annual dialogue on the state of affairs in PNG is another forum that may also be utilised to improve spaces for informed public debate.

# 3. Implementation arrangements

## 3.1 Implementation structure

LLCAC will be implemented by a small team within TVI, with staffing levels growing over the duration of the program depending on how successful the team is. As required, TVI will also draw upon the expertise of subject matter experts, particularly to support implementation of Component 2. An organogram of the proposed positions is provided in Figure 2. The TVI LLCAC implementation team will lead the conceptualisation and development, implementation, and monitoring of strategies, activities and outputs relating to the three components.

****

LLCAC will have a flexible program implementation structure which will allow for resources to be re-allocated as and when the need arises. The Policy and Program team which consists of the Policy and Program Manager, Program Officers and graduate Interns will work as a pool of resources that can be organised flexibly under the leadership of the LLCAC Head of Program.

A pool of subject matter experts will be established to allow them to work directly with the implementation team as and when particular reform areas require input from subject matter experts. One of the subject matter experts will be a gender expert who will work with the MEL team on gender aspects of the program; their inputs will decrease over time as the capacity of the TVI staff to deliver on gender-related matters is built.

The Policy and Program Manager will lead coordination efforts of the program team i.e., policy work, data analysis, and operational aspects of LLCAC. Program officers will assist implementation of the three program component activities. The Communications and Marketing Manager will be engaged to assist with media and communication work for LLCAC. The Finance Manager will be responsible for financial matters and ensuring expenditure of the budget is within the required standards. The MEL Manager will be responsible for implementation of the LLCAC MEL Plan/Framework including ensuring LLCAC work has impact on gender and social inclusion aspects. The MEL Manager will also be responsible to conduct gender and social inclusion analysis for all LLCAC activities. The Data Officer will be responsible to analyse data relating to LLCAC implementation activities to support LLCAC program implementation. The Administration Officer will be responsible for the operational and administrative aspects of LLCACs day-to-day operations.

To support significant changes with the organisation, LLCAC will also have a dedicated People Manager (full-time), dealing with human resources matters and a Change Manager[[20]](#footnote-20) who will work part-time in the first year of implementation. The Office Manager will be in charge of the office, including all admin and logistics for travel and programs. The Executive Assistant will work directly with the Head of LLCAC and will support in managing key stakeholders and meetings[[21]](#footnote-21).

LLCAC falls within the coalitions work stream for TVI. The Head of LLCAC will be part of the TVI management whose primary focus is to have oversight and drive LLCAC work and all operational aspects of LLCAC. The TVI Operations Director will continue to have oversight over finance in consultation with the Head of LLCAC. The finance role will devote 60% of time to LLCAC and is in addition to the existing finance role that is performed with regard to all other TVI programs.

The TVI LLCAC Head of Program will have oversight on operations and cross-cross cutting issues. She will work directly on the Harvard and TAF partnerships and will be responsible for the quality delivery of outputs under the program. The TVI LLCAC Head of Program and TVI Executive Director will ensure coordination between different parts of the organisation and have equal accountability for ensuring program delivery, quality of outputs and results, sound budget management, and risk management. An operations manual will be developed for the program and will be utilised by all staff members. The LLCAC lead (Head of LLAC) role is proposed to be carried out by the nominated person w. The person has been an integral part of the establishment of TVI and has experience in both the government and private sector.

Both TVI LLCAC Head of Program and TVI’s Executive Director will report to the Joint Steering Committee (see section 4.1) where decisions are made with regards to finance, human resource, risks and overall performance. They are also responsible for keeping DFAT counterparts informed of significant development in their areas of responsibility. LLCAC will operate from the 1st Floor of Cuthbertson House in Port Moresby. This office space is able to house all working staff. The office space will also cater for meeting space to allow staff to host meetings.

## 3.2 Implementation plan

An implementation plan has been developed for LLCAC that covers a five-year period (see Annex F). It is divided into three sections of activities – short term activities (6 months to 12 months), medium term activities (Years 2-3) and long-term activities. The short-term activities identified in the Implementation Plan are the LLCAC set up activities and reforms identified to be piloted to test out the change process set out in this design. The medium-term activities and long-term activities are not set in stone but are the main areas of focus which are all implementation activities for the three LLCAC Components.

# Governance and management

## 4.1 Governance and management arrangements

LLCAC governance and management will be operationalized through the structures of the Joint Steering Committee (JSC) and the Joint Program Management Team (PMT) (see figure 3).



## 4.2 Joint Steering Committee

The Joint Steering Committee (JSC) will provide strategic direction and oversight for LLCAC. The JSC will consist of representatives from DFAT, the Minister Counsellor Governance, the Counsellor Justice Accountability and Subnational and the DFAT PNG Governance Advisor. It will also consist of representatives from TVI, Board Chairperson and TVI Patron. The JSC will be co-chaired by DFAT Minister Counsellor and TVI’s Chairperson or their respective proxies. The JSC will meet on a six-monthly basis. The key responsibilities of the JSC include:

* Setting the strategic direction of LLCAC.
* Determining and agreeing on priority areas for the year and the duration of LLCAC.
* Reviewing and approving individual activity proposals based on the agreed criteria.
* Reviewing financial performance of the program, including consideration of audit results, and value for money analysis. Discontinuing or stopping activities that do not gain traction over a reasonable period or that pose risk to TVI and DFAT.
* Approving key policies and documents that will support LLCAC’s relevance, effectiveness, and efficiency.
* Determining and approving the pool of expert consultants who will be subject matter experts to assist with research and development of LLCAC reform packages as and when required by the Head of LLCAC and TVI LLCAC implementation team.
* Giving clearance or approval to communication products.
* Approving annual workplan and budget for LLCAC and assessing the mid-year and annual reports on LLCAC activities.
* Providing overall oversight of the program and ensuring that proportionate risks are taken by the program that are not detrimental to TVI or DFAT.

## 4.3 Partnership Strategic Advisory Panel (PSAP)

The Partnership Strategic Advisory Panel (PSAP) is the advisory body to the JSC. It will meet on a quarterly basis. The PSP will be composed of four regular members nominated by DFAT and TVI. Additional members may be invited to provide specific subject matter expertise as determined by the JSC. Specific criteria for determining PSAP members will be jointly defined by DFAT and TVI in the Operations Manual. The role of the PSAP members include:

* Providing high-quality strategic input, analysis, and quality assurance to support technical contestability of LLCAC reforms and strategies.
* Reviewing concept notes, work plans and progress reports, and strategy documents on their potential to achieve transformational impact, technical soundness, and political feasibility.
* Providing advice or inputs of substantive or strategic value to the overall direction and program strategies as may be instructed by the JSC.
* Sharing knowledge and information about the LLCAC program with other development professionals when appropriate occasions arise.

4.4 Program Management Teams

The *Joint* Program Management Team (JPMT) are the senior operational officers responsible for leading the operations of the LLCAC. It is also the Secretariat to the JSC. The JPMT will ensure work between the JSC and LLCAC are coordinated and implemented in a manner that is consistent with the strategic direction from the JSC. The JPMT will comprise of nominated representatives from the DFAT Governance Portfolio and TVI LLCAC Management Team.

The key responsibilities of the *TVI* PMT include:

* Ensuring effective implementation of LLCAC activities under the LLCAC Implementation Plan.
* Ensuring effective communication and coordination of activities between the LLCAC implementing team, the PMT and JSC.
* Ensuring implementation of decisions and instructions from the JSC.
* Providing coordination, administrative and technical support to the implementing teams:
	+ Progress and performance monitoring including budgeting.
	+ Quality assurance of concept notes, work plans, including gender, MERL and risk assessments.
	+ Organizing learning sessions and activities.
* Ensuring visibility of LLCAC with the appropriate risk mitigation strategies.
* Developing and communicating case studies on successes, impact, and lessons from LLCAC implementation.
* Ensuring all deliverables to DFAT are of good standard and meet DFAT quality requirements.
* Performing other related program management functions as and when required.
* Producing annual work plans, annual and mid-year reports and program risk management plans.

# 5. Monitoring, Evaluation, Research and Learning

As noted in Section 2, LLCAC will work in an adaptive, iterative manner as opposed to a traditional linear programming approach. To support this approach, LLCAC will have a robust MERL system, regular pause and reflect sessions, and will make amendments to ways of working as required. Interrogation of the program’s theory of change, and the theory of change for each issue pursued, will be a critical part of the MERL system. Interrogation on the theories of change will: assess progress, describe and support understanding on what the program is achieving, inform the management of activities and risks, keep track of lessons learned and changes in the context and increase understanding on how and why change is occurring.

Monitoring, learning and evaluation activities will be carried out on a regular basis by TVI staff, guided by an annual work plan. TVI’s internal monitoring will be augmented by a partnership with Harvard University who will provide regular analysis of elements of LLCAC through an action research approach that will also publicly share learnings from the program. [[22]](#footnote-22). Information produced by the MERL system will primarily be used to guide decisions by the Joint Steering Committee. It will also be used by the PMTs and implementation team to develop and deliver on component wor kplans. Significant information and evidence organised around key learning and evaluation questions will be summarised by the M&E Officer, following the standard reporting cycle for the Joint Steering Committee.

## 5.1 Monitoring system and tools

LLCAC’s monitoring system will monitor (and evaluate) results and observations from the program’s theory of change. This theory of change describes what LLCAC aims to achieve, how the program will achieve it, the underlying assumptions supporting the program’s theory of change and associated risks. In monitoring the theory of change TVI will record, monitor, evaluate and report information on inputs and strategies, immediate changes and contributions by LLCAC (outputs), attainment of the intermediate outcomes (and LLCAC’s contribution to any observable change) and the end of program outcome of progress in public policy reforms being implemented. The assumptions inherent in the theory of change will also be considered and reviewed on a regular basis to ensure they still hold true.

The system will also look to record and monitor *reform* theories of change. These theories of change will be developed upon identifying the key issue to be pursued and will continually evolve and change throughout the lifetime of the intervention as new issues are taken on and lessons learned. The monitoring system will integrate gender and inclusion considerations, examining effects on women, men, other genders and marginalised groups as appropriate. It will also be built and used in a way that is simple, pragmatic and supports decision making and conclusions.

To monitor inputs (of both the program and reform theories of change) TVI will use existing internal systems including financial systems, contract management, and activity tracking. To monitor activities and outputs, TVI will develop a series of standardised questions that will be asked throughout implementation and will use quantitative and quantitative methods to respond accordingly. Questions will consider efficiency, relevance, gender and social inclusion and effectiveness considerations – sample questions of which are included in Box 7. Specific indicators are not yet known but will be developed once reform areas have been identified and agreed upon.

Box 6: Sample output monitoring questions

|  |
| --- |
| * What strategies were used to influence and support policy reforms?
* What policies were supported and influenced and when?
* How many developmental leaders and coalitions were supported and/or developed? How many were women or from marginalised groups?
* What is the level of public awareness on the issue (baseline development) and how has it changed?
* How efficient is the management of resources?
 |

To monitor and evaluate progress towards achievement of intermediate outcomes, LLCAC will look to assess contribution to reforms and issues of sustainability. Evidence of contribution to short-term and long-term impact will be generated through the systematic collection of reform timelines to allow process tracing and the collation of stories and case studies. Sample questions which will be used (and further refined during implementation) are included in Box 8. The Most Significant Change technique will be used to support learning on where interventions have supported change.

Box 7: Sample outcome monitoring questions

|  |
| --- |
| * What reforms have been adopted by government agencies?
* How have adopted reforms changed incentives and behaviours?
* How many developmental leaders have acted on potential reform opportunities and how did they? Who are they?
* What are the spaces for public debate (baseline development) on the issue and how has it changed?
* In what instances did LLCAC contribute to the adoption of reforms?
 |

Finally, to assess progress towards achievement of the end of program outline, LLCAC will look to consider what reforms were implemented and the extent to which progress was made. Questions will also be considered on what differences have occurred in the lives of Papua New Guineans as a result of the reforms. Further detail is provided in Annex C, LLCAC’s Performance Assessment Framework which will be developed further during the first six months of implementation.

## 5.2 Evaluation and learning

Learning from doing is a critical aspect of the LLCAC approach and will be supported through regular pause and reflect sessions held on a six-monthly basis. These sessions will support reflections on what is working well, what isn’t and how interventions should adapt. Pause and reflect sessions will be run by the PMT and components leads, with reflections shared with the joint steering committee to inform decision making. External support may also be drawn upon as needed. Key learnings from pause and reflect sessions will also be used to inform an evaluation of the program. At least one independent progress review is expected during the life of the program.

##  Research

At particular junctures of implementation, research will be conducted on how change, taking a coalition for change approach, is happening in PNG, and the appropriateness of TVI’s theory of change. This work will require reviewing TVI’s theory of change and evaluating progress during implementation to ensure that our understanding on how change occurs is accurate. Case-studies will also be undertaken on particular issues or reforms and would be made available on TVI’s learning management systems.

## 5.4 Communications

Data and information from LLCAC will be shared internally throughout the governance structures of the program and, as appropriate, will be disseminated publicly. Information shared externally may include knowledge products as research papers, briefing documents and stories. A communication plan will be developed in accordance with DFAT branding rules and agreed-upon visibility guidelines.

# 6. Gender, disability and other cross-cutting issues

## 6.1 Gender equality

PNG faces a wide range of challenges in relation to improving development outcomes for women, PWD, and other disadvantaged groups. Due to a high estimated maternal mortality ratio, low women’s share of seats in parliament, low rates of women’s participation in the labour force, and low rates of girls achieving some form of secondary education, PNG ranked 161 out of 189 countries in UNDP’s latest global Gender Inequality Index.[[23]](#footnote-23) High levels of gender-based violence present significant barriers to women in all aspects of life from travel to employment to accessing services or participating in civic affairs, with data suggesting that two-thirds of women in rural and urban areas are affected by domestic violence and 62% of sexual abuse cases have involved children.[[24]](#footnote-24)

International evidence suggests that for gender norms to change, inequality and exclusion need to be explicitly addressed and that some sectors can play a greater role than others in supporting change, i.e., the health sector (ensuring women have control over their fertility); education (ensuring girls and children with disability can safely access education and have equal opportunities with boys to access vocational and opportunities); justice (ensuring that women and girls are safe from GBV and where they are survivors have access to justice; governance (ensuring women and persons with disability enjoy the same civic and human rights as men); and economic sectors (ensuring women are economically empowered).[[25]](#footnote-25)

TVI will promote gender equality as a priority theme throughout LLCAC by ensuring that gender concerns are either integrated as an important objective within a specific reform issue or that a reform issue itself has some aspect of gender equality as a principal objective. Particular attention will be paid to seeking out opportunities that can support reforms related to DFAT’s three priority pillars of enhancing women’s voice in decision making, leadership, and peace building; promoting women’s economic empowerment; ending violence against women and girls. LLCAC will explore potential opportunities for working with DFAT’s sectoral and other programs, such as the Church Partnership Program’s support for gender equality theology, as well as the regional Pacific Women program. TVI will promote diversity in the membership of LLCAC coalition teams, ensuring that women, PWD, and other underrepresented groups participate in identifying and implementing reform strategies.

Given the importance of gender equality as a specific but not principal reason for undertaking LLCAC, the assigned OECD/DAC gender policy marker for LLCAC is “significant”. A key early activity during the inception phase will be the development of a gender equality strategy that will guide efforts to mainstream and operationalize gender equality across LLCAC. The strategy will include the identification of specific gender indicators that will be included as part of the MERLA framework. Gender and disability disaggregated data will be collected wherever possible.

As part of its institutional development efforts TVI will also strengthen its HR policies to emphasize the importance of diversity in hiring across all levels of the organization.

## 6.2 Disability inclusiveness

Consultations with networks of persons with disability (PWD) on other DFAT programs have confirmed that PWD have limited access to decision making processes in society.[[26]](#footnote-26) There has been no specific study on the prevalence of disability in PNG but applying the WHO’s global estimate of 15% of the population[[27]](#footnote-27) suggests that more than a million people in PNG are living with some form of disability or impairment.

LLCAC presents an opportunity for TVI to step up its support for PWD. In support of GOPNG’s national policy on disability[[28]](#footnote-28) and consistent with DFAT’s agency-wide strategy on disability[[29]](#footnote-29) and the recently issued good practice note on disability inclusion,[[30]](#footnote-30) TVI will support a twin-track approach of mainstreaming PWD as appropriate within LLCAC operations and targeted reform initiatives designed specifically to benefit people with disabilities. TVI will explore and promote opportunities for both engaging and supporting networks of PWD to develop their voice and agency and contribute to development policy and decision making through their engagement in LLCAC-supported activities.

PWD have been integrated into LLCAC’s theory of change and MERLA activities will include collection of disaggregated data on PWD as appropriate.

## 6.3 Climate change

PNG is ranked as the eighth most vulnerable country in the world to the risk of climate change.[[31]](#footnote-31) Highland regions are susceptible to extreme weather events, such as heavy rainfall, which are likely to increase the occurrence of landslides and inland flooding. Coastal regions, islands, and the low-lying atoll areas are mostly vulnerable to extreme weather events, storm surge, sea-level rise, and coastal inundation.

With more than three-quarters of the population living in rural areas, the risk of exposure to natural hazards is very high. Most of PNG’s rural population relies on subsistence farming for livelihoods with limited capacity to protect themselves from climate-induced natural disasters. The rugged mountainous terrain as well as limited access to basic infrastructures, such as roads and bridges, has hindered access to health care, education and broader development opportunities. Women are particularly vulnerable due to the lack of access to land, income, credit and other resources. This lack of access impedes their ability to cope with climate stresses and disasters.

Following are the future predicted changes in climate for PNG:[[32]](#footnote-32)

* El Niño and La Niña events will continue to occur, but there is little consensus on whether these events will change in intensity or frequency
* Annual mean temperatures and extremely high daily temperatures will continue to rise
* Average rainfall is projected to increase in most areas, along with more extreme rain events
* Droughts are projected to decline in frequency
* Sea level will continue to rise
* Ocean acidification is expected to continue
* The risk of coral bleaching is expected to increase
* Tropical cyclones are projected to be less frequent but more intense.

Given the implications of climate change on future opportunities for young people, especially those living in rural communities whose livelihoods depend on the sustainable management of natural resources, TVI will explore ways to integrate climate change perspectives into reform issues as appropriate.

## 6.4 Private sector

Engaging private sector organizations can act both to ensure the sustainability of a reform and participate as important, often well connected, members of reform coalitions. By ensuring that reforms supported by LLCAC become part of the everyday practice of government bureaucracy or are locked in through market dynamics, the interplay between firms and consumers can be positively changed with reforms becoming more sustainable and more difficult to rollback.

Participation of the private sector contributes to building better business and investment environments and supporting growth in specific markets by removing barriers to efficient market operation and increasing competition in key sectors of the economy – all of which are consistent with the strategic objectives of Australia’s aid investments in private sector development.[[33]](#footnote-33)

LLCAC will enable TVI to further deepen and expand its existing partnerships with private sector organizations. For example, TVI activities that promote youth engagement and leadership activities have been well supported by organizations related to the extractive industries, especially Oil Search Foundation and ExxonMobil. In addition, TVI is in the process of establishing a long-term partnership with Digicel Foundation that includes the broadcasting of educational programming over a newly-established TV channel.

LLCAC can help to leverage TVI’s engagement with private sector coalition members as a crucial voice to underscore the importance of the reform to a specific sector and will enable TVI to engage the private sector by tapping professional and personal business networks, such as the Business Coalition for Women, as well as undertaking careful analysis of the private sector’s stake in specific reforms.

## 6.5 Innovation

TVI was established as a youth-driven organization more than 10 years ago with a fundamentally innovative perspective on how to engage students in PNG’s tertiary institutions. Adopting innovative approaches to respond to the emerging social, economic, and political challenges confronting the country remains central to TVI’s core values.

LLCAC presents an opportunity to further deepen TVI’s innovative mindset and expand to new areas of reform. In doing so, TVI will draw on a substantial body of knowledge and experience from both within PNG and globally that has used a framework of “politically informed, locally-led and adaptive responses”[[34]](#footnote-34) to promote reform. Drawing on experience from regional and global programs, e.g,. DFAT’s Pacific Leadership Program,[[35]](#footnote-35) TVI will apply the principles of adaptive management to guide implementation of LLCAC.

In practice, this will entail “thinking and working politically” to help develop strategies that build the necessary political will to institute change. TVI will use a range of tools such as locally-informed political economy analysis, stakeholder mapping, risk analysis, horizon scanning to help understand the context for reform and to develop a working theory of change. Given the emphasis TVI places on supporting change to build the long-term capacity of public institutions to deliver better development outcomes, rather than coming with pre-determined solutions to pre-determined problems, LLCAC will use problem-driven iterative adaptation[[36]](#footnote-36) to identify and analyze complex problems that are holding back development and find local solutions tailored to the local political and institutional context.

In the initial years of implementation TVI will focus on developing a working model for LLCAC that will build on TVI’s existing partners and reform agendas. Over time LLCAC can be made available to help build the capacity of teams in other sectoral and thematic programs to better understand processes of change and ways to build coalitions to achieve change.

# 7. Budget

## 7.1 Financial plan

|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
| **DIRECT COSTS** | **Year 1** | **Year 2** | **Year 3** | **Year 4** | **Year 5** | **TOTAL** | % of total |
| Component 1 |  618,817  |  837,079  |  883,562  |  1,022,904  |  955,660  |  4,318,022  | 16% |
| Component 2 |  963,967  |  1,720,173  |  2,057,974  |  2,384,379  |  2,414,268  |  9,540,761  | 35% |
| Component 3 |  376,850  |  427,284  |  457,375  |  475,670  |  494,697  |  2,231,877  | 8% |
| MERLA |  675,531  |  753,330  |  939,631  |  828,321  |  1,039,237  |  4,236,049  | 16% |
| Finance & Operations | 1,287,243  |  943,013  |  1,030,133  |  1,019,962  |  1,060,761  |  5,341,112  | 20% |
| **TOTAL** **DIRECT COSTS** | **3,922,407**  |  **4,680,878**  |  **5,368,674**  |  **5,731,238**  |  **5,964,623**  |  **25,667,820**  | 95% |
| **Management Fee** |  **196,120**  |  **234,044**  |  **268,434**  |  **286,562**  |  **298,231**  |  **1,283,391**  | 5% |
| **TOTAL COSTS** |  **4,118,527**  |  **4,914,922**  |  **5,637,108**  |  **6,017,800**  |  **6,262,854**  |  **26,951,211**  | 100% |

The estimated cost of the proposed program for a five-year period is PNG Kina 26,951,211

In the budget total salaries of K8.7m have been apportioned as follows: Management, Communication and Marketing and Program Management have been distributed equally to each of Components 1,2, 3 and MERLA. The MERLA salaries are directly allocated as are Operations. It is assumed that some year 1 activities or staff appointments will not commence at the start of the program. Years 2-5 are assumed to be fully functional.

Component 1 supports building the network and capacities of identified developmental leaders and includes costs such as training fees, development of toolkits (years 1 and 4), and travel, accommodation and communication associated with networking. This represents 16% of total costs. Component 2 funds preparing concept notes and work plans for the identified reform issues and then the implementation of the reform issues work plan. It is the largest component with 35% of the budget. Because the scope, scale and nature of each reform issue is not identified at this stage a lump sum has been allowed on an annual basis. Component 3 provides opportunities and space for discussion and debate. The activities to be funded include published material and opportunities for face-to-face lectures and dialogue.

The support for the MERL activities is particularly significant for this proposal. TVI has in the past engaged consultants to undertake this function. The budget including salaries represents 16% of the budget. The proposal recommends the appointment of two staff (Monitoring and Evaluation Manager and Data Officer) and the budget provides direct support to develop capacity in these roles. The operating budget funds the cost of data collection, and dissemination as well as independent mid-term and final reviews.

To commence year 1 there will be 9 positions including management, program, monitoring and evaluation and communications staff engaged directly in the program. These will be supported by 4 operational staff who will share time between LLCAC and other TVI programs. This includes appointment of a human resources officer, a role new to TVI. In addition, the LLCAC will engage a driver, cleaner and junior administration officer. The number of staff is expected to grow to 18 at a total cost of around K8.7m. The program will also be supported by graduate interns and an allowance has been included to, where necessary, engage external consultants. It is expected that the program will draw heavily on technical assistance and a total of K4.8m (18%) is included in estimates for the Components and the MERLA budgets. Support will be drawn on to produce analytical reports, case studies, visits of external advisors focused on learning lessons and reflection. As well as MERLA, technical expertise will be drawn on for strengthening the programs gender equality, and inclusion approaches. These figures are seen in the context of a program which is largely organisational and involves very modest asset requirements.

The total travel budget is estimated at K2.4m (9%) comprising some international travel for external technical assistance (K.76m) but primarily domestic travel (K1.7m) to support the regional reach of the program.

The LLCAC program will have a discreet space within the TVI office, and the program management section of the budget covers all direct office costs. Also included are the costs to support and run the three governance bodies supporting LLCAC. The Operations budget includes purchase of assets required to establish the program, including office furniture, some refurbishment to create a meeting space and two vehicles (one as part of the LLCAC Head salary package) as well as annual operating costs. The total cost is estimated at K3.3m excluding salaries or 20% of the total budget. The provision for purchase of the office equipment, which includes spaces for volunteers and visiting experts, is phased in recognition of staggered staff start dates.

The LLCAC program will operate within the wider body of TVI and the 5% management fee will make a contribution to the costs which indirectly support the functioning of programs, including executive, board and audit costs.

The full budget, available at Annex J, includes the notes and assumptions. Some key assumptions include that domestic and international travel will be possible for at least a major part of the 5-year program and that the estimated costs remain relatively consistent. An annual inflation rate of 4% has been applied to years 2-5 and the total costs converted from PNG kina to Australian dollars at an exchange rate of PGK 1: AUD 3.6 These assumptions can be tested and agreed as part of the contractual process. It is noted that changes in the Kina to AUD exchange rates may create a funding surplus or shortfall which could affect implementation and achievement of program objectives. LLCAC funding and budgeting will follow Australia’s financial year.

## 7.2 Fraud management

TVI currently has fraud mitigation policies and procedures incorporated in the Finance Manual, and the Code of Conduct which all staff are required to sign. In anticipation of increased staff numbers, a substantially larger budget and greater stakeholder reach, TVI will develop a standalone Fraud Policy. This policy will reflect that increased staff numbers allow for greater segregation of duties and stress the importance of appropriate and original support documentation. TVI will develop new finance templates to reflect the budgeting, operating, and reporting needs of the LLCAC program but essential checks and balances will remain in place.

TVI currently has an induction program for all new staff and volunteers. With the appointment of a human resources officer this program will continue and the follow up training will be strengthened. Staff training on risk mitigation and safeguarding policies and procedures will divided into shorter, more targeted sessions delivered biannually. This measure is being implemented to normalise and embed a culture of awareness and compliance and will be applied to all staff.

An integrated approach to the program financial management where program staff are actively encouraged to use financial management tools and finance staff can understand and actively contribute to program outcomes will help to build skills and transparency to minimise risks of financial mismanagement or fraud.

# 8. Risk Management and safeguards

## 8.1 Risk management

A risk and safeguards framework has been prepared that presents a preliminary assessment of potential risks to LLCAC and how these risks might be mitigated. Currently all risks listed in the risk matrix are rated medium. This implies the success of the current program in managing risks through collaboration and open communication between DFAT and TVI. This also implies that the existing controls are effective in managing the risks identified. The following are the major initial risks that have been identified:

* GoPNG seeks to restrict civic space and media independence that could create a major disruption to the investment
* Natural disasters, including pandemic that may impact on the safety and security of personnel
* TVI does not have the technical capacity to effectively implement an issues-based approach
* The grant from DFAT to TVI is subject to fraud, used outside intended purpose, or partners have inadequate safeguards and systems in place
* GoPNG accuses AHC of interfering in PNG's sovereignty through its support for TVI
* Gender equality and inclusion are not driven through all program components as a priority
* LLCAC coalitions do not lead to national level results at scale
* TVI staff, especially women, are victims of crime
* LLCAC’s program approach, emphasizing GESI, portfolio approach to working politically, and learning and adapting not effectively implemented

The overall inherent risk rating at the start of the program before risk control measures are implemented is assessed as very high. This reflects the country context in which LLCAC is being implemented, the relative unfamiliarity of TVI with DFAT’s programming requirements, and the potential political sensitivity of the program. Following proposed control measures are put in place – many of which are articulated in the capacity development plan for TVI, it is expected that the risk rating would be medium.

Risks identified in the risk framework will be monitored by the JSC and updated by the PMT in the case that any new or specific actual risks are identified. It is expected that the JSC will also review the critical risks to program success, offering a performance oversight perspective on major risks and how they should be addressed.

The concept note template for each reform activity will include a risk matrix to ensure all potential risks are identified and analyzed, and mitigation measures are identified. Work plans and progress reports will provide detail on team monitoring and management of risks. The reporting templates will be co-developed with DFAT and annexed in the Operations Manual.

## 8.2 Environmental and social safeguards

Given the nature of LLCAC’s design it is unlikely that the program will have any adverse environmental and/or social impacts. While LLCAC may engage in supporting reforms across a wide range of sectoral issues, LLCAC will not support or provide advice on any specific investments that have the potential for adverse environmental and/or social impacts. On the contrary LLCAC will seek to identify policy options that promote greater environmental and social sustainability, with a focus on promoting increased resilience of vulnerable communities and people. This extends to negative impacts relating to displacement, resettlement, and indigenous people which are considered very unlikely to occur.

As LLCAC will engage with a wide range of stakeholders in different parts of the country, there is some risk that instances of sexual exploitation, abuse or harassment (SEAH) may occur. As part of its risk management and mitigation strategy TVI will review and strengthen its own internal policies to further reduce SEAH risks.

Health and safety issues will be included as part of efforts to improve the overall HR policies of TVI and ensure compliance with DFAT’s health and safety policies as necessary.

# Annex A: The Voice Inc (TVI)

*This annex provides an overview of the history of TVI and how development to the LLCAC program has come about.*

***“Go Fast, Go Alone, Go Far, Go together”* - The Voice Inc.’s Journey**

This African Proverb[[37]](#footnote-37), *“If you want to go fast, go alone, if you want to go far, go together”* strongly resonates with TVI’s coalitions journey.

TVI started out as a student law awareness group in 2007 by a group of third year law students at the University of Papua New Guinea (UPNG). The main activity of the law awareness group was to conduct awareness in communities about people’s constitutional rights. The rationale for the focus on conducting law awareness was based on the premise that there is a break down in the social contract between the State as the duty bearer to safeguard rights of the people and the rights bearers – the people to understand their rights under the *Constitution* to be able to hold the State to account to discharge its duty by upholding the people’s basic rights and in turn achieving development. The law awareness group was seen as a closed group for only law students which may not have a greater impact; hence, membership expanded to other disciplines within UPNG. The Voice became a student association on campus and operated on campus. It raised its own funds and was able to conduct its first rural awareness program in Garaina, Morobe Province and provided library books to the primary school there.

The underlying problem identified was the lack of leadership in the country. With the tribalistic culture that is evident, people are loyal to their tribal and cultural groupings which, coupled with clientelism, leaders are less responsive to the greater good. The Voice focused its activities to build young leaders with the motto that ‘*young people are leaders in creating the future today’*. Hence, the inception of the DREAM[[38]](#footnote-38) Program. The DREAM Program is a self-discovery program that enables young leaders to identify their passion and how to use their passion as an active citizen contributing to nation building. Overall, it was about living a purpose driven life.

In 2010, The Voice was incorporated as an association under the *Companies Act* and recognized as a legal person. This allowed TVI’s scope of work to expand beyond UPNG and Port Moresby to other tertiary institutions and schools within and outside of Port Moresby. The DREAM Program was re-modeled into the Leadership Development Program. TVI learned from the experiences of the DREAM alumni that active citizenship and nation building are important components that need to be included in the program. Students who register for the program commenced with the DREAM Program and in the second level work on small community projects and the final stage is participate in the Rural Challenge Program where they get to go to a rural community to study the development issue there and assist in working on a community project there.

TVI’s community engagement has extended over the last five years through the grants program designed for TVI alumni to access for respective community projects they are leading. The grants program has supported projects pertaining to citizens and participation, gender-based violence, economic development and social enterprise, climate change and environmental justice, renewable energy, disability and social inclusion, water and sanitation, health and wellbeing, peace and justice, education and literacy, financial inclusion and youth development. TVI has reached more than 35,000 people in all four regions of PNG through its community engagement improving access to water, sustainable energy to power community social enterprises, upskilling famers to practice integrated farming systems, and more.

This is due to years of building young leaders who have penetrated the private and public sector workforce and in strategic areas. They also have influence in their communities and perform an active role in improving development outcomes for their communities.

TVI has also extended its work to four university campuses outside of UPNG and a total of 17 high schools and primary schools across the country.

TVI sees change happening through a movement of citizens taking action individually and collectively to achieve PNG’s developmental goals. In order to trigger the movement of citizens to take collective action, TVI empowers its people to realise their full potential, facilitates active involvement of TVI members in sustainable development initiatives and ensures a sustainable organization that promotes the culture and values of TVI. This approach is reflected in the four workstreams under the TVI Strategic Plan 2019 – 2022 which is themed around supporting citizens to find their voice, act and build a sustainable future. The four workstreams are:

* ***Education*** – educational materials are developed to support leadership development in schools, universities, and the community
* ***Alumni and Community*** – support TVI alumni and members by providing continuous learning and leading opportunities and providing access to resources to implement change projects in their communities
* ***Social enterprise*** – provide packaged training and customized solutions to suit the leadership development needs of business houses, government and other partners. Also engage in product development to promote TVI message to a wider audience
* ***Coalitions*** – connect voices to power by bringing together organisations and individuals to solve specific policy and development challenges. Includes organizing issued based coalitions to support PNG’s development plans in line with the SDGs.

TVI sees itself ready to work in coalitions due to the social capital and trust it has built over time to be able to work on issues-based coalitions. Through the coalitions workstream, preliminary work was undertaken to appreciate whether TVIs partner agencies would want to work on issues-based coalitions. All of TVIs partners that attended preliminary meetings on the possibility of a coalition agreed that it is needed and acknowledged the need to work together to build each other’s capabilities and also have greater impact around issues for a common good.

Through this work and the TVI community and networks, TVI coalitions work will assist to build capacity of existing coalitions to catalyse and sustain transformational change, mobilise and equip developmental leaders to work on issues-based coalitions and improve the quality of informed public debate to bring about change.

# Annex B: Public policy reforms

*This annex provides case-studies on public policy reforms over the past 20 years, highlighting successes and challenges.*

* ***Reducing the power of the Public Service Commission for merit appointments of Department Heads*** -. The Public Service Commission (PSC) had the independent mandate to appoint senior public officials. This enabled a public service that was independent from political interference. Appointments were merit based. Highly educated leaders were appointed as heads of agencies. They had the ability to provide sound advice and perform their duties without the fear of termination. The public service was independent and professional. This all changed in the mid-late 1980s when the powers of the PSC to appoint through an independent, merit-based process were transferred to the Cabinet to appoint heads of agency and senior government positions became contract based rather than a tenure of permanency. PSC had wide-ranging powers on recruitment policy, setting terms and conditions for public servants, and training. PSC was thought by politicians as too powerful, sometimes defying the government. The administrators saw PSC as a source of bureaucratic delay and frustration. The 1986 *Public Services (Management) Act*  changed the role of the PSC to that of an advisory body and the Department of Personnel Management was established to manage personnel matters. This created a highly politicised public service where departmental heads change when a Minister changes. It has completely undermined the independence and professionalism of the public service and eroded ethical standards in the public service. (Pieper, 2004)
* ***Decentralisation*** - Local government councils were established by the colonial administration in a centralised government system. After independence, a new tier of sub-national bodies and area authorities were created for coordination of local government activities at the administrative district. The colonial system of administration was noted as cumbersome. The *1977 Organic Law on Provincial Government* established the provincial government system and the district administrations were renamed provinces. Provincial administration was vested in the departments in the provinces. Delivery of basic services such as education, health and agriculture declined and financial mismanagement became a norm resulting in the suspension of provincial governments by the central government. At the political level, this reform shifted the power dynamics whereby the assertive provincial politicians were ‘eating into the power of national representatives in their own constituencies’ (Turner, 1991). Administrative capacity and the performance of line functions deteriorated and the performance was poor. In 1995, the *Organic Law on Provincial and Local Level Government* was passed. It abolished the provincial departments and the provincial administration was established. There was confusion on the coordination efforts at the provincial level and the national department level. The reform devolved powers pertaining to certain areas to the provinces however, in two categories - primarily provincial which included areas such as primary education and liquor licensing and concurrent which included areas such as health and forestry. Powers in these areas could be exercised by both levels of government however, in the event of a conflict, provincial laws applied in the primarily provincial list of areas and national laws took precedence over the provincial laws. The poor record of public service was attributed to decentralisation reforms. The political structure changed from a centralised colonial administration to different models of decentralisation in the 1977 reform and in the 1995 reforms. These reforms, though were argued to empower provinces in dealing with their affairs, are a demonstration of the power tussle between the central government and provincial governments. Performance of the public service still remains low and the quality of services has declined. The 1995 reform exacerbated the problems already created by initial reforms. Significant funds are tied to administration costs rather than development and overall impeding service delivery.
* ***Public sector reforms (1999)*** *-* The good years of the public service was before the 1980s during which the colonial administration was still existent and centralised. Driven by a high nationalistic feeling, everyone shared the common goal of freeing PNG from colonial powers and to enable PNG to manage its own affairs. Public servants were well educated and were professional with nation building as the common goal across the public sector. There was strong monetary controls and fiscal policy that was reflective of well coordinated and synergised institutional, budgeting and public administrative systems. Public servants were well trained and dedicated to the delivery of services at the subnational level. This dynamics changed when political advisers were appointed to provide alternate advice to that provided by highly qualified public servants. This was seen as a positive approach in strengthening the competency of political leaders and promote contestability. The politicians were of the view that the public service was too powerful and independent hence, not responsive to political needs. Public resources increasingly were controlled by politics rather than public policy and politicians became heavily involved in administration and project management. The Skate, Mekere and Somare governments all championed policy interventions to improve public sector performance however, these reforms have not addressed the poor performance by public service. Good governance, transparency and accountability and small, efficient public service were goals for the policy interventions based on external advice from donors such as the World Bank; however, the issues still remain. These policy interventions were focused around technical reasons for policy failures such as lack of public sector capacity however, the political dimension of reform underpins the root causes of policy failure (Turner and Kavanamur,(2009)[[39]](#footnote-39).
* ***A currency float (1995)*** -  The kina was floated in 2004 as an intervention to address the fiscal crisis that caused the decline in international reserves close to zero. It was also due to the thinness of trading in the currency. This is an example of a top down reform that is designed by a small group of elites with limited public consultation. The kina as been a ‘managed’ float. Government has had the tendency to fix the rate due to pressure from interest groups. As a result the value of kina depreciated against the US and Australian dollars. The economy suffered from lack of policy discipline by the government. Inflation increased drastically and there was considerable reduction in the GDP growth (Duncan and Zu, 2000)[[40]](#footnote-40).
* ***Land mobilization*** - Land mobilisation is an example of a controversial and sensitive issue that required mass education to inform the public and key stakeholders of the need for this reform and its impact (Kavanamur et al, 2005[[41]](#footnote-41)). The aim of the Land Mobilisation Project 1989–95 was in response to the World Bank proposal, among other things, to mobilise alienated and customary land through tenure conversion and ‘lease-lease backs’[[42]](#footnote-42). This became a contentious issue when the World Bank proposed to tie this reform as a condition to a loan to PNG. Politicians and interest groups argued that if the government defaulted on its World Bank loan, customary landowners would lose their land. Riots broke out on the eve of the 1997 elections and in 2002 where four university students were shot. (Manning,)[[43]](#footnote-43) Such sensitive issues require appropriate strategies to inform the people and stakeholders, which in turn greatly depend on the circumstances (Kavanamur et al, 2005).
* ***Financial sector reform (2001)*** - Financial reforms were part of the structural adjustment programs that the Mekere government championed to rescue the economy from financial crisis and near collapse of financial institutions. People lost wealth and trust in the financial system. Depreciated currency, an increase in public debt and low levels of foreign reserves triggered the financial sector reform. The three key areas in the financial sector reform included: (i) the central banks role; (ii) government fiscal policy; and (iii) superannuation legislation and restructuring. The reform of the Central Bank legislation provided the independent monetary policy authority and financial regulation authority. With the independent regulatory authority, the Central Bank was able to enhance and strengthen the governance and performance of the old PNG Banking Corporation into a striving Bank of South Pacific and also strengthen governance of the savings and loans societies. Using its strong position as monetary policy authority, the Central Bank established a sound macroeconomic environment. Limitations on its lender role to the government to K100 million on a temporary advance facility and the prevention of the central bank financing government budget deficit , removed the scope of excessive borrowing and in turn, improved fiscal policy(Briggs[[44]](#footnote-44)).
* ***Liberalization Telecommunications (2006)*** - Telecommunication liberalisation was noted as the most difficult one to be implemented in contrast to other Pacific countries. This was due to the policy uncertainty. NEC made a decision in 2005 for liberalisation of telecommunications in PNG and immediately after that the National ICT Policy 2006 reversed this decision however, due to a binding international commitment under PNG's membership to the WTO and the private sector pressure, telecommunications remain liberalised in PNG. Over seven national ICT policies were passed over a 3 year span since the 2005 NEC decision for market liberalisation. These frequent policy changes created significant uncertainty about investment regulations. Nevertheless, when PNG authorities were reminded of the commitments under the WTO telecommunications commitment (i.e. The WTO General Agreement on Trade and Services (GATS) Telecommunications Service Reference Paper), they realigned their policies to those commitments. The multilateral policy restraint, therefore, provided credibility to the reform program and gave confidence to international and domestic investors (Duncan). Lessons from this reform include; despite the regulatory capture; once the consumers realised the benefits to a liberalised market, consumers were able to exert their force for the market to remain liberalised, regulatory capture also provides the incentive for government to reverse its commitment - as in the case of the Independent Consumer and Competition Commission, its autonomous role to grant license was reverted to the Minister for Communications given its role in issuing license to Digicel. Another key lesson is convincing the public that services will improve and prices will be reduced is critical to gaining their support for the introduction of competition.
* ***Tuition Fee Free (TFF) Policy -*** The TFF Policy was introduced in 2012 eliminating tuition fees for students up to Grade 10 and subsidising tuition for tertiary students. This was part of the roll out of the Universal Basic Education UBE) Plan (2012-2019). This was the fourth try to adopt the free education policy. The goal of the UBE Plan was to have all school aged children have access to basic education. The government invested more in the education sector to achieve universal basic education. Earlier reviews showed that the enrollment rates increased however, arguably the student ratio to teachers and resources was limited. The TFF achieved substantially increased accessibility to schools. Study has shown that TFF had resulted in improved quality in education facilities however, overcrowding was the prominent challenge. The TFF policy made education affordable and equitable. The importance of involving communities in funding decisions has been shown to be crucial to improving school performance in PNG and in other countries. Overtime TFF subsidies have not been released on time and some schools did not receive the full amount of subsidies due to the schools.

# Annex C: Lessons learned

*This annex provides an overview of lessons learned from other similar programs that have been implemented around the world in recent years. Five programs have been analysed (details below); learnings from each program has informed the design of this program.*

|  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- |
| Program name | Country | Donor |
| 1. Developmental Leadership Program
 | Fiji | DFAT |
| 1. Pyoe Pin/Sone Sie
 | Myanmar | FCDO |
| 1. Tilitonse
 | Malawi | FCDO |
| 1. Multi-Donor Civil Society Support Program
 | Rwanda | FCDO |
| 1. State Accountability and Voice Initiative (SAVI)
 | Nigeria | FCDO |

**Fiji – Evaluation of Pacific Leadership Program (PLP) 3**

﻿High level findings from the evaluation include:

* PLP3 has provided space for experimentation, learning and innovation around how Australia can support developmental leadership and coalitions for change in the Pacific.
* PLP3 has generated knowledge that is relevant to its stakeholders, particularly to its Pacific partners and to an academic audience. However, knowledge and lessons from PLP’s experience have been slow in coming, with many key studies still being finalised.
* PLP3 has been its most effective in supporting collective action led by Pacific Island leaders and coalitions (particularly at the national and sub-national levels) in pursuit of policy and institutional changes and reforms.
* PLP3 can claim to have played a role in supporting a number of policy and institutional changes across the Pacific for the public good, but not to the level of ambition articulated in the design.
* PLP3 has been its least effective in communicating with influence, especially with DFAT.
* This type of work takes time. Lessons from international experience and Australia’s own development practice suggest the need for long-term strategies (in the order of 10-20 years).

A number of factors influencing the operating environment of PLP3 have constrained the

effectiveness of the program:

* Unlike earlier phases, the design of PLP3 did not include co-location of DFAT staff within the PLP team, moving it to a purely managing contractor modality
* With DFAT-AusAID integration, the role of the DFAT Suva Post changed in regard to regional programs, with overall strategic direction returning to DFAT Canberra, and HOMs in the Pacific assuming responsibility for their respective bilateral development programs
* Reduced senior executive resources at DFAT Suva Post
* A high level of on-going uncertainty in relation to the program, its budget and its leadership (including the death of PLP’s deputy team leader early in phase 3, and the failure to replace the deputy team leader and recruit an influential Pacific Islander as team leader, although two attempts were made to do so)
* Loss of PLP ‘champions’ within DFAT Canberra able to articulate the program’s value.

“…internal supporters within the donor organisation who can advocate and make space for these approaches; close working relationships between the donor and implementing team; flexible and long-term funding arrangements; and a recognition that change trajectories and results cannot be predicted”, (Denney and McLaren 2016, p 31).

**Malawi: Tilitonse Program (2012-16)/Tilitonse Foundation (2017+)**

﻿Lessons learned:

* Importance of mentoring and accompaniment from the start
* Redressing the balance between developing CSOs as organisations, and building capacity of civil society
* Focusing more on implementation of existing policies rather than policy-making advocacy
* Having sufficient governance skill sets of program staff
* Better connecting national, district and community-level work
* Being more realistic about governance objectives, and specific impacts
* Implementing systematic ways of incrementally documenting governance change.

Recommendations:

* Strategically cluster support, particularly around mutual problem solving.
* Increase ‘evaluability’ and impact by evidencing parts of the program, rather than pursue an ‘aggregation’ of the whole.
* Support partners to think and work politically – with an emphasis on doing Political Economy Analysis (PEA) through ongoing practical mentoring.
* Shift the monitoring (and learning) around governance results to better support adaptive programming.
* Think carefully about the use of program funds, including the potentially distorting effects of grants on sustainable processes of citizen engagement.
* Broaden out from a narrow focus on CSOs and citizen voice – to engage with middle classes, business and religious groups who have potentially greater say in what the government does.
* Develop the capacity of CSOs to connect with these more influential groups and ensure that the interests of the poor and excluded are heard.
* Build coalitions of interest around ‘issue-based projects’ (complementing a general call for proposals and a Thematic Call) focused on objectives that are mutual and positive for citizens and the government such as practical service delivery and economic development.
* Identify issues through research and political economy analysis.
* Provide a context where government agencies are themselves willing to engage, partly by involving more powerful groups to diminish government fears

Literature review findings:

* *Context is everything.* design needs to be based on clear understanding of the political economy of the context and ‘work with the grain’ of local ways of doing things. This requires project interventions that are adaptive and about learning.
* *Demand and supply need to work together.* change is not about one set of people trying to get the other set to behave better. Governments become more accountable and responsive when state-led reform and social mobilisation occur together. This indicates a need to work across supply and demand sides in alliances and platforms, and identify issues with the potential to galvanise action across government and civil society.
* *Work with the grain.* The way formal systems work is fundamentally affected by informal ways of doing things. Successful action addresses ‘collective action’ problems that stakeholders actually face and involves acts of initiative and imagination by local leaders. Instead of importing ‘best practice’, programs should facilitate space for local problem solving and collective action, building on existing concerns, initiatives and skills.
* *Limitations of CSOs.* concerns about ‘briefcase’ CSOs with weak links to citizens and an unclear mandate, as well as concerns from CSOs about the imposition of donor planning, reporting and monitoring frameworks that favour elite groups. Ways forward suggest paying attention to **integrity, quality and ties to the grassroots in selecting CSO partners**; broadening out from the comfort zone of CSO partners to a wider constituency of non-government actors; and building partners’ capacity to work in a politically intelligent ways – with enhanced political economy analysis, networking, research and communication skills. (+ power analysis)
* *Gradual reduction of role of CSOs.* CSOs should build capacities of communities / citizens so that they gradually take responsibility in problem solving and collective action, rather than CSOs being seen as mobilisers and agents of the masses.
* *Expectations of change.* Research highlights a tension between donors’ common need for quick results, and the long-term complex processes of governance change. Recommendations are for robust evaluation evidence of E&A projects, and more realism about what can be achieved in the short term. M&E processes, ToC and impact assessments should locate results in their political economy context and focus expectations of change on a middle ground of attitude and behaviour change rather than high-level achievements against SDGs.
* Important distinction between ‘tactical’ and ‘strategic’ initiatives. Tactical initiatives are bounded, localised and information led – but information alone often turns out to be insufficient to influence significant change. Strategic initiatives, in contrast, bolster enabling environments for collective action, scaling up citizen engagement beyond the local arena and attempting to promote government capacity to respond.
* Focus not only on citizen ‘voice’ but also on government ‘teeth’ to respond. It also highlights the importance of scale-up. ‘Horizontal’ scale-up increases citizen participation and representation. ‘Vertical’ scale-up links community-level monitoring with policy advocacy, and citizen-led reform with more official oversight bodies (such as parliaments, media and ombudsmen) to gain power and clout. Both require flexibility and adaptation.
* Avoid isomorphic mimicry” – “best practice” reforms and solutions that look good to an external funder, but do not necessarily change anything or engage significantly with the complexities of the local political economy. Typical examples are policies and laws that are debated and passed but never implemented. Too much focus on this type of result in turn leads to “capability traps”, as those seeking donor support focus on the types of reform that leverage funding, rather than the types of reform that make a real difference in their own context.
* An entirely training-led approach to building capacity is unlikely to achieve its objectives and that effective capacity building and organisational development is generally best achieved through a combination of learning, coaching, mentoring and implementation support.

**Myanmar: Pyoe Pin**

Lessons learned:

Distinguish more clearly between adaptive delivery (‘everyday PEA’) and adaptive programming (a longer-term process) and ensure that the two are both present and mutually supportive:

* **Adaptive delivery** is a way of doing development differently in the day-to-day. Instead of implementing “The Plan”, frontline staff think on their feet, continuously navigating through a fog of complexity, ambiguity and uncertainty. They do this using curiosity, evidence, emotional intelligence and instinct (noticing the frown on the face of the minister and changing tack in mid conversation) in a powerful blend of short-term learning, thinking and decision-making. The focus on learning is critical to all that Pyoe Pin does. Pyoe Pin facilitation means that all actors learn more about their context, the issue they engage with; they learn new ways of working together, learn more about one another’s interests and incentives, learn more about the options available for improving things. In this way, frontline workers come up with best guesses on what to do next, then test and correct in a continuous engaging and learning process.

Relationships are the currency and foundation of effective adaptive delivery. personal relationships often substitute for weak institutional networks

* **Adaptive programming** is a slower, more deliberate decision to step back, commission political economy analysis and bring in critical friends to help set new directions. Connecting adaptive delivery with adaptive programming is critical to achieving results. Getting “stuck” in an issues-based project as a result of building good relationships, creating project opportunities and wishing to retain technical staff, is a risk and may signal that the politics and priorities of this particular intervention are wrong. The inertia that follows extensive investments in building knowledge and networks and the desire to ‘stay in the game’ as more and bigger players enter is a temptation that can only be overcome if strong adaptive programming is prepared to over-ride the next steps approach of adaptive delivery to make the next leap for the program. In the case of Pyoe Pin, political openings also multiplied the opportunities in a given sector, further leading to lock-in and fuelling the argument for realising the full benefit of sunk costs, when a more strategic approach might have targeted new and significantly different spaces, such as the Peace Process. In this sense, value for money considerations need to be able to incorporate a consideration of opportunity cost.

How to recruit, incentivise and retain entrepreneurial spirits of the ‘adaptive delivery’ kind? Such individuals are born networkers, with a deep instinct for power analysis and grasp of the shifting landscape of opportunities and threats, and the patience and stamina required to get results.

*Pyoe Pin has struggled to describe its work in ways that satisfy donors.* The subtleties of adaptive delivery – operating below the radar; spotting and reacting to the frown on the face of the minister and often unpredictable results that this generates – can easily be overlooked or brushed aside in the search for cruder metrics to feed the results/value for money machine linked to achievements predicted within results frameworks.

*Pyoe Pin would do better to focus on reporting its critical contribution and resist any temptation to claim attribution.* To do this it appears most important to recognise the political aspects of change – to answer questions of how power has shifted and changed and how Pyoe Pin has played a part in this. For example, in the case of SWiM, it is not only the technical changes in the law that has made a difference (reduction in sentences, access to medical care and legal aid) but the political gains – for example shifts in understanding and attitude which have accrued through the establishment of the network of hitherto informal groups of workers; registration of their organisation; participation of their representatives on parliamentary committees; meetings with the House Speaker and access to training for the police.

*Pyoe Pin needs to think more carefully about how to track and report the consequences of the changes it helped trigger.* Such an exercise is not cost-free, of course: Pyoe Pin, like any organization, has to consider the prior question of how much time and brainpower to allocate to detailed monitoring and learning, compared to doing the work in the first place.

Pyoe Pin would benefit from more thinking on IBP theories of action and the introduction of mechanisms to connect adaptive delivery decision making with results reporting and adaptive programming.

The uncomfortable conclusion is that adaptive programming may have to face in two directions at once – be adaptive to the local context and to learning based on the intervention, as well as be adaptive to the changing political context in donors’ own countries.

**Nigeria: SAVI**

Lessons learned:

* Should have built coalitions of interest cutting across civil society, government, the private sector and the media. Instead, did Issue-Based Projects (IBPs) in the C4C portfolio were, with one exception, run as civil society advocacy campaigns.
* Optimal approach would surely be one that combines an assessment of political feasibility with a technically informed judgement about scale of impact and sustainability.
* Using donor resources not to pay people to do things but to support the things they are willing to do with their own resources has proven extraordinarily powerful as a working method.
* The supply–demand metaphor and the V&A concept of governance work for development have clearly outlived their usefulness. They have become a serious obstacle to understanding, communicating and consolidating the sort of relationship-building that is illustrated by what SAVI actually does in Nigerian states - misleading about the source of the potential gains from multi-stakeholder interactions, which are **about missing coordination and collective action, not about one set of actors demanding things from another set**.

**Rwanda – Ikiraro (multi-donor fund for support to civil society organisations)**

Lessons learned and recommendations for future programming:

* Policy-influencing programs are more likely to be effective and impactful when there is strong demand from within government and the right mix of technical support is provided quickly and efficiently.
* The quality of program leadership matters. It is important to recruit an outward-looking team leader that has previous experience working on similar programs in similar contexts. It is also important the program management team has the right mix of technical and relationship management experience and skills.
* Working collaboratively with other sector development programs adds value, particularly by complementing sector specialisms with policy engagement capacities.
* Issue selection is a complex process which is difficult to implement. Policy-influencing programs need to focus on a small number of sectors; although there is a need for multiple lines of work within sectors in the knowledge that progress is seldom linear and not always predictable, often characterised by stops and starts.
* The focus on specific sectors needs to be supported by policy specialists rather than generalists as government values sound, timely and relevant information from credible sources. For instance, there is a need to recruit an economist to advise on economic issues
* Analytical processes that aim to understand the contextual nature and causes of the policy problem are useful when embedded in daily practice but not if undertaken as standalone processes.
* It is important to think beyond issue-based analysis and research, to ensure a more tailored package of support, driven by the interests of GoR policy managers, enabling policy managers to package the evidence and sell to others within government, particularly central ministries and build wider coalitions of support on policy direction.
* Future programs need to mitigate the reputational risk associated with stopping or adapting lines of work mid-stream in the quest for improved effectiveness.
* Future programs need to develop a suite of tools focused on monitoring outcomes. This will require clarity on outcomes of specific interventions and associated baseline information.
* M&E tools need to be designed to enable the program to experiment, learn and adapt as well as monitor and report.
* The program needs to limit the range of policy domains and issues it engages on.
* Close attention needs to be given to securing the program authorising environment.
* DFID suppliers need to ensure they recruit experts in VfM to support local implementing partners and produce strong VfM reports.
* Policy influencing is likely to be more effective if backed by a strong evidence and clear interest from GoR. Interventions will be more effective if issue selection is demand-led, driven by priorities and strong incentives to deliver quickly.
* Policy engagement needs to be underpinned by a nuanced understanding of the interests of policy managers and decision-makers as much as the wider policy context.
* A more holistic package of technical and financial support is required. The mix varies by policy context but is likely to include highly technical, evidence-based studies (costed options, regression analysis, policy briefs), key stakeholder consultation and embedded short-term advisory support (to produce policy briefs and build support with stakeholders from other MDAs).
* Seeking to improve policies in areas of existing DFID investment is likely to add more value.

# Annex D: Problem Tree



# Annex E: Theory of change



# Annex F: Implementation plan

|  |  |
| --- | --- |
|  ***Activities*** | ***Australian Financial Year*** |
| ***Jul*** | ***Aug*** | ***Sep*** | ***Oct*** | ***Nov*** | ***Dec*** | ***Jan*** | ***Feb*** | ***Mar*** | ***Apr*** | ***May*** | ***Jun*** |
| **SHORT TERM (6-12 months) FY 21 -22** |
| ***Activity 1 - Governance arrangements*** |
| ***Activity 1.1 Joint Steering Committee*** |
| 1.1.1 Prepare Terms of Reference for Joint Steering Committee |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| 1.1.2 Joint Steering Committee Quarterly Meetings |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| ***Activity 1.2 Program Management Team*** |
| 1.2.1 Program Management Team (DFAT/TVI) Quarterly Meetings |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| 1.2.2 Implementation of recommendations from Organisational Review |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| ***Activity 1.3 Reporting and Planning Processes*** |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| 1.3.1 Prepare planning and reporting templates |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| 1.3.2 Establish reporting arrangements |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| 1.3.3 Prepare communication protocols |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| ***Activity 2 - LLCAC Operations*** |
| ***Activity 2.1 Staff Recruitment etc*** |
| 2.1.1 Recruitment and engagement of implementation team |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| 2.1.2 Set up of office space |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| 2.1.3 Set up of internal business process |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| ***Activity 2.2 Administrative Processes*** |
| 2.2.1 Personnel Management |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| 2.2.2 Procurement |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| 2.2.3 Asset Management |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| 2.2.4 Operations Manual |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| ***Activity 3 - LLCAC Components*** |
| ***Activity 3.1 Leadership and Coalition Development*** |
| 3.1.1 Partnership with Building State Capabilities Program of Harvard University |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| 3.1.2 Identify and build network of developmental leaders around issues for reform |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| 3.1.3 Building State Capability Course for authorisers and developmental leaders |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| 3.1.4 Establish partnership arrangement with DJAG for PDIA training |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| 3.1.5 Develop reform toolkit |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| 3.1.6 Creation of video series to document case studies on TVI Learning Management System |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| ***Activity 3.2 Policy Reform and Implementation*** |
| 3.2.1 Prepare concept notes and workplans for reform issues |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| 3.2.2 Commence implementation of reform issues workplan |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| ***Activity 3.3 Spaces for informed public debate*** |
| 3.3.1 Produce monthly knowledge product around reform issues |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| 3.3.2 Conduct quarterly lecture series themed around reform issues |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| 3.3.3 Conduct Annual Dialogue on PNG State of Affairs |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| **MEDIUM TERM (Years 2 and 3) FY 22-24** |
| ***Activity 1 - Governance arrangements*** |
| ***Activity 1.1 Joint Steering Committee*** |
| 1.1.1 Joint Steering Committee Quarterly Meetings |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| ***Activity 1.2 Program Management Team*** |
| 1.2.1 Program Management Team (DFAT/TVI) Quarterly Meetings |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| ***Activity 2 - LLCAC Operations*** |
| Activity 2.1 Staff Review, Renewal and Recruitment |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Activity 2.2 Financial Report to DFAT |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Activity 2.3 Project Audit |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Acitivity 2.4 Institutional Audit |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| ***Activity 3 - LLCAC Components*** |
| ***Activity 3.1 Leadership and Coalition Development*** |
| 3.1.1 Building network of developmental leaders |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| 3.1.2 Building State Capability Course for authorisers and developmental leaders |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| 3.1.3 Creation of video series to document case studies on TVI Learning Management System |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| ***Activity 3.2 Policy Reform and Implementation*** |
| 3.2.1 Review progress of reform issues implementation |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| 3.2.2 Prepare concept notes and workplans for reform issues (for years 2 and 3) |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| 3.2.3 Continue implementation of reform issues |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| ***Activity 3.3 Spaces for informed public debate*** |
| 3.3.1 Produce monthly knowledge product around reform issues |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| 3.3.2 Conduct quarterly lecture series themed around reform issues |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| 3.3.3 Conduct Annual Dialogue on PNG State of Affairs |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| **MEDIUM TERM (Years 3 and 4) FY 25-26** |
| ***Activity 1 - Governance arrangements*** |
| ***Activity 1.1 Joint Steering Committee*** |
| 1.1.1 Joint Steering Committee Quarterly Meetings |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| ***Activity 1.2 Program Management Team*** |
| 1.2.1 Program Management Team (DFAT/TVI) Quarterly Meetings |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| ***Activity 2 - LLCAC Operations*** |
| Activity 2.1 Staff Review, Renewal and Recruitment |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Activity 2.2 Financial Report to DFAT |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Activity 2.3 Project Audit |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Activity 2.4 Institutional Audit |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| ***Activity 3 - LLCAC Components*** |
| ***Activity 3.1 Leadership and Coalition Development*** |
| 3.1.1 Building network of developmental leaders |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| 3.1.2 Building State Capability Course for authorisers and developmental leaders |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| 3.1.3 Creation of video series to document case studies on TVI Learning Management System |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| ***Activity 3.2 Policy Reform and Implementation*** |
| 3.2.1 Review progress of reform issues implementation |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| 3.2.2 Prepare concept notes and workplans for reform issues (for years 2 and 3) |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| 3.2.3 Continue implementation of reform issues |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| ***Activity 3.3 Spaces for informed public debate*** |
| 3.3.1 Produce monthly knowledge product around reform issues |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| 3.3.2 Conduct quarterly lecture series themed around reform issues |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| 3.3.3 Conduct Annual Dialogue on PNG State of Affairs |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |

# Annex G: Monitoring, evaluation and learning framework and tools

LLCAC’s Monitoring, Evaluation and Learning (MEL) Framework will be comprised of two distinct but complementary systems: a) Program MEL; and b) Reform MEL. The systems will be guided by their respective theories of change: a) Program Theory of Change (Annex E); and Reform Theory of Change (figure below).

An indicative Performance Assessment Framework using a set of indicators and key questions has been prepared overleaf to assess progress and evaluate LLCAC at the program level. This will be further developed within the first six months of the program. A reform theory of change, with associated indicators, will be developed once proposed reforms are approved by JSC. Although dynamic, this level will use standard methods and tools for its management and assessment.



The table below provides an overview of some of the program MEL tools that will be used during implementation. These tools will be further refined and developed during implementation. Reform MEL tools will include the use of timelines, reform theory of change analysis, coalition analysis and the use of case-studies.

|  |  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
|  | Level | Focus | Considerations | Tools | Responsibility |
| Evaluation | * End of program outcomes
* Intermediate outcomes
 | Results | * Achievement of program objectives
* Sustainability
* Contribution
* GESI
 | Program review | * Independent evaluator
* DFAT
* PMT
 |
| * Outputs
 | ProcessResults | * Effectiveness
* Efficiency
* Equity
* Economy
* Contribution
 | Final reportsGESI scorecard | * JSC
* DFAT
* PSAP
 |
| Monitoring | * Activities
 | ProgressProcess | * Effectiveness
* Efficiency
* Equity
* Economy
 | TimelinesQuarterly and six-monthly reportsGender analysisCoalition feedback | * Implementing personnel
* PMT
* JSC
 |
| Ex-anteevaluation | Proposed reforms/issues | Problem analysis | * DFAT priorities
* GoPNG priorities
* GESI
 | Concept note | * JSC
* PSAP
 |
| Learning | All | ProblemStrategySolution | PSAP commentsKnowledge productsLearning sessions | * Harvard University
* PSAP
* PMT
 |

|  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |
| Results | Evaluation questions | Means of verification | Indicators |
| Monitoring | Evaluation | Learning |
| End of program outcome |
| * Progress in public policy reforms
* Collective action approach to reforms mainstreamed
* Quality of public discourse improved
 | * What progress has been made in public policy reforms?
* How has collective action led to progress in public policy reforms?
* How has public discourse changed?
 | PMT collects information from implementing personnel and shares with independent evaluator. | Independent progress reviewPMT commissions research or organises activity to address evaluation questions | Knowledge sharing activities e.g. six-monthly pause and reflect sessions | Evidence of:* Progress in public policy reforms
* Changes in public discourse

Reform-specific indicators to be developed. |
| Intermediate outcomes |
| * Targeted reforms adopted by public agencies
* Capability increased in TVI, TVI partners and TVI alumni to promote and support application of collective action approach
* Space for informed public debate expanded in prioritised areas
 | * What reforms have been adopted by government agencies?
* How have adopted reforms changed incentives and behaviours?
* How many developmental leaders have acted on potential reform opportunities and how did they? Who are they?
* What capabilities were enhanced to support the application of the collective action approach?
* What are the spaces for public debate (baseline development) on the issue and how has it changed?
* In what instances did LLCAC contribute to the adoption of reforms?
 | PMT collects information from implementing personnel and shares with JSC | JSC conducts annual reviewsPSAP conducts annual reviewsPMT commissions research or organises activity to address evaluation questions in conjunction with Harvard University | Learning sessionsReforms stories by theme | * Number of reforms adopted by targeted government agencies
* Number of leaders and potential leaders identifying and acting on potential reform opportunities (men and women)
* Evidence of change in capabilities of leaders to apply a collective action approach
* Evidence of leaders recognising LLCAC’s contribution

Reform-specific indicators to be developed.  |
| Outputs and activities |
| * Technically sound and politically feasible reforms identified and pursued
* Capabilities of leaders and potential leaders to apply approach developed
* Increased level of public awareness about priority development issues
 | * What strategies were used to influence and support progress in policy reforms?
* What policies were supported and influenced and when?
* How many developmental leaders and coalitions were supported and/or developed? How many were women or from marginalised groups?
* What is the level of public awareness on the issue (baseline development) and how has it changed?
* How efficient were the processes for analysing, implementing, monitoring and reporting the development of technically sound and politically feasible reforms?
* How efficient is the management of resources?
* How efficient were the processes in generating and making use of learnings?
* How relevant were the proposed issues worked on to GoPNG and DFAT development priorities?
 | Implementing personnel collects reform baseline information (if feasibly) and keeps records using timelines. Information collated by PMT. | Implementing personnel conducts self-assessment by responding to reform progress report questions. JSC conducts six monthly review | Reforms stories from teams.Documentation of lessons learned in program progress report.  | * Number of policies supported and influenced (2-3 in first year).
* Number of developmental leaders and coalitions supported and/or developed.
* Number of publications/forums or roundtable discussions held on key issues.
* Evidence of efficiency, effectiveness, equity and economy in the use of financial resources.
* Number of workshops/trainings held.
* Number of male and female participants.

Reform-specific indicators to be developed.  |

# Annex H: Budget

|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
| **TOTAL COSTS** |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| 104% | Inflation |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| 0.36 | Fx rate |  |  |  |  |  |  |
|  | **Description** | **Year 1** | **Year 2** | **Year 3** | **Year 4** | **Year 5** | **TOTAL** |
| **A** | **Direct program cost** |  |  |  |  |  |  |
|  | **Components** |  |  |  |  |  |  |
|  | 1. Leadership and coalition development | 623,333 | 544,267 | 566,037 | 688,679 | 612,226 | 3,034,542 |
|  | Salaries Component 1 | 529,650 | 550,836 | 572,869 | 595,784 | 619,616 | 2,868,755 |
|  | 2. Policy reform and implementation | 876,925 | 991,400 | 1,185,856 | 1,380,890 | 1,396,526 | 5,831,597 |
|  | Salaries Component 2 | 529,650 | 550,836 | 572,869 | 595,784 | 619,616 | 2,868,755 |
|  | 3. Spaces for informed debate | 129,725 | 134,914 | 140,311 | 145,923 | 151,760 | 702,632 |
|  | Salaries Component 3 | 545,700 | 567,528 | 590,229 | 613,838 | 638,392 | 2,955,687 |
|  | MERLA - direct costs | 329,606 | 342,790 | 489,251 | 370,761 | 536,036 | 2,068,444 |
|  | Program management | 837,843 | 564,037 | 586,598 | 610,062 | 634,464 | 3,233,004 |
|  | Set-up asset costs | 119,500 |  |  |  |  | 119,500 |
|  | **TOTAL DIRECT COSTS** | **4,521,932** | **4,246,607** | **4,704,021** | **5,001,722** | **5,208,635** | **23,682,918** |
| **B** | **Indirect costs (10% of direct costs)** | **452,193** | **424,661** | **470,402** | **500,172** | **520,864** | **2,368,292** |
|  | **TOTAL COSTS Kina** | **4,974,125** | **4,671,268** | **5,174,423** | **5,501,894** | **5,729,499** | **26,051,209** |
|  | **TOTAL COSTS AUD** | **1,790,685** | **1,681,656** | **1,862,792** | **1,980,682** | **2,062,620** | **9,378,435** |

BLANK PAGE

1. See Annex A for further detail on The Voice Inc. [↑](#footnote-ref-1)
2. <https://freedomhouse.org/country/papua-new-guinea> [↑](#footnote-ref-2)
3. <http://press-files.anu.edu.au/downloads/press/p55871/mobile/ch22.html> [↑](#footnote-ref-3)
4. <https://www.worldbank.org/en/country/png/overview> [↑](#footnote-ref-4)
5. <https://www.macrotrends.net/countries/PNG/papua-new-guinea/infant-mortality-rate> [↑](#footnote-ref-5)
6. <https://knoema.com/atlas/Papua-New-Guinea/topics/Education/Literacy/Adult-illiteracy> [↑](#footnote-ref-6)
7. World Bank. 2021. *Papua New Guinea Economic Update, January 2021 : Dealing with a Triple Crisis*. Washington, DC [↑](#footnote-ref-7)
8. <https://openknowledge.worldbank.org/bitstream/handle/10986/35194/Papua-New-Guinea-Economic-Update-Dealing-with-a-Triple-Crisis.pdf?sequence=1&isAllowed=y> [↑](#footnote-ref-8)
9. Kavanumur et al 2013. [↑](#footnote-ref-9)
10. See Section Six for further information. [↑](#footnote-ref-10)
11. <https://auspng.lowyinstitute.org/issue/gender-equality/> [↑](#footnote-ref-11)
12. <https://www.dlprog.org/ftp/info/Public%20Folder/1%20Research%20Papers/Learning%20and%20Leadership.pdf.html> [↑](#footnote-ref-12)
13. Adapted from Pett, J. (2020): Navigating adaptive approaches for development programs. A guide for the uncertain. [↑](#footnote-ref-13)
14. Since 2011, Australia has supported two phases of CfC. A detailed description and analysis of the program to date is contained in Sidel, J. and J. Faustino. 2020. *Thinking and working politically: Coalitions for Change in the Philippines.* The Asia Foundation: Manila (accessible at <https://asiafoundation.org/publication/thinking-and-working-politically-in-development-coalitions-for-change-in-the-philippines/>). [↑](#footnote-ref-14)
15. <https://www.dfat.gov.au/sites/default/files/papua-new-guinea-australia-comprehensive-strategic-and-economic-partnership-signed.pdf>. [↑](#footnote-ref-15)
16. <https://www.dfat.gov.au/sites/default/files/covid-response-plan-papua-new-guinea.pdf>. [↑](#footnote-ref-16)
17. <https://www.dfat.gov.au/sites/default/files/dfat-and-ngos-effective-development-partners.pdf>. [↑](#footnote-ref-17)
18. <http://www.paclii.org/pg/CPCReport/Cap2.htm> [↑](#footnote-ref-18)
19. Leftwich, A. and Wheeler, C. (2011): Politics, Leadership and Coalitions in Development Findings, insights and guidance from the DLP’s first Research and Policy Workshop. Frankfurt 10 -11 March 2011 <https://www.dlprog.org/publications/research-papers/politics-leadership-and-coalitions-in-development-findings-insights-and-guidance> [↑](#footnote-ref-19)
20. The Change Manager post is budgeted for under the accompanying capacity development plan. [↑](#footnote-ref-20)
21. The proposed budget also included limited funding for a driver, cleaner and Office Assistant. These roles will be recruited when/if support is required. [↑](#footnote-ref-21)
22. TVI has commenced initial discussions with the Building State Capability team at Harvard University. [↑](#footnote-ref-22)
23. <http://hdr.undp.org/en/content/gender-inequality-index-gii> [↑](#footnote-ref-23)
24. Department for Community Development and Religion. 2016. *Papua New Guinea Gender-based violence strategy.* Port Moresby, and Darko E. et al. 2016. *Gender violence in Papua New Guinea: the cost to business.* ODI, London. [↑](#footnote-ref-24)
25. Harper, C., Marcus, R., George, R., D’Angelo, S. and Samman, E. (2020) *Gender, power and progress: How norms change*. London: ALIGN/ODI ([www.alignplatform.org/gender-power-progress](http://www.alignplatform.org/gender-power-progress)) [↑](#footnote-ref-25)
26. Justice Services and Stability for Development Program (JSS4D) and PNG Australia Transition to Health (PATH) programs. [↑](#footnote-ref-26)
27. WHO/World Bank. 2011. *World report on disability.* Geneva. [↑](#footnote-ref-27)
28. GOPNG. 2015. *National policy on disability 2015-2025.* Port Moresby. [↑](#footnote-ref-28)
29. DFAT. 2015. *Development for All 2015-2020: Strategy for strengthening disability-inclusive development in Australia’s aid program.* Canberra. (<https://www.dfat.gov.au/sites/default/files/development-for-all-2015-2020.pdf>). [↑](#footnote-ref-29)
30. <https://www.dfat.gov.au/sites/default/files/disability-inclusive-development-guidance-note.pdf>. [↑](#footnote-ref-30)
31. Bündnis Entwicklung Hilft, Ruhr University Bochum – Institute for International Law of Peace and Conflict. 2020. *World risk report 2020.* Bochum (<https://weltrisikobericht.de/wp-content/uploads/2020/09/WorldRiskReport-2020.pdf>). [↑](#footnote-ref-31)
32. Pacific-Australia Climate Change Science and Adaptation Planning Program partners. 2015. *Pacific-Australia Climate Change Science and Adaptation Planning Program - Current and future climate of Papua New Guinea.* Canberra (<https://www.pacificclimatechangescience.org/wp-content/uploads/2013/06/14_PACCSAP-PNG-11pp_WEB.pdf>). [↑](#footnote-ref-32)
33. DFAT. 2015. *Strategy for Australia's aid investments in private sector development.* Canberra. [↑](#footnote-ref-33)
34. Teskey, G. and L. Tyrrell. 2021. *Implementing adaptive management: A front-line effort. Is there an emerging practice?* Abt Associates. Canberra. (<https://abtassocgovernancesoapbox.files.wordpress.com/2021/04/abt-associates_adaptive-management_a-frontline-effort_digital-1.pdf>). [↑](#footnote-ref-34)
35. L. Denney and R. McLaren. 2016. *Putting ‘thinking and working politically’ into practice – with a gender and Pacific twist.* Devpolicy blog accessible at: <https://devpolicy.org/putting-thinking-and-working-politically-into-practice-with-a-gender-and-pacific-twist-20161110/> [↑](#footnote-ref-35)
36. See Building State Capability program at <https://bsc.cid.harvard.edu/>. [↑](#footnote-ref-36)
37. Quoted by Al Gore [↑](#footnote-ref-37)
38. DREAM acronym stands for Dream, Relationships, Education and Experience, Attitude, and Mission Statement. [↑](#footnote-ref-38)
39. Turner, M and Kavanamur,D 2009, ‘Explaining Public Sector Reform Failure: Papua New Guinea 1975–2001’ in *Policy Making and Implementation:Studies from Papua New Guinea*, ANU Press, Canberra. [↑](#footnote-ref-39)
40. Duncan, RC and Zu, X 2000, Should Papua New Guinea adopt a stronger exchange rate regime?, *Pacific Economic Bulletin*, Vol 15, No 2, ANU Press, Canberra. [↑](#footnote-ref-40)
41. Kavanamur, D, Okole, H, Manning M and Levantis, T 2005,*Pacific Economic Bulletin*, Vol 20, No 1, ANU Press, Canberra. [↑](#footnote-ref-41)
42. The *Land Act prevents* customary landowners from directly leasing land to outsiders. But they can lease it to the state and then lease it back. Thus, landowners wishing to engage in direct land dealings are able to enter into a lease – lease back arrangement with the government. In this way, landowners acquire a leasehold interest in their land, which may then be mortgaged or subleased to investors. [↑](#footnote-ref-42)
43. <https://www.dfat.gov.au/sites/default/files/MLW_VolumeTwo_CaseStudy_14.pdf> [↑](#footnote-ref-43)
44. <https://treasury.gov.au/sites/default/files/2019-03/04_The_financial_sector_in_PNG.pdf> [↑](#footnote-ref-44)