My telegram of 15th October Circular Z.305. [1] In anticipation of
discussions at Singapore with representatives of the United States
and of the Netherlands, certain instructions had been prepared and
sent to Commanders in Chief in the Far East as to line which
should be taken in conversations. It has since been explained to
Commanders in Chief that owing to later developments as to United
States attitude conversations of wide scope envisaged in the
instructions are not likely to take place in the immediate future
and that instructions should accordingly be held in abeyance for
the present. [2] In case however position should change and it is
possible to conduct discussions at Singapore on this plane with
United States and Dutch representatives, it may be of interest to
the Prime Minister [3] to have the following summary of the
instructions in question. BEGINS.

(a) Conversations to be conducted with complete frankness and full
information on any questions raised to be imparted.

(b) Basic assumption that we, with the United States and the
Dutch, are at war with Japan; decisions to be without prejudice or
any political commitments.

(c) Object to co-ordinate plan for employment of British, United
States and Dutch forces in the event of war with Japan.

(d) Discussions with United States to cover plans for common
action in the event of Dutch failing to come in. Similarly
discussions with Dutch to cover action in the event of the United
States failing to come in.

(e) Scope to be limited to military problem in the Far East,
Indian Ocean and Pacific, including Australia and New Zealand.

(f) Following to be covered:-

(1) Plans for strategical employment of Allied forces.

(2) Technical and administrative arrangements to enable Allied
forces to operate together.

(g) United States representatives to be invited to take as basis
for strategical discussions Far Eastern War Memorandum [4], United
States fleet taking place of British naval forces in plan.

Principal question would be how far the United States would be
able to make up our own naval deficit in plan and from where they
would operate, i.e. Singapore, Hong Kong, Manila, Guam or
Honolulu.

(h) As defence problem would include Philippines and Netherlands
East Indies in addition to our own interests, Manila is thought
most suitable as advanced main fleet base, provided that local
defences are adequate. All British and Dutch bases to be
considered available though Hong Kong might not in fact be
practicable.

(i) Main offensive against Japan to be economic. With United
States intervention patrols to cut Japanese trade with North
America would be unnecessary.

(j) Primary role of Dutch naval forces to provide local defence in
Netherlands East Indies, and to hold gateways into Indian Ocean in
collaboration with other Allied forces.

(k) Under basic assumption set out above it is thought that
possibility [of] [5] Japanese expedition against Australia or New
Zealand can be ruled out, but danger of attempt on Hong Kong would
remain.

(l) With United States battle fleet in the Far East likelihood of
sea-borne attack on Malaya or Netherlands East Indies would be
greatly reduced and communications with Indo-China subject to
interruption. Nevertheless possibility of land and air attack on
Malaya would remain.

(m) Far Eastern appreciation (summary in my telegram of 12th
August Circular Z.24 [6] amplified by tactical appreciation to be
prepared at discussions at Singapore and modified by assumption of
United States intervention, to be basis of discussions on local
defence problems. ENDS.

(2) We have also had under preliminary consideration question of
command in area in contingencies in question. It is felt that
there would be advantage in the establishment of a unified
[strategical] naval command in the Pacific Ocean and the Far East,
including waters around the Netherlands East Indies, Malaya,
Australia and New Zealand. Further it is thought that Britain
[sic] and Dutch naval forces operating in the Far East and Pacific
Ocean should be placed under United States command, with exception
of purely local defence forces which would remain under local
British and Dutch command. Any Dutch naval forces operating in
purely local defence of Singapore should be under British command.

Indian Ocean would remain a British command under Commander-in-
Chief East Indies, and we think United States and Dutch should
place any naval forces operating to westward of Dutch islands
under our operational command.

(3) The foregoing suggestion as to United States command of the
naval forces in the Far East and the Pacific is intended to apply
to Australian and New Zealand naval forces as well as our own and
is therefore subject to concurrence of His Majesty's Governments
in those Dominions.

(4) No question of command of land forces would, it is thought, be
likely to arise with United States or Dutch. As regards air units
operating from Allied territory other than their own our view is
that these should come under operational control of air command in
which they are operating.

(5) Instructions to our representatives at the London discussions
are similar to those set out above but are somewhat more detailed
especially as regards United States air and army co-operation.

Relevant problems of economic warfare will also be discussed in
London in collaboration with the Ministry of Economic Warfare,
including ability of the United States to exercise control at
source in South America and Dutch plans for denial to Japan of oil
from the Netherlands East Indies.

(6) Please inform the Prime Minister as above for his most secret
and personal information.