

# Strategic Review of Australia’s Support for Peace in Mindanao

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## **List of Acronyms**

AFP – Armed Forces of the Philippines  
ARMM – Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao  
ASG - Abu Sayyaf Group  
Australian DFAT - Australian Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade  
BASIC Bangsamoro - Building Sustainable Institutions and Communities in Bangsamoro  
BaSulTa – Basilan, Sulu, Tawi Tawi  
BBL - Bangsamoro Basic Law  
BDAF – Bangsamoro Development Assistance Fund  
BG – Bangsamoro Government  
BIFF – Bangsamoro Islamic Freedom Fighters  
BTF – Bangsamoro Trust Fund  
BTC - Bangsamoro Transition Commission  
CAA – Conflict-Affected Areas  
CAB – Comprehensive Agreement on the Bangsamoro  
CBD – Cross Border Trade  
CDD – Community-driven development  
CHD – Center for Humanitarian Dialogue  
CfC - Coalition for Change  
CSO – Civil Society Organization  
CVE – Countering Violent Extremism  
CVI – Conflict, Violence and Instability  
FAB – Framework Agreement on the Bangsamoro  
FASTRAC – Facility for Advisory Support for Transition Activities  
GPH – Government of the Philippines  
IA – International Alert  
IAG – Institute for Autonomy and Governance  
IOM – International Office of Migration  
IP- Indigenous People  
LGUs- Local Government Units  
MILF – Moro Islamic Liberation Front  
MNLF- Moro National Liberation Front  
MTF- Mindanao Trust Fund  
OPAPP – Office of the Presidential Adviser on the Peace Process  
PHRODF – Philippine Australia Human Resource and Organizational Development Facility  
POC – Peace and Order Council  
PNP – Philippine National Police  
SC – Supreme Court  
SWS – Social Weather Stations  
TAF - The Asia Foundation  
TJRC - Transitional Justice and Reconciliation Commission  
WB – World Bank

## **Strategic Review of Australia’s Support for Peace in Mindanao**

## (Final Report of the Review Mission)

### I. Background

1. The Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade (DFAT) appointed a three person team<sup>1</sup> to conduct a strategic review of Australia's support for the peace process in Mindanao from 23 August to 4 November 2016. The objectives of the review were to: a) assess the effectiveness and relevance of BASIC<sup>2</sup> Bangsamoro ('BASIC') program, and b) provide strategic advice on Australia's wider support for peace in Muslim Mindanao. The review team conducted a desk review of progress reports of BASIC implementing partners<sup>3</sup>, and field interviews (list at Annex A) from 19-29 September 2016. It used a set of criteria drafted by the Australian Embassy Manila, as set out in its Terms of Reference (at Annex B).

2. The Australian Embassy Manila identified two key changes in context which had impacted current activities: a) the failure to pass the proposed Bangsamoro Basic Law (BBL) providing for the establishment of the Bangsamoro Government (BG) in 2015; and b) the new peace strategy promulgated by the new Government of the Philippines (GPH) under President Rodrigo Duterte. It asked the review team to assess the effectiveness and relevance of current activities against the new context, including a) assessing the extent to which BASIC partners had adjusted their programming, and b) suggesting what changes might be required for BASIC and Australia's wider peace support.

3. The review team presented its initial findings at a meeting with the Australian Embassy, chaired by Deputy Head of Mission, Mat Kimberley, on 30 September 2016.

4. This report elaborates on the team's initial assessments, addressing comments made by Australian Embassy staff during the presentation and drawing on additional data not available at the time of presentation. The assessments herein are based on interviews, qualitative reports from BASIC partners<sup>4</sup> and information from secondary sources.

### II. Mission Findings<sup>5</sup>

#### On Effectiveness

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<sup>1</sup>The team was composed of Fermin Adriano (Team Leader), Robin Bednall (DFAT Fragility and Conflict Section), and Sophia Close (Peace and Gender specialist). The Review Team extends its sincere appreciation to the support of the following individuals and institutions for the successful completion of the mission: Mat Kimberley (Deputy Head of Mission), Timothy Smith (First Secretary), Dwan Mei Dumas (Senior Program Officer) and Shannen Enriquez (Program Officer) of the Australian Embassy in Manila; Undersecretary Nabil Tan, Assistant Secretary Rolando Asuncion, and Director Arvin Chua of the Office of the Presidential Adviser on the Peace Process (OPAPP); Chairman Mohagher Iqbal of the MILF Implementing Peace Panel and its members; Attys Cecille Jimenez and Ishak Mastura of TRJC; Atty Benito Bacani and staff of IAG; Francisco Lara and staff of IA; Steven Rood and staff of TAF; and Oxfam Philippines and WEAct1325 officials and staff members. Those not mentioned here are acknowledged in Annex A of this report.

<sup>2</sup>Building Autonomous and Sustainable Institutions and Communities in the Bangsamoro (BASIC) Bangsamoro.

<sup>3</sup>The four implementing partners are: (a) Institute for Governance and Autonomy (IAG); (b) International Alert (IA); (c) Oxfam and WEAct1325; and (d) The Asia Foundation (TAF).

<sup>4</sup>With the exception of sex disaggregated data, no quantitative data was available to support evaluation of BASIC partners.

<sup>5</sup>Refer to Annex C for the evaluation summary matrix of the performance of the four implementing partners.

*A. Attaining objectives and adjusting to the changing context*

5. All four BASIC partners aimed to build a constituency supportive of the passage of the proposed BBL in Congress. Their efforts were geared to attaining this goal from the beginning of BASIC implementation in late 2014 up to the third quarter of 2015 when it was clear that the bill would not pass in view of the Mamasapano incident in January 2015 that drastically changed public opinion against the BBL. The expected non-passage of the bill and the scheduled presidential election in 2016 altered the political context within which BASIC partners operated.

6. **BASIC partners were generally successful at building constituencies in support of the peace process.** BASIC partners were able to identify positive examples of increasing civil society engagement (i.e. with women's groups, media, academic institutions, faith-based organizations, and indigenous people's (IPs) groups) and local government units (LGUs) in the peace-process, and their influence on key stakeholders, including OPAPP, MILF and legislators. Among them, BASIC partners sponsored the conduct of hundreds of forums, orientation workshops, training programs and meetings to inform key stakeholders and the public on the provisions of the BBL and the reasons behind them. BASIC partners report 9,009 people (3,749 women and 5,350 men) were reached between July 2014 and June 2016.<sup>6</sup>

7. The Institute for Autonomy and Governance (IAG) specifically targeted LGUs for their information sharing campaign, cognizant of their critical role in ensuring the likely success of the BBL's implementation. International Alert (IA) conducted impressive advocacy work with key legislators in Congress through their political mapping project and their active media campaign at the national level. Oxfam and WEAct1325 focused their activities on promoting women's participation in drafting provisions of the BBL that would affect women's rights. The Asia Foundation (TAF) produced analytical papers supportive of the BBL and disseminated them to its broad network of local partners including media and members of the Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP) and Philippine National Police Force (PNP).

8. **All but one of the four implementing partners made adjustments, but none of these adjustments demonstrated partners had developed any systematic plans to achieve program outcomes effectively in the changed context.** IAG adjusted its activities but its original objectives (determining an administrative role for LGUs within an enhanced autonomous region and promoting greater participation in the peace process through driving better understanding of the BBL provisions) lost much of their traction with the non-passage of the BBL. IAG noted that the activities under their original twin objectives were now geared toward maintaining peace and stability at the LGU/community level due to rising frustrations as a result of the non-passage of BBL. In a meeting with the Australian Embassy in Manila, IA argued that supporting Constitutional Reform should be its new priority. It shifted its work to political mapping and lobbying parliamentarians on Federalism, obstacles to the peace process and a campaign to protect the autonomy provision enshrined in the 1986 Constitution. It continued its conflict prevention and mediation activities as a way of addressing clan conflict (rido) in selected areas of ARMM.

9. Oxfam and WEAct1325 did not make any adjustments to their activities arguing that "despite the changes in external context, ...the Project remains relevant." TAF responded to

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<sup>6</sup>Data from BASIC reports: IAG: 607 women and 642 men; IA: 307 women and 508 men; TAF: 2785 women and 3928 men; and Oxfam/WeAct1325: 550 women and 272 men.

the changed environment by intensifying effort in building and strengthening its peace constituency. It also continued its conflict mediation and prevention activities, focusing on addressing horizontal conflicts (*rido*) that could destabilize the overall peace process.

10. **DFAT managed BASIC partners adequately but could have acted earlier to coordinate re-focused activities supporting the peace process.** Although OPAPP continued to assure donors that the BBL would pass through most of 2015, it became clear after the Mamasapano incident that public sentiment had changed dramatically. DFAT convened a coordination meeting in November 2015 with all partners and continued to manage partners through individual and group quarterly meetings. However, it missed an opportunity to coordinate a combined re-engagement strategy when it became clear in February 2015 the peace process was in peril.

#### *B. Addressing drivers of conflict and violence*

11. **BASIC partners deployed local conflict management tools successfully.** IA addressed conflict arising from operations of “shadow economies” (i.e., illegal gun trade and informal land transactions). Its conflict mediation activities were informed by the results of its conflict monitoring system that provided up-to-date information on conflict in the Bangsamoro region. TAF supported clan-based conflict management that could mitigate conflict which may have impacted the peace process.<sup>7</sup> Similar to IA, it employed traditional leaders and traditional dispute mechanisms to successfully mediate *rido*. Oxfam invested in the revival of the Grassroots Peace Monitoring Network (GPMN), to prevent possible outbreaks of community violence. Women comprised 22 of the 81 grassroots peace monitors Oxfam trained. IAG worked directly with local formal institutions involved in conflict mediation and prevention through the provincial and municipal peace and order councils (POCs). However, it is not clear what actions IAG took in cases where LGU officials or their clan members were directly involved in the conflict.

12. However, conflict mediation and prevention activities of the BASIC partners had very limited geographical coverage and **the use of these mechanisms may not be sustainable in the long term.** While their efforts resulted in documentation of specific experiences and insights on the effectiveness of informal or traditional institutions in mediating conflict, these projects were too “micro” in nature to lead to significant reduction in the overall incidence of horizontal conflict, given its pervasiveness.<sup>8</sup> There have been numerous studies conducted in the past on community-based conflict mediation.<sup>9</sup> However, without being adopted by

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<sup>7</sup>*Rido* incidents that could potentially lead to direct clashes between government troops and the MILF or MNLF forces. Clan war or *rido* involves two influential families competing over political positions or economic resources. If one family or group is allied with the government and the other with the rebel forces, both can seek the assistance of the party to which they are allied to, and eventually transform their clan conflict into a vertical conflict.

<sup>8</sup>IA’s conflict monitoring system shows an increase in the incidences of horizontal conflict despite the dramatic decrease in vertical conflicts after the signing of the Framework Agreement on the Bangsamoro (FAB) between the GPH and the MILF. This is consistent with the literature on post-conflict elsewhere wherein a rise in horizontal conflict was seen after the successful signing of peace accord (Barron, et.al., 2013).

<sup>9</sup>A review of selected experiences was undertaken in the 2016 IOM-WB report submitted to the Transitional Justice and Reconciliation Commission (TJRC), entitled, “Land: Territory, Domain and Identity” (for publication).

government institutions, these informal institutions will not be able to reach a sufficient scale to make a sustained impact on violence.

13. **BASIC partners have good convening power at a community level, and undertook a significant number of outreach activities, but cannot reach or influence all key local political leaders and stakeholders that matter.** IAG undertook 21 activities with local leaders in Sulu, which were acknowledged by a prominent local leader as having given these groups a voice in the peace process and having helped to address concerns around the peace process. Although these activities demonstrated IAG's ability to convene groups not previously part of the peace process their messaging lacked resonance not coming from the MILF. While IA demonstrated it was able to raise awareness on the adverse impact on BaSulTa of the closure of cross-border trading with Sabah among key Philippine authorities, the Malaysian authorities continue to maintain trade restrictions as of the writing of this report. The rising incidence of kidnap-for-ransom (KfR) activities and the emergence of various criminal groups in the Sulu archipelago constrained activities of BASIC partners there. It also limited monitoring and evaluating due to security concerns. With the exception of IAG's website<sup>10</sup>, BASIC partners did not demonstrate any substantive inclusion of people with disability.

#### *C. Impact of research on policies and programs*

14. **BASIC partners were generally successful in clarifying controversial provisions in the BBL and were able to reach their target audiences.** IA was actively engaged in advocacy with key legislators, assisted by their political mapping tool. IAG conducted a series of workshops and forums with LGU officials, utilizing their research and position papers, to clarify provisions in the BBL causing concerns that they would clip LGU powers. TAF used its extensive local networks in Mindanao, including media outlets and academic institutions, to allay the fears of local opinion leaders regarding the BBL. However, TAF could have more effectively tapped the advocacy expertise in its Coalition for Change (CfC) project, enabling it to reach more legislators. Oxfam and WEAct1325 were mostly engaged in outreach advocacy on the BBL and the overall peace process, as well as developing a gender peacebuilding training manual.<sup>11</sup>

#### *D. Promoting gender equality and women's empowerment<sup>12</sup>*

15. **BASIC partners reported increased women's participation in the political process but it is unclear to what extent their activities contributed to gender equality.** After DFAT provided gender training to all partners in 2014, each partner provided sex-disaggregated data for their activities but little evidence on the quality of women's influence. Aside from Oxfam, BASIC partners did not provide strong evidence of impacts of gendered peacebuilding or supporting sustainable improvements in women's capacity to participate in community decision-making. Further analysis is necessary to assess the quality and impact

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<sup>10</sup> See: <http://www.politicsforpeace.com/pwd>

<sup>11</sup> Lao, 2015, Training Manual: Women's Leadership in Politics, Peace and Security, WE Act 1325.

<sup>12</sup> In line with the 2015 Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) including Goal 5 on gender equality, Goal 10 on reducing inequalities within and among countries, and Goal 16 on peaceful inclusive societies, Australia's National Action Plan on Women, Peace and Security 2012-2018, and DFAT's 2016 Gender Equality and Women's Empowerment Strategy.

of the contributions of both female and male participants on the promotion of gender equality and in addressing gender-specific issues in the context of peace negotiations. Overall BASIC partners limited their 'gender sensitivity' to a focus on women and did not mainstream or target activities that worked to systemically change power relationships and inequalities between women and men, boys and girls.

16. IAG ensured women's participation in all the forums and workshops it conducted. IA partnered with a women's CSO in raising awareness about the BBL and its local conflict mediation activities. TAF also utilized a number of women's groups as partners to include both MNLF and IP representatives to support a more inclusive peace process. Oxfam, through WEAct1325, successfully collated and advocated for the inclusion of women's perspectives into the final version of the BBL. WEAct1325 members identified tensions that arose between themselves and both men and some local women as a result of their rights-based approach. The challenge of supporting meaningful participation of women and other identity groups and the diverse views on gender equality highlight the complexity of undertaking gender-sensitive peacebuilding.

#### *E. Alignment with other Australian assistance in Mindanao*

17. DFAT hosted quarterly meetings in the Embassy but the review team did not have access to meeting records indicating whether or not BASIC partners were able to share experiences and coordinate efforts adequately, nor how much they were asked to contribute to DFAT's wider peace support programming through FASTRAC, MTF, OPAPP, CfC and HRODF.

18. **Wider activities Australia funds to support peace and development in Mindanao remain relevant, but need to be re-configured to deliver the best possible effect.** DFAT's general approach in the face of ongoing uncertainty should be to support effective existing mechanisms, while being flexible in advocating for improvements to better align them with the changing context. In line with the GPH's expected 'convergence' agenda the Facility for Advisory Support for Transition Capacities (FASTRAC) needs to expand its technical assistance beyond the MILF to cover technical requirements of wider groups (such as the MNLF, IPs and women). The Mindanao Trust Fund (MTF) needs to retain its technical expertise and relationships of trust it has built up in target MILF camps and communities, but potentially adjust to a new management structure in line with GPH policy. The MTF or any new multi-donor mechanism must provide leadership in the smooth transition of assistance from confidence-building activities, which has been the basis of GPH and donor interventions for almost two decades, to more sustainable livelihood activities for conflict-affected communities. TAF's CfC conducted national-level advocacy on the passage of the BBL, but should be reviewed to better complement with BASIC partners should the draft "Enabling Law" be completed and filed in Congress for approval. The bulk of technical assistance to OPAPP was unspent, requiring a different approach to any future engagement. The Philippine Human Resource and Organizational Development Fund (HRODF) have produced highly trained Bangsamoro scholars but only a few of them are directly working in conflict affected areas or on the peace process.

#### **On Relevance**

*Adjustments in response to changed environment and relevance of programs/partners*

19. **BASIC partners made adjustments, but some were inadequate due to the constraints of their objectives.** IAG's efforts in ensuring participation of LGU officials in the peace process and in clarifying the role of LGUs within an enhanced autonomous region are no longer relevant given the non-passage of the BBL and won't be until the completion of the "Enabling Law". IA's shift toward supporting the "Enabling Law" will have to wait until the re-organized BTC is established. IA's objectives on gun control and cross-border issue projects are beyond its capacity to achieve from outside government. IA's work on horizontal conflict generated by "shadow economies", complemented by the results of its conflict monitoring system, exhibits strong potential for future programming work for the government and development partners in conflict areas.

20. Oxfam and WEAct1325 did not make any significant adjustments arguing that the cross-cutting nature of gender as a development and peace concern sustained program relevance. This is correct, however Oxfam (and IAG) could also have provided proposals on how to strategically position their gender programming to target additional stakeholders or institutions to effectively advocate for gender equality at all levels of government. TAF broadened its engagement to include MNLF and IPs in the peace conversation in response to the Duterte's peace roadmap aimed at a more "inclusive" peace. It continued addressing clan conflict or *rido*, an area of comparative advantage. The rise in horizontal conflict after the signing of the GPH-MILF peace agreement attests to the relevance of this work.

21. The review team was also asked to investigate the comparative advantage of working through the three international NGOs instead of directly funding local NGOs. The review team assessed that, due to its current lack of internal risk management and accountability systems, funding to WEAct1325 should continue to be managed through Oxfam or a similarly competent NGO with a strong gender-sensitive approach. Management arrangements for other BASIC partners remain appropriate. However, given IA and TAF are both led by, and depend on, well-connected senior personnel, the review team recommended the Australian Embassy monitor the viability of these organisations in the near term.

#### *G. New initiatives/objectives/partners to support the Duterte peace process*

22. Besides the provision of technical assistance to the formulation of the "Enabling Law", BASIC partners are now engaged in the political dialogue on federalism. IAG, with its comparative advantage in local governance, is involved at senior levels in the federalism process. IA is also engaged in the federalism agenda and has also lent its expertise to the peace talks between the GPH and the Communist Party of the Philippines. Oxfam/WEAct1325 has intensified its community peace building and livelihood activities among local women to prevent outbreak of armed violence due frustration over the non-passage of the BBL. TAF is attempting to expand the peace table to include the MNLF and IP groups in support of the government's peace roadmap of ensuring greater inclusivity.

23. Two major information vacuums remain: what is really happening in the island provinces, particularly Sulu and Basilan; and how far violent extremism has taken root. On the first concern, the proliferation of armed groups engaged in KfR and other criminal activities combined with poor local governance in Sulu and Basilan had made the area practically inaccessible to non-residents. Basic data on socio-economic indicators are



unreliable, making it difficult to properly plan for the development of these islands.<sup>13</sup> Incidents of armed conflict are also underreported because of threat to security of media in these provinces and the geographical remoteness of the islands. NGO partners who have been working in the area for an extended period, such as the Center for Humanitarian Dialogue (CHD), should be encouraged to provide more information on the drivers of conflict and violence in these places and possible peace-building measures to address them.

24. **Even in the event that the GPH can achieve ‘convergence’ through the passage of multiple peace agreements into law (not a foregone conclusion), a yet harder stage of the peace process will begin.** Given that an estimated 40% of peace agreements fail in the first five years, the period immediately after the signing of a peace agreement will entail a high level of community vulnerability to conflict<sup>14</sup>. High expectations of early peace dividends by communities that have experienced violence, poverty and displacement for multiple generations may be dashed as the GPH struggles to deliver at large scale. Australia will need to support partners in Mindanao and at national levels to broaden conflict monitoring, widen gender-sensitive participation in decision making at all levels and support the restructuring of governance systems that support conflict-sensitive service delivery to communities.

*H. Extent of program support to regional security and economic growth*

25. Some BASIC partners partially addressed this criterion. IA undertook a cross-border study on security issues involved in transporting goods from Sabah to Sulu or Tawi Tawi and livelihood opportunities generated by the trade, particularly among women. Oxfam and WEAct1325 conducted livelihood projects, but they were micro in scale and there is no evidence they were economically sustainable.

**III. Possible Scenarios: Opportunities and Risks**

26. The review team assessed that **the effectiveness and relevance of recommendations on future programming would depend significantly on the prevailing political context** of the peace process. Its analysis identified four possible political scenarios and the likely opportunities and risks for programming, as follows:

**Political Scenarios for the GPH-Moro Peace Process**

| Scenario  | Opportunities   | Risks  |                |
|---|---|--|----------------|
| <b>Scenario 1:<br/>Negotiations<br/>successful &amp;<br/>BBL/Enabling</b> | - Donors/Moros able to leverage additional GPH funds for conflict-affected areas (CAAs) | - Fall in President’s political capital  | <b>LOW</b>     |
|   | - Harmonizing Moro rebel groups agendas<br>- Establishment of Bangsamoro Trust Fund     | - GPH foreign relations complicate donor support<br>- OPAPP spread too thin (e.g. NPA)<br>- Loss of GPH proponents of key donor mechanisms | <b>L<br/>I</b> |

<sup>13</sup>The World Bank’s Mindanao Jobs Report volume on “Conflict-Affected Areas of Mindanao” (2016) encountered difficulties in gathering reliable data from BaSulTa (Basilan, Sulu and Tawi Tawi) noting that official survey institutions could not easily access these provinces and data from local government offices are unreliable in the absence of qualified staff to gather correct data.

<sup>14</sup>Cooper et.al. 2011, A More Violent World? Global Trends in Organised Violence. p. 35.

|  |   |  |  |
|--|---|--|--|
| <p><b>Law Filed in Congress</b></p>  | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Continuing TJRC work addressing injustice</li> <li>- Continuing CDD projects</li> <li>- Supporting CSO engagement on BBL passage</li> </ul>  | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Expectations of peace dividends not met</li> <li>- Likely opposition to passage of Enabling Law</li> <li>- Inadequate BTC capacity to write law and implement</li> <li>- Internal MILF, and MILF-MNLF dynamics</li> <li>- Extremists/breakaway groups from MILF</li> <li>- Unexpected violence</li> </ul>   | <p><b>K<br/>E<br/>L<br/>I<br/>H<br/>O<br/>O<br/>D<br/><br/>O<br/>F</b></p>   |
| <p><b>Scenario 2: BBL/Enabling Law not passed; overtaken by Federalism</b></p> | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- BBL a catalyst and model for discussions on federalism</li> <li>- Federalism offers opportunities for MILF and MNLF to rule respective places where they have influence and control</li> <li>- Opens door for Constitutional change to accommodate “self-determination” demand of the Bangsamoro</li> <li>- Engaging CSOs on broader approaches to peace-building</li> </ul> | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Undermining provisions in CAB/FAB that have long been fought for by the MILF</li> <li>- Disaffection with smaller geographical area of rule due to splitting of Bangsamoro and loss of special autonomy</li> <li>- Prolonged debates will result in increasing frustration at the ground level (making violent extremist groups more attractive)</li> </ul> | <p><b>I<br/>N<br/>C<br/>R<br/>E<br/>A<br/>S<br/>I<br/>N<br/>G<br/><br/>V<br/>I<br/>O<br/>L<br/>E<br/>N<br/>C<br/>E</b></p> |
| <p><b>Scenario 3: No BBL; No Federalism</b></p>                                | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Greater sense of urgency for Supreme Court to render a decision on what is a Constitutionally acceptable autonomous region</li> <li>- Opportunity to further strengthen CSO and other conflict management mechanisms</li> <li>- ARMM govt assumes a greater role in delivering services</li> </ul>   | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Peace panels might lose ability to effectively function and/or manage conflict</li> <li>- Collapse in trust in GPH</li> <li>- Delivery of services more difficult</li> <li>- Violent extremist groups emerge</li> </ul>   | <p><b>E<br/>N<br/>C<br/>E</b></p>  |
| <p><b>Scenario 4: Breakdown of the Peace Process</b></p>                       | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Using CSOs as a bulwark against further deterioration in efforts to build support to peace process</li> <li>- ARMM govt assumes a greater role in delivering services</li> </ul>   | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Splinter/breakaway groups from MILF leading to multiple armed groups with no central command</li> <li>- Emergence of violent extremist groups</li> </ul>  | <p><b>HIGH</b></p>   |

27. Based on this analysis, the review team identified four common **strategic opportunities** for future programming: a) the negotiating parties will require technical advice to support a successful peace process, whether through an “Enabling Law” route or through federalism; and, regardless of the political scenario, it will remain important to b) build a constituency for peace with CSOs and the general public to ensure widespread support for the passage of any legislative measure granting greater autonomy to the Moros; c) strengthen inclusive and gendered peacebuilding; and d) work to address longstanding biases and historical injustices against the Moros and IPs by mainstream Filipino community.

28. Conversely, the review identified three common **strategic risks** that should ground programming decisions: a) the possibility expectations of early passage or the enactment of the “Enabling Law” and/or federalism may be dashed under any scenario, triggering rising frustrations over the peace process; b) incidents of violence will continue and even rise, particularly horizontal conflict and those perpetrated by radical groups, and in the process undermining peace efforts; c) rebel groups may further splinter and support violent extremist groups, as efforts flounder.

29. The review team further noted that emerging strains in the bilateral relationships of the GPH with key donors could complicate the aid delivery environment.

#### **IV. RECOMMENDATIONS**

##### ***Part A: BASIC***

30. **Develop a coordinated advocacy strategy supporting the peace process and addressing biases, stereotypes and historical injustice.** A key factor in the failure of Congress to pass the BBL was the weak public support it generated due to long held prejudices and ignorance of the historical injustices committed to Moros.<sup>15</sup> BASIC partners should work collectively with their partners (including Mindanews) to deliver consistent, clear messaging to build public support and address negative public sentiment that may undermine peace-making efforts, including attempts to pass the new ‘Enabling Law’. The President’s public recognition of the historical injustice committed to the Moros and IPs provides an opportunity to increase support for this information dissemination and advocacy activity. In addition, the recognition by the GPH Implementing Peace Panel that transitional justice and reconciliation is a key activity under the “Annex Normalization Agreement” can serve as the entry point for DFAT to support various institutions and individuals working on transitional justice and reconciliation issues. Current BASIC partners such as TAF, IA, and IAG can be tapped to perform these activities. Other institutions such as the Philippine Center for Islam and Democracy (PCID), Indigenous Peoples Development (IPDev) Foundation, Ateneo de Davao University, and Miriam College’s Center for Peace Education also have the expertise to engage in such information dissemination and advocacy work.

31. **Increase coordination of BASIC partners.** DFAT should more regularly convene joint meetings with BASIC partners to better coordinate their advocacy efforts and respond more effectively to changes in context. To ensure efforts are locally-led, DFAT should see itself as an engaged facilitator rather than a manager, drawing BASIC partners together

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<sup>15</sup>Refer to TAF’s discussion of the results of the SWS public opinion survey on the BBL and the Mamasapano incident in its monograph entitled, “Filipino Public Opinion on the Bangsamoro Basic Law and the Mamasapano Incident” (SWS February, March and June 2015 Surveys).

regularly to develop common positions. Immediate priorities DFAT should encourage should include: developing a shared communication strategy to address the new context; sharing lessons learnt on implementing programs during the adjustment period; soliciting suggestions on how to support the new government's peace roadmap; and facilitating DFAT gender training to move BASIC partners beyond collecting sex disaggregated data to better integrating gender sensitivity into their programs and M&E frameworks.

32. **Focus BASIC partners on areas of core comparative advantage.** To maximize their effectiveness, including by spending more resources on delivering a coordinated advocacy strategy, BASIC partners should be encouraged to suspend non-core areas of programming (e.g. IA's cross-border trade work and Oxfam's livelihoods work). Their core interventions should be based on their respective areas of strength. IA should focus on further improving its conflict monitoring system and influencing government programming. TAF should move from piloting its decade-long work on local dispute resolution mechanisms to lobbying government to institutionalise them. TAF and IAG should draw on their access to expertise to enhance discussions on federalism. Oxfam and WeAct1325 should maximize their efforts to promote women's empowerment and participation in the peace process, particularly for IP women.

33. **Find opportunities to raise the profile of promising conflict management tools.** To ensure conflict management tools explored by BASIC partners, in particular on *rido* (TAF) and 'shadow economies' (IA), can be taken to scale, DFAT and BASIC partners should look for opportunities to promote them to key policy-making audiences. BASIC partners should encourage government agencies to work with them on pilots in specific flashpoint areas (e.g. Aleosan, Upi, Pikit, Datu Piang) with a view to scaling-up. DFAT's recent agreement with CHD to develop horizontal conflict management tools in Sulu is a promising initiative that offers additional entry points to the region. DFAT should encourage TAF, IA and CHD to discuss how horizontal conflict management tools could be scaled up and institutionalized across conflict-affected areas. In supporting the expansion of local and/or customary conflict management systems, partners should be encouraged to ensure their efforts do not erode gains made in gender equality.

34. **Embed a stronger gender-sensitive approach across BASIC.** A gender-sensitive approach to peace-building remains a crucial determinant of BASIC's ability to deliver inclusive and sustainable outcomes. BASIC's current approach does not go far enough. DFAT should encourage IA, TAF and IAG to move beyond collecting sex-disaggregated data to actively and systematically analysing opportunities for their work to change power relationships and inequalities between women, men, boys and girls. DFAT should conduct a second round of training for BASIC partners on gender-sensitive approaches to programming, including designing and reporting on gender sensitive qualitative indicators to improve understanding and integration of gender.

35. **Deliver more targeted gender-inclusive programming gender-inclusive under BASIC.** BASIC partners should draw on their existing programs and partnerships to take up opportunities to change power relationships and inequalities between women, men, boys and girls. The review team identified a number of opportunities BASIC partners could take up within their existing objectives, including: 1) TAF scaling up women's participation in informal horizontal conflict management systems; 2) TAF and IAG supporting analysis into gender-inclusive governance and decision-making for advocacy in discussions about different prospective forms of federalism; 3) TAF and IA conducting further advocacy at

national and provincial levels on gender-inclusive governance; 4) IAG working with male LGU leaders to challenge, not entrench, gender stereotypes; 5) IAG and WeAct1325 facilitating access for women's groups, IP's and other vulnerable groups to participate in the planning, budgeting and delivery of local-level services, taking into consideration the implications for women's security and their often disproportionate care burdens; and 6) Oxfam and WEAct1325 broadening support for implementation of the Philippines National Action Plan on Women Peace and Security by promoting a unified platform of gender interests among different women's organisations across class and religious lines (e.g., elite, rural and IP women, women with disability and female headed households).

If DFAT continues funding BASIC partners after June 2017, additional activities could also include: a) IAG and WeAct1325 facilitating access for local women's groups and IP organisations to participate in the planning and delivery of services, taking into consideration the implications for women's security and their often disproportionate care burdens; b) TAF, IAG and WEAct1325 focus on policy advocacy on gender-sensitive governance targeting provincial and municipal governments, barangays and local boards; and c) WeAct1325 scaling up their support to GPMN and linking it to IA's conflict monitoring system.

### **Part B: Future Programming**

36. **Strengthen Australian Government alignment.** DFAT, in consultation with other relevant Australian agencies, should update its Mindanao Delivery Strategy to reflect new political realities and ensure that BASIC and other Australian programs, such as the Education Pathways to Peace in Conflict-Affected Areas of Mindanao (PATHWAYS), are aligned.

37. **Strengthen inclusivity and gender-sensitivity of DFAT programming.** To ensure more sustainable outcomes, all DFAT programming in Mindanao should be based on sound analysis, including of gender, indigeneity, ethnicity and ability. Taking a gender perspective also requires critical examination of the roles and experiences of men and boys in peacebuilding. Changing the beliefs and attitudes of individuals requires the transformation of the institutions and structures that reinforce these patriarchal gender norms, including educational, legal and cultural institutions. Australia has an opportunity to support that transformation through the BASIC and PATHWAYS programs, where support for new curriculum could also address notions of masculinity that drive conflict, and active dialogues between women and men can begin to restructure the drivers of gender inequality. DFAT should incorporate gender responsive economic recovery into other DFAT investments in conflict-affected areas in Mindanao (e.g. Economic and Infrastructure Facilities)<sup>16</sup>. DFAT should also consider how to better integrate the *2015-2020 Development for All Strategy* into the BASIC program.

38. **Further strengthen conflict and gender-sensitivity in the PATHWAYS program.** The Review Team found a consistent, wide recognition of BEAM-ARMM's positive role in supporting peace through basic education. As its successor, PATHWAYS has an opportunity

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<sup>16</sup> For example, a 2013 study of UNDP economic recovery programs in six post-conflict countries found that less than four per cent of economic recovery spending was allocated to furthering women's economic empowerment and gender equality or meeting women's needs (Douglas, 2015). Investment in gender-responsive economic recovery leads to important results for the whole society.

to build on existing goodwill to act as a flagship for Australia's efforts in supporting peace and as a catalyst for wider educational reform. There is strong evidence that inclusive education and curriculum reform can reduce disparity and positively influence peace-building (Nayler, 2015; Thompson, 2015). PATHWAYS should look for opportunities to implement recommendations of the TJRC Report (2016) on addressing historical injustice, grievances and land dispossession. Australia should continue to promote disability-inclusive education, by removing physical barriers through our infrastructure investments, and work with partner governments to enhance access to services. Implementing these recommendations may require adjusting PATHWAYS' monitoring and evaluation framework.

39. **Promote continuity of existing support mechanisms while uncertainty over peace road map architecture is resolved.** Given the ongoing uncertainty of the peace processes DFAT should ensure it continues to support sustained peacebuilding efforts at both national and community levels. DFAT should extend funding for BASIC if it looks likely there will be a gap in NGO support after June 2017 and for the MTF after December 2016 while the GPH determines which multi-donor mechanism it would like to use. DFAT should communicate this commitment early to partners.

40. **Continue to work flexibly at multiple levels of the peace process.** In the context of significant policy uncertainty on the GPH peace road map, the Review Team assessed Australia's current strategy of working to influence a political settlement through national (PAPP, FASTRAC, HRODF, CfC) and local (BASIC partners) levels, as well as delivering a 'peace dividend' in communities across Mindanao (through MTR, BEAM-ARMM), remains appropriate. There is strong evidence that the focus of other development partners on national level conflict has failed to transform major sources of violence (WB-IOM 2016, p. vii). BASIC's design correctly assessed that there were potential spoilers that were not yet being reached or incorporated into peace processes (e.g. LGUs). As the peace process evolves, additional actors will become important, necessitating a flexible approach able to work at multiple levels.

41. **Advocate for centralized GPH (OPAPP) coordination of donors.** There is currently no coordination mechanism for the multiple multilateral agencies, bilateral donors and international NGOs working in Mindanao. While DFAT should advocate to preserve its legitimate interests in choosing which sectors it will support, it should advocate for OPAPP to play a leadership role in enhancing sharing and planning among donors to minimize inefficiencies and overlap.

42. **Widen technical assistance to both MILF and other Moro peace-builders.** FASTRAC should more broadly support the more inclusive peace process envisaged by the new GPH. Australia should join like-minded in advocating to allow an expansion of focus in FASTRAC to build the technical capacity of both the MILF and other groups to participate in the peace process. Further, DFAT should advocate for FASTRAC to be sufficiently flexible to provide technical capacity building activities to support the development of alternative models of autonomy (including federalism) should the BBL negotiations fail. Australia should only deliver any such assistance under multi-donor funding arrangements approved by GPH in order to minimize risks.

43. **Start shifting multi-donor funds engaged in community-driven development from confidence building measures to inclusive socio-economic development.** While confidence-building measures are necessary in sustaining the peace process at the political

level between the government and the Moro rebels, poor and conflict-affected communities have consistently identified livelihood activities and access to social services such as education and health as among their most important needs.<sup>17</sup> The Multi-Donor Trust Fund (MTF) has worked over several years to build trust of the MILF to deliver community-driven development activities in MILF communities. Most of these areas were also previous recipients of community cash grants to build basic social infrastructure such as school classrooms, barangay health centers, farm-to-market roads, potable water project, etc. under the ARMM Social Fund Project (ASFP). Many are covered by the “Conditional Cash Transfer” project of the government. What is lacking, as articulated in the needs assessment of conflict areas, are jobs that will provide sustainable income for community members. Though jobs cannot ensure absence of violent conflict, they can contribute to stabilization because they enhance confidence on a better future for poor communities. Australia should join advocacy with like-mindeds to ensure the MTF is extended to 2017 until a new fund is operationalized. Our advocacy should ensure that, as far as possible, current implementing partners and engagement be maintained under a new fund. The review team does not recommend funding the Bangsamoro Development Assistance Fund (BDAF) until MNLF expresses clearer priorities.

44. **Continue to provide bilateral funding to strengthen civil society.** The efforts of BASIC partners to mitigate violence and maintain support for the process in the face of the public backlash over the Mamasapano incident and subsequent failure of the Aquino administration to pass the BBL highlighted the important role a strong civil society could play in supporting peace. In the context of significant uncertainty regarding the formal peace-building architecture under the new Duterte Administration, civil society can play an adaptive role. Should the peace process deteriorate, its efforts could act as a bulwark against further violence. Should the peace process progress, it can advocate for a more inclusive national framework that takes account of local concerns.

45. **Scale up local conflict management tools and seek to implement them systematically.** Horizontal conflict will continue to be a feature of the Bangsamoro, even in the event of a negotiated peace. It will be essential to take tools for managing local conflict and work to integrate them into formal systems for a lasting reduction in violence. BASIC partners IA and TAF (and CHD) are well placed, and should be encouraged to work collaboratively, on this effort.

46. **Conduct ongoing analysis of conflict dynamics.** Even in the event of a successful ‘convergence’ of peace agreements in Mindanao into the implementation stage, significant challenges will continue to emerge, including: managing trauma, normalization (disarmament, demobilization and reintegration), security sector reform, addressing historical grievances and injustices<sup>18</sup>, promoting national reconciliation, shifting gender roles, supporting displaced communities and providing a visible peace dividend. Horizontal conflicts and transnational crime, including violent extremism, are likely to continue. Ongoing analysis will ensure DFAT is poised to respond appropriately to changing dynamics.

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<sup>17</sup>Refer to World Bank. 2005. Joint Needs Assessment of Conflict Affected Areas in Mindanao. Manila: WB. The findings of the needs assessment were also validated by the, Bangsamoro Development Agency. 2014. Bangsamoro Development Plan. Cotabato City.

<sup>18</sup> See 2015 TJRC report.

47. These options could be pursued by adjusting the balance of activities within DFAT's forecast budget allocations, though more funding could widen their impact.



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## **Annex A**

### **Strategic Review of Australia's Support for Peace in Mindanao**

#### **Review Mission Interviews**

##### *Australian Embassy*

Mat Kimberley, Deputy Head of Mission  
Tim Smith, First Secretary  
Dwan Mei Dumas, Senior Program Manager  
Shannen Ann Enriquez, Program Manager  
Tom Parks, Governance and Fragility Specialist (Bangkok)  
Lt Col Tim Lopsik, Assistance Defence Attaché  
Mr Anthony Maguire, Team Leader, Australian Federal Police  
Daniel Featherston, Economic Councillor  
Richard Rodgers, Political Counsellor  
Dr Paul Hutchcroft, Lead Governance Specialist  
Nigel Bruce, First Secretary, Education  
Peter Carreon, Senior Program Officer, Education

##### *Philippine Centre for Islam and Democracy*

Amina Rasul-Bernardo

##### *Magbassa Kita Foundation Inc.*

Parisya H. Taradji, Executive Director

##### *The World Bank*

Matt Stephens, Senior Social Development Specialist  
Bane Agbon, Consultant

##### *Delegation of the European Union to the Philippines*

Edoardo Manfredini, Program Manager  
Emily M. Mercado, Programme Officer, Operations Section

##### *GZO Peace Institute*

Karen N. Tanada

##### *Centre for Peace Education*

Jasmin Nario-Galace, Executive Director

##### *Oxfam*

Justin Morgan, Country Director

##### *UNDP*

Titon Mitra, Country Director  
Alma Evangelista, Team Leader, Resilience and Peacebuilding Unit  
Chetan Kumar, Senior Policy Advisor, Conflict Prevention

*Japan International Cooperation Agency*

Yuko Tanaka, Senior Representative, Human Security Group

Maiko Morizane, Representative, Human Security Group

*Embassy of Canada*

Stephen Weaver, Counsellor (Development) and Head of Cooperation

Elizabeth Baldwin-Jones, Counsellor, Political and Public Affairs

Brian Post, First Secretary (Development)

*Transitional Justice and Reconciliation Commission (TJRC)*

Atty Cecil Jimenez

*International Alert*

Francesco 'Pancho' Lara, Country Director

Nikki de la Rosa, Deputy Country Director

Ruel Punongbayan, Program Manager,

Kloe Carvajal, Program Manager

Markus Meyer, Programme Manager South- & Southeast Asia

*Government of the Philippines*

Bai Sandra Sema, Deputy Speaker for Mindanao

*Institute for Autonomy and Governance*

Atty Benny Bacani, Executive Director

Jacque Fernandez, Deputy Executive Director

ReyDan Lacson, PRO Politics Project Manager

*The Asia Foundation*

Steven Rood, Country Director

*Centre for Humanitarian Dialogue*

Bong Montessa, Country Director

Suzanne Damman, Project Manager

Ibrahim Badiee, Project Officer

Michael Vatikiotis, Regional Director, Asia

*Embassy of Japan*

Yudai Ueno, First Secretary; Member of the International Contract Group

Bumpei Sugano, Second Secretary, Economics Section

*Office of the Presidential Advisor on the Peace Process (OPAPP)*

Atty. Nabil A. Tan, Undersecretary

Rolly B. Asuncion, Assistant Secretary for Policy and Programs

Arvin Chua, Director

*IAG Beneficiaries*

Amina Dalandag, Maguindanao DILG Provincial Director

*MILF Central Committee*

Sammy Almansur, MILF Military Vice-Chairman and Head of the Bangsamoro Islamic Armed Forces

*MILF Implementation Peace Panel*

Mohagher Iqbal, MILF Implementation Team Head/former MILF Peace Panel Chair

Melanio Ulama, MILF Implementation Team representative of IPs

Said Sheik, MILF Implementation Team Member

Jun Mantawil, Panel Member

Muhajirin Ali, Panel Member

Atty. Lai Dumama

Abdullah Cusain

Atty Lanang Ali

Haron Meling

Abu Khaled

*The Asia Foundation (Cotabato Office) and partner organisations*

Noraida Chio, Senior Program Officer

Aisha Midtanggal, Assistant Program Officer

Anwar Saluwang – United Youth for Peace and Development (UNYPAD)

Froilyn Mendoza and Romeo Saliga – Teduray Lambangian Women’s Organisation (TLWOI)

Baina Samayatin – Moro Women Development and Cultural Centre (MWDECC)

Samsodin Amella – Mindanao Action for Peace and Development Initiatives (MAPAD)

Kusain Amino – Kadtabanga Foundation for Peace and Development Advocates, Inc (KFPDAI)

Hamsa Landayan – Local Initiatives for Peace and Development (LIPAD)

Tungko B. Tadtagan – Bangsamoro Centre for Just Peace in the Philippines (BCJP)

Datuali U. Ibrahim – Action for Advancement and Development of Mindanao (AFADMin)

*Community and Family Services, International*

Steven Muncy, Executive Director, CFSI

Noraida Abdullah Karim, Director for Mindanao Programme

*OXFAM and partner organisations and beneficiaries*

Noel Pedrola, Programme Officer, OXFAM

Rena Ong, Business Support Manager, OXFAM

Noraisa Sani, Project Officer Al Mujadilah Development Foundation

Dayang Karna Bahidjan, Project Officer WEACT 1325

Noraida Abo, Executive Director, United Youth of the Philippines Women (Unyphil Women)

Jurma Tikmasan, Executive Director, Tarbilang Foundation Inc

Marcial Jontong, Finance Officer OXFAM

*ARMM Board of Investments and Bangsamoro Study Group*

Atty. Ishak Mastura

*US Embassy*

Teresa Grantham, Mindanao Officer, First Secretary (Political)

Christopher Foley, Deputy Chief, Office of Program Resources Management

Gil Dy-Liacco, Head, Portfolio Management Unit, Office of Program Resources Management  
Bernadette Cariaga, Development Assistance Specialist for Evaluation and Gender, Office of Program Resources Management  
Gerardo Porta, Project Management Specialist for Democracy and Governance, Office of Economic Development and Governance  
Consuelo Anonuevo, Project Development Specialist for Family Planning and Maternal and Child Health, Office of Health

*Centre for Peace and Conflict Studies*

Emma Leslie, Executive Director

*International Alert partner organisations and beneficiaries*

Ruel Punongbayan, Programme Manager

Delfin Borrero, Advocacy Manager

Mohammad Abas

Aldahas Kanakan

Sahara Mama

Yusoph Palawan

Lininding Alim

*UK Embassy*

Rupert Compston, First Secretary (Political and Security)

## **Annex B**

### **Strategic Review of Australia's Support for Peace in Mindanao**

#### **Terms of Reference**

##### **Terms of Reference for Strategic Review of Australia's Support for Peace in Muslim Mindanao Version: 16 August 2016**

#### **Background**

The Philippines is home to two of the longest-running insurgencies in the world: Muslim rebel groups fighting for autonomy in central and western Mindanao and a communist insurgency found throughout many parts of the country. A milestone was reached in the peace process between the Government of the Philippines (GPH) and the Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF) in March 2014 with the signing of a peace agreement, the Comprehensive Agreement on the Bangsamoro (CAB).

A proposed Bangsamoro Basic Law (BBL) was drafted to give effect to this peace agreement and was considered amongst the most important pieces of legislation that the Aquino administration sought to pass in its remaining time in government. The bill ultimately failed to pass in the final session of Congress before the May 2016 elections. This was due in no small part to the political fallout following the killing of 44 Philippine National Police officers in early 2015 in Mamasapano by a force that reportedly included MILF fighters.

Fears that the failure to pass the BBL would result in a return to large-scale conflict have not yet been realised. The MILF leadership has restated its commitment to the peace process and is preparing to engage with a new administration. The starting point for its negotiations with the new administration will be the CAB, which the MILF considers akin to 'treaty status', and – in an ideal scenario – the BBL.

In late July 2016 the Duterte administration released its 'Bangsamoro Peace and Development Roadmap', which outlines in broad terms the government's next steps. These are:

- convergence of the disparate stakeholders in the Bangsamoro (MILF, Moro National Liberation Front, Indigenous Peoples, Local Government Units etc.);
- consolidation of all existing agreements on the Bangsamoro and implementation through a new enabling law (in lieu of the BBL);
- putting aside any constitutional issues until a Constitutional Convention;
- approval by Congress of the new law and establishment of a new 'Bangsamoro Governance structure'.

The Government has highlighted the following themes that underpin the roadmap:

- inclusivity, ongoing dialogue and confidence building;
- accelerated delivery of socio-economic programs in conflict-affected communities;

- constituency building and advocacy for the peace process, particularly outside Mindanao and among non-Moro; and
- marketing of the roadmap to all stakeholders.

Much of the peace ‘architecture’, such as international bodies, is yet to be defined. As well as the above peace process, the government is reinvigorating peace negotiations with Communist groups and pursuing constitutional reforms that would create an as yet undefined ‘federal’ Philippine state.

### **Australia’s Support for Peace in Muslim Mindanao**

Australia’s support for peace in Muslim Mindanao is currently delivered through the following partners and activities:

#### *Building Autonomous and Stable Institutions and Communities in the Bangsamoro (BASIC Bangsamoro) activities (\$5.5 million, 2014-2017)*

1. *International Alert: Building Legitimate Institutions for a Durable Peace: Minimizing Conflict Risks and Maximizing Peace Dividends in the Bangsamoro (\$2 million, October 2014 – June 2017)*

- working with three grassroots organisations: PAILIG Development Foundation, LUPAH Sug Bangsamoro Women's Association and TASBIKKA Inc.
- activities include neutralising the spread of firearms, harnessing development potential of cross-border trade in Sulu Sea, sustaining support to the peace process, providing real time conflict data from Alert's Bangsamoro Conflict Monitoring System, strengthening peace advocacy networks, working with Ulama, land and clan mapping to address issues of violent conflict and clan feuding.

*NOTE:* International Alert is, under the same agreement, delivering additional support to the peace process worth \$1.5 million.

2. *The Asia Foundation: Building Autonomous and Stable Institutions and Communities for Bangsamoro Advancement through National-level and Grassroots Organisation and Networks (B-BANGON) (\$1.4 million, November 2014 – June 2017)*

- working with 28 organisations with strong networks in Mindanao, the project aims to strengthen local mechanisms to avert escalation of local conflict and ensure that the peace process is widely supported
- components include research and analysis, media engagement for responsible and inclusive reporting, advocacy and outreach, inventory and scoping of conflict and ensure formal-informal coordination on local conflict management.

3. *Oxfam: Building Autonomous and Stable Institutions and Communities Through Socially Cohesive, Transparent, Accountable and Responsive Transition in the Bangsamoro (\$0.9 million, November 2014 – June 2017)*

- working with six women’s organisations (We Act 1325 and partner members) to advance women's participation and leadership in conflict resolution and peacebuilding

- activities include building capacity of women in conflict resolution and peacebuilding, completion of an action research on women's security; on-going review and assessment of the Local National Action Plan on women, peace and security and implementation of peace and development projects by women.
4. *The Institute for Autonomy and Governance: Promoting Political Climate and Stability for Peace in the Bangsamoro* (\$1.2 million, December 2014 – June 2017)
- the project aims to build support among local political leaders for the peace process, technical assistance in the development of the local governance and security framework, supporting the peace and order councils and linking local government units and normalisation bodies
  - working with three organisations – Philippine Center for Islam and Democracy (PCID), Local Government Development Foundation (LOGODEF), and Zamboanga Basilan Integrated Development Alliance (ZABIDA).

Multilateral activities

5. *Facility for Advisory Support for Transition Capacities (FASTRAC): joint UNDP and World Bank initiative* (\$2.3 million, April 2013 – June 2017)
- in support of peace negotiations and a subsequent peace agreement, provides technical assistance and advice on key issues in the transition to the Bangsamoro as determined by the GPH and MILF Peace Negotiating Panels and the Bangsamoro Transition Commission (BTC)
  - provides national and international expertise and advice to the BTC, Joint Normalisation Commission (JNC), The Transitional Justice and Reconciliation Commission (TJRC) and other associated bodies on key issues in the Bangsamoro such as governance, economic development, public administration, justice, combatant transition and security
  - funds public consultations and roundtable discussions on key policy changes for the Bangsamoro Basic Law (BBL).
6. *Mindanao Trust Fund (World Bank): World Bank administered trust fund* (\$3.36 million, June 2005 – December 2016)
- supported the drafting of the Bangsamoro Development Plan (BDP), agreed by the GPH and the MILF
  - the Reconstruction and Development Program supports four activities: Community Driven Development (CDD)/Community Driven Reconstruction (CDR); a livelihoods component, the Program for Local Economic Development through Enhanced Governance and Grassroots Empowerment (PLEDGE); operational costs for the MILF Project Management Team for the Sajahatra Bangsamoro program, a joint GPF-MILF activity aimed at improving health, education, and livelihood conditions of MILF communities
  - in December 2015, new programs were approved such as community development and livelihood assistance from December 2015 to December 2016 through the Bangsamoro ADVANCE program to provide: (i) assistance communities in the area of the six acknowledged camps and 25 Base Commands of the MILF; (ii) additional support for vulnerable groups in the area of the six



Camps; and (iii) technical assistance to the parties to design a Program Management Office/Executive Secretariat for Normalization.

#### Bilateral activities

7. *Office of the Presidential Advisor on the Peace Process (OPAPP)*: (\$0.5 million, June 2014 – June 2016)

- direct funding to enable OPAPP to deliver on the peace process, including through public awareness campaigns.

#### Activities delivered through other programs

##### *Human Resource and Organisational Development Facility (HRODF)*:

HRODF provides a suite of human resource and organisational development training. It helps the Bangsamoro Development Agency (BDA), the Bangsamoro Leadership and Management Institute (BLMI) and the Department of Education ARMM improve their processes, structures, skills set, and behaviours to enable positive change and continuous improvement thereby enabling better services delivery.

HRODF also delivers an in-country scholarship program. The pilot cohort was focused in conflict-affected areas in Mindanao with the view to build up a body of officials who can provide the services expected from and delivered by a new Bangsamoro government.

##### *Coalitions for Change (CfC)*:

The CfC program seeks to foster collaboration between civil society stakeholders and government to pursue policy development and implementation for economic growth and poverty reduction.

For Bangsamoro, CfC works to broaden the peace constituency by building coalitions among business community and civil society stakeholders to encourage wider consultation and support for the peace process. It also aims to facilitate the normalisation process during and after the transition by consolidating the rule of law in partnership with security sector institutions.

### **Objective**

The review serves as the mandated mid-term review of the bilateral BASIC Bangsamoro program. It is, however, formative in nature and will inform the future direction of Australia's bilateral activities and broader support for peace and stability. It will assess the effectiveness of Australia's support for peace in Muslim Mindanao to date, and its appropriateness in the context of the change in the Philippine administration and the new leadership, policies and institutional environment this entails.

It will help DFAT answer the question: what can we learn from the challenges faced in the political process to inform our interventions going forward?

### **Scope**

The review will consider the implementation of the above support to the peace process, including project outcomes, and assess the extent to which these activities remain appropriate in the new political context.

The primary recipient for the report is DFAT management. Implementing partners will also be provided with the report and constitute a secondary audience.

## Criteria

The review will address the following criteria and (indicative) questions:

Effectiveness: *Are we achieving the results that we expected at this point in time?*

- a) How well did each partner adapt to the changing political context? Were opportunities missed?
- b) Is each activity on-track to meet its outcomes and objectives?
- c) Is the program as a whole addressing the drivers of conflict and violence? Does it meet the 'do no harm' standard?
- d) What is the impact of the research activities being supported? Have these been used to inform policies and programs?
- e) Is the program as a whole making progress as expected in effectively promoting gender equality and women's empowerment?
- f) Are activities well-aligned with other Australian aid interventions in Muslim Mindanao?

Relevance: *Is this still the right thing to do?*

- g) How well have current programs adapted in response to the change in context? Are there programs/partners that are no longer relevant?
- h) What new initiatives/objectives/partners are needed to support the formal peace process under the Duterte Government?
- i) Can/should more be done to integrate countering violent extremism activities?
- j) To what extent do the programs support regional security and economic growth?

Based on evidence against these criteria, the review should make recommendations regarding the utility of further funding for programs assessed. The review should also make recommendations for improvements that could be made over the remaining implementation period as well as how the program can best adapt to the changing context now and in the future.

## Methodology

While the specific methodologies will be determined by the review team in consultation with Manila Post, it is expected that the review will cover the following approaches:

- Document review (as per reference list)
- Key informant interviews (suggested list below)
- Program field visits to project locations (suggestions below)

Manila Post will provide a briefing to the team on the political context prior to the review mission.

## Outputs/ Deliverables

The review team will produce:

1. A debriefing presentation for Embassy staff on the mission's findings
2. A draft report outlining the assessment and recommendations, submitted by 17 October. The report should be no more than 15 pages long and include an executive summary of no more than two pages.
3. A final report by 4 November.

## Indicative Timeframe

The consultation and field visits will take place in the Philippines for 10 working days starting on 19 September 2016.

| Review Phase & Actions   | Location            | Indicative Days          | Indicative Dates                        |
|--|---------------------|--------------------------|---|
| <b>1. <u>Inception</u></b> <ul style="list-style-type: none"><li>• Review Documents</li><li>• Briefing with DFAT (via telecon)</li><li>• Draft evaluation plan</li></ul> |                     | 3 working days           | Week of<br>22-26 August<br>17 September |
| <b>2. <u>Consultation/ Program Field visit</u></b>   | Manila,<br>Cotabato | 9 working days           | 19-29 September                         |
| <b>3. <u>Presentation of Aide Memoir</u></b>   | Manila              | 1 day                    | 30 September                            |
| <b>4. <u>Drafting</u></b>  |                     | Up to 10<br>working days |   |
| <b>5. <u>Submission of First Draft</u></b>   |                     |                          | 17 October                              |
| <b>6. <u>Draft and Final Report</u></b> <ul style="list-style-type: none"><li>• DFAT and NGO partner comments on draft report</li><li>• Report finalised</li></ul>       |                     |                          | 17-25 October<br>4 November             |

## Suggested list of organisations/people to be consulted

- Implementing partners: including organisations with which DFAT has funding agreements, relevant subsidiary partners and other relevant organisations
- Other donors/UN agencies: UK, EU, Norway, Japan
- Philippines representatives: GPH representatives, representatives of the parties to peace agreements, IP organisations, sub-national government stakeholders
- Australian Government: Relevant staff and management in Manila

## Team Composition/Roles

- Dr Fermin Adriano (Team Leader)

- Responsible for leading the team in meetings with interlocutors; drafting; and coordinating team inputs to the final report.
- Mr Robin Bednall
  - Responsible for DFAT-specific advice to the team and inputs to the final report, including on peace, conflict and CVE policy; editing to ensure the final report is fit for purpose for DFAT; and other inputs as agreed with the review team.
- Dr Sophia Close (Peace and Gender specialist)
  - Responsible for peace and gender specific inputs to the final report, developed in consultation with team members; and other inputs as agreed with the review team.

### **Reference Documents**

- DFAT design documents
- Partner design documents
- Partner reporting
- DFAT quality reporting

## Annex C

### Evaluation Matrix – Performance of BASIC Partners Against Review Criteria

| Evaluation Criteria based on TOR   | Institute for Autonomy and Governance (IAG)   | International Alert (IA)   | Oxfam/WEAct1325  | The Asia Foundation (TAF)   |
|--|---|--|--|---|
| <b>Effectiveness</b>   |   |  |  |   |
| <b>1) Adjustment to changing political context</b>                                       | Adjustments to the activities were made but original thrusts of (a) promoting greater LGU participation in the peace process, and (b) determining LGU administrative role within an autonomous region were retained. Reason for continuing efforts was to maintain peace and stability at the LGU/community level given failure of the BBL to pass. | Focus of work alternative mechanisms that will ensure stability at the ground level despite non-passage of the BBL and continued work on conflict prevention stemming from operations of “shadow economy”, and clan conflict ( <i>rido</i> )   | No explicit change in activities was made. Its accomplishment report noted that “despite the changes in external context, .... Project remains relevant” (page 15 of 1 Jan to 30 June 2016 accomplishment report).   | Intensified effort in building and strengthening peace constituency among key stakeholders, such as the MILF and the MNLF. IPs, AFP and PNP, LGU officials, CSOs and women’s groups, given the failure of the passage of the BBL. Continuation of local level conflict mediation and peacebuilding addressing horizontal conflicts (i.e., <i>rido</i> ) which have direct bearing on the peace process between the government and the Moros.  |
| <b>2) Attaining outcomes and objectives</b>  | Workshops/forums/ meetings were conducted to attain objectives. They led to greater participation of LGUs to the BBL but not necessarily their buy-in particularly in the province of Sulu.   | Effective advocacy work achieved through thematic mapping of legislators on their stand on BBL (during its deliberations) and disseminating results of the analyses and position papers of IA on BBL and the peace process. While issue of trade embargo imposed by Malaysian between Sabah and the islands of Tawi-Tawi and Sulu and its negative impacts were raised to concerned Philippine authorities, it was beyond the implementing partner’s capacity to influence GPH decisions on the matter. Also, despite efforts to stem trade and use of illicit weapons, it was beyond the capacity of the implementing partner to achieve significant headway on this concern. | WEAct1325 successfully incorporated 28 provisions in the BBL protecting women’s rights and promoting greater women’s participation in the peace process. Project proponent was an active partner in the series of consultation activities sponsored by the high-level Peace Councils created by the previous President advocating for women’s leadership role in the peace process. However, tensions were noted between national level women’s advocacy and local (Bangsamoro) women’s advocacy groups because of the different contexts within which they operate. | Analytical papers were produced and disseminated to peace stakeholders; numerous workshops/ forums were sponsored with key stakeholders (including key personnel from the police and Philippine Armed Forces) participating; regular information dissemination through media partners (Mindanews) were also undertaken. Conflict mediation on a number of <i>rido</i> cases was successfully achieved. However, linkage with TAF’s CfC was not fully utilized for more effective advocacy work. |
| <b>3) Addressing drivers of conflict and violence. Comply with “do no harm” standard</b> | Effectively allayed the fears of LGUs, a potential spoiler, helping to prevent protests or violence.<br><br>“Do no harm” used in Sulu when IAG did not insist of  | Project activities addressed drivers of conflict stemming from operations of “shadow economies”. Its activities were informed by the results of the conflict monitoring system thereby   | Forums/ workshops/ meetings conducted were able to identify drivers of conflict among participants. Some of the women participants trained had become  | Activities were geared toward addressing drivers of conflict, particularly <i>rido</i> . Traditional leaders and traditional dispute mechanisms were utilized in conflict mediation.  |

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|   | pushing for “normalization” agenda given the strong position of the LGU that there were no MILF camps in the province and hence, normalization is not relevant. Discussion was shifted to supporting the peace effort at the provincial and community levels.  | enhancing relevance and timeliness of its conflict interventions. Conflict prevention was strengthened by the use of traditional conflict mediation mechanisms tapping assistance of traditional leaders in the community. Part of the goal is to use CVI measures to prevent violent extremism, instead of explicit CVE that may alienate community.   | leaders in their community and 22 women and 59 men were trained to revive the Grassroots Peace Monitoring Network (GPMN).   |   |
| <b>4) Impact of research: input to inform policies and programs</b> | Analyses and position papers were shared with the MILF and GPH negotiating panel members and legislators. Provincial LGUs in ARMM adopted recommendations coming from workshops of POCs conducted at different levels. Papers were posted in the IAG website for public access.  | Results of studies and position papers were disseminated to inform the “gun control law” debate in the country. Results of conflict monitoring study were widely disseminated to GPH and development partners to serve as one of the inputs in their programming work in conflict areas. The studies were also made available in the IA website.  | Action research and two policy studies undertaken and used internally for lobbying. Results of and position papers from women’s workshops/ forums were disseminated to key stakeholders in the peace process. A training manual for women’s participation in peace processes was designed and published.  | Research results were widely disseminated to key stakeholders; media dissemination was effective and informed debates on provisions of the BBL.   |
| <b>5) Promote gender equality and women’s empowerment</b>           | Deliberate efforts were made to ensure women’s participation in activities. However, whether women participation eventually resulted in them taking a leadership role in the peace process was unclear. Sex disaggregated data was collected for all activities.   | A women’s organization (i.e., Lulah Sug Bangsamoro Women Association) was tapped to assist IA in implementing various components of the project. The group was particularly effective in dispute settlement and conflict resolution and in promoting livelihood programs particularly those involved in the cross border trade between the islands of Tawi Tawi and Sulu, and Sabah. Sex disaggregated data was collected for all activities but the <i>quality</i> of women’s participation was unclear. | Most of project activities revolved around this concern. These activities were successfully implemented resulting in women’s increased participation in peace processes at national and local levels and and 28 points on women’s interests incorporated into the BBL. 8 of 117 trained women ran for national elections with 3 elected. Sex disaggregated data was collected for all activities. | Deliberate effort was made to encourage greater women’s participation in the conversation on the peace process. A number of local women’s groups (both Moros and IPs) served as partners of the project proponent. The impact and quality of these women’s participation is unclear. Sex disaggregated data was collected for all activities. |
| <b>6) Alignment with other Australian programs in Mindanao</b>      | Quarterly meetings were held among the four implementing partners and the Australian project management but it was unclear whether implementing partners benefited from information and experience sharing from those sessions. Overlap was evident in some activities (forums/ workshops on the BBL and the peace process). IAG | There was no deliberate effort to link up with other Australian programs in Mindanao.   | No deliberate effort made to link up with other Australian programs in Mindanao.  | Greater effort should have been exerted in tapping expertise of Coalition for Change (CfC), another project supported by DFAT, to ensure more effective advocacy campaign at the national level. No component on economic growth concern. (i.e., livelihood projects).  |

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|   | made no apparent effort to link with other Australian programs in Mindanao.   |  |   |  |
| <b>Relevance</b>  |   |  |   |  |
| <b>1) Adjustment of current programs to changed environment. Relevance of programs/partners</b> | Adjustments were made but the inherent limitation of sticking to original objectives (i.e., encouraging participation of the LGUs in the BBL discussion and allaying their fears on key provisions pertaining to relationship between BG and LGUs) in the absence of the BBL constrained project relevance. Continued focus on LGUs must be re-examined given the GPH move toward federalism. | Shift to assisting formulating “Enabling Law” was timely and relevant but assistance will have to wait until GPH and MILF panels clarify the mechanisms on how they are going to address this task. Gun control law and cross-border issues need whole-of-government approach to be successful (hence, beyond IA to achieve). IA should re-consider support to cross-border trade agenda given its huge scope. | Adjustment was not made because of the cross-cutting nature of gender as a development and peace concern. Project proponent deemed that objectives remain relevant despite changed context. A focus on gender-sensitive peacebuilding remains a significant challenge and area of need. | Engaging MNLF and the IPs to broaden participation in the peace process was most appropriate given failure of BBL to pass due to perception that it only addresses MILF agenda. Continuing work on <i>rido</i> is justified given previous enormous and ground-breaking work on this issue by project proponent. However, there will be a need to upscale work toward formalizing dispute/conflict mediation mechanisms. |
| <b>2) New initiatives/objectives/partners to support the Duterte peace process</b>              | Implementing partner now engaged in the conversations on federalism with new administration. It has also engaged the new OPAPP leadership, contributing to crafting its broad strategic roadmap for the peace process.  | Involved in the dialogue on federalism and the peace talks with the Communist Party of the Philippines. Should contribute more on the peace process between GPH and the MNLF and IPs.  | Intensification of community peace-building and livelihood activities, through women’s groups, to prevent armed violence from erupting as a result of non-passage of BBL.   | Expanding the peace table to include MNLF and IPs is supportive of the more inclusive thrust of the Duterte administration on the peace process. Project proponent will be a major contributor to the discussion on federalism because of its strength on governance issues.   |
| <b>3) Integrate CVE activities into programs</b>  | CVE concerns were articulated in some of the forums/workshops and ostensibly addressed through IAG’s ‘community peace-building work’, but no specific action was taken.   | This is one of the ongoing activities of the project proponent, though a separate activity from BASIC. However, there is a need for a more in-depth study of the extent and operations of radical groups in rural and urban Bangsamoro communities.  | No specific activities on this concern.   | Unclear whether <i>rido</i> conflict resolution will also address CVE concerns. Project proponent, given its broad local network, is one of the institutions that can successfully conduct a more in-depth analysis of VE.   |
| <b>4) Extent of program support to regional security and economic growth</b>                    | Not included in the project.  | Addressing cross border trade touched on security issues at the border (with Sabah and Sulu and Tawi Tawi) and livelihood opportunities of small time trader, mostly women, engaged in barter trade. Making a significant dent on the issue will require a whole-of-government approach.   | Except for micro livelihood activities (although there is no evidence that this approach is sustainable), there was no deliberate effort exerted along this concern.  | Link between CVE in Mindanao conflict areas and regional security concern was unclear because project proponent activities on CVEs were not systematically laid down though it acknowledged emergence of the threat.   |