Historical documents
Circular cablegram D27 LONDON, 16 January 1940, 10.40 a.m.
MOST SECRET AND PERSONAL FOLLOWING FOR THE PRIME MINISTER
My Circular D.26. [1] Sir Roger Keyes [2] visited the King of the
Belgians at the latter's request on January 13th and was requested
by the King to convey to Hs Majesty's Government in the United
Kingdom a message as to the attitude which the Allies would adopt
towards Belgium in the event of her becoming involved in war on
the side of the Allies. This message asks whether the United
Kingdom Government would agree to the following three conditions:-
(1) No opening of negotiations for peace without participation by
Belgium.
(2) Guarantees for the complete restoration of Belgium's political
and territorial status and also of her colonies.
(3) Help for economic and financial restoration.
If these conditions were agreed to Sir Roger Keyes thought that
the King would be able to persuade His Majesty's Ministers to
invite the French and British troops into Belgium at once.
In reply Sir Roger Keyes has now been instructed to inform the
King of the Belgians as follows-
We are ready to accept the invitation to British troops to enter
Belgium and understand that the French attitude is the same.
We are asked to give guarantees to Belgium which go further than
anything we have promised France and which we might not be in a
position to carry on [sic] at the end of the war.
Subject to the above we are ready to promise as follows. If such
an invitation were given at once:-
(1) If Belgium thereupon becomes involved with the Allies in
hostilities against Germany we will not open peace negotiations
without informing Belgium and we should expect them to do the same
with us.
(2) We will do our utmost to maintain the political and
territorial integrity of Belgium and her colonies.
(3) If after the war Belgium is in need of financial and economic
assistance we will include her in any assistance we may be able,
in conjunction with our Allies, to render in these respects.
The King will realise that the value of the invitation will be
seriously discounted from point of view of Belgium as well as
ourselves unless the invitation is given in sufficient time to
enable the British and French troops to secure a strategical
advantage of position before any German attack begins.
[FA: A3195, [1.352] [3]]