1. Reference your ET.30, 31, 32 and 33. [1] I am furnishing you
with certain immediate observations in the hope that they will
reach you before you leave London. [2] I am proceeding to
Melbourne on Sunday for discussions with MacArthur [3], Blamey [4]
and the Chiefs of Staff and will cable you next week additional
observations arising from these conferences.

2. In the first place please accept my warmest congratulations on
your achievement and especially the fact that you have secured
three Spitfire squadrons for Australia and much equipment for our
Land Forces.

3. Reference ET.30. (A) Grand Strategy of the War.

Paragraphs two and three.

It is indeed surprising in view of Page's [5] membership of the
War Cabinet and the Pacific War Council, and Casey's [6] status in
Washington, that neither of them had been acquainted with the
decision to treat Germany as the primary enemy.

Apart from any special notification to the Commonwealth Government
through the usual channel or from the Prime Minister [7] through
the Winch Series, there were opportunities for revealing this
information to the Australian Government in the following
cablegrams:

(i) Appreciation of situation in the Far East [8] received through
the High Commissioner for the United Kingdom [9] on March 4.

(ii) Comments of United Kingdom Chiefs of Staff on appreciation by
Australian Chiefs of Staff forwarded by Australian High
Commissioner [10] in cablegram No. 55 of April 3. [11]

(iii) Comments of United Kingdom Chiefs of Staff on the
observations of the Australian Chiefs of Staff on (i) forwarded in
Dominions Office cablegram No. 362 of April 6. [12] In addition to
the public utterances of Colonel Knox [13] and A. V. Alexander
[14] mentioned by you there have been inklings of such a decision,
as in the concluding words of Dominions Office cablegram No. 382
of April 27 [15] that action against Malay barrier is beyond our
resources until Germany has been defeated.

Paragraphs four to eight.

Though Clause 18 of Annexure 'A' [16] says that the security of
Australia and other named centres must be maintained, it is
interesting to note that of the latter, Singapore, the East
Indies, the Philippines, Burma and the Burma Road have been lost.

As advised by MacArthur in PM.62 [17], there is a certain strength
necessary for the security of Australia as a base which exceeds
our maximum potential. This strength is the minimum that should be
provided as a defence against invasion.

Paragraphs nine to twelve.

In view of the background you have outlined, it is apparent that
MacArthur was right in stating that he lacked the forces necessary
to carry out a single part of his directive, and that it should
have been drafted in two sections showing immediate and ultimate
objectives. The former would have covered the defence of Australia
as a base. In view of this background and your statement of
Marshall's [18] strategical outlook, we must strive most
strenuously to help MacArthur get the forces, as you say, to carry
out that portion of the grand strategy embodied in his directive.

In regard to prior consultation on any future modification of the
grand strategy, it is noted that you propose to discuss the matter
frankly with Churchill and Bruce.

(C) Difficulties Confronting Australia.

Paragraph two.

Your statement on the attitude of the United States Air Chief [19]
towards allocations of American aircraft is disturbing as it is of
vital importance to obtain the aircraft for our expansion
programme of seventy-one squadrons, for which we are training
personnel and providing the ground facilities and ancillary
organisation. You will recall that item one on the agendum for the
Ottawa Conference [20] is the necessity for relating the training
capacity of the United Nations to the output of operational type
aircraft by those nations.

(D) General Results.

Paragraphs eight to sixteen.

The information regarding two Australian and one R.A.F. Spitfire
squadrons is very gratifying and these units with their excellent
equipment should have a demoralising effect on the Japanese,
particularly if the secret is well preserved. I presume censorship
will be rigid at the London end.

You will recall that in February War Cabinet considered
modifications of the Empire Training Scheme to meet the changed
strategical position and to provide for the allotment of R.A.A.F.

squadrons to the Pacific Theatre. [21]

When War Cabinet was recently considering the question of the
extension of the scheme beyond March 1943 it was decided that I
should raise this aspect with you in its relation to the
strategical needs of the South West Pacific [Area, particularly in
respect of air defence] requirements. [22] My message to Churchill
[23] will, as you suggest, accept this contribution in the spirit
in which it is made, for the gesture embodied in the despatch of
an R.A.F. squadron will have a splendid effect. I shall be glad
however if you will note War Cabinet's views on R.A.A.F. squadrons
and make the supply of personnel for other theatres a strong
factor in the provision of aircraft for the Australian Air Force.

Paragraph seventeen.

The instruction issued to Field Marshal Dill [24] to support
General MacArthur in Australia is very satisfactory and it is
hoped it will produce the desired results.

4. I am repeating to you separately my JOHCU message to Churchill.

[25]

CURTIN