Extracts CANBERRA, 19 June 1945

TOP SECRET

NATURE AND FUNCTIONS OF POST WAR DEFENCE FORCES [1]

TERMS OF REFERENCE:

By Minute No. 152/1945 [2] the Defence Committee decided it would
be desirable to give preliminary Joint Service consideration to
the question of the balanced post war defence forces that should
be maintained by Australia ...

[matter omitted]

PREVIOUS CONSIDERATION BY DEFENCE COMMITTEE:

2. The Defence Committee considered that it would now be possible
to formulate advice with regard to the nature and functions of the
Australian forces to be maintained post war, but that the question
of the strength and organisation of the forces cannot be resolved
until the Government has given some indication of the annual
expenditure which is likely to be allowed for defence in the post
war budget.

3. In pursuance of the foregoing paragraph, the Joint Planning
Committee were instructed to report to the Defence Committee
accordingly. The report of the Joint Planning Committee now having
been examined, the Defence Committee report on the Nature and
Functions of the Post War Defence Forces is attached as Appendix
'A' to this Minute.

FURTHER CONSIDERATION BY DEFENCE COMMITTEE:

Limitations of Forces contemplated:

4. The Defence Committee wish to lay stress upon the fact that
Australia's economy will preclude the provision of forces
necessary to her security. It is essential, therefore, to co-
operate fully in an Imperial Defence Policy and to give the
fullest support to any system of collective security.

[matter omitted]

Attachment (extracts)

REPORT BY DEFENCE COMMITTEE

Nature and Functions of Post War Defence Forces in Australia

[matter omitted]

II. WAR EXPERIENCE

[matter omitted]

Major Lessons:

11. (a) Experience has shown quite conclusively that, because of
the heavy and vital commitments elsewhere, it was not possible for
the Imperial force to protect adequately British possessions and
interests in the Pacific and SE Asia Areas. There is no certain
guarantee that history may not repeat itself in this regard in a
future war.

(b) Despite pre-war theories to the contrary, a sufficiently
powerful enemy may secure the necessary superiority of forces in
areas close to Northern Australia and may establish overseas bases
within striking distance of our coast, for forces of all arms
capable of operating therefrom.

(c) Because of commitments in other theatres, Empire or Allied
assistance may not be available for some considerable time for the
defence of Australia.

(d) The establishment of a British or Allied base or bases at
Singapore, in the Indies or elsewhere in the Western or SW Pacific
cannot, of itself, relieve Australia of the responsibility of
providing for its own local defence, or preclude the possibility
of invasion of her territories. Prior to 1942, the possibility of
enemy invasion was not a contingency to be provided against in the
formulation of defence policy. The course of this war has shown
quite conclusively that this policy was unsound and that security
against successful invasion is a major consideration in future
defence policy.

(e) Aircraft can operate as an independent arm and cooperate with
sea and land forces. It follows that not only should fleets and
armies be fashioned to assist the fullest development of air
power, but that air power should assist in every possible way in
enhancing the power of the other two Services. Unless this is
done, there can be no true combination of forces and, therefore,
no unity of offensive and defensive action. The operations of
amphibious warfare, requiring a balanced contribution from all
three Services, are highly important in modern warfare for they
lead to victory. The Navy may control the seaways; the Air Force
may batter the enemy; but only the ground troops can occupy the
enemy's territory and by so doing, inflict ultimate defeat. In an
overseas expedition, such forces as are necessary to enable us to
operate from secure bases, whilst providing a means of offensive
action finally to overcome the enemy's means of resistance, must
be organised and disposed for coordinated action in accordance
with the task. Ground troops cannot do this without being taken in
ships and without being supported by the Air Force. Whether this
air support is provided by mobile sea aerodromes (carriers) which
overcome the limits of range and endurance set upon aircraft or
whether it can be provided by shore air bases within range, is
immaterial. The outstanding lesson of modern warfare is the
importance of maintaining and coordinating all arms to a single
plan.

(f) Imperial co-operation is the basis of Imperial strategy. Past
Imperial conferences have accepted the principle that each part of
the Empire was to provide for its own local defence to its own
maximum capacity as well as being prepared to contribute to a
balanced Empire pool of resources for the successful prosecution
of an Empire war. Both this war and the last have proved this
cardinal principle to be sound.

(g) The pre-war system of training of the Australian forces and
the process of mobilisation of personnel and material resources
were inadequate to defend Australia in the event of sudden attack
by considerable forces. A system of universal service, therefore,
is essential to build up an adequate trained reserve which can be
mobilised by all three Services and employed in the minimum time.

(h) The machinery for direction, control and mobilisation of the
national effort, including the armed forces, was inadequate for
total war at short notice and unless such machinery is brought
into existence and the forces required are trained, equipped and
capable of mobilisation in a limited period of time, together with
the necessary reserves, the outcome of the next war may well be
disastrous from the early stages. As war is the final act of
policy, when all peaceful means of securing the nation's vital
interests fail, it follows that policy, strategy and condition of
the armed strength must be related one to the other. A country
which is not prepared for war may be defeated in detail before its
armed forces and resources can be mobilised.

(i) In accordance with pre-war doctrine, the Australian Army has
undertaken responsibility for providing many administrative
services for the R.A.A.F., and to a lesser extent, the Navy.

Fundamentally, this conception was based on the assumption that
the forces, particularly Army and R.A.A.F., would be operating in
the same area. The conduct of operations often requires action by
air forces from areas in which there is not sufficient army
administrative service to cope with the work involved, e.g. the
shipping, transportation and handling of quantities of supplies,
ammunition, fuel and stores of all natures. It is suggested that
it may be desirable to establish a service to control, direct and
supply the means of transportation along lines of communications
from the main base to the forward points where the fighting
Service itself takes over for distribution. Such an executive
Service could take over shipping, rail and air transportation,
dock operating and labour, hirings, postal and medical services,
canteens organised on lines of N.A.A.F.I., Red Cross and Comforts
Fund activities and Amenities Services.

(j) It is essential, not only to have a balanced co-ordination of
civil resources, but Australia must possess in peace the necessary
basic industries upon which naval, military and air power are
based.

(k) It is necessary that the conduct of operations should be
jointly coordinated in planning and execution by the Services
participating. This implies in the first place unified operational
and administrative control of each Service and coordinated control
of all three Services. It also envisages the location, together as
far as practicable, of headquarters of Commanders and Staffs of
the three Services. For combined operations, a joint planning
staff will be necessary.

(l) There is need for continuity in defence policy. Co-ordination
and direction of resources and national mobilisation of such
matters as manpower, materials and transportation will apply in
any future war, and, therefore, plans should be prepared in peace.

(m) (i) The present war has shown that Australia's strategical
position and resources make it likely that the Commonwealth will,
in any future war in the Pacific, be an important base for
operations. Whether Australia becomes a base for Empire forces,
Allied forces, or forces acting under the Military Council of a
Collective Security organisation, the development of a capacity to
base, service and repair these forces is an essential and its
security vital. Furthermore, although Britain, the main base of
the Empire, has managed to maintain her industries in this war, it
is obvious that their being so close to other countries makes the
risk of their being destroyed so great that it is imperative that
civil production, from which are derived the key defence
industries such as shipbuilding, aircraft production, production
of arms and munitions, clothing, food, etc., shall be developed in
Empire countries more remote from foreign air bases. Australia is
particularly well suited for this purpose.

(ii) Moreover, although it may be somewhat visionary, nevertheless
it is deserving of consideration as to whether a country such as
Great Britain could not be subjected in a future war, at short or
without notice, to such concentrations of attack by diabolical
forms of destruction, such as electronic developments, bombs and
rockets, coupled with gas and bacteriological warfare (including
crop destruction) as to cripple its war potential from the outset.

(iii) It is therefore desirable that while we must maintain our
basic defence industries, we should do so in accordance with an
Empire plan for the strategic deployment of such activities as
shipbuilding, supply and munitions production and aircraft
manufacture. Governmental agreements should be reached on these
aspects.

III. CONSIDERATIONS AFFECTING NATURE AND FUNCTIONS OF THE POST WAR
FORCES

Defence Weaknesses:

[matter omitted]

13. The facts must be accepted that the defence of the
Australasian area is beyond the capacity of Australia and New
Zealand unaided and that defence co-operation with the United
Kingdom and United States of America is essential. Furthermore,
Australia must fully participate in a World Organisation for
Collective Security and the basis of our own defence strategy must
be the maintenance of highly mobile offensive Naval, Army and Air
Forces equipped for extended operations over long distances and
with adequately protected bases in and to the north of Australia.

14. One of the dangers against which Australia with a limited
defence potential must safeguard herself, is that of being
unprepared to mobilise her full defence resources at short notice.

As it will not be possible to maintain large permanent forces, the
only alternative is the re-introduction of compulsory training for
all three Services, to enable the maintenance of an adequate basic
war organisation and the reserves necessary to complete this
organisation on mobilisation.

IV. SUMMARY OF MAJOR REQUIREMENTS
Dangers to Australia:

15. The particular dangers to which Australia is exposed are
therefore-
(a) Interruption of sea communications.

(b) Sporadic raids.

(c) Invasion.

Basis of Defence:

16. Defence against the particular dangers mentioned above should
be undertaken as follows:-

(a) Interruption of Sea Communications
Although this can only be prevented by a powerful Empire (or
allied) Fleet superior to that of any possible enemy in the
Pacific, with suitable defended bases from which to operate,
Australia's share must be-
(i) Provision of Naval forces, including ship-borne air craft.

(ii) Provision of adequate R.A.A.F. reconnaissance and striking
squadrons.

(iii) Development and defence of operational bases.

(b) Sporadic Raids
Against such attacks, which may be carried out on our shipping
routes or our military and economic objectives on the mainland or
island mandates, control of sea communications exercised by naval
(including carriers) and air forces is the primary safeguard. In
addition, it is also necessary permanently to station land forces
at vital areas in order to secure the bases for operations.

(c) Invasion of Mainland or Adjacent islands
The security of the bases must be ensured and the possibility of
their being threatened must be admitted, and accepted as a result
of experience. Provision is therefore necessary for-
(i) The deployment of Naval and Air Forces to operate from
northern bases which will have local protection by Army garrisons.

(ii) Forces capable of amphibious operations.

(iii) Mobile formations based on the Mainland.

V. RECOMMENDATIONS REGARDING THE NATURE AND FUNCTIONS OF POST WAR
FORCES
17. In view of the foregoing factors, it is recommended that
provision of defence forces as among the three Services should be
as indicated hereunder.

Naval Forces:

18. (a) A balanced Task Force including aircraft carriers,
supported by a fleet train, as a contribution to Empire security.

(b) A sea frontier force of escort, minesweeping, harbour defence
and surveying craft.

(c) The assault shipping required for combined operations.

Land Forces:

19. (a) The land forces should be so organised and disposed that
they can act in conjunction with the other Services in the
protection of areas of strategic importance and in the undertaking
of amphibious operations.

(b) Local mobile forces for the defence of the main vital areas.

(c) Coast and Anti-aircraft Defences and garrison forces for
bases.

Air Forces:

20. (a) Reconnaissance and striking forces capable of-
(i) Strategic operations.

(ii) Tactical operations in support of Naval and Land forces.

(iii) Defence of Sea communications and trade in co-operation with
the Navy.

(b) Forces for the defence of important bases.

(c) Transport aircraft to ensure flexibility of air forces and
airborne troops, and to provide air transportation for all
Services along Ls. of C. [3]

Defence Industries:

21. Those industries essential to the support of armed forces
should be established and maintained in peace to a scale which is
related to the national resources and to the ability of such
nucleus industry to expand readily to required war-time
proportions.

22. It is further recommended that the Government approach British
and Empire Governments to reach agreement on a plan for the
strategic deployment of defence industries and research throughout
the Empire.

[matter omitted]