Personal for Curtin from Evatt.

Your telegram P.M.83. [1]

(1) I greatly value the message from you and my colleagues
congratulating me on the success of the Mission. We owe much to
the consistent support of yourself, as Prime Minister. Personally
I owe very much indeed to Smith [2], Robinson [3] and my wife.

(2) I am glad to know that a revised strategy appreciation is
being prepared in the light of the probable results of the recent
Pacific battles. However, the present view held here is that the
engagements are not yet finished.

(3) Sir Owen Dixon [4] has now been here for a week and is
settling down to his new post. His formal reception by the
President [5] will take place this morning. He has now been
brought into personal contact with persons directly concerned with
the problem of the South-West Pacific theatre and its supply
needs. We have conferred with all the United States Chiefs of
Staff and with Sir John Dill and his colleagues, also with Captain
Lyttelton [6] of the British War Cabinet. Dixon has now been
placed in full possession of all relevant cables and documents
which bear upon the duties of his post which I regard as
practically equivalent to that of War Minister in the United
States.

(4) On the United States side, the attitude of the President has
been most cordial to Australia and yourself. He is especially
gratified at the warm relations between Australia and Churchill.

His attitude is reflected in that of his Chiefs of Staff.

(5) At the same time we are working out with the British Mission
under Dill the best method of carrying into effect Churchill's
undertaking that Dill should co-operate with the United States
Chiefs of Staff for the purpose of ensuring the security of
Australia. Dixon and I have discussed this important problem and
in due course he will make suggestions and recommendations as to
more regular communication between the Australian Chiefs of Staff
and Dill as Head of the British Mission here.

(6) The results of the battle at Midway appear even better than
newspaper reports first indicated. It seems that the aircraft
carrier strength of the enemy has been grievously impaired. [7]
More important still, Dill told us yesterday in confidence that
General Marshall [8] now favours a more active policy against the
enemy in the South-West Pacific. This will, of course, be in
accord with General MacArthur's [9] desires and I strongly
recommend that General MacArthur should communicate his views to
General Marshall at the earliest possible opportunity without
referring to Dill's statement to Dixon and myself
(7) The success in Midway seems to have been gained largely
through the very accurate intelligence work of the United States
Navy. It is pointed out, however, that if the two carriers asked
for [10] had been stationed in the South-West Pacific at the time
of the engagement the Japanese might have been more successful.

(8) As you know, I think that on the strategical level the best
results for Australia would. flow from General MacArthur's
personal representations to General Marshall. This, of course,
would not preclude you from communicating with the President
through Dixon at the highest level. However, the President is
always inclined to act on the recommendations of his Chiefs of
Staff.

(9) Our mission is really completed and the new Minister is in a
position to go straight ahead.

(10) Prior to receiving your telegram, all arrangements had been
made for us to leave Washington and to proceed from there to the
Pacific Coast, at the week-end. The battle started at Midway may
again flare up and it is possible that we will be delayed either
at San Francisco or en route. On the other hand, we have to be
ready at the Pacific Coast by the week-end, otherwise we may miss
the chance of transport home for some time. I think the personal
information I have gained should be placed at your disposal at the
earliest possible moment. At Washington we have had our farewells
and our baggage is packed and some of it is on the way.

(11) If the revised strategy appreciation comes before I leave I
shall at once make my comments available. You appreciate that any
proposed alteration in the strategy of the Pacific would have to
be approved by Marshall and King. [11] At the same time,
opportunities will probably occur on the Pacific War Council and
through Dixon's contacts with the President, Dill and the United
States Chiefs of Staff to contend for a revised strategy for the
South-West Pacific in an atmosphere which at present seems
favourable to a modified offensive. However, you know that
Marshall is the author of the plan for a Western European
offensive and this fact may continue to tell against any
alteration in the present strategy of the South-West Pacific area.

(12) I am about to attend my last meeting of the Pacific War
Council and the President has specially permitted me to bring
Dixon to the meeting so that there shall be no break of continuity
so far as Australia is concerned. The formal presentation of his
credentials takes place before the meeting.

(13) The President has discussed with me alternative proposals for
the further exchange of visits which I think I should discuss more
fully with you in person.

(14) Dixon has seen this telegram and he agrees with it.