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152 Mr W. S. Churchill, U.K. Prime Minister, to Mr R. G. Menzies, Prime Minister

Cablegram unnumbered LONDON, 2 October 1940

MOST SECRET AND PERSONAL

I am very sorry to receive your message of 29th September [1]
because I feel that the great exertions we have made deserve a
broad and generous measure of indulgence, should any particular
minor operation miscarry. You already have the information
contained in my message of 27th September [2] which is far more
explicit than anything given to the British Parliament up to the
present. A full secret report will be cabled you when we ourselves
hear the details from the Commanders on the spot. The situation at
Dakar was revolutionized by arrival of French ships from Toulon
with Vichy personnel and the manning of the Batteries by the
hostile French Navy. Although every effort was made the British
Navy was not able to stop these ships on their way. After strongly
testing the defences and sustaining the losses I have already
reported to you, the naval and military Commanders did not
consider they had the strength to effect and support a landing,
and I think they were quite right not to get us committed to a
shore operation which could not like the naval attack be broken
off at any moment, and might have become a serious entanglement.

With regard to your criticisms, if it is to be laid down that no
attempt is to be made which has not 'overwhelming chances of
success' you will find that a complete defensive would be imposed
upon us. In dealing with unknown factors like the degree of French
resistance it is impossible to avoid uncertainty and hazard. For
instance, Duala and with it the Cameroons were taken by twenty-
five Frenchmen after their Senegalese troops had refused to march.

Ought we to have moved in this case without having overwhelming
force at hand? Secondly, I cannot accept the reproach of making 'a
half-hearted attack'. I hoped that you had not sustained the
impression from these last five months of struggle which has
excited the admiration of the whole world that we were 'a half-
hearted Government' or that I am half-hearted in the endeavours it
is my duty to make. I thought indeed that from the way my name was
used in the Election that quite a good opinion was entertained in
Australia of these efforts.

Every care will always be made to keep you informed before news is
published, but we could not prevent the German and Vichy wireless
from proclaiming the course of events as they occurred at Dakar
before we had received any information from our Commanders.

With regard to what you say about the Middle East, I do not think
the difficulties have been under-estimated, but of course our
forces are much smaller than those which the Italians have in
Libya and Abyssinia and the Germans may always help them. The
defection of France has thrown the whole Middle East into Jeopardy
and severed our communications through the Mediterranean. We have
had to face the threat of invasion here and the full strength of
Germany's air bombing attack on our cities, factories and
harbours. Nevertheless we have steadfastly reinforced the Middle
East, and in spite of all our perils at home and scanty resources
have sent over 30,000 men, nearly half our best tanks, many anti-
aircraft guns needed to protect our vital aircraft factories, two
of the finest Units in the Fleet, the Illustrious and Valiant, and
a considerable number of Hurricane Fighters and Wellington
Bombers. We have done this in the face of an accumulation across
the Channel and the North Sea of barges and shipping sufficient to
carry half a million men to these shores at a single voyage and in
a single night. Therefore if the Middle East difficulties and
dangers have not been fully met, it is not because the Mother
Country has shirked her share of perils and sacrifice. At present
the situation in Egypt and the Sudan looks better than we feared
some time ago. Still, my dear Prime Minister and friend, as you
have allowed me to deem you, I cannot guarantee 'clear-cut
victory' in the Middle East, or that Cairo, Khartoum, the Suez
Canal and Palestine may not fall into Italian or German hands. We
do not think they will, and we are trying our utmost to resist the
attacks which are massing against us. But I can make no promises
at all of victory, nor can I make any promises that regrettable
and lamentable incidents will not occur, or that there will not be
disappointments and blunders. On the contrary, I think the only
certainty is that we have very bad times indeed to go through
before we emerge from the mortal perils by which we are
surrounded.

I felt it due to your great position and the extremely severe tone
of your message to reply with equal frankness.

CHURCHILL

1 Document 144.

2 Document 142.


[PRO: DO 114/113]
Last Updated: 11 September 2013
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