1. With further reference to your No. 40 [1], I have had a
discussion on the manning of additional ships from the Royal Navy
by personnel of the Royal Australian Navy.

2. My general attitude on what should be our approach to
additional commitments was outlined in Cablegram No. 28. [2]

3. In the light of my subsequent discussions on-
(i) the proposals put forward by me for closer Empire co-
operation;

(ii) the questions raised in our Cablegram No. 267 of 8th October
[3], relative to the Australian War Effort, to which no answer had
been given;

(iii) the plan for the use of British Forces in the war against
Japan; I do not favour any separate decision on this matter until
all aspects of the war effort can be looked at together.

4. I offer the foregoing opinion with the full realisation that
this course might mean delay in manning the ships unless the naval
intake is increased now to provide the trained crews at the
appropriate time. Further reasons for my views are contained in
the following remarks on the reasons for an increase in Australian
naval strength which are given in paragraph 6 of your Cablegram
No. 40:-

(a) In regard to this point, the ships are a mere fraction of the
strength of British ships that will shortly be available for
cooperation against Japan. The United States and Royal Navies will
have a preponderating superiority over the Japanese.

(b) In this case, there is a tag on the ships in regard to their
strategical control.

(c) The reference to the maintenance of the highest possible
effort by Australia is already provided for by the established
policy of the Government, which I have clearly outlined here. The
extent of our naval effort must be considered with those of the
land and air forces and our present and prospective commitments in
other directions as well.

(d) Canada has a population which is fifty per cent greater than
that of Australia. The correct comparison between the two
Dominions is their total war effort in the light of this factor.

(e) Notwithstanding the loss of ships, the personnel has
apparently been absorbed in manning other vessels, for the
personnel of the Navy has trebled since 1939.

As stated in the remarks on (c), this matter must be considered in
relation to the maintenance of the strengths of the other services
and other commitments.

(g) An opinion such as this can only be expressed in the light of
the discussions of the subjects referred to in paragraph 3 and is
a matter for judgement by me.

5. I would add that it has come to my knowledge that an expression
of the views [4] of the War Cabinet has been communicated to the
Admiralty through Naval channels. There is an explicit instruction
[5] against this and I shall be glad if you will ensure against
the repetition of this in regard to the information in this
cablegram.

CURTIN