Historical documents
Cablegram unnumbered CANBERRA, 4 March 1942
STRICTLY CONFIDENTIAL MOST SECRET
To be decyphered by Stirling and given to Sir Stafford Cripps [1]
alone.
Begins.
1. So far as was possible we have adopted your suggestion made
through Bruce [2] and have offered to make two brigades of A.I.F.
available as temporary garrison Ceylon. (See our telegram No. 160.
[3])
2. However we find that owing to circumlocution and other
obstacles the flow of munitions here is only a trickle. For
instance the bulk of United States production of Tommy guns and
ammunition for warships (twenty-five thousand guns) [4] is going
to the United Kingdom. We are in such a pass that Casey [5] in the
United States has to wire to Bruce in London to ask General
Macready [6] whether he might allocate proportion of these to
Australia. Obviously these matters involve higher political
direction rather than (wangling) or influence at a different
stage.
3. On 12 August 1940 Churchill laid down the following principle
to Australia and New Zealand. 'If however contrary to prudence and
self-interest Japan sets about invading Australia and New Zealand
on a large scale I have the explicit authority of the Cabinet to
assure you that we should then cut our losses in the Mediterranean
and proceed to your aid sacrificing every interest except only
defence safety (sic) of this island on which all depends.' [7]
4. The above is a political and strategical guarantee the meaning
and application of which I pray will never be debated in public.
5. The crisis has brought Australia and New Zealand (closer)
together and within a few hours we shall probably be making a
joint request to you and the United States as to a new United
Kingdom/United States Anzac Council at (Washington) to cover
Australia, New Zealand and Anzac area, a supreme commander and a
modification of jurisdiction of Chiefs of Staff Committee at
(Washington) by addition of Australian and New Zealand
representation. [8] Frankly on this occasion support from United
Kingdom instead of opposition is vital. If so future
misunderstandings may be avoided. It is thought that if the United
Kingdom agree Roosevelt will also agree. I hope (you will) spare
no effort to [assist] [9] us.
6. I desire to mention also the recent Russian request in relation
to post-war boundaries. (See Dominions Office telegram D. No. 112.
[10]) When Eden [11] was at Moscow some months ago we cabled the