Agendum 162/1940 9 July 1940

MOST SECRET

ANGLO-JAPANESE RELATIONS

1. I wish to draw attention to certain facts which emerge from the
exchange of cables regarding the three Japanese demands made upon
the United Kingdom.

2. I feel that the Japanese cannot read the text of the reply
which His Majesty's Ambassador' is instructed to convey in respect
to the Burma Road issue as other than a refusal by the United
Kingdom Government to concede this request. (Circular D.319) [2]

3. The principal operative paragraph, which says:-

'For some time past the specific war material from the United
Kingdom which was carried over the Burmese route to China has been
insignificant and it is likely to remain so. His Majesty's
Government, therefore, would find themselves unable to accept the
view that the supply of war materials by Great Britain to the
National Government of China is a direct cause of the prolongation
of hostilities,' can convey no other interest [sic] than that the
United Kingdom intends to continue to permit the use of this road
for the sending of war materials to Chiang Kai Shek. [3]

4. Many recent cables deal explicitly with the risk of Japan going
to war with us. Upon consultation the United States Government has
not asked the United Kingdom to refuse the three demands made but,
on the contrary, it has been suggested the United Kingdom should
submit to these demands in face of force majeure.

5. (I draw attention to one point of questionable diplomacy in the
text of the United Kingdom reply to Japan which places refusal to
dose route partly on basis that such action would be inconsistent
with United Kingdom's obligations to India and Burma. If
subsequently United Kingdom is forced to concede demand, she will
automatically have to confess acting at behest Japan in manner
inconsistent with her obligations to Dominion [sic] of India and
Colony of Burma.)
6. We have before us, while the text of the reply is under
consideration, Cable No. 520 [4], which commences:-

'Chiefs of Staff appreciation strongly stressing impossibility of
facing war with Japan was before the War Cabinet when reply
further considered this morning.'
7. The Australian Government's attitude towards this matter has
been variable.

8. We first expressed opinion that the three demands should be
conceded dated 27th June, 1940:-

'We consider the present three Japanese demands do not in
themselves vitally affect future or present security of Empire ...

and we can only arrive at the conclusion that if the United States
is not prepared to give the most complete support, these demands
should be conceded. The alternative is a grave risk of war,
against Japan, which cannot be contemplated in our present
position.

'Generally, we agree with view that it would be contrary to
successful prosecution of war for the U.S.A. to become involved in
war in the Pacific, and policy therefore must be based on
realities of situation and common sense that we should not at
moment take such action or by omission of reasonable action as
will cause Japan to become involved in this war.' [5]

Later, when opinion sought of proposed United Kingdom reply [6],
the text of which intended to make no concession but to propose
general discussion with Japan, the Australian Government indicated
unqualified concurrence in this suggested reply-Cable 2nd July:-

'We concur in terms of proposed reply to Japan.' [7]

9. On 5th July, Hard cabled [8], inter alia:-

'If an unfavourable proposal is submitted regarding the Burmese
Road, direct action will result, particularly in view of the
publicity given to the American announcement of inability to
prevent Japanese aggression in the Pacific. The Ambassador
suggests that I submit that Australia's influence on Home
Government would be appreciated to enable conciliation measures
for the removal of this pretext for aggression.'
10. Further cables of 5th and 9th to Bruce [9], read in
conjunction with earlier cables, must convey that Australian
Government is in state of doubt and indecision.

11. We have cable dated 6th July, No. 521 [10], stating:-

'United Kingdom supplies passing over Burma Road negligible,
supplies affected would be mainly American.'
12. I suggest that we might get a proper perspective of the
Australian Government's attitude on this critical issue by
considering what would be disclosed by an examination of our
records should the present attitude of the United Kingdom
Government lead to the Japanese embarking on hostilities against
us in the process of closing the Burma Road and Hong Kong
frontier.

13. The principal facts would be clear:-

(i) Statement that no fleet of British capital ships could be sent
to Singapore;

(ii) Every indication that the United States would not come into
war with us in the event of hostilities; (iii) The clear statement
of the British Chiefs of Staff-'Strongly stressing impossibility
of facing war with Japan.'
Series of cables from:-

(iv) Bruce pointing out that in his opinion United Kingdom
Government not adopting sufficiently positive attitude on this
grave and urgent issue.

(v) Accumulating evidence of ascendancy of Military Party and
Interventionists in Japan.

(vi) Cable from Hard on 5th July in which he informs Australian
Government that United Kingdom Ambassador at Tokyo suggests that
he submit that the Australian Government's influence on the Home
Government would be appreciated to enable conciliation measures
for the removal of this pretext for aggression.

14. In all these circumstances there has been no explicit
intimation by the Australian Government to the United Kingdom
Government that in our opinion these non-vital concessions should
be made rather than risk the possibility of war with Japan.

15. Perhaps the principal argument that has been used in
justifying the United Kingdom refraining from making these
concessions is that the British Empire would suffer great loss of
face. I would point out that if the Japanese take hostile action
against us to close these frontiers they would probably do so
without declaring war and would probably, at least for the time
being, confine themselves to this limited hostile action.

16. The British Empire would then be faced with alternative to
[sic] suffering this, or formally declaring war on Japan and thus
explicitly involving Australia and New Zealand in hostilities with
Japan.

17. In the first alternative, by refraining from declaring war,
the British Empire would lose face out of all proportion to that
lost in making the concessions.

18. On the other hand, if we are forced to make the formal
declaration of war against Japan on acts arising out of such a
remote interest to us as these three demands, I feel that the
Australian public would hold this Government blameworthy for
allowing matters to drift to such a pass without taking a definite
stand with the United Kingdom Government.

19. I therefore recommend that we should now without delay clear
up our previous uncertain attitude by saying in clear terms to the
United Kingdom Government that we would desire that these
concessions should be made rather than incur any real risk
whatever of becoming engaged in hostilities with Japan [11]

J. MCEWEN