Extracts LONDON, 28 April 1937

A total of 20 defence papers was prepared for the Australian
Delegation to the Imperial Conference. Extracts from Paper No. 1
and Paper No. 17 have been printed earlier in this volume
(Documents 13 and 14). The paper of which the following Document
is an extract was a summary of all 20 defence papers, stating the
details of the items submitted and the questions on which the
Australian Government desired advice. This summary was sent by the
Minister for Defence, Sir Archdale Parkhill, to the Secretary of
the Committee of imperial Defence, Sir Maurice Hankey, on 28 April
1937. The summary was then circulated to the Chiefs of Staff Sub-
committee of the Committee of Imperial Defence and used as the
basis for the discussions between the Chiefs of Staff and Parkhill
(see Documents 35 and 47). The items printed here are those of
wider political and strategic importance: the portions omitted
referred to technical and logistic defence matters.

PAPER NO. 1-THE POLITICAL AND STRATEGICAL CONSIDERATIONS RELATING
TO IMPERIAL AND LOCAL DEFENCE

ITEM SUBMITTED

1. The Commonwealth Government desires a review of the political
and strategical position relating to Imperial and Local Defence in
the light of the present international situation and the Foreign
and Defence Policies of the United Kingdom Government. The review
would lead to a definition of the political aim in peace, in the
Pacific Region, and hence the strategical object of Empire Forces
in the event of-
(i) War against Japan and another first-class Power
simultaneously;

(ii) War against Japan only.

THE POLITICAL Aim IN PEACE IN THE PACIFIC REGION

2. A definition is sought by the Commonwealth Government of the
political aim in peace in the Pacific Region. It is a necessary
preface to the consideration of the strategical situation in the
Pacific to have a clear understanding of the aims of British
Policy. The following questions therefore arise-
(i) What are the guiding considerations in British Policy for the
realisation of the aim of permanent friendship with Japan?
(ii) What is their relation to the maintenance of British
interests in China in view of Japan's penetration in Asia and her
claim to a special position in the Far East, which amounts to the
dictation of the conditions under which she will co-operate in
Chinese or Pacific questions?
(iii) (a) Is the present policy of accommodation to Japan a
temporary one pending the strengthening of British defences, and
does the United Kingdom Government propose to stiffen its attitude
when its rearmament is complete?
(b) Is the United Kingdom Government prepared to go to war in
defence of its interests in China and Hong Kong?
(iv) In the opinion of the United Kingdom Government, is the
maintenance of the integrity of the Netherlands East Indies vital
to the security of Singapore and the scheme of defence of Empire
interests that hinges on this base?
(v) (a) To what degree is British Policy in harmony with that of
the United States on matters relating to Asia and the Pacific
Region generally?
(b) If a firm stand is taken, to what extent can the United States
be relied on for co-operation in view of-
The general American attitude of isolation from the League, even
where they may have special interest, as in the Sino-Japanese
dispute in 1932/33;

The desire to maintain neutrality, as indicated by the recent
legislation by Congress;

The independent attitude revealed by their unwillingness to renew
Article 19 of the Washington Treaty?

THE STRATEGICAL OBJECT IN THE PACIFIC REGION IN WAR

3. The Commonwealth Government considers that Australian Defence
is inseparably bound up with Empire Defence, and the plans for its
own security are inseparable from the plans for the security of
the Empire as a whole. The plans of the Services are made in
relation to the strategical considerations of a particular war,
and the strategical objects of the Empire Forces in a war with
Japan, or Japan and another first-class Power, need clear
definition.

The Commonwealth Government therefore seeks the definition of the
strategical object of Empire Forces in-
(a) A war against Japan only;

(b) A war against Japan and another first-class Power
simultaneously;

In order that these may be related to the plans of the Australian
Forces in particular and those of other Empire Forces and
resources likely to be available for the defence of the interests
of the members of the British Commonwealth.

[matter omitted]

PAPER NO. 3-PROBLEMS RELATING TO THE BASIS OF AUSTRALIAN DEFENCE
POLICY-NO. 1 -PRIORITY OF PROVISION FOR DEFENCE AND THE TIME
FACTOR

[matter omitted]

(iii) THE TIME FACTOR

It has been noted that the United Kingdom Government is working on
plans for the completion by 1939 of its defences against any risk
from Germany, and that the British position in the Far East vis-a-
vis Japan is unsatisfactory until 1942, owing to the time required
for new naval construction. The Commonwealth Government would
therefore be glad of advice as to the period of time, in the light
of the political and strategical position relating to Imperial and
Local Defence (Paper No. 1), within which it is desirable that any
particular stage of progress for any Service or Services should be
completed.

APER NO. 4-PROBLEMS RELATING TO THE BASIS OF AUSTRALIAN DEFENCE
POLICY-NO. 3 -DEFENCE AGAINST INVASION

[matter omitted]

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED FOR ADVICE

10. (i) Strategical appreciation of defence against invasion
The Commonwealth Government would be glad to be furnished with a
strategical appreciation of the danger to Australia of invasion
and the defence against same, in the light of the Naval situation
and the security of the Singapore Naval Base and the line of
communications thereto-
(a) For the period up to 1942;

(b) After 1942.

It is desired to know whether, in certain circumstances (the
reasonable probability of which might be indicated), it would be
possible for Japan to undertake major military operations with an
object and on a scale amounting to invasion, against Australia,
The probable form and scale of such an attack might be stated. It
is also desired to know the probable period of warning that might
be available for completing preparations for defence after the
first obvious indication of a threat of war.

[matter omitted]

(iii) Strategic assumptions
The Government, in the light of the strategical appreciation of
the defence of Australia against invasion, which is sought in
Paper NO. 4, would like advice on the validity of Assumption (c)-
'The arrival of the British Main Fleet at Singapore with a minimum
of delay after the outbreak of war in the Far East.' (Note: The
phrase 'minimum of delay' connotes some period comparable with the
terms used in C.I.D. Paper 249-C, Part 1, paragraph 8 (c), viz,
'The arrival of the British Main Fleet at Singapore within 42 days
of the outbreak of war.')