**Vanuatu Australia Police Project**

**Independent Progress Report**

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# Aid Activity Summary

| **Aid Activity Name** | **Vanuatu Australia Police Project** | | |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |
| Aid Works initiative number | INJ675 | | |
| Commencement date | February 2011 | Completion date | June 2013 |
| Total Australian $ | $ 16,500,000 | | |
| Total other $ |  | | |
| Delivery organisation(s) | Australian Federal Police | | |
| Implementing Partner(s) | GoV law and justice agencies | | |
| Country/Region | Vanuatu | | |
| Primary Sector | Governance (Law and Justice) | | |

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# Acronyms

AFP Australian Federal Police

AusAID Australian Agency for International Development

CID Criminal Investigation Department

CPU Crime Prevention Unit

CSU Corporate Services Unit

GoV Government of Vanuatu

IDG International Deployment Group

IPR Independent Progress Report

LES Locally Engaged Staff

MoIA Ministry of Internal Affairs

NGO Non-Governmental Organisation

ODE Office of Development Effectiveness

PCC Project Coordination Committee

PMG Program Management Group

TA Technical Assistance

VAPP Vanuatu Australia Police Program

VPF Vanuatu Police Force

VPFCBP Vanuatu Australia Capacity Building Program

WRP Workforce Renewal Program

# Executive Summary

This is the Independent Progress Report (IPR) of the Vanuatu Australia Police Project (VAPP), which was launched in February 2011 and was scheduled to end in June 2013. VAPP followed on from the previous program of support to the Vanuatu Police Force (VPF), the Vanuatu Police Force Capacity Building Project (VPFCBP), which ran 2006-2011. The VAPP was managed and funded by AusAID, and implemented by the Australian Federal Police (AFP).

The IPR Team began its work in Vanuatu on May 2, with the assignment scheduled to end on May 16. Owing to political disagreements between the governments of Australia and Vanuatu, the program was suspended on May 9 2012. Notwithstanding these difficulties, AusAID requested the IPR Team complete its review.

The primary purpose of the Independent Progress Report was to examine the VAPP according to the criteria of effectiveness, efficiency and sustainability. The IPR Team sought to capture progress and lessons from the first year of implementation of the VAPP, ensure the program maximises the sustainability of the VAPP, provide evidence to inform key management decisions regarding future assistance to policing in Vanuatu, and derive lessons from the program that will be of wider relevance to Australia’s country program in Vanuatu and the AFP’s International Deployment Group.

The Independent Progress Report has been written according to an evaluation methodology agreed to by AusAID prior to the in-country mission. The methodology the team used to conduct its work was a mixed-method approach, based upon document review, desk analysis and, fieldwork, which included interviews and focus group discussions. Although the IPR Team was unable to fully complete its schedule of in-country meetings and discussions because the review was truncated, the IPR team is satisfied that it has gathered enough information to present solid conclusions and recommendations.

VAPP’s approach has in many ways paralleled the approach of the five-year VPFCBP that preceded it. This approach combined the deployment of individual police officers as advisers within the VPF combined with funding to pay for infrastructure and logistics projects as well as contributing to VPF running costs.

The program was divided into four areas of support that concentrated on training and professionalization of the VPF; infrastructure, assets and logistics; workforce renewal and internal VPF Governance. Seven long-term advisers were based in country during the program. The program manager doubled as adviser to the VPF Commissioner and others advisers were co-located at the training college, crime prevention unit, southern command headquarters in Port Vila, northern command headquarters in Luganville, and the Corporate Service Unit at VPF headquarters. An additional twenty-three short-term advisers worked on the program at various points since its inception.

In the view of the IPR, the VAPP has generated a number of accomplishments. Two of these achievements are especially notable. VAPP’s funding of the Workforce Renewal Program enabled long-serving officers to be pensioned off and younger cadets to be hired without increasing overall personnel costs. VAPP support has also enabled the VPF to extend its presence in the country in ways that it had previously been able to do. Provision of a boat has given the VPF the means to expand its reach in the northern islands while support for ‘joint patrols’ has enabled the forging of closer relationships between NGO’s, customary authorities, the VPF and the communities for whom it provides service. VAPP co-located its personnel, which was laudable. Additionally, the VAPP has been engaged in the provision of extensive capital infrastructure support, provided over fifty training courses and generated a range of manuals, handbooks and review documents. While each of these contributions are positive steps that strengthen the VPF’s capabilities, it is not clear that they add up to make a completely coherent police development program. The VAPP’s theories of change could not be well articulated to the review team.

The team notes that the empirical evidence is mixed regarding the effectiveness of the VAPP. A recent community perception survey indicated some improvements on the part of the VAPP but, at the same time, pointed to a decline to the overall safety and security situation in Vanuatu, calling into question whether the VAPP’s activities were addressing key concerns. When combined with a study of recent sexual violence cases, it is an open question whether VAPP’s contributions were most relevant to the needs of Vanuatu.

The IPR team has observed that the program’s monitoring and evaluation record has several deficiencies. Although the VAPP instituted a M&E regime, and consistently produced a wealth of informational data, the program’s M&E methodologies mostly recorded various types of outputs – numbers of courses delivered and manuals produced. There is little indication in the VAPP’s M&E system of what outcomes these activities have produced. The VAPP M&E regime did not consistently capture the requisite data with which to demonstrate that its activities contributed to specific outcomes. When outcomes were captured, it appears as if the data was not sufficiently analysed and used by VAPP as the basis upon which to ground its subsequent support activities. The IPR Team notes that the VAPP, reflecting the program’s design, paid little attention to the Ministry of Internal Affairs.

With regard to the efficiency of the VAPP’s approach, the team found that absence of a strategic vision of how to develop the VPF caused the VAPP to be less effective than it should be. Better prioritising its support activities would enable the VAPP to make better development decisions and increase the program’s “value for money.”

The team also found that only a small percentage of advisers’ time was spent providing actual advice and mentoring relating to policing. In fact, the principal role of VAPP advisors revolved around administrative and reporting issues. Employing AFP personnel to undertake these non-policing tasks is inefficient and uneconomical.

The Team approves of the current managerial relationships whereby AusAID directly supervised the AFP’s work but believes that this relationship could be enhanced still further. Linkages between VAPP and other Australian-funded initiatives that touch on law and justice could also be strengthened.

As regards sustainability, the Team found that without continued financial support, many VAPP-funded activities are unlikely to continue and VAPP-funded equipment will not be adequately maintained. With their generous funding, VAPP has created some unrealistic expectations within the VPF of the services it, the VPF, can deliver. It could even be argued that the VAPP has decreased VPF sustainability by creating high expectations and an increased logistical burden. The team found that the VAPP’s ‘police post’ scheme is unsustainable. Significant and enduring Australian monetary support will be required to maintain its current personnel levels and policing activities.

On the grounds of technical aptitude and professional skills necessary for upkeep of equipment provided, many VAPP initiatives appeared to be unsustainable. Some VAPP approaches also seem a poor cultural fit. An inadvertent effect of the VAPP’s funding disbursement model was bitterness on the part of VPF officers, which alienated some key players from the program.

With the VAPP scheduled to end in 2013, the IPR Team recommends a thorough redesign. Should the program be reactivated in the meantime, the IPR Team recommends that there be

* An expansion of workforce renewal program
* Prioritization of VAPP activities with regard to the training college, CSU and Southern Command
* Continuation of the Joint Patrols initiative and review support to current policy of police post expansion
* Language training for advisers and an undertaking to send out documentation in Bislama as well as English.
* The development of a core set of indicators by which to measure the performance of the VAPP
* Increased attention paid to the Ministry of Internal Affairs

Looking towards the end of the VAPP and any new successor program, other activities that the Independent Progress Report team considers that Australian Aid should pursue post-2013 include applied research into

* Prevailing crime trends in order to identify areas of greatest need; and
* The relationship between VPF and customary authorities

Among the lessons that can be derived from the experience of the Vanuatu Australia Police Program and which may be of relevance moving forward into the design of any new program are

* The AusAID-AFP relationship exemplified in Vanuatu is the most appropriate model for Australia’s delivery of policing programs
* Australian policing programs should always be grounded in empirical data, which entails, among other things, an increased focus on violence against women
* Design documents should cost out maintenance commitments
* Police development programs in Vanuatu should prioritize accountability and discipline
* Programs need to evolve with time and prevailing circumstance

# Introduction

## I. Activity Background

This is an Independent Progress Report (IPR) of the Vanuatu Australia Police Project (VAPP), which was launched in February 2011 and was scheduled to end in June 2013. VAPP built on the previous program of support to the Vanuatu Police Force (VPF), the Vanuatu Police Force Capacity Building Project (VPFCBP), which ran 2006-2011. The VAPP was managed, funded by AusAID, and implemented by the Australian Federal Police (AFP). Owing to political disagreements between the governments of Australia and Vanuatu, the program was suspended on May 9 2012 with AFP staff leaving the country the following day.

The discontinuation of the program affected upon this review, occurring as it did just after the midpoint of the IPR Team’s in-country consultations. Notwithstanding these difficulties, AusAID requested the IPR Team complete its review.

AusAID, Vanuatu, assembled the IPR Team. It comprised five people, Gordon Peake (team leader), Arthur Edmanley (Deputy Commissioner, Vanuatu Police Force), Jones Ephraim (Ministry of Internal Affairs), Patrick Hagan (Senior Evaluation Adviser, International Deployment Group, Australian Federal Police) and Eric Scheye (consultant).[[1]](#footnote-1) The IPR team began its assignment in Vanuatu on May 2, 2012 and ended its in-country work on May 10, a total of nine working days. Throughout its work in Vanuatu, the Senior Program Manager, Law and Justice, AusAID, Vanuatu joined the IPR Team. The team was thoroughly briefed on its first day in country by the First Secretary, AusAID and the Counsellor, AusAID.

To conduct the review, the IPR team split into two groups so as to maximise its coverage. The groups met with a wide range of representatives from the VAPP, VPF, civil society organizations, government and community groups in Port Vila, other parts of Efate Island, and Espiritu Santo. As per the Terms of Reference the two teams concentrated on issues pertaining to effectiveness and efficiency of the VAPP approach, and its sustainability. The Team received candid and frank feedback from many stakeholders with whom that it met.

This IPR Report is divided into three main sections entitled Introduction; Evaluation Findings; and Conclusions, Recommendations, and Lessons Learned. The Introduction lays out the objectives of the evaluation, the methodology that the IPR Team used in order to accomplish those aims, and the context within which the review took place. The Evaluation Findings section is broken down into three parts. These examine, respectively, the IPR Team’s analysis of the program’s effectiveness, efficiency and its sustainability. The concluding section is divided into three parts. The first part sums up the results of the IPR team’s review, followed by a series of practical and pragmatic changes which the IPR Team recommends VAPP introduces between now and the end of the program in June 2013. The final section, with an eye to subsequent programming following the end of the VAPP, outlines a number of lessons, which the review team identified, which may be worth bearing in mind going forward.

## II. Evaluation Objectives

The purpose of this IPR has been to examine:

1. *Effectiveness and Efficiency:* through reviewing the performance of VAPP, with a particular focus on whether the project contributed to changes in individual police competency, group capabilities and VPF organisational capacity; and
2. *Sustainability:* Reviewing VPF budget allocations and recurrent costs of current and proposed organisational arrangements to identify gaps and sustainable options for addressing them.

More specifically, this IPR was designed to

* Capture progress and lessons;
* Ensure the program maximises the sustainability of VAPP’s benefits;
* Provide evidence to inform the future assistance to policing in Vanuatu; the level of funding, the approach, and the modality
* Recommend options that AusAID/AFP can pursue during the remainder of VAPP’s lifespan to improve sustainability
* Draw lessons about development programming relevant for Australia’s country program in Vanuatu, and the AFP’s International Deployment Group (IDG)

It is important to note that this IPR was never meant to be a fully fledged evaluation of the VAPP, adhering to the complete set of OECD/DAC assessment categories and criteria. Instead, this IPR was explicitly and narrowly focused, as per the team’s ToR, on issues pertaining to effectiveness, efficiency, and sustainability, with a view to providing guidance to AusAID as to what a successor program to VAPP should look like.

## III. Evaluation Methodology

This IPR is written to correspond strictly to the team’s Evaluation Methodology, agreed to by AusAID prior to the team’s arrival in country.[[2]](#footnote-2) The IPR Team has used a mixed-method approach based upon: (a) document review and desk analysis and (b) fieldwork consultation, which included interviews and focus group discussions. This approach ensured that the IPR team’s conclusions are based upon a range of techniques including, but not limited to:

* “data culled from a variety of sources;
* the use of multiple perspectives to interpret the data;
* the use of a team of evaluators, each of whom comes to law and justice development

From a unique standpoint… and

* Participatory techniques.”[[3]](#footnote-3)

VAPP and AusAID Vanuatu provided written documents to the IPR team prior to arrival and following departure from country. The IPR Team also conducted its own research, collecting material from a variety of sources. Once assembled, the IPR Team has documentation from a wide range of data points including, but not limited to, Government of Vanuatu (GoV) studies and publicly enunciated policy positions, academic and scholarly articles and research reports, perception surveys, VAPP program design documents, quarterly progress reports, minutes from the Program Management Group and Project Coordination Committee, records of the fortnightly meetings between the VAPP adviser and the Corporate Service Unit of VPF, perception surveys, work plans, AusAID annual reports and email communications. While in country, following closely the evaluation questions set out in the methodology, the team conducted a wide range of semi-structured interviews and group discussions with a wide cross-section of stakeholders and interlocutors. The team interviewed all but one of the current long-term VAPP advisers and sought the viewpoints of a selection of senior, middle-ranking and junior officers of the VPF. In order to receive multiple perspectives on policing in Vanuatu, the team also consulted with a wide range of community members drawn from both rural and urban areas. The team’s informants included chiefs, youths, members of the business community, municipal government officials, NGOs working on domestic violence issues and senior representatives of churches. [[4]](#footnote-4)

Prior to departure and/or upon return to Australia, members of the team met with key individuals previously involved in the development and management of the VAPP, such as the former program manager and the previous monitoring and evaluation adviser, both of whom had finished their engagement with VAPP a few months prior to the mid-term review.

The mixed-method approach facilitated the IPR team’s ability to use various analytic techniques as it conducted its work, “including induction (discovery of patterns); deduction (testing of theories); and abduction (uncovering explanations), the combination of which will produce more valid and reliable evaluation findings.” When combined, the IPR team’s approach enabled it to use multiple sources and techniques to verify, double check, and triangulate individual claims and team findings to ensure that they were reliable, valid, and verifiable.

As noted, the team’s time in country was reduced by the unanticipated turn of events, which saw the AFP expelled from the country. This meant that the IPR team was unable to complete its full schedule of interviews and consultations. Among the individuals with whom the team was unable to meet were: one of the long-term advisers, a locally engaged staff member considered as having significant corporate knowledge, and a building contractor involved in the VAPP’s police post project. Nor was it possible to have meetings with representatives of other AusAID programs in Vanuatu. Scheduled meetings with the members of the *Stretem Rod blong Jastis* law and justice program in order to talk through potential synergies with VAPP, and AusAID’s health and education programs in order to discuss channelling donor funds through government systems did not eventuate. The IPR Team had also hoped to arrange additional focus group discussions with community groups and civil society organization in Port Vila in order to obtain further perspectives from the general public about the VPF.

The IPR’s Team premature departure from the country also posed unanticipated problems in terms of collecting data. As is customary in all reviews and evaluations, the IPR Team members had follow-up questions and queries once it returned to its home bases. However, eliciting this information proved somewhat of a challenge. When following-up on queries the team was told by VAPP staff (by then back in Australia) that much of the information it sought was not in their possession, but stored on VAPP computers in Port Vila. Locally engaged VAPP staffs were thus tasked with retrieving outstanding pieces of information. Although much of the material requested was uncovered, some could not be sourced, whether because it was not filed to the shared drive to which LES staff had access or owing to idiosyncratic filing techniques on the part of VAPP staff. Among the documentation that could not be found were materials written by the M&E adviser and notes of one-on-one meetings between the VAPP Commander and VPF Commissioner. These documents would have been helpful to the IPR Team in order to verify comments, opinions and recollections that it gathered in country and from interlocutors in Canberra.

However, even despite these missing data points, the team is confident that it has assembled enough information for it to present its findings and form solid conclusions.

## IV. Context

A. The VAPP: Standing on the Shoulders of Previous Australian Policing Programs

The Vanuatu Australia Police Project (VAPP) was designed as a 16-month program to run from February 2011 to June 2012. The VAPP was extended to June 2013 and had a total funding of AUD 16.65 million.

VAPP was a successor program to the VPFCBP that ran 2006-2011.[[5]](#footnote-5) That program was reviewed in 2008 at the halfway point of its operations. The evaluators strongly commended the Workforce Renewal Program by which new recruits were hired and older officers retired. The evaluators also concluded that the program had made significant progress in a number of other areas. At the same time, concerns were raised about the sustainability of the program’s achievements. At the time of the review, Australia, through the VPFCBP, was providing 35% of the VPF’s budget[[6]](#footnote-6), and the evaluators counselled both Australia and Vanuatu to ‘recognise issues of sustainability, particularly recurrent cost financing implications’.[[7]](#footnote-7)

In a somewhat modified form VAPP continued with the approach adopted by the VPFCBP. This involved the deployment of individual police officers to act as ‘capacity builders’ within the VPF combined with dedicated funding reserved for infrastructure, logistics and running costs.

Broadly speaking six long-term advisers worked under area 1. The program manager doubled as adviser to the VPF Commissioner and others advisers were co-located at the training college; crime prevention unit; southern command headquarters in Port Vila; and the northern command headquarters in Luganville. In the course of the program, twenty-three short-term advisers deployed from Australia, supplemented them.[[8]](#footnote-8)

Areas 2 and 3 consisted, respectively, of funding capital infrastructure and equipment, and rejuvenating the VPF through pensioning older officers and funding new recruits. One long-term adviser worked on internal governance issues and was based in the VPF’s Corporate Support Unit. Twelve short-term advisers[[9]](#footnote-9) worked in this area in the sixteen months of the program working on developing a range of registers, policies, and procedures.[[10]](#footnote-10) Additionally, the AFP nurse, psychologist and chaplain made visits to Vanuatu in the duration of the program and these individuals were also designated as ‘short-term advisers’. In the professional judgment of the IPR Team, the VAPP approach coincided well with the definition of what an Office of Development Effectiveness (ODE) draft report on law and justice terms ‘organizational capacity development’.[[11]](#footnote-11) This model revolves around the training and equipping of formal state law and justice agencies and their staff, primarily located in and servicing the country’s capital, together with support for improving internal management systems and governance processes. The underlying presumed rationale is that increases in the VPF’s organizational capacity and skills base will convert into improvements in the quality of the service it provides. This ‘organizational capacity development’ model is the dominant model of justice assistance provided by the Australian aid program, although it should be noted that the ODE review raises doubts as to whether it is always the most effective.

VAPP was not the only Australian program working in the field of law and justice in Vanuatu. The other major program components in this sector are the *Stretem Rod blong Jastis* program and core support to the Vanuatu Women’s Centre (VWC). The VWC provide counselling and support services to women and children survivors of physical and sexual violence, the major reported crime in Vanuatu.

B. The VPF

The Vanuatu Police Force is the largest actor in the country’s law and justice sector. Administratively sitting underneath the Ministry of Internal Affairs, the Commissioner of Police and his six hundred plus staff are responsible for the administration and operations of the VPF in three broad areas: general duties policing, a paramilitary oriented Mobile Force and a Maritime Wing. Generally speaking the VAPP has concentrated upon supporting the areas of the VPF engaging in general duties policing, a strategic decision which the IPR Team endorses.

The VPF have a relatively limited geographical reach beyond Port Vila and major towns. The IPR team was told that more than three quarters of the police are based in the capital city. On most islands, there is no police presence at all. For the 75 per cent of the population who live in rural areas, far off islands or parts of islands, accessing the nearest police post, or even a telephone network to call the police, might involve a lengthy and difficult journey. As a result the majority of everyday disputes in the country are still largely addressed by informal and customary means rather than through recourse to the police. In Vanuatu allegiances to non-formal mechanisms for conflict resolution and restorative justice are just as strong – if not stronger – than fealty to state institutions. In many parts of Vanuatu, chiefs are the only form of redress for disputes.

Empirical research suggests that the relationship between the police and customary chiefs is a complex and ever changing one, dependent upon personal relationships, clan/village affiliation, and given circumstance.[[12]](#footnote-12) Officially, chiefs are empowered to work on resolving ‘minor’ disputes, while more serious disputes (such as sexual offences) lie exclusively within the competency of the VPF. In practice the IPR Team heard that, owing to the circumscribed reach of the VPF, customary authorities have a more hands on role in dispute resolution. The VPF, therefore, works at the interface of two, frequently overlapping, systems, one the formal (State) system and the other consisting of dynamic ‘traditional’ or customary systems.[[13]](#footnote-13)

A number of empirical studies, some commissioned by AusAID, have pointed to the questionable level of service that citizens receive when they do go to the police, especially women. This sense was reaffirmed to the IPR Team. A senior community leader told that team that the police in Port Vila ‘listened but did not act’ and business figures that participated in a focus group discussion in Luganville voiced similar concerns. The participants noted that they had little to no confidence that the police would arrive when called upon.

A major problem in Vanuatu is domestic violence. According to a 2008 AusAID report produced prior to the VAPP, ‘even when physical access is not an issue, in general, women consider the police a last resort, in part because of fear of inciting greater wrath and violence from their partners, but also because of the callous treatment women often receive from the police.’[[14]](#footnote-14)AusAID concluded that violence against women in Vanuatu was ‘severe and pervasive’, with upwards of 80% of police incidents involving domestic violence.[[15]](#footnote-15) A study of young offenders indicated that severe ‘youth-on-youth’ violence was a growing problem in Vanuatu, especially in Port Vila.[[16]](#footnote-16) Dealing with the fall-out from land disputes is another matter that commands police attention.

# Findings

## I. Effectiveness

The IPR Team believes that, despite current political difficulties, the VAPP contributed to a number of VPF achievements, two of which are of particular significance. The most enduring and, perhaps, important has been the Workforce Renewal Program (WRP). Second, with VAPP support, the VPF has been able to project its presence in Vanuatu in ways it has previously been unable to do. This pertains to a range of VAPP supported activities, including the use of the boat harboured in Luganville, which permits patrols in the northern islands; training courses conducted outside of Port Vila; and establishing, over the past few months, closer working relationships with NGOs in order to enhance the relationship between the VPF and the communities for whom it provides service.

On top of these contributions, the VAPP co-located its personnel within the offices of the VPF. Working inside VPF’s offices, AFP officers interacted with their Vanuatu colleagues on a professional day-to-day, hour-by-hour basis, the benefits of which cannot be underestimated. In itself, this is not an achievement, but rather a means to an end, one which Australian police development programs have not been consistently able to accomplish. However, during its interviews, the IPR Team found that there are questions regarding the effectiveness of those daily interactions.

There were numerous other contributions to strengthening the VPF that the VAPP undertook. Among these were the extensive capital infrastructure support given by VAPP and the across-the-board assistance provided to the VPF Corporate Services Unit. These initiatives appeared to be more discrete, individual accomplishments, whose effects may be less lasting than those referred to above. Each of these contributions, in its own right, may be a positive step that strengthens the VPF’s capabilities, but taken together it is not clear that they added up to make a coherent police development program, one grounded in well understood theories of change. It is one of the findings of the IPR Team, therefore, that the VAPP, not having prioritised its activities, had not adequately described or followed a coherent strategic vision to improve the delivery of safety and security to Vanuatu’s population.[[17]](#footnote-17)

The team notes that the empirical evidence is mixed regarding the effectiveness of the VAPP. A recent community perception survey indicated some improvements on the part of the VAPP but, at the same time, pointed to a decline to the overall safety and security situation in Vanuatu, calling into question whether the VAPP’s activities were addressing key concerns. When combined with a study of recent sexual violence cases, it is an open question whether VAPP’s contributions were most relevant to the needs of Vanuatu.

Finally, the IPR Team was faced with the difficulty in verifying VAPP’s contributions. At best, the IPR Team can attribute VAPP contributions to the ways in which, according to one VAPP officer, some “car mechanics” sense a vehicle’s motor, by sound and feel rather than through verified data. Although the VAPP instituted a M&E regime, and consistently produced a wealth of informational data, the program’s M&E methodologies mostly recorded various types of outputs – numbers of courses delivered; numbers of short-term TA provided; manuals produced; etc. There is little indication in the VAPP’s M&E regime(s) of what outcomes/results these activities have produced. This is not to suggest that there are no outcomes/results. Rather, the finding is that the VAPP M&E regime did not generate the requisite data with which to demonstrate that its activities contributed to specific outcomes/results.[[18]](#footnote-18) For instance, the training courses supported by the VAPP may be excellent, but there is no way to determine from the VAPP’s M&E regime(s) that the skills imparted in those courses have been used by the VPF officers who have been trained and that their training resulted in a tangible improvement of safety and security for an identifiable demographic group. On the other hand, when outcomes/results were generated, it appears as if the data was not sufficiently analysed and used by VAPP, as the basis upon which to ground its subsequent support activities.[[19]](#footnote-19)

Workforce Renewal

The IPR Team believes that the WRP initiative is likely to be the VAPP’s most significant and enduring contribution to strengthening the VPF. The initiative retires selected officers, who have long-served in the police, and hires young cadets to replace them without increasing overall personnel costs. Doing so simultaneously addresses a number of important objectives:

* to revitalize the VPF, which had no recruitment from 1987 through 2006;
* to increase the overall manpower of the police service, around thirty young cadets can be hired for each retirement; and
* to augment the number of women VPF officers.[[20]](#footnote-20)

The latest round of the WRP was conducted in 2011, bringing in thirty new officers, including eight women. A second round had been planned for 2012, but was appropriately postponed because the list of potential recruits had not been updated. The unanticipated benefit from postponing the second round has been a massive increase in the number of applicants for admission into the VPF, which is a highly positive sign. The team heard reports that there were upwards of 900 submissions.

During its interviews with the population, the IPR Team was told, on a number of occasions, that the attitude and professionalism of the new recruits once they begin serving is better than that of their older VPF colleagues. According to a group of youths in Luganville, for instance, the younger members of the VPF have better “communication with the communities.” Municipal officials in Luganville concurred, stating “the young recruits are doing their job better than the older ones. New recruits response is much faster and appropriate…. The community have a lot more trust in the recruits.”

On the other hand and not surprisingly, some senior VPF officers do not have the same opinion of their younger colleagues. The IPR Team was told, for instance, “there’s no discipline in the new recruits. They have good knowledge but little discipline,” despite the implementation of a “mentoring program” for the new recruits and their two-year probationary period.[[21]](#footnote-21) The issue of discipline appears to be a challenge of much wider proportions than young vs. older VPF officers, and weak discipline seems to pervade the police service.[[22]](#footnote-22)The IPR Team recommends that ensuring better discipline within the VPF ought to become a high priority within any subsequent program of Australian assistance to the VPF.[[23]](#footnote-23) Despite the challenge of discipline, it is the judgment of the IPR Team that the WRP initiative should be extended and deepened.

Projecting its Presence

Another notable contribution that the VAPP made to police development in Vanuatu was its support for and, more recently, its advocacy of the VPF’s projecting its presence more consistently in areas of the country where it has previously been unable to do so *and* in ways in which it has not done. Among the initiatives that the VAPP supported were:

* deploying the boat harboured in Luganville to transport VPF teams to areas of the northern islands where there is no police presence;
* conducting training courses outside Port Vila; and
* establishing remote patrols with closer working relationships with NGOs.

The use of the boat to project VPF’s presence into areas in which it has not been present for upwards of 20 years is crucial for a number of different reasons. First, it enabled the VPF to begin to establish relations with communities where none currently exist; second, it provided an initial socialisation of those communities as to Vanuatu’s penal code and the role of the VPF;[[24]](#footnote-24) and, third, solidified the relation of the VPF with the local authorities, namely the village elders and chiefs through whom safety, security, and justice in the villages depends and to whom victims of crime most frequently turn for resolution and redress.[[25]](#footnote-25)

The provision of a boat enabled the strengthening of the relationship between the VPF and the village elders and chiefs; this endeavour ought to be, in many areas of Vanuatu, a central component of any future police development program. In a cluster of villages on north Efate, the IPR Team was told that among the most important functions of the VPF is to stand behind chiefly authorities and act as deterrence. For example, in this village, when chiefs and village elders cannot resolve a local dispute, most often concerning youths, they turn to the VPF as an authority of last resort. As one chief said, it is “through the police that peace is maintained.” Another stated that when it is a community problem -- and that definition is broad and includes civil disputes, such as paternity, adultery, etc. -- the police “are seen as neutral. Police bring about peace and give options to follow. The police station is safe ground.” This VPF-chief relationship may be more vital outside Port Vila than it is within the capital, given the lack of “ethnic” homogeneity within Port Vila’s various neighbourhoods.

The function of the VAPP to build relationships extended beyond the boat. It pertained with equal vigour to strengthening the bonds between the VPF and NGOs across the country, an initiative that the VAPP began in the last couple of months of the program. On its patrols, extended and otherwise, the VPF, responding to VAPP’s advocacy among others, invited and worked with a number of NGOs, such as Save the Children, Vanuatu Women’s Centre, and Wan Smolbag. The potential benefits are large in terms of greater socialisation of communities and neighbourhoods, as well as in service delivery. If these regular and extended patrols by the VPF were to be continued there is the possibility that the police may be perceived as a facilitator in the delivery of public goods and services by the NGOs and, hence, may become more trusted by the populace, particularly youths.[[26]](#footnote-26)

Co-Location of VAPP Personnel

The VAPP should be congratulated for having established sufficiently trusted relations with the VPF so as to have been able to co-locate its advisers within the offices of the VPF. The physical proximity of VAPP and VPF officers was a boon to effective police development. Sitting in VPF offices, participating in daily interactions, an AFP adviser was better situated to understand the police’s culture, become conversant with its priorities, and versed in its needs. Close physical proximity permitted a fuller and more substantive professional day-to-day interaction between mentor and mentee, which is one of the primary roles of AFP long-term advisers.

According to the VAPP’s 2011 Report to the PCC, “feedback from counterparts and other key stakeholders rate overall Advisor performance at 4,” with 5 being the optimal score.[[27]](#footnote-27) This score is excellent. However the IPR Team heard a contrasting story, one that leads to an alternate conclusion. For instance, although VPF officers consistently praised their VAPP advisers for being friendly and enjoyed working alongside them, it was also evident that with three out of the six long-term VAPP advisers, not including the program’s manager, the substantive relationship was less than optimal. Issues noted were tensions within the unit between the VAPP adviser and his counterparts, claims of ineffective performance, and adviser’s counterparts questioning whether the adviser had the technical/substantive expertise to be a mentor.[[28]](#footnote-28) On a number of occasions, the team heard from VPF interlocutors that VAPP advisers did not make an effort to acquire basic Bislama. A consequence of VAPP advisers communicating and writing almost exclusively in English, the team was told, was that VPF staff were reluctant to ask for assistance because they were not comfortable having detailed conversations in that language.

The inconsistency between VAPP’s own findings and those of the IPR Team cannot be easily dismissed. Their divergence, however, impedes the Team from reaching a definitive conclusion as to the effectiveness of the VAPP’s co-location. It is, however, the judgment of the IPR Team that co-location is an inherent good and that, overall, VAPP’s ability to co-locate its advisers is a positive achievement; albeit a means to an end, police development, rather than a tangible outcome/result in its own right.

The IPR Team notes that the program’s design concentrated almost exclusively upon the VPF and paid little attention to the civilian ministry with oversight responsibilities for the force, the Ministry of Internal Affairs (MoIA). [[29]](#footnote-29) The program’s implementation reflected the design’s focus. The Team also recognises the work that the VAPP has undertaken in augmenting the capabilities of the Police Services Commission to improve civilian oversight of the VPF. Although representatives from the MoIA were members of the PMG and PCC, and provision of support to the MoIA was discussed, for several reasons VAPP did not provide any dedicated short or long-term advisory support to the Ministry. As a result, the IPR team believes that the program was overly tilted towards the police to the detriment of this vital institution. [[30]](#footnote-30) The IPR Team recommends that future police development initiatives seek to involve closer working with the MoIA. [[31]](#footnote-31) The Team acknowledges that there are perceived sensitivities in terms of foreign police officers working with a civilian ministry, but suggest that this nervousness could be obviated through the provision of civilian advisers.

Other VAPP Contributions

The VAPP contributed to the strengthening of the VPF through supporting a myriad of other initiatives. It is not the place of this Report to enumerate all the projects and efforts. Rather it is important to note that these endeavours included, among many others:

* 56 training courses;[[32]](#footnote-32)
* Police General Orders manual;
* Human resource policy manual;
* asset management and stolen property databases;
* community crime prevention education packages;
* Firearms and Registration system review;
* victim impact statement; and
* new accountability procedures to check and verify VPF per diem requests.

In addition, the VAPP devoted significant resources to an extensive capital infrastructure program, building, renovating and refurbishing numerous police facilities, structures, and rooms.[[33]](#footnote-33) Approximately 40% of the money allocated to the VAPP was allocated to infrastructure and assets.[[34]](#footnote-34) Simultaneously, the VAPP provided operational funding to numerous VPF activities and it has been reported that Australian funds paid for up to 40% of the VPF’s operational costs.

The difficulty the IPR Team has with this extensive list of completed projects is that, while each support activity may be worthy in and of itself, there does not appear to be a strategic vision that links one achievement to another or that progressively builds upon past VAPP accomplishments. Although joint VAPP/VPF business plans had been produced, these documents were not mentioned in any meetings that the IPR Team had with VPF staff, suggesting that the documents were rarely used as a means to guide activities. VAPP advisers with whom the IPR Team spoke also struggled to provide a clear rationale for why one support activity was undertaken by the VAPP rather than another. For instance, the IPR Team was informed that within the CSU there are 77 discrete projects that have been identified for VAPP assistance. However, the method by which those projects would be prioritised could not be explained by the VAPP advisors.[[35]](#footnote-35) Furthermore, the IPR Team was told that there is no vehicle maintenance plan or support activity, even though the VAPP recently gifted seven new vehicles to the VPF. Similarly, even though IPR Team repeatedly heard complaints about the slowness of the CSU’s processing of requests for operational contingencies, the Team was told of no current development effort being undertaken to assess and accelerate these procedures within the CSU.

A comparable situation existed within the Police College and the Criminal Investigation Department (CID). Without question, the VAPP has significantly improved the facilities and operations of the Police College. However, at the same time, VPF staff in senior leadership positions at the college informed the IPR Team that there has been no analysis of which skill sets within the VPF are most in need of improvement; nor has there been any prioritisation of the 86 courses taught since the VAPP’s inception. As one VPF trainer noted, there has been “not much planning on which courses should be taught when and why.” The VPF were dissatisfied with the VAPP response to their request to establish a “curriculum unit” that could begin to monitor and evaluate how VPF personnel are using their newly acquired skills after they leave the Police College.[[36]](#footnote-36) The IPR Team is not in a position to recommend that such a unit be established, but such a unit would be one way to begin to rectify the absence a strategic plan for the College; knowledge of what skill sets the VPF most needs to possess, but currently does not in sufficient depth; and the lack of a prioritisation of courses taught at the College.[[37]](#footnote-37)

Similar challenges with regard to a lack of a strategic direction and prioritisation of VAPP support activities existed within the CID. The 2012 Community Survey suggests that most of the individuals who report that they have been the victims of a crime have been victimised multiple times. However, as stated to the IPR Team by the relevant VAPP adviser, there was no VAPP support to how CID classifies and manages these cases or, more broadly, identifies and analyses criminal patterns, managerial systems that are pivotal to strengthening the performance of CID units. The IPR Team was also told that police and civilian prosecutors reject “a high percentage” of police files. One VPF officer stated that the prosecutors claim that the evidence compiled in the cases the VPF forwards to the prosecutors “are just stories and not evidence.” [[38]](#footnote-38) Despite this being a pivotal hinge in the criminal justice system, the Team was told that there was no project currently being supported that would begin to rectify this fundamental problem.[[39]](#footnote-39) If such an effort were to be undertaken in the future it would require collaboration between any successor program and other AusAID endeavours, which at the time of the review operated, as the IPR Team was informed, “in isolation with one another, not developing linkages… as it is police for police.”

Consequently, one of the principal finding of the IPR Team is that, despite the VAPP’s evident achievements, the lack of a strategic plan and the absence of prioritisation of its support activities prevented the VAPP from being as effective as it could have been. Unquestionably, the VAPP has contributed to the strengthening of various VPF capabilities. Nevertheless, these contributions did not add up to a coherent police development program. In the absence of a clear rationale why one course of action has been undertaken rather than another many VAPP activities appeared to be discrete, one-off achievements that are unlikely to be sustainable.

Responding to Context and Utilising Empirical Data

The VAPP should be commended on the inclusion in their monitoring framework of a community perception survey, the most recent of which was finalized in 2012. Longitudinal data collected in community perception surveys represent one of the best methods available to assess changes in the behaviour of police, and are a powerful tool with which to identify priority areas of concern that should be addressed. Within the community survey, there are a number of indications that the service provided by the VPF has improved. For example, more respondents said the VPF took action on crimes reported than did in the two previous surveys. Forty-five percent of those surveyed pronounced themselves very satisfied with the actions taken by the police on the crimes reported, with another 20% registering satisfaction. Sixty-three percent who reported crimes said they received feedback from police on the outcomes of the investigation. These statistics are clear indications of improvement.

At the same time, the survey also presented evidence of deterioration in the VPF’s performance. Sixty-nine percent of the respondents did not report crimes committed against them, which was more than double the numbers reported in the 2006 and 2008 survey. Sixty-one percent of the respondents “said they would trust very few police officers in doing their work without taking sides”[[40]](#footnote-40) and “the proportion which thought they would trust very few police officers increased as compared to that of 2008.”[[41]](#footnote-41) Additionally, 55% of respondents believe crime has increased from 2006, while another “30 per cent perceived it had not changed.”[[42]](#footnote-42) It also appears, as evidenced by data in the PMG quarterly reports that VPF response times have deteriorated.[[43]](#footnote-43)

There is some risk in a simplistic interpretation of these statistical discrepancies.[[44]](#footnote-44) However, combined with the IPR Team’s aforementioned findings, the data suggests the likelihood that the VAPP may not have focused its support activities on Vanuatu and the VPF’s most pressing needs, namely day-to-day policing. Crime in the capital appears to be increasing and much of it may revolve around youths. For example, a study of 50 recent sexual violence cases indicates that, within Port Vila, the predominant violence involves adolescent boys abusing adolescent girls. Youth focus groups found that VPF violence towards youth was very common, with several participants having experienced it directly.[[45]](#footnote-45) The Community Survey suggests that relations between the police and youths have deteriorated from 2008 to 2012, in that, by a significant proportion, more respondents believed that relations were “poor… in 2011 (34 per cent)… than did so in 2008 (23 per cent).”[[46]](#footnote-46) Despite this data, the IPR Team found no VAPP supported initiatives to address youths in conflict with the law.

Violence against women is another issue that does not seem to have garnered enough VAPP attention, even though the program design emphasised the importance of the challenge.[[47]](#footnote-47) According to the Survey, domestic violence -- along with fighting -- was the “most recently experienced crime by most respondents.”[[48]](#footnote-48) Even though, the IPR Team has been told that the VPF has improved its issuance of Family Protection Orders, it is a finding of the Team that the VAPP program does not adequately take into account the prevalence of violence against women and, therefore, has not effectively tailored its police development support to respond to the needs of the populace. The IPR Team notes that New Zealand Police are also working on addressing domestic violence issues and believes that there is substantial impetus for partnership and cross-collaboration on the issue both between these two programs but also the *Stretem Road Blong Jastis* initiative.[[49]](#footnote-49)

Monitoring & Evaluation

The VAPP had an extensive reporting framework – weekly, monthly, and quarterly. As part of its reporting, the program issued statistics on a series of VPF operational issues, such as number of patrols conducted, traffic accidents attended, community safety awareness programs delivered, pending and completed criminal investigations, successful prosecutions, and summons issued. The extent of the reporting produced is impressive. The IPR Team also believes that quarterly visits from the VAPP M&E adviser assisted in refocusing in-country advisers on the tasks as identified in the project document.[[50]](#footnote-50)

The challenge, however, was not the breadth of the reporting *per se*, but rather the ability of the reporting to inform programming and assess performance. On that score the VAPP’s M&E systems are lacklustre. For example, the 2012 PMG Report states that the Police General Orders Manual “will provide the VPF with modern and accountable practices and procedures.” This may be conceptually true, for that is one of the objectives of a general orders manual. However, for the VAPP and its goal to improve the performance of the VPF, the question is not the existence of a physical Manual, which is an output, but how the Manual is used day-to-day by VPF officers, an outcome. There was nothing in VAPP’s reporting that suggests a means by which to appraise how the Manual is being used.[[51]](#footnote-51) There was no testing of VPF personnel of their knowledge of their Orders, its procedures and policing processes. And, as there appeared to be no VAPP initiative to support the use of the Manual, the mere fact of its having been published is diminished, further rendering the program’s reporting less than effective, as it is an open question whether the Manual will be used by the VPF.[[52]](#footnote-52)

The VAPP M&E system was modelled upon that of the previous Australian police program, the VPFCBP.[[53]](#footnote-53) Appropriately, the framework broke down the VAPP into its goals, purpose, and four areas of work; laid out key monitoring questions; and presented the tools/measures used to assess performance. While the monitoring questions, on the whole, appeared to be reasonable, there was inadequate discussion of how VAPP support activities related to those questions or to the tools/measures used to appraise VAPP effectiveness. For instance, the Survey’s data and statistics on prosecutions were used to indicate whether community perceptions of their safety and security and VPF service delivery were improving. However, according to information provided to the IPR Team and as discussed above, the VAPP did not substantively engage with police or civilian prosecutors, so that there could be little valid and verifiable correlation between rates of successful prosecutions, VAPP activities, and its performance.[[54]](#footnote-54) Similarly, no theory of change was articulated by the VAPP to indicate how its support initiatives would increase community perceptions of their safety and security. Clearly understood theories of change could have contributed to informing decisions on support initiatives, and suggested appropriate measures to track outcomes. The situation was the same with regard to the VAPP’s extensive support for the professionalization of the VPF through assistance provided to the Police College and the expansion of training courses. The lack of prioritisation notwithstanding, VAPP support for the number of training courses delivered, and that increasingly these courses offered to VPF personnel outside Port Vila, were impressive outputs. These courses may have been excellently designed and presented. The VAPP’s M&E regime, however, did not measure whether the courses produced any outcomes/results or were useful in influencing the operational or managerial behaviour of course participants in their daily law enforcement activities. The 2011 Report to the PCC, for example, has an impressive list of courses that have been given, but no indication of what the outcome/result of VPF personnel having attended the courses might be.

The tools enumerated in the M&E framework are exclusively output indicators – numbers of courses delivered and participants. Discussions in the PMG minutes may indicate changed verbal commitment by VPF management, but, while verbal commitments may indicate an appreciation of an issue, , they do not necessarily speak to enhanced political will and cannot be correlated to better service delivery by the police or improved community perception of safety and security. There are numerous intermediate steps, none of which are enumerated by the VAPP M&E framework. Moreover, the monitoring questions related to training in the M&E framework were themselves outputs and not outcomes/results -- progress against training plans that were not prioritised; inclusion in training courses of relevant laws, codes of conduct, human rights provisions -- and unrelated to participant learning and, most importantly, subsequent use of the skills learned in a course.

The same applied to VAPP assistance to improve the internal governance of the VPF. The monitoring question, “has VPF begun to implement the recommendations of the CSU review in an effective and efficient manner,” may be appropriate weekly reporting, concentrating as it does on whether implementation of recommendations has begun. It is not an adequate measurement of the outcomes of the project on the target behaviour of the VPF. More appropriate measures would be such indicators, if correlated to specific VAPP activities, such as the average number of days with which a request for operational funding is answered or the average number of days a police vehicle is out-of-service.

Consequently, the IPR Team finds that the VAPP’s M&E regimes was important in capturing short-term activities, but cannot be considered satisfactory in measuring the program’s performance. [[55]](#footnote-55)

## II. Efficiency

The IPR Team finds that the efficiency of the VAPP can be improved with regard to its management and the use of long-term advisers. Similarly, the relationship between the AFP and AusAID, while good, can be strengthened.

Management

As suggested above, the absence of a strategic vision of how to develop the VPF, into which would be folded well-enunciated theories of change, caused the VAPP to be less effective than it should be. Furthermore, and acknowledging the complexities of the environment in which it was working the apparent lack of VAPP prioritisation of its support initiatives raises questions regarding the management of the program, for these challenges are managerial rather than operational ones. Consequently the VAPP should articulate a cogent strategic vision of police development appropriate to the specific Vanuatu context characterised by, among other elements, endemic scarcity of resources (financial and human), logistical/geographic difficulties, growing urbanisation of Port Vila, and the enduring importance of local authorities (chiefs and village elders). Based upon that strategic vision, the VAPP would be able to begin to discuss with the VPF how to prioritise individual support activities. Doing so will also strengthen VAPP’s management along another dimension.

It is also the IPR Team’s judgment that the VAPP oftentimes over-emphasised the importance of maintaining good relationships with senior VPF officials at the cost of good development practice. Better prioritising its support activities would enable the VAPP to make better development decisions and increase the program’s “value for money.” For example, the IPR Team was told that the MoIA advocated for the establishment of a Crime Prevention Unit (CPU) within the VPF. In response, the police created such a unit, but the unit is not considered by the VPF as a policing or law enforcement function. Its activities, therefore, do not appear to be integrated into VPF operations on a day-to-day basis, forming a cornerstone of the organisation’s norms and values. As a result, the purpose of the CPU was been undermined. Another example pertains to the supporting the VPF’s policy of police post expansion, the sustainability of which will be considered in detail in the relevant subsequent section. The IPR Team was told that the Government of Vanuatu has a policy of expanding the presence of the police into rural areas, a laudable goal in which the IPR Team sees merit. The vehicle for this expansion was the building of static police posts dotted around the islands, the location of which, the team was told, were determined by criteria that did not primarily relate to policing needs. While the VAPP did execute an oversight process that validated the specific locations, it is not clear that the oversight was adequate to ensure that all of the police posts were sensibly located and could be sustainably maintained.[[56]](#footnote-56) It should be noted that the Team heard of a number of instances in which the VAPP did successfully resist requests from the VPF for, among other things, extra equipment and overseas travel. Among the requests that the team learned were apparently turned down included proposals for handheld weapons and long arms, vehicles and up to five new boats as well as applications to fund VPF participation in training and study opportunities in China, Fiji and Solomon Islands. The IPR Team was also informed that VAPP refused to accede to a request from the VPF to continue paying the salaries of police recruits following graduation.[[57]](#footnote-57)

Long-Term Advisers

As already suggested above, there are questions regarding the effectiveness of long-term advisers and a sharp divergence of the evidence between the VAPP and the IPR Team. What is not open to question, however, was how VAPP advisers spend their time. One senior VPF official noted that he rarely relied on his adviser of substantive policing advice. Instead, the adviser was highly valued by his VPF counterpart as a means by which, first, to manage relations with VPF Headquarters and, second to extract operational resources out of the VAPP. In other words, this adviser was largely used by his counterpart as a mechanism to circumvent VPF managerial inefficiencies *and* as a bankroller of VPF police operations. When queried by the IPR Team, this adviser concurred and acknowledged that the vast majority of his time was occupied by these activities with lots of time also taken for compiling and writing VAPP administrative reports. Only a small percentage of this adviser’s time was spent providing substantive policing advice and mentoring. His extensive policing expertise, therefore, was not being efficiently used.

This use of VAPP advisers seemed to be the rule rather than the exception. During its interviews, the IPR Team found that the principal role of VAPP advisors is providing the VPF with access to the program’s operational funds, processing and following up requests for other types of administrative assistance, and VAPP reporting requirements. These are functions that can be performed by civilians and do not require AFP personnel. Employing AFP personnel to undertake these non-policing tasks is inefficient and uneconomical.

The comparative advantage of AFP personnel lies in their vast policing expertise. When it comes to operational questions, only police can provide advice, mentoring, and know-how to the VPF. On substantive police-to-police issues, no one can substitute for VAPP’s advisers. But the way in which the VAPP functions the advisers’ substantive expertise, their policing knowledge and understanding, was poorly and inefficiently used.

AusAID Management

The VAPP is the one Australian police development project that is directly supervised by AusAID in country. The IPR Team’s judgment is that this program management model is excellent and, echoing the findings of the ODE Law and Justice review, ought to be the principal method by which Australia delivers police development.

That said, AusAID supervision of the VAPP could be improved. While the VAPP provides AusAID with extensive reports and meets with AusAID representatives regularly, it appeared to the IPR Team that communication of opinions and perceptions of influence between AusAID and the VAPP was not consistently sufficient to satisfy both partners. This may have as much to do with AusAID not knowing enough about police development and, therefore, not being capable of asking the “right questions,” as it was VAPP either not providing appropriate information and/or not being adequately receptive to AusAID viewpoints.[[58]](#footnote-58)

As already indicated, it is imperative that linkages between the VAPP and other AusAID law and justice initiatives be established and concrete activities undertaken together. Support to the MoIA is another endeavour that crosses areas of substantive expertise -- governance, public administration, *and* police development -- and, therefore, engagement should be done jointly. While the team acknowledges that best practice monitoring for law and justice programs is a complex and evolving area, the VAPP could potentially improve its regime by seeking greater M&E support from AusAID.

At the same time, the IPR Team recognizes that the new position of Senior Program Manager, Law and Justice, enabled enhanced day-to-day AusAID oversight of the VAPP. The office holder – a long-term resident of Vanuatu with developed language skills, local knowledge and relationships – was able to leverage that familiarity to be an effective resource for AusAID, as well as members of the VAPP.

## III. Sustainability

As noted in the section on effectiveness, the IPR Team believes that financial assistance from VAPP has contributed to the VPF significantly expanding its territorial reach. This contribution was lauded by the Police Commissioner who told the team that “VAPP is a major player in providing funding support in rural and remote infrastructure development. On remote policing patrols, Good Will visits and crime prevention program are very important as brings Police service closer to the people that need it.”[[59]](#footnote-59) However, as the Commissioner noted, these endeavours were ‘costly’ exercises and ones that were, currently, far beyond the financial means of the State.

The IPR Team endorses the conclusions of the VPF Commissioner. These initiatives are extremely praiseworthy, but few are sustainable, given the VPF’s current operating budget, which the team was told was as low at 600,000 vatu per month. Simply put, the VPF cannot sustain its current level of activities without continued financing from Australia, a monetary reality acknowledged in the VAPP’s own design document.

Sustainability refers to the probability that the changes attributable to programmatic activities persist after donor assistance has ended.[[60]](#footnote-60) Although first and foremost associated with issues of finance and money, sustainability has four other dimensions. These are (1) technical and personnel: are introduced techniques and equipment able to be maintained are reform goals matched to the quantity and quality of available staff; (2) cultural: are the proposed reforms suited to wider context; (3) ownership: has enough been done to generate support from politicians and other elites, and to explain the nature and purpose of reforms to the public.[[61]](#footnote-61) Accordingly, the IPR Team examined the VAPP in relation to these elements. The section concludes with an analysis of the police post expansion program, which the IPR Team believes not to be sustainable.

Financial

The IPR team finds that the VAPP, building on previous Australian policing support programs, has created unrealistic expectations within the VPF of the services it, the VPF, can deliver. Without continued financial support, VAPP-funded vehicles, radios, police outposts, boat, and other equipment are unlikely to be adequately maintained.[[62]](#footnote-62) In fact, the team learned that there is next to no allocation for maintenance within the VPF budget and nor is there likely to be one in the short to medium term.

Despite advice delivered verbally to both the VPF and the MoIA by senior VAPP officials that Australia would not be supporting the maintenance costs associated with these assets in perpetuity, this message may not have been received as clearly as it was communicated. It seemed to the team that national authorities implicitly assumed that VAPP would pick up these bills. The sense that ‘Australia will pay’ may, in fact, have been retarding VPF’s ability to negotiate with relevant government agencies for an increase in budget. It could even be argued that the VAPP is actually decreasing VPF sustainability by creating high expectations and an increased logistical burden.

Similarly, there are scarce funds for the VPF to conduct policing operations. Generous per diems[[63]](#footnote-63) for operations; fuel for cars and maritime craft; victuals for the boat crew; phone credit for officers; and even daily morning tea[[64]](#footnote-64) for the staff of the police training college and many other monetary investments are among the costs and expenses being funded by the VAPP.[[65]](#footnote-65) This is a totally unsustainable proposition. Clearly, the VPF will require significant and enduring Australian monetary support to maintain its current personnel levels and policing activities. The conclusions of the 2008 review of the VPFCPB regarding sustainability are equally relevant four years later.

Technical & Personnel

On the grounds of technical aptitude and professional skills necessary for upkeep of equipment provided, many VAPP initiatives appeared to be unsustainable. For example, while VPF personnel are able to skipper and run the boat, they do not possess the requisite skills to manage and maintain its continued use.[[66]](#footnote-66) A VAPP adviser with considerable knowledge of maritime matters concurred that the VPF would not be able to sustain the boat without a watchful outside eye. As noted, the IPR Team believe that the VPF boat has wrought considerable benefits to the organization’s reach in the northern part of the country. To maintain this benefit, however, will require continued Australian support.[[67]](#footnote-67)

Another initiative which seems of questionable sustainability involves radio-communications. Over the last decade, three separate radio systems, at least two of which were provided by Australia, have been provided for various components of the VPF. None currently work, including the most recent system that has been installed by the VAPP over the course of the last year and which reportedly cost in the region of $500,000. A VPF Commander told the team that the most recently gifted system – which, if it worked, would have email capability – was simply too complicated. Neither he nor his officers understood how to work it and he continued to rely on the mobile phone network, sometimes relying on the VAPP adviser to buy him refill cards. The officer observed that other, more simple-to-use systems would have been better for his men and women. Moreover, the IPR Team were told that there were a range of installation issues that beset the project. Installation required the erection of nine metre high steel posts at fixed points throughout the country, a profound logistical challenge given the rough terrain. Problems were then compounded further by a software compatibility issue, which meant that the system would crash without warning.[[68]](#footnote-68) It should be noted that this project was ongoing at the point of the review, which may well have contributed to misunderstandings regarding the use of the system.

Cultural

Another dimension of sustainability is cultural, namely whether VAPP initiatives fits appropriately within the customs and mores of Vanuatu. Two examples illustrate that some VAPP activities are a poor fit. The first pertains to the application process for budding VPF recruits. The latest round of recruitment has, reportedly, resulted in over 900 applications, which indicates a desire for young people to join the service and can be construed as a positive proxy indicator. However, the application form used for the recruitment appears to be largely based upon an Australian model. The form asks for which ‘suburb’ an applicant hails from, a quintessentially Australian form of address. Other questions, the IPR team were told, do not correspond to prevailing realities and cultural morays in Vanuatu. The form used in the 2012 was apparently prepared by a previous adviser in the VPFCBP program and was not modified by the VAPP adviser.[[69]](#footnote-69) Perhaps the biggest issue, however, is the language of the form. In a country of three official languages, and where Bislama is the *lingua franca*, VAPP printed off and distributed only English language versions of the form for the 2012 intake. This puzzling decision to distribute forms in only one language clearly puts non-English speaking applicants to the VPF at a clear disadvantage.

In a similar vein, VAPP advisers generated a wide range of policies, procedures, manuals and registers, the long-term impacts of which seem doubtful.[[70]](#footnote-70) Consistent with the institutional capacity development philosophy of the VAPP, the idea is that a better-managed institution will translate into a better service to the citizens of Vanuatu. These instruments, however well conceived, seem to be rarely used by VPF, raising issues about their impact on performance and their utility in terms of decision-making. For example, one VAPP output was a discussion paper thinking through role descriptions for an expanded VPF. The GoV mooted a personnel increase from 600 to 900 officers and the intention behind the document was that it be a springboard for an informed internal discussion on the merits (and affordability) of the proposed enlargement. In the judgement of the IPR Team, the document clearly took time and effort on the part of the adviser to prepare. The problem is that, seemingly, the only people who have read the document fully are members of the IPR Team. No-one in the CSU, including the individuals with responsibility for finance and personnel, had studied the document, despite no small amount of prodding and cajoling from their VAPP adviser. CSU staff said the document was ‘too long’ (albeit short by Australian standards) and did not fit within the culture of decision-making within the VPF or among ni-Vanuatu more generally. The team was told that patiently talking through an issue was a better fit than the production of a ‘long document’.[[71]](#footnote-71) None of the members of the CSU – the intended beneficiaries of much of these workplace primers – said they actually consulted the handbooks written by VAPP advisers as a matter of course.[[72]](#footnote-72) Nor did much of the advice seem to have rubbed off. One individual with responsibility for policy and planning stated that he still did not feel comfortable writing policies and procedures.

Ownership

Sustainability also refers to the extent to which local elites feel as if they ‘own’ the program in question. The IPR Team had an extensive open and frank discussion on this issue with the VPF Commissioner and his leadership team.[[73]](#footnote-73) The Commissioner, on behalf of the executive, told the team that he felt that he had comparatively little ownership of the program. He felt that decisions were often taken without his input, and only referred to him afterwards for sign off. Whether this is the case or not – the team heard multiple viewpoints and is not in a position to reach a definitive conclusion – is, in some ways, a secondary issue. That the Commissioner felt strongly enough to raise the issue directly with the IPR Team illustrated his perceived lack of influence.[[74]](#footnote-74) The IPR Team notes that AFP disputes the Commissioner’s interpretation.

An unintended consequence of the rather cumbersome and bureaucratic VAPP funding disbursement model – designed for the best of intentions in order to ensure a clear audit trail – was bitterness on the part of VPF officers, alienating some key players from the program. The funding model can be faulted on two levels in terms of sustainability. Not only was it time-consuming for VAPP advisers; it also engendered feelings of disempowerment on the part of the VPF.

Senior figures within the VPF told the IPR Team that, while they very much appreciated Australian support and resources, and wanted it to continue for at least the next five years, they would prefer a different funding modality whereby with appropriate oversight, funding would be channelled through Government of Vanuatu systems. The VPF executive cited other sectors such as health and education as payout models for any future program of Australian assistance to emulate. [[75]](#footnote-75) The IPR Team notes that monies to pay for retirement benefits under the Workforce Renewal Program are currently being channelled through the government’s financial systems.

Police Posts: A Case Study of Un-sustainability

Many of the multiple dimensions of sustainability are at play in terms of the VAPP’s proposal to expand VPF through the establishment of static police posts.

A raft of issues has beset implementation of the police post building project. There were three problems with the initiative in terms of sustainability. First, the VPF reportedly has difficulty finding officers to staff the posts. One post at Loh in Torres is built but sits empty. Secondly, even if the VPF manages to persuade staff to be posted there, officers risk being completely isolated, given the non-functioning communications network. Nor had the arrangements with the local community to provide accommodation to the police been consistently executed by said community.[[76]](#footnote-76) Thirdly, in terms of access, the VPF rely almost entirely on other VAPP-funded assets, such as the boat, to reach these posts. Potentially, officers could be marooned for weeks, even months. Compounding the sustainability issue are other challenges relating to insufficient information flowing down the VPF chain about the posts, lengthy delays caused by problems negotiating land access, and locations seemingly selected on according to political calculations and without evident empirical analysis.

The difficulties of the police post endeavour sits in contrast to the joint patrols that the VAPP has been supporting over the last few months. The IPR Team was impressed with the integration of NGO groups into the remote patrols and, while unable to directly assess population response, there are indications that the communities involved were pleased to have this contact. More importantly, this modality of remote policing is likely to be more sustainable by the VPF over the long term. The IPR Team believes that there may be greater utility in continuing to support joint patrols than police post expansion. Since the program was suspended, all work on the police posts has stopped.

# Conclusion, Recommendations & Lessons Learned

## I. Conclusion

Building on previous Australian policing programs, the IPR Team finds that the VAPP generated a number of accomplishments in its one-year of operations. Two of these achievements are especially laudable: the continuation of the Workforce Renewal Program and assisting the VPF to expand their presence beyond urban areas and into rural communities. The VAPP also contributed to a number of other achievements. These include the provision of training courses, and the production of manuals, databases and reviews. The IPR Team recognizes that VAPP co-located its personnel, something that not all Australian police development projects have been able to accomplish. Similarly, the VAPP works within an M&E reporting system, albeit one that could be substantially improved.

Although the VAPP engaged in a welter of activities, the team found little evidence that, taken together, these pursuits add up to a strategically conceived police program. Overwhelmed by the multifaceted needs of the VPF, advisers provided assistance to lots of activities but the IPR team could find little clear rationale as to why one course of action has been undertaken rather than another. Furthermore, a survey of community perceptions commissioned by VAPP turned up ambiguous results about improvements within the VPF.

In terms of efficiency, the IPR team observed that advisers’ skills and experience was not being optimized. Advisers spent an inordinate amount of time processing VPF requests for funds for operations, training, and equipment and assorted other monetary matters. Additionally, advisers also expended a lot of time on internal administrative processes and fulfilling internal reporting obligations. All told, these non-policing tasks left very little time for substantive policing advice. In other words, civilian personnel could just as productively undertake many of the tasks. This is an inefficient use of highly trained and credentialed AFP expertise. The team notes approvingly the program management arrangements whereby AFP implements under supervision from AusAID. The team finds this supervisory relationship could be strengthened still further, and that the VAPP could integrate further with other relevant AusAID programs in Vanuatu.

In terms of sustainability, VAPP financial assistance enabled the VPF to work at a much higher level of operational capacity than it could by relying on the State budget alone. To maintain its current personnel levels and policing activities, however, the VPF will require significant and enduring Australian monetary support. The team queries whether some VAPP initiated activities are technically sustainable and a good cultural fit. The VPF, while supportive of the VAPP, would prefer a different modality by which funding is delivered, one that gives them a greater sense of ownership.

The IPR team concludes that Australia should continue with a program of support to the VPF. The team recommends a redesign of the VAPP in 2013. Between then and now, a number of practical steps should be taken in order to enhance the current program and prepare for a future iteration. It goes without saying that the IPR’s Team’s recommendations are predicated upon a resolution to the current issues between the Governments of Vanuatu and Australia and return of AFP staff.

## II. Recommendations for between now and 2013

*Short-Term Recommendations*

A. Expand and deepen the workforce renewal program

The IPR Team finds that the workforce renewal program is one of VAPP’s most significant and enduring accomplishments. This initiative increases the total VPF manpower and invigorates the organization with new recruits, who have been reported to have a positive impact on the organization and communities. This is an undertaking that the GoV cannot currently achieve on its own and a laudable and important initiative which Australia should continue to support.

The IPR Team notes that, because of the present political difficulties and the end of the financial year in Australia, the latest stage of Workforce Renewal, with the retirement of another group of VPF personnel and the selection and recruitment of new police cadets, had to be postponed. The Team recommends that this round of retirement and rejuvenation should be recommenced as a matter of priority, and that work commence on another before the conclusion of the program.

B. Immediately prioritize VAPP activities with regard to the training college, CSU and Southern Command; reconsider the need for a dedicated position in Northern Command

The IPR Team has noted some areas in which VAPP assistance could be enhanced. With regards to the training college, this means conducting a needs analysis and, from that, developing a short-list of pivotal courses to be delivered.[[77]](#footnote-77) The IPR Team believes should take approximately 9-12 months to develop.

Within the CSU the VAPP, as much as practicable, should move away from trying to develop new systems, procedures, manuals and policies and instead assist in improving the VPF’s day-to-day work. For example, VAPP should work with relevant staff in order to improve the VPF’s ability quickly and accurately to process operational funding requests, an issue that the IPR Team heard repeatedly about during its mission. Developing handbooks, manuals, registers and the like should no longer be the primary focus of any short-term adviser brought in under the program.

For southern command, it means moving away from focusing on the Criminal Investigations Department and returning to general duties policing, the original intention for the position as prescribed in the design document. The adviser should also have responsibility for crime prevention.

Commander North – having himself worked as a capacity builder on an overseas police development mission –told the IPR Team that he does not rely on his long-term adviser for substantive policing issues but does require support vis-à-vis the VPF boat and managing the relationship with headquarters. Therefore, it is imperative that any incoming adviser is tested to ensure that he/she has the requisite nautical skills. This position need not necessarily be fulltime.

By prioritizing, Australia will be able to reduce the number of short term and long term TA, focus support on concrete and well-defined initiatives, and deliver measurable outcomes. Such a recommendation is consistent with the VAPP Design Document, which noted that ‘beyond 2012...the VPF and Project work together to agree on a plan for decreasing reliance on long-term advisers.’[[78]](#footnote-78)

C. Continue with Joint Patrols and review support to current policy of police post expansion

The IPR Team believes that there is great value in continuing with the joint patrols. As an activity, it strengthens and fortifies VPF relationships with both customary authorities (chiefs) and NGOs, and is an excellent initiative. The IPR Team believes that VAPP advisers should, wherever possible, also accompany the joint patrols. Extended time out of Port Vila will not only enhance relationships between advisers and counterparts; it will also enable them to see for themselves the realities of law and justice provision in the rural areas, in which the vast majority of the population still lives.

At the same time, VAPP needs to reassess the police posts. As a first step, this requires a re-appraisal of the utility of posts to which VAPP has already agreed. As a second step, this entails leveraging the data generated in the research proposed above in order to base decisions on locations on firm evidence.[[79]](#footnote-79) Thirdly, it involves ensuring that all logistical requirements are in place to ensure that police officers deployed are fully capable of discharging their functions effectively. Obviously, the VAPP needs to ensure that any decisions regarding location(s) are socialised throughout the chain-of-command.

*Longer-term recommendations*

D. Pay increased attention to issues of language

An implicit theme emerging from many of the IPR Team’s consultations with ni-Vanuatu stakeholders was the issue of language. English is not the predominant language of Vanuatu and the IPR Team believes that there should be some attempt to bridge the linguistic gap between advisers and recipients of advice.

Consequently, the program should provide language training and, then test staff halfway through their first year in country in order to ensure that all long-term TA are conversant in basic Bislama after six months in country. This recommendation is not designed to create fluency or proficiency, merely everyday familiarity.

In a similar order, VAPP needs to ensure that any written materials (including, but not limited to recruit forms) are not produced and distributed only in English. In this respect, VAPP publication should mirror AusAID practice in Vanuatu, which publishes in multiple languages as a matter of course.

E. Develop a core set of indicators by which to measure the performance of the VAPP

The IPR Team recognises the VAPP’s efforts to record and report on its achievements, but the Team has also identified areas where the current M&E regime is deficient. Accordingly, VAPP should engage an M&E specialist. This recommendation merely reinforces a finding in the VAPP Project Design Document which noted that “if cooperation is envisaged beyond June 2012, then a more robust monitoring system for long-term engagement will need to be developed.”[[80]](#footnote-80) This requires the establishment of crucial indicators, agreed upon with the VPF, by which VAPP’s performance will be assessed. This entails moving away from the recording of short-term inputs and outputs towards measuring the program’s contributions to generating results and outcomes. This should also cut down on the number of forms (and time needed to complete them). AusAID’s Law and Justice Policy Section could assist in this endeavour.

F. Pay increased attention to the Ministry of Internal Affairs

The Ministry of Internal Affairs is the duly constituted body for the civilian strategy, oversight and policy development for the police in Vanuatu, but has received limited attention thus far from VAPP and, it would seem, predecessor programs. Any future programming should concentrate more upon this vital institution. To prepare the ground for future assistance, VAPP should undertake an assessment of current management systems and structures within the MoIA.

As already indicated, it is imperative that linkages between the VAPP and other AusAID law and justice initiatives be further developed and concrete activities undertaken together. As support to the MoIA is an endeavour that crosses areas of substantive across-program expertise -- governance, public administration, *and* police development – VAPP engagement should be undertaken in conjunction with other endeavours.

G. Utilize existing empirical data and, as necessary, commission new research on prevailing crime trends in order to identify areas of greatest need

The IPR Team finds that programmatic decisions tend to have been taken based as much on feel, intuition and personal preference, as on analysis of relevant existing information. The decision of VAPP advisers to focus on certain policing streams (e.g. anti-narcotics in southern command) rather than others (e.g. violence against women and youth-on-youth crime) is a case in point.

Moving towards empirical-based decision making implies a two-step approach. In the first instance, it bespeaks a need to predicate a reorganized program upon data and trends indicated in, among other sources, the 2012 Community Survey, the survey on young offenders and 2009 AusAID research on violence against women in Vanuatu. This documentation should provide an indication of the greatest areas of need and, accordingly, the areas in which VAPP support should concentrate.

This exercise will also serve to indicate gaps in empirical knowledge on crimes, and policing response. This could take the form of a crime survey, or victimization study, whereby researchers can enquire of a representative and statistically significant group of people about the crimes that they experienced in the last year. Such surveys are considered to provide a more accurate picture of the true level of crime than mere police statistics alone because they also include crimes that have not been reported to or recorded by the police. The IPR Team recognizes that this will not be an easy undertaking because of the geography of Vanuatu. Nor will the research necessarily be completed before the VAPP ends in June 2013. Nevertheless, the IPR Team strongly recommends that AusAID give consideration be given to a survey of this kind in order to give any future post-VAPP programming a strong empirical foundation. AusAID may consider utilizing the expertise of the World Bank Justice for the Poor program and/or State Society and Governance in Melanesia Program to assist in this research work.

H. Commence research into relationship between VPF and customary authorities

Paralleling the findings of research, the IPR Team found that chiefs in Vanuatu adjudicate over a wide range of potential disputes, often only calling upon the VPF when, either, they are not able to resolve the issue ‘in-house’, where one or both parties do not accept their verdict, or when they threaten to go to the VPF as a form of implied threat. Consistent with many parts of the developing world, including the places where Australia has law and justice programs, customary authorities still hold more sway and influence than formal state institutions, such as the police.

Within the VAPP, there appears to be gaps in knowledge as regards to both the interplay between the VPF and customary authorities, as well as what the role of customary chiefs are throughout the islands of Vanuatu. Better understanding of this relationship will enable VAPP to debate requirements from a better informed position with the VPF.

Accordingly, the IPR Team recommends that AusAID, as part of a wider orientation towards gathering and relying on empirical data, support research to identify and understand better the relationships between the formal and customary system in Vanuatu in order to be able to develop a better targeted program.

## III. Lessons Identified with Implications for Future Programmatic Direction

Building upon the recommendations laid out in the previous section the following lessons derived from the IPR Team’s evaluation of the VAPP are intended to be of use to all stakeholders as they discuss future programmatic direction for Australian policing assistance in Vanuatu.

A. AusAID management exemplified in Vanuatu is the most appropriate model for Australia’s delivery of policing programs

The IPR Team finds that the arrangement pioneered in Vanuatu – AusAID managing the program and AFP implementing it – works well and should continue.[[81]](#footnote-81) It not only provides political distance for the AFP, given its distinctive roles in law enforcement and police development, but also correlates with the findings of the ODE Law and Justice Review. The team found that the Senior Program Manager, Law and Justice, position was extremely valuable as a form of linkage between the AFP and AusAID.

The implication is that AusAID has an important role to play in helping AFP ensure the policing program has a strategic framework. Going forward this suggests that AusAID’s role has three elements:

1. Making sure that any AFP program is linked to other law and justice programs in Vanuatu
2. Ensuring that program arrangements allow each agency to play to its strengths. For AusAID this connotes taking the lead in program development, monitoring & evaluation, contextual knowledge and partner government relations, and for AFP this means technical expertise, peer-to-peer contact and capacity building.
3. Helping to set a stronger strategic direction for the policing program, including seeing to it that monitoring and evaluation is outcome focussed and that outcomes are relevant to the Vanuatu context.

B. Australian policing programs should always be grounded in empirical data

Analyzing and basing decisions on information is a central principle of modern policing organisations. In Australia and many other parts of the world, police organizations use data such as crime statistics, victimization surveys, incident reports and incident analysis in order to devise solutions to problems and prioritize efforts. Thorough and meticulous mining of data should be replicated in Australian policing programs, with programmatic efforts grounded on empirical findings.

In Vanuatu, the empirical data suggests that violence against women and youth in conflict with the law are two of the principal law and justice issues. In Port Vila, the evidence also indicates that youth may be the largest group of perpetrators of violence against women. It is recommended, therefore, that special attention in any future programming would take the prevailing empirical evidence into account and devote resources to these means.

C. Design documents should cost out maintenance commitments

Although the VAPP Project Design document noted that the program was unsustainable at current levels it not did enunciate any strategies as to how to maintain the infrastructure provided through the project. The result is that Australia has funded the provision of assets, such as the boat, which require continued infusions of funding after the end of the program in order to remain functioning and functional. There is no maintenance budget for cars that have been gifted by VAPP. Legacy funding will most likely also need to be provided to maintain other capital infrastructure such as police posts, training rooms and air conditioning units.

This experience suggests that comprehensive cost analyses are needed when Australia provides capital infrastructure and equipment for land and sea operations (recurrent costs, maintenance, personnel). Accordingly, such a thorough breakdown of budgetary implications needs to be undertaken for existing VPF assets that have been gifted by VAPP. The IPR Team was pleased to learn that there are incipient plans in VAPP to support the Vanuatu Mobile Force in terms of maintenance and upkeep.

D. Police development programs in Vanuatu should prioritize accountability and discipline

Ensuring better discipline and/or greater internal and external accountability was a regular refrain in many of the IPR Team’s meetings and consultations both within the VPF and with informed outside parties. The team heard frequently about allegations of both weak discipline and a whimsical enforcement system within the VPF, with the resultant impact on the effectiveness of some VAPP endeavours. For instance, the Team heard that the boat in Luganville was not sailing particularly often because the captain was under indefinite suspension for an administrative infraction.

The issue of (in) discipline seems a central issue in the VPF, but is one that the VAPP has only just begun to address in specific terms. This suggests that ensuring better discipline within the VPF ought to become a high priority within a successor police development program. This is a multilayered approach, which is not just a matter of training, although education will no doubt be an element of any ‘disciplinary focus’.

The IPR Team notes that VAPP has undertaken a review of the Professional Standards Unit within the VPF. The team was informed that the review recommendations were accepted, hence constituting a potential jumping off point for future work in this area.

E. Programs Need to Evolve with Time and Prevailing Circumstance

As circumstances change, the mechanisms by which and with which Australia delivers assistance must also adapt.

In the case of Vanuatu, this has three repercussions, to be elaborated upon in a design process for a revamped VAPP. First, it means establishing a grant for the VPF by which it can manage funds gifted by Australia for its continued operations. This grant could be channelled through the Ministry of Finance to be managed by the MoIA for the use of operational activities by the VPF. Naturally, this funding mechanism requires the appropriate fiduciary risk management and financial modalities. Secondly, it implies an evolution away from long-term AFP TA in order to maximize their extensive policing expertise. Putting money through an operational fund frees up significant time for AFP capacity builders to leverage their skills to the maximum benefit of fellow officers in the VPF. Thirdly, and building upon existing programmatic achievements, it suggests bolstering efforts to strengthen of the relationships between the VPF and village elders and chiefs through remote patrols and other strategies, a goal consistent with the emerging law and justice policy frameworks of both the Governments of Australia and Vanuatu.

# Annex A

**Terms of Reference**

**Vanuatu Australia Police Project (VAPP)**

**Independent Review**

**BACKGROUND**

**A brief orientation to the project**

1. The Vanuatu Australia Police Project (VAPP) is a 16 month program that runs from February 2011-June 2012 with AusAID-funding of AUD 9.9 million. An outcome of the Australia-Vanuatu Partnership for Development talks in August 2011 has been that the project be extended to 30 June 2013.
2. Australia has provided support to the law and justice sector in Vanuatu for over 10 years.
3. VAPP builds on the previous program of support to the Vanuatu Police Force (VPF), the Vanuatu Police Force Capacity Building Project (VPFCBP) that ran 2006-2011.
4. VAPP is essentially a capacity building project. The VAPP supports efforts by the VPF to build its own capacity towards self-reliance. This is done through the provision of long[[82]](#footnote-82) and short-term[[83]](#footnote-83) technical assistance, training, coaching or mentoring, study tours, and provision of assistance in planning and maintaining infrastructure and equipment.

**The delivery mechanism**

1. VAPP is a different modality to other policing projects in the Pacific where AFP is both manager and implementer, and accountable for funds. In Vanuatu VAPP is currently managed by AusAID and implemented by the Australian Federal Police (AFP) in partnership with the VPF. This management arrangement was at the request of the Government of Vanuatu (GoV) following a breakdown in relationship between the AFP and GoV.

**The project**

1. The overall project goal and purpose of the project reflects the VPF vision and mission. The Project's goal is a safe and secure environment for all citizens and visitors of Vanuatu. The Project’s purpose is to contribute to the provision of excellent policing services and strong (close) police/community relations.

**Expected end of project outcomes**

1. Expected end of project outcomes as stated in the project design document:
2. *Training and professionalisation of the VPF:* VPF training and outreach strategies and policies are in place and being implemented by VPF, and continue to maximise training by and participation of women police.
3. *Infrastructure, assets and logistics:* Priority infrastructure development and assets purchases are achieved and VPF maintenance plans are in place.
4. *Workforce renewal:* At least one round of workforce renewal has been completed.
5. *Internal VPF governance:* Management and Financial governance frameworks are completed and VPF staff are able to implement them; and Project personnel have provided advice and support allowing for the implementation of priority CSU review recommendations.
6. Some outputs to date include:

* A transition to a younger and more skilled VPF: 120 new recruits have graduated from this college since 2006 and have been a welcome addition to the VPF workforce, which now numbers 600. Of these recruits, 26 per cent (32) are women;
* Increased capacity of the VPF to have a more visible presence in rural areas: through new and refurbished barracks, police posts and stations in Tanna, Aneityum, Loh, Santo and Sola, and the provision of a coastal patrol vessel, the Turoroa, to service the northern islands of Vanuatu;
* Peer to peer relationships: forged under this partnership between Australia and Vanuatu police forces, which will have long term, lasting impacts on both sides; and
* Community outreach and links with local civil society organisations: such as with the Vanuatu Women’s Centre, is another stand out achievement.

**Key approaches**

1. The key approaches employed in the initiative are:
2. *Training and professionalisation of the VPF:* This area covers a broad range of capacity-building activities to increase the VPF’s move towards self reliance in specific policing skills and management. This area involves the 7 long-term advisers working alongside their VPF counterparts on day-to day police work, and project related activities. The 36 (to date) short-term advisers carry out specific training or one-off discrete tasks to meet the needs of the VPF. The project also funds a range of training activities; customised or off-the-shelf, in-house or external, informal, formal, training of trainers, and scholarships.
3. *Infrastructure, assets and logistics:* The VPF’s annual budget is typically insufficient to cover all VPF operational needs and infrastructure priorities. Project funding is used to rehabilitate existing facilities, build new facilities, and to purchase buses, cars, boats and other equipment.
4. *Workforce renewal:* The workforce renewal program supports organisational change and human resource management improvements. It provides the funds to pay outgoing officers their statutory entitlements for retirement. VPF is unable to meet these payments without donor assistance. This then frees up VPF operating budget to fund up to 40 new recruits. Funding for two workforce renewal programs has been budgeted for under VAPP. Despite the retirements freeing up VPF operating budget, the project paid for the costs of one round of new recruits.
5. *Internal VPF governance*: the project supports activities to strengthen the VPF internal government systems like the provision of short-term advisers to develop operating procedures and human resource manual, asset management and firearm registry systems.

**Issues**

1. The VAPP has invested heavily in adviser inputs and infrastructure development as well as asset purchase. The VAPP may have raised expectations and established systems that cannot be maintained without continued donor assistance.
2. The VPF plans to scale up police numbers from 600 to 900 by 2020. VPF salaries currently make up 83% of their total budget allocation and they are unable to meet their operational needs without the contribution of the VAPP.
3. The large number of infrastructure and asset investments funded through VAPP, including a number of new remote police posts and stations, raises questions about the ability of the VPF to maintain these and existing assets from an already tight operational budget. These assets in remote locations also raise questions about the balance between formal and traditional justice systems.

**Development plans**

1. Australia’s assistance to the police is in line with the Vanuatu Government's Priorities and Action Agenda (PAA) objectives to build stable institutions. The Government of Vanuatu confirmed law and justice as a priority outcome under the Australia-Vanuatu Partnership for Development.
2. VAPP is a key component of Australia’s investment in the law and justice sector in Vanuatu. The other major program components in this sector are the Vanuatu Law and Justice Partnership Program (Stretem Rod blong Jastis) and core support to the Vanuatu Women’s Centre (VWC). The VWC provide counselling and support services to women and children survivors of physical and sexual violence.

**The Mid-Term Review**

1. The Vanuatu Government, following the Australia-Vanuatu Partnership for Development Talks in August 2011, requested that AusAID facilitate an independent review of this phase of the VAPP. AusAID’s support to the VPF was last reviewed in 2008.
2. The review of VAPP is timely as the GoV is developing an updated law and justice policy framework that will set priorities and targets for law and justice services, including policing, across the sector. The new policy framework will address the issue of integration of traditional (*kastom*) and formal justice systems.
3. Also, a number of recent aid reviews have significant implications for policing assistance in Vanuatu. These include the Aid Effectiveness Review (2011) and the Office of Development Effectiveness Discussion Emerging findings from the ODE Law and Justice Evaluation (August 2011).

**PURPOSE OF THE REVIEW**

1. The purpose of the independent review is accountability and program improvement. The review will examine project :
2. *Effectiveness and Efficiency:* Review the performance of VAPP, with a particular focus on whether the project contributed to changes in individual police competency, group capabilities and VPF organisational capacity; and
3. *Sustainability:* Review VPF budget allocations and recurrent costs of current and proposed organisational arrangements to identify gaps and sustainable options for addressing them.
4. Lessons learned from the independent review will be used to inform future programming of Australian assistance to the VPF.

**Primary users of the information**

1. The primary users of the information are the Government of Vanuatu (Ministry of Internal Affairs, Vanuatu Police Force, Police Services Commission, and the Ministry of Justice and Community Services), AusAID (Pacific Division and Port Vila post), and AFP International Deployment Group.

**Key management decisions**

1. The independent review will provide recommendations for program improvement for the remainder of the VAPP.
2. The independent review will also provide evidence to inform the future assistance to policing in Vanuatu; the level of funding, the approach, the modality and how the project will be managed.

**SCOPE AND APPROACH OF THE REVIEW**

1. The review team will develop an evaluation plan that is consistent with Evaluation Capacity Building Program (ECBP) Standard 5 on Evaluation Plans. This will be submitted for AusAID’s approval prior to the in-country mission.
2. The review approach will include document/literature review, stakeholder interviews, and field inspections. A review of documents and literature will be held at the reviewers’ home offices and then in-country, stakeholder consultations will be held in Vanuatu and if appropriate in Canberra, and field visits will take place in Vanuatu. A non-exhaustive list of reference documents can be found in Annex A.

**Priority Review questions**

The independent review will focus on three evaluation criteria: effectiveness, efficiency and sustainability. The following primary evaluation questions are to be addressed in the evaluation plan and evaluation report. These may be supplemented by the review team with secondary questions when developing the evaluation plan or during fieldwork.

1. Effectiveness:

* To what extent is the VAPP on track to achieve its end of project outcomes?
* What changes to VPF police knowledge, attitudes and skills have resulted from VAPP training activities?
* What changes to VPF police behaviour has resulted from VAPP training activities?
* To what extent has infrastructure contributed to changes in delivery of law and justice services in remote areas of Vanuatu?
* How has information collected by the monitoring system and evaluations been used to support management and continuous improvement of VAPP?

1. Efficiency:

* Are there other capacity development modalities that would have delivered the same outputs and intermediate outcomes with less inputs?
* Are there other capacity development modalities that would have delivered more outputs and intermediate outcomes with the same inputs?

1. Sustainability:

* To what extent can VPF budget allocations meet the recurrent costs of current and proposed organisational arrangements in VPF?
* How sustainable are training and professionalisation changes delivered by VAPP?
* How sustainable are workforce renewal changes delivered by VAPP?
* How sustainable are infrastructure changes delivered by VAPP?

**COMPOSITION OF THE INDEPENDENT REVIEW TEAM**

1. The review team will consist of:
2. Team Leader (responsible for coordinating inputs of team members and finalising written reports) with monitoring and evaluation experience and a strong expertise in law and justice, public financial management, extensive experience in the Pacific region, a thorough understanding of Australia’s aid program;
3. A law and justice specialist with a focus on organisational change;
4. Government of Vanuatu representative;
5. Australian Federal Police M&E specialist; and
6. AusAID review manager.
7. Skill Sets Required by the Team Leader:

* methodological monitoring and evaluation expertise;
* experience in the law and justice sector;
* knowledge of public sector finance;
* knowledge of development in the Pacific;
* thorough understanding of the Australian aid program and experience in aid program development, planning, reviews, and monitoring and evaluation;
* excellent interpersonal and communication skills, including a proven ability to liaise and communicate effectively with Ni-Vanuatu; and
* ability to deliver timely and high-quality written reports.

1. Skill Sets Required by the Law and Justice Specialist:

* experience in the law and justice sector, and in particular policing;
* knowledge of organisational change processes and capacity development modalities suited to the Pacific;
* knowledge of development in the Pacific;
* thorough understanding of the Australian aid program and experience in aid program reviews;
* excellent interpersonal and communication skills, including a proven ability to liaise and communicate effectively with Ni-Vanuatu; and
* ability to contribute to timely and high-quality written reports.

1. The review team will be supplemented with inputs, as directed by the Team Leader, from the Australian Federal Police International Deployment Group monitoring and evaluation specialist.

**REPORTING ROLES AND RESPONSIBILITIES OF THE TEAM**

1. The Team Leader will:

* plan, guide and develop the overall approach and methodology for the review;
* manage and direct the review’s activities, representing the review team and leading consultations with government officials and other donor agencies;
* manage, compile and edit inputs from other team members to ensure the quality of reporting outputs;
* produce an aide memoire, synthesise review material into a clear draft evaluation report and a final evaluation report; and
* represent the team in peer reviews.

1. The law and justice specialist will:

* work under the overall direction of the Team Leader;
* represent the review team and lead consultations with government officials and other donor agencies;
* produce inputs to and provide comments on the evaluation plan, the aide memoire, the draft and final evaluation report; and
* represent the team in peer reviews, if required.

1. Government of Vanuatu member will:

* work under the overall direction of the Team Leader; and
* provide advice, context, an understanding of GoV processes, and possibly relevant documentation from the Vanuatu Government.

1. Australian Federal Police M&E specialist member will:

* work under the overall direction of the Team Leader;
* provide advice and relevant documentation from the Australian Federal Police;
* contribute to the required dialogue; and
* provide input into the evaluation report with a particular reference to the monitoring and evaluation plan for the project.

1. The AusAID representative will, under the direction of the Team Leader, observe the review. They should jointly ensure that AusAID and AFP participation does not compromise the capacity of the review team to maintain independence in conducting the review.

**TIMING & DURATION**

1. The independent review will commence in April 2012 and be completed no later than 15 July 2012. An indicative timing and duration for the scope of services is as follows (final dates and inputs will be negotiated with the Team Leader following the presentation of the evaluation plan):

| TASK | PERIOD | LOCATION | INPUT (days) | | |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
|  | TEAM LEADER | L&J SPECIALIST | |
| Document review | 15-16 April | Home Office | 2 | | 2 |
| AusAID briefings | 17 April | Home Office /communication with Vanuatu post and Canberra | 0.25 | | 0.25 |
| Evaluation Plan (as per Standard 5) | 20 April | Home Office | 2 | | 1 |
| Evaluation mission | 2-16 May | Vanuatu | 14 | | 14 |
| Preparation of aide memoire (during mission) and stakeholder workshops to present initial findings (final day) | 15 May | Port Vila | 1 | | 1 |
| Draft Evaluation Report | 31 May | Home Office | 7.25 | | 5 |
| Peer Review of Draft Evaluation Report | 15 June | Canberra / Home office | 0.5 | | - |
| Redrafting report after feedback from AusAID and other stakeholders | 30 June | Home Office | 2 | | 1.75 |
| **TOTAL** |  |  | **29** | | **25** |

**OUTPUTS**

1. The following reports are to be provided:
2. *Evaluation Plan* consistent with Evaluation Capacity Building Program (ECBP) Monitoring Standard 5: Independent Evaluation Plans (Methodology). The plan will be submitted for agreement with AusAID and GoV prior to mission.
3. *Evaluation Mission Aide Memoire* – initial findings to be presented at workshop with key stakeholders in Port Vila, including Vanuatu and Australian Government agencies, at the completion of the in-country mission. The format for the Aide Memoire will follow AusAID’s template (to be provided).
4. *Final Draft Independent Evaluation Report* consistent with Evaluation Capacity Building Program Monitoring Standard 6: Independent Evaluation Reports. The draft should be a final draft and include all necessary annexes. This will be provided to the evaluation manager, AusAID Port Vila, within 15 working days of completion of the field study to Vanuatu. Feedback from AusAID and other stakeholders will be provided within three weeks of receiving the draft report, and following a peer review.
5. *Independent Evaluation Report* - final document within 10 working days of receiving the feedback, incorporating feedback from stakeholders and the evaluation peer review. The report will be no more than 25 pages (plus annexes). Findings, ratings, lessons, and recommendations should be clearly documented in the report. The final evaluation report will be published on AusAID’s website.

**Documents for Review**

AusAID will provide hyperlinks/electronic copies of documents prior to the evaluation commencing. AusAID appreciates the documentation is extensive although not exhaustive.

*Program documents:*

Vanuatu Australia Police Project – Project Design Document 2011

*Reports:*

VAAP Progress Reports – November 2011 and February 2012

Community Perception Survey December 2011 - results

Vanuatu Police Force Capacity Building Project Mid-Term Review 2008

Vanuatu Law and Justice Partnership Prorgram (Stretem Rod Blong Jastis) Project Design Document 2010

*Government of Vanuatu documents:*

1. Vanuatu Priority Action Agenda
2. Thinking Long Acting Short 2009-2012
3. Vanuatu Law and Justice Sector Strategy and Action Plan 2009-2014
4. Vanuatu National Survey on Women’s Lives and Family Relationships, 2011
5. Sexual Offenders – An analysis of 50 offenders and their offences, 2009
6. Mapping Report: Informal and Formal Systems to Protect Children in Vanuatu, 2011
7. Documentation resulting from the Ministry of Justice and Community Services National Law and Justice Sector Summit, Mele Village, 23-26 January 2012.

*AusAID documents:*

1. Evaluation Capacity Building Program Monitoring Standards
   * Standard 5: Independent Evaluation Plans (Methodology)
   * Standard 6: Independent Evaluation Reports
2. Templates
   * Template: Independent Progress Report Aide Memoire
   * Template: Independent Progress Report
3. Policy documents and delivery strategies
   * Independent Review of Aid Effectiveness 2011 <<http://www.aidreview.gov.au/publications/aidreview.pdf>>
   * Australian Government response to the Independent Review of Aid Effectiveness <[http://www.AusAID.gov.au/publications/pubout.cfm?ID=5621\_9774\_1073\_3040\_2380&Type](http://www.ausaid.gov.au/publications/pubout.cfm?ID=5621_9774_1073_3040_2380&Type)>
   * ODE: Discussion Paper: Emerging findings from the ODE Law and Justice Evaluation August 2011
   * AusAID’s strategy paper on Effective Governance, November 2011

# Annex B

**Vanuatu Australia Police Project**

**Evaluation Plan**

27 April 2012

1. **Introduction - Purpose**

The Vanuatu Australia Police Project (VAPP) was designed as a 16 month program to run from February 2011 to June 2012. The VAPP has now been extended to June 2013 and now has a total funding of AUD 16.65 million. VAPP builds on the previous program of support to the Vanuatu Police Force (VPF), the Vanuatu Police Force Capacity Building Project (VPFCBP), that ran 2006-2011. The VAPP is managed by AusAID and implemented by the Australian Federal Police (AFP).

The purpose of the mid-term review is is accountability and program improvement. The review will examine project:

1. *Effectiveness and Efficiency:* Review the performance of VAPP, with a particular focus on whether the project contributed to changes in individual police competency, group capabilities and VPF organisational capacity; and
2. *Sustainability:* Review VPF budget allocations and recurrent costs of current and proposed organisational arrangements to identify gaps and sustainable options for addressing them.

Lessons learned from the independent review will be used to inform future programming of Australian assistance to the VPF.

The purpose of this evaluation plan is to outline the methodology with which the Independent Progress Report (IPR) team will use to assess the implementation of the VAPP and write its appraisal.

This IPR, occurring at the midway point of the program is designed to:

* capture progress and lessons from implementation;
* ensure the program maximises the sustainability of VAPP’s benefits in its remaining implementation time; and
* provide evidence to inform the future assistance to policing in Vanuatu; the level of funding, the approach, the modality and how the project will be managed
* recommend options that AusAID/AFP can pursue during the remainder of VAPP’s lifespan to improve sustainability of current activities
* draw lessons about development programming relevant for policing assistance, Australia’s country program in Vanuatu, and the AFP’s International Deployment Group (IDG)

This evaluation plan builds on, refines and operationalises the ToR provided to the IPR Team by AusAID Port Vila. It also outlines the methods and timeframe the evaluation team will use to meet the ToR’s objectives and scope, as well as outlining the proposed roles of team members. The plan is consistent with Evaluation Capacity Building Program (ECBP) Standard 5 on Evaluation Plans.

**2.Evaluation Questions**

This evaluation will help the Governments of Australia and Vanuatu, first, assess VAPP’s effectiveness, efficiency, sustainability and the lessons learned. Based upon these findings, the IPR will, second, offer a set of recommendations of potential courses of program improvement that AusAID can undertake for the remaining duration of the VAPP. Third, the IPR will provide evidence to enable decision-makers to make informed judgements about the scope and form of future assistance to policing in Vanuatu.

To do so, the IPR will pay particular attention to the cost of policing and the impact of programming on the intended beneficiaries of the VAPP, namely the citizens of Vanuatu who are expected to receive an improved quality of policing through VAPP activities. Australian assistance is only ever one of many influences on justice development in Vanuatu, however, it is improbable to be able to apply a strict causal approach to result attribution with regard to AusAID’s support. Additionally, consulting with beneficiaries is essential in order to determine whether programming is owned by them, has achieved outcomes/results, and is relevant to their needs.

Furthermore, the identification of beneficiaries is crucial to understanding the VAPP’s implicit and/or explicit theory of change.[[84]](#footnote-84) The team will seek to understand the theories of change that underlie VAPP and, from those theories, inquire on the relationship between the component's activities, their intended beneficiaries, and achieved objectives and outcomes/results, for it is only from outcomes/results that AusAID can determine whether its programming has produced value for money.[[85]](#footnote-85)

In conducting the review, the IR Team will also take note of the ongoing process led by the GoV, which is updating the country’s law and justice policy framework that will set priorities and targets for law and justice services, including policing, across the sector. The new policy framework will address the issue of integration of traditional (*kastom*) and formal justice systems and the IPR Team will assess how future Australian funded policing assistance will fit into that rubric.

Finally, the IPR Team recognizes that, during the course of the review, it may well become privy to private and confidential information. As well as the confidentiality clauses contained in individual team member’s contracts, the evaluation plan endorses and commits to comply with the Australasia Evaluation Society code of ethics.

The evaluation questions are structured to correspond to the stated evaluation criteria for the ToR. For the purposes of this evaluation plan, these criteria are defined as follows:

* *effectiveness* is the extent to which the desired programmatic outcomes are achieved or expected to be achieved from delivered outputs;
* *efficiency* refers to how resources (funds, expertise, time, etc.) have been used and translated into outputs;
* *sustainability* is the probability that the changes attributable to programmatic activities persist after donor assistance has ended; and
* *lessons learned* is the extent to which knowledge and understandings gained by experience have been incorporated into subsequent annual planning decisions and future programming

The IPR Team define ‘capacity development’as the process of developing competencies and capabilities in individuals, groups, organisations, or sectors which will lead to sustained and self-generating performance improvement.

*Effectiveness and Efficiency*

What are the VAPP’s theories of change? Who are the intended beneficiaries of VAPP’s activities and how do the program’s theories of change correlate programmatic activities to achieving results for those beneficiaries?

To what extent has the VAPP resulted in behavioural change at the level of the individual officer? Has VAPP capacity building resulted in an increase in an individual officer’s knowledge about policing, an improvement in attitudes to his/her task, and an enhancement of relevant skills? Are these improvements captured in the VAPP’s M&E regime?

To what extent has VAPP efforts wrought improvements within the organizational components of the VPF with which it has been working? What, specifically, are these improvements? Are these changes captured in the VAPP’s M&E regime?

To what degree has VAPP developed the organisational capacity of the VPF? What, specifically, are these improvements?

To what extent has implementation of programmatic activities contributed to achievement of intermediate objectives and outcomes? Are the objectives on track to being achieved? If not, what implementation changes, if any, in the one year left for VAPP implementation, need to be made to ensure objectives can be achieved?

Has VAPP effectively improved the professionalism of the VPF and contributed to an improvement in police-community relations? Is this change captured in the program’s M&E framework?

Is there a coherent and complementary approach between and among the VAPP and other Australian-funded initiatives in the law and justice sector within the country?

How has VAPP effectively developed its relationships with partners so as to influence the achievement of programmatic objectives?

Have the activities produced the intended changes in terms of improved infrastructure, assets and logistics? Are there reliable and verifiable outcome-based indicators in place to objectively measure how funding capital purchases has translated into improved policing and greater territorial coverage?

Have the activities produced the intended changes in terms of enhanced VPF corporate governance. i.e operating procedures and human resource manual, asset management and firearm registry systems; management and financial governance frameworks.?

Is the VAPP’s current M&E system collecting the right information to allow judgement to be made about achievements, meeting objectives and sustainability at the next evaluation point?

Is the current VAPP approach to capacity development the most efficient? Are there other approaches that would have delivered the same results with fewer inputs and at less cost? Could other approaches have delivered more outputs and intermediate outcomes?

How has information collected by the monitoring system and past evaluations been used to support management and continuous improvement of VAPP?

What are the current challenges/risks of implementation, and how are these being addressed? Is a risk management approach applied to management of the activity? What are the risks to achievement of objectives? Have the risks been managed appropriately?

*Sustainability*

To what extent can VPF budget allocations meet the recurrent costs of current and proposed organisational arrangements in VPF? What are the current costs of policing, and what are the anticipated future costs?

How sustainable are training and organisational changes delivered by VAPP?

How sustainable are workforce renewal changes delivered by VAPP?

How sustainable are infrastructure changes delivered by VAPP?

What budgetary and financial realities need to be assessed when considering future assistance to the VPF?

Do VAPP partners (the VPF, relevant ministries and others) have sufficient ownership, capacity and resources to maintain the activity outcomes without (or with reduced) Australian Government funding? Have they exhibited sufficient commitment to do so?

Within the agreed scope of work for 2011-2013, what additional actions, if any, could reasonably be taken to increase sustainability of outcomes?

Has VAPP worked closely with the VPF on the issue of budget allocations and recurrent costs of current policing and proposed organisational arrangements? Is there sufficient expertise within VAPP to work on issues relating to finance and sustainability?

Are there any areas of current activities that are clearly not sustainable? What actions, if any, in the short time left for VAPP implementation, should be taken to address this?

*Lessons Learning*

How well has learning from implementation and previous reviews (self-assessment and independent) been integrated into the VAPP activities? In particular, what lessons identified identified in 2006-11 Vanuatu Police Force Capacity Building Project (VPFCBP) have been learned and addressed?

What learning has taken place with regard to the following issues: policy engagement in a sensitive sector; implementation and M&E of capacity development initiatives; implementation of service delivery in remote areas; in managing relationships across different Australian programs and funded initiatives; in managing relationships with stakeholders (government, civil society, local, and non-state). How has that learning, if there were learning, been utilized programmatically?

What lessons can be applied to VAPP implementation and/or to the broader Australian aid program in Vanuatu? What lessons from VAPP are useful for the AFP’s International Deployment Group, which currently engaged in police development programs elsewhere in the region?

Has the VAPP fulfilled Vanuatu and Australian priorities different from those addressed by other law and justice programs and initiatives?

**3. Evaluation Methodology**

The methodology for implementing this evaluation plan is based upon two processes: (a) document review and desk analysis and (b) fieldwork consultations. Within this division, a mixed-method approach will be employed, as it is best suited to meeting the objectives of the ToR. This approach will appropriately verify, double check, and triangulate the evaluation findings through:

* data derived from a variety of sources;
* the use of multiple perspectives to interpret the data;
* the use of a team of evaluators, each of whom comes to law and justice development from a unique standpoint (see Roles and Responsibilities of Team Members below); and
* participatory techniques.

For quantitative law and justice performance data, the team will rely on available information drawn from relevant GoV systems, as well as those employed by the AFP and AusAID. Naturally, the strengths and weaknesses of those systems are a risk, but, in themselves, they are also evidence of law and justice development. For qualitative law and justice performance data, the team will rely on available information collected from a variety of sources, including, but not limited to, GoV studies, academic and scholarly accounts, perception surveys, and other related information. In addition, qualitative data will gathered through fieldwork consultations.

These sources of data will be further supplemented by information culled from program design documents, GoV policy statements, VAPP work plans, financial and budget records, progress reports, etc.

Using a mixed-method approach and multiple data sources permits the use of various analysis techniques, including induction (discovery of patterns); deduction (testing of theories); and abduction (uncovering explanations), the combination of which will produce more valid and reliable evaluation findings.

*Document review and desk analysis*

The evaluation team will review an extensive list of key documents related to the planning and performance of VAPP, including design documents, progress reports and monitoring data.

As already indicated these documents will include, but not be limited to:

* program design and progress reports;
* program work plans and monitoring assessments;
* government policy statements (GoV and GoA);
* previous independent assessments and reviews;
* financial and budgetary statements; and
* research and scholarly articles and studies.

These documents will be analyzed in order to learn directly about the VAPP; inform the review team of directions of inquiry it may wish to pursue further; establish linkages to other sources of information; and verify and triangulate data. What precise information the team will pull from these sources cannot be determined at this point in time, prior to a thorough reading and comprehensive analysis of the documents, a process that the timelines of this IE do not permit.

*Fieldwork Consultations*

The proposed fieldwork will consist of interviews, data gathering and site visits to North Efate and Santo in particular. The purpose of these consultations and visits is to ask the evaluation questions and compile information and evidence to inform the evaluation.

Above and beyond the evaluation questions enumerated above, fieldwork consultations, discussions, and interviews are divided into four categories: (i) VPF counterparts, (ii) VPF executive and management (iii) project personnel, and (iv) beneficiaries.

In terms of methods to be used, it is also expected that fieldwork consultations will consist of semi-structured interviews and discussions with individuals and small groups of individuals. The team may also include goal attainment scaling, competency testing and other methods appropriate to the effective evaluation of capacity development. It is anticipated that there may also be more structured focus group discussions. At the end of the fieldwork, it is also expected that there will be a debriefing workshop, which will also function as one of the means by which the team will receive feedback from a range of stakeholders, thereby enhancing the participatory nature of the evaluation.

The following interview questions are enumerated to provide guidance to team members for the questions they are to pose during discussions and interviews with the interlocutors they will meet. The following questions have been structured in a logical sequence in order to elicit the requisite information that the team believes is required to respond fully to the ToR.

It is also important to note that the range of questions allows for interviewees to engage on multiple levels. For instance, some of the questions are open-ended; others ask for self-assessments. A number of questions are intended to probe for more factual and objective data -- historical and analytic. As a result, it is believed that this mixed-method approach will afford a greater validity and reliability of findings.

What precise information the team will require, as well as derive from the interviews, however, cannot be ascertained prior to the team’s initiating the evaluation process. This is due, in part, to the twists and turns a review process inevitably undergoes and the need for the team to maintain an open mind as to what information is, in fact, essential, which, oft-times, cannot be grasped at the outset of the evaluation and, frequently, leads down unanticipated pathways. The inability to define with greater specificity the requisite information required is also due to the logistical inability of the team to meet, discuss, thrash out, and agree upon these questions prior to its arrival in Vanuatu.[[86]](#footnote-86)

Additionally, as already indicated, an evaluation is an iterative process of probing, verifying, double checking, and triangulating information from a multitude of sources. To facilitate the team’s proficiency in engaging in this iterative process, it is expected that the team will meet for debriefings each morning and evening. At these meetings, which will be informal, team members will be expected to present their day’s activities and objectives (in the morning) *and* their subsequent findings and tentative understandings (in the evening). These meetings will offer the team an opportunity to share, query, and explore issues and challenges as they arise. The meetings will also provide time for verifying whether the team, as a cohesive whole, is on track in responding to its ToR responsibilities and obligations, disclosing what additional information may be required to uncover and/or what information needs to be verified and triangulated. As these debriefings occur, the team will also maintain a ‘running list’ of VAPP ‘wins/achievements.’

The morning and evening debriefings are also essential given that the team will operate, in the main, in two flexible groups. The first group is to centre upon the Team Leader and issues pertaining to financial sustainability and the costs of policing. The other group circles around the Law and Justice Specialist, focusing on the VAPP’s capacity building activities. The debriefings, therefore, will be the opportunity for the team to listen to and question their colleagues; explore common emerging themes and challenges; identify gaps in knowledge and information that require additional attention; and cross-fertilize their findings and emerging understandings.

*Interview Questions*

(i) Counterparts: VPF

Can you provide some examples of how VAPP has improved your knowledge about what it takes to be a police officer?

What new skills have you learned through the VAPP? How have you applied those new skills (if any) on the job and in the office?

How often on a weekly basis do you interact with VAPP advisers? What is the nature of your discussions? How would you characterize these discussions? In what language do you communicate?

How do you use the equipment and infrastructure that has been provided to you under the VAPP? Is the equipment and infrastructure you have been given useful to addressing what you perceive are the major challenges in your station/work area?

How much has (any) training you received from VAPP been attuned to policing realties?

How would you characterize your relationship with the community? Can you point to any changes in your approach to the community following assistance from VAPP?

(ii) Counterparts: VPF Executive & Management

Can you describe the nature of the assistance that you, as an individual, and your functional area, have received from VAPP in the last year? How often, in an average week and month, do you interact with VAPP advisers? How would you characterize that interaction?

How best can your needs be met by VAPP? What are the challenges?

What budgetary and financial assistance do you currently depend on from VAPP? How important is VAPP assistance in sustaining the expanded reach of the VPF?

How has VAPP improved the internal governance of the VPF? How is the program on workforce renewal going? What indicators do you use to reach that conclusion?

What further institutional changes do you believe are needed within the VPF? What plans do you have to advance and realize these institutional changes?

What form of assistance do you believe that you will need after the end of VAPP and in any subsequent program? Is it primarily financial? Is it primarily logistical? Is it primarily ‘technical advice’?

What do you believe are the current costs of running the VPF? How much of the VPF budget goes on fixed costs, such as salary? Do you have budget projections for 2013 and beyond?

How has the VAPP program assistance improved the VPF’s ability to deliver better services? How do you know?

(iii) VAPP Personnel

What is your role in VAPP?

What does your part in the project aim to achieve?

How was that aim set?

To what extent did it achieve those aims?

To what extent do you think the outcomes are sustainable?

How do you define capacity development?

What strategies do you use to engage with your VPF counterparts? How effective are those strategies?

What is VAPP doing well and not doing well? What are its strengths and challenges? Does this VAPP have the necessary prerequisites for success?

Has there been lesson learning within the VAPP? What are the lessons? How are lessons implemented?

What approaches (training, workplace mentoring etc) have worked best in terms of instilling changed behaviour within the VPF? How do you know what works and what doesn’t?

How much does current VAPP programming take into account the cost of policing and issues regarding maintenance and upkeep of equipment?

What are the current challenges/risks of implementation? How are these being addressed?

How is the VAPP working with other parts of the justice sector? How does VAPP work with police prosecutors, for instance?

Is there a coherent and complementary approach between and among VAPP, and other AusAID funded initiatives in the law and justice sector?

How does VAPP report on achievements to AusAID? How is the program being managed and overseen?

(iv) Beneficiaries: citizens, women, churches, service users/non-users

When you experience a crime, or have a conflict/dispute to whom do you turn for resolution (police, national court system, village elders, churches, NGOs, etc...)?

What do you expect your police to do?

How well do the police meet your expectations? Why do you think that is?

Are your law and justice -- access to justice, gender equality, quality of law and justice delivered -- needs being met better today than yesterday – give examples. How are you needs being better met? Why are they being better met?

What can be done to meet your law and justice needs in future? What are the law and justice challenges?

**4. Roles and Responsibilities of Team Members**

The evaluation team is comprised four members: a team leader; a Law and Justice Specialist, a Monitoring & Evaluation Specialist, and a representative(s) from the VPF and GoV.

The team leader, Gordon Peake, will:

* plan, guide and develop the overall approach and methodology for the evaluation;
* manage and direct the evaluation’s activities, representing the evaluation team and leading consultations with government officials and other donor agencies;
* manage, compile and edit inputs from other team members to ensure the quality of reporting outputs;
* produce an aide memoire, synthesise evaluation material into a clear draft evaluation report and a final evaluation report; and
* represent the team in peer reviews, if required.

The Law and Justice Specialist, Eric Scheye, will in consultation with the team leader:

* work under the overall direction of the Team Leader;
* lead on issues relating to capacity development and organizational change;
* produce inputs to and provide comments on the evaluation plan, the aide memoire, the draft and final evaluation report; and
* represent the team in peer reviews, if required
* other incidental duties as required and agreed.

The Monitoring & Evaluation Specialist, Patrick Hagan, will in consultation with the team leader:

* + work under the overall direction of the Team Leader;
  + liaise and facilitate communication with the Australian Federal Police;
  + contribute to the collection of interview and focus group data; and
  + provide input into the evaluation report.

The VPF and GoV representatives Arthur Edmanley and Jones Ephraim will:

* work under the overall direction of the Team Leader; and
* provide advice, context, an understanding of GoV processes, and possibly relevant documentation from the Vanuatu Government
* participate in discussions with government Ministries, departments and other stakeholders
* provide input into the evaluation report
* other incidental duties as required and agreed

AusAID’s Senior Program Manager, Helen Corrigan, will:

* Brief the team on AusAID’s strategic directions, relationship with Government of Vanuatu (GoV) and issues in VAPP implementation of particular interest;
* Liaise between the evaluation team and AusAID, VAPP staff and GoV representatives as needed;
* Monitor the progress of the evaluation, participate in interviews/workshops as appropriate and facilitate the discussion of the team’s findings with AusAID.

In addition, the IR Team will provide regular updates to AusAid through processes that will be agreed jointly at the outset of review and provide a concluding feedback workshop to present the findings, discuss the implications, and explore possible future directions.

**5. Itinerary**

To be settled in consultation with the AusAID post once the evaluation plan approach has been endorsed in-principle.

**6. Report Structure**

The aide memoire, draft and final reports will be submitted electronically in MS Word format, in accordance with AusAID’s Guidelines for Independent Progress Reports, and in accordance with Standard 6: Evaluation Reports. As specified, the report structure will comprise and build on the following structure to address the key themes of this evaluation:

* Executive summary of up to 6 pages (also capable of being read as a distinct document);
* Findings against evaluation questions;
* Conclusions and recommendations.
* Background on the aid activity (to be an Annex); and
* Outline of the evaluation objectives and methods (to be an Annex).

**7. Target Dates for Deliverables**

The following reports will be provided:

* Evaluation Plan / Draft Methodology - for agreement with AusAID and submitted in final copy by 21 April 2012;
* Evaluation Mission Aide Memoire – initial findings to be presented at workshop with key stakeholders on 15/16 May;
* Draft IE Report – to be provided to the Senior Program Manager, on or before 11 June;
* IE Report - final document within 10 working days of receiving the feedback, incorporating feedback from stakeholders and the evaluation peer review on or before XXX.

**Annex A**

Preliminary List of Documents

*Program documents:*

Vanuatu Australia Police Project – Project Design Document 2011

*Reports:*

VAAP Progress Reports – November 2011 and February 2012

Community Perception Survey December 2011 - results

Other relevant reports and documents:

Vanuatu Police Force Capacity Building Project Mid-Term Review 2008

Vanuatu Law and Justice Partnership Prorgram (Stretem Rod Blong Jastis) Project Design Document 2010

*Government of Vanuatu documents:*

1. Vanuatu Priority Action Agenda
2. Thinking Long Acting Short 2009-2012
3. Vanuatu Law and Justice Sector Strategy and Action Plan 2009-2014
4. Vanuatu National Survey on Women’s Lives and Family Relationships, 2011
5. Sexual Offenders – An analysis of 50 offenders and their offences, 2009
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7. Documentation resulting from the Ministry of Justice and Community Services National Law and Justice Sector Summit, Mele Village, 23-26 January 2012.

*AusAID documents:*

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   * Standard 5: Independent Evaluation Plans (Methodology)
   * Standard 6: Independent Evaluation Reports
2. Templates
   * Template: Independent Progress Report Aide Memoire
   * Template: Independent Progress Report
3. Policy documents and delivery strategies
   * Independent Review of Aid Effectiveness 2011 <<http://www.aidreview.gov.au/publications/aidreview.pdf>>
   * Australian Government response to the Independent Review of Aid Effectiveness <<http://www.ausaid.gov.au/publications/pubout.cfm?ID=5621_9774_1073_3040_2380&Type>>
   * ODE: Discussion Paper: Emerging findings from the ODE Law and Justice Evaluation August 2011   
     AusAID’s strategy paper on Effective Governance, November 2011

# Annex C

Fieldwork Consultations

**Wednesday 2 May 2012**

|  |  |
| --- | --- |
| Logistics, program and review briefing by David Momcilovic (First Secretary), Helen Corrigan (Senior Program Manager) – **Gordon, Eric, Patrick Hagan, Arthur and Jones** | 0800-1000 |
| Briefing with Katherine Ruiz-Avila (AusAID Counsellor), David Momcilovic (First Secretary), Helen Corrigan (Senior Program Manager) **– Gordon, Eric, Patrick Hagan, Arthur & Jones** | 1000-1030 |
| Morning tea break | 1030-1100 |
| Review team planning to discuss structure & outline of the program, and mission & team composition  – **Gordon, Eric, Patrick Hagan, Arthur, Jones, Helen & David**  To include a lunch provided by AusAID | 1100-1330 |
| Briefing from VAPP team Leader, Peter Kuhnke, and other VAPP TA – **Gordon, Eric & Patrick** | 1330 - 1500 |
| Orientation of police college, central police station, VANSEC House – **Gordon, Eric & Patrick** | 1530-1630 |

**Thursday 3 May 2012**

|  |  |
| --- | --- |
| Meeting with VPF Commissioner and VPF Executive  **Gordon, Eric, Patrick, Arthur, Jones & Helen** | 0800-0930 |

| **GORDON PEAKE & team** |  |
| --- | --- |
| Meeting with VAPP TA, Chris Dillon, and Corporate Services Unit (CSU) | 1000-1200 |
| Lunch – own arrangement | 1200-1330 |
| Meeting with VPF CSU and finance staff to discuss management and financial frameworks, VPF budget allocations and sustainability issues of project | 1330-1630 |

| **ERIC SCHEYE & team** | **Time** |
| --- | --- |
| Meeting with VAPP Police Training College Adviser and staff | 1000-1200 |
| Lunch – own arrangement | 1200-1330 |
| Meeting with VAPP Operations Adviser, South, Ron McFadyen and staff of Criminal Investigation Department | 1330-1500 |
| Meeting with VPF at Police Station – CID and other sections | 1500-1630 |

**Friday 4 May 2012**

|  |  |
| --- | --- |
| Field visit to NORTH EFATE:  People to talk to: police officers at post  communities | Depart 0800  Consultations 0930 - |
| Attend a project vehicle handover ceremony | 1400-1600 |

**Saturday 5 May 2012**

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| --- |
| FREE DAY |

**Sunday 6 May 2012**

|  |  |
| --- | --- |
| Lunch meeting with Allen Le Lievre  **Gordon. Eric, Patrick, Jones, Arthur, Helen** | 1330-1430 |

**Monday 7 May 2012**

|  |  |
| --- | --- |
| General briefing on VAPP activities with VPF in Luganville  **Gordon, Eric, Patrick, Arthur, Jones & Helen** | 0800-0900 |

| **GORDON PEAKE & team** | **Time** |
| --- | --- |
| Meeting with Sanma Provincial Government | 0930-1030 |
| Meeting with Sanma Counselling Centre | 1100-1200 |
| lunch |  |
| Meeting with VMF | 1400-1500 |
| Join Eric & team at meeting at Maritime College / Maritime wing | 1530-1630 |

| **ERIC SCHEYE & team** | **Time** |
| --- | --- |
| Meeting with VPF officers at Luganville Police Station | 0930-1200 |
| Lunch |  |
| Meeting at Maritime College / Maritime wing | 1400-1630 |

**Tuesday 8 May 2012**

|  | **Time** |
| --- | --- |
| Field visit to remote location - WEST COAST SANTO - on police boat MV Turoroa | Depart 0800 |

**Wednesday 9 May 2012**

|  |  |
| --- | --- |
| Meeting with Luganville Mayor | 0800-0900 |
| Meeting with Luganville Business Chairman | 0930-1030 |
| Hotel check-out and transport to airport | 1045-1100 |
| Return flight to Port Vila | Check-in 1115 |
| MISSION ENDED |  |

1. Since the review took place, Deputy Commissioner Edmanley has subsequently been promoted to Acting Police Commissioner. [↑](#footnote-ref-1)
2. For a copy of the IPR Team’s methodology see Annex B [↑](#footnote-ref-2)
3. VAPP Evaluation Methodology p.5 [↑](#footnote-ref-3)
4. For a schedule of the IPR Team’s fieldwork consultations see Annex C [↑](#footnote-ref-4)
5. VPFCBP itself built upon Australian support provided to the VPF since 2002. [↑](#footnote-ref-5)
6. VPFCBP Mid-Term Review p.10 [↑](#footnote-ref-6)
7. Ibid p.3 [↑](#footnote-ref-7)
8. These short-term advisers were: ‘backfill northern command position’; police tactical unit training (2 positions); ‘UN trainers (7 positions); ‘intel training’ (2 positions); ‘police tactical unit training’ (2 positions); ‘surveillance training’ (3 positions); ‘accident investigations’ (1 position) and media awareness training’ (1 position) and ‘Fingerprint Development Lab Scoping’ [↑](#footnote-ref-8)
9. VAPP documentation available to the IPR Team did not actually differentiate which particular area the short-term advisers worked in. Accordingly, the IPR Team has extrapolated which area the particular adviser was working in based on the job title. [↑](#footnote-ref-9)
10. These positions were ‘firearms registry’; ‘HR Policy Manual’; ‘Roll Out Comm’s (sic) Network’; ‘PSO Card Machine Trainer’; ‘Legal Adviser-PGO’s’; ‘Firearms Review- Recommendations’; ‘HF Email/radio review’; ‘HR Policy Manual-Launch’; ‘Joint Ops and Planning Centre’ and ‘VPF Asset Management’ [↑](#footnote-ref-10)
11. Marcus Cox, Emile Duituturaga & Eric Scheye *ODE Evaluation of Australian Law and Justice Assistance: Synthesis Report* (Discussion draft, December 2011) [↑](#footnote-ref-11)
12. Miranda Forsyth *A Bird That Flies with Two Wings: Kastom and State Justice Systems in Vanuatu* (Canberra: ANU epress 2009) pp.152-156 [↑](#footnote-ref-12)
13. Vanuatu Ministry of Justice and Community Services *Reflections on the National Law and Justice Summit* (undated document) p. 5-9 [↑](#footnote-ref-13)
14. AusAID *Violence Against Women in Melanesia and East Timor: Building on Global and Regional Promising Approaches* (2009) p. 174 [↑](#footnote-ref-14)
15. Ibid. [↑](#footnote-ref-15)
16. Dipatmen blong Koreksenoal Sevis *Sexual Offenders: An Analysis of 50 offenders and their offences* (Undated report in possession of the IPR Team) [↑](#footnote-ref-16)
17. This Report’s assertion that the VAPP should formulate its strategic vision does not necessarily imply that that vision requires a 5+ year plan, stating what precise support activities will be undertaken. Rather the argument is that the VAPP requires an idea of how to go about developing the VPF and should break that vision down into discrete 2-3 year achievement plans. [↑](#footnote-ref-17)
18. The IPR Team notes that VAPP program manager attended an AusAID Team Leaders’ meeting where training and updated information was provided on the new outcomes/results reporting needs and that VAPP was in the very early stages of implementing these requirements in its reporting. [↑](#footnote-ref-18)
19. The IPR team acknowledges that the VAPP encouraged data analysis by VPF officers through the ‘project’ component of the Leadership Development Course taught by the Australian Institute of Police Management (and funded by VAPP). [↑](#footnote-ref-19)
20. The capacity of the training college for new recruits is 33, of which eight places have been dedicated for females. [↑](#footnote-ref-20)
21. According to officers at the Police College, when the recruits “go to their stations, it is like they were never here” because “they don’t enforce discipline at the stations.” [↑](#footnote-ref-21)
22. In a focus group of VPF officers, the IPR Team heard that “disciplinary rules are not effective. No one is accountable for officers’ discipline.” [↑](#footnote-ref-22)
23. When the issue was raised at the Police College, the IPR Team was informed that VAPP’s response was for more training and “refresher courses.” [↑](#footnote-ref-23)
24. According to one VPF officer, in the provinces, “the people don’t know what is against the laws, what is the penal code, what are the activities of the police, crime prevention.” [↑](#footnote-ref-24)
25. See 2012 Community Survey, p. 13. [↑](#footnote-ref-25)
26. This is an example of a theory of change, one that requires empirical testing and validation and It is of the type that is missing within the VAPP. [↑](#footnote-ref-26)
27. 2011 VAPP Report to the PCC, p. 14. It appears that the composite score was compiled from interviews querying counterparts on the following topics:

    “What role does the advisor play in the day to day running of your command?

    Are you happy with the advice received from the Advisor?

    Is it at the level that you would expect it to be?

    Are you the only contact the Advisor has within your command?

    Does the Advisor have the skills and experience you need to assist in the development of your command?

    Do you believe there has been an improvement in the performance of the VPF as a result of the activities of the VAPP?

    What other factors have influenced the improved performance of the VPF?

    Do you think the community’s perception of the VPF has improved?

    Why do you think this is the case?” (pp. 13-14)

    As a method by which to evaluate adviser performance, it is interesting to note that none of the forgoing questions correspond to specific outcomes/results or to concrete skills that the adviser is to have transferred to his counterparts. The 1-5 scoring method was based on the scale used by AusAID in their Quality at Implementation Reporting. [↑](#footnote-ref-27)
28. The former program manager attributed some of the issues that the team heard about to personality disputes between individual advisers and certain figures within the VPF. The program manager was aware of these issues and had, he stated, been managing them in order to minimise friction. [↑](#footnote-ref-28)
29. In the forty-two page VAPP design document, the Ministry is only referred to twice and both times in the context of governance arrangements. [↑](#footnote-ref-29)
30. The Team notes that there were apparently excellent relations between the long-standing Director-General of the MoIA and senior leadership of the VAPP. [↑](#footnote-ref-30)
31. It should be noted, however, that the AFP and Australian police development rarely engages with Ministries of Interior or their equivalent institution. In Papua New Guinea and Timor-Leste, the AFP does not engage substantively with the appropriate Ministry and, in the Solomon Islands, RAMSI’s support of the appropriate Ministry have been minimal to non-existent. [↑](#footnote-ref-31)
32. Between February and November 2011, 668 VPF personnel attended courses programs, 2011 VAPP Report. The courses provided were: general duty refresher; mentoring programs; computer training; disciplinary course; domestic violence; driver’s management course; human rights; investigations course; operational orders; VPF recruit course; Certificate IV at Work Place; Digital Crime Scene Photography Course; Forensic Assessment; Basic Intelligence Course; Investigation Involving Youth and Children; Management Course; Middle Management Course; Media Training; Police Tactical Response Unit; UN Training Mission and Surveillance Course. [↑](#footnote-ref-32)
33. See 2012 VAPP PMG Report for a list of such facilities. [↑](#footnote-ref-33)
34. In terms of spending the VAPP budget can be broken down as follows: 44% adviser and AFP management fee / 56% ‘areas of work’ and of this training& community 18.45%; infrastructure& assets 59.16%; workforce renewal 19.76%; management systems 2.64%. Information provided to IPR Team by AusAID, June 5, 2012 [↑](#footnote-ref-34)
35. The IPR Team acknowledges that, because the review was truncated, it did not have the opportunity to speak with the locally engaged program officer tasked with implementing the 77 recommendations. [↑](#footnote-ref-35)
36. Upon returning from Vanuatu, the team learned that the VPFCBP project had engaged a short-term adviser for three months to develop a curriculum unit. No VPF staff made mention of this adviser’s work in the course of the team’s interviews in country. The team concludes, therefore, that this STA input bequeathed little legacy. [↑](#footnote-ref-36)
37. The IPR team acknowledges that the former program manager disagrees with this assessment. He noted that the “college team sat down at the commencement of the year and maps out a college programme for the year which was agreed to by the Commissioner and the Executive” (comments received by IPR Team June 29, 2012). The IPR Team was able to source the college programme, a one page spreadsheet which blocked off days for training courses. The IPR Team notes that none of the courses pencilled into the calendar for early May were taking place and also notes that no one with whom the IPR Team spoke could provide a prioritisation of and/or rationale for the number of training courses offered. [↑](#footnote-ref-37)
38. The team notes that the VAPP Commander had already commenced regular meetings with the new Law and Justice Advisor and had included this individual “into some important strategic working groups,” (consolidated comments received by IPR Team, August 8, 2012). [↑](#footnote-ref-38)
39. The team recognizes that the VAPP were funding a Police Prosecutors course but notes that their involvement did not extend to providing input to the material being presented. The team was told that the training package was designed and materials prepared by the current head of the State (Police) Prosecutors Office. [↑](#footnote-ref-39)
40. 2012 Community Survey, p. 18 [↑](#footnote-ref-40)
41. Ibid. [↑](#footnote-ref-41)
42. Ibid, p. 8. [↑](#footnote-ref-42)
43. According to the Survey, “most [respondents] (34 per cent) thought that police always take a long time and a similar proportion (or 33 per cent) responded that most of the time the police take too long to respond,” (p. 24). [↑](#footnote-ref-43)
44. The IPR Team notes that the survey service provider changed for the most recent collection due to data validity concerns [↑](#footnote-ref-44)
45. It should also be noted that the IPR Team learned that many individuals in Vanuatu believe that someone who allegedly commits a crime deserves to be beaten by the police, albeit, not severely. The Survey indicates that “most (61 per cent) respondents perceived that police officers use physical force to carry out their Duties,” (p. 19). [↑](#footnote-ref-45)
46. Community Survey, p. 27. [↑](#footnote-ref-46)
47. “Australia’s commitment to reduction of violence against women across the Pacific region is also consistent with GoV’s commitment to gender and development objectives and to the GoV’s law and justice sector Strategy. VAPP will maximise efforts to encourage VPF’s work in relation to the above priorities, particularly through specific collaboration with other Vanuatu organisations such as Ministry of Justice and Community Services (responsible for Department of Women’s Affairs)and Vanuatu Women’s Centre and with other donor-funded activities which target this issue.” VAPP Project Design Document p.14 [↑](#footnote-ref-47)
48. Community Survey, p. 11. [↑](#footnote-ref-48)
49. The IPR team notes that Commander VAPP has met with the New Zealand police project and “encouraged/welcomed NZPol into remote joint patrol working groups.” Comments received by IPR Team August 8 2012. [↑](#footnote-ref-49)
50. The IPR team was told that not all advisers were familiar with the project design documentation and other foundational texts. This meant that they tended to construe their tasks based on what they believed their own individual strengths and interests were rather than what was proscribed for their respective positions in the design. The quarterly visits from the M&E adviser assisted, in at least the period he was in country, in re-orienting them towards their tasking. [↑](#footnote-ref-50)
51. This is not to suggest that the VAPP’s support that brought the Manual in existence is not an accomplishment, but it is a means to an end, better service delivery, and not a result in itself. [↑](#footnote-ref-51)
52. Lessons learned on law and justice programming in fragile environments that focuses on the production of policies, manuals, and multi-year strategic plans (more than 3 years) has shown that these endeavours are, usually, ineffective for a number of reasons. First among the reasons is that the policies, manuals, and strategic plans are, invariably, written by expatriates, see AusAID Timor-Leste Justice Sector Support Facility Independent Completion Report, May 2012. As far as the IPR Team can tell, most VPF policies, manuals, and strategic plans have been written by Australians and, invariably, AFP personnel (serving or retired). [↑](#footnote-ref-52)
53. See Developing the VAPP Monitoring and Evaluation Framework, p. 2 [↑](#footnote-ref-53)
54. The IPR Team notes that the VAPP funded the participation of a police prosecutor on its AIPM leadership in course. The individual in question was developing a “project on prosecutions and issues around evidence collection and brief preparation,” (consolidated comments received by IPR Team August 8, 2012). [↑](#footnote-ref-54)
55. The team heard multiple viewpoints about whether or not AusAID had raised concerns about the inadequacies of the VAPP’s M &E system prior to the review. Owing to the variances of the different perspectives, the IPR Team is unable to reach any definitive judgement as to if these conversations took place. [↑](#footnote-ref-55)
56. The AFP has noted that discussions did take place as to the whys and wherefores of police post construction. The team was directed to minutes of the fortnightly meeting between the project and CSU. The team has examined these minutes and notes that the discussions are mostly of a technical (‘how to build’) nature and did not appear to focus on strategic issues around police post location.   [↑](#footnote-ref-56)
57. The IPR Team was not able to find written documentation that referenced these refusals. Perhaps owing to the sensitivities of the issues, notes may not have been recorded. The minutes of the November 23, 2011 meeting of the Project Coordination Committee record one instance where VAPP deferred a request to fund a request for additional infrastructure investment.

    “ Commander VAPP Quade: we’re in a situation where we’re restricted in terms of expenditure. If requests do come to us in the first instance, primarily for infrastructure, it is not that we’ve said no, it is about priorities, and the project team, it is not just the project making decisions, but in consultation with the VPF, depending on the requests, and the funding available. It could be considered, but it is all dependent on financial ability. Some housing has been arranged in these new locations. Perhaps this should be discussed further. It is easier for us if building new rather than have to go and upgrade staff housing. So if decisions are going to be made, it should be between all of of (sic) us and see whether that is the direction to be taken. However, other activities will suffer accordingly. It is a matter of priorities. So it is not no, simply that the issue has only just raised its head.” p.7 [↑](#footnote-ref-57)
58. Commenting on an earlier draft, the former program manager told the IPR Team that he believed he was “always receptive” to AusAID viewpoints, (Email to IPR Team June 29, 2012). The current incumbent noted that he regularly met with AusAID and “discussed all VAPP matters including management and project coordination,” (comments received August 8, 2012). AusAID did not comment on this section of the draft report. [↑](#footnote-ref-58)
59. Written Comments provided to IPR Team by VPF Commissioner Joshua Bong, May 3, 2012 [↑](#footnote-ref-59)
60. VAPP Methodology version 2 p.2 [↑](#footnote-ref-60)
61. Definition adapted from AusAID *Promoting Practical Sustainabilty* (2000) Available at http://AusAID.gov.au/publications/documents/sustainability.pdf [↑](#footnote-ref-61)
62. Commenting on the first draft of this report, the AFP noted that vehicles donated to the VPF in May 2012 “were purchased to replace very older and costly vehicles, particularly those in remote locations. They were to reduce outgoing costs and improve safety and community support”. The IPR Team is not in possession of the evidence that would demonstrate how police cars would, in and of themselves, improve safety and community support. [↑](#footnote-ref-62)
63. The VAPP pays per diems in accordance with the rates set out in Government of Vanuatu policy. The IPR Team heard that these per diem rates often significantly exceed the costs incurred in travel in Vanuatu. The IPR Team notes that the program manager had implemented agreements through the CSU Commander that any request for per diems would go before the CSU committee, and they would decide on a suitable allowance for any travel. The CSU Commander would have the responsibility to approve any funds payable to VPF members. [↑](#footnote-ref-63)
64. The IPR Team learned that the program manager was reconsidering the policy of funding of morning refreshments. [↑](#footnote-ref-64)
65. The IPR team met with a member of the VPF who had attended training on leadership and management provided by the Australian Institute of Police Management, which was held in Port Vila shortly before the team’s arrival. As part of the training, which he described as excellent, the officer was asked to develop a project which would showcase some of the skills he had acquired or honed on the course. The project being considered by the officer would cost 55,000 vatu, funds which he did not have in his budget to cover. Upon being asked who would pay for the project, he replied: “Why, the VAPP, of course”. [↑](#footnote-ref-65)
66. The IPR Team learned that the projected annual cost of servicing the VPF boat stationed at Luganville was approximately AUD $125,000 per year. There is no money in the VPF budget for maintaining the boat. [↑](#footnote-ref-66)
67. With the VAPP funding spigot now turned off, the high costs of maintaining the VPF boat have become apparent. The team has learned that, as of mid-August, the boat is marooned in Port Vila because the craft does not have the life rafts that meet safety regulations. The boat cannot leave its dock until these items are purchased. An additional full safety check that may also be required will apparently be even more costly. There is no money in the VPF budget to pay for either the life rafts or the service. The net effect is that, at time of writing, this costly acquisition is no longer operational.

    [↑](#footnote-ref-67)
68. The previous program manager, informed the IPR Team that the VPF had been extensively consulted on the radio project and were ‘very comfortable with the proposal which included a STA providing advisory support and training to implement and maintain the system,’ (Comments received by IPR Team June 29, 2012). The IPR Team also acknowledges that the VAPP had been funding a ‘large number’ of computer training courses intended to assist the VPF and that only a couple of courses had been conducted prior to their expulsion. Consolidated comments, August 8, 2012. [↑](#footnote-ref-68)
69. “These application forms have been utilised in the past and to my knowledge have not been modified to any great extent. I was not involved in formatting these application forms so I am unable to provide any input to your question concerning this.” Email from former VAPP Training Adviser to IPR Team, June 3, 2012. [↑](#footnote-ref-69)
70. Again, these documents tend to exist only in English. [↑](#footnote-ref-70)
71. In the course of one its consultations, a member of the CSU pointed to a VAPP adviser stating: “if it’s a long document, you know he wrote it.” [↑](#footnote-ref-71)
72. By contrast, CSU staff told the team that they required training in forensic investigation, fingerprinting, dog handling and search &rescue, skills hard to immediately square with a corporate support function. [↑](#footnote-ref-72)
73. Because of the abridged period in country, the IPR Team were unable to seek direct inputs from the Ministry of Internal Affairs. [↑](#footnote-ref-73)
74. It should be noted that the Commissioner also related these concerns to the VAPP Program Manager shortly after his meeting with the IPR Team. The Team believes that this exchange was an indication of a positive working relationship between the VAPP Program Manager and VPF Commissioner. [↑](#footnote-ref-74)
75. Because the IPR was cut short, the team did not have time to meet with relevant Australian programs, which are channelling funding through government systems. [↑](#footnote-ref-75)
76. Originally, the VAPP agreed to build posts in areas where the communities had agreed to provide housing for the officer. However, the IPR learned that these accommodation annexes were not built, leaving officers without a roof over their heads. The IPR Team was informed that issues around accommodation were being addressed through the purchase by VAPP of housing containers. While this solves the problem of where the officer sleeps, it also increases the ongoing support costs of the initiative. In the judgement of the IPR Team, this is an example of the VAPP relying overly on monetary solutions. [↑](#footnote-ref-76)
77. A training needs analysis was recommended by the training adviser, 2010-2012 in his End of Mission report. The end of mission report did not address the issue of why the adviser in question did not initiate one during his tenure. [↑](#footnote-ref-77)
78. VAPP Design Document p.31 [↑](#footnote-ref-78)
79. The IPR Team heard a number of suggestions from VPF officers as to more appropriate places for police posts than which are currently mooted. For example, two senior figures in Command North told the team that it would be much better to place a post on Pentecost Island than the area on western Espiritu Santo where a post in planned. In the absence of data, the IPR Team cannot adjudicate upon the veracity of this recommendation. [↑](#footnote-ref-79)
80. VAPP Project Design Document p.40 [↑](#footnote-ref-80)
81. The IPR Team’s finding chimes with recommendations 4 and 6 of the ODE Law and Justice Review, which advocate “collaborative working on substantive issues” and “genuine collaboration in developing assistance strategies and priorities” between AusAID and AFP on law and justice development. [↑](#footnote-ref-81)
82. VAPP has 7 long-term technical advisers – Team Leader and Adviser to Commissioner and Executive; Adviser- Training; Adviser – Crime Prevention and Community Relations; Adviser – Southern Command; Adviser – Northern Command; Adviser – Corporate Support; Project Officer. [↑](#footnote-ref-82)
83. There have been 36 short-term advisers providing training and input in the period February 2011 – March 2012. [↑](#footnote-ref-83)
84. See Office of Evaluation Effectiveness, ODE Evaluation of Australian Law and Justice Assistance Synthesis Report, *Discussion Draft*, *18 December 2011*, p. 19. [↑](#footnote-ref-84)
85. According to the ToR the expected end of project outcomes of the VAPP are

    1. *Training and professionalisation of the VPF:* VPF training and outreach strategies and policies are in place and being implemented by VPF, and continue to maximise training by and participation of women police.
    2. *Infrastructure, assets and logistics:* Priority infrastructure development and assets purchases are achieved and VPF maintenance plans are in place.
    3. *Workforce renewal:* At least one round of workforce renewal has been completed.
    4. *Internal VPF governance:* Management and Financial governance frameworks are completed and VPF staff are able to implement them; and Project personnel have provided advice and support allowing for the implementation of priority CSU review recommendations.

    [↑](#footnote-ref-85)
86. Team members are based in Canberra, New York and Port Vila. [↑](#footnote-ref-86)