PRIME MINISTER'S VISIT ABROAD

The following is a summary of the main points of the statement
made by the Prime Minister [1] to the Advisory War Council on his
visit abroad:-

1. UNITED KINGDOM WAR CABINET
The Prime Minister stated that he had attended meetings of the War
Cabinet whilst he was in London and was somewhat disturbed at the
manner in which this body worked. He did not consider that there
was an effective Cabinet as ordinarily understood. This arose from
several reasons. Mr. Churchill played a large part in the personal
direction of the strategy of the war. The War Cabinet was not a
critical body owing to the personal domination which had been
established by the Prime Minister. The economic and financial
aspects of war were of minor importance to the Prime Minister, who
was solely concerned with the military operations. In the view of
Mr. Menzies, the Australian organisation for the higher direction
of the war is better than the corresponding machinery in the
United Kingdom and the U.S.A. The Cabinet system, as it is
understood in Australia, simply did not operate in the United
Kingdom.

The Prime Minister explained that the War Cabinet comprises the
following Ministers:-

Rt. Hon. Winston Churchill, C.H., M.P., Prime Minister and
Minister of Defence.

Rt. Hon. C. R. Attlee, M.P., Lord Privy Seal.

Rt. Hen. Sir John Anderson, G.C.B., G.C.S.I., G.C.I.E., M.P., Lord
President of the Council.

Rt. Hon. Anthony Eden, M.C., M.P., Secretary of State for Foreign
Affairs.

Rt. Hen. Arthur Greenwood, M.P., Minister without Portfolio.

Rt. Hon. Lord Beaverbrook, Secretary of State.

Rt. Hon. Sir Kingsley Wood, M.P., Chancellor of the Exchequer.

Rt. Hon. Ernest Bevin, M.P., Minister of Labour and National
Service.

The regular members are always supplemented at meetings by Service
Ministers and their Advisers. In addition, the Secretary and
Assistant Secretary to the War Cabinet and Minute Secretaries are
also present. Other Ministers are co-opted when subjects in which
they are interested are under consideration, and they may be
accompanied by Advisers. The Prime Minister's impression was that
meetings of the War Cabinet partook more of the nature of a public
gathering and were too unwieldy.

The meetings of the War Cabinet are held about twice weekly and
are of brief duration. The brevity is due to the procedure
followed. After the Chiefs of Staff have given a short review of
any matters of military interest since the last meeting, the Prime
Minister generally expresses his opinions on policy and the course
of the war in such terms that there is great reluctance on the
part of the United Kingdom Ministers to offer any views to the
contrary. In Mr. Menzies' experience nobody, apart from himself,
had offered any criticism. Cabinet discussions are practically
non-existent, and the only discussions on strategy that were
originated by anyone other than Mr. Churchill arose from the
Australian Prime Minister.

The really effective organ in the determination of military policy
is the Defence Committee, which comprises the Prime Minister and
the three Service Ministers. It is dominated, however, by the
Prime Minister's strategical views. He proceeds to give effect to
his opinions by the preparation and issue of a directive, and, if
major considerations are involved, it is submitted to War Cabinet
for confirmation.

2. UNITED KINGDOM MINISTERS
Members of the War Cabinet-
Mr. Churchill, Prime Minister and Minister of Defence-A man of
great ability and a great leader, but he must be critically
supported and not surrounded by 'yes-men'.

Mr. C. R. Attlee, Lord Privy Seal-Intelligent, not reluctant to
offer an opinion, but not a man of real and forceful personality.

Sir John Anderson, Lord President of the Council-Previously a
distinguished civil servant and a first-class administrator, a man
of solid ability, but does not offer any views outside the field
of his particular experience.

Mr. Anthony Eden, Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs-A person
of considerable knowledge and great industry, but a light weight
who has not developed in recent years.

Mr. Arthur Greenwood, Minister without Portfolio-Included in the
War Cabinet because of his position in the Labour Party, but does
not exercise any great influence.

Lord Beaverbrook, former Minister of Aircraft Production, now
Secretary of State-The one man able to stand up to Mr. Churchill,
but disappointed with the manner in which the War Cabinet works,
and does not attend unless specially interested in some particular
subject.

Sir Kingsley Wood, Chancellor of the Exchequer-Has a good deal of
ability but his heavy responsibilities as Chancellor do not give
him any time for concentration on matters relating to the general
conduct of the war.

Mr. Ernest Bevin, Minister of Labour and National Service-Has a
mind of his own and does not hesitate to speak it. The
responsibilities of his post are, however, all-absorbing.

Ministers not in the War Cabinet-
Lord Cranborne, Dominions Secretary-An able Minister.

Mr. A. V. Alexander, First Lord of the Admiralty-A very good
administrator and the best of the Service Ministers. Mr. David
Margesson, Secretary of State for War-New to Ministerial
responsibilities and promises to do well.

Sir Archibald Sinclair, Secretary of State for Air-Nice
personality but holds his post as Leader of the Liberal Party. He
carries little weight as a Minister.

Mr. Herbert Morrison, Home Secretary-A proved administrator from
his experience as Chairman of the London County Council. He was
originally appointed Minister of Supply, and was in an unfamiliar
field, but he has made a good Home Secretary.

Chiefs of Staff-
Admiral Sir Dudley Pound, First Sea Lord-Too old and past his job.

The Prime Minister illustrated this by reference to his own
suggestions for measures to interrupt the enemy convoys
reinforcing and supplying Tripoli, which the Royal Navy had been
tardy in adopting.

Air Chief Marshal Sir Charles Portal, Chief of the Air Staff-An
able officer who did well in the Bomber Command, but, like other
Chiefs of Staff, is being killed on his feet by late night
meetings convened by the Prime Minister.

General Sir John Dill, Chief of the General Staff-Has a high
reputation, very intelligent with great knowledge, but incapable
of standing up to the Prime Minister.

3. THE IDEAL WAR CABINET
In the Prime Minister's opinion, the ideal War Cabinet should
consist of five or six Ministers without departmental
responsibilities. This body should hold daily meetings and review
the military situation with the Chiefs of Staff They would be able
to devote their entire energies to the higher direction of the
war. A War Cabinet constituted on these lines functioned in the
later stages of the last war. Mr. Lloyd George [2] informed the
Prime Minister that no War Cabinet can be effective which does not
include a Dominion representative, and stated that he had received
invitations to join the War Cabinet, but refused to become a
member of a body which is a War Cabinet in name only.

The Prime Minister illustrated the importance of the need for
Dominion representation in the War Cabinet by an incident relating
to the campaign in Greece. The Secretary of State for Foreign
Affairs and the Chief of the General Staff had recommended that
military operations should be undertaken in Greece on a certain
basis. The Dominions were consulted accordingly, and the Secretary
of State had had discussions with the Turks and Yugo-Slavs. On his
return to Athens, however, he found that General Papagos [3] had
weakened in his attitude and had not moved troops to certain
positions as originally contemplated. The Secretary of State, the
Chief of the General Staff and the Commander-in-Chief, Middle East
[4], agreed, however, with the Greek Government that the campaign
should proceed, and the Chief of the General Staff had signed an
agreement with the Greeks accordingly. In War Cabinet Mr. Menzies
denied the right of a United Kingdom Minister to make a binding
agreement on a matter so vitally affecting the Dominions. Mr.

Churchill agreed with his view and informed the Secretary of State
accordingly, emphasizing that participation in military operations
in Greece must be decided solely on military grounds. On
reconsideration of the matter, the Secretary of State, the Chief
of the General Staff and the Commander-in-Chief Middle East, again
recommended that the campaign be approved in the light of the
situation after this further review.

Mr. Menzies instanced this case as proof of an unsatisfactory
attitude of mind towards questions in which Dominion interests are
involved, and added that Mr. Churchill has no conception of the
British Dominions as separate entities. Furthermore, the more
distant the problem from the heart of the Empire, the less he
thinks of it.

4. WAR FINANCE
The Prime Minister is not interested in these questions and states
that he 'never did understand sums.'

5. FOOD SUPPLIES
There is a Ministry of Food which is ably directed by Lord
Woolton, but its responsibility relates to the distribution of
available food. The Department of Agriculture is separate, and the
Ministry of Food has no say in agricultural policy relating to the
production of food requirements. The quantity of imports of
foodstuffs is determined by the tonnage that can be made available
after providing for the requirements of the Ministry of Supply.

6. SHIPPING
The construction and repair of ships is controlled by the
Admiralty. Labour is controlled by the Department of Labour and
National Service. Transport facilities at ports are under the
direction of the Ministry of Transport. Quantity and types of
imports are controlled by the Ministry of Supply, and the
activities of the Ministry of Shipping are confined to the
arrangement of charter agreements.

Mr. Menzies represented to the Prime Minister the importance of a
more coordinated direction of shipping problems, but the Prime
Minister regards these matters as subordinate to the general
strategy and direction of the war.

7. FOREIGN POLICY
Mr. Menzies stated that he had the lowest opinion of the
efficiency of the Foreign Office, and illustrated this by an
account of his discussions on foreign policy towards Japan. He had
been amazed to discover that the Foreign Office views were utterly
negative and had urged the need for a realistic approach by:-

(i) A frank discussion with Japan of the facts of the position;

(ii) Pointing out to Japan the effects which war with the British
Empire and probably the U.S.A. would have upon her;

(iii) Abandoning an attitude of resignation to the inevitability
of a conflict which the Foreign Office appeared to hold.

In regard to the Prime Minister's speech in London which had been
the subject of some criticism in Australia, he observed that it
had been based on the foregoing points, and, in fact, was entirely
contrary to the impression which had been created in some quarters
in Australia that he was advocating a policy of appeasement. He
added that on the return of the Secretary of State from the Middle
East he had been informed by Mr. Eden that he was in full
agreement with the Prime Minister's views. The Prime Minister
added that the absence of the effective working of the War Cabinet
machinery no doubt contributed to the inability to formulate a
satisfactory policy.

8. GERMAN STRATEGY
The Prime Minister observed that the advisers of the United
Kingdom Government have consistently under-estimated the German
capacity for speedy movement, as indicated by the counter-
offensive against Libya. He understood that the tanks lost at
Dunkirk were of a. poor type and not comparable with the German
machines. The latter had 40-mm. armour and a speed of 30 miles per
hour, derived from 350-horsepower engines. The United Kingdom
tanks had 20-mm. armour and a speed of 10 miles per hour from Ford
engines. It was a matter of some satisfaction that the Germans,
after reaching the Channel ports, had not gone on to invade
England, for had they done so, they would probably have won the
war early.

The Prime Minister emphasized the need for armoured fighting
vehicles, mechanical transport, anti-tank guns and anti-aircraft
guns, as the strength of modern armies is not to be gauged in
terms of manpower but by the extent to which they possess fire
power and mobility.

The Prime Minister observed that, on the outbreak of the war, the
United States Army was in a parlous condition in regard to
armoured fighting vehicles and effective measures were only now
being taken to provide for the mass production of suitable types
of tanks.