Output 1.1: National Safeguards System

Operation of Australia's national system of accounting for, and control of, nuclear material, items and facilities.

Performance Measures

• Australia's obligations are met under Australia's safeguards agreement with the IAEA.
• Australia's system of safeguards permits and authorities is administered in a timely and effective manner.
• Australian uranium at mines and in transit is accounted for properly.

Performance Assessment

International Obligations

Reporting Obligations under the Australia–IAEA Comprehensive Safeguards Agreement

ASNO met all of Australia's obligations during the reporting period for the submission of declarations and notifications on nuclear materials, facilities and activities, as required by Australia's safeguards agreements with the IAEA.

For each material balance area (summarised in Table 3), ASNO provided reports to the IAEA as required by the Comprehensive Safeguards Agreement. Report statistics are summarised in Tables 4 and 5 below. There were efficiency improvements during 2018–19 as the majority of inventory transactions and physical inventory takings were submitted to ASNO via ASNO's NUMBAT (NUclear Material Balance And Tracking) database portal by permit holders.

The portal allows permit holders to manage many aspects of their permit without paper forms, including updates to their nuclear material inventory and authorised points of contact.

The high number of reports in Table 4 attributed to ‘other locations' primarily relates to small holdings of uranium and thorium compounds at universities and research institutions.

Table 3: Material Balance Areas (MBAs) in Australia for IAEA safeguards purposes

LOCATION	MATERIAL BALANCE AREA (MBA)	NAME OF FACILITY OR LOCATION OUTSIDE FACILITY (AS DESIGNATED IN AUSTRALIA'S SUBSIDIARY ARRANGEMENTS WITH THE IAEA)
Lucas Heights	AS-A	HIFAR (Note: de-fuelled in 2007)
Lucas Heights	AS-C	Research and development laboratories
Lucas Heights	AS-D	Vault storage
Elsewhere	AS-E	Other locations in Australia (e.g. universities, industrial radiography companies, hospitals)
Elsewhere	ASE1	Other locations in Australia (e.g. universities, industrial radiography companies, hospitals)
Lucas Heights	AS-F	OPAL reactor
Lucas Heights	AS-H	Synroc waste immobilisation plant
CSIRO (various sites)	AS-I	CSIRO

Table 4: Number of line entries in inventory and inventory change reports submitted by ASNO to the IAEA for each MBA

LOCATION/FACILITY	MBA	2017–18	2018–19
ANSTO research laboratories	AS-C	958	997
HIFAR (de-fuelled 2007)	AS-A	0	0
ANSTO vault storage	AS-D	359	336
OPAL reactor	AS-F	701	34315
Other locations	AS-E ASE1 AS-I	2737	2405
TOTAL		4755	4081

Table 5: Number of line entries (by report type) submitted by ASNO to the IAEA across all MBAs

TYPE OF DATA	2017–18	2018–19
Inventory Change Report (monthly)	2151	1449
Physical Inventory Listing (annual)	2341	2422
Material Balance Report (annual)	263	210

Table 6 is a summary of total quantities of nuclear material by category in Australia. A small quantity (2.7 kg) of ²³⁵U in high enriched uranium is retained in Australia and used for a variety of purposes primarily due to the utility of the particular chemical, physical and isotopic characteristics. Typical uses of this material include: research and development related to nuclear non-proliferation activities; validating the commercial application of ANSTO's Synroc waste immobilisation technology; nuclear forensics for identifying illicit nuclear materials; development of detection technologies and chemistry work. The quantity comprises several items in various locations around Australia such as ANSTO and some universities.

Table 6: Nuclear Material in Australia at 30 June 2019

CATEGORY	QUANTITY	INTENDED END-USE
Source Material
Uranium Ore Concentrates (UOC)	961 tonnes	Export for energy use pursuant to bilateral agreements
	3.5 tonnes	Storage
Natural Uranium (other than UOC)	4,492 kg	Research, storage
Depleted Uranium	28,159 kg	Research, shielding
Thorium Ore Residues	59 tonnes	Storage/disposal
Thorium (other than Thorium Ore Residues)	1,942 kg	Research, industry
Special Fissionable Material
235U – low enriched	128,787 grams16	Research, radioisotope production, storage
235U – high enriched	2,746 grams	Research, storage
233U	3.8 grams	Research
Plutonium (other than 238Pu)	1,203 grams	Research, neutron sources

As well as requiring reporting on nuclear material inventory and transactions, the Comprehensive Safeguards Agreement also requires reporting on design and operational attributes (relevant to safeguards) of nuclear facilities. This information is provided to the IAEA in Design Information Questionnaires (DIQs) for each facility MBA, and in the case of MBAs for locations outside facilities (LOFs), in LOF information questionnaires.

The Safeguards Act requires permits for possession of associated material, associated equipment and associated technology (collectively termed associated items). Permits for associated items ensure Australia can maintain regulatory controls on technology, equipment and material with potential proliferation risks, can report on design attributes for DIQs, and meet other reporting obligations under various nuclear cooperation agreements. Table 7 lists the inventory of associated items in Australia.

Table 7: Associated Items¹⁷ in Australia at 30 June 2019

CATEGORY	QUANTITY	INTENDED END-USE
Associated Material
Deuterium and heavy water	20.9 tonnes	Research, reactors
Nuclear grade graphite	83.4 tonnes	R&D and storage
Associated Equipment
HIFAR18	1	Reactor
HIFAR coarse control arms (unused)	5	Reactor components
HIFAR coarse control arms (used)	14	Reactor components
HIFAR safety rods	3	Reactor components
HIFAR fuel charging and discharging machines	2	Reactor components
OPAL reactor19	1	Reactor
OPAL control rods	14	Reactor components
OPAL control rod drives	6	Reactor components
Nuclear-grade zirconium tubes	<50 kilograms	R&D and storage

Reporting Obligations under the Australia–IAEA Additional Protocol

The Additional Protocol (AP) gives the IAEA greater access to information and locations related to nuclear fuel cycle activities, thereby allowing the IAEA to provide greater assurances not only that all declared nuclear material is accounted for, also that states do not have any undeclared nuclear material or activities. Australia was the first country to sign and ratify an AP with the IAEA, which came into force for Australia on 12 December 1997.

ASNO prepares and provides annual declarations under a range of AP categories, as well as quarterly declarations on relevant exports. Table 8 lists the number of entries made under each category. An important aspect of the AP is reporting to the IAEA on nuclear fuel cycle related research and development activities. ASNO ensured that all IAEA requirements were met during the reporting period with respect to nuclear research and development.

Table 8: Number of Entries Made under the Additional Protocol

TYPE OF DECLARATION UNDER ARTICLE 2.A AND 2.B OF THE ADDITIONAL PROTOCOL		2013 –14	2014 –15	2015 –16	2016 –17	2017 –18	2018 –19
2.a.i	Government funded, authorised or controlled nuclear fuel cycle-related research and development activities not involving nuclear materia	2	2	3	8	10	13
2.a.ii	OPAL operational schedule	-	1	1	2	1	1
2.a.iii	General description of each building on each site, e.g. ANSTO, universitie	175	154	156	289	274	273
2.a.iv	Manufacturing or construction of specified nuclear related equipmen	1	1	2	2	2	0
2.a.v	Location, operational status and production capacity of uranium or thorium mines or concentration plant	4	4	4	4	620	6
2.a.vi	Information on source material that is not of a composition or purity that requires full IAEA safeguards requirements	7	7	8	7	7	7
2.a.vii	Information on nuclear material exempted from safeguard	6	6	4	4	4	4
2.a.viii	Information related to the further processing of intermediate or high-level waste containing plutoniu	-	-	2	2	2	2
2.a.ix	Exports or imports of nuclear-related equipment listed in Annex II of the Additional Protoco	-	-	-	-	-	-
2.a.x	General 10-year plans related to nuclear fuel cycle activitie	3	3	3	4	4	521
2.b.i	Nuclear fuel cycle-related research and development activities not involving nuclear material and not funded, authorised or controlled by the Governmen	1	1	2	-	-	-

Safeguards Developments in Australia

The IAEA implements safeguards in Australia in accordance with the provisions in a range of instruments: the Comprehensive Safeguards Agreement; Additional Protocol; Subsidiary Arrangements; and facility attachments for each material balance area (MBA). Australia's MBAs are described in Table 3. The overarching framework the IAEA uses to prioritise and optimise various in-field verification and headquarters analysis activities under these instruments is the State-level approach for Australia, which was updated in 2016.

In Australia, the IAEA and ASNO apply most of their respective safeguards efforts to the Australian Nuclear Science and Technology Organisation (ANSTO), particularly safeguards aspects of the ANSTO Nuclear Medicine (ANM) project. At full operation, ANM has the capacity to supply a significant proportion (up to 25 per cent) of the world's requirements for molybdenum–99 (Mo–99), the parent product of the world's most widely used nuclear medicine, technetium–99m. During the reporting period the IAEA conducted some inspections of the ANM plant, and completed a hot test of a customised active well coincidence counter (AWCC) for verifying the ²³⁵U content in solid waste (see further details at page 43).

As reported in the 2017–2018 Annual Report, a new permit and MBA was created to centrally manage safeguards and security across all Commonwealth Scientific and Industrial Research Organisation (CSIRO) sites. The new MBA structure streamlines managements and reporting of CSIRO's small inventory of nuclear material, and allows for more efficient adaptation to changes in business units and research functions. For IAEA safeguards purposes, CSIRO is categorised as a Location Outside Facility (LOF) as it holds only small quantities of nuclear material and has no nuclear facilities. The LOF MBA for CSIRO is of the same type as the two LOF MBAs (described in Table 3) covering locations such as Australian universities, laboratories, State radiation safety regulators, and others. During the reporting period, ASNO and the IAEA finalised what is known as a LOF Attachment for CSIRO outlining implementation rules in relation to reporting, record keeping and inspections. On 3 May 2019 the IAEA conducted its first physical inventory verification (PIV) inspection of CSIRO, to verify the starting inventory of CSIRO under the new MBA structure.

ASNO continues to engage with the Department of Industry, Innovation and Science's (DIIS) process to establish a facility for Australia's radioactive waste. During the reporting period, ASNO provided advice to DIIS and ANSTO on IAEA safeguards requirements that may influence aspects of the engineering designs for the facility.

Table 9: Status of Permits and Authorities under the Safeguards Act as at 30 June 2019

PERMIT OR AUTHORITY	CURRENT TOTAL	GRANTED	VARIED	REVOKED	EXPIRED
Possess nuclear material	110	5	24	0	3
Possess associated items	10	1	2	1	0
Transport nuclear material	19	1	1	0	1
Transport associated items	0	0	0	0	0
Establish a facility	2	0	1	0	0
Decommission a facility	1	0	0	0	0
Communicate information contained in associated technology	7	1	1	1	0
TOTAL	149	8	29	2	4

Permits and Authorities System

ASNO continued to operate Australia's state system of accounting for and control of nuclear material (SSAC) in accordance with Australia's Comprehensive Safeguards Agreement with the IAEA and national legislation. Australia's SSAC is implemented through permits issued under the Safeguards Act. Notice of all permit changes were published in the Australia Government Gazette as required by subsection 20(1) of the Safeguards Act. A summary of all permits granted, varied, revoked and expired is in Table 9.

As reported in the last few Annual Reports, in line with the governance and risk management policies under the Government's regulatory reform agenda, ASNO re-designed the models for permits under the Safeguards Act to follow a small number of template permits with a compliance code format for different ranges of nuclear material holdings. During the reporting period all but one permit holder have now transitioned to the new permit model²² – with the last permit to be updated in the coming months.

Essential to this work is a fit-for-purpose database for managing permits and preparing routine reports on nuclear material inventory and transactions to the IAEA. ASNO continued to work with the database development team (under DFAT's Information Management Division) on the design and testing of ASNO's NUMBAT database. A significant milestone in the reporting period, was the first use in July 2018 of NUMBAT's online portal for permit holders to update inventory records directly. Each July ASNO collects updated inventory records from around 100 permit holders, to check and compile into inventory, inventory change and material balance reports to the IAEA (see Tables 4 and 5), following its detailed reporting schema. The online portal worked well, with generally positive feedback from permit holders, significantly reducing overall effort required on this process.

IAEA Inspections

During the reporting period the IAEA conducted inspections in accordance with standard arrangements under Australia's Comprehensive Safeguards Agreement and the Additional Protocol. Inspections were conducted at ANSTO's Lucas Heights site, CSIRO's Black Mountain (Acton, ACT) site, and Beverley and Four Mile Mines (Heathgate Resources). The IAEA conducted its annual, scheduled physical inventory verification inspection at ANSTO in May, and a short notice random inspection in October. Details on all inspections are provided in Table 10, and the IAEA's findings from these inspections (where available at the time of publishing this Annual Report) are listed in Appendix B.

ASNO officers facilitated access for the IAEA inspectors in accordance with conditions under respective permits issued under the Safeguards Act and accompanied the inspectors during all of their activities. As reported in ASNO's 2017–18 Annual Report (page 46), there is a technical challenge regarding the IAEA measuring uranium content in solid waste from molybdenum–99 (Mo–99) radiopharmaceutical production. ASNO and ANSTO have been working closely with the IAEA on a solution, and the IAEA has now constructed a detector for measuring the uranium content in the waste. The detector is an active well coincidence counter (AWCC) that measures uranium by counting multiple neutrons in coincidence produced by fission induced by a small, built-in neutron source. A successful hot commissioning test of the detector was completed at ANSTO in February 2019 using Mo–99 production solid waste.

Table 10: IAEA Safeguards Inspections 2018–19

Date	Facility	Material balance area23	Type24
9–11 October 2018	ANSTO	AS-C and AS-F	Complementary Access (4.a.i)
		AS-F	Short Notice Random Inspection
		AS-C	Complementary Access (4.a.i)
18–21 February 2019	ANSTO	AS-C	Technical visit for hot commissioning test of AWCC detector and testing dual sealing application
2–3 May 2019	CSIRO – Black Mountain	AS-I	Physical Inventory Verification
6–10 May 2019	ANSTO	AS-D	Design Information Verification & Physical Inventory Verification
		AS-C	Design Information Verification & Physical Inventory Verification
		AS-F	Design Information Verification & Physical Inventory Verification
		AS-C	Complementary Access (4.a.i)
20 May 2019	Beverley and Four Mile uranium mines (Heathgate Resources)	AS-E	Complementary Access (4.a.i)

The IAEA recognises that this is a technical challenge for which a solution is well advanced with plans to begin using the AWCC detector for routine verification of solid waste in 2020, subject to approval by ARPANSA. Accordingly, this has not affected its overall conclusions for this material balance area or for Australia as a whole. The IAEA's 91b statement for material balance area AS-C for 2017–2018 (see Appendix B) concludes ‘that all declared nuclear material has been accounted for and that there were no indications of the undeclared presence, production or processing of nuclear material'. Furthermore, the IAEA has maintained the broader conclusion for Australia that ‘all nuclear material remained in peaceful activities' (see Appendix B).

The AS-I Material Balance Area (established February 2018, see Annual Report 2017–2018, p 44) covers CSIRO sites that hold nuclear material. While the IAEA periodically conducts complementary access inspections at locations within AS-I, a physical inventory verification (PIV) will be conducted about every four years at a location selected by the IAEA. This frequency is reflective of the small quantities of nuclear material held across all of these locations.

The first PIV in AS-I was conducted in May 2019. The IAEA selected CSIRO's Black Mountain (Acton, ACT) site for inspection and IAEA inspectors completed a thorough check of all nuclear material inventory. An explanation of how the IAEA reports on the outcomes of these inspections is included in Appendix C.

Taking a sample of nuclear material for analysis during physical inventory verification at CSIRO – Black Mountain in May 2019.

ASNO Inspections

During 2018–19, ASNO accompanied the IAEA on all of the inspections listed above. ASNO attended these inspections to ensure Australia's obligations are met in a timely and efficient manner, and to ensure the inspections are conducted effectively.

The IAEA holds inspections to help it draw its conclusions on the correctness and completeness of Australia's nuclear accounting reports and safeguards declarations. ASNO inspectors are able also to use these opportunities to observe the inspected organisation's performance against their domestic permit conditions. This proves an efficient mechanism for ASNO's stakeholder outreach on regulatory requirements.

In addition to the IAEA inspections, ASNO conducted a safeguards inspection at CSIRO to prepare for the scheduled IAEA physical inventory verification inspection. ASNO also conducted two visits to CSIRO to assist with characterising small legacy items of nuclear material and adding them to the inventory records. Some safeguards aspects were also included in some of the security inspections conducted by ASNO.

Inventory balances

ASNO performed the annual material balance evaluation of the nuclear inventory accounts for each MBA with minor differences between book and physical inventory. These inventory differences were reported to the IAEA in conjunction with inventory change reports and physical inventory listings. Details are provided in Table 11. These were primarily due to re-measurement of batches by permit holders with small holdings of nuclear material (e.g. universities, research institutes).

Table 11: Inventory Differences Recorded during 2018–19

MATERIAL BALANCE AREA	DIFFERENCE BETWEEN BOOK AND PHYSICAL INVENTORY*	COMMENT
Other locations (MBA AS-E)	14.70 kg depleted uranium –0.02 kg natural uranium 0.02 kg thorium	Primarily due to one radiography device previously on the physical inventory having been found not to contain depleted uranium, and due to re-measurements of other batches.
Other locations (MBA ASE1)	0.68 kg depleted uranium –0.18 kg natural uranium 0.12 kg thorium	Primarily due to re-measurements of batches.
CSIRO (MBA AS-I)	22.98 (0.68) g enriched 235U 0.16 kg natural uranium 0.20 g plutonium 0.07 kg thorium	Re-measurement of batches as part of CSIRO's campaign to characterise legacy inventory in storage.

* Figures in brackets refer to isotope weight.

15 The reduction in the number of line entries for the OPAL reactor resulted from a change to the structure of ASNO’s reports to the IAEA on the movements of target plates for the production of the radiopharmaceutical, molybdenum-99.

16 The quantity of 235U in low enriched uranium in Australia decreased by approximately 100 kg between 30 June 2018 and 30 June 2019, primarily due to the export of spent fuel assemblies from the OPAL reactor to France (refer to Output 1.2).

17 Not including associated technology.

18 The ANSTO Board decided to cease operation of HIFAR in January 2007. The reactor was de-fuelled in May 2007. It is awaiting decommissioning.

19 Includes, inter alia, the reactor reflector vessel and core grid.

20 This value includes one entry for each of Australia’s four uranium mines, one entry for the production of all mines, and one entry with the total production of all concentration plants at all mines.

21 The additional entry for 10-year plans relates to the Australian Government project to site, design and build a national radioactive waste management facility.

22 Templates available at: https://dfat.gov.au/international-relations/security/asno/Pages/template-permits-and-compliance-codes.aspx

23 See explanation of each material balance area in Table 3.

24 Details on different types of inspections are outlined in Appendix B.