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378 Mr A. W. Fadden, Acting Prime Minister, to Lord Cranborne, U.K. Secretary of State for Dominion Affairs

Cablegram 206 [2 April 1941] [1],

MOST SECRET

My telegram No. 187 of 27th March [2] paragraph s. The
Commonwealth Government's views as to the scope of and points for
discussion at the proposed conference at Singapore are as
follows:-

2. The suggested scope of the conference is:-

(a) To formulate coordinated naval plans for the East Indies,
China, Australia and New Zealand Stations, including the
Netherlands East Indies Naval Forces;

(b) To establish a broad outline of policy with American co-
operation.

3. Suggested points for discussion under paragraph 2(a) are as
follows:-

(a) Plans. Two separate plans are required:-

(i) When naval forces available are as given in paragraph 12 of
the Anglo-Dutch-Australian Conference. [3]

(ii) When naval reinforcements are sent. In this case the plan for
reinforcement east of Suez, on a progressive basis, which has been
the subject of discussion between the Australian Prime Minister
[4] and the Admiralty, should be taken into account.

Plans should include action to be taken in the event of Japan
concentrating an attack on our shipping in the hope of reduction
or dispersal of our naval strength prior to, or at the same time,
launching an attack on Singapore or Netherlands East Indies.

(b) Convoys. A further examination of the provision of escorts for
troop convoys in the Indian Ocean (Anglo-Dutch-Australian
Conference paragraph i i), also of escort for Australian personnel
proceeding to Koepang and Ambon (Anglo-Dutch-Australian conference
paragraphs 7 and 8) and naval measures required for their
maintenance. The possibility of basing naval forces at Darwin for
this purpose and in support of Netherlands East Indies naval
forces operating in Eastern Archipelago.

(c) Essential Supplies. Method of maintaining essential supplies:-

(i) To Singapore, Netherlands East Indies, Near and Middle East,
Australia and New Zealand.

(ii) To the United Kingdom via Panama.

(d) Strategical Command. Any adjustments required in the
Strategical Command consequent upon recent discussion in
Washington. The position with regard to Netherlands East Indies in
this respect needs clarification.

(e) Recent Washington Discussions and Anglo-Dutch-Australian
Report. Area for strategical direction discussed in Washington to
be brought into alignment with spheres of operational control
mentioned in Anglo-Dutch-Australian Conference paragraph 19.

(f) Tactical Command. Tactical Command and other problems when
Allied Forces are co-operating.

4. Points for discussion under paragraph 2(b) are:-

How U.S.A. naval aid in the Far East to the extent agreed on at
Washington could best be dovetailed into the plans to be
formulated above.

COMMANDERS-IN-CHIEF TO CONFER
5. The need is stressed for the fullest representation possible of
Commanders-in-Chief at the Conference. [5]

FADDEN

1 The date has been inserted from the copy received in London. See
PRO-FO 371/27774.

2 Document 366.

3 For the report of this conference See AA: A2671, 109/1941,
Annexe C.

4 R. G. Menzies. See Document 343.

5 This cablegram was also sent to the N.Z. Prime Minister, Peter
Fraser, as no. ii i; to the U.K. Commander-in-Chief in the Far
East, Air Chief Marshal Sir Robert Brooke-Popham; and to the U.K.

Commander-in-Chief in China, Vice Admiral Sir Geoffrey Layton.


[AA: A3196,1941, 0.4068]
Last Updated: 11 September 2013
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