For Chief of Naval Staff [1] from Naval Attache. [2]

Fifth Progress Report.

(1) Following is summary vide last paragraph of telegram No. 151.

[3] The views expressed have received the approval of the United
States Chiefs of Staff but have not, as far as is known, been
discussed with the State Department.

(2) General. The United States representatives find themselves
unable to subscribe to the view expressed in paragraph 6 of my
telegram No. 151. They consider that the retention of Singapore is
'very desirable' and that its loss would be 'unfortunate' but they
hold that its loss 'would not have a decisive effect on the issue
of the war'.

(3) In support of this view, they argue:

(a) Invasion of Australia and New Zealand or India beyond the
present resources of Japan.

(b) Distances make serious Japanese attack on sea operations in
the Indian Ocean unlikely, and the United States could ensure the
security of communications from Australia and New Zealand to the
Western hemisphere and thence to the United Kingdom.

(c) Proportion of the material support to the war effort which is
now provided by Australia and New Zealand might be replaced by
further supplies from the Western hemisphere.

(d) The loss of raw materials now drawn from Malaya and
Netherlands East Indies would not be fatal. Replacements could in
time be found from elsewhere.

Despatch of United States capital force to Singapore
(4) United States representatives finally rule out the possibility
of the despatch of United States capital ship force to Singapore,
arguing:

(a) Such a deployment would be inconsistent with the fundamental
principle of the United States policy that the Western hemisphere
must remain secure. In the event of British defeat the United
States must have immediately available for use in the Atlantic and
Pacific naval forces capable of withstanding attack from overseas.

(b) Associated Far Eastern bases are incapable of protecting and
supporting a battle fleet and in view of the needs of the British
Isles it would be impossible to collect enough shipping to
maintain a large fleet in that region.

(c) Associated naval strength in the Atlantic requires the maximum
possible augmentation in order to bring about the defeat of
Germany.

(5) They suggest that if, in spite of these arguments, we still
maintained that it is essential to send reinforcements to the Far
East, necessary naval forces should be British and should be
released from the Atlantic or Mediterranean in the light of
substantial United States naval reinforcement proposed for these
theatres. This suggestion, which at first sight would appear quite
illogical in view of paragraph (4) (c) above, is put forward
reluctantly and is based on the contention that it is preferable
for armed forces of each nation to operate in areas in which its
own interests are primarily involved.

Reinforcement of Asiatic Fleet
(6) United States representatives refuse to contemplate any
reinforcement of their Asiatic Fleet either now or on the outbreak
of war. In support of this they argue:

(a) It would be strategically unsound to detach any forces from
the Pacific Fleet which would then have difficulty in taking
offensive action, to divert the Japanese naval strength away from
Malaya. Any reinforcement of the Asiatic Fleet could therefore
only be at the expense of the United States naval effort in the
Atlantic, which effort they are not prepared to reduce.

(b) It would be strategically unsound to locate any additional
surface forces in the Philippines during peace time. Far from
being a deterrent such forces would invite attack because they
would be far from support by the Pacific Fleet. It would be
politically impossible to locate any such forces at British, Dutch
places in advance of war.

(c) Any additional submarines would have to come from the Pacific
fleet, whose submarine strength is already ample for 'effective
diverting action' or alternatively from the Atlantic contribution.

(d) Despatch of additional aircraft might act as a deterrent, but
could not long delay loss of Philippines. Any such contribution
however would be at the expense of the Atlantic theatre.

(7) United States representatives consider that it would be a
serious mistake for the United Kingdom in making their strategical
dispositions to withstand a Japanese attack against Singapore to
count on prompt military support by United States. In support of
this they argue:

(a) It is most unlikely that United States would declare war
against Japan solely because that country had occupied Indo-China
or Thailand.

(b) There is serious doubt that United States would immediately
declare war against Japan were she to move against Malaya, British
Borneo or the Netherlands East Indies, unless the United States
were previously at war with Germany and Italy. Congress before
deciding whether or not to declare war against Japan for
infringing Malaya, almost certainly would require a considerable
period for debate.

Summary ends.

(8) Discussions on this subject will be resumed Tuesday February
25th.

(9) It is essential at this stage that no effort be made to bring
any political pressure to bear in respect of the subject matter of
above message. Grateful therefore if no reference be made to
contents of this telegram. Minister [4] fully concurs.

CASEY