FIRST ENCLOSURE

2 September 1942

The question of my position in the War Cabinet and the wider
question as to how the War Cabinet is functioning has been giving
me a considerable amount of thought during the past few weeks.

On the 28th July I sent to the Prime Minister, following on our
conversation of the previous evening, a Note setting out, at
considerable length, the position of the Australian Representative
in the War Cabinet as I saw it. [1]

On the 31st July as a result of that Note I had a talk with Attlee
who the Prime Minister had asked to deal with the matter. This
conversation resulted in the agreement which is embodied in my
letter to Attlee of the 1st August. [2] The arrangement which
Attlee and I arrived at will probably work out satisfactorily so
far as my obligation to keep the Australian Government reasonably
well informed as to developments here is concerned.

I am doubtful, however, whether it will resolve the problem of my
own position in relation to the War Cabinet, as to which I feel a
certain uneasiness. The impression has been created by the public
statements of the Prime Minister here and the Prime Minister in
Australia that I am a Member of the War Cabinet. Owing to that
impression I am regarded in many quarters as sharing
responsibility for decisions taken by the War Cabinet and for the
way in which the War Cabinet functions. It is asking a good deal
to expect me to accept this responsibility when I am given so
little information and am consulted so little.

In view, however, of the necessity of avoiding rows I clearly must
stomach it and, unless my position becomes quite intolerable,
carry on trying to make the present arrangement work.

With regard to the functioning of the War Cabinet the position, as
far as I can judge, of the United Kingdom Members is not greatly
different from my own. This, however, is not my business. In any
event it does not cause me great concern because I believe in one
man having supreme authority in running the war provided he uses
those working under him in the way that will give him the maximum
assistance in his almost superhuman task.

The Prime Minister stands so far above all his colleagues that he
is obviously the man in whom the supreme authority should be
vested. The trouble is that while the Prime Minister is assuming
that supreme authority he is not utilising his colleagues in the
War Cabinet in a way calculated to provide him with the maximum
assistance they can render. This constitutes a serious defect in
the higher direction of the war but up to date the consequences
have not been as serious as might have been expected. If
continued, however, the consequences will be disastrous.

In considering what can be done to remedy the present position the
Prime Minister's unrivalled services must never be overlooked. The
debt due to him for his inspired leadership and undaunted courage
in face of all the reverses we have suffered since Dunkirk can
never be repaid.

During this period which I would describe as the 'emotional'
period of the war, the Prime Minister was a gift from God. Now,
however, that 'emotional' period has passed and what is required
is not inspiration for the people but organisation and planning by
a central thinking machine which is in constant touch with every
aspect of the higher direction of the war.

This machine should be the War Cabinet but as it is at present
operating it is not fulfilling its functions and the Prime
Minister is not getting the help he should. Too much of the burden
is being borne by the Prime Minister. It is true, as many people
would contend, that this is due to the Prime Minister's
temperament. The Prime Minister's temperament, however, is no
justification for failure to act if action is necessary.

Although my relations with the Members of the War Cabinet are
admirable, I have felt it would not be quite playing the game to
discuss this matter with them behind the Prime Minister's back. I
therefore cannot speak from actual knowledge but I am convinced
that all the Prime Minister's colleagues in the War Cabinet, if
they would give their opinions frankly, hold the view that
alterations in the present system are imperative. If this is so it
is surely their duty to tell the Prime Minister and to suggest to
him what they consider should be done. They are, however,
apparently not prepared to do so.

The reason I imagine that would be given for this reluctance would
be that if a Minister tenders advice to the Prime Minister on a
matter which he regards as of vital importance and the Prime
Minister refuses to accept that advice, the only course open to
the Minister is to resign. This course it would be argued can
quite properly be taken in peace time but that in war time the
resignation of a Member of the War Cabinet involves consequences
so serious that such action can only be taken under the most
exceptional circumstances.

I also feel that the attitude of the Members of the War Cabinet is
influenced by the recognition by them of the Prime Minister's
outstanding position and prestige in the United States of America
and Russia. Because of this they are reluctant to take any action
which might precipitate a crisis which would weaken the Prime
Minister's position.

This latter consideration does not appear to me to make an
approach to the Prime Minister more difficult, but easier. In
ordinary circumstances a Minister's approach to the Prime Minister
on a question of fundamental importance carries with it the
possibility of the Minister's resignation if his view is not
accepted. Under the war circumstances of to-day the possibility of
resignation would imply a threat. I know of no one who would react
more violently against a threat, or even a suggestion of a threat,
than the Prime Minister. No such implication need, however, arise
if in an approach to the Prime Minister he was told at the outset

how essential his services were considered and the whole position
was put to him in the frankest way. It seems to me the matter
could be thrashed out without the Minister concerned placing
himself in the position of his having to resign if the Prime
Minister was not prepared to accept his views.

Everything of course depends upon how the conversation was
handled. Personally I am convinced that if there is anyone in the
War Cabinet big enough to put the whole position to the Prime
Minister in the right way the Prime Minister would respond and
satisfactory results would be achieved.

The case which should be put to the Prime Minister should not, in
my view, be directed to any question of detail but should be
broadly based upon the necessity of improving the central thinking
machine, i.e. the War Cabinet.

The way in which that improvement could be brought about would, in
my view, be by regular daily meetings of the War Cabinet. These
meetings would keep under continuous review all questions
concerning the war and would provide a central thinking machine. I
recognise that it would be impossible for the Prime Minister, with
the great burden he is carrying and his many preoccupations, to
attend these meetings continuously. The measure of his attendance
would depend on how the arrangement worked. I also recognise that
members of the War Cabinet who are administering Departments, e.g.

the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, the Minister of
Production and the Minister for Labour, might find difficulty in
attending regularly and continuously. This fact, it might be
argued, suggests the desirability of the War Cabinet being
composed of Ministers without Departmental responsibilities. This
point it is not for me to pursue. Taking the position as it is, I
am convinced that regular daily meetings of the War Cabinet would
be valuable and that Ministers with Departmental responsibilities
would find them most helpful in relation to their own problems.

As a practical method of giving effect to the proposal made above
I would suggest the following-
1. The members of the War Cabinet, other than the Prime Minister,
should meet every day at 10 o'clock under the Chairmanship of the
Deputy Prime Minister to deal with matters other than strategical
or operational questions.

At these meetings matters referred by the Prime Minister or raised
by individual Members of the War Cabinet would be dealt with. Such
matters would be subject of a preliminary exchange of views from
which it would be determined what action should be taken with
regard to them, e.g. preparation of a report by a Member of the
War Cabinet, or by the Department, or Departments, concerned. To
these meetings of the War Cabinet other Ministers, not Members of
the War Cabinet, would from time to time be summoned.

The meetings under the Deputy Prime Minister would be of such
duration as was necessary. Where little had to be dealt with they
might be of short duration. Where a complicated and difficult
question had to be handled they might be of practically continuous
duration until the matter was disposed of.

2. A further meeting of the War Cabinet, presided over by the
Prime Minister, should be held at a later hour daily or at less
frequent intervals if daily meetings were found to be unnecessary.

At these meetings a report of the proceedings at the earlier
meeting would be made and the Prime Minister's endorsement of
decisions arrived at sought.

These meetings would also afford the Prime Minister an opportunity
of consulting his colleagues with regard to matters he was
handling, particularly Defence questions, and where necessary of
obtaining their endorsement of any action he contemplated taking.

3 The Chiefs of Staff would make their weekly report at the
ordinary Monday meeting of the War Cabinet which should continue
to be held. Apart from this meeting the Chiefs of Staff should not
attend War Cabinet meetings save where specific questions
requiring their presence were under discussion.

Such a system as I have outlined above would ensure a practical
method of carrying on the central direction of the war without
imposing too great a burden on the Prime Minister. It might be
objected that the method proposed would tend towards Members of
the War Cabinet arriving at decisions without the Prime Minister
having taken part in the discussions with the result that if the
Prime Minister found himself in disagreement with a decision of
his colleagues he might have difficulty in reversing it owing to
his colleagues having already been formed into a united front.

Having controlled a Cabinet for just on seven years this objection
does not disturb me.

The position of a Prime Minister, and this is particularly so in
the case of the present Prime Minister here, is so strong that he
can ensure that in respect to any questions which he regards as of
vital importance his view will prevail.

S.M.B.

1 See Documents 14 and 15.

2 See Document 14.

SECOND ENCLOSURE

25 September 1942

The experience of the past three years has demonstrated that Air
strength is going to be a, if not the, determining factor of the
war. This is extremely fortunate for us.

In my Note of June 16th [1], I said-

'In the Air ... we have the resources to enable us to create an
overwhelming and decisive strength. During 1942 the combined
production of the United States of America, the British Empire and
Russia may well be twice that of the Axis Powers, and in 1943 four
times. This strength properly employed should enable us to defeat
the enemy. If we are so to employ it, however, there must be
fundamental reconsideration of our strategic and production
policies.'

The three months that have passed since the above was written have
not altered the position save that the indications now are that in
1943 our production is likely to be five, if not six, times that
of the Axis Powers.

The main question is how are we going to use that power. As I see

it, it will be employed directly, i.e. by bombing Germany and
Italy and probably, in view of the developments that are taking
place, Japan also, and indirectly by co-operation with our Sea and
Land Forces.

In the Chiefs of Staff report of the 18th July (W.P.(42)302) [2]
the Chiefs of Staff laid down in their terms of reference to the
Naval Staff-Air Staff Committee the following order of priority
for the utilisation of our Air resources-
(a) Minimum necessary fighter defence of the United Kingdom
(b) Minimum necessary allocation for securing our vital
communications and interrupting those of the enemy
(c) Maximum possible provision for the offensive both direct and
in support of land operations.

I have never heard this order of priority challenged and at the
meeting of the War Cabinet on the 12th August [3], at which this
matter was discussed, I was under the impression that it was
confirmed.

If, in fact, it does stand, we should be giving effect to it by
providing, in the approved priority, for the security of our vital
communications. This, however, we are not doing as is shown by the
Chiefs of Staff report above referred to. This appears to me a
most extraordinary and illogical position and I can only explain
it by attributing to the Air Ministry a too narrow vision of the
paramount importance of the Air in modern warfare. Its vital
contribution towards victory is not only going to be its directly
offensive power of bombing the enemy, although this may be its
major contribution, but its co-operation in making it possible for
our sea and land forces to carry out their respective functions.

The attitude of the Air Ministry appears to be, however, that the
safeguarding of our communications is a task for the Navy and that
any utilisation of our Air resources in this task is a diversion
of the Air from its legitimate function of bombing Germany. This,
to my mind, is taking far too narrow a view as each of the three
Services has responsibilities and an essential role to fulfil in
the exercise of sea power. In certain areas, whether we like it or
not, modern developments have made the Air the predominant arm
and, unless it plays its part, the approved strategy cannot be
given effect to.

That strategy gives a priority to the securing of our vital
communications and to interrupting those of the enemy and the Air
must make its contribution to that end. In any event all the
pother and friction that has been caused with regard to the air
allocation for securing our sea communications seems to me absurd
as whatever decision was taken would not affect our bombing
capacity of Germany to the extent of more than four or five
Squadrons and then only for a limited period.

The issue involved in connection with our bombing offensive
against Germany is not one of whether four or five Squadrons will
be available a few months earlier or later. It is a question of
framing our strategic and production policies so as to provide at
the earliest possible date the maximum number of Bomber aircraft
that our bases can handle and that it is practical to operate in
the air.

If that is our policy it is not a question of fighting about a few
aeroplanes for ensuring our vital communications, it is a question
of determining a reasonable limit to the land forces we are going
to bring into being so as to prevent our capacity for production
of directly offensive aircraft being diverted to the building of
an unnecessary number of Army co-operation planes.

On this point I am convinced that we should not think in terms of
more than 30 to 50 Divisions for the European theatre. My reason
for this view is that if the circumstances are favourable this
number of Divisions will be ample for cleaning up Germany. If the
circumstances are unfavourable no number of Divisions that we
could provide and transport would be adequate. With a sound Air
policy the number of Divisions necessary for the North American
Continent would be relatively small.

S.M.B.

[PRO:PREM 4/50/11]

1 See Document 5, note 1.

2 For Bruce's earlier comments on this report see Document 13,
note 2.

3 For Bruce's record of this meeting see Document 21.