My Government has recently given consideration to a combined Far
Eastern Appreciation of the Australian Chiefs of Staff, February,
1941 [2], which is summarized hereunder:

The situation on which the appreciation is based is as follows:

A. The war position is that obtaining on 13th February, 1941.

B. Japan creates situation result of which British Empire and
Netherlands East Indies forced declare war on her and therefore
allied.

C. Direct intervention by U.S.A. uncertain.

Comparison of Forces indicates-
I. Whatever move Japan decides to make, she has ample Naval Forces
to spare [to] [3] attack trade in Indian Ocean, Netherlands East
Indies and Pacific. Attack trade routes probably by one or more
heavy armoured cruisers or squadron 6 inch or 8 inch cruisers,
possibly accompanied by aircraft carriers.

II. Regarding military forces, she has minimum 10 Divisions, for
which requisite shipping available. She can provide a
preponderance [of] Forces in any two of three principal areas-
Malaya, Netherlands East Indies and Australia.

III. Japan can make available Air Forces which are greatly
superior in numbers reserves and homogeneity to the combined
British and Dutch Air Forces in the Far East-340 carrier borne
aircraft, 650 shore based aircraft. Total British and Dutch
strength 503.

Sea communications most likely to be threatened are:-

a. Indian Ocean, mainly Eastern section.

b. South China Sea, Western Pacific (North Australia).

c. South-Western Pacific, including Tasman and Trans-Pacific
routes.

Although Malacca Straits might be denied to Japanese Naval Forces,
these Forces might elude or destroy Dutch Forces guarding many
passages through Netherlands East Indies and operate against our
communications in Indian Ocean, which greatly facilitated if
Japanese established advance bases in Netherlands East Indies.

Dispositions of N.E.I. Forces in forward line to guard Straits
there, i.e., the line North Borneo, North Celebes, North-Western
New Guinea, will provide best protection against such Japanese
naval action.

Trade route in Indian Ocean most seriously threatened is that
between Colombo and Singapore. Remaining routes are so remote from
Japan that, unless she first captures the N.E.I., they can
scarcely be said to be threatened except by raiders.

Use of N.E.I. bases by our Forces would assist maintenance
communications between Malaya and Australia-New Zealand.

War effort of Australia and New Zealand has its principal focus in
area of Tasman Sea and, if command this area lost, transport
troops and trade by both Dominions would cease or [be] reduced to
trickle; this area very open to attack. With their existing bases
in Mandated Islands and numerous potential advance bases further
south, will be little difficulty and every advantage in Japanese
maintaining there constantly cruiser force which could well be
spared, even though main attack elsewhere. In absence British
cruiser force adequate counter them-Australian New Zealand trade
and shipping could be held up indefinitely outside range shore
based aircraft. Furthermore, area of South-West Pacific of great
importance relation U.S.A. Naval assistance, which must move from
North-Eastern Pacific to the Western Pacific to exercise necessary
pressure. Great emphasis laid on importance of line approach
Singapore, i.e., Honolulu, Fiji, Darwin, Singapore. This line
considered most favourable for U.S. Naval reinforcements. Very
important prevent Japanese gaining foothold across line, i.e., New
Guinea, New Hebrides, New Caledonia, Fiji. If they succeeded,
would make passage American reinforcements hazardous.

Our object is make best dispositions possible secure our most
important interests.

Considered there are three main courses of action Japan may take:-

a. Invasion Australia or New Zealand.

b. Attack Malaya with object seizing Singapore.

c. Attack Netherlands East Indies object enforcing separate peace
with Dutch.

Other contingencies against which Japan must provide-
a. American interference Western Pacific.

b. Movement reinforcements from Australia.

c. Movement reinforcements from India.

CONCLUSION
Invasion Australia New Zealand ruled out initially; most likely
course by Japanese attack Malaya object capturing Singapore.

Retention Singapore base vital to security Far East.

Security Netherlands East Indies vitally affects that of Singapore
and Australia.

While sea routes Indian and Pacific Oceans vital importance for
maintenance trade and continuance war effort in Middle East and
United Kingdom, security South-Western Pacific essential safe
passage to and operation of American Fleet in East Indies area in
event American intervention.

Naval and Air Forces should be employed prevent Japanese
establishing naval and air bases within striking distance our
vital interests, while sufficient Forces must be retained for
local defence and defence sea communications.

Army policy [for] defence measures [in] each allotted area [should
be] that, while main Army Forces provide final opposition against
invasion, provision must be made [to] garrison outlying bases [to]
ensure continued operations [of] naval and air forces.

The following main recommendations of the Chiefs of Staff have
been endorsed by my Government:-

While must be accepted that defence of area including Malaya,
N.E.I., Australia and New Zealand one strategic problem,
responsibilities each Government for defence its own and common
interests must be arranged and clearly defined. Practical scheme
reinforcement must be worked out, which will ensure rapid
concentration any threatened point of Forces drawn from resources
strategic area as whole. Northern limits of Australian and New
Zealand area responsibility line inclusive Timor, Sermata Island,
Taninbar Islands, exclusive Aru Island, to South Coast New Guinea
at 141st meridian, inclusive Mandated area New Guinea and Nauru.

Definitions limits Malayan and Netherlands East Indies
responsibilities matter for consideration by parties concerned.

Conclusion Singapore Defence Conference, 1940, Part I [4], para.

27, that minimum naval forces considered necessary Australian New
Zealand waters provided only by return all Australian and New
Zealand naval forces now serving overseas, this conclusion
reaffirmed. Considered, however, that matter be discussed
forthcoming Singapore Conference in light information available as
to complete plan disposition Naval Forces Far East. Would
appreciate if necessary arrangements could be made by Admiralty so
that these forces can be sailed Australia with minimum delay.

Information will be obtained regarding necessity for provision
from Australia food, munitions and supplies to Malaya after
outbreak hostilities, as will affect naval and air plans.

Australian Army is to arrange provision of garrisons necessary
within Australian area, utilisation A.I.F. units outside mainland
and local personnel where practicable, e.g., Papua and New Guinea.

This will involve additional commitments not hitherto
contemplated. Having in view the limitations our Army resources of
equipment, these commitments will have priority over any others in
Far East. 8th Division will be retained use Australian Area and
Far East, and present arrangement for it proceed Middle East join
Australian Corps has been cancelled.

The Governments responsible should make dispositions and establish
ground facilities in conformity with Part I, para. 6 of report of
Singapore Conference, 1940. Concurrence Dutch authorities to be
sought stationing Australian Forces in N.E.I., particularly Timor,
should need arise.

Officers from each Service to be appointed Liaison duties in
N.E.I.

As it is desired plans be completed at forthcoming Singapore
Conference showing complete naval plan for Far East including
Forces necessary Indian Ocean and initial disposition of East
Indies, China, Australian and New Zealand squadrons, if full
information is not now available on this subject my Government
strongly presses for supply of information sought in paragraph 2
of my telegram No. 87 of the 12th Feby. [5], on this subject. [6]