Extract LONDON, 8 March 1941

MOST SECRET

2. GENERAL NAVAL STRATEGICAL POSITION [matter omitted]

(ii) Far East
The Vice Chief of the Naval Staff [1] stated that in the plans
made for war with Japan it had not been contemplated that the
British Empire would be fighting Germany, Italy and Japan
together. There were not sufficient capital ships to provide a
fleet in Home Waters, one in the Mediterranean and one in the Far
East. The prospect of success against such a combination depended
primarily on the possibility of the United States coming in, in
the event of war with Japan. If we were left alone against these
three enemies, he could not see how the Mediterranean situation
could be preserved and it would be necessary to withdraw from that
region.

The Prime Minister [2] referred to a statement in a cable he had
received from the Prime Minister, United Kingdom [3], that in the
event of war with Japan our forces would be withdrawn from the
Mediterranean should Australia and New Zealand be threatened.

The Prime Minister said it was necessary to resolve a general
declaration of this nature into a plan of the specific measures
that really would be possible in the event of such a contingency
arising. There are large forces in the Middle East, including
three Australian Divisions, and they could not just be left to
their fate. To withdraw them, however, would take time, shipping
would have to be provided, convoys organised and Naval protection
afforded in the meantime. Much could happen in the Far East during
this period.

The Vice Chief of the Naval Staff stated that we should not go to
war with Japan over their occupation of any part of the
Netherlands East Indies-this would only add to the number of our
enemies, and if Germany could first be defeated we could turn to
Japan later and deal with her. He would bluff up to the point of
telling Japan that if she went into the Netherlands East Indies we
would fight, and the strong stand of a few weeks ago had
undoubtedly deterred Japan from taking action. If the United
States should join us there would be no problem in this region,
and the result of the Staff talks now being held should shortly be
known.

The Prime Minister stated that, if Japan should establish herself
in the Netherlands East Indies, Australian public opinion would
undoubtedly insist on military action to eject her, as her
presence in this region would strike at the very basis of
Australian defence by introducing a very powerful threat to
Singapore, and by enabling Japan to make an attack on Northern
Australia with land-based aircraft.

The Vice Chief of the Naval Staff was of the view that if we had
adequate air strength in the Far East Japan would not attempt such
an operation. It might not be possible immediately to despatch
capital ships to Singapore.

The Prime Minister pointed out that this view supported his
contention for the provision of adequate air strength at
Singapore, including Hurricane Squadrons. He was of the view that
in the general reference to reinforcing our position in the Far
East with capital ships we have only been deluding ourselves.

The Vice Chief of the Naval Staff repeated that the Naval Plans
had not provided for a War against triple enemies, but this point
was queried by the High Commissioner [4] who observed that the
only variation in the original plan had been the defection of
France as an ally.

The Prime Minister considered that there was need for a definite
plan of Naval reinforcement east of Suez to the extent to which it
might be possible on a progressive basis according to events in
the Mediterranean.

It was necessary to get down to a realistic appreciation of our
position on Naval dispositions and consider in conjunction with
them the extent to which an increase in air strength in the Far
East could supplement the provision of capital ships which might
be available, [? or] to provide for the security of this region in
their absence.

Australian local defence on land and in the air had been based on
an hypothesis furnished by the Chiefs of Staff which indicated the
improbability of invasion because of the Naval protection which
could be afforded in the Far East. Recent approval had been given
for the increase of the strength of the R.A.A.F. for Home Defence
from 19 to 32 Squadrons and, if the aircraft for these were
provided and the air strength at Singapore increased, a powerful
deterrent would be offered to Japanese aggression, particularly if
the Japanese Air Force should prove to be no better than the
Italian Air Force. There is therefore every reason for completing
the equipment of the R.A.A.F. and developing the Australian
aircraft industry as the source of supply East of Suez.

In reply to an enquiry the Vice Chief of the Naval Staff stated
that the United States Navy was considered to be better than the
Japanese Navy, and he would have no hesitation in engaging the
Japanese Fleet with 60% of their number of British ships. [5]