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| FinalReport | Independent Completion Review of the  Coalitions for Change (CfC) Program  Implemented in Partnership with DFAT by  The Asia Foundation in the Philippines  Final Report  Submitted 17 February 2018  Reviewer: Peter Bazeley  peter.b@zeley.com |



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| Population: | approx. 103 million in 2016 *(Australia 24 million in 2016)* |
| Population density: | approx. 300 per km2 *(Australian Capital Territory 171 per km2)* |
| GDP per capita: | approx. USD 2,951 in 2016 *(Australia USD 49,928 in 2016)* |
| *Source:* | World Bank and Australian Bureau of Statistics data |

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Abbreviations and Acronyms

|  |  |
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| AIP | DFAT Philippines Aid Investment Plan |
| ARMM | Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao |
| AUD | Australian Dollar [one Australian Dollar = approximately 38 Philippine Pesos] |
| AQC | Aid Quality Check |
| CfC | Coalitions for Change |
| CSO | Civil Society Organisation |
| DAC | Development Assistance Committee of the OECD |
| DFAT | Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade of the Australian Government |
| DHOM | DFAT Deputy Head of Mission |
| DRR(M) | Disaster Risk Reduction (and Management) |
| ESRA | Election Service Reform Act |
| FAN | Fully Abled Nation |
| IPR | CfC’s 2013/14 Independent Progress Review |
| JSC | Joint Steering Committee |
| M&E | Monitoring and Evaluation |
| MEL | Monitoring, Evaluation and Learning |
| NGO | Non-Government Organisation |
| ODE | DFAT’s Office of Development Effectiveness |
| OECD | The inter-governmental Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development |
| PACAP | Philippines-Australia Community Assistance Program |
| PMT | Program Management Team |
| PSP | CfC’s Program Strategic Panel |
| PWD | Persons with disabilities |
| SHS | Senior High School |
| TAF | The Asia Foundation (in this context, The Asia Foundation in the Philippines) |
| USD | United States Dollar |

Important Definitions and Concepts Used in this Report

*All but the first of these concepts were introduced in the report of CfC’s 2013/14 Independent Progress Review (led by the same reviewer). They are rehearsed here to provide continuity and consistency of definition for this completion report, while the definition of ‘governance’ has been updated to reflect more recent DFAT strategy.*

‘Chasing Change’ *(Not included in the IPR definitions but discussed during this ICR)*

External aid and development interventions rarely introduce sustainable change *ab initio* or from the supply side. They can lack ownership, legitimacy and leverage. But aid and development interventions do often speed up, deepen, broaden and improve the quality of nascent change processes (through the determination of, for example, government or civil-society) where they already have some institutional legitimacy and indigenous champions. ‘Chasing change’ was a term introduced fifteen or so years ago as part of the debate about aid effectiveness in policy reform: put your money where change looks promising, not where it doesn’t. The concept also reverberates in more recent discourses on thinking and working politically with notions of ‘going with the grain’ of policy reform, ‘politically-smart and locally-led development’, and CfC’s own filter of ‘technically sound, politically possible’.

‘Civil Society’

In this Review we have taken, and encourage, a broad definition of ‘civil society’. We see civil society as the individual, and the aggregate of the, non-governmental organisations that represent or advance the interests of society and its citizens. However, for us this captures more than simply the established ‘NGOs’ and community-based organisations. It would include, for example, business / private-sector bodies, the media, and faith-based organisations. Some would also include ‘societal instruments’ such as ombudsmen and elected representatives as being part of ‘civil society’ in the widest context.

More conceptually, ‘civil society’ can be thought of as a coalescing among citizens—often in relation to the affairs of the state—in pursuit of public goods. ‘Civil society’ is both a voluntary social/political capital and an economic force.

‘Governance’

The following is taken from DFAT’s 2015 *Effective Governance* strategy[[1]](#footnote-2): “There are many definitions of governance, but all refer to how power and authority are used to manage a country’s resources. Most definitions also refer to how power and authority are exercised by individuals and through institutions – institutions are the formal and informal rules that organise social, political and economic relations. They provide a structure for the way people live and interact – the way that people and groups of people agree and express their interests, and how competing interests are mediated.”

‘Institutions’

Throughout this Review, we use ‘institutions’ across two rival definitions:

* First, as in ‘governance’ above, in the *New Institutional Economics*[[2]](#footnote-3)sense of ‘the rules of the game’: the rules, incentives and sanctions that ultimately shape how individuals, groups, coalitions, organisations, sectors and perhaps whole populations behave – socially, economically, and politically. They may be written and formal (for example, legislation) or informal and implied (for example, societal conventions or traditions) – and many things in between.
* Second, in the mainstream political science sense of organisational structures that are characterised by coherence, complexity, autonomy and adaptability. Across these four characteristics, effective institutions (whether bureaucracies, militaries or political parties) have the capacity to endure over time.

‘Partnership’

In contrast to a ‘principal-agent’ relationship (below), a ‘partnership’ represents a collaborative effort between fully-competent parties with complementary agendas, with each contributing assets[[3]](#footnote-4) that the other does not have (or have enough of). By so doing, both parties achieve more than they could achieve by acting alone, or something that they could not otherwise achieve at all. Important principles in any such partnership is the recognition of the other party’s/parties’ right/s to have their own—possibly different—values and so legitimately to influence the course of the joint endeavour. (And to benefit from the fruits of that joint endeavour.) Similarly, both or all parties should bear any risks[[4]](#footnote-5) of failure.

‘Principal-Agent’

In contrast to a ‘partnership’, a ‘principal-agent’ relationship exists where one party (the ‘principal’) has its own values and objectives and seeks to deliver on those by employing an ‘agent’ to ‘do the running’ on its (the principal’s) behalf. Sometimes a principal is employing the agent because the agent has greater knowledge or influence than the principal has. This situation can potentially result in ‘agency dilemmas’ where the agent, through their advantageous knowledge and positioning, is potentially able to pursue courses of action of more interest to itself (the agent) than to the principal, or to the principal’s original objectives. There are therefore ‘agency costs’ either in accepting that the agent delivers on a slightly different agenda, or in mitigating such ‘dilemmas’.

‘Strategic Opportunism’

The notions of ‘policy windows opening and closing’, and of ‘chasing change’ (above) where the return on investment (or risk) will be highest, are important tenets of policy work[[5]](#footnote-6). ‘Strategic opportunism’ captures this ability to be ‘fleet and flexible’ (ODE) or ‘nimble and strategic’ (this Review) and by so doing capitalise on unexpected opportunities that emerge through the inevitably chaotic and often unplanned processes of policy reform. This is not to say that a program should deviate from its original objectives, but rather to recognise that no ‘plan’ is ever likely to capture, *ex ante*, all the relevant, interesting, policy options and opportunities that may present themselves over time. This is particularly so where the priorities of both the donor and the partner government ebb and flow as political values change.

‘Transformational’ (or ‘Transformative’) *vs.* ‘Transactional’ Development

When the development community started thinking about achieving the pace and scale of social and economic development implied by the Millennium Development Goals, it realised that it had to do far more than ‘just buy things’ that people or organisations needed. Rather, it had to leverage change in the ‘institutions’ (definition preceding page) that ultimately shape the nature and course of the lives and livelihoods of whole populations of people. (Hence the parallel recognition of the irreplaceable role of government and good governance in such a process.)

Just buying results, where the value of the outcome equates to the value of the transaction (financial or otherwise) itself, for example providing food aid or renovating classrooms, is referred to as ‘transactional’ development. The total value of the intervention is essentially (and merely) the sum of its inputs. One could never deliver enough ‘transactional’ aid and development to achieve the Millennium Development Goals at a global level, or even nationally in most cases.

By contrast ‘transformational’ development brings about fundamental change for the better in institutions whose reach goes beyond (hopefully far beyond) the direct influence of the development intervention itself. (Such change is often referred to as ‘reform’.) The value of the intervention is more than the sum of its parts. In leveraging impacts the scope and scale of which is far greater than the input, transformational development is also about effectiveness, efficiency and value for money.

Independent Completion Review (ICR) of the

Coalitions for Change (CfC) Program

Implemented in Partnership with DFAT by The Asia Foundation (TAF) in the Philippines

Final Report

Submitted 17 February 2018

Reviewer: Peter Bazeley | [peter.b@zeley.com](mailto:peter.b@zeley.com)

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| Key Points / Executive Summary   * CfC is doing well and remains highly relevant to Australia’s Aid Investment Plan for the Philippines. It is effective and efficient, and should lead to sustained outcomes. Joint governance arrangements are now solid, fit for purpose and effective.   ***On the basis of this review, investment in a further phase of CfC (which also takes into account the other recommendations of this review) is warranted.***   * CfC needs, unambiguously, to be seen as an instrument in the wider aid program’s toolkit and as such should contribute to the achievement of the country program’s broad objectives. However this does not mean that it should necessarily mirror the other elements of the country program.   ***But that requires real clarity of purpose, for its next phase, as to what are the objectives of the Australian aid program’s presence and efforts in the country and what success looks like for it.***   * While there is little doubt as to CfC’s achievements, it has difficulty robustly describing its *contribution* to complex, multi-factorial, policy processes – instead erring towards bold assertions of causation (of higher level social and economic outcomes).   ***A new phase of CfC should develop and institutionalise a more robust approach to analysing and succinctly reporting its* contribution *to significant policy reform processes (as opposed to asserting causal links to higher-level impacts).***   * While CfC is now thinking about gender in most of its activities it is in the main relatively tokenistic. CfC is still missing an important opportunity: it could surely be proactively applying its considerable policy analysis and policy-influencing skills and ways of working to bigger and more significant policy issues surrounding gender equality and women’s empowerment (and other issues of inclusivity) in the Philippines.   ***A new phase of CfC should proactively seek to address gender inequality and women’s empowerment through CfC’s analysis of, and support to, significant policy reform initiatives in this area (subject always to CfC’s usual ‘technically sound, politically possible’ filters).***   * CfC’s success has to date depended to a large extent on the expertise and experience of a few individuals within The Asia Foundation. If its approaches are to be replicated and scaled up, it needs to [continue to] extend beyond its current confines.   ***The Phase 2 design should include a component to extend the ‘thinking and working politically’ concepts and approaches of CfC to other policy actors and organisations.***   * Thinking and working politically within the context of a bilateral aid program implies several not insignificant technical, aid-alignment, risk-management and accountability issues. The original nervousness about some of these has largely been removed by improved governance arrangements, including a deeper level of engagement between DFAT and TAF.   ***Phase 2 will require a continued and significant role in CfC’s governance and advisory structures for the DHOM and Counsellor at post, as well – importantly – as the yet-to-be-appointed DFAT governance adviser. But the return on such an investment is high.***   * CfC has deservedly won considerable interest and attention from the *thinking and working politically* community, including academia. This has been useful to CfC.   ***However, Phase 2 should seek to balance the specialist political science inputs with broader technical, aid and development expertise.*** |

The Review

1. This was an Independent Completion Review (ICR) undertaken prior to the scheduled end of the first phase of the *Coalitions for Change* (CfC) program.
2. CfC is the main component of an AUD 44.1 million partnership established between Australia’s Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade (DFAT) and The Asia Foundation (TAF) in the Philippines. CfC commenced in late 2011 and the current 6½-year[[6]](#footnote-7) phase ends in mid-2018. CfC has the transformative goal of enhancing the impact of evidence-based public policy-making and implementation of priority development issues.
3. At DFAT’s request, TAF is preparing a partner-led design for a new phase of CfC.

Purpose

1. My terms of reference are at Annex 7.
2. The review’s primary purpose is to inform a new phase of Coalitions for Change (CfC) by:
3. **Understanding how CfC contributed to a process of change to achieve high impact reform outcomes**, with the following key questions asked by DFAT:
4. *How did CfC bring about transformative change in key reform areas?*
5. *To what degree did CfC make a difference to gender equality and empowerment of women and girls through its activities?*
6. **Assessing the effectiveness and efficiency of governance and management arrangements**, with the following key questions asked by DFAT:
7. *How effective has CfC been in targeting high impact reform areas and remaining flexible in responding to strategic opportunities?*
8. *How efficient have the governance and management arrangements of Coalitions for Change been in enabling program impact?*
9. I was also asked to provide a **commentary against the established OECD DAC and DFAT evaluation criteria** of Relevance, Effectiveness, Efficiency, and Sustainability, as well as DFAT’s additional criteria of Monitoring & Evaluation and Gender Equality. (Paras 64 to 91 below.) In addition TAF’s facilitated self-assessment (at the review workshop) against these criteria is presented in Annex 4. There is crossover between these performance criteria and the review’s core questions: one set of analyses are in part founded on the other.
10. Given its primary purpose of informing the design of a second phase, which will likely engage over time with different reform areas and different actors in different contexts, the emphasis of the review was on generic, bigger-picture, issues.
11. The review was of CfC Phase 1 but with a focus on the period following the 2013/14 IPR (*i.e.* 2014 to present) and the degree to which recommendations of that review[[7]](#footnote-8) were actioned.

Method and Limitations

1. In the limited amount of time between contracting and the in-country review:

* A DFAT-agreed ‘evaluation plan’ was drafted and circulated to those involved with the review in advance, setting out scope, methodology and expectations.
* Insofar as time allowed, I studied a selection of the many reports and documents on CfC provided by TAF and DFAT.

1. I visited Manila in November/December 2017 (schedule at Annex 6) and:

* Was briefed by management teams and senior executives from DFAT and TAF;
* Conducted a briefing and self-assessment workshop with TAF;
* Met with current and past executives and CfC advisers in DFAT and in The Asia Foundation, as well as external observers and analysts. (Including by phone those in Australia, the USA, the UK and Canada.)
* Conducted semi-structured interviews with stakeholders at country-program, program management, partner-organisation (grantee) and government levels;
* Continued to browse an ever-increasing volume (well over 200) of CfC reports and other contextual documents presented to me; and
* Debriefed the DFAT and TAF teams.
* I also participated in Phase II design discussions with both TAF and DFAT.

1. As a short (10 weekday days of information-gathering), single-person, Manila-based review, I had no opportunity to undertake primary data collection or analysis. I relied on accounts provided by DFAT and TAF management and other observers, triangulated through interviews with others where possible. I was unable to conduct in-depth analysis across the multiple targets of reform or sub-programs, but did meet with CfC’s main implementing partners. This was a broad-brush high-level review, not an evaluation at input, activity or output level.

Independence

1. I am an independent aid effectiveness and development-strategy specialist who has worked on the design, configuration and performance of Australian (and others’) aid programs at sector and country-program level across Asia and the Pacific, as well as on agency-wide strategy and performance issues. I have a particular interest in the role of aid in supporting policy and institutional reform, not least through ‘thinking and working politically’.
2. My Review was independent in that I have had no prior management or implementation role in CfC. However I have played a role in earlier review and design processes of both CfC and some of its predecessor programs in the Philippines. These provided relevant historical and institutional insights.

The Program and its Context

1. This large middle-income country is enjoying robust economic growth and is not dependent on aid. However ensuring the quality[[8]](#footnote-9) and sustainability of growth, and greater equality[[9]](#footnote-10) in access to the benefits of growth, is a challenge – not least in the context of complex political constructs, governance arrangements and security issues. Australia’s Aid Investment Plan (AIP) for the Philippines – focusing on economic growth, institutions for transparent and accountable governance, and conditions for peace and stability – is therefore relevant. But what does the unique political, economic and institutional context of the country imply for the design and configuration of a medium-sized bilateral aid program seeking real impact for its investment?

“The minor role played by aid in the Philippines, together with a difficult governance environment, means that supporting national-level reform through the aid program is challenging. This is reflected in the limited success of the Australian aid program support for top-down reforms to date.

“However, when conditions are right, reform is possible.”

*ODE Mid-Term Evaluation of the Australia-Philippines Development Assistance Strategy, March 2012*

1. This was the question being deliberated when CfC was first conceived, 2009-2011. The result was a shift from Australia’s long-standing support for transactional civil society service-delivery programs to something more transformational: something that sought to help reform the policies and *institutions* (definition page v) that shape the quality of economic growth and the efficiency and effectiveness of governance.
2. The mechanism chosen was a partnership with a respected international NGO (The Asia Foundation – TAF) in the Philippines, through which grants could be made available, and other forms of support given, for “**advocacy and the negotiation of better outcomes through political processes**” [[10]](#footnote-11).
3. The modality, or ways of working, assumed by TAF were derived from its considerable experience and established networks in the field and from contemporary thinking about ‘thinking and working politically’ and ‘doing development differently’ [[11]](#footnote-12). It focuses on its own brand of ‘development entrepreneurship’, flexible ‘strategic opportunism’ and supporting ‘coalitions’ of players and reform champions. (Drawn from a diverse range of actors or groups working on policy actions and reforms: civil society organisations, formal and informal advocacy groups, political elites, individuals, academics, the private sector and the media, and the formal institutions of government.)
4. CfC thus pushes out the boundaries in terms how a bilateral donor such as Australia might operate in a country such as the Philippines to achieve significant impact in a context of complex governance and other social and economic challenges. Unsurprisingly therefore, the partnership – being at the vanguard of new development approaches – has had to work out new rules of operation, especially in terms of donor-implementer governance and management arrangements, risk management, and how progress is monitored and evaluated within the important – if sometimes inelastic – context of donor accountabilities and performance systems.
5. Given both its substance and its process, there is potentially some political and reputational risk (as well as some potentially big prizes) associated with thinking and working politically. DFAT has positioned CfC so that it is[[12]](#footnote-13), and can be seen to be, working at arm’s length to other engagements of the Australian government or embassy. Furthermore, falling under Australia’s program of independent support to civil society in the Philippines, CfC is not subject to a specific government-to-government agreement. However, for the same reasons, DFAT maintains a close and relatively (to more traditionally-configured, externally-managed, programs) intensive involvement in the governance of the program.
6. Notwithstanding its construct as a grant-based partnership with an independent NGO, CfC was always intended to be an important instrument in the Australian aid program’s Philippines toolkit, contributing effectively to higher-level aid investment objectives. Relevance to the delivery of the aid program thus becomes an important consideration for any review of CfC.

Financing

1. DFAT has allocated a total of AUD 44.1 million to the current 6½-year (2011-2018) phase of the DFAT-TAF partnership (which also includes some non-CfC activities). A proportion is retained by DFAT for Post-initiated activities, program oversight and other aid management functions (reviews, evaluations *etc.*), but the majority of the partnership’s budget – AUD 42.5 million – is managed by TAF under a grant agreement.
2. Of the AUD 42.5 million[[13]](#footnote-14) TAF-managed funds:

* Approximately AUD 30 million is budgeted for direct program costs[[14]](#footnote-15), of which
  + AUD 21 million is allocated to CfC grants and various forms of support and technical assistance to CfC partner organisations;
  + AUD 9 million is allocated to non-CfC components of the DFAT-TAF partnership (‘other related activities’, PACAP and child protection);
* Approximately AUD 1.8 million is allocated to funding the partnership’s Program Support Unit in Manila
* Approximately AUD 10.7 million is allocated to TAF Philippines implementing office costs (AUD 5.8 million) and TAF headquarters (San Francisco) indirect costs (AUD 4.9 million).

Findings: DFAT’s Key Questions

The Asia Foundation team’s own thoughts about these key questions, discussed at the ICR workshop, are summarised at Annex 3.

1. **Understanding how CfC contributed to a process of change to achieve high impact reform outcomes**, with the following key questions asked by DFAT:
2. ***How did CfC bring about transformative[[15]](#footnote-16)*** ***change in key reform areas?***

1. CfC’s *modus operandi*, cited in international *thinking and working politically* debates, is an amalgam of approaches. At the centre is TAF’s ‘Development Entrepreneurship’ model[[16]](#footnote-17) (text box, right – but note also footnote[[17]](#footnote-18) below). But much is also drawn – or has parallels in – elements of well-described, contemporary, politically-savvy approaches to development such as ‘Problem Driven Iterative Adaption’, ‘Thinking and Working Politically’, ‘Politically Smart and Locally Led Development’ and ‘Doing Development Differently’. Annex 1 provides a synopsis of these other concepts.

**TAF’s *Development Entrepreneurship* Model**

The goal of *development entrepreneurship* is to find “technically sound, politically possible” reforms.

“**Technically sound**” is defined by three characteristics:

1. Transformative. The proposed reform has the possibility of changing the incentives and behaviour of the majority of people and organizations. As a result of that change, the interplay will likely lead to better development outcomes.
2. Institutionalisation. The proposed reform has the possibility of becoming part of and being incorporated into one of two structures: as part of structured and formalised bureaucratic practices or as part of responses to market signals. In both cases, the purpose of the change is to make reform the “new” status quo and thereby ensuring policy sustainability.
3. Scale. With limited funding or support, the proposed reform has the possibility of expanding beyond the specific project intervention site or agency.

“**Politically possible**” is a situation when the political environment favours reform. Because people, emotions and interests are involved, determining “politically possible” is a difficult endeavour. In a world too complex to model, there is no empirical test to determine this condition. Instead experience and educated guesses are our tools. We turn to the “how to” and “who will” find technically sound, politically possible reforms.

*Source*: *adapted from The Asia Foundation Occasional Paper No.12.*

1. CfC has pursued many of these principles, which typically revolve around:

* Political savviness
* Including understanding where the *political capital* lies and who are the decision-makers, reformers and anti-reformers, and what external forces and events can be harnessed to encourage reform.
* ‘Working with the grain’ of reform – or ‘chasing change’ (page v);
* Identifying and supporting local champions – whoever they are wherever they are to be found;
* The centrality of indigenous solutions;
* Flexibility and adaptability through continuous learning; and
* Taking ‘small bets’ – pursuing a range promising activities and dropping others.

1. However, these are essentially the generic descriptors of the *thinking and working politically* modality. All the razzmatazz surrounding thinking & working politically narratives has served to obscure a simple description of what CfC actually does, or spends its money on. I boil this down to:

* Identifying relevant and important policy reform areas through a ‘technically sound, politically possible’ lens.
* Sometimes in response to requests for assistance from existing reform champions; sometimes the product of ongoing TAF analysis and engagement.
* Identifying committed champions (and anti-champions) of change in important policy areas.
* Usually through TAF’s longstanding connections and networks of Philippines policy advocates.
* Drawn from a multiplicity of backgrounds and organisational contexts; sometimes temporary, sometimes enduring; sometimes formal coalitions, sometimes informal networks.
* Analysing the political and technical context and developing an evidence base for reform.
* Either through TAF’s in-house resources or by contracting them in.
* Including the identification of entry points into policy debates and processes – whether they be people, organisations, events (political, economic *etc.*) or contemporaneous external trends, influences and forces.
* Mentoring partners on politically-savvy strategy and process
* Using proven political- and policy-analysis methodologies.
* Including technical assistance in areas such as legislative drafting, *etc.*
* Convening power and process facilitation – promoting and supporting policy dialogue and advocacy and providing practical support to actors or groups working on policy actions and reforms … including hands-on help in ‘getting things done and making things happen’.
* With sensitivity about the subtlety of any connections to external resourcing[[18]](#footnote-19).
* Iteratively analysing progress, and adjusting strategy accordingly.
* Which might include dropping the initiative if it’s not showing promise.

1. These concepts and ways of working are inherently attractive in terms of thinking about how, in reality, a development initiative might gain sufficient traction to contribute meaningfully to significant reform in a political and institutional context as large and complex as that of the Philippines. It is not, after all, a shortage of money or skills that hampers development in the country: it is the institutions and how individuals and organisations respond to incentives and disincentives to behave differently. “Wicked” problems, as some describe such policy conundrums. (Text box, below).
2. From a number of external analyses[[19]](#footnote-20) and from this review’s discussions we can draw out some key, probably defining, features of success:

* A flexible, non-risk-averse[[20]](#footnote-21), non-prescriptive approach by DFAT allowed and encouraged innovation and innovative ways of working in how the program was configured and implemented by its partner, TAF Philippines. Not least (for example):
  + The diversity of ‘not-the-usual-suspects’ individuals and organisations with whom CfC was able to work;
  + The ability to ‘chase change’ by focusing effort and resources on those reform areas that emerged as most promising and by pulling back from those areas that were not progressing;
  + The ability to provide the kind of support to reform processes that were necessary to move things forwards at any given point in the reform process – from simple logistical help through financial and technical assistance and evidence-gathering, to advice on navigating complex political-economy dilemmas.

**“****Wicked” Problems**

“The Australian Public Service (APS) is increasingly being tasked with solving very complex policy problems. Some of these policy issues are so complex they have been called ‘wicked’ problems. The term ‘wicked’ in this context is used not in the sense of evil, but rather of an issue highly resistant to resolution.

Successfully solving or at least managing these wicked policy problems requires a reassessment of some of the traditional ways of working and solving problems in the APS. They challenge our governance structures, our skills base and our organisational capacity.

It is important, as a first step, that wicked problems be recognised as such. Successfully tackling wicked problems requires a broad recognition and understanding … that there are no quick fixes and simple solutions.

Tackling wicked problems is an evolving art. They require thinking that is capable of grasping the big picture, including the interrelationships among the full range of causal factors underlying them. They often require broader, more collaborative and innovative approaches. This may result in the occasional failure or need for … adjustment.”

*Source: Tackling wicked problems: a public policy perspective.* Australian Public Service, 2012.

*Viewed at:* www.apsc.gov.au/publications-and-media/archive/publications-archive/tackling-wicked-problems

* DFAT’s chosen partner (TAF Philippines) had deep and wide-ranging, often pre-existing, connections into the world of policy action and reform in the Philippines. Through this network, TAF was successful in finding the right people to do the right thing at the right time.
* The policy action and reform advocates with whom CfC has worked have clearly been – in almost every case – highly motivated and committed individuals. Some of these demonstrated a thorough grasp of political and technical[[21]](#footnote-22) issues during this review. (And in most cases they also already had a solid track record in the field.) Ownership of the reform endeavours was theirs, not CfC’s, TAF’s or DFAT’s.
* TAF staff provided particularly valuable networking, mentoring and challenge functions to the policy-reform processes being worked-up by their partners, delivered in a supportive and flexible manner. TAF staff were trusted and dependable in the eyes of their partners.
* While there was something of a shaky start in the early years, the joint DFAT-TAF governance arrangements that emerged, including (some at least) critical forms of monitoring, evaluation, learning and feedback into decision-making, were particularly important in giving the program effective direction, and at the same time managing risk. This also then gave DFAT greater confidence in the program. (See paras 61 to 63 below for further discussion of governance.)
* Ongoing external analysis and advice on the political and institutional context, provided both by TAF-appointed specialists and by DFAT Manila’s governance adviser, became central to the program’s strategic direction. (See also under discussion of governance below.)
* As CfC got into its stride it became much more attuned to the identification of truly ‘transformational’ reforms which delivered (or hold high hopes of delivering) sustained benefits to significant segments of society and the economy. (In contrast to some elements of CfC’s early-years portfolio which were more transactional.)

1. While success has to be a dominant descriptor of the program, areas of CfC that still need some development include, or have included:

*Historically (as noted in the 2013/14 IPR):*

* A lack of clarity of purpose initially (including within DFAT), particularly in terms of what ‘transformational’ implied.
* Uncertainty on both sides initially (largely since resolved) as to what this particular form of ‘partnership’ (between DFAT and TAF) involved and how it had to be managed.
* A reticence initially to focus effort and resources where there was the greatest prospect of sustained reform, and to stop support to initiatives that bore little such promise. This has however since been largely corrected: seven of CfC’s 28 core reform initiatives have since been stopped where they didn’t appear to be progressing sufficiently to warrant the investment. (Annex 2.) Furthermore a number of the less ‘transformative’ but still important initiatives have been transferred to other program management streams to improve focus. (The ‘other related DFAT-TAF partnership activities’ shown in Annex 2.)

*And probably still currently:*

* Effectively promoting gender equality and women’s empowerment is an important tenet, globally, of Australian aid. The 2013/14 IPR criticised CfC for being ‘gender blind’. Since the IPR CfC has raised its game as regards gender, but there is still much more it – as an influential policy-orientated program – could do. This is discussed further in paras 29 to 40 below.
* CfC’s monitoring and evaluation (M&E) has historically been confused as to its objectives and unable to demonstrate (as an M&E system) much utility. And while CfC has maintained detailed logs of the processes and events that shaped its policy reforms initiatives, CfC doesn’t always produce particularly meaningful narratives about its *contribution* to complex change processes. This is discussed further in paras 48 to 52 below.
* While less of an issue than at the time of the 2013/14 ICR, there remains some debate over the extent to which CfC should serve, or restrict its range of activities to, the ‘mainstream’ elements of the Australian aid program in the Philippines. The authors of the draft CfC ‘Legacies, Linkages, Lessons’ book draw the firm conclusion that a (or even *the*) central determinant of success is the extent to which CfC was allowed to do its own thing (success) or was required by DFAT to align itself with other elements of the country program (lack of success). I’m not convinced that this is the defining distinction, but agree that ‘retrofitting’ thinking and working politically into pre-cast and more transactional programs may or may not be straightforward. (See paras 55 to 60 below.)
* Sustainability, discussed further at 79 to 82 below, must continue to be a defining consideration in what CfC does and how it does it. Sustainability should be a consequence of locally-owned transformative development. (Because transformative development is about changing – because key elements of society or its representatives really want to – the institutions that shape behaviours and outcomes in perpetuity.) But I have two observations from this review:
  + With the change in administration and a different (and as yet poorly understood) policy regime in the country, there has at times been apprehension that even some of CfC’s flagship reforms (such as tobacco tax) may yet be reversed[[22]](#footnote-23). I do not however think there is much utility in fretting over such high-level policy shifts: that’s the name of the game.
  + What I do think is important though is that any proposed policy intervention should be accompanied by an informed narrative about the likelihood (or not) of any substantially increased capital or recurrent expenditure, and the administrative capacity, required to sustain that reform – for example land acquisition for school decongestion now that (CfC-induced) regulatory hurdles have been resolved.
* At a program management level, CfC’s heavy reliance on one or two key TAF individuals’ experience and contacts is potentially precarious and raises questions (but not necessarily insurmountable ones) over replicability and scaling-up.

1. ***To what degree did CfC make a difference to*** ***gender equality and empowerment of women and girls through its activities?***
2. CfC was criticised in its 2013/14 independent progress review for its “low degree of gender awareness” and for exhibiting “a degree of gender blindness”. So it has had to get its act together from a low base. Things are better now, but – in my opinion – the program still falls far short of its potential to make a real difference in this area.
3. However, the extent to which CfC is getting across gender equality and women’s empowerment can be interpreted at a number of levels. It is the question of ‘how much is enough’ that needs to be debated and resolved.
4. CfC was not designed to be a ‘gender initiative’ *per se* [[23]](#footnote-24) (and the DFAT-TAF partnership agreement made no mention of gender imperatives) but it could – and I would say should – nonetheless, as an effective policy-influencing program, be a potent tool in taking forward DFAT’s gender equality and women’s empowerment (as well as other inclusivity) interests.
5. This notion is reinforced by more recent DFAT policy. Notwithstanding any [explicit] lack of requirement at the time of CfC’s grant agreement to pursue (among other things) gender objectives, DFAT’s February 2016 *Gender Equality and Women’s Empowerment Strategy*[[24]](#footnote-25) emphasises that more than 80% of Australia’s aid investments, regardless of their objectives, are now to “effectively address” gender issues in their implementation. (Apparently 78% of investments did so in 2014/15 – begging the question as to what “effectively” means in practice.) Against the DAC’s gender equality policy markers[[25]](#footnote-26) recent DFAT annual Aid Quality Checks have rated CfC as follows as regards gender equality:

* 2014/15: A ‘significant objective’;
* 2015/16: ‘Not targeted’;
* 2016/17: ‘Not targeted’.

1. It is therefore, first and foremost, a value-judgement that needs to be made by DFAT Post as to whether and how far CfC, as one of its aid investments, should specifically pursue – in the context of its *raison d’être* of “advocacy and the negotiation of better outcomes through political processes” (footnote 10 above) – gender equality and women’s empowerment if it is to continue to be a recipient of its funding. (And then what success looks like in this respect.) In considering this, DFAT and TAF need in my opinion to go beyond – as one DFAT adviser put it to this review – “gender bean-counting” and consider how the program could make a real difference through the deployment of its undoubtedly powerful approaches to achieving policy and institutional reform at scale.
2. At the lowest (operational rather than developmental) level CfC has championed gender equality and wider inclusivity in its staffing and program management, as have many of its partner organisations. (As highlighted in the draft ‘CfC book’, and in various program reports.) But this is just good employment practice, not a targeted development outcome of wider significance.
3. The wider TAF-DFAT partnership also has a gender mainstreaming strategy in place and standard operating procedures now require a level of gender analysis at initiative design, implementation and reporting. So most initiatives now include some form of gender-awareness in the conduct of the initiative, ranging from – for example – encouragement of the use of gender-neutral language (airports) to more intellectual analysis of gender-differentiated impacts (senior high school transition).
4. Annex 5 reproduces CfC’s current gender matrix and the state of play, gender-wise, of each of the principal reform areas. From this it can be seen that a number of gender-differentiated narratives have been developed from some of CfC’s interventions. For example in analysing the obvious and not-so-obvious narratives behind senior high school student drop-out rates[[26]](#footnote-27) and voter turn-out. However “no possible gender story yet” is a common notation in CfC’s gender matrix. (Annex 5.)
5. My sense is that most of CfC’s gender analyses are retrospective by-products of the more targeted policy debates. So it’s not clear to me how these gender findings, such as they are, will or can be used to advance gender equality and women’s empowerment in practice, or at scale, other than in terms of somewhat non-specific knowledge-generation.
6. CfC has yet to reach the stage where it is proactively targeting or using its undoubted skills in *thinking and working politically*, and its experience and networks, to influence important gender-related outcomes at scale in the same, transformative, way that it has successfully applied itself to other significant social and economic issues.

**‘From participation to transformation’**

“Gender equality is a politically and culturally sensitive area that requires careful gender and political economy analysis. It requires us to commit to do no harm and take into account challenges faced by countries … .

“We will think politically so we address the binding constraints to equality. We must be realistic about what we can achieve and where we can add value, and avoid inadvertently undermining local efforts. We will identify local champions and follow their lead.”

*Source*: extracted from DFAT’s February 2016 *Gender Equality and Women’s Empowerment Strategy.*

1. And there are plenty of social and economic policy issues that impact disproportionately negatively on women and children in the Philippines. Think overseas domestic workers and the remittance economy, tourism and hospitality industry employment practice, or rural access to information and communication technology as impromptu examples of obvious gender-related disparities and inequities where, perhaps, thinking and working politically – while still of course applying CfC’s ‘technically sound and politically possible’ lens – could impact significantly on what are otherwise, undoubtedly, ‘wicked problems’ [[27]](#footnote-28).
2. All the above is not to say that gender equality and women’s empowerment should become, in DAC/DFAT terminology, a ‘principal’ objective of CfC but, rather, that it should – as an important instrument in the Australian aid program’s toolkit – look harder to see if there may be ways of using its methodologies and comparative advantage to make a difference in an area so fundamental to the Australian aid program’s – CfC’s funding partner’s – values. (Gender would thus become a consistently recognised ‘significant’ objective in DFAT’s rankings, bringing CfC more into line with DFAT’s 2016 Gender Equality and Women’s Empowerment Strategy.)
3. **Assessing the effectiveness and efficiency of governance and management arrangements**, with the following key questions asked by DFAT:
4. ***How effective has CfC been in targeting high*** ***impact reform areas and remaining flexible in responding to strategic opportunities?***
5. CfC has been effective at identifying and seeing through to satisfactory conclusion a number of high-impact reforms. The contribution CfC made to these complex, multi-factorial, reform areas is undoubtedly attributable to its ways of working and astute political and policy analysis, described earlier.
6. All grantees and partner organisations interviewed in this review emphasised the unique and pivotal role that CfC played in achieving what they did.
7. Policy and institutional developments across multiple areas have in turn led to higher-level outcomes that mean significant things to the economy and to society. CfC’s 28 (to date) intervention areas are listed at Annex 2, and are documented in detail in multiple other reports, but the more impactful of those 28 reform areas are cited as:

|  |  |
| --- | --- |
| CfC Reform Area | Impact |
| The passage of legislation on alcohol and tobacco excise tax in 2012 | * Additional annual revenue of about A$1.3 billion earmarked primarily for universal healthcare * As of December 2015, revenues generated allowed the Philippine Health Insurance Corporation to cover 92 percent of the country's total population or 14.7 million families, as well as subsidize coverage for 5.9 million senior citizens.   Smoking prevalence fell from 29 percent in 2012 to 25 percent in 2015, while the percentage who never smoked increased from 50 percent to 59 percent over the same period (Social Weather Stations Survey). |
| Policies issued in 2015 to purchase land to establish new schools and reduce school congestion | * The new procedures led to the first-ever purchase of 7 parcels by the Department of Education in 2016 that can accommodate 20,000 students currently attending congested schools * Reflecting the institutionalization of the reform:   + DepEd established the Sites Titling Office to continue the reform   An additional seven parcels were purchased in 2017 |
| Rules issued in 2015 to administratively title government land | Due to the new rules, the number of schools titled jumped from an average of 4 per year to 2,000 and 2,800 in 2015 and 2016 respectively |
| Policy to expand Clark International Airport to reduce congestion in the Manila Airport in 2016 | As a result, there was a 56 percent increase in number of passengers (404,853 to 632,713) to Clark Airport over the same period (January to May) between 2016 and 2017 |
| Supported the establishment of partnerships between the national titling agency and local governments on land titling | * In 2016, an additional 5,000 families received land titles due to funding from the Bohol Provincial government to the national titling agency   Titling targets reached with additional personnel provided to national agency by Agusan del Sur province |
| Assisted in the cleansing of Autonomous Region of Muslim Mindanao electoral rolls of fictitious and/or under-age voters in 2012, and in deterring electoral violence in 2013 | * 600,000 ineligible voters were delisted |
| Enhanced accessibility, inclusivity, and participation by and for Persons with Disabilities (PWDs) in the 2013 and 2016 elections | * Established 6,211 accessible polling places from 2 in 2013 to increased accessibility of the 2016 elections * Increased participation of PWDs in the election with 318,013 voters with disabilities registered in the 2016 elections as compared to 82,000 in 2013   Included PWD sensitivity as part of the training of the Board of Election Inspectors in the 2016 Elections. |
|  | |
| In a number of other cases, CfC helped Philippine government and civil society partners introduce reforms but the impact of those have yet to emerge. Among these are: | |
| * The passage of the Election Service Reform Act (ESRA) in 2016, which removes public schoolteachers from compulsory election duty and reduces incentives for local politicians to interfere with public schools; * Introduced new guidelines in 2017 for use of the National Disaster Risk Reduction and Management Fund to enable local governments to secure funding for disaster risk reduction, mitigation, prevention, and preparedness in disaster-prone localities across the Philippines; * Contributed to the passage of the Free Internet Access in Public Places Act in 2017 to promote competition and increase access to broadband. * Assisted the Department of the Interior and Local Government issue guidelines in 2017 for developing the Local Road Network Development Plans with decision-making procedures based on CfC pilots projects in the Visayas and Mindanao. * Contributed to the Department of Education and the Department of Labor and Employment’s Immersion policy for Senior High School students to improve learning by increasing the number of hours spent in workplace environments. It also has a potential impact on gender and child protection with a provision defining ‘safe learning areas’ and the protection of minors from hazards and exploitation. | |

*Source:* TAF – extracted from a *work-in-progress* draft of the CfC Phase 2 design document, made available to this review.

1. Importantly (and this does not imply any sense of failure on CfC’s part) work on a number of reform areas has been stopped because they were not – as they unfolded – showing sufficient promise or return on investment. Introducing such “stopability” into the program was a key recommendation of the 2013/14 IPR to improve aid effectiveness by concentrating CfC’s finite effort and resources where monitoring suggested they could have most effect. Annex 2 shows how seven reform areas have been stopped in this way.
2. In this regard it is important to recognise the complex and non-linear, unpredictable, multi-dimensional nature of policy reform – particular in ‘wicked’ (box, page 8) policy areas to which CfC has commendably often applied itself. This means that – as DFAT’s DHOM told this review – we should hope for a few big successes mixed with some modest success, but also entirely expect (and be comfortable with) failure to impact sometimes as well.
3. In terms of remaining flexible to strategic opportunities while honouring the substance of the country program, I believe CfC is striking an appropriate balance. In terms of ‘compliance’, this is somewhat easier now that the tightly defined ‘pillars’ of the former country program have been replaced by a more broadly-articulated Aid Investment Plan.
4. But discussing CfC’s involvement in these very high profile and large-scale reform processes raises a fundamentally important concept – one which is probably this review’s core observation:

Analysing contribution

1. CfC is undoubtedly good at what it does – thinking and working politically and facilitating (in the broadest sense) policy reform. (Paras 23 to 27 above.) We have also seen some important and significant policy reforms eventuate in areas wherein CfC has been active – with real impacts observed in society and the economy. (Para 43 above.) However, the causation between these levels (activity, outcome and impact) is not well analysed. In fact, the level of causation that is claimed occasionally, as one well-informed observer put it, can sometimes “create a degree of unhelpful incredulity”.
2. While there can (for example) be no doubting[[28]](#footnote-29) that CfC made a fundamentally important contribution to the scope, scale and timing of excise tax reforms, and while there can also be no doubting that increased tobacco taxation results in decreased prevalence of smoking[[29]](#footnote-30), the complexity of the processes, factors, actors and influences means that the net result was – of course – the product of many different people and organisations doing and saying many different things at the same and different times.
3. This problem of evidencing attribution in public policy making is not a new dilemma, and understanding it is fundamental to making informed and effective public policy and expenditure choices. Just as it is in deciding whether an aid-funded intervention is worth the donor’s tax-payers’ money or not. In such complex areas of work, we cannot seek the same narratives about causation or attribution that we can in simpler, more transactional, aid interventions. (For example, we pay for and distribute school text books and can then simply count how many students benefit from our investment.)
4. What we can and should do though, in more complex interventions, is form a plausible and reasonably robust assessment of the *contribution* we have made. Was it significant and timely? Was it – in retrospect – pushing things in the right direction? Did it tangibly improve the scope, scale, quality and pace of reform? Was it uniquely useful (or would others have done it if we hadn’t)? If we can, with reasonably robust evidence, then say that we – as one of multiple players on the field – made a significant contribution to (but did not necessarily cause) a favourable outcome, then that is good enough.
5. CfC therefore needs to be a master of *Contribution Analysis –* an established and well-documented approach[[30]](#footnote-31) to the evaluation of complex public policy interventions – and produce better/ more credible contribution stories. The good news is that much of the data required for this is already collected and documented – but not used for this purpose – in the meticulous ‘process time lines’ that CfC has maintained for some of its interventions. These (as well, probably, as the collection of other information) should become standard practice across the program if it is to make sense of its contribution to complex processes of change.

Other caveats

1. A related, if minor, observation is also that in some cases CfC’s engagement built on some solid foundations laid by others – notably World Bank and other agencies’ efforts which, for one reason or another, faded before the finish line. Again, this is no bad thing – and indeed it reflects that worthy ‘strategic opportunism’ to which this report has referred earlier. But again, it points to the need for the articulation of plausible and significant contribution, rather than erring towards overstated causation.
2. More importantly, while CfC has contributed significantly to the development of important public *policy* choices, these haven’t always also been accompanied by a dialogue about the public *expenditure* choices that might be implied. For example CfC’s successful work on land titling and site acquisition as a route to school decongestion implies public expenditure choices (which are usually a zero-sum game) that are yet to be made if the policy is to be implemented at a scale large enough to make a difference to resolving the national problem. CfC has to stop somewhere, and trying to capture public expenditure choices in its remit is probably a step too far. But it will be a consideration in any evaluation of CfC’s higher-level impacts – which was not part of this review.

Relationship and Contribution to the Aid Investment Plan

1. As discussed in the 2013/14 review, clarity of purpose (on DFAT’s part) is hugely important. It is important to the strategic planning of CfC (and other programs), and it’s important to the day-to-day decisions of program management teams which shape the scope and nature of the initiative. Senior DFAT staff are aware of (and shared with this review) the need to sharpen clarity of purpose across the aid program, not least in better defining the ‘why’ of Aid Investment Plans such that the ‘what’ – the actual program interventions – can better focus on where impact is most sought.
2. The extent to which CfC serves, or is deferential to, the other mainstream components of the country program was discussed during the 2013/14 independent progress review and I think the issue is largely resolved. In summary I think CfC should go where it can have most impact – and that implies being able to respond to shifting contexts and strategic opportunities when they emerge – while remaining relevant to the higher-level objectives of the Aid Investment Plan. (See also under ‘Relevance’, paras 67 to 68 below.)
3. It is easy to map CfC’s relevance to DFAT’s current Aid Investment Plan (which – since the IPR – replaced the ‘pillars’ of the country program). The current AIP is all about economic growth, institutions for transparent and accountable governance, and conditions for peace and stability – which is what CfC is also all about.
4. That said, the current AIP is broadly-defined so the issue of relevance and ‘degrees of adherence’ to the thrust of the country program may re-emerge if that plan is more tightly defined in the future.
5. But in this discussion of whether or not CfC should mirror other elements of the country program, it is also important to remember *why* we seek focus in the portfolio. It is to improve impact and aid effectiveness by doing fewer things at bigger scale, rather than spreading ourselves too thin. However, *thinking and working politically* is fundamentally another, but completely different, approach to aid effectiveness and achieving impact. To force one approach on top of the other is therefore likely to be of nugatory benefit with respect to an aid effectiveness narrative.
6. This implies being cautious about unrealistic linkages – or retrofitting – to other pre-existing components of the country program unless well-reasoned added-value can be demonstrated.
7. ***How efficient have the*** ***governance and management arrangements of Coalitions for Change been in enabling program impact?***
8. The 2013/14 IPR noted some disconnects and dysfunctionalities in program governance and management, with some frustrations apparent on both sides of the partnership. These appear to have been resolved in many important respects.

* Now benefitting from robust (but separate) technical and strategic advice (see next bullet), as well as more frequent and focused meetings, the Joint Steering Committee has been able to provide more consistent direction. At the same time it has been better able to assess risks and decide on strategies to manage and mitigate risks. Both parties appear more comfortable with the partnership’s construct and operation now, as compared with the IPR’s observations.
* A new organ in the governance of CfC, the Program Strategic Panel (PSP), has been institutionalised. This high-end technical panel robustly interrogates CfC’s analysis and progress and advises the executive-level Joint Steering Committee. Made up of senior DFAT, TAF and independent advisers, it has also bridged the divide between what each party understands the important features of the political context and the program itself to be. It has produced pertinent recommendations.
* The PSP is also an important and effective instrument in the monitoring, evaluation and learning loop – although I suggest that this has to date largely focused on *thinking and working politically* discourses rather than on broader relevance and aid effectiveness issues.
* The DFAT governance adviser in the Philippines (recently returned to Australia and not yet replaced) played a significant technical role in linking the program to DFAT thinking, not least through the PSP. This is an important and continuing role for the successor adviser, yet to be appointed.
* There is a strong culture of monitoring, evaluation and learning within TAF and CfC. Indeed, it is intrinsic to the very ethos of TAF’s *Development Entrepreneurship* model. Since the 2013/14 IPR there has been a more obvious willingness – in response to internal reflection on progress – to stop programs that are not showing so much promise. This is an important development in terms of managing for results.
* Staffing and line-management arrangements within TAF have been adjusted. In particular there is a noticeably more synergistic relationship between CfC staff involved in technical direction and those involved in program management.
* TAF’s recruitment of ex-DFAT program management staff has helped foster an improved understanding and dialogue at that (program management team) level, although some frustrations remain about the program being able to report the right information in an appropriate format for DFAT’s requirements. This may sometimes be to do with DFAT and TAF not being aligned in their understandings of what data and information will be most useful to reflect the unique nature of what CfC is and does and how it defines success.[[31]](#footnote-32)

**Contrasting perspectives**

“If each [CfC] intervention has a clear TOC [theory of change] / pathway / set of milestones, then progress along that can be measured and we can accurately judge whether it’s on track, or if not, what that means…”

*Source:* A DFAT submission to this review

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“CfC teams have been given ‘long leashes’ for wide-ranging exploration and development of their ideas, without the burdens of measurable ‘milestones’ or ‘key performance indicators’ imposed from above. Unlike in most contract-oriented donor projects, this kind of work environment has enabled and encouraged CfC teams to listen, to acknowledge the limitations of their knowledge, to challenge one another’s thinking, and to admit mistakes.”

*Source*: work-in-progress draft of text for a CfC *‘Legacies, Linkages, Lessons’* publication provided to this review.

1. DFAT have posited that CfC absorbs a significant amount of staff time and skills on its part, particularly (presumably) in relation to its relatively modest size in terms of spend. However, I suggest that it is time and effort well spent. Policy work does not spend much (compared to more transactional programs) but it can – if done well – have a disproportionately large impact. (As suggested in Para 43 above.) DFAT’s investment in staff time needs to be accounted for in terms of outcomes, not spend.
2. CfC staff need to be not just technically sound but also politically savvy[[32]](#footnote-33). As noted earlier, CFC’s political savviness and methodological success draws heavily on the experience of one longstanding staff member in particular: TAF’s Director for Economic Reform. This dependency might imply that the initiative is not in itself yet that replicable or scalable. However TAF dispute that: they are confident that none of their inputs is necessarily inimitable, and substantive effort has already been made to train up others (within and beyond TAF) in its approaches. Design of a second phase of CfC will likely include further specific efforts to ensure that skills and approaches are diffused out to a range of other organisational contexts.

Findings: Performance against DAC / DFAT Criteria

1. While there is inevitably crossover with the preceding sections of the report, this section runs through – for ease of reference – the standard OECD DAC, and DFAT, evaluation criteria used in DFAT’s *Aid Quality Check* reporting.

Relevance

1. As the context suggests (refer for example to paras 15 and 26 above) it is policy and institutional reform that is needed if there is to be better quality growth and better governance. Transactional (‘just buying things’) interventions and conventional organisational development and capacity-building programs (which are predicated on an assumed lack of knowledge or capability as opposed to a lack of institutional incentives) rarely impact in that respect.
2. So … if CfC can demonstrate significant effects on policy and institutional reform, then it has to be highly (particularly) relevant in terms of how a medium-sized bilateral aid program might operate in the Philippines context.
3. A recurring question over ‘relevance’ is the more operational one of whether CfC should also mirror other, thematic, interventions in the country program. In the past these have related to sectors and institutions - ‘education’ for example.
4. I do not think it necessarily needs to (but can if it adds value), for two reasons:

* It could be a tall order to retrofit ‘doing development differently’ into a conventional program. If thinking and working politically can add value to another program – while passing the tests of ‘technically sound and politically possible’ – then that’s a bonus. But what doesn’t fit can’t fit.[[33]](#footnote-34)
* It would unnecessarily be trying to overlay one approach to aid effectiveness over another. Concentrating resources around a limited number of intervention areas (*i.e.* the ‘pillaring’ of a country aid program) is essentially done to improve aid effectiveness. Thinking and working politically is another, but completely different, approach to aid effectiveness and not one readily melded into one that isn’t ‘thinking and working politically’, either conceptually or operationally.

1. However, as the CfC program as a whole is intended to be a tool in DFAT’s approach to addressing the higher-level objectives of its Aid Investment Plan, it should clearly be designed and managed to contribute meaningfully to the defined higher-level purpose of the Australia aid program’s presence and efforts in the country – currently defined as impacting on economic growth, transparent and accountable governance, and peace and stability. (But that’s what CfC does, mainly, so currently no problem.)

Effectiveness

1. Effectiveness – whether a program is having its desired effect, qualitatively and quantitatively – has to be judged against some clarity of intent about what the objectives of one’s presence and efforts are, and what success looks like. That has never been particularly neatly defined for CfC. The problem is accentuated by a tendency to describe CfC’s effects in terms of very high level outcomes, which – as discussed at paras 48 to 52 above – present an evaluator with some analytical problems.
2. If, however, we content ourselves with judging effectiveness on the basis of asking “Did CfC make significant and timely contributions to policy processes which ultimately lead to the achievement of higher level social and economic outcomes?”, and “Did it do this reasonably consistently?”, then we can say that CfC has been very effective.
3. I would select the following as good examples of this:

* An increase in tobacco and alcohol excise tax, yielding an increase in public expenditures on health as well as, putatively (see footnote 29 above), a reduction in smoking;
* Changed policies, rules and capacities regarding school congestion – by addressing a CfC-identified binding constraint to school expansion (land titling and acquisition);
* Overcoming political and legislative obstacles to a stalled dual airport strategy for Manila, promoting expansion of Clark airport and contributing (among other factors) to decongestion and improved performance at Ninoy Aquino airport.
* Successful voter registration reforms in ARMM (which has particularly troublesome governance challenges), resulting in delisting some 600,000 ineligible voters;
* Enhanced accessibility, inclusivity and participation in elections of people with disabilities. (A 285% increase in voters with disabilities was registered in the 2016 elections.)

Efficiency

1. ‘Efficiency’ in DAC terms is about ‘bang for buck’, and whether we could get more for our investment by configuring the program differently. A benefit:cost analysis of CfC would be very problematic and would require bold assumptions about many unknown variables. This review was certainly not equipped to do that.
2. However one can certainly say that, where they are effective (see above), transformative programs that contribute to durable change in the policies and institutions that ultimately shape how the economy works are highly efficient. Policy work is not capital intensive and the resultant outcomes can potentially have impacts across the whole of society. *I.e.* they can yield a big return for relatively small investments, from an aid perspective.
3. Provided CfC can properly demonstrate its effectiveness, we can say that it is probably also a particularly efficient use of aid resources.
4. It does involve a significant amount of Post’s time[[34]](#footnote-35) to oversee – technically and managerially. This is not least due to the inherent political and reputational risks. (Which appear well managed.) However, this is nonetheless a small investment for the returns that can be anticipated.

Impact

1. Assessing impact – the highest level of a program’s effects at the top of its intervention logic – normally requires a substantive and purposive evaluation, usually carried out some time after the event. This review has not attempted to validate impact, but notes CfC’s claims of such impact (such as changed smoking behaviours).
2. As above, there needs to be more robust contribution analysis and a further-reaching examination of counterfactuals and – particularly – sustainability issues before CfC’s impacts can be properly (credibly) reported.

Sustainability

1. As with *Efficiency*, programs whose principal product is a durable shift in the rules of the game – the policies and institutions that ultimately shape the economy and citizens’ lives and livelihoods – are inherently sustainable.
2. Interestingly CfC’s flagship reform – the increase in tobacco tax (heavily opposed by some parts of the industry with greatest vested interests but supported by others) – was subsequently re-categorised (by CfC) as ‘red’ in terms of sustainability, because of the risk of policy reversal under the new administration. (Although more recent analysis is that this risk has apparently receded.)
3. I would also like to see a more informed narrative about the likelihood of the substantially increased capital expenditures required to support some of CfC’s policy reforms – for example land acquisition for school decongestion now that legal and regulatory hurdles have been resolved.
4. As already discussed, the sustainability of deploying ‘thinking and working politically’ *approaches* in the Philippines context needs some reflection, given current dependencies on a relatively small cadre of equally aid-savvy expertise. This is likely to be a consideration in the design of a second phase.

Gender Equality

1. (See also the more substantive discussion above on gender.)
2. CfC scored badly on addressing gender equality at the 2013/14 IPR. Since then, although some slightly off-the-mark gender narratives are still to be found in CfC documentation, the program has undoubtedly upped its game on gender. It is now able to discuss the impacts of policy reforms on differentiated segments of society, for example – if only retrospectively.
3. However, there’s more to do and further to go. CfC’s unique selling point is its ability to identify binding constraints to development and find ways of addressing those through politically-savvy processes that lead to policy and ‘rules of the game’ reform. So – surely – CfC should be at the vanguard of applying such analysis and effort to the significant issues of gender inequality in the Philippines.

Monitoring, Evaluation and Learning

1. There have been some significant developments in terms of monitoring, evaluation and learning since the mid-term review, but we’re not there yet.
2. The introduction of the Program Strategic Panel (PSP) has introduced a remarkably thorough and regular review mechanism. Comprising senior technical people from TAF, DFAT and beyond (including political and governance specialists), the panel has been able to interrogate CfC plans and progress and make well-informed recommendations on the direction and emphasis of the program. This is exactly the sort of ‘learning loop’ that was sought by the 2013/14 review, and there are examples of the program now being adjusted in response to learning. Excellent.
3. The PSP – along with other moves by senior management – has also served to increase the level of Post’s engagement with the program, contributing to greater understanding between the two sides of the DFAT/TAF partnership. (In what was always going to be a mould-breaking way of working.)
4. However, the *thinking and working politically* emphasis of CfC’s learning loops, and the considerable academic interest in CfC, has maybe crowded out a critical analysis of more conventional – but equally important – technical, developmental and aid effectiveness considerations.[[35]](#footnote-36), [[36]](#footnote-37)
5. CfC doesn’t need to say that it caused the major policy shifts that have been witnessed. That would, as one respected observer told this review, be “frankly ridiculous”. But, because the ‘chain of causality’ is poorly defined, that is what much of CfC’s literature sometimes seems to suggest. That may delight the *Thinking and Working Politically* community, but it doesn’t convince everybody.
6. But that is not to say that CfC doesn’t make significant – often pivotal and game-changing – contributions to complex multi-factorial change processes. It does. But that contribution is not well articulated. (See paras 52 and 78 and footnote 30 regarding *contribution analysis*.)

Overall Conclusion

1. CfC is doing well and remains in my view highly relevant to Australia’s Aid Investment Plan in the Philippines. It is one of just a few programs, certainly in DFAT’s global portfolio, successfully championing more effective, politically-savvy, ways of working to achieve significant outcomes in complex political, institutional and economic contexts – which is the challenge in this country.
2. While it had some teething problems in the early years, CfC’s implementing arrangements – in the form of a grant-based partnership with a uniquely experienced international NGO – have proved particularly fit for purpose. (Although how replicable and scalable that is remains something of a question.)
3. Perhaps particularly in the context of its success, and the fact that many eyes are on it, CfC needs to be able to tell a better and more robust story about its unique contribution to advancing policy reform. Less about its academically interestingly modality (of thinking and working politically) and more about the [unique?] role it played on the field, among other players.
4. Given its apparent potency, I feel that real opportunities are being missed in terms of taking forward one of DFAT’s core objectives, *viz.* actively promoting the achievement of gender equality at scale.
5. CfC’s complex political and institutional environment, and also the potential for political and reputational risks to surface from time to time, deserve a close relationship being maintained between the partners in the endeavour – DFAT and TAF. Not just at the operational level, but importantly at the technical and executive levels too. While this may – for a relatively small-spend program – be demanding on time and resources, it is time disproportionately well invested in terms of achieving significant and widespread impact on society and the economy.
6. All this, though, assumes a clarity of purpose about the aid program in the distinctive context of the Philippines. Every effort needs to be made to articulate that clarity of purpose, such that those who direct and manage difficult programming and program-management choices are clear of the objectives and what success should look like.

Recommendations

|  |
| --- |
| Recommendations of CfC’s 2017/18 Independent Completion Review |
| 1. **On the basis of this review, investment in a further phase of CfC (which also takes into account the recommendations below) is warranted.**   *Refer to: the overall thrust of this review and paras 65 to 69 above in particular.*  *Action: DFAT on the basis of an appropriate TAF-led design.* |
| The design for the new phase should: |
| 1. **Be informed by, and be framed to deliver against, real clarity of purpose about the objectives of** *(i.e.* what success looks like for) **the presence and efforts of the Australian aid program in the Philippines.**   *Refer to: paras 69 - 70 and 97.*  *Action: TAF ‘Phase 2’ design team on the basis of such an articulation by DFAT.* |
| 1. **Institutionalise a well-considered and appropriately-resourced approach to analysing and succinctly reporting against CfC’s contribution to significant policy reform processes (as opposed to more questionably claiming causation at impact level).**   *Refer to: paras 48 - 52 above.*  *Action: TAF ‘Phase 2’ design team, in dialogue with DFAT and potentially also external strategic M&E expertise.* |
| 1. **Allied to the above, program-in from the inception of any new phase the agreement, clear definition and robust implementation of ‘who needs what information’ for monitoring, evaluation and learning purposes. (Not least so that any future evaluation has appropriate data to work on.)**   *Refer to: paras 51, last bullet of para 61, para 78 and text box page 16.*  *Action: TAF ‘Phase 2’ design team in dialogue with DFAT – and probably also external strategic M&E expertise.* |
| 1. **Much more proactively seek to address gender inequality through CfC’s analysis of, and support to, significant policy reform initiatives in this area (subject always to CfC’s usual ‘technically sound, politically possible’ filters).**   *Refer to: paras 29 to 40.*  *Action: TAF ‘Phase 2’ design team, in dialogue with DFAT and potentially also outside expertise.* |
| 1. **Design-in efforts to promote and institutionalise the replicability and scalability of CfC approaches beyond TAF.**   *Refer to: para 63.*  *Action: TAF ‘Phase 2’ design team, in dialogue with DFAT.* |
| 1. **Recognise the importance of maintaining a close and ongoing engagement between DFAT and TAF in terms of executive-level strategic direction (including risk management) and in technical (governance) analysis and advice. This suggests a continued and significant role in CfC’s governance and advisory structures for the DHOM and Counsellor at post, as well as yet-to-be-appointed DFAT governance adviser.**   *Refer to: paras 61 and 96.*  *Action: DFAT to prioritise; TAF to (continue to) include in Phase 2 governance structures.* |
| 1. **Better balance the solid political science analysis and advice that CfC enjoys (most formally at the level of PSP) with an equally important interrogation of wider technical, aid and development effectiveness considerations.**   *Refer to: para 89 and its footnotes.*  *Action: TAF ‘Phase 2’ design team, in dialogue with DFAT.* |
| 1. **As with CfC Phase 1, and given the substantive recommendations of this review with respect to a second phase, schedule an Independent Progress Review relatively early in Phase 2 (say at about 18 months from inception) to reflect on direction and emphasis.**   *Action: DFAT Program Management Team.* |

Acknowledgements

1. I am extremely grateful for the time and insights provided by the many people whom I met on this Review: without your candour and willingness to engage I would not have got anywhere at all. I know, from the experience of sometimes being on the other side of the table, how all-preoccupying such reviews can be.
2. Special thanks go to the DFAT and TAF program management teams for their flawless logistical arrangements, extensive briefing materials and their support throughout.

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Annex 1: Approaches to Working Politically

|  |  |
| --- | --- |
| **Problem-driven iterative**  **adaptation (PDIA)**  (Andrews et al., 2012) | **Problem-driven iterative adaptation** has been advocated by researchers at the Kennedy School of Government at Harvard University. It focuses on:   * Finding indigenous solutions for locally defined problems in performance. * Creating an authorising environment for decision-making that encourages positive deviance and experimentation. * Embedding this experimentation in tight feedback loops that facilitate rapid experiential learning. * Engaging broad sets of agents to ensure that reforms are viable, legitimate, relevant and supportable. |
| **Thinking and working politically**  (Thinking and Working Politically  Community of Practice, 2013) | In 2013, representatives of donors, together with leading thinkers and researchers, created a community of practice **promoting thinking and working politically** in development and focusing on what donors can do. Recognising that political economy analysis has not shifted donor practice, three core principles are promoted:   * Strong political analysis, insight and understanding. * Detailed appreciation of, and response to, the national and local context. * Flexibility and adaptability in programme design and implementation. |
| **Politically-smart and locally led development**  (Booth & Unsworth, 2014) | Booth and Unsworth document programmes that are characterised as **politically smart and locally led**, understood as:   * Politically informed by a sense of history and an in-depth understanding of country and sector context, including continually updated national/subnational political economy dynamics. * Politically astute by using information about politics intelligently and creatively. Donors and partners must be clever operators, with the capacity to work with or around politics, as well as donor constraints. Third parties will be more politically informed and astute than outsiders can ever be. * Nationally and locally owned, not just in the narrow, technocratic sense, such as the Paris Declaration, but focused on problems that have salience for potential beneficiaries and at least some individuals/groups with the power to support, influence or block change. * Nationally/locally negotiated and delivered, prioritising national and subnational leadership and capacity to search for solutions to locally identified problems. Locals will more likely have the motivation, credibility, knowledge and networks to mobilise support, leverage relationships and seize opportunities in politically astute ways. |
| **Doing development differently**  (The Doing Development  Differently Manifesto  Community, 2014) | The **Doing Development Differently Manifesto** commits signatories to develop programmes that:   * Focus on solving nationally/locally defined problems that are debated and refined in an ongoing process. * Are legitimised at all levels (political, managerial and social), building real ownership (not just on paper) and momentum. * Work through national and local conveners to mobilise all those with a stake in progress to tackle common problems and introduce relevant change. * Blend design and implementation through rapid cycles of planning, action, reflection and revision to foster learning from success and failure. * Manage risks by making ‘small bets’: pursuing activities with promise and dropping others. * Foster real results – real solutions to real problems that have real impact: that build trust, empower people and promote sustainability. |

*Source:* Adapted from Hadley, S. & Tilley, H. (2017) *Governance for Growth in Vanuatu: a review of a decade of thinking and working politically’*, ODI Report. London: Overseas Development Institute, in turn adapted from Denny, L. & Barron, P. (2015) *Beyond the Toolkit: supporting peace processes in Asia*. ODI Report. London: Overseas Development Institute

Annex 2: Register of CfC Activities, December 2017

*Key:*

|  |  |
| --- | --- |
|  | *Completed* |
|  | *Ongoing* |
|  | *Stopped* |

| JULY 2014 to  JUNE 2015 | | | | JULY 2015 to  JUNE 2016 | | JULY 2016 to  JUNE 2017 | | | JULY 2017 to  JUNE 2018 | | | | |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
| CfC BASIC EDUCATION | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| Senior High School (SHS) Transition | | | | | | | | | | | |  | |
| Education School Facilities Decongestion | | | | | | | | |  | | | | |
| Education and Electoral Reform (ESRA) | | | | | | | | |  | | | | |
|  | | | | | | | Reducing Constraints to Youth Employment | | | | | | |
|  | | | | | | Fully Abled Nation (FAN)  Improving Access to Education and Employment of People with Disabilities | | | | | | | |
| CfC DISASTER RISK REDUCTION | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| Private-Public Partnership on Disaster Response | | | |  | | | | | | | | | |
| Support for Rental to Housing Subsidy | | | |  | | | | | | | | | |
| National Land Use Act | | | |  | | | | | | | | | |
| Rules for Local Government Funding  from the National DRRM Fund | | | | | | | | |  | | | | |
| CfC ECONOMIC GROWTH (ECON) | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| Amendments to Build-Operate-Transfer Law | | | | | |  | | | | | | | |
|  | | | | Airport Infrastructure for Economic Growth | | | | | | | | | |
|  | | | | | | Broadband Infrastructure | | | | | | | |
|  | | | | | | Increasing Competition and  Foreign Investment in Public Utilities | | | | | | | |
| Ensuring Credible and Effective Implementation of Excise Tax | | | | | | | | Tax Reform for Acceleration and Inclusion (TRAIN) | | | | | |
|  | | | | | | | Metro Manila Mobility Reform | | | | | | |
| CfC GOVERNANCE | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| Grassroots Participatory Budgeting Process | | | |  | | | | | | | | | |
|  | Sustaining Bottom-up Budgeting | |  | | | | | | | | | | |
| Good Governance Through Transparency Initiatives | | | | |  | | | | | | | | |
| Fully Abled Nation (FAN)  Increasing Access to PWDs for Elections | | | | | |  | | | | | | | |
| Fostering Economic Growth by Strengthening Land Governance | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| Coordinating Roads and Infrastructure Investments for Development (CR+ID) | | | | | | | | | | | |  | |
|  | | Local Infrastructure Asset Management (LIAM) | | | | Fund Augmentation Rules (FAR) | | | | | Improving Local Roads | | |
|  | | | | | | | Increasing the Integrity of Elections | | | | | | |
|  | | | | | | | Balanced Socialized Housing Development | | | | | | |
|  | | | | | | | CfC Reform Book | | | | | | |
| CfC MINDANAO | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| Support to the Peace Process | | | | | | | | | | | |  | |
| Security Sector Reform | | | | | | | | | | | |  | |
|  | | | | | | Countering Violent Extremism (CVE) | | |  | | | | |
|  | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
|  | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| OTHER RELATED DFAT-TAF PARTNERSHIP ACTIVITIES | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| Generating Evidence to Track the Progress of Anticorruption Initiatives | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| Electoral System Redesign for Development | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
|  | | | | Election-Related Activities (Carter Center) | | | | |  | | | | |
|  | | | | Public Financial Management Edited Volume  (PFM Book) | | | | | | | | |  |
|  | | | | | | Child Protection Against Online Sexual Exploitation Project | | | | | | | |
|  | | | | | | Rule of Law (ROL)  Judicial Reform Support Project | | | | | | | |
|  | | | | | | Exploring Avenues for Reform of Central Local Relations, including Federalism (RCLR) | | | | | | | |
|  | | | | | | | | | | Networking and Capacity-building for the Rule of Law | | | |

*Source:* DFAT Manila

Annex 3: ICR TAF Workshop Conclusions – Key Questions

*Source:* TAF Philippines Program Management Team write-up


|  |  |
| --- | --- |
| Table 1:  ***How did CfC work? What did it do? What was effective and what was not?*** | |
| **Actual Inputs** | **Summary/Highlights** |
| ***How did CfC work? What did it do?***   * Provided an enabling environment project to identify/attract local leaders committed to improving Philippines * Iterative process * Being proactive * Brokered conversations among influential/motivated/integral parties * Nudged policy reform positively * Analytical work/review * Modelling of the application of a policy change * Evidence-based approach * Identified problems that no one else is thinking about * Data gathering * Background research * Succeeded in competing for authorization * Identified TAF’s resources: manpower and its network, strategy on how to approach the problem   ***What was effective?***   * Started looking at your exit as you implement the project * Influenced partners to be reform-oriented * Identified other reform opportunities associated w/ partners * Identified societal pressing issue/problem – approach discussed freely within the team * Identified TAF’s resources * Connected who you know either professionally or personally   ***What did not work?***   * Going to the ground with preconceived problems and/or solutions * Too process focus * Implementation issues rather than the reform work * No end-game * Documenting results (to improve on) * Maintain partnerships/social capital * Groupthink or echo- chamber * Cross-thematic collaboration | * CfC has been instrumental and effective in: * Bridging different networks of experts, CSOs, and local leaders * Identifying problems that are evidenced-based * Training its resources (internal and external) to be reform-oriented in approaching the problem * Maintaining open communication between and among thematic teams * There is still a need to: * Ensure that all the results, especially those that need improvement, are documented * Be innovative in coming up with a solution |
|  | |
| Table 2:  ***How strong is the evidence? Will it be sustained?*** | |
| **Actual Inputs** | **Summary/Highlights** |
| ***How strong is the evidence?***   * Evidence cannot be reflected in all reforms * Do we know what evidence to look for? * Evidence could be the number of people ‘around the table’ or the number of people (we had) convinced * Evidence is ‘arbitrary’   ***Will it be sustained? (How can it be sustained?)***   * Too early to tell if the evidence will all be sustained * To be sustained, it is important to have a baseline prior to CfC intervention * There is also a need to monitor impact over time * Measures that will help monitor the evidence should be easy and applicable * Measures should matter and should be embedded in the policy so that the government can do the M&E for you | * There is a need to ensure that there is a defined M&E framework and approach that will/is: * Monitor impact over time * Consolidate all the aspects of the reforms/coalition that have evolved (i.e., CfC timeline updated from time to time) * Easy to use, accessible, and extremely helpful even in the most adaptive set-up |
| Table 3:  ***What were the gender dimensions? How did CfC respond?*** | |
| **Actual Inputs** | **Summary/Highlights** |
| ***What were the gender dimensions?***   * Elections * Gender disaggregated data gathered * No analysis on participation issues * CR+ID * CSOs are largely represented by women but majority of the decision-makers are men * Disability * Note that there are already inherent barriers (i.e., discrimination of PWDs whether they are female or male * During DPO/CSOs representations, men are the most aggressive, and take most of the talk time * SHS * More boys are dropping out because in the first place, girls are not enrolling to SHS * Gender stereotypes in SHS courses (e.g., less men in housekeeping, more women in semiconductor, etc.)   ***How did CfC respond?***   * Gender analysis * Hiring of gender consultants/ advocates * Gender spotlighting * Introduced new gender concepts into the report (CR+ID), IRRs (ESRA), and guideline (DRR) * “Conscious” inclusion of all gender in the local planning | * Inputs shared by the team revolve around the ff. gender dimensions:   + Attitudes and beliefs   + Political representation   + Leadership   + Access * For the last two years, TAF has been proactive in giving gender perspectives on its approaches and analysis. Some of the activities were:   + Gender Trainings   + Connecting with gender specialists and advocates   + Inclusion of gender perspectives into the templates, reports, notes, etc.   + Constant check-ins with the team |


**CfC ICR WORKSHOP PARTICIPANTS**


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| --- | --- | --- |
|  | **Participant** | **Organization & Theme / Sector** |
| DFAT ICR Consultant | Peter Bazeley |  |
| Senior Management | Sam Chittick | TAF |
| Program Management Team | Christine Bantug | TAF |
|  | Wanda Casten | TAF |
|  | Marikit Castillo | TAF |
|  | Patrick Bolaños | TAF |
| TAF Thematic Teams | King Ocampo | TAF - SNG |
|  | Hygeia Chi | TAF - SNG |
|  | Quintin Atienza | TAF – Disability |
|  | Jowil Placerda | TAF – Disability |
|  | Jaime Faustino | TAF – Economic and Reform |
|  | Chrys Pablo | TAF – Economic and Reform |
|  | Jestine Mendoza | TAF – Economic and Reform |
|  | Henry Grageda | TAF - Education |
|  | Kimberly Garcia | TAF - Education |


Annex 4: TAF Self-Assessment of Performance against DAC / DFAT Evaluation Criteria


(Reviewer-facilitated all-staff CfC ICR workshop session, November 2017)














Annex 5: Current Gender Matrix

**Coalitions for Change (CfC) Program and Other Related Activities**

*Source:* TAF Philippines

|  |  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
| Reform Initiative | Gender Targets | Updates  (January to June 2017) | Possible Knowledge Products / Gender Story | Support Needed by Teams | Action points  (July 2017 – June 2018) |
| Basic Education – Senior High School and Human Capital | Activity on the high drop-out rates of boys will continue to be a gender spotlight. For 2016-2017, this will be done on two levels:  (a) exploring additional 4Ps (conditional cash transfer) grants to high school beneficiaries and  (b) developing gender-specific school-based instruments for spotting students at risk of dropping out (SARDO). | The exploratory quantitative research on the “non-compliant” 4Ps (conditional cash transfer) beneficiaries in high school revealed the significant differences in reasons by sex (male and female) and location (city and non-city) factors. That is, gender or location has no influence on non-compliance brought by inaccessible facilities and supply-side constraints.  This study has been endorsed to DSWD. The agency is interested at replicating study when the agency updates its database.  The CfC-initiated qualitative research by the Social Development Research Center (SDRC) of De La Salle University examined factors for dropping out, including possible gender differences. | Better Understanding on the Boys Drop-Out Factors | Gender focal point’s inputs on the gender story | 1. Continue to strengthen gender mainstreaming and ensure that gender is on the radar of the team 2. Integrated gender lens/language into the Theory of Change 3. Document what actions were taken on the boys drop-out results (i.e. school-based instruments for SARDO) 4. Possibility of including pre and post-tests for the school and division levels 5. Include in the potential social protection linkage the gender implication and also check the upcoming IRR on age and gender discrimination 6. For the PQF, consider tucking in a requirement that the policy should not discriminate based on gender |
| Basic Education – Education School Facilities Decongestion | Ensure that female and male students benefit from decongested classrooms. | Women continue to be key participants in land acquisition workshops.  In terms of gender disaggregated statistics on congestion figures from affected schools, CfC has requested for the disaggregated gender data in congested schools from the Department of Education. The request has not been acted upon yet. | No possible gender story yet | Technical assistance and guidance on gender programming | 1. Gender focal and gender consultant to help the team flesh out and harvest gender stories. 2. Integrate gender lens/language into the Theory of Change. |
| Basic Education – Education and Electoral Reform | For the research paper, sex-disaggregated data will be reflected. In the drafting of the IRRs, women’s participation will be highly encouraged including during consultations. | In terms of gender, the inputs from female and male participants of focus group discussions with teachers’ organizations and Commission on Election (COMELEC) were taken into consideration. CfC plans to include gender concerns in selection criteria of Board of Election Inspectors (BEI) in the draft Implementing Rules and Regulations (IRRs) of Election Service Reform Act (ESRA).  It is anticipated that the law will improve teachers’ welfare and increase citizens’ (female and male) participation in elections. | No possible gender story yet | Technical assistance and guidance on gender programming | 1. Gender Focal and Gender Consultant to help the team flesh out and harvest gender stories. 2. Integrated gender lens/language into the Theory of Change. |
| DRR – National DRRM Fund | Integrate gender mainstreaming strategies in the guidelines for the utilization and prioritization of the NDRRM Fund by ensuring that projects abide by gender responsive budgeting and planning at the local and national levels. Activities on mobilizing gender focal persons to provide a gender lens to the DRRM fund allocation and monitoring will be considered. | CfC continues to mainstream gender in its reform activities. In fact, our national partner for the National Disaster Risk Reduction and Management (NDRRM) local fund reform initiative helped endorse the guidelines on the accessing of disaster funds by local governments to the NDRRM Council.  The guidelines include gender indicators as part of the project evaluation checklist.  Specifically, the Philippine Commission on Women provided inputs on mainstreaming gender, disability and inclusivity in the draft policy. Suggestions were put forward to integrate gender standards in the menu of projects to be funded from the NDRRM Fund. CfC, through OCD shall work with PCW and DRRNET in enhancing the section on project evaluation and standards checklist. This will help LGUs and NGAs to ensure gender and inclusivity in proposing projects to be funded from the NDRRM Fund. | No possible gender story yet. | Technical assistance and guidance on gender programming | 1. Gender focal to work closely with DRR Team in terms of gender mainstreaming activities for DRR (i.e. meetings with PCW and OCD) 2. Integrate gender lens/language into the Theory of Change. 3. Establish that there are gender-related risks. 4. Reiterate gender sensitive standards for facilities resourced from the NDRRM fund. |
| Economic Growth – Airport Infrastructure | Female and male profile of the leadership of key agencies involved in airport infrastructure (e.g., CAB, DOTC, DOT, Clark, NAIA) will be gathered. In addition, gender language will be included in the proposed dual airport priority policy. | The team is committed to ensure and monitor the use gender sensitive language in drafting of policies and (2) monitor the participation of male and female in the reform. Any update on the former will be reported accordingly. | No possible gender story yet | 1. Technical assistance and guidance on gender programming 2. Support (gender inputs) on the development of new concept notes | 1. Gender focal and gender consultant to help the team flesh out and harvest gender stories 2. Integrate gender lens/language into the Theory of Change 3. Consider spot checking on airport facility 4. Ensure gender sensitive language in the reports 5. Focus on participation |
| Economic Growth – Broadband |  | No gender risks determined perhaps more on internet access |  |  |  |
| Governance – Fostering Economic Growth by Strengthening Land Governance | To continue gender neutrality of Philippine property rights laws, ensure that proposed policies will be gender compliant. Include provisions for the collection of sex-disaggregated data in the proposed national titling program and Agricultural Free Patent Act. | The CfC team will continue to observe for any gender issues that may implicitly or explicitly manifest during the documentation of the experiences of the various partnership areas.  In terms of generating increased evidence and analysis about the likely gender dimensions arising from the National Land Titling Program, CfC will make a renewed effort at improving the focus on gender. | No possible gender story yet | Technical assistance and guidance on gender programming | 1. Gender Focal and Gender Consultant to help the team flesh out and harvest gender stories 2. Integrate gender lens/language into the Theory of Change 3. PMT will help the team write-up story on women land titling beneficiaries |
| Governance – CR+ID | Continue to document and highlight gender success stories in the form of cases studies. These stories will be disseminated to stakeholders. | Case studies on gender spotlight are being finalized by the TAF-CfC Program Management Team. These case studies highlight a feature study on the municipal engineer of Baclayon and the inclusion of gender criteria in roads and infrastructure investment prioritization scheme in Caraga region.  Out of 20 trainings and workshops conducted from this period, 37.21 percent were women. On the other hand, for meetings, consultations and discussion, 50.18 percent of were participated by women. | Women Leaders of the Business Chambers  Political Empowerment of Women, representative of CSOs in the government structures, participation of women in development council.  There is an on-going negotiation with the writer/consultant. In case the negotiation fails, the team will write the stories.  Guide Questions devised by teams. Data Gathering has started. | Review of the gender stories | 1. Gender focal, in close coordination with the gender consultant to devise Guidance Notes for writing gender stories 2. Integrate gender lens/language into the Theory of Change 3. Gender stories to be harvested, PMT and Team will work together with Mariel 4. While CfC’s aim is not directed to women, CfC is harnessing women leaders 5. Consider two possible outputs:  * Women leaders (including previous drafts) * Criteria setting – Team will improve M&E first then signal PMT for possible story |
| Fund Augmentation Rules (FAR) |  |  |  |  | 1. Consider drawing from CR+ID’s previous aim of using gender as criteria for prioritizing investments (e.g. through the PRNDP guidelines). 2. Consider building evidence to say that there were no prioritization criteria previously and show that by using a set of criteria, the gender gap is addressed. |
| Housing |  |  |  |  | 1. Team to focus on relocation, developer compliance and formulating a beneficiary list which all need to have gender lens. 2. Team to understand gender issues not necessarily to address them. |
| Governance – Ensuring the Credible and Effective Implementation of the Excise Tax Reform | Expand the benefits to women and men of the Excise Tax Law by defending the law in the mandatory review that will be undertaken in the third quarter of 2016. | Discussions with government partner agency is on-going. Gender considerations will be raised as the technical issues are being worked out.  In terms of generating the gender dimensions of the proposed tax reform areas, CfC will make a renewed effort at improving the focus on gender.  In terms of generating the gender dimensions of the proposed tax reform areas, CfC will make a renewed effort at improving the focus on gender. | Effects of the Excise Tax Law on Women | Funding resource for writers | 1. Gender focal and gender consultant to help the team flesh out and harvest gender stories 2. Integrate gender lens/language into the Theory of Change 3. Follow up proceeds on Sin Tax with AER |
| Economic – Public Utilities |  |  |  |  | Team to cite in the report: no limiting access to men or women in the use of public utilities |
| Metro Manila Transportation reform |  | None – no reform focus yet, hence no gender implications. |  |  |  |
| Increasing the Integrity of Elections |  | None – no reform focus yet, hence no gender implications. |  |  |  |
| Education –  Fully Abled Nation | Look at the issues involving gender and disability including through economic empowerment of women with disabilities and legal assistance and access to justice for children with disabilities. | On gender, FAN recognizes the “triple discrimination” suffered by women and other marginalized gender groups with disabilities (i.e., on the basis of being poor, having a disability, being a woman or gay, as well as the intersection among them).  FAN also recognizes the gender implications on the families of people with disabilities[[37]](#footnote-38).  Given the limited timeframe, the project will focus on women and explore with BEST the possibility of conducting an in-depth study to have a more nuanced and fuller understanding of the “triple discrimination” and the resulting gender impact to the families of people with disabilities. If this is possible, FAN will help BEST coordinate and conduct activities contributing to this study, such as consultation with FAN’s key stakeholders. | No possible gender story yet | Technical assistance and guidance on gender programming | 1. Team to work closely with gender consultant to: 2. Update/Revise the Gender Analysis: 3. Update/Revise the Gender Target 4. Agree on the gender Strategy per reform (mainstreaming or spotlighting) 5. Devise an updated Gender Action Plan 6. Craft Gender Benchmarking for monitoring and evaluation of gender targets. 7. Integrate gender lens/language into the Theory of Change 8. On employment research: determine policy opportunities to address drop in employment for women 9. On Inclusive education: consider the gender risks at the school level not to work on a solution but to be able to acknowledge certain issues 10. Consider actions for the law to have child protection and gender-based policies. |
| Governance – Fund Augmentation Rules | By becoming active part of local stakeholders promoting and advocating for this purpose, the end-users can put their stake such as in ensuring the gender dimensions in the initiative.  Ultimately, the local coalition is envisioned to be widened, and the process of roads & infrastructure identification, designing and programming becomes more inclusive. | For Fund Augmentation Rules (FAR), this may mean sustaining the work with the local TWGs for Roads and Infrastructure, such that the end users become members or are engaged of the TWGs in the advocacy for the LGU to sustain its support and priority to maintaining the good conditions and/or open new roads |  |  | 1. Team to meet with gender consultant to: 2. Update/Revise the Gender Analysis: 3. Update/Revise the Gender Target 4. Agree on the gender Strategy per reform (mainstreaming or spotlighting) 5. Devise an updated Gender Action Plan 6. Craft Gender Benchmarking for monitoring and evaluation of gender targets. 7. Integrate gender lens/language into the Theory of Change |
| Mindanao – Support to the Peace Process and Security Sector Reform | AFP Gender and Development Strategic Plan | In its gender spotlight project, CfC directly worked with gender expert and the gender and development (GAD) officers of the of the various AFP units. This strategic partnership allows for a higher probability of institutionalizing the necessary reforms on GAD.  Female Marines (who are now deployed) received Gender Training from CfC. They have developed general appreciation of the role of female Marines in a male-dominated Marine Corps. |  | Gender consultant to help integrate a gender perspective in all peace and security efforts, hence will provide an in-depth analysis of the sensitive peace-building program for Mindanao. | 1. Team to work closely with gender consultant to: 2. Update/Revise the Gender Analysis: 3. Update/Revise the Gender Target 4. Agree on the gender Strategy per reform (mainstreaming or spotlighting) 5. Devise an updated Gender Action Plan 6. Craft Gender Benchmarking for monitoring and evaluation of gender targets. 7. Integrate gender lens/language into the Theory of Change 8. For the peace process, team to consider the following questions: can BWUP continue without our support? For WOMB, do they have presence? What is the plan of the government re BBL? 9. Team to check with CRT if they are able to implement their activities, gather evidence that the gender trainings have impact (e.g. if barracks are gender sensitive) 10. Team to check Rosalie Hall’s paper for gender implications 11. Team to consider indicators for gender sensitive Civil Military Operations 12. Team to consider gender analysis for the report (e.g., propensity of males, motivations for involvement) |
| Child Protection | Providing support to child witnesses (who are mostly girl children). In addition, it will continue to take into consideration the needs of sexually exploited children with disability towards making the draft bill more PWD friendly. Legal audit will continue to be a gender spotlight activity because of its potential to inform broader judicial reforms. | Gender audit has been completed and showed the need for physical set up to consider gender (i.e. girl children have different needs than boy child survivors).  To support judicial reform initiatives pertaining to family courts and the rules of court’s provisions involving children, the preliminary results of the evaluation was presented last October 2016 during the 2nd National Summit of Family Court Judges | Story on promoting Children’s Rights to a Safe and Secure Online Environment through the AlamBau.ph website.  Story on equipping the QBE. Child Friendly and Gender Sensitive Program (equipment) | Technical assistance and guidance on gender programming  The team is proposing for a visual gender storyboard on AlamBaU. Gender focal to further discuss and explore on this. | 1. Integrate gender lens/language into the Theory of Change 2. Work closely with gender consultant to: 3. Update/Revise the Gender Analysis: 4. Update/Revise the Gender Target 5. Agree on the gender Strategy per reform (mainstreaming or spotlighting) 6. Devise an updated Gender Action Plan 7. Craft Gender Benchmarking for monitoring and evaluation of gender targets. 8. Discuss with team and gender consultant on how to dig and mine further the results of legal audits of courts 9. Team to highlight in future reports gender-sensitivity of tools developed 10. Team to provide anecdotal evidence of PGH, Cebu equipping facilities (e.g., conduct interview later on with hospital staff/doctors on the intervention and impact) |
| Justice | Gender Audit of the Judiciary | The project will commence the gender audit of the judiciary after approval by the Supreme Court Committee on Gender Responsiveness in the Judiciary. | No possible gender story yet | Technical assistance and guidance on gender programming | 1. Gender focal and gender consultant to help the team flesh out and harvest gender stories 2. Integrate gender lens/language into the Theory of Change 3. Team to work closely with gender consultant to: 4. Update/Revise the Gender Analysis: 5. Update/Revise the Gender Target 6. Agree on the gender Strategy per reform (mainstreaming or spotlighting) 7. Devise an updated Gender Action Plan 8. Craft Gender Benchmarking for monitoring and evaluation of gender targets. 9. Team to think through what is next after the audit and after the gender consultant gets selected 10. On MACR – consider reporting on gender disaggregated data on legal aid summits and trainings for NPS 11. On MACR – team to establish profile of child victims (i.e. more boy than girl victims, handling of cases for boys and girls) |
| An Edited Volume on the Budget Reform in the Philippines | All of the authors will include gender-responsive budgeting considerations in their respective chapters. | Authors have been advised to include gender considerations. Four authors have submitted while there is difficulty obtaining materials for the other chapters.  Chapter on gender is problematic with only five writers left | No possible gender story yet | Technical assistance and guidance on gender programming | 1. Gender focal and gender consultant to help the team flesh out and harvest gender stories 2. Integrate gender lens/language into the Theory of Change |

Annex 6: Schedule of ICR Meetings, Manila, November-December 2017

| **2017** | **Activities** |
| --- | --- |
| 25 Nov (Sat) | * Peter Bazeley evening arrival |
| 26 Nov (Sun) | * Further reading / workshop preparation |
| 27 Nov (Mon) | * Entry meeting with DFAT Governance Team * Entry meeting with Mat Kimberley (DHOM) and Kerrie Anderson (Development Section Counsellor) * Meeting with Tim Smith and EJ Solis of Mindanao team |
| 28 Nov (Tue) | * Whole day workshop with TAF |
| 29 Nov (Wed) | * BBA (Broadband) * FEF (Land governance) * LENTE (ESRD) |
| 30 Nov (Thu) | * Telecon with Paul Hutchcroft (former Governance Adviser DFAT Manila and member CfC PSP) * Meeting with Anne Orquiza (Portfolio Manager - DRR team) * Meeting with Felicity Lee and Ester Roxas (National Education Team) * Meeting with John Alikpala (Portfolio Manager, Infra team) |
| 1 Dec (Fri) | * Telecon with Geoff King (Director, PNG Governance and Performance Section/former Counsellor – Governance and Humanitarian) * Meeting with Milalin Javellana, Facility Director for the Australia Awards and Alumni Engagement Program and previously, Philippine Australia Human Resource and Organisational Development Facility * Meeting with Kathleen Tolosa, Executive Director of SRI (Mindanao) * Meeting with Joji Camelon (former AusAID Program Officer for CfC) |
| 2 Dec (Sat) | * Analysis |
| 3 Dec (Sun) | * Analysis |
| 4 Dec (Mon) | * Telecon with Steve Rood (former TAF Country Representative) * Telecon with David Dutton (AS SMB/former DHOM Manila * Telecon with Sarah Boddington and Sandra Kraushaar (Director and Assistant Director, respectively, Governance Section in Canberra * Telecon with Ky Johnson (former Deputy Country Director, TAF Manila * Meeting with Sam Chittick (TAF Philippines Country Director) * Follow up meetings with TAF thematic teams * Skype call with John Sidel (PSP member for CfC) |
| 5 Dec (Tue) | * Meeting with Aydz Rangiris, Head – Sites Titling Office, Dept. of Education * Meeting with Usec Austere Panadero of the Dept. of Interior and Local Government * Meeting with Birgit Hansl (Team Leader for Game Changers) and Lani Azarcon (Team Leader for Australia – World Bank Philippine Development Trust Fund) |
| 6 Dec (Wed) | * Telecon with Jaime Chua (CfC PSP member) * Telecon with Nadine Ragonjan (former TAF staff looking after Mindanao activities now based in Canada) * Meeting with Sandy Paredes of the League of Provinces * Meeting with Erika Geronimo (former Portfolio Manager – Governance) |
| 7 Dec (Thu) | * Meeting with Attorney Ronaldo Gutierrez, Exec. Dir. of ULAN (FAN) * Meeting with Jaime Faustino, Director Economic Reform and Development of TAF * Discussion with TAF Program Management Team * Discussion with TAF Phase 2 Design Team |
| 8 Dec (Fri) | * Discussion with DFAT Program Management Team * Meeting with Mr Julius Hontiveros, Chief – Rehabilitation and Recovery Management Service, Office of Civil Defence * Meeting with Ms. Veronica Hitosis of the League of Cities * Jo-Ann Diosana, AER (tax reform) |
| 9 Dec (Sat) | * Analysis; aide-mémoire preparation |
| 10 Dec (Sun) | * Aide-mémoire preparation & submission to DFAT |
| 11 Dec (Mon) | * Telecon with Robyn Biti (PS Director and former Education Section Counsellor) * Meeting with Ben Esguerra (Political Section) * DFAT Governance Team debrief * Debrief to DFAT DHOM and Counsellor * Attend DFAT/TAF meeting on Phase 2 design * Submission of aide-mémoire to TAF |
| 12 Dec (Tue) | * TAF debrief |
| 13 Dec (Wed) | * Peter Bazeley departure |

Annex 7: ICR Terms of Reference

**Independent Completion Review**

**Coalitions for Change Program under the Australia – Asia Foundation in the Philippines Partnership**

**Terms of Reference**

Background: Australia – The Asia Foundation Partnership

1. In October 2011, Australia (represented then by the Australian Agency for International Development or AusAID Manila) and The Asia Foundation in the Philippines (TAF) entered into a country-level Partnership for three years (2011-2014). The country-specific partnership arrangement aims to support the Philippine Government’s development agenda within the context of Australia and TAF’s respective country strategies. The overall goal of the Partnership is to “enhance the impact of evidence-based public policy making and implementation of priority development issues in the Philippines that are jointly determined by Australia and the Foundation.”
2. The specific objectives of the Partnership are to:
3. better leverage the assistance programs of TAF and Australia to facilitate and develop capacity for more constructive engagement between government, civil society and other stakeholders;
4. expand networks of both organisations to facilitate locally-driven policy reform;
5. develop capacity and increase knowledge sharing and collaboration between the Foundation and Australia, especially tools and approaches to support locally-driven policy reform;
6. enhance the role of evidence in informing policy reform; and,
7. establish more integrated and coherent approaches in the design and implementation of programs in areas of common interest.
8. The Partnership had **three** components at the onset:

**Coalitions for Change (CfC)** which supports multi-sectoral formal and informal coalitions/networks push for specific reforms and/or institutional strengthening that seek transformative change[[38]](#footnote-39). CfC adopts innovative and experimental approaches such as political economy analysis, *Thinking and Working Politically*, and *Development Entrepreneurship* in supporting coalitions/networks as agents of reforms and in strengthening Philippine government capacity for policy implementation. CfC provides financial and technical support to build capacity of coalitions and the evidence base in support of reforms including priority sectors of the Australian aid program in the Philippines.

Activities under the CfC component include completed and on-going reform work on:

* Economic growth (i.e. airport infrastructure, broadband infrastructure, public utilities, tax reform, Metro Manila traffic, road safety);
* Basic education (i.e. local school boards, classroom decongestion, senior high school transition);
* Mindanao (i.e. electoral reform, election-related violence, security sector reforms, countering violent extremism);
* Subnational governance (i.e. roads, Fund Augmentation Rules);
* Public finance management (i.e. excise tax reform);
* Disaster risk reduction (i.e. informal settler families, fund guidelines); and
* Persons with disabilities (i.e. Fully Abled Nation, employment).

**Other research, analytical and capacity development activities** that originally provided a pool of flexible resources for responding to reform opportunities of interest to Australia and TAF. In 2015, this component was subsumed under the CfC component as a supplementary component entitled, “**Other Related Activities**” to support priority activities of DFAT and TAF through technical assistance and capacity building.

Activities under the Other Related Activities component include research and capacity development work on judicial reform, human rights, child protection against online sexual exploitation, reform in central-local relations and electoral systems redesign, among others.

**Philippines – Australia Community Assistance Program (PACAP)**, managed under the Partnership from 2011 to June 2014, this component supported community-initiated sustainable poverty alleviation programs and activities across the Philippines. As part of the broader assistance of Australia, an offshoot program called PACAP Yolanda provided livelihood assistance to communities affected by Typhoon Haiyan and the Bohol earthquake from January 2014 to June 2015. For a limited time, this component of the Partnership also included secretariat work for the Embassy’s Direct Aid Program (DAP) from October 2015 until June 2016.

1. The Partnership has the following governance arrangements:
2. The Joint Steering Committee (JSC) is the highest governing committee of the CFC. It is comprised of two representatives from each organisation and headed by the Deputy Head of Mission (Australian Embassy) and Country Representative (TAF). From the previous six-monthly meetings, the JSC now meets quarterly (alternating between comprehensive meetings and progress meetings) since early 2017. The main functions include:

* discuss strategic reform issues and agree on priorities;
* approve all key policies relating to the Partnership;
* consider, review and approve proposals for funding;
* review implementation performance, provide guidance, advice and instruction to DFAT and TAF implementing teams.

1. The Partnership Strategic Panel (PSP) provides high-quality strategic input, quality assurance and technical contestability to improve the quality of activity planning and strategies of CfC activities. PSP members review planning and strategy documents prepared by sector teams to ensure they are responsive to program requirements. The PSP, which currently has four members, are experts in the field of governance and thinking and working politically.
2. DFAT and TAF operational staff make up the Joint Program Management Team (PMT) which serves as the Partnerships’ operational and coordination body.
3. An Independent Progress Review (IPR) of the Australia – TAF Partnership was conducted in 2014 that found CfC to be relevant, effective, probably efficient and sustainable. It recommended an extension to mid-2018 to take the Partnership through the May 2016 presidential election and allow time to assess the new administration’s priorities, evaluate progress and design a new phase if appropriate. Other key recommendations included the following:

* more proactive leadership and decision-making on program direction, including instilling a more universally understood clarity of purpose;
* a more succinct and elegant M&E system to match that greater clarity of purpose;
* greater attention to gender and the important influence which thinking and working politically can have on gender outcomes;
* institutionalisation of *stoppability*, or the ability to make an informed judgement about what return on investment (or risk) a particular avenue of work is likely to achieve – and then pull back from initiatives that are not going to deliver such a return;
* more openness to “strategic opportunism”, without deviating from its core objectives; and
* greater focus on transformative change

1. The Australia – TAF partnership has evolved over the years. Amendments to the partnership arrangements were made in April 2012 (revised clauses related to annual planning and reporting without financial implication), May 2014 (expanded scope of activities, increased budget, and extended the arrangement until June 2017), and December 2016 (extended the arrangement until June 2018 with an increase in budget). A new design and partnership arrangement will be developed to implement a second phase of activities that will focus on the transformational activities of the CfC program.

Objectives of the Independent Completion Review

1. The Independent Completion Review (ICR) will focus only on the review of transformative approach of CfC instead of the broader partnership. This review aims to inform the new phase of the CfC by providing evidence on (1) how the program contributed to the process of transformative change to achieve high impact reform outcomes; and (2) assess the effectiveness and efficiency of governance and management arrangements.

Scope and Focus

1. The assessment will cover the whole period of CfC Phase 1 with a focus on the period after the Independent Progress Review – from January 2014 to present. The review should also examine the degree to which recommendations of the 2014 IPR were actioned.
2. The ICR will not include a review of PACAP noting that it has already been evaluated in the 2014 IPR. Other non-transformational activities such as child protection, judicial reform and on Mindanao will be excluded in the review.
3. The assessment will use DFAT’s performance and quality criteria. However, TAF’s Strategy Testing approach to monitoring and evaluation may provide guidance in the assessment noting the non-traditional nature of CfC. Below are the evaluation questions for this completion review:

On the Process and Outcomes of Transformative Change

1. **How did CfC bring about transformative change in key reform areas?**

Seeking evidence of the process and sustained outcomes of reform, with particular consideration of how reform outcomes are sustained over time, which strategies were most effective and which are not, the broader relevance of CfC in contributing to the objectives of Australia and TAF in the Philippines, and how it adapted to changes in the economic, social and political contexts.

1. **To what degree did CfC make a difference to gender equality and empowerment of women and girls through its activities?**

A part of the analysis of the process of transformative change, seeking analysis of how gender-responsive the process was – both in terms of CfC activities and actions of partners through the reform process. Given the IPR identified a degree of “gender blindedness” in CfC, this analysis could also include lost opportunities and strategies for improvement in Phase 2.

On the Management of CfC

1. **How effective has CfC been in targeting high impact reform areas and remaining flexible in responding to strategic opportunities?**

Following up on from the findings of the IPR, seeking analysis of how well CfC has pursued the most high impact and transformative reform opportunities, and how Phase 2 can improve on this.

1. **How efficient have the governance and management arrangements of Coalitions for Change been in enabling program impact?**

Following up from issues identified in the IPR, with particular focus on clarity of purpose, DFAT and TAF understanding of the “partnership”, staffing, risk management and how monitoring feeds into decision-making.

Scope of Services

1. The independent evaluator will provide the following services:
2. Participate in a verbal briefing (with Post on key issues, by phone while developing the evaluation plan, followed by in-country briefing)
3. Review background and other relevant materials
4. Initial planning, allocation of tasks, and review of relevant documents, prior to the in-country mission
5. Liaise with DFAT Manila to finalise the Evaluation Plan, meeting schedule and logistical arrangements. The Evaluation Plan is required to meet DFAT Aid Program Monitoring and Evaluation Standards (Independent Evaluation Plans – Standard 5) and consider TAF’s Strategy Testing approach to monitoring and evaluation noting the non-traditional nature of CfC
6. Conduct consultations with internal stakeholders in Manila (Governance Team; Deputy Head of Mission; Counsellors; First Secretaries and Portfolio Managers for parts of the Embassy with an interest in CfC)
7. Conduct consultations with external stakeholders, including:

* The Asia Foundation (Country Director, Deputy Country Director, TAF PMT, sectoral teams)
* Key CfC grantees
* The members of the Partnership Strategic Panel (current and previous members, if possible)
* Key personnel who have been involved in the management and implementation of CfC and its other activities from AusAID/DFAT and TAF

1. Provide high-quality, independent and professional advice and expertise to ensure that objectives of the ICR are met;
2. Advise DFAT of any risks, concerns, or issues that may adversely impact on the conduct of the review in a timely manner;
3. Provide well-written reports in a format to be agreed with DFAT;
4. Use evidence to support the review and final assessment; and
5. Provide exit debriefing to DFAT and TAF prior to completing the in-country mission.

Reporting Requirements

1. The independent evaluator is expected to deliver the following documents and reports:
2. An evaluation plan – providing details on how the evaluator will execute the review. The plan should include assumptions, approaches, guide questions, timeframe, and deliverables. The plan will be finalised after consultation with DFAT and then TAF. (DFAT Aid Program Monitoring and Evaluation Standards – Independent Evaluation Plans Standard 5) <https://dfat.gov.au/about-us/publications/Documents/monitoring-evaluation-standards.pdf>
3. An aide memoire (of no more than 5 pages) on preliminary findings and recommendations to be presented to DFAT and then TAF (prior to completion of in-country mission)
4. Exit Briefing to present the preliminary findings and recommendations to be presented to DFAT and then TAF
5. A draft ICR report with executive summary provided to DFAT Manila and then to TAF in electronic version. The report will meet DFAT’s quality standards (DFAT Aid Program Monitoring and Evaluation Standards – Independent Evaluation Reports – Standard 6) <https://dfat.gov.au/about-us/publications/Documents/monitoring-evaluation-standards.pdf>
6. A final ICR report of no more than 30 pages in length (excluding annexes), with a standalone executive summary provided to DFAT Manila and then to TAF Philippines in electronic version.

Timing

1. The ICR will be conducted from November 2017 to February 2018. Following the indicative timeline:

* 20 Oct 2017 – Finalise ToR and confirm the independent evaluator
* 22 Oct to 10 Nov 2017 – Process contract of independent evaluator
* 13 to 17 Nov 2017 – Desk review of ICR reading list by the independent evaluator and submission of draft evaluation plan
* 24 Nov 2017 – Evaluation Plan and mission itinerary finalised
* 27 Nov to 13 Dec 2017 – In-country ICR mission
* 15 Jan 2018 – independent evaluator submission of draft report to DFAT and TAF
* 19 Feb 2018 – independent evaluator submission of final report to DFAT and TAF

Evaluator and Responsibilities

1. An independent evaluator who is not/has not been directly involved in the management and implementation of CfC will conduct the ICR.
2. The independent evaluator is expected to have skills in:
3. Policy reform and institutional strengthening
4. Iterative and/or adaptive monitoring and evaluation
5. Civil society engagement and coalition-building
6. Governance reforms and decentralisation
7. Partnerships
8. Gender
9. Monitoring and evaluation
10. Data collection
11. Facilitation
12. Report writing
13. Familiarity with the Australia – TAF Partnership, particularly on CfC
14. Thinking and working politically (TWP), development entrepreneurship (DE), doing development differently (DDD) and/or problem-driven iterative adaptation (PDIA).
15. The independent evaluator will have respective key expertise, skills and responsibilities:
16. Must have (i) at least 10 years of experience in evidence-based public policy, governance and institutions, civil society capacity development programs, political economy analysis, adaptive and iterative approaches to aid programming, and (ii) good facilitation skills.
17. Responsibilities:

* Manage the review and execute the review plan and achieve the objectives
* Review, assess and provide an analysis and recommendations guided by the evaluation questions
* Produce the outputs including review plan, draft and final reports, and presentation materials
* Facilitate discussions
* Present findings and recommendations of the review to DFAT and TAF

1. The participation of DFAT and TAF in the review will be as follows:

DFAT

1. Managing the set-up of the review including drafting the terms of reference, selecting and contracting external expertise, identifying stakeholders to be consulted, and providing advice to the independent evaluator on the reading list.
2. Provide to the independent evaluator briefing on the AIP and other aid investments of Australia in the Philippines as well as key DFAT documents relevant to the review;
3. Respond to the independent evaluator’s review-related inquiries and clarifications.

TAF

1. Provide advice to DFAT on stakeholders to be consulted and, once agreed, schedule and arrange external meetings and interviews.
2. Brief the independent evaluator on CfC, other related activities and PACAP.
3. Provide the independent evaluator with TAF knowledge products included in the reading list.
4. Provide the independent evaluator with information on implementation of CfC, other related activities and PACAP as well as views and motivations of TAF.
5. Respond to the independent evaluator’s inquiries and clarifications.
6. Where appropriate, DFAT and TAF staff will accompany the independent evaluator in select meetings and interviews with external stakeholders.

Independent Completion Review reading list

* DFAT M&E Standards (Standards 5 and 6)
* TAF Strategy Testing: An Innovative Approach to Monitoring Highly Flexible Programs
* CfC Phase 2 draft Investment Concept Note
* CfC Design Document and Monitoring and Evaluation Framework
* Partnership Independent Progress Review Report
* Aid Investment Plan 2015/16 to 2017/18
* DFAT Gender, Child Protection and Safeguards policy documents
* Australia – TAF Partnership QAI, AQC and PPA reports
* Coalitions for Change: Origins, Evolution and Lessons
* Australia – TAF Partnership reform/other related activities’ concept notes, progress, final and other reports
* Australia – TAF Partnership knowledge products (i.e. action research outputs, case studies, reform stories, reform books)
* TAF’s reflection paper on the Partnership and CfC
* Sidel/Faustino draft volume
* Hutchcroft’s Ten Characteristics of CfC
* PSP Comments 2014-present
* Sidel reports 2012 –present

1. Effective Governance: Strategy for Australia’s aid investments (March 2015). Australian Government Department of Foreign Affairs, Canberra. [↑](#footnote-ref-2)
2. See for example North, D. (1990) “Institutions, Institutional Change and Economic Performance”. Cambridge University Press. [↑](#footnote-ref-3)
3. Intellectual, physical, financial, position and influence, skills, experience, etc. [↑](#footnote-ref-4)
4. It is in this sense that the word ‘risk’ appears throughout the report: we are referring to the risk of failure, or at least the risk that success is far from guaranteed. We are not anticipating a higher level of risk along other dimensions, whether it be fiduciary risk, fraud risk, etc. The risk of systematic program failure, moreover, can be judged to be low. [↑](#footnote-ref-5)
5. See for example ODE’s ‘Thinking and Working Politically: an Evaluation of Policy Dialogue in the Australian Aid Program’, Australian Government, April 2013. [↑](#footnote-ref-6)
6. Following extensions approved in 2014 and 2016. [↑](#footnote-ref-7)
7. The recommendations of the 2013/14 IPR are summarised in para 5 of my ToR, reproduced on page  of this report. [↑](#footnote-ref-8)
8. As emphasized by The World Bank, this review. [↑](#footnote-ref-9)
9. The Philippines’ Gini coefficient declined slightly from 46.5% in 2012 to 44.4% in 2015 but is still high compared to other Asian countries. [↑](#footnote-ref-10)
10. An impromptu summary of what CfC does, usefully suggested by a DFAT executive in Canberra, this review. [↑](#footnote-ref-11)
11. About which there is now a considerable literature – see summary at Annex 1. [↑](#footnote-ref-12)
12. By virtue of CfC being managed and implemented through a grant made to an independent NGO. [↑](#footnote-ref-13)
13. All figures rounded. [↑](#footnote-ref-14)
14. Sub-grants, technical assistance, dedicated sub-project staff *etc.* [↑](#footnote-ref-15)
15. TAF’s definition of ‘transformative’ in the text box above was developed further in CfC’s 2013/14 IPR which emphasised the centrality of transformative reform and defined it along three dimensions: “strategically leveraged development which reaches well beyond the intervention itself by means of adjusting the ‘institutions’ that shape the course of progress, at some scale and with some real prospect of sustainability”. [↑](#footnote-ref-16)
16. See Jaime Faustino (2012) *Development Entrepreneurship: a model for transformative institutional change*. The Asia Foundation Occasional Paper No.12. The Asia Foundation, Philippines. [↑](#footnote-ref-17)
17. Some find this definition of ‘technically sound’ obfuscates the need, also, for technical (*i.e.* will it work in practice) and developmental analysis. [↑](#footnote-ref-18)
18. A clear and useful ‘Partnership Visibility and Key Messages Guide’ has been produced and agreed between DFAT and TAF in this respect, defining ‘high’, ‘conditional’ and ‘no’ DFAT visibility categories across CfC’s intervention areas. [↑](#footnote-ref-19)
19. Including John Sidel’s continuing CfC ‘action research’ analysis and reports, a working-draft of text for a CfC ‘Legacies, Linkages, Lessons’ volume, TAF ‘Working Politically in Practice’ Case Studies, and unpublished analysis (‘Coalitions for Change: Origins, Evolution and Lessons’) by Jacqueline de Lacy and Daniel Harris. [↑](#footnote-ref-20)
20. But with robust mechanisms for monitoring, managing and mitigating risk. [↑](#footnote-ref-21)
21. Other observers have commented, however, that political savviness and specific technical knowledge has not always been broad or deep enough in some cases. [↑](#footnote-ref-22)
22. Although the general conclusion is that this risk has now passed. [↑](#footnote-ref-23)
23. *I.e.* gender equality and women’s empowerment is not a ‘principal’ objective of CfC in DAC terminology. [↑](#footnote-ref-24)
24. <http://dfat.gov.au/about-us/publications/Pages/gender-equality-and-womens-empowerment-strategy.aspx> [↑](#footnote-ref-25)
25. <http://www.oecd.org/dac/gender-development/dac-gender-equality-marker.htm> [↑](#footnote-ref-26)
26. Which on the surface show higher drop-out rates among boys than girls … until the lower enrolment rate of girls is factored-in. [↑](#footnote-ref-27)
27. Text box . [↑](#footnote-ref-28)
28. John Sidel analysed this comprehensively (including the presentation of a ‘null hypothesis’) in his Development Leadership Program report on CfC of July 2013. [↑](#footnote-ref-29)
29. There is evidence on the link between taxes and reductions in smoking prevalence. The World Health Organization says “Significantly increasing the excise tax and price of tobacco products is the single most consistently effective tool for reducing tobacco use.” See for example: <http://pubdocs.worldbank.org/en/194111488396355116/Raising-Tobacco-Taxes-24FEB2016-DRAFT4-1-StandardView4-3.pdf> [↑](#footnote-ref-30)
30. A good starting reference would be Mayne, John (2001) *Addressing Attribution through Contribution Analysis: Using Performance Measures Sensibly*. Canadian Journal of Evaluation Vol.16, Iss.1: 1-24. [↑](#footnote-ref-31)
31. My view on this recurring CfC performance-management dilemma is that realism and utility lie somewhere between the two perspectives presented in the text box above. Policy work is undoubtedly non-linear, messy and peppered with false starts, dead-ends and unexpected openings. Flexibility and ‘strategic opportunism’ is an explicitly recognised tactic in thinking and working politically. These things are not readily captured in Aid Quality Check templates. But it is also possible to describe support to policy reform objectives in a logical, cause-and-effect, narrative. (Perhaps building a story from something like the simple descriptors of CfC’s work in para above.) ‘What’s presently wrong’ and ‘what better would look like’ can usually be described, as can what needs to change to get there – even if the tactics can’t be. Intelligently-constructed performance frameworks need not be rigid rule books but, rather, flexible and useful management tools that help that very process of visiting and revisiting progress in the light of experience – even in the foggy area of policy reform. [↑](#footnote-ref-32)
32. Observers have sometimes lamented a lack of political savviness among staff, notwithstanding solid technical skills. [↑](#footnote-ref-33)
33. But there are good examples of how the twain have met to mutual advantage. For example: CfC’s work in land governance would not have been possible without the previous efforts of more traditional efforts; the institution of the ‘Conditional Matching Grants to Provinces’ program came out of the Provincial Roads Management Program adopting CfC approaches; the school decongestion activity was a natural off-shoot of earlier transactional investment in building classrooms; work in aid for trade was to include a number of complementary tasks performed by CfC. [↑](#footnote-ref-34)
34. Although TAF reports less face-to-face time between DFAT and the TAF PMT since the IPR. [↑](#footnote-ref-35)
35. Although there have been some efforts to address this: for example TAF’s ‘Working Politically in Practice’ series of case studies by David Booth and others reflect, among other things, on aid effectiveness issues. [↑](#footnote-ref-36)
36. While their objectives and ways of working are entirely different, it is worth noting the concern previously raised about PACAP in terms of it being difficult to afford, cost-effectively, a sufficient breadth and depth of technical expertise in the context of low-budget – but nonetheless developmentally complex – small-grant projects. [↑](#footnote-ref-37)
37. Girls and women who do not have disabilities are also affected as they are often assigned as caregivers of family members with disabilities (Women’s EDGE, p. 110 & 112). [↑](#footnote-ref-38)
38. Transformative change is strategically leveraged development that reaches well beyond the intervention itself by means of adjusting the “institutions” that shape the course of progress, at some scale and with some real prospect of sustainability. [↑](#footnote-ref-39)