‘Responding to the Needs of the Most Vulnerable Population Affected by Disasters and Conflict through Emergency Relief and Cash Assistance (Philippines)’

# Midterm Review

# Final Report

26 February 2023

Government of Australia - Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade

Philippine Red Cross

# Program Details

|  |  |
| --- | --- |
| Program Name: | PRC-DFAT Multi-Year Agreement (MYA) |
| DFAT agreement number: | 74553 |
| Country: | Philippines |
| Start and End date of Program: | 1 March 2020 – 31 December 2024 |
| Total Program Budget: | AUD6,100,000 (after amendments) |

Author: Johan van Duijn- IndependentConsultant

# Glossary, Acronyms and Abbreviations

|  |  |
| --- | --- |
| **Acronym** | **Stands for** |
| 3W | Who, What and Where (Database of relief operations hosted by OCHA of the United Nations) |
| AQC | Aid Quality Check (DFAT form/template) |
| AUD | Australian Dollar |
| BAC | Bids and Awards Committee (of the PRC) |
| BHW | Barangay Health Worker |
| CA | Chapter Administrator |
| CfR | Cash for Relief |
| CN | Concept Note |
| CPP | Child Protection Policy |
| CTP | Cash Transfer Programming |
| CWG | Cash Working Group |
| DFAT | Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade |
| DMS | Disaster Management Services (department of PRC-HQ) |
| DOH | Department of Health |
| DPO | Disabled Person’s Organization |
| DPWH | Department of Public Works and Highways |
| DRMB | Disaster Response Management Bureau |
| DSWD | Department of Social Welfare and Development |
| ESSP | Environmental and Social Safeguarding Policy |
| FAQC | Final Aid Quality Check (DFAT form/template) |
| FbF | Forecast-based Financing |
| FFP | Family Food Pack |
| FGD | Focus Group Discussion |
| FSP | Financial Service Provider |
| GOP | Government of the Philippines |
| GRC | German Red Cross |
| HARD | Humanitarian Action and Disaster Resilience (Unit at Australian Embassy Manila) |
| HQ | Headquarters |
| HR | Human Resources |
| ICRC | International Committee of the Red Cross |
| IFRC | International Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies |
| IRSPO | International Relations and Strategic Partnerships Office (of the PRC) |
| KII | Key Informant Interview |
| KPP | Key Policy Priorities (of DFAT) |
| KRQ | Key Review Question |
| LGU | Local Government Unit |
| M&E | Monitoring and Evaluation |
| MDRRMO | Municipal Disaster Risk Reduction and Management Office(r) |
| MolLab | Molecular Laboratory |
| MSWDO | Municipal Social Welfare and Development Office(r) |
| MPCG | Multipurpose Cash Grant |
| MTR | Midterm Review |
| MYA | Multi-Year Agreement |
| NCR | National Capital Region |
| NDRRMC | National Disaster Risk Reduction and Management Council |
| NFI | Non-Food Item |
| NGA | National Government Agency |
| NPA | Negative Pressure Ambulance |
| NGO | Non-Governmental Organization |
| NPC | National Project Coordinator |
| OCHA | Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (of the United Nations) |
| OECD-DAC | Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development – Development Assistance Committee |
| PDAO  PDM | Persons with Disability Affairs Office  Post-Distribution Monitoring |
| PDRRMC | Provincial Disaster Risk Reduction and Management Council |
| PHP | Philippine Peso |
| PLW | Pregnant and Lactating Woman/Women |
| PPE | Personal Protective Equipment |
| PRC | Philippine Red Cross |
| PSEAH | Preventing Sexual Exploitation, Abuse and Harassment |
| PWD | Person/People With Disability |
| RA | Republic Act |
| RC143 | Red Cross 143 – Local Red Cross committee composed of volunteers |
| RDANA | Rapid Damage Assessment and Needs Analysis |
| RM | Review Matrix |
| RRAP | Response and Recovery Assistance to the Philippines (humanitarian investment of DFAT Manila post) |
| SADDD | Sex, Age and Disability Disaggregated Data |
| SDN | Surigao del Norte |
| SOP | Standard Operating Procedure |
| STK | Shelter Tool Kit |
| ToR | Terms of Reference |
| TWG | Technical Working Group |
| W&FP | Work and Financial Plan |
| WASH | Water, Sanitation and Hygiene |
| WFP | World Food Programme (of the United Nations) |
| WGQ-SS | Washington Group of Questions – Short Set |

# Acknowledgements

The consultant would like to thank the following without whom this review would not be possible:

* Ms Roxette Jatulan, the PRC focal person/coordinator for the MYA and this review. Towards the end of this review, she was supported by Ms Nathalie Mae Doverte.
* Chapter Administrators, coordinators of Disaster Management Services and other staff and volunteers of the PRC Chapters visited and consulted during this review.
* Abt Associates’ PALMSS facility for providing logistical and other support.
* DFAT’s Portfolio Manager for Humanitarian Action and Disaster Resilience (HARD), and DFAT’s Senior Program Officer for HARD.
* Representatives of Local Government Units (LGUs) and external agencies.
* All other participants who took part in this evaluation.

This report is written in Australian English and guided by the Style Manual of the Australian Government. This manual can be accessed through: [www.stylemanual.gov.au](http://www.stylemanual.gov.au).

# Contents

[Program Details 1](#_Toc128147999)

[Glossary, Acronyms and Abbreviations 2](#_Toc128148000)

[Acknowledgements 3](#_Toc128148001)

[Contents 4](#_Toc128148002)

[Tables and Figures 5](#_Toc128148003)

[1. Introduction 12](#_Toc128148004)

[1.1 Background 12](#_Toc128148005)

[1.2 Description of the MYA 12](#_Toc128148006)

[1.3 Review objectives 13](#_Toc128148007)

[2. Methodology 14](#_Toc128148008)

[2.1 Overall design 14](#_Toc128148009)

[2.2 Tools and consultations 15](#_Toc128148010)

[2.3 Limitations and delimitations 16](#_Toc128148011)

[2.4 Data analysis and synthesis 17](#_Toc128148012)

[3. Findings and merit ratings 17](#_Toc128148013)

[3.1 OECD-DAC Criteria 18](#_Toc128148014)

[3.1.1 Relevance 18](#_Toc128148015)

[3.1.2 Coherence 26](#_Toc128148016)

[3.1.3 Effectiveness 27](#_Toc128148017)

[3.1.4 Efficiency 36](#_Toc128148018)

[3.1.5 Sustainability 42](#_Toc128148019)

[3.2 Key Policy Priorities 44](#_Toc128148020)

[3.2.1 Gender Equality 44](#_Toc128148021)

[3.2.2 Disability inclusion 46](#_Toc128148022)

[3.2.3 Risk management 48](#_Toc128148023)

[3.2.4 Environmental and Social Safeguards 50](#_Toc128148024)

[3.2.4 Climate Change and Disasters 51](#_Toc128148025)

[3.2.5 Innovation 52](#_Toc128148026)

[4. Conclusions and recommendations 52](#_Toc128148027)

[4.1 Conclusions and recommendations from the findings 52](#_Toc128148028)

[4.2 Recommendations from stakeholders 60](#_Toc128148029)

[5. Lessons learned 61](#_Toc128148030)

[Annex A: Synthesis process 63](#_Toc128148031)

[Annex B: Summary Survey results 67](#_Toc128148032)

[Annex C: Conducted consultations 72](#_Toc128148033)

[Annex D: Review Matrix 75](#_Toc128148034)

[Annex E: Locations and kind of support received from the MYA 94](#_Toc128148035)

[Annex F: Discussions and action plan – documentation 10 January 2023 discussion with DFAT and PRC 96](#_Toc128148036)

# Tables and Figures

[Table 1: Review Criterion/KPP and sample KRQs 13](#_Toc131346361)

[Table 2: PRC Clusters and participation in MTR activities 15](#_Toc131346362)

[Table 3: PDM survey respondents - households with member(s) with a condition/situation increasing vulnerability (% of respondents) 20](#_Toc131346363)

[Table 4: Status of respondents in Isabela (% of beneficiaries with complete data) 21](#_Toc131346364)

[Table 5: Target and remaining number of prepositioned items (as of Nov 2022) 29](#_Toc131346365)

[Table 6: MYA COVID-19 output targets and achievements 32](#_Toc131346366)

[Table 7: Differences in budgeted and actual expenditure on NFIs in AUD (October 2022 minus July 2020) 41](#_Toc131346367)

[Table 8: Risks most relevant to the MYA and their status as per MTR 48](#_Toc131346368)

[Figure 1: DFAT’s rating matrix for evaluation criteria (Source: FAQC) 17](#_Toc131153335)

[Figure 2: Pictures of STKs in Tilod, Baras (left) and Son-ok II in Pintuyan 41](https://icnprod01-my.sharepoint.com/personal/joan_odena_dfat_gov_au/Documents/Desktop/230331%20PRC-DFAT%20MYA%20MTR%20Report%20-%20Final_MS_JO.docx#_Toc131153336)

[Figure 3: Food Truck 'Bluey' at Namayan Warehouse (Nov 2022) 43](https://icnprod01-my.sharepoint.com/personal/joan_odena_dfat_gov_au/Documents/Desktop/230331%20PRC-DFAT%20MYA%20MTR%20Report%20-%20Final_MS_JO.docx#_Toc131153337)

Photo Credits: Johan van DuijnExecutive Summary

Introduction

Since 1990, the Philippines has been affected by 565 natural disaster events, which have claimed the lives of nearly 70,000 Filipinos and caused an estimated USD23 billion in damages, making the Philippines one of the most disaster-prone countries in the world.

The Philippine Red Cross (PRC) was created through Republic Act (RA) 95 in 1947. The PRC became a member of the National Disaster Coordinating Council in 1989 or known as the National Disaster Risk Reduction and Management Council (NDRRMC) since the 2010’s RA 10072. The PRC has been a partner of Australia since 2006.

The Australian Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade (DFAT) entered into an AUD3 million Multi-Year Agreement (MYA) with the PRC to support families in the event of humanitarian crises. The agreement commenced on March 2020 but was amended shortly after to include support to PRC’s COVID-19 response. The total value of the MYA increased to AUD6.1 million, composed of AUD4.1 million for the COVID-19 response, and AUD2 million for the prepositioning of emergency response goods and cash. The agreement continues until December 2024.

The MYA, after the amendments, has two distinctive pillars with activities:

1. Disaster preparedness through prepositioning:

* Non-Food Items (NFI) comprised of sleeping kits, a Hygiene kit, and jerry cans; shelter materials (tarpaulin and shelter tool kit); and Health kits for mothers and newborn children.
* Unconditional multipurpose cash assistance for emergency relief to 5,000 families.
* Procurement of a Food Truck (*named Bluey*).

1. Increased Government’s COVID-19 response capacity:

* Establishment of a molecular laboratory (MolLab) to increase the COVID-19 testing capacity.
* Procurement of a negative pressure ambulance (*named Skippy*).
* Provision of 1 million personal protective equipment (PPEs) for healthcare workers.

Review objectives

The purposes of the Midterm Review (MTR) as per Terms of Reference (ToR) are:

1. An external and independent evaluation that will systematically and objectively assess the achievements, progress and key challenges and opportunities of the program towards the achievement of expected outcomes.
2. To provide findings based on credible evidence to inform project management and the future directions of the multi-year prepositioning arrangement with PRC.

MTR design

The MTR is guided by the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development – Development Assistance Committee’s (OECD-DAC) criteria for evaluation: Relevance, Coherence, Effectiveness, Efficiency, and Sustainability. In addition, the MYA was assessed against DFAT’s Key Policy Priorities (KPP). The process was guided by key review questions, and the consulted sources include PRC representatives, DFAT, beneficiary Local Government Units (LGU) and community members, and external stakeholders. The methodology was primarily qualitative with quantitative data from existing reports and a survey among PRC staff. Visits were made to 5 PRC Chapters that distributed DFAT supported NFIs or cash. The data collection took place from late October 2022 to early January 2023.

The evaluator adopted DFAT’s six rating levels: Very good, Good, Adequate, Less than Adequate, Poor and Very poor to assess the performance against the criteria and their subdimensions derived from the review questions. See the table below for a description of each of the ratings. The three higher ratings are highlighted in green, considered Satisfactory by DFAT standards, while the ones in orange signify an unsatisfactory performance.

| **Merit Rating** | **Description** |
| --- | --- |
| Very good | Evidence of very strong performance; positive feedback from all consulted sources. No weaknesses were identified. |
| Good | Evidence of a strong performance; predominantly positive comments. No weaknesses, or a few weaknesses without real consequences. |
| Adequate | Evidence of noticeable positive performance; more than half of sources suggest a positive performance. Only a few weaknesses identified with serious impact on performance. |
| Less than adequate | A mix of positive and negative comments. Inconsistent comments across the sources of information, and the different locations. Sources highlight a number of weaknesses with a serious impact on performance |
| Poor | Clear evidence of unsatisfactory performance. Findings are predominantly negative, or partial weak evidence. Many weaknesses are identified. |
| Very poor | No positive evidence found, or predominantly weak evidence |

To establish the merit rating for a criterion, a two-step synthesis process was applied using rubrics: 1) review questions under a criterion were treated as subdimensions and given their own merit rating informed by the review findings; and 2) ratings of the different subdimensions were consolidated into one judgement for the criterion.

Conclusions and key recommendations – The OECD-DAC Criteria

The *Relevance* of MYA is rated as ‘**Adequate’**. The relevance to the beneficiaries and government are ‘**Good’** and ‘**Very Good’**, with the timeliness of the relief support and needs assessments rated a little lower, but satisfactory. The items that were distributed were in line with the needs of the recipients. The beneficiaries and LGU officials reported that most of the distributed items are of immediate use to the recipients. This was supported by observations from the consultant at locations with recent relief support to Typhoon Rai. In some locations, community members raise questions regarding the choice of an item they receive, or why in-kind, rather than the provision of cash. The distribution of cash in Cebu and Mandaue City was the appropriate modality to provide emergency relief - the markets were open for recipients to purchase the items they prioritized. The transfer value was at PHP3,500 lower than the amount provided by other agencies.

*Key recommendation 1: PRC to consider a review of the content of the Shelter Tool Kits (STK) and make it smaller with only the urgently needed tools. PRC to also study the effects of their new initiatives to distribute or lend tools at the community level.*

*Key recommendation 2: Increase the cash grant amount to PHP5,000, in line with other agencies. The target number of beneficiary families must be adjusted accordingly.*

The timeliness subdimension, from the recipient’s perspective, is rated as ‘**Less than adequate’.** A number of the distributions took place 3 or more weeks after a calamity. Conditions in evacuation centres are found inadequate and some damaged by the calamity, making people move back to their origin with a few days. The affected population in most visited communities receive food and water during this period, but often no support to address other needs. The prepositioned cash was in one emergency, with the stakeholders of the opinion that its mobilization should be possible in less than 2 weeks, rather than the 3 weeks.

*Key Recommendation 3: PRC to review its internal approval process to facilitate an earlier release of Cash for Relief (CfR) funds during emergencies, including area selection, beneficiary criteria, and capacity assessment of chapters to implement CfR. PRC should aim to deploy validation and beneficiary registration teams within a week after a disaster, where feasible, as specified in the agreement.*

The MYA included the purchase of one Food Truck and a negative pressure ambulance (NPA). The importance of the vehicles is rated as ‘**Good’.** The vehicles are designed to provide critical support, with the Food Truck, one of the first PRC units designed to prepare meals on site. The ambulance was one of the few of its kind when it was purchased, but its utilization could have been higher. The rating for Coherence is **‘Good’**. The NFIs complement the food provided in the selected target areas by Non-Governmental Organizations (NGO) and National Government Agencies (NGA).

The merit rating for *Effectiveness* is **‘Adequate’,** the result of subdimension ratings varying from ‘Less than adequate’, to ‘Very Good’. The delivery of COVID-19 outputs is rated as **‘Very Good’**, with the implementation of most components as per anticipated timeline and within the allocated timeframe. The established MolLab analysed more than 2 million tests, and more than 1 million pieces of PPE were distributed to front line workers. The distribution of NFIs has reached to date 1,488 of the 4,500 anticipated beneficiary families, or about a third of the target. During the MYA, 1,449 families received NFIs from stocks of the previous prepositioning agreement between DFAT and PRC. The prepositioned cash was mobilized for 945 beneficiary families, or 19% of the target of 5,000 families.

The logistical support is rated as **‘Adequate’.** The items prescribed by the MYA are all procured. The procurement process is often longer than it should be, but this has not affected the mobilization of DFAT stocks for disaster victims. The stock of the previous prepositioning agreement was sufficient in the first responses. The total available stocks are being validated by PRC.

*Key recommendation 4: PRC to address immediately the weak stock and inventory management, ensuring the inventory generates instantly the type of items, donors, and information on expiry dates. DFAT is recommended to accompany the roll out of the new inventory management system with the commissioning of a physical count of stored items.*

The PRC experienced a shortage of service providers, and challenges with transportation assets, hampering a faster delivery of NFIs and cash to beneficiaries. Despite the logistical challenges, the mobilization speed is rated as **‘Good’,** with PRC demonstrating the capacity to deliver and distribute in affected communities within the 3 weeks prescribed in the project proposal. The DFAT items are not necessarily among the first being mobilized. The decision to position items in smaller warehouses demonstrated that quicker mobilization is possible, with a distribution of NFIs in less than 10 days. The distribution of CfR took as long as most NFIs distributions, 3 weeks, despite cash requiring less logistical arrangements.

The selection and validation of the beneficiaries was not done as prescribed in PRC’s internal guidelines, in particular the omittance of establishing community committees in the CfR covered areas under the MYA. Consequently, the compliance with the Cash Transfer Programming (CTP) guidelines is rated as **‘Less than adequate’.**

*Key recommendation 5: PRC and DFAT to establish a standard process to ensure due diligence in the delivery of relief support. PRC to develop a beneficiary selection checklist for the team leaders and members that helps them in the conduct of due diligence and document the procedures and deviations from the process. PRC needs to ensure compliance with its internal protocols to facilitate DFAT support and help affected populations as soon as reasonably possible.*

*Key recommendation 6: DFAT and PRC to replenish and expand the prepositioned stocks from Cebu and Luzon to smaller warehouses, in particular Cagayan de Oro and possibly in Leyte, to allow for quicker responses.*

The quality of reporting is **‘Adequate’**. The reports present accomplishments in procurements, distributions, and financial updates, but frequently the data contains errors and inconsistencies and discrepancies over time. The overall Monitoring and Evaluation (M&E) is **‘Less than adequate’.** There is no evidence that beyond tracking outputs other learning activities are conducted or documented to inform adjustments in programming or operations. The reporting is biased towards the number of items distributed rather than the recipients. In addition, no Sex, Age and Disability Disaggregated Data (SADDD) of beneficiaries is provided. Post Distribution Monitoring (PDM) is conducted as part of a larger monitoring more than six months after the distribution, rather than within a month, as indicated in the project’s design.

*Key recommendation 7: PRC to define and propose the target number of beneficiaries, disaggregated by sex, gender and disability both in their proposal (concept note) and project reporting. The existing data collection tools and methods need to be aligned with the DFAT reporting template. Quarterly and annual reports should include a summary and reflection on the implementation of DFAT support, including target vs actual number of beneficiaries with SADDD, and an updated stock inventory and its location.*

The overall merit rating for *Efficiency* is **‘Adequate’.** The subdimensions for Efficiency are mostly rated **‘Adequate’,** and **‘Good’** for cost-effectiveness. PRC’s tendering process ensures competitive prices for NFIs. The length of procurement processes is longer than what PRC units consider ideal, but this has not affected the availability of NFIs. The procurement has been completed in a smaller number than batches in the initial plan. The scoring for the timely implementation is not higher than Adequate, because the early procurement, combined with low utilization, increases the risk of expiry of items, as well as consuming warehouse space for prolonged periods. Timeliness should not mean the earliest possible procurement, but the right moment when there are sufficient stocks without clogging warehouses.

*Key recommendation 8: The number of stocks supplied to Chapters should be better aligned with the number of target beneficiaries indicated in their requests, where stocks are available.*

*Key recommendation 9: PRC to explore framework agreements with new Financial Services Providers (FSPs) and transport services*

The utilization of the procurement NFI kits is low. More than halfway through the agreement 1,000 out of the 4,500 NFI kits have been distributed. This is partially due to the utilisation of remaining stocks from the previous agreement with DFAT. To date, none of the 4,000 Health kits have been distributed. The efficiency of the use of the food truck and the ambulance depends on the perspective. The vehicles are not fully utilized, but as a result should gain a longer lifespan. The number of trips of the ambulance, on average just over once a week transporting COVID-19 patients, could be accommodated by other units. The MolLab is being scaled down while the equipment could be used for other medical purposes. The income generated from the testing has given PRC the resources for other investment and operations.

Overall, Sustainability is rated as **‘Adequate’**. The lifespan of vehicles may be extended by the low use but will require maintenance. The maintenance budgets are reportedly not fixed, with funds available when there are operations and projects, like the MYA. The MolLab equipment that has not been repurposed yet also contributes to this lower rating. The quality of distributed items is considered very good, but a rating of **‘Adequate’** given due to the sanitation concerns over foldable jerrycans.

Findings towards DFAT’s Key Policy Priorities (KPPs)

The KPPs are DFAT priorities. There are no specific activities in the MYA to strengthen the KPPs.

1. The *Gender Equality* criteria is rated as **‘Less than adequate’.** The promotion or strengthening of gender equality is not a focus of MYA, or part of PRC’s early emergency response in general. PRC does promote equal participation of women, but this is not supported by SADDD. The collected information is incomplete or of mixed quality to make SADDD possible.
2. The overall rating for *Disability Inclusion* is **‘Adequate’.** The needs assessments do not identify the needs of PWDs and there is no evidence that PWDs or their organizations participate in the MYA other than PWDs being recipients. However, it is evident that PWDs are among the beneficiaries, and in many places prioritized during the needs assessments and beneficiary selection.
3. The overall merit rating for *Risk Management* is **‘Adequate’.** The risk register is updated quarterly, as required, and in between the regular reviews as needed. The rating is not higher due to the limited engagement of stakeholders in the risk management, and a number of additional actions that can be taken to further address identified risks, for example by increasing community awareness and participation in needs assessments and improving supply chain management.
4. The overall score for Safeguarding is **‘Adequate’.** The partners both have social safeguarding policies in place. The Chapter staff have knowledge of the policies, but no information was shared on incidents and complaint mechanisms. In principle any incidents are endorsed to the relevant LGUs or welfare desks. The health and safety of vulnerable groups is protected, but there are concerns on the use of cash in envelope as a delivery method and the stress it gives to Chapter staff.
5. The KPP of Climate Change and Disasters is **‘Very poor’.** Neither DFAT nor PRC has identified climate change and disaster associated risks of the project. This despite climate change intensifying natural hazards and their impact.

**The following are key recommendations for partnerships beyond 2024:**

1. DFAT to provide financial support to implement the PRC strategy to establish 17 additional logistical hubs throughout the Philippines.
2. The prepositioning of NFIs needs to be based on historical use and projected utilisation. PRC to expand list of suppliers that can provide NFIs with expiry dates (e.g., soaps) and schedule deliveries in tranches depending on current inventory and projected needs.
3. Partnerships between DFAT and PRC to move from output based to the inclusion of outcomes that describe a change in gender equality and disability inclusion. Strategies that are practical within an early response activity should be explored with PRC and possibly drawing on experiences from other organizations and countries.

# 1. Introduction

## 1.1 Background

1. Since 1990, the Philippines has been affected with 565 natural disaster events, which have claimed the lives of nearly 70,000 Filipinos and caused an estimated USD23 billion in damages, making it one of the most disaster-prone countries in the world. Apart from frequent earthquakes and volcanic eruptions, an average of 20 typhoons make landfall every year in the Philippines. Located along the ‘Pacific Ring of Fire,’ at least 60% of the total land area of the country is exposed to multiple hazards and 74% of the population is vulnerable to their impact.
2. The PRC was created through RA 95 in 1947. The PRC became a member of the National Disaster Coordinating Council in 1989 or known as the NDRRMC since the 2010’s RA 10072. The PRC has been a partner of Australia since 2006 with Australia engaged in prepositioning emergency relief items with the PRC since 2010. PRC’s nationwide presence, wide network of volunteers, and logistics capacity has enabled Australia to respond to major disasters and emergencies. The PRC is recognized as an independent and autonomous NGO society auxiliary to the Philippine government in the humanitarian field.
3. DFAT entered into an AUD3 million MYA with the PRC to support families in the event of humanitarian crises. The agreement commenced on March 2020 but was amended shortly after to include support to PRC’s COVID-19 response, and eventually increased to the amount of AUD6.1 million. The agreement that continues until December 2024 continues to have a component for the prepositioning of emergency response goods and cash at a value of AUD2 million.

## 1.2 Description of the MYA

1. The MYA, after the amendments, has two distinctive pillars with activities:

a) Disaster preparedness through prepositioning:

* + Non-food Items (NFIs) comprised of sleeping kits (blankets, plastic mat, and mosquito net); a hygiene kit, and jerry cans; shelter materials (tarpaulin and shelter tool kit); and health kits (mother and newborn kits) for 4,500 families.
  + Unconditional multipurpose cash assistance for emergency relief to 5,000 families (PHP3,500 per family) to be utilised for the purchase of basic needs/services such as food, cooking utensils, medicines, clothing, transportation.
  + Procurement of a Food Truck (*named Bluey*) that will serve hot meals to people affected by emergencies.

b) Increased Government’s COVID-19 response capacity:

* + Establishment of a MolLab to increase the COVID-19 testing capacity in the country.
  + Procurement of a negative pressure ambulance (*named Skippy*) for COVID-19 patients.
  + Provision of 1 million pieces of Personal Protective Equipment (PPE) for healthcare workers.

1. As of 25 October 2022, the workplan for the COVID-19 response has been completed and 94% expensed, while the prepositioning arrangement is 70% expensed – which brings the total project utilisation rate at 86%. PRC has procured all the NFIs with some positioned in strategic locations across the country. DFAT is yet to receive a final proposal from PRC how to utilise the approximate AUD200,000 remaining from the COVID response budget. The latest indications are that PRC would like to utilise the budget for COVID-19 activities, rather than divert it to the prepositioning.

## 1.3 Review objectives

1. The purposes of the MTR in the ToR are:

* An external and independent evaluation that will systematically and objectively assess the achievements, progress, and key challenges and opportunities of the program towards the achievement of expected outcomes.
* To provide findings based on credible evidence to inform project management and the future directions of the multi-year prepositioning arrangement with PRC.

1. The review assesses the MYA’s performance using the OECD-DAC criteria of relevance, coherence, effectiveness, efficiency, and sustainability. In addition, the review explores progress or initiatives towards DFAT’s KPP: Gender Equality, Disability Inclusion; Risk Management; Environment and Social Safeguards; Innovation; and Climate Change and Disasters.

The Terms of Reference (ToR) provided draft Key Review Questions (KRQ). The consultant restructured the existing questions and added where appropriate. A summary of the final set of questions endorsed by DFAT and PRC is presented in Table 1. All KRQs and detailed questions are provided in Annex E. The findings against the OECD-DAC criteria directly reflect on the performance of the MYA, while those for the KPPs give a picture of the current situation to inform any future activities to strengthen the MYA or the partnership beyond the MYA to comply with the broader Australian Government’s humanitarian aid priorities.

Table : Review Criterion/KPP and sample KRQs

**OECD-DAC Criteria**

| Criterion/KPP | Sample KRQs |
| --- | --- |
| *Relevance* | 1. How relevant and appropriate was the assistance provided by PRC from the perspective of the Philippine national government agencies (NGAs) and local government units (LGUs)? 2. How relevant and appropriate was the assistance from the perspective of affected communities? |
| *Coherence* | 1. To what extent did the assistance support the Philippine Government in responding to disasters and emergencies? |
| *Effectiveness* | 1. What were the most significant results achieved by Australia’s multi-year prepositioning arrangement? 2. What were the most significant results achieved by Australia’s COVID-19 response with PRC during the relevant period? 3. Are the results of the investment/activity appropriately and regularly reported to DFAT? |
| *Efficiency* | Information:   1. Could the information flow between delivery partners be strengthened? 2. How well informed were communities/beneficiaries about the selection and distribution process?   Management:   1. Is PRC managing the implementation of funded activities well, including keeping to agreed output delivery schedules? 2. How well did PRC procurement and financial management systems support timely and quality program implementation? 3. Is the allocation of human resources adequate? |
| *Sustainability* | 1. What mechanisms and procedures are in place to ensure long time operation of the assets procured under the MYA?  2. How durable are the NFIs provided by PRC? |

**DFAT KPP**

|  |  |
| --- | --- |
| Criterion/KPP | Sample KRQs |
| *Gender Equality* | 1. Is the M&E system generating robust information that collects comprehensive sex-disaggregated data and uses gender indicators, which is analysed and used to drive improvement and learning?  2. How does the MYA contribute to gender equality? |
| *Risk Management* | 1. Are the project risks proactively managed? |
| *Inclusion* | 1. How well are PWDs and other groups (pregnant and lactating women (PLW), seniors, etc) represented among the beneficiaries? |
| *Environmental and Social Safeguards* | 1. What evidence is there that the partner’s safeguard capacity needs have been addressed and reporting systems are in place, effective, and regularly reviewed?  2. How well does PRC comply with DFAT’s safeguard principles and safeguards, including Child Protection, Preventing Sexual Exploitation, Abuse and Harassment (PSEAH) and Indigenous peoples? |
| *Climate Change and Disasters* | 1. Have the climate change and disaster risks associated with the project been identified, included in the risk register, and effectively managed? |
| *Innovation* | 1. What innovation is the project applying, or encourages the generation, testing and capture of new approaches? |

# 2. Methodology

## 2.1 Overall design

1. The overall design of the MTR is mixed methods, with a higher prevalence of qualitative tools. The purpose of the mixed method design, to use the typology of Greene, Caracelli and Graham (1989)[[1]](#footnote-1), is complementarity, using different data sources to explain the findings of different methods. In addition, the different sources will allow for the triangulation of findings.
2. Data collection for the review took place from October 2022 to January 2023. A debriefing on the data collection, along with the presentation of initial findings, was conducted on the 14th of December. The draft report was put in circulation on the 29th of December after which a presentation and discussion was conducted on the 10th of January. The gathering at PRC’s Headquarters (HQ) brought together the Australian Embassy’s Humanitarian Action and Disaster Resilience (HARD) team members and around 15 representatives of various PRC departments with an implementing or support role to the MYA. One of the objectives of the meeting was to discuss the draft recommendations and a way forward. Annex F contains a summary and the action points coming out of the meeting. The final report was presented to the principals of the partnership, compose of PRC’s secretary general, senior management of PRC’s DMS unit and DFAT.

## 2.2 Tools and consultations

1. The evaluator conducted a document review, key informant interviews (KII), focus group discussions (FGD), and launched an online survey to seek the perceptions of Chapter staff and volunteer on:
   1. Appropriateness and effectiveness of response practices. The survey included different sets of questions depending on the Chapter’s response.
   2. Protection and Safeguarding principles.
2. The evaluator consulted with representatives from different departments at PRC Headquarters. The departments and/or individuals were suggested in the ToR and expanded during the inception meeting.
3. The consultant visited or otherwise engaged with all the Clusters that distributed prepositioned items or cash, as well as the mobilization of *Bluey,* the Food Truck. Table 2 provides a list of the Chapters that received support from the MYA, including those receiving NFIs from the preceding prepositioning agreement with DFAT. The table summarizes how the Clusters and stakeholders within their area contributed to this review. A detail list of activities conducted for this review is provided in Annex C.

Table : PRC Clusters and participation in MTR activities

|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
| Cluster | Calamity | Municipal LGU | Barangay  LGU | Beneficiary consultations | FGD/KII Chapter staff | Chapter survey | Food Truck case study  Interviews |
| Albay | Typhoon Goni |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Batangas | Taal eruption |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Caloocan/  Navotas | COVID-19 |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Catanduanes | Typhoon Goni |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Cebu | Typhoon Rai |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Isabela | Typhoon Vamco |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Rizal | COVID-19 |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Southern Leyte | Typhoon Rai |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Surigao del Norte | Typhoon Rai |  |  |  |  |  |  |

1. Interviews were conducted with external stakeholders to the MYA, in particular concerning Cash Transfer Programming (CTP):
   1. Oxfam in the Philippines
   2. Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA)
   3. International Federation of the Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies (IFRC)
   4. German Red Cross (GRC)
2. An interview was conducted with representatives of the Australian embassy, including the HARD unit.
3. The consultations were all conducted as confidential – this report does not refer to individuals. Annex E lists all the conducted consultations. Question guides for these consultations were based on the Review Matrix in Annex D.

## 2.3 Limitations and delimitations

Limitations

1. The ToR, and in particular the initial KRQs were developed by DFAT and PRC. After their revision an inception meeting was held, and the two partners invited to comment on the review matrix. There was however no feedback provided by PRC, and overall, the responsiveness of different PRC departments was low, delaying the overall review process.
2. The PRC was asked repeatedly to provide relevant contacts within the Department of Health (DOH) and the Department of Social Welfare and Development (DSWD) to consult. A formal request to those agencies to participate was only sent in January, with the agencies being unresponsive to the request, despite follow-up by the consultant. Consequently, there is no reflection by these NGAs on the MYA.
3. The Chapters received the anticipated activities and a proposed schedule at least a week in advance. However, the arranging of activities usually commenced after the arrival of the consultant, with the following consequences:
   1. Municipal or city representatives were not available.
   2. The activities were not conducted in a sequential explanatory approach with the consultation with Chapter staff as the last activity, providing an opportunity to verify findings from the field.
4. The consultant assumed that Chapters would have certain information readily available, like beneficiary lists and needs and market assessment reports, but these are all at the central level.
5. The implementation timeline was affected by the following:
   1. The aforementioned delayed response or action from HQ staff in regard to providing contacts for external stakeholders, in particular government agencies.
   2. Consultations with PRC-HQ staff were postponed due to Typhoon Nalgae (Paeng).
   3. The consultant falling ill, resulting in a postponement of part of the field visits by 10 days.
6. The review would, from its design, have a higher representation from PRC than any other stakeholder. A possible positive bias was mitigated by introducing the review as a learning activity, encouraging a critical internal look on operations.
7. The survey had 16 entries less than the anticipated minimum of 30 respondents, despite numerous invitations. In addition, the number of respondents per contributing Chapter varies from 1 to 7, making any comparison between areas insignificant. The data on some questions is presented, but they should not be given any statistical significance. A summary of the survey data can be found in Annex B.
8. The MTR takes place more than 2 years after its start. The visited barangays often received support from different public and private entities. The Australian Aid logo helped to focus FGD participants on the DFAT support, but the timing of distribution and how it compared to support received from other agencies may not be accurate due to challenges in recall. Where possible information was verified through entries in the ‘Who, What and Where’ (3W) database of OCHA. Unfortunately, not all agencies have entered their support in the 3W database.

Delimitations

1. The review aims to explore underlying factors supporting or hampering the implementation of the MYA. It is outside of this review to conduct a full audit of financial or procurement paper trails (i.e., the review of actual vehicle maintenance schedules). Upon sharing by PRC in January 2023, a limited review of the financial records was conducted to gain insight in the posting of expenditures against activity budgets.

## 2.4 Data analysis and synthesis

1. The KRQs cover a wide range of topics, and the project’s documentation indicate a similar broad variation in performance. The rubrics provided in DFAT’s Final Aid Quality Check (FAQC) are to be used to provide ratings, but it is a challenge to cover such a variety of topics in one rating for a criterion. To facilitate the assignment of a merit rating, review questions and topics were classified as subdimensions – each getting an individual rating, followed by a synthesis process to establish an overall rating for the criterion. The synthesis process is included as Annex A. The process includes DFAT’s FAQC ratings matrix as seen in Figure 1. Ratings of Very good, Good and Adequate are considered as *Satisfactory,* and Less than adequate, Poor and Very poor as *Unsatisfactory.*

**Ratings Matrix**

|  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- |
| **No** | **Rating** | **Merit rating** |
| **6** | Very good | Satisfactory |
| **5** | Good | Satisfactory |
| **4** | Adequate | Satisfactory |
| **3** | Less than adequate | Unsatisfactory |
| **2** | Poor | Unsatisfactory |
| **1** | Very poor | Unsatisfactory |

Figure : DFAT’s rating matrix for evaluation criteria (Source: FAQC)

1. Quantitative data from the survey was analysed with Microsoft Excel, and Qualitative data summarized using NVIVO.
2. Based on the review findings, a number of the subdimensions were reformulated or merged during the analysis process. The main reason to merge was that individual subdimensions turned out to be irrelevant or data too similar for a number of subdimensions. Providing each of the subdimensions with a rating would give the data too much weight and an overrepresentation in the rating of a criterion. A number of subdimensions are not rated, with the reason(s) given in the relevant section of the report.

# 3. Findings and merit ratings

1. This chapter is divided in two sections, one for the OECD-DAC criteria and one for the KPPs. Within each of the sections the findings are presented as follows:

* The core questions for the section.
* The merit rating for the assigned criteria from the Review matrix.
* A summary table of the merit ratings for all subdimensions under the criterion.
* A brief description of the findings for each subdimension.

## 3.1 OECD-DAC Criteria

### 3.1.1 Relevance

The core questions for this section on Relevance are:

* How relevant and appropriate was the assistance provided by PRC from the perspective of the Philippine NGAs and LGUs?
* How relevant and appropriate was the assistance from the perspective of affected communities?

1. The *Relevance* of the MYA is rated as **Adequate**. The subdimensions are mostly ‘**Good’** and ‘**Very Good’**, with lower ratings for the timeliness of the relief support and needs assessments. The items that were distributed were in line with the needs of the recipients. The beneficiaries and LGU officials reported that most of the distributed items are of immediate use to the recipients. This was supported by observations from the consultant. In some location questions are raised regarding the choice of an item, or why in-kind, rather than the provision of cash. In Cebu and Mandaue City, the markets were open, and the goods or items prioritized by the beneficiaries available. The distribution of cash was therefore an appropriate modality to provide emergency relief, but the transfer value of PHP3,500 was lower than the amount provided by other agencies.

The majority of the distributions took place 3 or more weeks after a calamity which shows effective implementation of PRC’s Standard Operating Procedure (SOP). The timeliness subdimension is rated as ‘**Less than adequate’** if viewed from the community perspective**.** The affected population in most visited communities received food, but often no support to address other needs during this period. The prepositioned cash was only used on one occasion with the stakeholders expressing that its mobilization should be possible in less than 2 weeks.

The MYA included the purchase of one Food Truck and a negative pressure ambulance. The importance of the vehicles, in particular at the time of purchase is rated as ‘**Good’.** The vehicles are designed to provide critical support, with the Food Truck as one of the PRC’s first units designed to prepare meals on site. The ambulance was one of the few of its kind when it was purchased, but its utilization, as well as that of the Food Truck, can be higher.

| **Subdimension** | **Merit rating** |
| --- | --- |
| Relevance of the MYA to the government (NGAs and LGUs) | Very Good |
| Adequacy of needs analysis | Adequate |
| Relevance of distributed goods to recipients | Good |
| Appropriateness of cash distribution | Good |
| Timeliness of distribution versus needs | Less than Adequate |
| Importance of purchased vehicles – Food Truck and ambulance | Good |
| Contribution of molecular laboratory to COVID-19 management | Very Good |

*Relevance of the MYA to the government (Rating: Very Good)*

1. The PRC sources unanimously described the Molecular Laboratory (MolLab) and the means to operate it is instrumental to the country’s fight against COVID-19. At that time, the Government of the Philippines (GOP) did not have testing facilities. PRC’s Manila Port MolLab, established the testing capacity to screen international travellers, important for containing the virus’ spread.
2. The focus of NGAs and LGUs is the provision of food. Despite their limited means, also some of the consulted barangays prepositioned food for a few days, but no NFIs.
3. In addition to the provision of food, sometimes local governments, and in particular the DSWD already had NFIS to address the immediate needs of disaster affected families. The mobilization can however be slow and criticized for favouritism and politicization. The PRC Isabela Chapter reports that after Typhoon Vamco, the PRC was the only agency providing kits. The NFIs and kits of the PRC provide the opportunity to rapidly complement government efforts, which provided sufficient food assistance.
4. The Catanduanes province has prepositioned NFIs since Typhoon Goni in 2021. For example, the Municipal Social Welfare and Development Office (MSWDO) of Baras has 200 prepositioned Hygiene kits. The number of prepositioned family food packs (FFP) in the municipality increased from 200 to 500 during the ongoing typhoon season. The MSWDO distributed Family Food Packs (FFPs) after Tropical Depression Nalgae (Paeng), October 2022.

*Adequacy of needs analysis (Rating: Adequate)*

1. The early needs assessments:
   1. are informed by the expected trajectory and impact of a typhoon or storm. The possible mobilization of DFAT prepositioned goods or cash is proposed to DFAT through a Concept Note (CN) submitted by PRC’s Disaster Management Services (DMS).
   2. usually involve the identification of totally destroyed and partially damaged houses by barangay officials and volunteers.
   3. includes ideally a Rapid Damage Assessment and Needs Analysis (RDANA) by a multi-disciplinary team from PRC chapters and HQ.
2. The consultant was only shared the RDANA for Typhoon Rai and mostly relied on the recall of Chapter staff, volunteers, and community members on the procedures taken. Their statements describe an assessment largely in line with what was defined in the SOP for the geographical targeting of beneficiaries, prioritizing the most affected and least served areas. Municipal governments of Pintuyan, Surigao City, and Baras confirmed that the selected barangays were among the hardest affected and deserving the early support. In the visited locations, community members and leaders stated that the PRC presence was observed once or twice in the area for the registration and distribution. House visits by PRC were described in three out of the eight visited locations, with only once, in Pintuyan, for the inspection of all houses.
3. The selected locations were severely affected by natural disasters. The selection of target beneficiaries within a location, as per SOP, may involve four reference criteria: 1) Relief needs – For example, survivor of disasters and displacement; 2) Shelter - The extent of damage to the houses; 3) Livelihood status; and 4) Vulnerability of the family. The application of the criteria varies across the visited areas:
   1. The selection is in all visited locations was guided by totally and partially damaged houses, but the classification does not inform a uniform intervention strategy. Sometimes only households with totally damaged houses are included. During the Typhoon Goni response, only the totally damaged households received complete NFI kits. In 2021, for Typhoon Rai, the number of totally damaged houses in Barangay Punta Bilar was 130 to 140, while all more than 400 households received the same support. Similarly, in Barangay Son-ok II, Pintuyan, there were 45 totally damaged houses among 142 families, with all receiving tarpaulins and a Shelter Tool Kit (STK). In addition, the FGDs with beneficiaries highlighted that the distinction of totally and partially damaged houses were not as strictly applied as per DSWD definitions (see the Box).[[2]](#footnote-2) The PDM exercise by PRC presents that 51% of the families that received support after Typhoon Rai had their house totally destroyed.
   2. The consulted PRC staff consistently said that in an early response, pregnant women, seniors, Persons with Disabilities (PWD) and other vulnerable groups and their needs were not a specific focus. The beneficiaries are not registered as such, but it is apparent in some locations, for example Catanduanes, that the elderly and PWDs were included, despite their houses not being totally damaged.

**Box: DSWD classification for damaged houses**

1. Totally damaged house – entirely destroyed and unfit for habitation or without any of the structural features indicated on the partially damaged house.

2. Partially damaged house – liveable with reusable shelter materials and/or with the following existing/remaining features based on its original structure:

* Footing/foundations
* Posts/columns
* Floor beams/supports
* Walling beams/supports; and,
* Roof beams/supports

Source: DSWD Memorandum Circular No. 6, Series of 2019.

1. The PRC’s Post Distribution Monitoring (PDM) surveys provide insights on the inclusion of vulnerable groups in PRC’s emergency responses. The survey form inquires among the respondents whether their household has a member with a specific condition or is in a situation that can increase vulnerability. The analysis of existing data for the three major typhoons during the Multiyear Agreement (MYA) is presented in Table 3. The majority of households, 59% upwards, do not have members with a special condition. The second largest group are widow/widowers, ranging from 9% - 26% across the three PDMs. The households with PWDs are fairly similar, varying from 11 – 12%, as well as pregnancy of around 4% in all the surveys.

Table : PDM survey respondents - households with member(s) with a condition/situation increasing vulnerability (% of respondents)

| Typhoon | Typhoon Goni | Typhoon Vamco | Typhoon Rai |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |
| Location(s) | **Catanduanes** | **Isabela** | **All areas** |
| N | **507** | **315** | **898** |
| No special situation | 64% | 59% | 72% |
| Widow/widower | 12% | 26% | 9% |
| PWD | 12% | 11% | 12% |
| Chronically ill | 16% | 10% | 6% |
| Pregnant | 4% | 4% | 4% |
| Orphan | 1% | 0% | 1% |
| No response | 0% | 0% | 2% |

1. The representation of vulnerable groups can vary depending on who identifies the beneficiaries. Table 4 provides a summary of beneficiaries after Typhooon Vamco in Isabela province. Barangay Auitan in Isabela shows a focus on widows, while in Barangay Alibagu, the majority of the recipients are married, with higher percentage of PWD and single parents. In Auitan, a verification process was conducted by PRC, while in Alibagu, PRC relied on the list made by the Barangay Health Worker (BHW). The difference in distribution shows that the composition of beneficiaries can depend on who does the beneficiary selection. In data coming from the BHW, 12% of the beneficiaries are PWDs compared to that of 4% by the PRC. The BHW selected more single parents as beneficiaries, 14%, compared to 1% by the PRC. The biggest difference however is that the PRC has a much higher percentage at 35%, of widowed beneficiaries, compared to only 2% in Albano identified by the BHW.

Table : Status of respondents in Isabela (% of beneficiaries with complete data)

| Status | Auitan, San Pablo (N=112) | Alibagu, Ilagan City (N=131) |
| --- | --- | --- |
| PWD | 4% | 12% |
| Married | 56% | 71% |
| Single | 1% | 1% |
| Single parent | 4% | 14% |
| Widowed | 35% | 2% |

1. The Cash for Relief (CfR) by the PRC Cebu Chapter needs special mention:
   1. OCHA consolidates a Humanitarian Needs and Priorities report, on behalf of the Humanitarian Country Team (HCT) and humanitarian partners. In the December 2021 report, Cebu was not included as a target area[[3]](#footnote-3), but later included in the Emergency Shelter cluster. This inclusion was only for cash for labour or conditional to building materials, not Multipurpose Cash Grants (MPCG)[[4]](#footnote-4). The PRC conducts independent assessments, during which CfR was identified in areas that had functioning markets. The RDANA of PRC in Cebu identified MPCG as a modality, but not just cash for shelter. The RDANA also identifies damaged livelihoods and nutrition as reasons to provide cash. The Chapter stressed the loss of livelihood as a driving factor behind the inclusion of the areas in a response. According to the 3W[[5]](#footnote-5), no other organization distributed cash in these cities. The PRC did not share the result of RDANA’s or other assessments to support the CfR.
   2. The CfR was reportedly designed to accommodate a distribution date set by the PRC-HQ. In various consultations it was suggested that the location and the CfR modality was informed by a visit of the PRC Chairman and invited guest of the Australian Embassy. Some PRC staff expressed the concern that necessary shortcuts to meet the date may have led to the inclusion of families that do not meet the selection criteria among the beneficiaries.
2. Other Challenges and concerns identified in the MTR are:
   1. RDANAs experience delays due to the availability of the local Chapter staff and volunteers, and that of other Chapters and HQ to complement assessment teams. During TY Vamco and TY Rai, PRC absenteeism was highly caused by staff being in COVID-19 isolation.
   2. The PRC is seen by both communities and barangay officials as a neutral agency. However, according to several sources, even if conducted or verified by PRC, the selection processes may not completely eliminate favouritism. Only 10% of the listed recipients need to be visited.
   3. FGD participants in one of the CfR barangays found the criteria insufficient and were of the opinion that employment and income should play a more important role in the selection to remove those on the list that have access to savings or did not lose their job.
3. In a number of locations, for example in Pintuyan, Southern Leyte and Punta Bilar, Surigao Del Norte, people lost not only their house or roof, but also a lot of household and personal items. This is also true for flood affected areas. The PRC stresses that response plans balance the needs, the type of support available, and in its auxiliary role to the government, to support 30% of the most affected families. In this balancing act, PRC can rarely provide the affected families with everything they have lost.

*Relevance of distributed goods to recipients (Rating: Good)*

1. The people in Typhoon affected areas indicate that, besides their house, most of their possessions get damaged or destroyed. This happens when changes in storm intensity occur and people suddenly have to evacuate, only bringing their important documents, some food, and the clothes they are wearing.

‘After food, shelter repair is the priority of the constituents. When it comes to shelter it is better to provide the materials than cash, because of the high prices of building materials after a calamity’.  
*Municipal official*

1. In general, families left evacuation centres within 2-3 days to start shelter repairs. The officials in Pintuyan had observed that most of the houses in the supported barangays already had done major repairs in a month after the distribution of STKs and tarpaulins. In 3 out of the 5 visited barangays, it was mentioned and observed that tarpaulins are replaced by corrugated galvanized iron (CGI) sheets, and the tarpaulins repurposed as a wall, or stored for future use. In one of these, barangay officials mentioned that some tarpaulins, against PRC advice, got sold.
2. In the FGDs the consultant explored how important NFI sets[[6]](#footnote-6) were for the recipients. A ranking exercise in two barangays (one affected by TY Goni and one by TY Rai) showed that after having food and drinking water, tarpaulins and sleeping kits were found as the most important items. A number of items, like water containers were identified as less needed, with families having alternatives that can be used. The provision of complete NFI kits with tarpaulins fills broader needs than that of shelter support on its own. The distribution of shelter materials can be accompanied by the provision of orientation and materials on improved shelter construction. The communities supported after Typhoon Rai only recall orientations by PRC on COVID-19. Some people in Punta Bilar recalled that an orientation on shelter construction was provided by the government’s Technical Education and Skills Development Authority.
3. In two locations, both in Isabela province, the type of items is questioned by the beneficiaries, consultant, and to lesser extent, PRC staff. Barangay Auitan received a variety of items, and people were happy with them, but due to the late arrival, a month after the floods, some items like hygiene items were not that necessary anymore. In Barangay Alibagu, the receiving residents were not sure why they received hygiene kits and suspected it may be to clean their house and general hygiene after the flooding. The Chapter confirmed that Health staff may have recommended the kits considering the possibility of water-borne diseases.
4. The survey asked from participants the extent they agreed with the statement: ‘*The families receiving NFIs and/or kits should have received cash’.* Out of the respondents 39% answered they Strongly agreed, or Agreed, while 54% Disagreed or Strongly disagreed. This strong division was also present within the Chapter with 7 respondents, indicating that strong disagreement on the modality of support can occur.

*Appropriateness of cash distribution (Rating: Good)*

1. The PRC provided CfR to 945 families during the Typhoon Rai response. Reportedly, the selection of cash as the mode of support is based on the RDANA that was conducted. The consultant did not have access to this report, but participating individuals confirmed that the markets and shops were open, including hardware stores.
2. The CfR recipients agreed with the choice of cash as the modality of support, despite the rising costs of basic needs like water, and building materials. The price of CGI sheets went up by 25-50%.
3. The recipients considered the amount of PHP3,500 small. The beneficiaries compared it with the value provided by other agencies within their barangay and in other locations. Members of the Cash Working Group (CWG) recommend higher levels, with some going beyond the current minimum of PHP5,000 set by the Philippine Government (GOP). The needs of families varied much. The large families or single-headed households spent most of, or the complete MPCG on food, while 3 out of the 5 participants in an FGD bought only hardware to rebuild their house. At the increased price, families were able to buy 6 CGI sheets to cover part of their house. In the FGD in Jagobiao, about half of the 16 participants used a part of the cash to buy food. Some large families would use all the money for food and just made simple repairs to their house without buying materials.
4. The variety in use of the MPCG aligns somewhat with the PDM findings, but at 96% compared to the FGD participants a much larger portion of the respondents use the MPCG for food. According to the PDM, 70% used part of the grant for house repair. One woman stated that part of the house still had a functional roof, and they used all the money to pay for the school enrolment of her daughter. If the people would not have received any assistance, then they would have bought some cheap tarpaulin to assure a part of the house will be dry to stay and sleep. In Jagobiao, Cebu, a different cash distribution took place during Typhoon Rai, where every family received PHP5,000. The people could not agree on who the donor was, and no other cash distributions are recorded in the 3Ws. According to PRC, the amount of PHP5,000 was provided by the IFRC.
5. The beneficiaries in Cebu and Mandaue City confirm that cash was very much needed. They are living in an urban environment in which they depend on formal or informal livelihoods for a living, of which many got interrupted or destroyed completely. For example, a PWD noted that his spouse had a job in a shopping mall, but due to electricity interruption, she did not earn an income for months.

*Timeliness of distribution versus needs (Rating: Less than adequate)*

1. The timeliness subdimension when considering it from the perspective of affected families is rated as **‘Less than adequate’.** While food needs are usually catered for during this period, the affected population in most visited communities do not get support to address other needs during this period. The majority of the distributions took place 3 or more weeks after a calamity which according to PRC is within their SOPs, but the needs of people is earlier. In particular, the prepositioned cash was not capitalized on.
2. The majority of the communities were content with the received support, yet FGD participants wished for a sooner distribution. Most of the beneficiaries are typhoon victims with their houses destroyed. In two of the visited locations, evacuation centres were damaged, urging people that had taken refuge there to go back home to their barangay as soon as possible. While the basic needs like food was often cared for in the first week, having immediate access to shelter materials helps people to have better living conditions. On several occasions, the psychological stress of living in precarious conditions was mentioned.
3. The following are identified as reasons why distributions are not taking place earlier:
   1. The focus of PRC staff on the provision of food, rescue, first aid, and other immediate needs during the first 72 hours.
   2. The time required to conduct the RDANA, are often dependent on the arrival of human resources external to the Chapter. The RC143, a local volunteer committee trained by the PRC, could provide support, but is not set up in all communities. In Punta Bilar, assessments were quick due to the presence of the RC143.
   3. Logistical challenges, in particular the location of NFIs and required transportation.
   4. The inaccessibility of locations.
4. The DMS unit does at times deploy NFIs based on experience, rather than waiting for an RDANA. An example is the early deployment to Catanduanes making NFIs available for distribution within a week after Typhoon Goni struck. Also the STKs deployed for Typhoon Rai left the warehouses within days.
5. The hygiene kits provided in Isabela in flood affected areas were appreciated but were received several weeks after the water subsided. Considering that cleaning and the prevention of water-borne diseases is a driving factor in providing the kits, the distribution is quite late.
6. According to the consulted stakeholders, the distribution of NFIs in Punta Bilar, Surigao City could be done earlier, but the PRC Chapter shared that there was a mix up with the trucks. The truck with the DFAT items was expected to go to Barangay Roque, where the distribution took place on the 3rd of January. Instead Barangay Roque received NFIs from IFRC. The distribution in Punta Bilar took place a few days later on the 7th of January, after the Samaritan Purse distributed tarpaulins on the 2nd of January. Punta Bilar was a widely supported community -- the IOM provided shelter materials in the same month, according to the community and the 3W database.[[7]](#footnote-7) The situational report of the Surigao City CDRRMO also provides examples of government agencies providing NFI support within a week after the landfall. The CDRRMO reports that the shelter rehabilitation phase for the city officially started the 5th of January.
7. The external sources agree that the prepositioning of cash is unique. CTP is common among humanitarian actors, with an increase from 40% to 60% of support provided in cash since Typhoon Haiyan in 2013. However, the use of cash is within many agencies subjected to a lengthy approval process or an appeal needs to be launched. This can delay cash transfers by months. The PRC staff is satisfied with the distribution of cash within 3 weeks, but other stakeholders, including Red Cross affiliates, feel that cash that is already with PRC should be deployed much quicker.

*Importance of purchased vehicles – Food Truck and Ambulance (Rating: Good)*

1. An important slogan of the Red Cross is: ‘*Volunteers + Logistics + Information Technology = A Red Cross that is Always First, Always Ready, Always There!’.* PRC’s Food Trucks are an important element to be the first. The DFAT donated ‘Bluey’ is not unique, but expands PRC’s capacity to provide early response, for example, to pre-emptively evacuated populations. The PRC has now 35 Food Trucks spread across the country, of which 25 are units of a new design introduced in 2021. Each of the trucks can, according to the PRC, produce a maximum of 800 meals, but usually is limited to 600.
2. After its handover to the PRC on the 28th of May 2021, Bluey was deployed on five occasions. Twice during the eruptions of Taal Volcano in 2021 and 2022, the COVID-19 outbreak, and most recently the North Luzon Earthquake in Abra in August 2022. In total, the Food Truck served 31,093 individuals.
3. The Rizal Chapter reported that the deployment for COVID-19 was for a nutrition project in the National Capital Regional (NCR), supported by the Japanese Red Cross. The project targeted returning residents and families in COVID-19 isolation. Priority is given to children, elderly, and pregnant women. During Taal and other calamities, trucks are deployed to evacuation centres with PRC volunteers in the centres supporting awareness raising and crowd control. In the evacuation centres, all people receive a meal, guided by a plan made with the LGU. The Food Truck deployments are usually part of a larger emergency response plan that targets 30% of affected families. The recipients of hot meals are counted as part of this 30%, with the hot meal being a complementation of the food provided by the evacuees themselves or the LGU.
4. The stakeholders highlighted the following positive experiences with Bluey:
   1. The cooking equipment operates on gas, making it deployable in areas without electricity.
   2. The vehicle is larger than earlier models that only allowed one person inside. The old models were designed for food distribution, rather than to function as a mobile kitchen.
   3. Bluey is equipped with a rice steamer which has different layers helping a more exact cooking of number of portions. At maximum capacity, it produces enough rice portions for a full day. This is more compared to other type of units equipped with ordinary rice cookers.
5. In addition, the stakeholders experienced a number of following challenges while using Bluey:
   1. The space in the van. Although it is an improvement from earlier Food Truck units, Bluey still only allows 2 to 3 people to work inside at the same time.
   2. The vehicle does not behave very well on bumpy roads, and its height makes it difficult in disaster hit areas where there are low hanging tree branches or electricity cables. Bluey received guards to protect the lamps on the roof.
   3. The washing area is quite small and bigger pans are washed outside.
   4. The ventilation in the truck could be better. The suggestions are to add more windows, or that the sunroof can be opened to the outside.
   5. The user’s instructions of equipment are not in English.
6. The number of trucks is increasing, and the DSWD is procuring them. Food safety and nutritional aspects of the served meals becomes more important. PRC staff reports that nutritional meals are now composed by PRC-HQ staff, and the chapters can choose from different options based on what is available and fits the budget. The Food Trucks are not covered by Hygiene and Sanitation licenses.
7. The negative pressure ambulance is one of PRC’s three in the NCR. At the onset of the COVID-19 pandemic, the government did not have, and to date, does not have negative pressure ambulances. This type of ambulance helps to contain the virus in the vehicle and protects its crew from contamination.

*Contribution of molecular laboratory to COVID-19 management (Very Good)*

1. The relevance of the MolLab at the Manila Port is rated as **‘Very Good’**. All consulted stakeholders agree that the MolLab played an important role in the prevention of COVID-19 transmission, in particular by testing incoming international passengers at arrival and during quarantine. Unfortunately, there has been no independent input from the DOH on the impact of the DFAT support to the country’s COVID-19 management.

### 3.1.2 Coherence

The core question on coherence is: *To what extent did the assistance support the Philippine Government in responding to disasters and emergencies?*

1. The overall rating for Coherence is **‘Good’**. The prepositioned NFIs complement the food provided in the selected target areas by NGOs and NGAs. The prepositioned cash is unique and has the potential to be distributed quickly.

| **Subdimension** | **Merit rating** |
| --- | --- |
| The MYA complementing other relief efforts | Good |
| Added value of MYA compared to other relief | Very Good |

*The MYA complementing other relief efforts (Rating: Good)*

1. The PRC is a permanent member of the National Disaster Risk Reduction and Management Council (NDRRMC), and the Chapters are members of the Provincial Disaster Risk Reduction and Management Council (PDRRMC). The PRC and its affiliates report to the NDRRMC what support, the scope of the support they can provide, as well as the donor. The coordination of assessments and relief assistance is predominantly taking place at the PDRRMC.
2. The overlap of support is minimized through coordination activities at the provincial level, as well as by PRC staff observations of activities of private entities. Private individuals or groups do not necessarily attend coordination meetings or add their support to the 3Ws database. The PRC engages to varying extent with lower level LGUs, with some municipal officials expressing their grievance with the lack of coordination.
3. The PRC aims to provide support to 30% of the most affected population. The DFAT prepositioning makes a direct contribution to PRC targets. For example, the MPCG helped around 30% of the affected families in Barangay Jagobiao , and about 40% of the families in Pintuyan municipality that had their houses totally destroyed.
4. The IFRC representative recalls that the NFI needs as consolidated at the NDRRMC for Typhoon Rai was around 15,300 sets. The IFRC was able to commit around 5,000 sets, while DFAT/PRC supplied 1,000 sets. The DFAT contribution represents around 7% of the total needs. OCHA reports in their Typhoon Rai second situational report that by the 6th of January 6,197 sleeping kits, 8,363 tarpaulins, and 4,366 tool kits[[8]](#footnote-8) were distributed. The DFAT NFI distributions on 1 January in Pintuyan, and 7 January in Surigao City, represent respectively 7%, 12%, and 12%.
5. The CWG facilitates the coordination when agencies have cash distribution activities within the same municipality. Due to the lower value of the DFAT Multipurpose Cash Grant (MPCG), the PRC avoided locations where the higher value of PHP5,000 is provided. Chapter staff noted that efforts are made to exclude beneficiaries of 4Ps, a regular Department of Social Welfare and Development (DSWD) conditional cash grant to poor and vulnerable households, but it could not be verified whether this is common practice.

*Added value of MYA compared to other relief (Rating: Very Good)*

1. The PRC has a wide network of Chapters and volunteers that can be mobilized. This increases staff availability, often with the local knowledge and contacts. In addition, PRC has trained staff from HQ and other Chapters that can be mobilized. Only trained staff are deployed to operations.
2. The RDANA team members represent different disciplines, providing a holistic assessment of the situation.
3. The staff and volunteers can provide complimentary Information, Education and Communication activities in preparation of, and during distributions.
4. The DSWD used to stock more NFI items, but according to the Isabela Chapter they stopped doing this at a local level due to concerns over expiring items. The PRC’s stocks now provide an alternative source when needed.

### 3.1.3 Effectiveness

The core questions for this section on Effectiveness are:

* What were the most significant results achieved by Australia’s multi-year prepositioning arrangement?
* What were the most significant results achieved by Australia’s COVID-19 response with PRC during the relevant period?
* Are the results of the investment/activity appropriately and regularly reported to DFAT?

1. The merit rating for *Effectiveness* is **‘Adequate’,** the result of subdimension ratings varying from ‘Less than adequate’, to ‘Very Good’. The delivery of COVID-19 outputs is rated as **‘Very Good’.** The outputs were delivered as per allocated budget and timeline. Procurement was sped up by the use of emergency procurement protocols. The extent that outputs for NFIs are delivered according to plan is rated as **‘Adequate’**. This rate is established based on the complete procurement and prepositioning, and the utilization of available stocks. A higher score would be given if there is a justification for the volumes and timing of procurements. The logistical support is rated as **‘Adequate’.** The items required for MYA were all procured in time, even if not as quick as PRC claims it can be. Transportation issues and the lack of services providers did hamper a faster delivery of NFIs and cash to beneficiaries. A remaining challenge is the accuracy in the inventories of stored NFIs and other items.

Despite logistical challenges, the mobilization speed is rated as **‘Good’.** The PRC has demonstrated that goods can be distributed within the 3 weeks prescribed in the project proposal, but DFAT items are not necessarily among the first being delivered or distributed. The decision to position items in smaller warehouses demonstrated that quicker mobilization is possible and the distribution of items in less than 10 days. The distribution of CfR took as long as that of most NFIs distributions, 3 weeks, despite cash requiring less logistical arrangements. The compliance with the Cash Transfer Programming (CTP) guidelines is rated as **‘Less than adequate’.** The selection and validation of the beneficiaries was not done as prescribed in PRC’s internal guidelines, in particular the omittance of establishing community committees in the CfR covered areas under the MYA.

The quality of reporting is **‘Adequate’**. The reports present accomplishments in procurements and financial updates, but the data contains errors and discrepancies over time. The overall M&E is **‘Less than adequate’.** The quarterly and annual reports provide little to no reflection and learning. There is no evidence that beyond tracking outputs other MYA specific monitoring or evaluation is conducted, and experiences in actual implementation informing adjustments in PRC’s programming or operations.

| **Subdimension** | **Merit rating** |
| --- | --- |
| Delivering planned prepositioning outputs | Adequate |
| Speed of mobilization prepositioned items | Good |
| Delivering planned COVID-19 outputs | Very Good |
| Impact of COVID-19 outputs | Not rated |
| Effectiveness of logistical support | Adequate |
| Compliance with CTP guidelines | Less than adequate |
| Quality of reports | Adequate |
| Effectiveness of M&E systems | Less than adequate |
| Unintended results/consequences | Not rated |

*Delivering planned prepositioning outputs (Rating: Adequate)*

1. The final procurement of NFIs, consisting of Health Kits, took place in the third quarter of 2022. Table 5 presents the procured sets, 4,500 NFI sets composed of a Sleeping Kit, Hygiene Kit, 2 Jerry cans and 2 Tarpaulins. In addition, 2,400 STKs and 2,000 each of Mother Kit and Newborn Kits were purchased. The completion of the procurement is earlier than the original timeline, which anticipated procurements every year.
2. Table 5 also provides the number of distributed and remaining items for the current MYA 74553, as well as the remaining items of previous agreement 72150. This data was presented to DFAT in December 2022. The original data contained an error and clarification was sought in regard to the number of tarpaulins. The tarpaulins amount to 7,876 sets, including 4,376 from the previous arrangement and 3,500 of the new agreement. One thousand sets were distributed since the start of the MYA. The other items completing a set of NFIs, sleeping kits, hygiene kits, and jerry cans have each 3,500 remaining plus 397 of the old agreement. From the original 2,400 STK stocks still 1,900 remain after the distribution in Pintuyan. No Mother or Newborn Kits have been distributed. Annex E includes a summary of the distributed items during the timeline of Agreement 74553. All the items distributed during Typhoon Goni and Typhoon Vamco came from stocks of prepositioning Agreement 72150. In January 2023, PRC presented a new set of numbers different from Table 5 and according to PRC was still being verified.

Table : Target and remaining number of prepositioned items (as of Nov 2022)

| Prepositioned items | Target and procured (sets) | Distributed 74553 items | Remaining 74553 | Remaining 72150 | Total remaining |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
| Sleeping Kits | 4,500 | 1,000 | 3,500 | 397 | **3,897** |
| Hygiene Kits | 4,500 | 1,000 | 3,500 | 397 | **3,897** |
| Jerry can (set of 2) | 4,500 | 1,000 | 3,500 | 397 | **3,897** |
| Tarpaulin (set of 2) | 4,500 | 1,000 | 3,500 | 4,376 | **7,876[[9]](#footnote-9)** |
| STK | 2,400 | 500 | 1,900 | 0 | **1,900** |
| Mother Kits | 2,000 | 0 | 2,000 | 0 | **2,000** |
| New born Kits | 2,000 | 0 | 2,000 | 0 | **2,000** |

1. The target number of items and the number of families to benefit from CfR was revised after the amendments made to the agreement due to the inclusion of the COVID-19 response. The amendment expects from PRC a revision of the original target of 18,000 families – resulting from the reduction of NFIs and CfR grants, and given there are new beneficiaries from the COVID-19 interventions. A new figure and breakdown was not proposed by PRC. While undocumented, PRC’s understanding is that the target for NFI beneficiaries is 4,500 and 5,000 beneficiaries for CfR. This extends the assumption made in the project proposal that STKs and health kits overlap with those of NFI beneficiaries, while in practice, STKs are distributed to other families. No beneficiary numbers were established for the COVID-19 interventions, or a documented explanation whether 18,000 beneficiaries would still be reached.
2. The progress reports do not provide a summary with the actual number of beneficiary families reached by MYA 74553. The total is 988 for the recipient of NFIs sets, and 500 receiving STKs, or in total 1,488 families. This is 33% of the perceived number of 4,500 target families. The tarpaulins distributed in combination with the STKs are not reported against the DFAT stocks. An additional 12 PRC volunteers received NFIs during Tropical Depression Paeng distributions. During MYA 74553, NFIs of old stocks were received by 1,449 families and 51 PRC volunteers. They are not reported against this MYA. Details can be found in Annex E.
3. The MYA has a procurement schedule, but the distribution of relief from the MYA does not have a timeline – the actual use of NFIs/kits and CfR depends on the occurrence of calamities, the needs assessment, and compliance with the triggers for the deployment of DFAT support. These triggers were finalized in Nov 2022 to clarify what was meant with medium and large crises in the proposal. It was noted by PRC that the absence of the triggers delayed the approval by DFAT use of the CfR. The consultant does not see this as a valid argument because Typhoon Rai was before the finalization of the triggers and both cash and NFIs were distributed then. In addition, there is no evidence that any requests for cash distribution were disapproved. The disapproved CN for TY Chanthu (Kiko) did not include CfR.
4. The procurement schedule does not align well with the utilization of items.
   1. The PRC Health unit reports that during large typhoons like Typhoon Goni 800 Mother kits, and 800 Newborn kits are distributed. On average, it is around 500 each kit per typhoon. The DFAT kits were available for Typhoon Rai, but PRC’s Health unit explained that existing stocks needed to be used first. No entries of Health kit distribution were found in the 3Ws of Typhoon Rai of July 2021. The consultant identified a number of factors that may cause non-mobilization of these kits: 1) Chapters are not aware of the existence of such kits, thus will not request them; 2) The targeting does not include the identification of Pregnant and Lactating Women (PLWs); and 3) At HQ level, there appears to be limited attention to the health kits – in the CN for Paeng, they are not mentioned as prepositioned items.
   2. The number of STKs used in the Typhoon Rai response was 500 while Southern Leyte requested Emergency Shelter Assistance for 1,000 families. The STKs in this response came from DFAT, while the accompanying tarpaulins were not from the DFAT stock. The remaining 500 families received support by February the earliest. Considering old and new stocks, more tarpaulins can be distributed, or even all 1,000 families receiving STKs from DFAT stock.
5. The utilization rate of the items procured under this agreement, as based on Table 4 is just over 20%, while the MYA at the time of this report is at 59% of its duration. During the recent responses 500 to 1,000 kits of NFIs were mobilized. Extrapolating these distribution levels, it can take another 3 to 7 years before the NFI stocks are fully utilized, and Health Kits maybe even longer.
6. The PRC deviates at times from the CNs. The SDN Chapter was not identified in the CN for relief assistance, even so when the CN was issued after landfall of Typhoon Rai. The relatively early distribution of STKs in Southern Leyte was the result of trucks intended for SDN were not able to proceed. The deployment for SDN indicates a quick change from the CN without providing an explanation in further reporting. Some PRC sources indicated a coordination gap between PRC staff deployed from other locations managing the response, and the Chapter. A second example is from the CN for Typhoon Vamco, which recommends the use of DFAT stocks for 500 families. In total, 949 families were supported without an explanation in the progress reports why this was increased.

*Speed of mobilization prepositioned items (Rating: Good)*

1. PRC’s proposal for the MYA envisions a possible pre-deployment of NFIs to Chapters in or close to the affected areas, but this has not been practiced yet. The consultant acknowledges the difficulty in pinpointing the areas with the highest needs more than 72 hours before the expected landfall. Both Typhoon Goni and Typhoon Rai changed course and intensity close to making landfall.
2. The time between the CN and actual distribution of goods varies from 2 weeks in Southern Leyte to over a month in some other areas. Annex E includes the areas with DFAT distribution, the actual date of the calamity and when the distributions took place.
3. The distribution of NFIs is ideally conducted earlier, in particular to address shelter needs. However, the distributions are largely within the parameters set out in the proposal. The proposal prescribes the completion of a detailed assessment within 1 to 2 weeks and distribution orders requiring at least a week after finalization of a beneficiary list. An early utilization of goods also depends on items from which donor gets mobilized first, PRC explaining that it aims to follow a ‘first in, first out’ policy in warehouses. An example is in Catanduanes, which received its first NFIs 5 days after landfall, but this did not include DFAT marked items. The DFAT items for SDN reportedly arrived before the year end, but were only distributed on 7January 2022, demonstrating that early arrival does not guarantee an early distribution. The data of release from the Cebu warehouse could not be provided by DMS logistics, but it was suggested that the date of distribution aligns with the availability of dignitaries to attend the distribution ceremony.
4. The PRC logistics and warehousing units state that the deployment of items can be done as soon as the appropriate papers are endorsed by DMS. Together with the fleet management unit they can process documents in 4 hours and start loading trucks immediately. The following were provided by relevant staff as potential timelines under favourable conditions:
   1. A delivery for the recent Abra earthquake on Luzon can be within 3 days.
   2. The delivery from Luzon to Surigao can be done within a week.
5. Illustrating PRC’s overall challenges, the Typhoon Rai response uncovered the following:
   1. Non-operational PRC trucks – due to the frequency of disasters there are always vehicles undergoing repairs.
   2. The current location of warehouses:
      * Long distances between the location of stocks and target areas.
      * Island geography of the Philippines increasing the dependence on clearance and availability of barges/ferries and ports being open.
   3. Understaffing, fatigue, and the isolation of Chapter staff and volunteers due to COVID-19.
   4. Underestimation of severity of impact. For example, during Typhoon Vamco, initially, most resources were allocated to support the response in Cagayan, even if other areas such as Isabela province also experienced a lot of flooding.
6. A distribution within 3 weeks may be considered acceptable by PRC staff, however it does not make PRC the first to distribute NFIs. In the response to Typhoon Rai, NGOs like Oxfam and Action Against Hunger distributed NFIs within 2 weeks. One senior PRC staff is of the opinion that with a quick assessment, PRC should be able to distribute NFIs within 2 weeks.
7. The recent response to Tropical Depression Paeng demonstrated that with more strategic prepositioning, especially if it can avoid sea travel, distribution can be quicker than what was experienced during Typhoon Rai. The process from CN to withdrawal of items from the Cagayan de Oro (CDO) warehouse and the actual distribution took 5 to 8 days depending on the location of the distribution. This was achievable despite the use of a PRC truck coming from Davao del Sur and several trips back and forth to CDO.
8. The delivery of NFI items is, according to the PRC, preferably done with its own trucks. In large calamities, this may however be not sufficient and reportedly PRC is exploring framework agreements with transport providers.
9. The opinions on the speed of mobilization of the prepositioned MPCG differs across stakeholders:
   1. PRC staff state that beneficiary identification usually takes 2-4 weeks, with the distribution after TY Rai falling within this period. In other areas the beneficiary assessment was in January to March, with the earliest distribution in March.
   2. According to external parties, PRC, as well as some PRC staff, is not capitalizing on the fact that the cash is already in the society’s account. Cash should be available quicker at the Chapter level.

*Delivering planned COVID-19 outputs (Rating: Very Good)*

1. The COVID-19 component incorporated in this agreement were designed to establish PRC’s capacity to support the GOP’s response. All the planned activities have already been completed. Table 6 provides a summary.

Table : MYA COVID-19 output targets and achievements

| Activities | Target | Remarks |
| --- | --- | --- |
| Molecular Laboratory (MolLab) establishment and operational support | 1 | Operational by May 2020. Official handover on 27th of June 2020. |
| Ambulance (Skippy) | 1 | Official handover on 27th of June 2020. |
| Face masks | 1,000,000 | Completed by First quarter of 2021 |
| PPEs | 20,000 | Completed by First quarter of 2021 |

1. The consultant was not shared a complete Work and Financial Plan (W&FP) for the COVID-19 operations, but the budget suggests a maximum period of 12 months. All the achievements in Table 6 fall within that period. The PRC demonstrated that in an emergency, the conceptualization of plans can be quick, with the proposal finalized and most requirements met within a month. The MolLab was operational by May 2020 and received accreditation by the GOP in June 2020. The MolLab and the ambulance were both handed over on 27 June 2020. The procurement and provision of 1,000,000 face masks and 20,000 PPEs for medical front liners was reportedly completed by the first quarter of 2021, but the financial records show entries as late as June 2021. The descriptions of the booked expenses do not include the number of items purchased to allow verification.
2. The MolLab was instrumental in the testing of arriving passengers and quarantined individuals at the height of the repatriation of overseas workers. The MolLab has analysed 2,086,452 specimens of which about 82% were swab tests, and the remaining 18% saliva tests.
3. The MolLab has the largest testing capacity of laboratories in the Philippines. The reduced demand led to a scaling down commencing the third quarter of 2022. The laboratory only received financial support to cover the operational costs for the first 6 months, with the laboratory soon cost-effectively, and even providing income to the PRC. In the meantime, with a remaining DFAT budget, costs continued to be charged to the DFAT funds until March 2022.

*Impact of COVID-19 outputs (Rating: No rating – one sided input from PRC only)*

1. The number of COVID-19 deaths as of December 2022 is reported at just over 65 thousand. PRC’s head of the MolLab states that without the support of the international community to establish the testing capacity, this could have reached 200,000.
2. The capacity of the purchased machines in the Manila Port MolLab allowed the testing of up to 1,000 samples per machine. At its handover the MolLab was expected to test 12,000 samples per day.[[10]](#footnote-10) The laboratory tested samples delivered by LGUs and mega swabbing centres of the DOH. In April 2021, it was reported that the average daily number of tests was 6,200.[[11]](#footnote-11) At the time of the MTR there were only 300 tests analysed each day. Shared records show that the highest monthly number of tests was 143,217 in September 2021, indicating the laboratory was not used to its full capacity.

*Effectiveness of logistical support (Rating: Adequate)*

1. The logistics within PRC is divided in the units 1) warehousing, 2) fleet management and 3) procurement. The procurement unit prepares the documents for tenders and seeks management authorization conform the estimated amount for the tender. The Bids and Awards Committee (BAC) claims that advertising and succeeding steps can be within two months, with goods delivered one to two weeks after awarding the supply contract. However, all the processes described in quarterly partnership reports take about 6 months. An extreme example is the procurement of health kits. The purchase order was furnished at the BAC in the third quarter of 2020, followed by bids opening in March the following year, and the first 600 out of 1,000 sets delivered a year after the start of the process.
2. Despite the long procurement processes, the Multiyear Agreement (MYA) has not experienced implementation delays. By 2022, all items have been procured, with earlier distributions relying on stocks from the previous agreement. (See also earlier paragraph on the [old agreement](#oldagreement)).
3. The opinions on the functionality of the warehouses, and in particular the stock inventories vary. While warehouse staff state they provide up-to-date information to DMS managers through a Google folder (online), the quality of the content is being questioned by other PRC staff. In regard to the MYA the following were mentioned:
   1. The total remaining stocks and their location is still under validation. The latter is not unique to DFAT stocks and is attributed by PRC to the falling in disuse of a previous stock inventory application. Warehouse staff showed the consultant the excel sheets used at present. During the presentation of the draft report, PRC shared that a new application, Microsoft Dynamics 365 is being rolled out.
   2. The absence of or erroneous labelling of stocks and shipments is suspected by PRC to be the cause of DFAT stocks going to a different barangay in SDN.
   3. Hygiene kits, and to a lesser extent health kits, contain items likely to expire during this agreement. Within the PRC, people are blaming each other for the expiry of items. Some state that the expiry dates of stocks are not available, while others share that inventories are shared twice-a-week and include expiry dates. The expiry of items is by parts of the organization seen as something avoidable by proper stock management and framework agreements with suppliers, while for others it is expected, and contingencies in place for the replacement of expiring items.
4. The fleet maintenance is crucial to the speedy mobilization of items. During the Typhoon Rai response the state of trucks challenged a quick response. Although this did not necessarily affect the transportation of DFAT items, it is a concern for the future when large volumes need to be transported. A defective barge lent to PRC by an external partner delayed the delivery of DFAT items from Cebu to SDN.

*Compliance with CTP guidelines (Rating: Less than adequate)*

1. The PRC process for cash beneficiary selection prescribes the conduct of a Community Assembly and normal practice is to establish a Barangay Committee (BarCom) to support the setting of beneficiary selection criteria and validation of the selected families. In neither of the barangays such activities were mentioned or recalled by the sources. The collection of data in one barangay, according to community members, was done by the barangay health workers or social workers and mainly looked at the state of houses. In the second barangay, its officials recall that PRC volunteers did the selection of beneficiaries, without their involvement at any stage. The given reason was the fast tracking of the distribution. The list of recipients was however posted publicly at the barangays.
2. The Focus Group Discussion (FGD) participants in Mandaue City disagreed on whether validation of potential recipients was done or not. While some were unaware of a validation exercise by PRC, others said that households were sampled. It could not be established whether this was within the 10% requirement. Most FGD participants only recall PRC coming twice, once for the registration and the second time for the distribution. Initially both the activities were supposed to be on the same day, but the distribution was postponed. A few individuals were of the opinion that a more rigorous assessment should look at the recovery capacity of families. Families that could immediately restart their livelihood, or are better off and have savings, should have been excluded. Others rather see that everybody receives, regardless the level of damage and socio-economic situation of the family.
3. The distribution is ideally done with a Financial Service Provider (FSP). PhilPost could not do the distribution and PRC did not have a framework agreement with an alternative FSP. Earlier agreements expired after Typhooon Haiyan. The least preferred method of cash in envelope was used.

*Quality of reporting (Rating: Adequate)*

1. In the proposal for the MYA, PRC commits itself to quarterly progress reports and stock inventories, as well as the annual W&FP, accomplishment report and financial report. In response to DFAT not receiving reports on time early in the implementation, PRC decided that both the DMS, as well as the International Relations and Strategic Partnerships Office (IRSPO) will share copies of reports to DFAT.
2. The accuracy of financial reports has been the biggest challenge for DFAT. The reports are signed off by senior management, but according to DFAT still contain errors. A quick review of the posted expenses in the financial report of 25 October 2022[[12]](#footnote-12) against the budget lines, shows a number of postings which should have been charged elsewhere. They are primarily seen in the COVID-19 component.
3. The accuracy of stock records was still questioned internally by PRC in January 2023 (see earlier section around [Table 5](#stockverification84)). From PRC’s end changes in Forex have been affecting budgets. In December 2021 it was resolved to use for the cost of NFIs the average Forex rates of when the AUD transfers were received. The PHP35 per AUD was maintained for the CfR. Since this resolution, these values are consistently used in the reports.
4. The quarterly and annual reports are concise and accepted by DFAT. According to PRC, the reporting template is like what is used for other donors and not creating any additional burden to PRC staff to ensure compliance.
5. The MTR consultant identifies the following weaknesses regarding the annual and quarterly reports, primarily due its template:
   1. The reports do not describe changes between the CN and actual distributions.
   2. The reports are output oriented and do not provide any reflection, analysis, or learnings.
6. The different reports have inconsistencies and errors – here some examples:
   1. The numbers of items in stock changed over time, and at the time of this report is still under validation.
   2. Discrepancies between the reported number of tests conducted by the MolLab and those in the shared summary sheet.
   3. The location of recipients in the quarterly reports is different than in master lists. For example, the distribution in SDN includes in the master lists an additional barangay, with reduced number of beneficiaries in Gigaquit, Surigao del Norte.
   4. The reported times that the donated Ambulance was used fluctuated between an actual use of ‘Skippy’ and the average of all ambulances (around 700), with a final number of 144 times over 27 months.
7. The reporting to the 3Ws is not a requirement within the MYA, yet it could be expected that donor agencies get their due credit. The entries on DFAT supported NFIs and cash in the 3Ws seems largely correct for Typhoon Rai but mixed for Typhoon Goni. For example, all NFIs distributed in Palta Salvacion were accredited to the United Arab Emirates, and in Tilod, Baras to the IFRC. In Albay, the distributed NFIs are correctly tagged to DFAT. The 3Ws of Typhoon Vamco has no entries for DFAT-PRC items.[[13]](#footnote-13)
8. The targeting of vulnerable groups would suggest they are highlighted during reporting, but SADDD is not provided in any of the documents. Details on this subject are provided in section 3.2.1.

*Effectiveness of M&E systems (Rating: Less than Adequate)*

1. The quarterly and annual reports present outputs. There is no evidence of analysis, reflection, or learning on why plans change, for example delays in procurement. The sources suggest that there is reflection during meetings between PRC and DFAT, but any outcome of those is not in public documents. An example is moving items to other warehouses, but there is no documentation of what experiences or discussion preceded the decision. The movement of stocks to more strategic locations can be seen as a positive example of how learnings can contribute to improved programming.
2. The PDM for Typhoon Rai identified the same, thus unaddressed, issues as documented during the PDMs of Typhoon Goni and Typhoon Vamco. Examples are:
   1. The timing of the PDM – the many months lapsed between distributions and the PDM poses a recall challenge for the survey respondents. The PDM for Typhoon Rai was even later than for the other PDMs.
   2. The master lists of beneficiaries were not available before the PDMs. At the time of this MTR the master lists of CfR in Cebu were still being validated.
3. The document trail for a number of releases of NFIs from warehouses to their destination reportedly are incomplete, hampering the reconciliation of the existing stocks. The knowledge of local Chapter staff is often incomplete due to less partaking in the operations – they themselves and their families are affected by the calamity. This situation makes it important for timely consolidation of information after the early response has been concluded.
4. The external stakeholders confirmed PRC’s limitation in data management. PRC might have data available, but do not have the capacity, especially human resources, to analyse and present it. During this MTR, it appeared difficult for PRC to timely share documents, suggesting a broader need to improve information management.

*Unintended results/consequences (Not rated)*

1. The majority of consulted individuals and groups did not identify any positive or negative unintended results. In particular, the community members highlighted their appreciation for the received support.
2. Positive unintended consequences that were shared are:
   1. DFAT felt that the COVID-19 support elevated the partnership with PRC, enhancing the relationship through an activity that has quick, and yielded productive results.
   2. DFAT experienced the Food Truck’s usefulness during different types of calamities and situations as a positive factor, from natural disasters to populations in COVID-19 isolation.
   3. Since 2021, PRC purchased 25 new units of Food Trucks. Reportedly, they were paid from income derived from COVID-19 testing - indirectly a number of the trucks were financed by income from conducted tests at the Port Manila MolLab. This could not be confirmed by the review of income streams and budgets.
3. Negative unintended consequences that were shared are:
   1. DMS noted that the MYA has a limited duration. The MYA is not seen as a long-term commitment by DFAT to replenish NFI stocks or cash. According to one senior staff member, this creates hesitancy in PRC to use a lot of stocks. During the presentation of the draft report, it was noted that this opinion was not necessarily shared by all DMS staff.
   2. Barangay officials and residents report that the exclusion of some people from beneficiary lists instigates jealousy. In a number of community meetings, participants were of the opinion that everyone was affected and thus support should be equal. Exclusions and jealousy, however, did not lead to conflicts.

### 3.1.4 Efficiency

The core questions for this section on Efficiency are:

* Could the information flow between delivery partners be strengthened?
* How well informed were communities/beneficiaries about the selection and distribution process?
* Is PRC managing the implementation of funded activities well, including keeping to agreed output and delivery schedules?
* How well did PRC procurement and financial management systems support timely and quality program implementation?
* Is the allocation of human resources adequate?

1. The questions for the Efficiency criterion informed seven subdimensions. This is a reduced number from the Review Matrix. The three subdimensions for community level engagement were collapsed in to one and classified as ‘Not rated’. The subdimension was not rated, because in the course of the review it became more apparent that full transparency to communities may hamper relief efforts and raise expectations among communities.
2. The overall merit rating for Efficiency is **‘Adequate’.** The subdimensions for Efficiency are mostly rated **‘Adequate’,** and **‘Good’** for cost-effectiveness. PRC’s tendering processes ensure competitive prices for NFIs. The length of procurement processes is longer than what relevant PRC units consider as ideal, but this has not affected the availability of NFIs. The procurement was completed in a smaller number than batches than the initial plan, resulting in an **‘Adequate’** rating for the delivering of outputs. The scoring is not higher because the early procurement combined with low utilization increases the risk of expiry of items in the Hygiene and Health kits. The utilization of NFIs is low, partially caused by stocks from the previous agreement with DFAT. The utilization of the ambulance and Food Truck procured is below their potential. An **‘Adequate’** rating has been assigned based on the subdimension of the premise that the purchased units are to be utilized. The assets might have a longer lifetime, but the trips made by the ambulance could also have been made by other PRC units, or the unit may have been used more in other urban centres.

| **Subdimension** | **Merit rating** |
| --- | --- |
| Efficiency of coordination between PRC and DFAT | Adequate |
| Level of transparency and participation of potential beneficiaries | Not rated |
| Delivering outputs as planned | Adequate |
| Procurement and financial management supporting timely and quality implementation | Adequate |
| Utilization of assets | Adequate |
| Cost-effectiveness of purchased NFIs and assets | Good |

*Efficiency of coordination between PRC and DFAT (Rating: Adequate)*

1. The response of DFAT to the CNs for NFI mobilization, and other inquiries regarding the mobilization of DFAT support items reportedly has been quick, within the 2 to 3 days prescribed in the project proposal.
2. The MYA is overseen within PRC by the National Project Coordinator (NPC). The overall oversight of the NPC over the whole Agreement and the reporting was, however challenged by the parallel management of the COVID-19 activities by Health personnel.
3. PRC considered the general staffing to MYA as adequate, but prefers to have a designated finance officer. The challenges in financial reporting as found during the MTR is evidence of this weakness. The frequent submission of erratic financial reports which are endorsed by PRC senior management, indicates that PRC and DFAT have been unable to find structural solutions for the issue.
4. The responsiveness of PRC to DFAT reportedly fluctuated over the duration of the MYA. Initially, the responsiveness of the PRC to communications was considered poor, but it improved with the appointment of the NPC towards the end of 2020. In the months before the MTR, DFAT noted a slowing down, and the consultant also experienced high non-responsiveness of PRC personnel to email and phone communications, even when requests were coursed through or endorsed by the NPC. The key positions within the DFATs HARD experienced a staff turnover during MYA, while towards the end of the MTR a new person is commencing in the position of NPC. The transition to new staff likely affects working relationships.
5. PRC has formal internal communication protocols but decision-making can be slow. DFAT appreciates the practice of receiving updates from the NPC while internal PRC discussions are ongoing. Some decision-making processes are however very long. For example, a proposal for the reallocation of remaining COVID-19 was requested as early as the 2nd Quarter of 2022, but by December DFAT still had to receive a formal and final proposal.
6. The bi-annual Principals Meeting is by both parties considered as a valuable venue for updating each other and making important decisions when needed.

*Level of transparency and participation of potential beneficiaries (Rating: Not rated)*

1. This dimension is not rated. In development programming, participation and transparency are considered positive attributes but might not be equally applicable in emergency settings where assessments are to identify the most in need without raising expectations or communities able to influence the needs assessment.
2. The community members and official report shared that when the PRC comes to their location, they do not know whether they will receive support.
3. The consulted community members did not play a direct role in the selection of beneficiaries, except for barangay officials and PRC volunteers that take part in the assessment(s). In 2 out of the 8 visited locations, a number of community members were interviewed as part of the selection or validation procedure.
4. None of the visited locations (FGD participants and community officials) recalled the conduct of community consultations, including the locations where CfR was provided. This is in violation with the Standard Operating Procedures (SOP) of Cash Transfer Programming (CTP). Except for some CfR recipients, community members did not know what they would receive prior to the distribution. The PDMs report that 79% of the recipients were aware of the amount before the actual distribution, higher than what was shared in the consultations for this MTR. It needs to be noted though that the PDM covered also other cash distributions in later months.
5. PRC on purpose does not provide information during the assessments on the types of support. This strategy is applied to avoid raising expectations among communities or families that fail to meet the criteria or unavailability of the required support. In some communities the people know PRC as a relief agency but, no specifics are provided on whether their community would qualify. The Chapter reports the beneficiary lists were posted at the barangay, including the amount to be provided.

*Delivering outputs as planned (Rating: Adequate)*

1. The initial work and financial plan for the overall agreement envisaged the procurement of items in each of the five years. The actual practice was to break the procurement of each of the NFI category in two batches, one in the year of 2021 and in 2022. Progress documentation does not provide reasons for deviating from the original plan.
2. The reduction of procurement cycles works in favour of the Bids and Awards Committee (BAC) in reducing their workload and other resource requirements for procurements. However, warehouses have to accommodate large stocks, and advance purchasing increases the risks of expiry of items (see also on [expiry of Hygiene kits](#expiry108) and [expired items in warehouse](#expiry20percent)). In fact, the DFAT stocks used in the Typhoon Goni and Typhoon Vamco responses were still from the previous arrangement, therefore, the inventory should have informed a more appropriate procurement plan.
3. The financial summary as of 25 October 2022, presents a few concerns:
   1. The earlier mentioned remaining balance of the COVID-19 response is AUD266,188. This represents 6.49% of the budget and the discussion on reallocating this amount has been ongoing since June 2021.
   2. The budget line for NFI Delivery has been exhausted. However most of the items have not been distributed yet to regional warehouses or actual calamity victims. The distribution cost will need to come from alternative sources.
4. The delivery of the CfR is ideally through Financial Service Providers (FSP), with currently PhilPost as the only one in use. The PRC used to have a framework agreement with GCash that provides an E-wallet. GCash offers slightly lower fees, PHP75 per transaction against PhilPost’s PHP100, but the agreement expired and needs to be renegotiated.

*Procurement and financial management supporting timely and quality implementation (Adequate)*

1. The findings for this subdimension are partially reported in other sections:
   1. The procurement processes can be quicker, but the length of procurement has not had an impact on the availability of NFIs. Approval processes reportedly were slow in the past due to prevailing authorization levels, but recent adjustments in approval levels of purchase orders should facilitate faster procurement.
   2. The application of emergency procurement rules facilitated the quicker availability of materials for the COVID-19 response.
   3. The NFIs and other items are considered of good quality, and the increasing cost of items does not seem to stop PRC to adhere to the procurement of quality items, except for a single observation by PRC staff that the quality of tarpaulins is still good but reduced.
2. The financial management has not had significant effects on the implementation of the MYA. The consolidation, however, of expenditures on the COVID-19 component has taken long and to date the remaining budgets have yet to be reallocated. Some of the postings appear to be charged against the wrong budget line.
3. The quality of implementation is not affected, but the management and analysis of financial information could have improved the quality of programming. Budgets for the tarpaulins could have been used for other activities without compromising the response capacity.

*Utilization of vehicles (Rating: Adequate)*

1. The negative pressure ambulance Skippy and food truck Bluey do not have targets for operation. As with all operations, the deployment is based on identified needs. This subdimension looks at whether the vehicles are utilized at a level that justifies the expenditure.
2. The actual use of the negative pressure ambulance, as reported in December 2022 was adjusted to 144, contrary to the 700 plus reported earlier. The higher figure included all emergency ambulance services. The actual number translates to one patient every 6 days, or 60 times a year, lower than a normal ambulance use of 200 times a year, a number shared by PRC staff. The other two negative pressure ambulances in the NCR could have absorbed the trips made by Skippy, with the unit deployed elsewhere.
3. Considering an economic lifetime of 5 years, this would bring the cost per patient at AUD269 for the vehicle alone [[14]](#footnote-14). Operational costs will add a significant amount to this if a fulltime crew needs to be maintained. It can be questioned whether this is efficient use of the vehicle, yet an unverified internet sources states that emergency ambulance services cost PHP5,000 – PHP12,000 (AUD143 – 343).[[15]](#footnote-15) This suggests that if PRC would charge similar amounts, the operations can operate at cost recovery levels.
4. As presented in December 2022, Food Truck Bluey was deployed around half of the time (8 months) since its turnover in May 2021. The vehicle’s logbook does not include the use of the truck during COVID-19 operations. Interviews with the Chapters suggest that these operations took place in March 2022 reducing the truck’s use. The Chapters and LGUs indicated that it was likely Bluey that was deployed in response to fires in their jurisdiction. These could also not be confirmed with the logbook.
5. The Food Truck served a total of 31,093 individuals during its deployments. The number of meals per day is typically around 300 to 600 depending on the plan made with LGUs. This range suggests that Bluey was deployed up to 100 days since its handover, about 20% of the days it has been with the PRC. Reports show that in Caloocan 1,000 individuals were served in one day. It was explained by PRC that within the counting, individual translates as one meal, and that evacuation centres in Batangas may have been visited multiple times, thus the same individuals are receiving more than one meal.

*Cost-effectiveness of purchased NFIs and assets (Rating: Good)*

1. The initial budgets for the Food Truck were PHP3,300,000 and PHP3,500,000 respectively with a final procurement price of PHP3,244,788. The budget for the ambulance was PHP3M with a procurement price of PHP2,732,797. The cost of a bare unit of a Foton Tuano is over PHP2M according to online sources. Considering the inclusion of equipment and the urgent need, PHP2.7M seems a reasonable price.
2. The BAC advertises new bidding processes publicly, as well as directly approaching regular suppliers, to submit bids. The financial part of the original W&FP provides costing of individual items. The shared financial reports show closing figures for the NFI budget lines. PRC staff say that some items are higher than budgeted for and others are lower, with overall a higher total NFI cost than the allocation. The reduction of funds is partially caused by a reduction in the total available amount in PHP for NFIs due to the lower average Forex rate (PHP32.84) than the PHP35 per AUD as budgeted for. Table 7 summarizes the differences in expenditure for NFIs by item and overall. It shows that the Shelter and Health Kits were cheaper, while others are all more expensive, varying from AUD0.80 for jerry cans to AUD17.21 more for tarpaulins. The overall cost increased by about 11%, higher than the 7% reduction in exchange rate. The extra cost of the tarpaulins, responsible for 71% of the total increase, and the available old stocks could have informed a reduced purchase of tarpaulins to avoid cutbacks in the other budget lines.

Table : Differences in budgeted and actual expenditure on NFIs in AUD (October 2022 minus July 2020)

|  |  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
| Non-Food Item | Type | Quantity  purchased | Remaining stocks | Unit | Total |
| Blankets | sets | 4,500 | 397 | 3.52 | 15,850.38 |
| Plastic Mat | sets | 4,500 | 397 | 1.49 | 6,692.22 |
| Mosquito Net | sets | 4,500 | 397 | 1.11 | 4,980.16 |
| Hygiene Kit | kits | 4,500 | 397 | 5.68 | 25,559.23 |
| 10L Jerry Can container | sets | 4,500 | 397 | 0.80 | 3,610.88 |
| Tarpaulin | sets | 4,500 | 4376 | 17.21 | 77,449.87 |
| Shelter Tool Kit | kits | 2,400 | 0 | (0.28) | (669.87) |
| Mother Kit | kits | 2,000 | 0 | (11.05) | (22,094.91) |
| Newborn Kit | kits | 2,000 | 0 | (1.38) | (2,750.93) |
| Total Difference | - | - | - | - | 108,627.03 |

1. The STKs were found very useful, but it was observed in Pintuyan that a number of tools remained unused almost a year since the distribution, such as the pick-mattock and grab-hoe. The most useful items were the hammer, handsaw, nails, and ropes. One barangay captain said that there are many items, even hammers, that are not required in the kit since people would have them lying around, even after a disaster, or can be borrowed. PRC reports that alternatives like the distribution of tools at community level are being studied. Figure 2 shows on the left a picture of the tools remaining of a STK distributed in Barangay Tilod, Baras in 2020. The hammer, saw, grab hoe and shovel are all well used. To the right is a picture of a STK distributed in Pintuyan in January 2022. The cutlass, pick-hoe and shovel remained unused during the year.

Figure : Pictures of STKs in Tilod, Baras (left) and Son-ok II in Pintuyan





1. The distribution of hygiene kits, as with other items, is a result of the needs assessments and market analysis. The content of hygiene kits was questioned by participants in several FGDs. The hygiene kit aims to provide sufficient items for a family of five for a month. Many of the households receiving the kits are much smaller. As per Master lists, the average family size in Barangay Alibagu, Ilagan City, Isabela is 4.8, with 70% composed of less than 5 members. In Punta Bilar, Surigao del Norte, the average family size is 3.8, with 69% of the families having less than 5 members. FGD participants suggested that with a cash equivalent people could have addressed their hygiene, as well as other needs (AUD23 in the July 2020 budget). The distribution was conducted weeks after the needs assessment, hence items were already available on the market.
2. The consultant observed that in the Namayan warehouse at least 20% of the storage space were occupied by expired items or kits containing expired items. PRC staff members agree or even provide a higher estimate of 25%. The cost-effectiveness of hygiene and health kits depends on their utilization before the expiry of items. In the 2022 Quarter 2 report to DFAT, the PRC acknowledges the high expiry rate by proposing the allocation of remaining COVID-19 funds to a contingency for the replacement of 25% of the hygiene kits. This in addition to an existing ‘NFI contingency’ budget line dedicated for this. The allocation of the contingency suggests that the replacement of expiring items is an acceptable expense, yet some PRC members recommended local procurement or framework agreements with suppliers of expiring items to deliver them when they are needed. Better inventory management should also reduce the amount of expiring goods.
3. The supplier provides a kit usually as a whole in a predefined type of packaging. In exceptional cases, where some items do not meet the standards, they may be excluded and replaced by those of other suppliers. In these events, PRC will have separate transactions for each of the suppliers.

### 3.1.5 Sustainability

The core questions on Sustainability are:

* What mechanisms and procedures are in place to ensure long time operation of the assets procured under the MYA?
* How durable are the NFIs provided by PRC?

1. Sustainability is Overall rated as **‘Adequate’,** based on the low use of the vehicles that could extend the lifetime of vehicles, but with a concern of maintenance relying on unclear budgets depending on operations. The MolLab equipment that has not been repurposed yet also contributes to this lower rating. The quality of distributed items is considered very good, but a rating of **‘Adequate’** given due to the health concerns over the foldable jerrycans.

Figure : Food Truck 'Bluey' at Namayan Warehouse (Nov 2022)





*Asset maintenance (Rating: Adequate)*

1. The PRC was not able to provide maintenance plans or budgets for the individual or fleets of food trucks and ambulances. The maintenance budgets are embedded in larger budgets which according to PRC contained information too sensitive to share. The maintenance of Bluey is provided when there is an operation, rather than coming from a regular budget and schedule. The financial records for the COVID-19 component support this. The maintenance but was intended for Bluey and Skippy, but PRC also charged the maintenance cost of other vehicles to the MYA budget.
2. The consultant did not see the ambulance. But Food Truck Bluey was parked at the Mandaluyong warehouse where it awaits its next deployment. The truck itself seems in a reasonable state for an 18-month-old vehicle, but the interior can benefit from a good cleaning. Reportedly, food trucks undergo thorough cleaning before they are deployed again. The truck was parked in an open, unsurfaced area. PRC-HQ is seeking resources to build permanent sheds for the food trucks. Figure 3 shows the food truck at the Namayan warehouse, on 29 Nov 2022. The picture on the top shows the outside of the vehicle with the logos of the PRC and the Australian Government. The bottom picture shows the truck’s interior, pots, and pans, burners, and large steamer.
3. The fees for tests conducted in the MolLab in Manila Port were reportedly covered for 80% by PhilHealth and the rest privately. The operational costs of the laboratory during the height of its operation had lower cost than what was charged – the laboratory generated funds for the overall PRC operations. The equipment has been maintained by the supplier and faulty machines have been returned.
4. The current demand for testing is low. Three options were considered for the MolLabs:
   1. Reassign some of the equipment to the blood centre facilities.
   2. Use laboratory equipment in clinical laboratories for other infectious diseases.
   3. Maintain COVID-19 operations at a lower scale.

The scaling down has already started and repurposing them for other infectious diseases is still being studied. The PRC will maintain the capacity to increase COVID-19 testing if needed by storing some of the equipment. The DOH COVID-19 tracker shows that out of the 371 accredited Testing Labs, 319 conducted tests on 26 December, indicating sufficient other capacity for COVID-19 testing.[[16]](#footnote-16)

1. The MYA supported the procurement of desktops and laptops with the reported expenditures suggesting between 20 to 30 units, all charged to the COVID-19 project component. The only expense charged for computer equipment maintenance is that of a software package. The review did not inquire about the use of computer equipment after the completion of the COVID-19 activities.

*Quality of distributed items (Rating: Adequate)*

1. The safeguarding of quality is embedded in the procurement process. Items are described in detail in the bidding documents for suppliers to comply with. Potential suppliers are required to bring samples during the opening of bids. Most items are bought in large batches, but for accounting purposes, the bids for DFAT are different than for those funded by other sources.
2. The recipients are overall positive with the goods they receive. Items are of good brands and in several FGDs, participants stated they cannot afford the same quality. Items like towels and blankets distributed more than 2 years ago are still in use.
3. The quality of the tarpaulins was praised, and many are still in use more than 2 years after the distribution. Chapter staff did note that while the quality is still good, the new tarpaulins are of lesser quality than those procured during the previous prepositioning agreement.
4. The tools were in general found of good quality as well, with some hammers or pick-mattocks breaking relatively soon. The recipients could replace those by themselves.
5. The practicality and safety of the foldable jerry cans was questioned by community members – when filled, this type of jerry can be damaged easily and the small entrance makes it difficult for them to clean. The people prefer the big, solid plastic ones. DMS explained that the foldable jerry cans were in response to previous PDM findings in which people found them too heavy to use. The bulkiness of the sturdy 5-gallon units also poses logistical challenges.

## 3.2 Key Policy Priorities

### 3.2.1 Gender Equality

The core questions for Gender Equality are:

* Is the M&E system generating robust information that collects comprehensive sex-disaggregated data and uses gender indicators, which is analysed and used to drive improvement and learning?
* How does the MYA contribute to gender equality?

1. The Gender Equality criteria is rated as **‘Very Poor’.** The PRC and DFAT should be moving towards the presentation of SADDD, but the information being collected is incomplete or of mixed quality to make SADDD possible. Promoting or strengthening of gender equality is not a focus of MYA, or part of PRC’s early emergency response in general.

| **Subdimension** | **Merit rating** |
| --- | --- |
| Collection and utilization of SADDD during MYA | Poor |
| Adequacy and quality of SADDD analysis | Very Poor |
| Participation of women and women’s rights organizations | Less than adequate |
| Participation of relevant NGAs in MYA | Less than adequate |
| Staff capacity in gender analysis and planning | Not rated – the MYA does not have specific activities to promote gender equality, therefore it is not fair to assess the impact. |
| Impact MYA on gender equality | Not rated – the MYA does not have specific activities to promote gender equality, therefore it is not fair to assess the impact. |

*Collection of SADDD during MYA (Rating: Poor)*

1. The MYA has targets in terms of the number of NFIs procured, but no clearly defined number of families that PRC and DFAT want to reach with this MYA, or the number or percentage of recipients from vulnerable groups. The MYA does not have indicators or a logical framework.
2. The Chapters explained that beneficiary cards are filled by a family member, after which information is encoded in Excel templates. The cards ask whether the individual is married, a single parent or differently-abled, but this information is not reflected in all the excel files. The cards do not inquire about pregnancies or what kind of disability.
3. The electronic template to create master lists for NFI distribution includes a separate column for ‘Status’, presumably to indicate the marital status, as well as a column for ‘socially vulnerable groups’. The Chapters do not have complete data or data is not provided in the intended column. In addition, the template provides columns for the distribution of the members over age groups. These columns are appreciated, making age related data available. During the consultations, a PRC staff member indicated that the Washington Group of Questions – Short Set (WGQ-SS) is already part of reports, but it was clarified during the debriefing that this is not the case, despite a general awareness of the WGQ-SS.
4. The beneficiary files present an unusual high number of female-headed households, raising the suspicion that this contains the sex of the registered individual, rather than indicating the head of household. This may be by accident due to the presence of women during the registration process, but some Chapters mentioned a drive to aim for gender equality in the relief response. For example, in Catanduanes, the recipients of DFAT NFIs were 45% women, and all were labelled as head of households. Ideally both the household head and primary beneficiary are noted to allow for disaggregated analysis.
5. The PRC shared that data collected from the CfR recipients is more elaborate, due to the more stringent accountability requirements in terms of the registration of beneficiaries, and the ‘Know your Client’ principle as laid upon by the Central Bank of the Philippines on FSPs. As the master lists of the CfR beneficiaries were still being validated this could not be verified by the consultant. The PRC has been piloting the Red Rose application with the IFRC, which is a fully electronic beneficiary registration and financial aid delivery system.

*Adequacy and quality of SADDD analysis (Rating: Very Poor)*

1. The quarterly and annual reports do not include disaggregated data. The reports only provide the location and number of families that received NFIs or other support. External stakeholders highlight that the PRC does not have the capacity, human or technically, to generate insights from the available data. Currently the Information Management unit is composed of two staff and is responsible for the collection and analysis of data for all disasters nationwide.
2. The reports do not provide evidence that the collected data is analysed by vulnerable group, or disaggregation by age or sex of respondent or household head. A recent shift to Microsoft BI for the analysis of the PDM data for Typhoon Rai should facilitate disaggregated analysis.

*Participation of women and women’s rights organizations (Rating: Less than adequate)*

1. Women are participating in the project, and as reported in communities are often the ones that are participating in the distribution. Overall, PRC claims that the organization is promoting equality regarding activity implementation. As mentioned earlier, this is not consistently and correctly reflected in the beneficiary data. The disaster relief activities do not have activities or outcomes to promote sustained changes in gender equality.
2. The consulted individuals stated that women rights organizations are part of the Provincial and Municipal Disaster Risk Reduction and Management Councils. The visited Chapters did not know of women’s organizations, or the Chapters did not set up consultations with these organizations to discuss their participation in the MYA.

*Participation of relevant NGAs in MYA (Rating: Less than adequate)*

1. The MTR did not identify NGAs representing women, PWDs or other vulnerable groups that are knowingly participating in the MYA. PRC informs the NDRRMC about the deployment of DFAT prepositioned goods as part of the PRC’s response. The NDRRMC has four seats for national civil society organizations representing vulnerable groups. The PRC operates independently, making it unlikely that other NDRRMC members have an influence on the implementation of the MYA. UN-OCHA and the consulted red cross societies were not aware of the cash prepositioning.

*Staff capacity in gender analysis and planning (Not rated)*

1. The capacity in gender analysis was explored with Chapter staff. They state and show an understanding of the importance of gender equality and the targeting of women among beneficiaries, but do not have the capacity to do comprehensive gender analysis. The application of ‘Do No Harm’ principles may be the highest achievable in an early emergency setting and a comprehensive analysis irrelevant and too time consuming.
2. In the survey, an equal 45% of the respondents said that they ‘know a lot’, or ‘know very little’ of gender equality. The remaining respondent knows nothing (n=11). Among the same participants 27% knew a lot about gender analysis, with 55% a little, and 18% nothing. Just over half, 55% had no orientation or training on gender equality, and 73% no training on gender analysis.

*Impact MYA on gender equality (Not rated)*

1. The consulted individuals and groups, including beneficiaries, do not identify contributions of MYA to increased gender equality. The identification of beneficiaries and conduct of distribution activities promote the inclusion of women at different levels, and some sources say this may empower women, but there is no evidence or success stories to support this.

### 3.2.2 Disability inclusion

1. The overall rating for Disability Inclusion is **‘Adequate’.** There is no data on the needs of PWDs coming from assessments and no evidence that PWDs or their organizations participate in the MYA. The available data show however that PWDs are beneficiaries during distributions, although there is no data whether all types are represented.

| **Subdimension** | **Merit rating** |
| --- | --- |
| Understanding of needs of PWDs in MYA response operations | Adequate |
| Representativeness of different types of disabilities among MYA beneficiaries | Adequate |
| Participation of PWDs in MYA implementation | Adequate |
| Participation of NGAs representing PWDs in MYA planning and implementation | Very Poor |

*Understanding of needs of PWDs in MYA response operations (Rating: Adequate)*

1. Chapter staff demonstrate in the field and during interviews knowledge of the general needs of PWDs, and why they are more vulnerable in response operations.
2. The needs of PWDs are not described in the RDANA - disability or PWDs are not mentioned within the shared RDANA report.

*Representativeness of different types of disabilities among MYA beneficiaries (Rating: Less than adequate)*

1. The interviewed PWDs, barangay and municipal officials state that PWDs were specifically targeted for relief support, including from PRC.
2. The master lists of MYA are inconsistent in reporting whether PWDs are among the beneficiaries. Where it does, no specification is provided what type of disability. During the PDM of Typhoon Rai 12% of the households interviewed had a member with a disability, which compares well with the findings of the 2016 National Disability Prevalence Survey which concluded that 12% of Filipinos aged 15 and older have a severe disability.[[17]](#footnote-17)
3. The municipal governments should be able to provide the number of PWDs in each of the barangays, and the Persons with Disability Affairs Office (PDAO) in Baras confirmed this data is available. The MSWDO of San Pablo was able to show this data. The Chapter said this is due to growing emphasis of the government on PWDs and was not yet available during Typhoon Vamco in 2020. Chapters and assessment teams should in the future be able to use the available data on PWDs, as well as PLW, to help the targeting of vulnerable groups and allocation of NFIs or other support.

*Participation of PWDs in MYA implementation (Rating: Adequate)*

1. There is no evidence that PWDs are participating in the MYA, other than recipients of support. The survey respondents score on average of a 3.8 on the question *‘People with disabilities participate in the identification of family needs after a calamity’.* The score is equivalent to an Adequate merit rating, among the questions scoring lowest in the survey.
2. PDAOs expressed that PWDs and they themselves are not consulted in disaster preparedness activities conducted by Councils, even if the PWDs are known by the LGUs.

*Participation of NGAs representing PWDs in MYA planning and implementation (Rating: Very Poor)*

1. The PRC mentions in the proposal the consultation of PWD organizations in regard to the MYA, but there is no verbal or written evidence that this was practiced to date.

### 3.2.3 Risk management

The core question for Risk Management is: *Are the project risks proactively managed?*

1. The overall merit rating for risk management is **‘Adequate’.** The risk register is updated quarterly, as required, and in between the regular reviews as needed. The rating is not higher due to the limited engagement of stakeholders in the risk management, and a number of additional actions that can be taken to further address identified risks, for example, by increasing community awareness and participation in needs assessments and improving supply chain management.

| **Subdimension** | **Merit rating** |
| --- | --- |
| Adequacy of updating of risk register | Good |
| Robustness of risk management | Adequate |
| Level of participation of stakeholders in risk management | Less than adequate |

*Adequacy of updating of risk register (Rating: Good)*

1. The risk register is an internal DFAT document assessing the level of risks of DFAT investments. The risks related to the MYA with PRC are incorporated in the register for the overall Response and Recovery Assistance to the Philippines (RRAP) investment, and include categories related to 1) the partners and 2) the Department’s and partners’ operational environment. The register is reviewed quarterly, or anytime when an emerging situation dictates a review.
2. DFAT shared the registers of the first and second quarter of 2022. In between the two registers, a new system was adopted which reduces the available information available to the categories, any events, and the risk ratings. The shared registers do not show changes in the ratings, and no adjustments are recommended in the ratings because of the MTR. Table 8 provides the relevant risks and status at the time of the MTR.

Table : Risks most relevant to the MYA and their status as per MTR

| Risks | Status at the time of the MTR |
| --- | --- |
| PRC molecular laboratory is not optimized, or operations are stopped | The PRC MolLab is at the time of the review being scaled down. PRC has ideas for the use of the equipment, but no concrete plans have been presented. The equipment is moved to storage facilities, and their use for the detection of other diseases is reportedly hampered due to the absence of reagents to date other viruses or government policies regulating their use. |
| Activity implementation is delayed due to internal controls (i.e., procurement processes, beneficiary registration, etc) | The overall view of PRC is that the mobilization speed of prepositioned items is acceptable. Previous parts of this report present a number of areas that, within the current means (i.e., infrastructure) can be addressed to increase the speed of delivery: adequate assessment of the supply chain from warehoused items to the area of distribution; transparent and clear identification of the beneficiaries; and framework agreements with FSPs and transporters. |
| Limited response plan and fiscal requirements due to delayed information collection. | Limited response planning remains an issue, in particular coordination at the local level, as well as adhoc changes in programming in the goods and dates of distributions. |
| Partner reports wrong or conflicting information to Post re: project or financial updates (i.e., number of beneficiaries served, areas covered, and amount requested/disbursed. | The MTR identified a number of areas where beneficiary data is conflicting and, despite of previous reconciliation efforts, PRC is not confident that the figures are correct, and is undergoing a new validation process.  The review of financial records indicates that a number of items, including of large amounts, are charged to wrong budget lines, and some maybe not relevant to MYA. |

*Robustness of risk management (Rating: Adequate)*

1. PRC has already passed a general vetting process to become a regular DFAT partner – PRC demonstrated it has the proper policies and checks and balances in place. The identified steps to further reduce risk in the coming years seem adequate in most cases, for example, the areas of fraud prevention through training.
2. The robustness of the risk register may be strengthened in the areas identified in Table 9:
   1. A reduction in COVID-19 services is already a reality, and DFAT is concerned about the continued use of the equipment for other purposes. DFAT however needs to guard that PRC also maintains the capacity to quickly re-establish testing capacity if existing services will be overwhelmed during a new outbreak.
   2. The MTR indicates that clarity in beneficiary selection and in particular transparency towards communities can be improved. This needs more than coordination meetings alone and come with concrete steps on how this will be improved and demonstrated in future responses. PRC can also tap into existing data from municipalities on population demographics, in particular vulnerable groups (see also earlier paragraph on [available data](#pwddata184)).
   3. The slow supply chains are indicated as a potential risk to the reputation of Australia. This may increase when the humanitarian community knows about the prepositioning of cash. In addition, the suspicion that dignitaries define distribution dates needs to be addressed. Delays in the distribution of support does aggravate the living conditions of calamity victims, and purposively postponing distribution can damage Australia’s reputation. This requires a dialogue between PRC and DFAT on the adequacy of existing PRC policy or a new protocol or policy to ensure that transparency and due diligence is practiced in beneficiary selection and the timing of distribution.
   4. The inaccuracies and discrepancies in reports demonstrate poor information management. If DFAT wants to have a timely and correct account of what happens with DFAT supported supplies, then it should require PRC to timely and correctly record data. Spot checking will not be sufficient. The changing inventories weakens the confidence in the available stocks by DFAT and how overall stock management is conducted. The financial reporting has also shown weaknesses, with the misallocation and the possible inclusion of ineligible expenses. Audits of the financial records and the current stocks is needed.

*Level of participation of stakeholders in risk management (Rating: Less than adequate)*

1. The MTR considers primarily PRC as the stakeholder to participate in the risk management. The consulted PRC staff can recall some of their internal rules and practices on how to reduce operational risks, but they do not participate in the review and management of risks specifically for the MYA.
2. The ongoing challenges of incorrect stock inventories, expiring stocks, and financial reporting are indications that PRC can improve on risk reduction to mitigate potential consequences for MYA, PRC and DFAT.

### 3.2.4 Environmental and Social Safeguards

| **Subdimension** | **Merit rating** |
| --- | --- |
| DFAT compliance with Safeguards | Adequate |
| Adequacy of safeguarding by PRC (in early response actions) | Adequate |

*DFAT compliance with safeguards (Rating: Adequate)*

1. The MTR was tasked to look at whether the MYA is managed in line with the Environmental and Social Safeguard Policy (ESSP)[[18]](#footnote-18), Child Protection Policy (CPP), Preventing Sexual Exploitation Abuse and Harassment Policy (PSEAH), and Indigenous Peoples Strategy. The compliance of PRC with the policies is described in the Terms and Conditions of the agreement with DFAT. The progress documentation of the MYA does not provide a discussion on the application of these policies during the implementation.
2. The risk register for the first quarter of 2022 includes a section on Safeguards. The overall risk rating is medium, the result of medium risks of sexual exploitation or harassment during the implementation and contact with children. All other risks are considered low, for example the impact of the agreement on the environment, displacement, and indigenous people.
3. DFAT is working on workplace policies that promote environmentally friendly practices.
4. The PRC indicates that no incidents have been reported against the Child Protection Policy (CPP) and Preventing Sexual Exploitation, Abuse and Harassment (PSEAH). Hence, there is no evidence to assess the level of robustness or effectiveness of safeguarding measures.

*Adequacy of safeguarding by PRC (Rating: Adequate)*

1. The compliance of partners with DFAT policies is one of the five performance ratings in the Partner Performance Assessment. In the most recent assessment in May 2021, no details are provided on the performance in regard to Safeguards. A detailed assessment of compliance of partners through policies and their implementation can be a study on itself. During this MTR, the following were identified:
   1. PRC staff stated that the organization has its own counterparts to DFAT’s CPP and PSEAH. Staff is required to sign these as part of their contracts, and online orientations are provided to staff. Only people that are trained in Psycho Social Services and camp management undergo thorough training in practical applications, for example establishing child or women friendly spaces in evacuation centres.
   2. The consulted chapters do not report any incidents. It was also highlighted that the PRC only plays a supporting role to the LGUs. In the case of incidents identified by or reported to the PRC they will be referred to the relevant LGU officials, for example a Women’s Desk.
   3. The potential impact of procured items, for example, fuel consumption is not considered as a selection criterion during the procurement of vehicles. The observed use of vehicles, in particular their operation while stationary, indicates low awareness of staff on the consequences of fuel emission and how the organization’s operations can have an aggravating effect on the disasters it responds to. PRC conducts disaster mitigation activities like mangrove planting, but this is not a measure to off-set the organization’s carbon emissions.
   4. The beneficiary selection processes for early response are weak in documenting the participation of vulnerable groups. However, various review participants stated that during distribution ceremonies vulnerable groups like seniors and PWDs are provided with seats. The holder of the beneficiary registration card is the authorized person to pick up cash or in-kind support. This makes it easy for people that have difficulties in attending ceremonies to nominate someone else. IP groups are not included in the existing forms, and among the visited Chapters only targeted for special, long term development projects.
2. In the risk register, DFAT reports their satisfaction with PRCs mechanisms and safeguards towards the external environment. In this context, an assumption is made that as a screened organization and approved partner the PRC passes DFAT’s minimum expectation regarding the safety and security of staff and assets. The use of cash in envelopes and the involved responsibilities that were passed on to assigned PRC staff made them uncomfortable with the practice, in particular the withdrawal and personal responsibility of each staff member over carrying PHP300,000. PRC’s usual practice is to distribute cash through PhilPost with staff playing an observatory role only and ensuring that accountability requirements are met. The use of cash in envelops causes safety and mental health risks among staff, but without any reported consequences the risk rating of low remains valid.
3. The PRC reportedly has complaint mechanisms, and PDM surveys include questions on whether they are utilized. The PDM report for Typhoon Rai indicates that 34% (N=898; n=309) of the respondents knows how to reach the Red Cross. From all respondents 14% used the feedback mechanism (N=898; n=124). There is no data included what was reported or how the information was used. PRC did not respond to a request for details on the type of platform and if there was specific feedback on the DFAT support relief operations.

### 3.2.4 Climate Change and Disasters

| **Subdimension** | **Merit rating** |
| --- | --- |
| Extent of identification of Climate Change and Disaster Associated risks | Very poor |
| Effective Management of Climate Change and Disaster Associated risks | Very poor |

1. Neither DFAT nor PRC has identified climate change and disaster associated risks. Consequently, they are not in a risk register.
2. In the presentation of the draft report, a staff member noted that the PRC should be looking at how its operations affect climate change. It was recommended that PRC explores how the organization can reduce or mitigate its impact.
3. The survey respondents were asked to rate the performance of their office against the following:
   1. Reducing waste in operations – Scoring an average of 4.3, or Good, with female respondents having a higher score of 4.6, equal to a Very Good merit rating.
   2. Minimizing the use of fossil fuels during operations – Scoring an average of 3.9, with again female respondents scoring higher with 4.3 against 3.6 for men.

The differences suggest there exists a difference in understanding regarding the impact of operations on the environment between male and female staff members.

### 3.2.5 Innovation

| **Subdimension** | **Merit rating** |
| --- | --- |
| Innovation tested or mainstreamed in MYA implementation | Not rated |

*Innovation tested or mainstreamed in MYA implementation (Not rated)*

1. The prepositioning of cash under the MYA is an innovation for both DFAT Manila Post and the PRC. With the findings from this MTR the mobilization of the prepositioned cash needs refinement, and possibly adjustment on the amount to align it with those provided by other agencies and government directives.
2. The concept of food trucks is not new, and PRC has been using different models before the adoption of Bluey. However, DFAT considers it an innovation for Manila Post and for DFAT globally, and the trucks can be promoted broadly as an effective tool in emergency response.

# 4. Conclusions and recommendations

## 4.1 Conclusions and recommendations from the findings

This section discusses findings, presents key challenges and opportunities, and provides recommendations informed by this MTR. The recommendations are provided based on the discussion and prevailing challenges and opportunities. Most of the recommendations are for the remaining period of this MYA, with a few labelled as ‘long-term’, meaning beyond the current MYA if DFAT and PRC wish to continue the partnership. It also needs to be noted that some of the findings, and consequently recommendations, reflect overall operations of the PRC and may need internal reflection whether and how the recommendations can be implemented.

Initial recommendations were discussed during a presentation of the draft report on 10 January 2023. A documentation of the discussion is included in Annex F.

1. **Prepositioned volume of NFIs and Kits**

The volume of the purchased stocks is high considering the historical deployment during previous distributions. The imbalance is aggravated by the incorrect documentation of current and the remaining stocks from the previous agreement. It is unlikely that the current stocks will be exhausted before 2025 and at the current utilization rate and projects will only be used by 2026 at the earliest. This is acceptable for ensuring a roll over to a potential next agreement but poses challenges regarding expiry of items. The stocks should be used when there is an identified need, including the, to date unused, health kits.

The stocks of DFAT, as well as continuing procurement of donations by other Red Cross societies, federations, and private foundations, put a pressure on the current warehousing capacity. A part of the warehouses is taken up by expired items.

The forward positioning of stocks to smaller warehouses can address some of the warehouse challenges, as well as contributing to a faster response capacity. The delivery of DFAT stocks closer to locations a few days prior to a disaster has not been practiced.

Key challenges to address are:

* The accuracy of stock inventories.
* The timing of procurement versus the historical and projected needs.
* The central warehouses storing large number of old stocks and expired items.
* The balance between what is needed when and how fast it can be delivered.

A few opportunities are also identified during the MTR. In the short term, the large stocks of tarpaulins could be used for prepositioning with chapters. The stock of tarpaulins is proportionally high compared to other items, as much as three times the need for NFI kits.

For the long-term, the PRC is, with support from some affiliates, developing a strategy to develop 17 Chapters as hubs. This can be an opportunity for DFAT to support forward prepositioning beyond the MYA.

Recommendations:

1. PRC to address immediately the weak stock and inventory management, ensuring the inventory generates instantly the type of items, donors, and information on expiry dates. DFAT is recommended to accompany the roll out of the new inventory management system with the commissioning of a physical count of stored items.
2. The adequate promotion by PRC of the available items, their content and expiry dates among the respective departments at HQ. The latter is in particular important for the health kits, of which the level of awareness on their availability and target recipients needs to be raised among Chapters and people deployed during needs assessments.
3. The number of stocks supplied to Chapters should be better aligned with the number of target beneficiaries indicated in their requests, where stocks are available.
4. PRC and DFAT to explore the prepositioning nearer or sooner of tarpaulins. A number of communities identified this as the most important support they received.
5. PRC to discuss framework agreements with suppliers of expiring items. The items will be paid but the supplier will provide ‘fresh’ stocks in smaller batches.
6. PRC to consider a review of the content of the STKs and make it smaller with only the urgently needed tools. PRC to also study the effects of their new initiatives to distribute or lend tools at the community level.

*Long-term:*

1. DFAT to provide financial support to implement the PRC strategy to establish 17 additional logistical hubs throughout the Philippines.
2. The prepositioning of NFIs needs to be based on historical use and projected utilisation. PRC to expand list of suppliers that can provide NFIs with expiry dates (e.g., soaps) and schedule deliveries in tranches depending on current inventory and projected needs.
3. The sturdy non-foldable jerrycans should be prioritized in future agreements. They are preferred by the people, are stronger, and posing less health risks. There are smaller versions on the market that could be considered for particular target groups for which large units are too heavy.
4. **Relevance of items and the timing of distribution**

The MTR overall establishes a high relevance of the distributed items to the recipients. The beneficiaries report some minor issues on quality, in particular the foldable jerry cans.

The MTR identifies that beneficiaries would like to receive the goods earlier, but the distributions are largely within the 3 weeks the PRC committed to in their proposal.

The distributions in SDN and Cebu were reportedly delayed by 3 to 4 days to enable dignitaries to participate in the distributions. The delay was caused by weather conditions at the location of the visitors, and distributions could have continued without them. Furthermore, the original data for the distribution in Cebu was considered too early, and short cuts were made in the selection, validation, and registration of CfR beneficiaries.

Even if not fully confirmed, the mere suggestion alone that visiting dignitaries could cause the delay of support to disaster victims could potentially damage the reputation of the PRC and by extension the supporting donor.

Recommendation:

1. PRC to review its internal approval process to facilitate an earlier release of CfR funds during emergencies, including area selection, beneficiary criteria, and capacity assessment of chapters to implement CfR. PRC should aim to deploy validation and beneficiary registration teams within a week after a disaster, where feasible, as specified in the agreement.
2. **Beneficiary selection**

PRC’s SOP describes selection criteria for locations and beneficiaries. The common criterion in the selection of beneficiaries as understood by community members is the application of ‘Totally Damaged’ and ‘Partially Damaged’ houses. The summary data from PDMs and beneficiary registration suggest that vulnerable groups are included among beneficiaries, but data is incomplete.

The fast tracking of beneficiary selection is identified as a concern. In the CfR operation this meant omission of the usual practice of setting up a Barangay Committee (BarCom) and there is a broad concern that families that were not eligible based on damages or own recovery capacity, did receive CfR.

In some barangays it is the officials that lead the beneficiary selection process, while in other areas PRC reportedly did everything, with different levels of engagement from the municipal government.

The following challenges are identified regarding beneficiary selection:

* The level of organization of the community and the presence of RC143.
* The capacity of the assessment teams and Chapters to contribute to the selection process.
* The registration of beneficiaries across different areas is incomplete and inconsistent. This aspect is further discussed in a paragraph on [Targets and M&E](#target212).

Recommendations:

1. PRC to continue to orient the Chapter and HQ staff that are deployed on assessments on the selection criteria to be applied. Likewise, the orientations need to emphasize the importance to explain to the barangay officials and the community as a whole to prevent jealousy and potential conflict. Community consultations need to be held, or criteria disseminated in other effective ways.
2. PRC to make all possible effort to ensure that MDRRMOs and MSWDOs are informed, and where possible engaged in the process. This will often not be practical due to the post-disaster environment, but sharing of information on beneficiaries should take place as soon as possible. This should in particular be possible in urban settings, but for example in Catanduanes, MDRRMOs have radios.
3. PRC and DFAT to establish a standard process to ensure due diligence in the delivery of relief support. PRC to develop a beneficiary selection checklist for the team leaders and members that helps them in the conduct of due diligence and document the procedures and deviations from the process. PRC needs to ensure compliance with its internal protocols to facilitate DFAT support and help affected populations as soon as reasonably possible.
4. **Being the First**

The PRC aims to be the first to respond to the needs of disaster victims. The PRC is without a doubt among the first responders - the provision of food, rescue operations and first aid are the Red Cross’ priorities in the first 72 hours. In the distribution of DFAT NFIs, the PRC was not always the first.

The response during Typhoon Goni was quicker than government agencies, despite providing a broader range of support to communities, yet during Typhoon Rai, PRC did not capitalize on the prepositioned NFIs and cash.

In the aftermath of Typhoon Rai other organizations have been able to deliver items sooner than PRC. In response to Typhoon Rai also DSWD and other agencies already distributed cash ahead of the PRC. It is however acknowledged that this quick distribution by government agencies may be at the cost of proper beneficiary selection and prone to favouritism. Overall, cash as a modality of relief has become increasingly important.

The response to the floods in Zamboanga City and Maguindanao caused by Severe Tropical Storm Nalgae demonstrated that cutting out a need for sea transport, items can be delivered within a week.

Recommendations:

1. DFAT and PRC to replenish and expand the prepositioned stocks from Cebu and Luzon to smaller warehouses, in particular Cagayan de Oro and possibly in Leyte, to allow for quicker responses.

For the long-term see recommendation #8.

1. **Prepositioned cash and its utilization**

DFAT’s prepositioning of cash with PRC is unique. While PRC internally considers anything less than four weeks quite fast for the distribution of cash, the other agencies believe that it should be much quicker. Sources participating in this review suggest that with the right preparations, the completion of a beneficiary list within 2 weeks should be feasible.

The challenges concerning a quick utilization of the prepositioned cash are:

* PRC internal processes that delay the deployment of cash.
* The reliance on PhilPost as the sole FSP.
* The current level of MPCG provided through DFAT is at PHP3,500 lower than other agencies.

The PRC is aware of the opportunities offered by other FSPs like GCash with which the PRC has worked during its Typhoon Haiyan operations.

Recommendations:

1. PRC to review the experience from COVID-19 cash responses. In addition, the Chapters with significant experience can be mapped and earmarked for CfR.
2. PRC to explore framework agreements with new FSPs and transport services.
3. Increase the cash grant amount to PHP5,000, in line with other agencies. The target number of beneficiary families must be adjusted accordingly.
4. **Transparency and community awareness**

In an earlier paragraph the importance of community awareness on the selection criteria was highlighted. The participation of community members in assessments and beneficiary selection is often limited to barangay officials. The wider community does not participate and does not know what kind of support may be provided.

The NFI recipients often only found out during distribution what they would receive, while the recipients of CfR learned about the cash support at the time of publicly posting the beneficiary list.

Provided that communities are aware of selection criteria; the consultant supports PRC’s approach of not giving them details on the kind of support PRC may provide. For one, the affected population usually have multiple needs and do gratefully accept what is being offered. Providing a list of options can raise expectations, while a response needs to be balanced with the available stocks. The logistical challenge in Leyte that led to the distribution of STKs in Southern Leyte rather than SDN also justifies the limited information provided to communities.

Secondly, the PRC is an auxiliary to the government, and not aiming to provide everything.

1. **Targets and M&E**

The MYA has output targets for the number of items to be purchased during the MYA. These targets have been met for the NFIs, as well as all the targets for the COVID-19 support in the first year of the MYA. The MYA does not have target number of beneficiaries, outcomes, or indicators. There was no adjustment made in the initial 18,000 beneficiaries of the MYA prior to the amendments.

The shared beneficiary master lists all have information gaps and SADDD is not systematically collected from beneficiaries. Data is most complete from communities where validation of potential beneficiaries is conducted by PRC.

The challenges in M&E that need to be addressed are:

* The revised beneficiary target numbers are unofficial and based on the number of 4,500 NFI kits (not the health kits and STKs) plus the 5,000 CfR beneficiaries, totalling 9,500. The COVID-19 response does not have a definition of what constitutes a beneficiary.
* The reporting on MYA does not provide SADDD. The available data collection tools do not generate all the information to make SADDD possible.
* The M&E is restricted to the reporting on the outputs, and no broader monitoring or reflection is documented in progress reports.
* PDM missions collect data in DFAT/PRC supported areas 6 months or longer after the actual distribution. The late data collection is subject to recall errors from the respondents.

The following opportunities exist to help improve practice:

* DFAT has developed summary sheets for the collection of SADDD beneficiary data from its partners. This is guided by the M&E framework of the RRAP investment.
* LGUs increasingly have information available on the number of PWDs, PLWS etcetera that Chapters can use in response planning.

Recommendations:

1. PRC to define and propose the target number of beneficiaries, disaggregated by sex, gender and disability both in their proposal (concept note) and project reporting. The existing data collection tools and methods need to be aligned with the DFAT reporting template. Quarterly and annual reports should include a summary and reflection on the implementation of DFAT support, including target vs actual number of beneficiaries with SADDD, and an updated stock inventory and its location.
2. The review of the requirement of PDMs for DFAT areas, and the utility versus timing. The utility can be different for NFI distribution which can be more immediate, than cash, for which the use and impact may be over a longer period after the distribution. The modality can also be discussed, for example the use of volunteers or staff to collect the data. Any required resources for a DFAT response specific PDM may be accommodated from the remaining COVID-19 funds.
3. Orientation of PRC and Chapters on different types of disabilities, ideally through the introduction of the short set of Washington Group of Questions-Short Set (WGQ-SS).[[19]](#footnote-19)
4. PRC to roll out the new sheet for utilization by all Chapters. The whole transition to be completed by the end of the MYA in 2024.
5. PRC to include simple beneficiary data analysis to the responsibility of the NPC.
6. The PRC departments, and in particular, DMS, to develop a filing system and accompanying protocols for staff. Considerations should be given to file documents according to response and document types relevant to the response.
7. PRC Chapters to regularly solicit from municipalities or the province demographics on the elderly, PWDs and PLWs. This secondary data can be used during needs assessments and provide more detailed information on potential beneficiary groups in concept notes.

*Long term:*

1. PRC to include budgets in future proposals for small PDM activities.
2. **PRC support services**

The provision of relief support to disaster affected communities requires the coordination and collaboration of numerous PRC staff, departments, and Chapters. It is established that affected communities are reached, and largely with the support they need. The consultations, however, also demonstrate a more positive picture of how key players see their own functioning, compared to how others perceive them. Warehousing and general logistics say they can quickly mobilize stocks and have all information available, are criticized for not being able to keep correct records. The BAC consistently takes twice as long to procure items than it say it does. None of the challenges have a significant impact on the implementation of MYA, other than potential expiring items.

The identified challenges among support services are:

* The management of inventories and providing information to the relevant departments. This has earlier been discussed, together with recommendations on [stock management.](#prepositioning206)
* The financial records are endorsed by senior management while they contain questionable charges against budget lines of the COVID-19 response.
* The response to Typhoon Rai identified challenges with non-operational vehicles. The MYA found that the maintenance of Food Trucks is charged against operations, rather than a fixed budget based on a regular maintenance schedule. The financial records of MYA suggest this is the same for the ambulances with other units charged to MYA.
* PRC staff at HQ and Chapters report having multiple responsibilities, increasing their work pressure. The ‘slashing’ as it is referred to is partially the result of unfilled vacancies.

Recommendations:

1. PRC and DFAT to discuss the acquittal of COVID-19 expenditures or whether the erroneous charges are to such an extent that a reversal of postings is required. The PRC has advocated for a part-time finance officer to support the MYA implementation, but in the previous 12 months all payments are payroll and benefit related. No large expenditures are expected anymore, but if reversals are still possible and required than a finance officer could be assigned and budgeted for a short period to make corrections.
2. PRC to make maintenance plans for all vehicles, including regular maintenance or check-ups after major operations to keep vehicles ready for immediate deployment.
3. **Gender Equality and Inclusion**

The MYA, and PRC’s early emergency responses in general, do not have institutionalized processes to promote gender equality. The selection of women, PLW, PWDs and other vulnerable groups varies per location and disaster.

The following challenges are identified:

* The lack of SADDD to illustrate gender equality. This point is further discussed under [Targets and M&E](#target212).
* The complexity of early emergency response and the limited interaction with beneficiaries. Aiming for changes in gender equality may be unrealistic.
* During the implementation of the MYA, there is no active interaction with organizations representing Women or PWDs.

Recommendations:

1. PRC Chapters to reach out to Women’s and PWD organizations. Practical and cost-effective approaches could be through the civil society members of the PDRRMC, and the MDRRMCs in areas with ongoing projects.

*Long term:*

1. Partnerships between DFAT and PRC to move from output-based to the inclusion of outcomes that describe a change in gender equality and disability inclusion. Strategies that are practical within an early response activity should be explored with PRC and possibly drawing on experiences from other organizations and countries.
2. **Safeguards, Climate Change and Disasters**

Both DFAT and PRC have safeguarding policies for the PSEAH and Child Protection. Environmental safeguards are less common, and DFAT and PRC have yet to establish how their organizations can reduce their impact on climate change and disasters.

Recommendation:

1. DFAT to explore at the principal level PRCs position on environmental awareness raising among its staff and how impact reducing strategies can be developed and rolled-out within the agency. This can include strategies to offset carbon emissions and opportunities to promote PRC as a ‘green’ organization.

*Long term:*

1. *DFAT* to support partners in the development of workplace and organizational policies on environment friendly operations. The support does not necessarily come from the Response and Recovery Assistance to the Philippines (RRAP) investment or HARD budgets. A modality can be outsourcing this to specialist facilitators/agencies.
2. **Risk Management**

The PRC has been a regular partner of DFAT since 2006 and complying with the basic requirements of DFAT. The MTR identifies the following challenges in regard to risk management:

* The COVID-19 operations are being scaled down, but PRC did not share a clear plan what will be done with the equipment or contingency plans for widespread reoccurrence of COVID-19.
* The level of transparency towards communities on selection processes and potential benefits. This is further discussed in the paragraph dedicated to [transparency](#transparency211).
* The suggestion of the participation of dignitaries being prioritized over the distribution of relief as soon as possible. This is discussed in an [earlier section](#first209dignataries).
* The poor information management, in particular stock inventories, giving wrong account of DFAT support in disasters. This is discussed in the earlier paragraph on [NFIs](#prepositioning206).
* The financial reporting and in particular the charging/bookkeeping is a concern, although it seems to primarily be in the context of a crisis situation.

Recommendations:

1. PRC to design in collaboration with the DOH contingency plans for COVID-19 management. Contingency plans should have clear steps on how current equipment is being stored and maintained, and how they can be quickly mobilized when needed.
2. DFAT to request from PRC an inventory of all the procured assets, including the MolLab equipment, laptops, desktops computers, air-conditioning units, and their assignment/location after the scaling down of the MolLab. The inventory will demonstrate the continuing benefits of the MYA to PRC after the closure of the MolLab.

## 4.2 Recommendations from stakeholders

1. The stakeholders consulted during the MTR made a number of suggestions, ranging from small requests to strategic changes in the DFAT support to PRC.

A number are already included in Section 4.1. The others are listed in this section with a reflection and observations from the consultant.

* Anticipatory Action/Forecast-based financing (FbF) – This was suggested by a number of external stakeholders. The PRC has been part of a pilot project, but staff looks back at it with mixed feelings. Typhoon Rai would have been a good occasion to activate the FbF. The triggers to justify the cash support were reached within the 72-hour timeframe before the land fall, but less than 72 hours is considered insufficient time to mobilize the anticipated support. The concerns of some government and PRC officials are that FbF would be 1) difficult to sustain by local authorities when handed over, and 2) Recipients of FbF becoming dependent and wider communities losing the common practice to harvest food and bring goods or animals to safety on their own initiative.
* Livelihoods – In several communities, the support to rehabilitate or develop livelihoods was mentioned was requested. The direct support to livelihoods would be beyond the scope of a MYA focussed on emergency relief. However, CfR through MPCG does provide people the option to use some of the cash for livelihoods purposes.
* Increasing CfR – There is an existing trend among relief agencies of increasing the CfR amount. It was recommended by stakeholders to increase the CfR amount, as well as increasing the ratio of cash recipients compared to that of NFIs. An increase theoretically may be possible, but needs to be approached carefully. The need for NFIs will continue to exist in areas with limited markets.
* Decentralize the prepositioning of NFIs – The consulted stakeholders recommend the decentralization of NFI prepositioning, supporting the direction among the MYA partner representatives and incorporated in the recommendations.
* Community members suggest the distribution of smaller kits, for example hygiene kits, with accompanying cash for the purchase of other items.
* Red Rose – The electronic platform Red Rose and supporting its roll out has been suggested. Based on the information shared during the MTR the use of the application is in a pilot phase, and it is too early to recommend inclusion of support to Red Rose in future agreements between PRC and DFAT.

# 5. Lessons learned

The following definition for lessons learned is used: *Generalizations based on evaluation experiences with projects, programs, or policies that abstract from the specific circumstances to broader situations. Frequently, lessons highlight strengths or weaknesses in preparation, design, and implementation that affect performance, outcome, and impact.*[[20]](#footnote-20)

1. The COVID-19 response has been described as one with a steep learning curve. PRC’s experience of rapidly responding to crisis situations translated to a quick formulation of proposals and actions to combat COVID-19. The experience also teaches several important lessons for future similar situations. The incorporation of this type of intervention in an existing agreement saves time, but in the future the following should be required:
   1. The establishment of appropriate management structures that do not comprise reporting and other obligations. Despite adding new components, no independent management structure should be allowed. One coordinator should oversee the whole operation and agreement.
   2. The inclusion of adequate human resources – additional staff needs to be added as required, including finance and administrative staff commensurate to the activities and volume of expected transactions.
   3. Ensuring the reporting and management systems are in place when amendments take affect and new activities start.
2. The consulted stakeholders were asked what for them were lessons learned from the MYA. The responses are not all MYA specific, and a number are already considered or presented in other areas of this report. They are as follows:

* The CTP needs to have more FSP options, and framework agreements with PayMaya and GCash need to be renewed as soon as possible to avoid as much as possible the use of cash in envelope as the mode of delivery.
* The cash in envelope modality may need to deploy again in future circumstances. The CTP needs to have sufficient people deployed when cash in envelope is used. The amount that can be withdrawn by each Chapter staff is limited. The Cebu distribution was possible because COVID-19 cash distribution had ended, so the Chapter had the experience.
* The prepositioning in Cagayan de Oro has helped the response in Mindanao and prepositioning in a broader distribution of Chapters/warehouse need to be established. It is however also learned from the past that warehouse management is not necessarily a strength and priority of Chapters.
* The experience of non-operational trucks during Typhoon Rai led to an increased openness to contract with service providers. Rental companies should be part of preparing for a disaster response.

# Annex A: Synthesis process

**Introduction**

The analysis and synthesis of findings is often considered a weakness of evaluations. In particular the merger of data from mixed methods, qualitative and quantitative, is often subjective, rather than done systematically.

This document provides the outline for the synthesis of the review findings. The presented standards are established before the analysis of the collected data.

A number of key questions for the Relevance, Effectiveness, Efficiency and Sustainability criteria, can be considered subdimensions, which can be rated individually on performance. The synthesis presented in this process will help to determine the merit (quality) ratings for these subdimensions, and consequently for each OECD criteria.

The following are presented:

* The subdimensions under each of the OECD criteria. Additional subdimensions are provided in response to priorities like measuring results beyond outcomes.
* Rubrics and procedures for determining merit ratings for each of the subdimensions. These are aligned with the six performance levels in DFAT’s Final Aid Quality Check (FAQC).
* The process to determine merit ratings for the performance for each of the criteria.

The matrix consists of the following 6 performance levels:

| **Score** | **Ratings Matrix** | Merit rating |
| --- | --- | --- |
| **6** | Very good | Satisfactory |
| **5** | Good | Satisfactory |
| **4** | Adequate | Satisfactory |
| **3** | Less than adequate | Unsatisfactory |
| **2** | Poor | Unsatisfactory |
| **1** | Very poor | Unsatisfactory |

**Subdimensions under the evaluation criteria**

The OECD criteria, Key Priority Policies, and their subdimensions that are provided with a rating in this MTR are provided in the table below.

| **Criteria/KPP** | **Subdimension** |
| --- | --- |
| Relevance | * Relevance of the MYA to the government * Adequacy of needs analysis * Relevance of distributed goods to recipients * Appropriateness of cash distribution * Timeliness of distribution versus needs (Rating: Poor) * Importance of purchased vehicles – Food Truck and ambulance * Contribution of molecular laboratory to COVID-19 management |
| Coherence | * The MYA complementing other relief efforts * Added value of MYA compared to other relief |
| Effectiveness | * Delivering planned prepositioning outputs * Speed of mobilising prepositioned items * Delivering planned COVID-19 outputs * Impact of COVID-19 outputs * Effectiveness of logistical support * Compliance with CTP guidelines * Quality of reports * Effectiveness of M&E * Unintended results/consequences |
| Efficiency | * Efficiency of coordination between PRC and DFAT * Level of transparency and participation of potential beneficiaries * Delivering outputs as planned * Utilization of assets * Procurement and financial management supporting timely and quality implementation * Cost-effectiveness of purchased NFIs and assets |
| Sustainability | * Maintenance of assets * Quality of distributed items |
| Gender Equality | * Collection and utilization of SADDD during MYA * Adequacy and quality of SADDD analysis * Participation of women and women’s rights organizations * Participation of relevant NGAs in MYA * Staff capacity in gender analysis and planning * Impact MYA on gender equality |
| Disability inclusion | * Understanding of needs of PWDs in MYA response operations * Representativeness of different types of disabilities among MYA beneficiaries * Participation of PWDS in MYA implementation * Participation of NGAs representing PWDs in MYA planning and implementation |
| Risk Management | * Adequacy of updating of risk register * Robustness of risk management * Level of participation of stakeholders in risk management |
| Environmental and Social Safeguards | * DFAT compliance with safeguards * Adequacy of safeguarding by PRC (in early response actions) |
| Climate Change and Disasters | * Extent of identification of Climate Change and Disaster Associated risks * Effective Management of Climate Change and Disaster Associated risks |

**Merit rating for subdimensions**

The table below provides the merit rating for qualitative data. The table merges the 6 ratings of the FAQC with a rubric of Davidson (2005).

| **Score** | **Merit Rating** | **Description** |
| --- | --- | --- |
| **1** | Very good | Evidence of very strong performance; positive feedback from all consulted sources. No weaknesses were identified. |
| **2** | Good | Evidence of a strong performance; predominantly positive comments. No weaknesses, or a few weaknesses without real consequences. |
| **3** | Adequate | Evidence of noticeable positive performance; more than half of sources suggest a positive performance. Only a few weaknesses identified with serious impact on performance. |
| **4** | Less than adequate | A mix of positive and negative comments. Inconsistent comments across the sources of information, and the different locations. Sources highlight a number of weaknesses with a serious impact on performance. |
| **5** | Poor | Clear evidence of unsatisfactory performance. Findings are predominantly negative, or partial weak evidence. Many weaknesses are identified. |
| **6** | Very poor | No positive evidence found, or predominantly weak evidence. |

The quantitative data collected through surveys and interviews are predominantly through the use of Likert scales of four or five points. Some include an ‘I do not know’ response option and are excluded from analysis. The other choice options will be converted in numerical values, for example with a five-point scale: Strongly agree = 5, Agree = 4, Neutral = 3, Disagree =2, and Strongly Disagree = 1. In the used 6-point scale the lowest rating will be scored as ‘0’.

The average value of the responses will be calculated, and merit ratings assigned as per table below.

| **Merit Rating** | **Average of 5-point or 6-point Likert scale** |
| --- | --- |
| Very good |  |
| Good |  |
| Adequate |  |
| Less than adequate |  |
| Poor |  |
| Very poor |  |

**Procedure of setting merit ratings for subdimensions**

*For qualitative data only*

* Review the data/evidence collected and assign the appropriate merit rating

*For quantitative data only*

* Compare the analysed data with the merit ratings and identify the associated merit rating

*For quantitative and qualitative data*

* Assign the merit ratings for quantitative data
* Assign the merit rating for qualitative data
* If they are the same, then that is the final merit rating
* If the qualitative merit rating is higher than that of the quantitative, then the overall merit rating will go up, but a maximum of 1 level.
* If the qualitative merit rating is lower than that of the quantitative, then the overall merit rating will go down, but a maximum of 1 level.

In an equal number of subdimensions the lower rating will be applied.

**Merit rating matrix for dimensions**

The merit rating matrix below is valid for all dimensions. The table is adapted from Davidson (2005).

| **Dimensional rating** | ***Median subdimension rating*** | ***Subdimensions below ‘Good’*** | ***Subdimensions below ‘Adequate’*** |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |
| Very good | Very good | 0 | 0 |
| Good | Good or higher | >0 and < 1/3 | 0 |
| Adequate | Adequate or higher | (No restrictions) | >0 and < 1/3 |
| Less than adequate | Less than adequate or higher | (No restrictions) | (No restrictions) |
| Poor | Poor or higher | (No restrictions) | (No restrictions) |
| Very poor | Very poor | (No restrictions) | (No restrictions) |

Note: Conditions in all three columns must be met to receive the corresponding rating.

**Additional considerations**

In the case of unreconcilable or severely conflicting data sources this will be in the narrative. This will include the justification if any of the data is used in the synthesis.

If all data for a subdimension is considered unreliable or insufficient, then the subdimension will be excluded from establishing the overall merit rating.

The review included a number of questions that will not be given a merit rating, but a narrative of the findings will be included in the evaluation report.

References

Davidson, E.J. (2005). *Evaluation Methodology Basics: The Nuts and Bolts of Sound Evaluation*. Los Angeles, California: SAGE.

# Annex B: Summary Survey results

This Annex provides extracts of data from the survey among Chapter staff. The survey was self-administrated and participation was voluntary. The survey was shared to Chapter Administrators and/or DMS coordinators who were asked to forward it to other staff members and volunteers.

Background respondents

|  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- |
| **Table 1: Gender of respondents** | **N =16** | **Percentage** |
| Male | 8 | 50% |
| Female | 8 | 50% |
| Prefer not to say | 0 | 0% |

|  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- |
| **Table 2: Year when joining PRC** | **N = 16** | **Percentage** |
| 2020 onwards | 7 | 44% |
| 2015 - 2019 | 4 | 25% |
| Before 2015 | 5 | 31% |

|  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- |
| **Table 3: Source of (hearing about) survey** | **N = 16** | **Percentage** |
| PRC-HQ | 2 | 13% |
| Chapter administrator | 4 | 25% |
| PRC Colleague | 4 | 25% |
| Mid-Term Review Consultant | 4 | 25% |
| DFAT | 2 | 13% |

|  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- |
| **Table 4: Department/function of respondents** | **N = 16** | **Percentage** |
| Disaster Management Services | 5 | 31% |
| Safety Services | 1 | 6% |
| Health Services | 1 | 6% |
| Social Services | 1 | 6% |
| Red Cross Youth and Volunteer Services | 1 | 6% |
| Financial and Administrative Services | 1 | 6% |
| Volunteer | 6 | 38% |
| Other - Administrator | 1 | 6% |
| One person added two functions in the ‘other’ section | 17 |  |

|  |  |
| --- | --- |
| **Table 5: Responsibilities during disaster response** | **N = 14** |
| Pre-disaster assessment | 43% |
| Post-disaster assessment | 71% |
| Coordination with DSWD or LGUs | 36% |
| Coordination with other relief organizations | 43% |
| Beneficiary orientation | 43% |
| Beneficiary selection | 43% |
| Procurement of NFIs | 29% |
| Transportation of NFIs | 43% |
| Distribution of NFI or Cash | 79% |
| Supervision of NFI or Cash distribution | 64% |
| Exit survey | 29% |
| Post Disaster Monitoring | 50% |

**Table 6: Extent that respondent agrees with statements**

Notes:

1 - The N differs because not all questions were asked to all respondents and ‘I do not know’ responses are excluded from calculating the score.

2 - The third column recalculates the degree of agreement into an average score. For most score statements it is: Strongly agree = 5, Agree = 5, etc.

3 – The scoring of statement 7 and 12 is in reverse

|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
| Statement | N | Score for merit rating | Strongly Agree | Agree | Neither agree or disagree | Disagree | Strongly Disagree | I do not know |
| 1. The distributed NFIs/Kits were of very good quality | 13 | 4.5 | 62% | 23% | 15% | 0% | 0% | 0% |
| 2. We were able to distribute what the families needed. | 13 | 4.5 | 54% | 46% | 0% | 0% | 0% | 0% |
| 3. The delivery of the relief items from warehouses to the Chapter was on time | 13 | 4.3 | 46% | 38% | 15% | 0% | 0% | 0% |
| 4. The Chapter was able to include all affected families with persons with disabilities | 13 | 4.4 | 38% | 62% | 0% | 0% | 0% | 0% |
| 5. The coordination with the national and local governments was good | 13 | 4.4 | 46% | 46% | 8% | 0% | 0% | 0% |
| 6. Affected communities were informed about the available types of relief support, including cash and the type of NFIs/kits | 13 | 4.4 | 54% | 38% | 0% | 8% | 0% | 0% |
| 7. The families receiving NFIs and/or kits should have received cash. | 13 | 3.2 | 8% | 31% | 8% | 46% | 8% | 0% |
| 8.The distribution of the relief was when the beneficiaries needed it most. | 13 | 4.1 | 23% | 62% | 15% | 0% | 0% | 0% |
| 9.All the selected families were from PRC’s priority vulnerable groups | 13 | 4.3 | 38% | 54% | 8% | 0% | 0% | 0% |
| 10. The quality of NFIs of DFAT is the same as those from PRC or other donors. | 13 | 4.2 | 38% | 46% | 8% | 8% | 0% | 0% |
| 11. The same selection process is used for DFAT beneficiaries and other beneficiaries. | 12 | 4.3 | 31% | 54% | 8% | 0% | 0% | 8% |
| 12. Inclusion of a community/barangay to receive relief support depends on accessibility. | 13 | 3.9 | 15% | 62% | 23% | 0% | 0% | 0% |
| 13. Community members were informed about the beneficiary selection criteria and process. | 13 | 4.6 | 69% | 23% | 8% | 0% | 0% | 0% |
| 14. All beneficiaries in a barangay agreed on the kind of support from PRC. | 13 | 4.5 | 54% | 38% | 8% | 0% | 0% | 0% |
| 15. Women participate in identifying their family needs after a calamity. | 13 | 4.5 | 54% | 38% | 8% | 0% | 0% | 0% |
| 16. People with disabilities participate in the identification of family needs after a calamity. | 13 | 3.8 | 38% | 15% | 23% | 15% | 0% | 8% |
| 17. Women’s rights organizations participate in the identification of community needs after a calamity. | 13 | 4.3 | 46% | 38% | 15% | 0% | 0% | 0% |
| 18. Organizations representing People with Disability participate in the identification of relief needs. | 13 | 4.1 | 31% | 54% | 8% | 8% | 0% | 0% |
| 19. The Chapter has the right technical capacity for a disaster response | 10 | 4.6 | 60% | 40% | 0% | 0% | 0% | 0% |
| 20. The Chapter has sufficient number of staff for a disaster response | 10 | 4.2 | 50% | 30% | 10% | 10% | 0% | 0% |

**Table 7:Survey respondents engaged in the Food Truck deployment and their degree of agreement with statements (N=2)**

|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
| **Statement** | **Strongly Agree** | **Agree** | **Neither agree nor disagree** | **Dis-agree** | **Strongly Disagree** | **I do not know** |
| 1. The meals were provided to people who most needed it. | 100% | 0% | 0% | 0% | 0% | 0% |
| 2. The Chapter had sufficient resources to provide the number of meals it wanted to prepare. | 0% | 100% | 0% | 0% | 0% | 0% |
| 3. The provided meals are nutritious. | 100% | 0% | 0% | 0% | 0% | 0% |
| 4. Only vulnerable people were provided with free meals. | 50% | 50% | 0% | 0% | 0% | 0% |
| 5. The location of the food truck was easy to access by the people who needed the meals. | 100% | 0% | 0% | 0% | 0% | 0% |
| 6. The meals were provided to people that were not able to cook meals for themselves. | 50% | 0% | 50% | 0% | 0% | 0% |
| 7. Everyone who asked was provided with a meal | 50% | 0% | 50% | 0% | 0% | 0% |
| 8. Individuals could get as many meals as they wanted. | 0% | 50% | 50% | 0% | 0% | 0% |
| 9. The Chapter recorded details of the recipient of meals(s) and their family members. | 0% | 50% | 50% | 0% | 0% | 0% |
| 10. Calamity victims were informed about the location and operation hours of the food truck. | 100% | 0% | 0% | 0% | 0% | 0% |

**Table 8: Social and Environmental safeguarding – Status in office environment as by survey respondents and merit ratings**

|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
|  | Preventing sexual abuse and harassment during relief operations | Preventing child abuse | Reducing waste in our operations | Minimize the use of fossil fuels during operations | Protection of indigenous people's rights | Men and women are treated with equal respect in our office. | Men and women receive the same training in our office. |
| Very good | 56% | 63% | 44% | 31% | 50% | 56% | 44% |
| Good | 25% | 25% | 38% | 44% | 31% | 25% | 38% |
| Adequate | 13% | 13% | 19% | 13% | 6% | 19% | 13% |
| Less than adequate | 0% | 0% | 0% | 13% | 0% | 0% | 0% |
| Poor | 0% | 0% | 0% | 0% | 0% | 0% | 6% |
| Very poor | 0% | 0% | 0% | 0% | 0% | 0% | 0% |
| I do not know | 0% | 0% | 0% | 0% | 6% | 0% | 0% |
| I prefer not to respond | 6% | 0% | 0% | 0% | 6% | 0% | 0% |
| Average merit score | 4.5 | 4.5 | 4.3 | 3.9 | 4.5 | 4.4 | 4.1 |
| Male | 4.3 | 4.5 | 4.0 | 3.6 | 4.4 | 4.3 | 3.9 |
| Female | 4.7 | 4.5 | 4.5 | 4.3 | 4.6 | 4.5 | 4.4 |
| N for merit scoring (Only Very good – Very poor are used) | 15 | 16 | 16 | 16 | 14 | 16 | 16 |

**Table 9: Level of knowledge of respondents on CPPs and Gender**

|  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
| **Policy/topic** | **N** | **A lot** | **Very little** | **None** |
| PRC CPP | 16 | 63% | 38% | 0% |
| DFAT CPP | 16 | 38% | 50% | 13% |
| Gender equality | 11 | 45% | 45% | 9% |
| Gender analysis | 11 | 27% | 55% | 18% |

**Table 10: Survey respondents with and without training in safeguarding and gender equality**

|  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |
| **Type of training** | **N** | **Yes** | **No** |
| PSEAH | 16 | 75% | 25% |
| Child Protection | 16 | 75% | 25% |
| Gender equality | 11 | 45% | 55% |
| Gender analysis | 11 | 27% | 73% |

# Annex C: Conducted consultations

| **Date** | **Activity** | **Location** | **Participants Male** | **Participants Female** | **PWD Participants Male** | **PWD Participants Female** | **Total** |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
| 25 Oct | Interview PRC NPC | Virtual | 0 | 1 | 0 | 0 | 1 |
| 26 Oct | Interview PRC BAC | Virtual | 1 | 1 | 0 | 0 | 2 |
| 26 Oct | Interview PRC – Finance | Virtual | 0 | 1 | 0 | 0 | 1 |
| 26 Oct | Interview PRC – WASH; Fleet and Warehousing | Virtual | 1 | 2 | 0 | 0 | 3 |
| 7 Nov | Interview MSWDO San Pablo | Municipal Hall | 0 | 2 | 0 | 0 | 2 |
| 7 Nov | FGD NFI recipients | Barangay Hall Auitan, San Pablo | 5 | 9 | 0 | 0 | 14 |
| 7 Nov | Barangay Councillors | Barangay Hall Auitan | 0 | 2 | 0 | 0 | 2 |
| 7 Nov | Beneficiary interview | Barangay Hall Auitan | 0 | 1 | 0 | 0 | 1 |
| 8 Nov | FGD NFI recipients | House BHW – Capitol Hill, Ilagan City | 7 | 8 | 0 | 0 | 15 |
| 8 Nov | Barangay Councillors | Barangay Hall, Alibagu | 1 | 2 | 0 | 0 | 3 |
| 8 Nov | PRC Chapter staff Isabela | Chapter office | 5 | 3 | 0 | 0 | 8 |
| 10 Nov | Interview Mayor/MDRRMO/ MSWDO | Mayor’s office | 2 | 1 | 0 | 0 | 3 |
| 10 Nov | FGD Barangay Council Son-ok II | Barangay Hall | 4 | 2 | 0 | 0 | 6 |
| 10 Nov | FGD NFI recipients | Barangay Hall | 4 | 5 | 0 | 0 | 9 |
| 10 Nov | FGD single parents | Barangay Hall | 1 | 2 | 0 | 0 | 3 |
| 10 Nov | FGD PWDs | Barangay Hall | 0 | 0 | 2 | 1 | 3 |
| 17 Nov | DFAT | Virtual | 1 | 2 | 0 | 0 | 3 |
| 23 Nov | PRCHQ - Health | Virtual | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 |
| 23 Nov | PRCHQ - WASH PRCHQ – Molecular Lab | Virtual | 1 | 1 | 0 | 0 | 2 |
| 24 Nov | Interview Chapter Administrator (CA) Cebu | Chapter office | 0 | 1 | 0 | 0 | 1 |
| 24 Nov | FGD Chapter staff and volunteers | Chapter office | 2 | 2 | 0 | 0 | 4 |
| 24 Nov | Interview Barangay Captain | Barangay Hall | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 |
| 25 Nov | FGD Inayawan | Purok Sari Sari store | 0 | 5 | 0 | 0 | 5 |
| 25 Nov | FGD Inayawan | Barangay Hall | 1 | 4 | 0 | 0 | 5 |
| 25 Nov | FGD Jagobiao | Barangay Hall | 4 | 11 | 0 | 0 | 15 |
| 25 Nov | Interview PWD | Barangay Hall/Residence | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 |
| 28 Nov | Interview Oxfam | Virtual | 0 | 1 | 0 | 0 | 1 |
| 29 Nov | Discussion Warehouse staff | Mandaluyong warehouse | 2 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 2 |
| 1 Dec | Interview MDRRMO Baras | MDRRMO office | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 |
| 1 Dec | Interview Barangay Captain | Evacuation centre - Barangay Tilod | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 |
| 1 Dec | FGD NFI recipients | Evacuation centre - Barangay Tilod | 6 | 7 | 0 | 0 | 13 |
| 1 Dec | Interview senior recipients | Residence | 1 | 1 | 0 | 0 | 2 |
| 2 Dec | FGD NFI recipients | Barangay Hall Palta, Virac | 0 | 12 | 0 | 0 | 12 |
| 2 Dec | Interview family with PWD | Residence | 1 | 2 | 0 | 0 | 3 |
| 2 Dec | Interview single mother | Residence | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 |
| 2 Dec | Interview CA Cebu | Chapter office | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 |
| 2 Dec | FGD Chapter staff and volunteers | Chapter office | 2 | 2 | 0 | 0 | 4 |
| 6 Dec | Interview CA | Chapter office | 0 | 1 | 0 | 0 | 1 |
| 6 Dec | Interview Barangay Captain Punta Bilar | Chapter office | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 |
| 6 Dec | Interview PDAO | PDAO office | 0 | 1 | 0 | 0 | 1 |
| 7 Dec | FGD NFI recipients | Barangay Hall Punta Bilar | 6 | 10 | 0 | 1 | 17 |
| 7 Dec | Visit family with PWD | Residence | 1 | 0 | 0 | 1 | 2 |
| 7 Dec | Interview NFI recipients | Residence | 1 | 1 | 0 | 0 | 2 |
| 7 Dec | FGD Chapter staff and volunteers | Chapter office | 1 | 4 | 0 | 0 | 5 |
| 9 Dec | CA Southern Leyte | Virtual | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 |
| 13 Dec | Interviews DMS staff and management | Virtual | 2 | 1 | 0 | 0 | 3 |
| 15 Dec | Interview OCHA representative | Virtual | 0 | 1 | 0 | 0 | 1 |
| 15 Dec | Interview GRC representative | Virtual | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 |
| 15 Dec | Interview ICRC representative | Virtual | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 |
| 21 Dec | PRCHQ - Logistics | Virtual | 0 | 1 | 0 | 0 | 1 |
| 4 Jan | PDAO President Baras, Catanduanes | Phone | 0 | 0 | 1 | 0 | 1 |
| 6 Jan | CDRRMO Surigao City | Virtual | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 |
| 7 Jan | PRCHQ Welfare Services | Virtual | 0 | 1 | 0 | 0 | 1 |

# Annex D: Review Matrix

The review matrix in this annex is the version as per the inception report and is used to design interview templates. A number of the original subdimension have been removed or merged. The final subdimensions are in the narrative, and summarized as part of the Synthesis method presented in Annex A.

1. Relevance

To what degree was DFAT response programming relevant and appropriate, in terms of i) timeliness and the ii) changing needs and context?

| **Key Review Questions** | **Sub-criterion** | **Detailed review questions** | **Sources of information** | **Method/Tool** |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
| 1.1 How relevant and appropriate was the assistance provided by PRC from the perspective of the Philippine Government [national government agencies (NGA) and local government units (LGU)]? | Relevance of MYA to the government  Advantageousness of PRC/DFAT support | 1.1.1 What are the NGA/LGU relief programs providing support to victims of calamities?  1.1.2 What advantages/disadvantages does the PRC/DFAT support have compared to that of NGAs and LGUs? | * Documents and other publications * DSWD-DRMB * Project proposal * DSWD-DRMB * PRC-HQ - DMS * DFAT * Cash and NFI Cluster Working group (CWG) members | * Document review * Internet search * Interview |
| 1.2a How relevant and appropriate was the assistance provided by PRC from the perspective of affected communities? | Adequacy of needs analysis  Relevance of distributed goods to recipients | 1.2.1 How were the needs of vulnerable families exposed to a disaster identified?  1.2.2 To what extent were the distributed NFIs needed by vulnerable families? | * PRC-HQ - DMS * PRC-Chapters * Barangay Captain * Market and needs assessment reports (ILO, OCHA, PRC, WFP, Cash Working Group etc) * NFI recipients * Barangay captain | * Interview/Focus Group Discussion (FGD) * Document review * FGD * Interview * Case studies (family level) |
| 1.2b To what extent do DFAT funded activities reflect needs and priorities of the affected communities? | Appropriateness of cash distribution | 1.2.3 How appropriate was cash transfer programming (CTP) in the response to Odette? Where people able to purchase what they needed?  1.2.4 Beyond the conditions of the markets, what were the driving factors in deciding to provide NFI and/or cash support? | * Market and needs assessment reports (ILO, OCHA, PRC, WFP, Cash Working Group etc) * Cash recipients * Barangay captain * PRC Chapter staff * PRC-HQ DMS * DFAT * LGUs * MSWDOs * MDRRMOs * DSWD regional office * PRC-HQ DMS * PRC-Chapters | * Document review * FGD * Interview * Online Survey * Interview/Focus Group Discussion (FGD) * Thematic case study on cash transfer experience * Interview/FGD |
| 1.3 Was aid delivered at a time that it was most needed by the beneficiaries? | Speed of prepositioning | 1.3.1 Where are DFAT supported items stored? When are items prepositioned in areas potentially affected by disasters?  1.3.2 How long does it take to move items to key regions in pre and post disaster times? | * Warehouse inventories * PRC-HQ DMS * PRC-Chapters | * Document review * Interview/FGD |
| 1.4 How important were the assets in achieving PRC’s objectives? | Importance of Food Truck  Importance of ambulance  Contribution of molecular laboratory (ML) to COVID-19 management | 1.4.1 Why was the Food Truck important? What is the uniqueness of the Food Truck purchased by DFAT support?  1.4.2 Why was the pressurized ambulance important? What makes the DFAT supported ambulance unique?  1.4.3 How did the molecular laboratory (ML) contribute to combatting the COVID-19 pandemic in the Philippines? | * COVID-19 Response proposal * PRC-HQ Welfare services * PRC-Chapters (Batangas, Rizal) * LGUs (e.g., Nasugbu) * MSWDO * PRC-HQ Health Services/WASH * DFAT * PRC-HQ Health Services/WASH * DFAT * DOH | * Document review * (Phone) Interviews * Thematic case study? * Interview |

2. Coherence/ Connectedness (OECD/RRAP MEF)

| **Key Review Questions** | **Sub-criterion** | **Detailed review questions** | **Sources of information** | **Method/Tool** |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
| 2.1 To what extent did the assistance support the Philippine Government in responding to disasters and emergencies? | Complementation  Added value of MYA compared to other relief | 2.1.1. How do the provided NFIs and cash align/compare with that of the NGA and LGU relief programs?  2.1.2 What gaps in support did the PRC/DFAT fill?  2.1.3 What was the added value of PRC’s support? What makes the PRC support important? | * Project proposal * DSWD-DRMB * NDRRMC * PRC-HQ - DMS * OCHA/Oxfam * MSWDO | * Document review * Interview |

3. Effectiveness (AQC)

Was Australia’s humanitarian assistance (prepositioning arrangement and COVID-19 response) through PRC appropriate, timely and effective?

| **Key Review Questions** | **Sub-criterion** | **Detailed review questions** | **Sources of information** | **Method/Tool** |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
| 3.1 What were the most significant results achieved by Australia’s multi-year prepositioning arrangement? | Delivering planned prepositioning outputs | 3.1.1 What are the expected objectives, outputs, and outcomes of MYA?  3.1.2 Did PRC achieve the expected results at the activity level? Is each activity on-track to meet its outcomes and objectives?  3.1.3 To date, how many NFIs/kits have been distributed, and how many are in storage?  3.1.4 How do the outputs compare with the original agreement and subsequent work and financial plans?  Why were changes made if any? | * Project proposal * Logical framework/intervention logic * Work and financial plans * Warehouse inventories * Distribution reports/database | * Document review * Data analysis |
| 3.2 What were the most significant results achieved by Australia’s COVID-19 response with PRC during the relevant period? | Delivering planned COVID-19 outputs  Impact of COVID-19 outputs | 3.2.1 What were the planned activities and outputs?  3.2.2 To what extent were the planned outputs met?  3.2.3 What was the likely impact of the COVID-19 response? Or what impact did the support contribute to? | * Proposal * Work and Financial Plans * Progress reports * PRC-HQ DMS * PRC-Chapters * PRC -HQ Health Services * DFAT * DOH | * Document review * Interview/FGD * Interviews |

3.3 Was PRC-MYA able to timely procure quality items?

|  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |
| **Sub-criterion** | **Detailed review questions** | **Sources of information** | **Method/Tool** |
| Sphere standard compliance | 3.3.1 To what extent is PRC able to deliver items according to Sphere Standards? | * Sphere and PRC guidelines * Project proposal and progress documentation | * Document review |
| Compliance with PRC NFI standards | 3.3.2 To what extent is PRC able to deliver items according to PRC internal standards? | * PRC-HQ – BAC * PRC-HQ – DMS | * Interview |
| Effective procurement | 3.3.3 What are processes and mechanisms that help or hamper procurement?  3.3.4 What challenges, if any, exist to procure good quality items?  3.3.5 To what extent is procurement localized? | * PRC-HQ – BAC * PRC-HQ – DMS * PRC Chapters | * Interview/FGD * Survey |
| Quality of prepositioned items | 3.3.6 Are items of expected quality? | * NFI recipients * Barangay captain * Observation * Warehouse manager(s) | * Interview/FGD * Warehouse visit/Phone interview |
| Compliance with CTP guidelines | 3.3.7 How well does PRC comply with internal and externally agreed timelines for delivering cash?  3.3.8 What are processes and mechanisms that help or hamper timely delivery?  3.3.9 Were there any avoidable delays? (from MEFP) | * PRC CTP guidelines * PRC-HQ – DMS * PRC-HQ – Cash group * PRC Chapters * Cash Cluster Working group members * NFI recipients * Barangay captain | * Document review * Interviews * FGD * Interview |

| **Key Review Questions** | **Sub-criterion** | **Detailed review questions** | **Sources of information** | **Method/Tool** |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
| 3.4 Are the results of the investment/activity appropriately and regularly reported to DFAT? | Compliance with reporting requirements  Quality of reports | 3.4.1 What are the type of reports PRC is committed to provide?  What is the agreed, and actual frequency of submission to DFAT?  3.4.2 Are the reports accurate?  Do reports include the results in sufficient clarity and detail? | * Project Proposal * Progress reports/AQCs * DFAT * PRC-HQ - DMS | * Document review * Interview |
| 3.5 Were there any unintended consequences and impacts (positive or negative) as a result of our assistance? | Unintended results/consequences  (This may not be provided with a rating) | 3.5.1 What, if any, are unintended positive consequences as a result of the aid delivery?  3.5.2 What, if any, are unintended negative consequences as a result of the aid delivery?  3.5.3 What, if any, are unintended positive consequences as a result of the COVID-19 response?  3.5.4 What, if any, are unintended negative consequences as a result of the COVID-19 response? | * All stakeholders and documentation | * Interviews/FGD * Document review |

4.Efficiency (AQC)

Is our humanitarian response with PRC efficient and well managed?

| **Key Review Questions** | **Sub-criterion** | **Detailed review questions** | **Sources of information** | **Method/Tool** |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
| 4.1 Could the information that flows to and from delivery partners be strengthened? | Efficiency of communication between PRC and DFAT | 4.1.1 What are the current communication channels? What are the strengths and weaknesses in the channels?  4.1.2 Are DFAT and PRC documenting key decisions and delivery outputs? | * PRC-HQ – DMS * DFAT * Progress documentation | * Interviews * Document review |
| 4.2 How well informed where communities/beneficiaries about the selection and distribution process? | Level of transparency towards potential beneficiaries  Participation of community members in beneficiary selection  Participation of community members in identification and selection of support from MYA | 4.2.1 What information was shared to (potential) beneficiaries with regards to:   * Selection criteria * Selection process * Types of assistance * Monitoring of distribution   4.2.2 What was the role, if any, of community members in the selection of beneficiaries?  4.2.3 What was the role, if any, of community members in the selection of type of assistance? | * PRC-HQ – DMS * PRC Chapters * MSDWO * NFI/Cash recipients * Barangay captain * Chapter staff | * Interview/FGD * FGD * Interview * Online survey (Chapter staff) |
| 4.3 Is PRC managing the implementation of funded activities well, including keeping to agreed output delivery schedules? | Delivering outputs as planned | 4.3.1 What are the original and revised work and financial plans?  4.3.2 To what extent is MYA able to timely deliver the outputs in prepositioning?  4.3.3 To what extent is MYA able to timely deliver the outputs of the COVID-19 response?  4.3.4 What are factors that supported/hampered compliance with the work and financial plan? | * Project proposals * Progress reports * Logical framework/intervention logic * Work and financial plans * Warehouse inventories * Distribution reports/database * PRC-HQ - DMS * DFAT | * Document review * Data analysis * Interview |
| 4.4 Were the outputs achieved at least cost for the expected level of quality? | Price competitiveness of purchased NFIs and assets (ML, ambulance, Food Truck)  Quality of items | 4.4.1 What measures are delivery partners taking to ensure cost efficiency (in relation to inputs and activities) and cost- effectiveness (in relation to results)?  4.4.2 Are there opportunities to achieve a similar result more efficiently and/or at reduced cost by using new or alternative processes, practices, or technologies?  4.4.3 How do stakeholders perceive the quality of the NFIs? How durable are the items? | * PRC-HQ - DMS * PRC-HQ - BAC * PRC-HQ – Finance * Project documentation * Cluster Working group chairs (cash, CCCM, NFIs) * Suppliers * NFI recipients * Barangay captain | * Interview * Document review * FGD * Interview |
| 4.5 How well did the PRC procurement and financial management systems support timely and quality program implementation? | Effective support systems  Cost-effectiveness of Cash Transfer Programming (CTP) | 4.5.1 To what extent are PRC systems supporting timely implementation of the MYA? What are helping/hampering factors in delivering NFIs or cash?  4.5.2 How do PRC systems guarantee the quality of NFIs?  4.5.3 How could systems be improved?  4.5.4 How cost-effective is the CTP? What are the service fees of the Financial Services Providers?  4.5.5 How does the cost of CTP compare to other cash transfer interventions in the Philippines under similar conditions? | * PRC-HQ - DMS * PRC-HQ - BAC * PRC-HQ – Finance * Project documentation * Suppliers * Members Cash Working Group (OCHA/Oxfam) | * Interview * Document review |
| 4.6 How appropriate were the staffing levels within DFAT and PRC? | Adequacy of PRC staffing for MYA  Adequacy of DFAT staffing for MYA | 4.6.1 What were the numbers (or Level of Effort) of staff allocated to the MYA? How, if at all, does this fluctuate over time, for example when there is a calamity?  4.6.2 How consistent is the allocation of staff in terms of staff turnover and permanent occupancy of positions?  4.6.3 What evidence is there that the number is sufficient/too few/too many?  4.6.4 Do the allocated staff have the required competency? | * PRC-HQ – DMS * PRC-HQ – HR * PRC Chapter Administrator * DFAT * Chapter staff * PRC-HQ – DMS | * Interview/FGD * Document review * Online survey |

5. Gender Equality (AQC)

| **Key Review Questions** | **Sub-criterion** | **Detailed review questions** | **Sources of information** | **Method/Tool** |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
| 5.1 Is the M&E system generating robust information that collects comprehensive sex-disaggregated data and uses gender indicators, which is analysed and used to drive improvement and learning? | Collection of SADDD during MYA  Adequacy and quality of SADDD analysis  The use of SADDD data and reports for learning | 5.1.1 What are the gender related indicators included in MYA’s local framework or intervention logic?  5.1.2 Does PRC collect SADDD?  5.1.3 What gaps exist in the M&E system in general, and specifically to the collection of SADDD beneficiary data?  5.1.4 To what extent are pregnant and lactating women represented in the data?  5.1.5 How is data analysed and synthesized?  5.1.6 What is the data used for?  5.1.7 What data is collected and how is this reported in regular reports and to other stakeholders?  5.1.8 How does data related to sex and gender indicators influence MYA’s implementation?  5.1.9 What steps does PRC take to adhere to ‘Do No Harm’ principles?  How is SADDD used for improvement and learning? | * Proposal design * Logical framework/intervention logic * Beneficiary data (bases) * Distribution records/Master lists * Post Distribution Monitoring data * Progress reports * PRC-HQ– DMS   PRC-HQ – M&E | * Document review   Interview |

5.2 How does MYA contribute to gender equality?

|  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |
| **Sub-criterion** | **Detailed review questions** | **Sources of information** | **Method/Tool** |
| Participation of women and women’s rights organizations  Participation of relevant NGAS in MYA | 5.2.1 To what extent is civil society involvement seen as a way to enrich the prepositioning approach (e.g., supply procurement, inclusive and accessible storage infrastructure) or impede it?  5.2.2 Are women and women’s rights organisations actively involved in project implementation, monitoring, and review?  5.2.3 Was there an engagement with relevant Philippine Government agencies (e.g. Philippine Commission on Women) to mainstream Gender Equality, Disability and Social Inclusion (GEDSI) approaches in the MYA? | * PRC-HQ – DMS * PRC WS – PGI office(r) * PRC-HQ - BAC * Chapter administrators * Chapter staff * PRC-HQ – DMS * PRC WS-PGI office(r) | * Document review * Online survey * Interview |
| Staff capacity in gender analysis and planning | 5.2.4 Is staff capacity on gender analysis and planning adequate? If not, is it being strengthened? | * PRC Chapter staff * PRC Chapter Administrator * PRC WS-PGI office(r) | * Interview * Online Survey |
| Impact MYA on gender equality | 5.2.5 How does MYA contribute to gender equality and the empowerment of women and girls? (IMR)  5.2.6 Is there a component of the project that can be regarded as a good or an interesting example of any aspect of GEDSI integration (gender, disability, or ethnic minority/indigenous inclusion)? What are the key features, and key results, and how was this achieved? | * PRC-HQ – DMS * PRC WS-PGI office * DFAT * PRC WS-PGI office * PRC chapters | * Interview |

6. Sustainability (OECD/RRAP MEF)

| **Key Review Questions** | **Sub-criterion** | **Detailed review questions** | **Sources of information** | **Method/Tool** |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
| 6.1 What mechanisms and procedures are in place to ensure long time operation of the assets procured under the MYA? | Adequacy of maintenance and replacement plan | 6.1.1 How are the ambulance and Food Truck stored and maintained?  6.1.2 How well is the ML maintained?  What activities are done that could potentially reduce the lifespan of the procured assets?  6.1.3 What mechanisms does PRC have in place to ensure that the vehicles will be replaced at the end of their lifespan? | * Warehouse/workshop/   laboratory   * PRC-HQ - Logistics * PRC-HQ – Health services | * Observation * Interview |
| 6.2 How durable are the NFIs provided by PRC? | Durability of distributed NFIs | 6.2.1 How long are distributed NFIs expected to serve the beneficiaries?  6.2.2 What is the perception of recipients of the quality of items in terms of durability and how does it compare to similar items they would purchase?  6.2.3 How will beneficiaries replace the items in the future? | * PRC-HQ – DMS * PRC-HQ – BAC * NFI recipients * Barangay captain | * Interview * FGD * Interview |
| 6.3 How will COVID-19 services be sustained? | Sustainability of COVID-19 services | 6.3.1 Are there any strategies employed to ensure continuity and timely delivery of services during the COVID-19 pandemic?  6.3.2 To what extent are the strategies innovative? | * PRC-HQ – DMS * PRC-HQ – Health Services/WASH * DOH | * Interview |

7. Risk (AQC)

|  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
| **Key Review Questions** | **Sub-criterion** | **Detailed review questions** | **Sources of information** | **Method/Tool** |
| 7.1 Are the project risks proactively managed? | Adequacy of updating of risk register  Level of participation of stakeholders in risk management  Robustness of risk management | 7.1.1 Was the risk register reviewed and updated at least quarterly in the past twelve months?  7.1.2 Are the project risks regularly monitored and reported?  7.1.3 Are stakeholders consistently involved in the review of risks and risks management?  7.1.4 What evidences are there that demonstrate robust risk management, and existing controls and treatments have been implemented on time? E.g. examples that risks were present and how PRC/DFAT responded  7.1.5 How can PRC better manage ongoing and future risks? | * Risk register * PRC-HQ – DMS * DFAT * PRC Chapter Administrator * DSWD Regional offices * Barangay captain | * Document review * Interview/FGD |

8. (Disability) Inclusion (AQC)

8.1 How well are PWDs and other groups [Pregnant and Lactating Women (PLW), elderly etc.] represented among the beneficiaries?

| **Sub-criterion** | **Detailed review questions** | **Sources of information** | **Method/Tool** |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |
| Understanding of needs of people with disabilities in MYA responses | 8.1.1 Do intervention partners know the needs and priorities of people with disabilities and other vulnerable groups? (MEF)  8.1.2 Is there a component of the project that can be regarded as a good or an interesting example of any aspect of GEDSI integration (gender, disability, or ethnic minority/indigenous inclusion)? What are the key features, and key results, and how was this achieved? | * PWDs and/or guardians * MSWDO * Persons with Disability Affairs Office (PDAO) * PWDs | * Interview/FGD * Data analysis * Document review |
| Representation of people with disabilities in MYA | 8.1.3 Are people with a variety of impairment types (e.g., mobility, sensory, psychosocial, and intellectual) adequately represented, and is appropriate gender balance sought?  8.1.4 Is the M&E system able to collect and analyse SADDD for indicators about people, to track equality of outcomes? (See q5.1.2) | * Disabled People’s Organizations/associations | * Interview/FGD |
| Participation of PWDs in MYA implementation | 8.1.5 Are persons with disability stakeholders and DPOs actively involved in project implementation, monitoring, and review?  8.1.6 To what extent is civil society involvement seen as a way to enrich the prepositioning approach (e.g., supply procurement, inclusive and accessible storage infrastructure) or impede it? | * Distribution records | * Data analysis |
| Participation of NGAs in MYA planning and implementation | 8.1.7 Was there an engagement with relevant Philippine Government agencies (e.g., National Council on Disability Affairs and National Commission on Indigenous Peoples) to mainstream GEDSI approaches in the MYA? | * National/local demographical data * PRC Welfare Services PGI | * Document review |

9. Environmental and Social Safeguards (AQC)

| **Key Review Questions** | **Sub-criterion** | **Detailed review questions** | **Sources of information** | **Method/Tool** |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
| 9.1 What evidence is there that the partner’s safeguard capacity needs have been addressed and reporting systems are in place, effective and regularly reviewed? | PRC’s level of understanding safeguard policies | 9.1.1 What is the understanding of PRC of the safeguarding policies?  9.1.2 Is staff capacity on the safeguards adequate? If not, is it being strengthened?  9.1.3 How are safeguarding policies implemented at PRC-HQ and in the field?  9.1.4 How are incidents reported? What are the strengths and weaknesses of the reporting system?  9.1.5 How does PRC respond to incidents?  9.1.6 What reporting mechanisms are accessible to community members and beneficiaries? | * PRC-HQ – DMS * PRC-HQ – M&E * PRC Chapter administrator * DFAT * PRC Chapter staff * PRC-HQ – DMS * PRC-HQ – M&E * PRC Chapter administrator * DFAT | * Interview/FGD * Online survey * Interviews |
| 9.2 How well does PRC comply with DFAT’s safeguard principles including Child Protection, PSEAH and Indigenous peoples? | Adequacy of risk management plans | 9.2.1 What environment and social risks and impacts have been identified during the planning stage?  9.2.2 What measurements have been identified for safeguarding (as relevant):   * Environmental protection * Children, vulnerable and disadvantages groups * Sexual abuse and harassment * Displacement and resettlement * Indigenous People * Health and Safety   9.2.3 Are there resources and budget dedicated to manage safeguard risks/ impacts? | * PRC-HQ – DMS * PRC-HQ – M&E * PRC Chapter administrator | * Interview/FGD |
| 9.3 Are the project’s safeguard risks and impacts actively managed in line with DFAT’s Environmental and Social Safeguard Policy; Child Protection Policy; Preventing Sexual Exploitation Abuse and Harassment Policy (PSEAH); and Indigenous Peoples Strategy? | Effectiveness of safeguarding | 9.3.1 What incidents occurred in relation to the safeguards?   * Environmental protection * Children, vulnerable and disadvantages groups * Sexual abuse and harassment * Displacement and resettlement * Indigenous People * Health and Safety   9.3.2 What evidence is there that proves safeguard mitigation/management measures are robust, effective, reviewed regularly, reported, and used to support decision-making? | * PRC-HQ – DMS * PRC-HQ – M&E * PRC Chapter administrator | * Interview/FGD |

10. Climate Change and Disasters (AQC)

10.1 Have the climate change and disaster risks associated with the project been identified, included in the risk register, and effectively managed? (e.g., economic, socio-political, sustainability risks, etc.)

|  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |
| **Sub-criterion** | **Detailed review questions** | **Sources of information** | **Method/Tool** |
| Extent of identification of Climate Change and Disaster associated risks | 10.1.1 What climate change and disaster risks have been identified?  10.1.2 What measurements have been identified to manage the risks? | * Risk register * PRC-HQ – DMS * PRC-HQ – Environmental awareness/management office? * DFAT | * Document review * Interview/FGD |
| Effective Management of Climate Change and Disaster associated risks | 10.1.3 To what extent are the measurements being implemented? What evidence, if any, is there that the measurements are effective?  10.1.4 What efforts are PRC and DFAT making to reduce their carbon footprint?  10.1.5 Was the environment a consideration in the procurement of the vehicles? Was Fuel efficiency considered?  10.1.6 How and to what extent does environmental awareness play a role in the selection of NFIs and their suppliers? | * PRC-HQ-DMS * PRC – BAC | * Interviews |

11. Innovation Considerations (AQC)

|  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
| **Key Review Questions** | **Sub-criterion** | **Detailed review questions** | **Sources of information** | **Method/Tool** |
| 11.1 What innovation is the project applying that promotes, or encourages the generation, testing and capture of new approaches? | Level of innovation tested or mainstreamed in MYA implementation | 11.1.1 Is the project applying any innovative delivery mechanisms of NFIs and/or cash? If yes, what is being done to monitor and evaluate these mechanisms?  11.1.2 Are any mechanisms sufficiently tested for promotion among, and/or roll-out by other stakeholders?  11.1.3 Is the project applying innovative partnerships and collaboration? If yes, how does it apply innovative partnerships and collaboration? | * PRC-HQ – DMS * PRC-HQ – M&E * PRC Chapter administrator * DFAT * OCHA/Oxfam * MSWDO * MDRRMO | * Interview/FGD |

# Learning

* What are the lessons learned in the 2 ½ years of MYA implementation?
* Based on the lessons learned from the project implementation, what are the considerations and recommendations for the remainder of the program?
* Based on historical use, will the allocated funds and prepositioned items be fully utilized by the end of the project?

Through review, analysis, and synthesis of MTR findings.Annex E: Locations and kind of support received from the MYA

**Catanduanes**

|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
| **Municipality** | **Barangay** | **Fami-**  **lies** | **Dates of calamity** | **Distribution dates** | **Sleeping Kit** | **Hygiene Kit** | **10L**  **Jerry can** | **Tarpau-**  **lins** | **Shelter Tool Kit** | **Mother kit** | **New-born kit** | **CfR** |
| Baras | Tilod | 130 | 1 Nov 2020 | 16 Nov 2020 |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Bato | San Roque | 123 | 1 Nov 2020 | 16 Nov 2020 |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| San Andres | Alibuag | 74 | 1 Nov 2020 | 17 Nov 2020 |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Virac | Palta | 146 | 1 Nov 2020 | 17 Nov 2020 |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |

**Albay**

|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
| **Municipality** | **Barangay** | **Fami-**  **lies** | **Dates of calamity** | **Distribution dates** | **Sleeping Kit** | **Hygiene Kit** | **10L**  **Jerry can** | **Tarpau-**  **lins** | **Shelter Tool Kit** | **Mother kit** | **New-born kit** | **CfR** |
| Tiwi | Baybay | 67 | 1 Nov 2020 | 15 Nov 2020 |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Tiwi | Bolo | 125 | 1 Nov 2020 | 15 Nov 2020 |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Tiwi | Canaway | 113 | 1 Nov 2020 | 21 Nov 2020 |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Tiwi | Lourdes | 61 | 1 Nov 2020 | 24 Nov 2020 |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Tiwi | Sugod | 110 | 1 Nov 2020 | 25 Nov 2020 |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |

**Surigao del Norte**

|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
| **Municipality** | **Barangay** | **Fami-**  **lies** | **Dates of calamity** | **Distribution dates** | **Sleeping Kit** | **Hygiene Kit** | **10L**  **Jerry can** | **Tarpau-**  **lins** | **Shelter Tool Kit** | **Mother kit** | **New-born kit** | **CfR** |
| Tiwi | Baybay | 67 | 1 Nov 2020 | 15 Nov 2020 |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Tiwi | Bolo | 125 | 1 Nov 2020 | 15 Nov 2020 |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Tiwi | Canaway | 113 | 1 Nov 2020 | 21 Nov 2020 |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |

**Isabela**

|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
| **Municipality** | **Barangay** | **Fami-**  **lies** | **Dates of calamity** | **Distribution dates** | **Sleeping Kit** | **Hygiene Kit** | **10L**  **Jerry can** | **Tarpau-**  **lins** | **Shelter Tool Kit** | **Mother kit** | **New-born kit** | **CfR** |
| Tumauini | Fugu Abajo | 287 | 16 - 18 Nov | 3 Dec 2020 |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Ammugauan | Sto Tomas | 125 | 16 - 18 Nov | 4 Dec 2020 |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| San Pablo | Auitan | 88 | 16 - 18 Nov | 18 Dec 2020 |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |

**Leyte**

|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
| **Municipality** | **Barangay** | **Fami-**  **lies** | **Dates of calamity** | **Distribution dates** | **Sleeping Kit** | **Hygiene Kit** | **10L**  **Jerry can** | **Tarpau-**  **lins** | **Shelter Tool Kit** | **Mother kit** | **New-born kit** | **CfR** |
| Pintuyan | Caubang | 74 | 16 Dec 2021 | 1 Jan 2022 |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Pintuyan | Son-ok I | 151 | 16 Dec 2021 | 1 Jan 2022 |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Pintuyan | Son-ok II | 105 | 16 Dec 2021 | 1 Jan 2022 |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Pintuyan | Manglit | 134 | 16 Dec 2021 | 1 Jan 2022 |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Maasin City | Abgao | 36 | 16 Dec 2021 | 9 Feb 2022 |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |

**Isabela**

|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
| **Municipality** | **Barangay** | **Fami-**  **lies** | **Dates of calamity** | **Distribution dates** | **Sleeping Kit** | **Hygiene Kit** | **10L**  **Jerry can** | **Tarpau-**  **lins** | **Shelter Tool Kit** | **Mother kit** | **New-born kit** | **CfR** |
| Tumauini | Tungui | 161 | 16 - 18 Nov | 2 Dec 2020 |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Sto. Tomas | San Rafael Abajo | 150 | 16 - 18 Nov | 4 Dec 2020 |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| City of Ilagan | Alibagu | 165 | 16 - 18 Nov | 5 Dec 2020 |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| San Pablo | Auitan | 24 | 16 - 18 Nov | 18 Dec 2020 |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |

**Cebu**

|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
| **Municipality** | **Barangay** | **Fami-**  **lies** | **Dates of calamity** | **Distribution dates** | **Sleeping Kit** | **Hygiene Kit** | **10L**  **Jerry can** | **Tarpau-**  **lins** | **Shelter Tool Kit** | **Mother kit** | **New-born kit** | **CfR** |
| Cebu City | Inayawan | 249 | 16 Dec 2021 | 6 Jan 2022 10 Feb 2022 |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Mandaue City | Jagobiao | 696 | 16 Dec 2021 | 6 Jan 2022 4 Feb 2022 |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |

**Maguindanao**

|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
| **Municipality** | **Barangay** | **Fami-**  **lies** | **Dates of calamity** | **Distribution dates** | **Sleeping Kit** | **Hygiene Kit** | **10L**  **Jerry can** | **Tarpau-**  **lins** | **Shelter Tool Kit** | **Mother kit** | **New-born kit** | **CfR** |
| Datu Odin Sinsuat | Awang | 82 | 31 Oct 2022 | 5 and 23 Nov 2022 |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Datu Odin Sinsuat | Tapian | 108 | 31 Oct 2022 |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Upi | Nuro | 64/162 | 31 Oct 2022 | 8 Nov 2023 | 54 | 54 | 162 | 54 |  |  |  |  |
| Upi | Sefegefen | 56 | 31 Oct 2022 | 8 Nov 2022 |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |

**Zamboanga**

|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
| **Municipality** | **Barangay** | **Fami-**  **lies** | **Dates of calamity** | **Distribution dates** | **Sleeping Kit** | **Hygiene Kit** | **10L**  **Jerry can** | **Tarpau-**  **lins** | **Shelter Tool Kit** | **Mother kit** | **New-born kit** | **CfR** |
| Zamboanga City | Sta. Maria | 104 | 31 Oct 2022 |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Zamboanga City | Pasonanca | 80 | 31 Oct 2022 |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Zamboanga City | Tugbungan | 4 | 31 Oct 2022 |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |

# Annex F: Discussions and action plan – documentation 10 January 2023 discussion with DFAT and PRC

The tables in this Annex present the discussion conducted on 10January 2023. The discussions followed the presentation of the draft MTR report and were conducted in two groups, mostly composed by members of different PRC departments and units. The discussions were guided by key findings and the recommendations in the draft report. The numbers of the recommendations are those as in the draft report. . The recommendations in this final report may be different as a result of the discussion. The main objective of the work groups was to look at the feasibility of the recommendations and make a detailed as possible action plan to implement the recommendations.

**Targeting, SADDD and Monitoring and Evaluation**

| **Recommendation in draft report** | **Discussion/recommendation by group** | **Activities/actions** | **Timeline** | **Responsible person(s)** |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
| 16. PRC and DFAT to agree on the minimum reporting standards for SADDD and design the tools accordingly. The existing tools only require minimum adjustments to the electronic data sheets, but requires more work on the adjustment of paper-based templates and orientation of staff. | * DFAT/PRC include the information SADDD * DFAT will share the minimum reporting template * Further discussion with the Technical Officer on the availability of SADDD | * PRC reviews the existing beneficiary registration/documentation tools (paper and digital tools) * PRC/DFAT existing database must be updated from time to time * PRC to cascade the reporting template to all services | Last quarter of 2023  PRC will utilize the new SADDD template | DMS (MEAL & IM, DRCS)  Welfare Services  PMER |
| 21. PRC to define and propose the target number of beneficiaries, disaggregated by sex, gender, age and disability. Data collection tools and methods to be designed as per recommendation #16 and aligned with the DFAT requirements. | Feasible but details are subject for discussion by both parties from February - March 2023 | Elaborate an indicators guide amenable to both PRC and DFAT | Adapt in 1st quarter report of 2023 | PMER  (DMS, DFAT)  & IRSPO |
| 18. PRC to roll out the (new) updated/revised sheet for utilization by all Chapters. The whole transition to be completed by the end of the MYA in 2024. | Feasible | DFAT Team will provide the updated MYA template | Start of 4th quarter of 2023 |  |
| 20. PRC to include a simple MYA beneficiary data analysis with the responsibility of the NPC. | The NPC ensures that the data collected from different departments will be consolidated and analysed. | DMS will provide a memo that all reports should include the data segregation | Applied 1st quarterly report | DMS (DRCS, MEAL)  PMER  All Departments |
| 23. Revision of quarterly and annual reporting templates to include:   1. A summary and reflection on the CN for DFAT support allocations, the actual use, reasons for the selection of the actual locations and lessons from the distributions. 2. Fixed table on the remaining warehouse stocks and location. 3. The target and accumulated number of beneficiaries – gradual transition to SADDD. | Captured in quarterly meetings  - Reporting template comes from DFAT | DFAT Team will provide a new template |  |  |
| 14. PRC and DFAT to study and identify early triggers that can indicate the viability of a CfR response. The aim is to deploy validation and beneficiary registration teams within a week after a disaster. Mechanisms can be activated as soon as potential areas are selected in the CN, for example early discussions with the FSPs. | This is already available with the capacity of the chapters and teams that are experienced with CfR, for example during COVID-19.  However, the reality is that there are approval cycles that make a quick response difficult. These need to be studied. |  |  |  |
| 15. PRC to forge framework agreements with additional FSPs | This is in process |  |  |  |
| 18. Orientation of PRC and Chapters on different types of disabilities, ideally through the introduction of the short set of Washington Group of Questions (WGQ-SS).[[21]](#footnote-21) | This is feasible within the year  Implementation by NHQ | Protection, Gender, and Inclusion to include this orientation in its plans.  This will slowly be rolled out as an add-on to existing and planned training | By the end of 2023 | Welfare Services and IRSPO will facilitate the PGI orientation.  DMS/Dr. Nalupta must send a memo to all departments |
| 9. PRC to reorient Chapter and HQ staff that are deployed for assessments on beneficiary selection criteria. The criteria need to be made clear to the LGUs, their workers and the community to prevent jealousy and potential conflict. Community consultations need to be held, or criteria be disseminated in other effective ways. | * PRC continuously orient and brief HQ staff deployed and chapter staff volunteers 🡪 the original recommendation needs to be adjusted to reflect what is being done. * Ensure all chapters and HQ provide documentation report | * Provide checklist of what steps to take to field team leaders and staff. * Properly documented and endorsed 🡪 cc to the NPC for summary in the report to DFAT. |  |  |
| 23. The conduct of PDM within DFAT areas within 1 month after the distribution, as per original proposal. Review of the required resources and how this can be accommodated within the existing budget, or from remaining COVID-19 funds. | 1 month is not feasible.  The group recommends a PDM 3-6 months after the response operation.  **Consultant:** This needs to be discussed further with DFAT and PRC whether a PDM is still useful (e.g., for cash). The timing of the PDM should be aligned with the information needed and the potential for learning. In the meeting, it was also mentioned that a small survey by volunteers might also be possible and can be done quickly. The question is whether there is a reason for volunteers to influence results. | PRC shall review the PDM process, guidelines and objectives  Note: there are no written guidelines on the conduct of a PDM. The timeline to make these needs to be discussed with the MEAL team. |  | DMS team and PMER Team |

**NFI and Cash for Relief – prepositioning and mobilization**

| **Recommendation in draft report** | **Discussion/recommendation by group** | **Activities/actions** | **Timeline** | **Responsible person(s)** |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
| 3. PRC and DFAT to explore breaking up the NFI kits – with prepositioning near or sooner of tarpaulins – while other items will come a few days later. There are currently many more tarpaulins than other items.  Clarification:  Breaking up the NFI kits refer to the prioritization of the delivery of items, instead of just in 1 batch. | Shelter items usually need more extensive assessment prior to distribution. Usual immediate needs for affected communities are sleeping kits to replace the damaged or lost household items, water storage, and hygiene kits.  Also, PRC always try to maximize its assets when delivering relief. | **Consultant comment:**  Statement by group seems to contradict the practice. Tarpaulins were distributed as part of NFI kits including the sleeping kits and other household items. |  |  |
| 4. PRC to consider a review of the content of the STKs and make it smaller with only the urgently needed tools (i.e. hammer, rope, nails, saw). | PRC acknowledges the need to review the contents and guidelines of distribution. |  |  |  |
| 9. DFAT and PRC to replenish and expand the prepositioned stocks from Cebu and Luzon to smaller warehouses, in particular Cagayan de Oro and possibly in Leyte to allow for quicker responses. | In process and a review of warehouse capacity is ongoing |  | **Ongoing** |  |
| 2. Adequate promotion of the available items, their content and expiry dates among the respective departments at HQ, as well as Chapters. The latter is particularly important for the health Kits. | While the PRC-HQ acknowledges that the inventory reports must be accessible to all HQ offices, sharing the inventory to the chapter is not recommended, unless they are also managing their own warehouse which is indicated in the report HQ is managing.  Recommendations for which items are to be allocated in any particular area is based on the needs assessment and not on the available inventory. |  |  |  |
| 25. PRC to focus on establishing a functioning stock management system with an appropriate software application and staff qualified to use it. | In process; pending implementation for newer stock management and inventory system (MS Dynamic 365) which was reactivated in December 2022, trainings | Training of warehouse staff | Training will be completed by last week of January 2023. |  |
| 1. PRC needs to prioritize the improvement in stock management, ensuring the systems generate the type of items, donors, and expiry dates. | In process; pending implementation of newer stock management and inventory system |  | See above |  |
| 26. PRC senior management to critically review the Human Resources in the different departments and ensure that they are aligned with the needs of the programs. | Ongoing review initiated by the top management. Results will be submitted to the top management once finalized for appropriate actions.  Senior – Assistant Secretary General and Director Top Management – Secretary General and Chairman |  |  |  |
| 27. PRC to ensure the proper maintenance of the fleet and rotational use of vehicles to ensure that all stay in running condition. |  |  |  |  |
| 13. PRC to review the experience from COVID-19 cash responses and identify lessons that can be adapted to CfR. | There is a more stringent targeting, registration, and validation process for the CfR beneficiaries. PRC acknowledges the need to review the CTP guidelines and possible modification for the rapid deployment guidelines of CfR.  As much as possible and based on the context of the disasters, cash in envelope is the least option being considered.  Review of FSP guidelines and coordination with more FSP providers are also being reviewed including the training of personnel. |  |  |  |

1. Greene, J. C., Caracelli, V. J., & Graham, W. F. (1989). Toward a Conceptual Framework Mixed-Method Evaluation Designs. Educational Evaluation and Policy Analysis, 11(3), 255–274. Retrieved from <https://go.openathens.net/redirector/unimelb.edu.au?url=http%3A%2F%2Fepa.sagepub.com%2Fcontent%2F11%2F3%2F255.full.pdf%2Bhtml> [↑](#footnote-ref-1)
2. In Mandaue a third category of ‘Severely damaged’ was mentioned, possibly the result of the recently conducted PDM which uses three categories. [↑](#footnote-ref-2)
3. OCHA, 2021, Philippines: Super Typhoon Rai (Odette) Humanitarian Needs and Priorities (Dec 2021 – Jun 2022) <https://reliefweb.int/report/philippines/philippines-super-typhoon-rai-odette-humanitarian-needs-and-priorities-dec-2021> [↑](#footnote-ref-3)
4. OCHA, 2021, Philippines: Super Typhoon Rai (Odette) Humanitarian Needs and Priorities (Dec 2021 – Jun 2022) (2 Feb 2022) <https://reliefweb.int/report/philippines/philippines-super-typhoon-rai-odette-humanitarian-needs-and-priorities-revision#:~:text=The%20Humanitarian%20Needs%20and%20Priorities,damage%20to%20homes%20and%20infrastructure>. [↑](#footnote-ref-4)
5. Philippines – Typhoon Rai (Odette) 3W Who does What Where <https://data.humdata.org/dataset/typhoon-rai-odette-3w>? Version of 2 July 2022 [↑](#footnote-ref-5)
6. A complete NFI set is considered the packaged distribution to a family: 1 Hygiene kit, 2 Tarpaulins, 1 Sleeping Kit and 2 pieces of 10L Jerrycans. The kits are composed to cater for families with 5 members. [↑](#footnote-ref-6)
7. The same as footnote #5 [↑](#footnote-ref-7)
8. OCHA, 2022, Philippines: Super Typhoon Rai (Odette) – Situation Report No. 2 (As of 13 January 2022) <https://reliefweb.int/report/philippines/philippines-super-typhoon-rai-odette-situation-report-no-2-13-january-2022> [↑](#footnote-ref-8)
9. The inventory PRC presented to DFAT on 14 Nov 2022 has the wrong total of 8,376 for tarpaulins. [↑](#footnote-ref-9)
10. Australian Embassy, 2020, Australia provides support to Philippine Red Cross molecular laboratory for COVID-19 testing. <https://philippines.embassy.gov.au/mnla/medrel20200627.html> Accessed on 20 January 2023 [↑](#footnote-ref-10)
11. Manila Bulletin, 2021, Milestone: PH Red Cross Port Area lab records 1 million COVID-19 tests. <https://mb.com.ph/2021/04/10/milestone-ph-red-cross-port-area-lab-records-1-million-covid-19-tests/> Accessed on 20 January 2023 [↑](#footnote-ref-11)
12. The consultant only had the detailed financial report towards the end of the MTR. There has not been an opportunity to have the postings clarified. The allocations and accompanying summary are considered final by PRC. [↑](#footnote-ref-12)
13. OCHA, 2021, Philippines: Typhoon Goni (Rolly) and Vamco (Ulysses) 3W. <https://data.humdata.org/dataset/philippines-typhoon-goni-rolly-and-vamco-ulysses-3w-who-what-and-where> Version of 30 March 2021 [↑](#footnote-ref-13)
14. AUD80,244.50/(144 patients x(60months/29 months)) = AUD80.244.50/298 = AUD269. [↑](#footnote-ref-14)
15. Undated. List of Ambulance Service Hotlines: Philippines Price Rates. <https://medicalpinas.com/list-of-ambulance-service-hotlines-philippines-price-rates/#:~:text=The%20emergency%20ambulance%20service%20price,and%20above%20for%20fixed%20rates>. Accessed 25 December 2022 [↑](#footnote-ref-15)
16. Department of Health. Republic oft he Philippines. COVID-19 Tracker. <https://www.doh.gov.ph/covid19tracker> [↑](#footnote-ref-16)
17. Philippine Statistics Authority, 2019. Disability Spares No one: A new perspective. <https://psa.gov.ph/sites/default/files/attachments/ird/pressrelease/Press%20Release%20NDPS.pdf> [↑](#footnote-ref-17)
18. For this review version 1.4 of March 2019 was used. This policy includes the following safeguards: 1) Environmental protection 2) Children, vulnerable and disadvantaged groups; 2) Displacement and resettlement; 4) Indigenous peoples; and 5) Health and safety. A number have their own strategy documents. [↑](#footnote-ref-18)
19. The Washington Group on Disability Statistics, 2023. WG Short Set on Functioning (WG-SS) <https://www.washingtongroup-disability.com/question-sets/wg-short-set-on-functioning-wg-ss/> [↑](#footnote-ref-19)
20. OECD (2002). *Glossary of Key Terms in Evaluation and Results Based Management.* OECD. Paris. [↑](#footnote-ref-20)
21. <https://www.washingtongroup-disability.com/question-sets/wg-short-set-on-functioning-wg-ss/> [↑](#footnote-ref-21)