In my message No. 235 of 18th April [1] request was made for
intended strategic redistribution of the forces in the Middle
East. The evacuation of our troops from Greece and our reverses in
North Africa may quite probably have an adverse effect on Turkish
morale with the danger that Turkey may agree under German pressure
to permit the passage of German troops through Turkey so
facilitating an attack on Suez and Egypt. We rather apprehend that
reliability of the Egyptian Government is of a nature that in the
face of great adversity to our arms it would quickly collapse. The
effect of a successful attack on Egypt combined with a
simultaneous attack in North-West Africa could have the most
serious consequences to our position in the Mediterranean. The
effect of such possible happenings on Japan would be such that we
think it wise to assume that their active participation in the war
by southward attack on Singapore, the Netherlands East Indies and
ourselves would be almost inevitable.

We appreciate that the United Kingdom has a very formidable
problem to face in defence of its own shores and we also realise
that the preservation of the integrity of Great Britain is vital
to our own defence and security. Our great concern must, however,
centre around the defence of Australia and in the possible
position outlined above with Japan as our enemy. In that event we
do not think it prudent to assume that United States would enter
the war on our side at least not immediately.

In Dominions Office cable no. 510 of 23rd December, 1940 [2], a
message from Mr. Churchill was embodied stating in effect that if
Australia is seriously threatened by invasion there would be no
hesitation to compromise or sacrifice the Mediterranean position
to come to our assistance. A similar assurance was also contained
in Dominions Office No. 262 of 11th August, 1940. [3]

There are two important factors, however, that vitally affect
these assurances. Firstly, at the time they were given the
situation was very different from that which now exists and
secondly the assurances were subject to the important condition
the necessity for which we fully appreciate that the defence and
security of the Motherland must first be assured. It is also
understood that in substance the official United States viewpoint
is consistent with this and that the fundamental principle of the
United States policy is that the Western Hemisphere is the primary
and overriding consideration.

The position as outlined above was discussed this morning frankly
and in complete unity in the Advisory War Council and it was
unanimously agreed by all members of the Council and supported
fully by War Cabinet and the Government that a new appreciation
based on the circumstances outlined in this message is of the most
supreme importance and that this should not wait until the
position is substantially stabilised in the Mediterranean and
Middle East as such delay would be fatal in the event of further
deterioration of the position there. Such a review would enable us
to take stock of our war position in the light of altered outlook
and make such decisions as our own local defence requirements may
then demand.

We ask for a candid and outspoken appreciation which will provide
an outlook shorn of any optimism and which will convey an accurate
statement of the assistance that we could definitely rely on
rather than hope for in the circumstances outlined.

It must be accepted that the Empire and in particular we in
Australia should now have plans in train to meet the contingencies
which may be regarded as reasonably proximate. Such contingencies
are:-

(a) Turkey and possibly Iran coming under domination and subject
to control of Germany.

(b) Air and/or land action by Germany closing Suez.

(c) Action by Germany through Spain and North West Africa
successfully closing the Straits of Gibraltar.

(d) The possibility of British Fleet being by such actions
contained in the Mediterranean and having to fight its way out.

(e) The effect of any such contingencies on Japan and particularly
in relation to the security of Australia.

We think that the overriding necessity is that of having plans
prepared in advance as to disposition of naval and land forces
against any one or more of such contingencies. [4]