Historical documents
Cablegram 121 WASHINGTON, 3 February 1945, 8.35 p.m.
SECRET
Your telegram 150. [1]
I sent you my personal reactions in personal and confidential
letter of 22nd January [2] which should reach you at the coming
week end. It is difficult to get definite reactions here owing to
the fact that the big states are not really interested and the
small states are divided in their interests. I had a talk with
Halifax who had not given the matter any close consideration. He
says that he has received no information as to reactions in
London. His personal views are against waiting on the vote of the
Assembly before execution of the decisions of the Council but
favourable to some method of weighting the vote of the Council,
say by military potential or having regional basis. The latter, he
says, would not be favoured by Canada. He does not appear to be
impressed by the unfavourable position of the small nations and
thinks that the Dominions can get the influence they want by close
co-operation in Commonwealth block. He said that whatever appeared
in the document it would be difficult to bring a power into a war
without its consent but I pointed out that without the co-
operation of states in the locality in which a war took place
Council action would be practically impossible or at least
ineffective.
United States official opinion seems satisfied that domination of
the great powers is essential for an effective opposition to
aggression. [Commentators] [3] like Lippmann and Swing [4] support
this, but there is some criticism from academic circles.
Canada used the I.P.R. Conference at Hot Springs as a sounding
board. At this conference several State Department officials were
present. Canadian representatives emphasized the distinction
between middle powers, but there was no reaction in favour of this
distinction. The small powers emphasized the inadequacy of their
status and an American answer from the United States Delegation
was that they would obtain satisfaction in the Assembly, the
economic and social Council and various [functional] agencies
where they could exercise their influence to prevent the growth of
conditions likely to cause a breach of peace. There was some
support for regional representation. One report of a discussion
said that members felt that since under the present proposals for
peace preservation, the calling into action of lesser powers is
likely to fall more heavily on some nations than on others, the
nations so affected should be given special consideration in the
election of member states in the Security Council particularly the
first Council.
Canadian representatives also suggested that the big powers' right
of veto should be limited to the imposition of sanctions and that
they should not be able to prevent the Council taking cognizance
of matters or making recommendations. I am trying to obtain the
Chinese reactions but the views of the Ambassador would be of no
value and the Russians will say nothing.
Representatives of small European powers show little concern about
the position of the small powers. One central European Ambassador
told me that things would sort out all right and another said that
the big powers should guarantee some rights to the small states.
My own view, finally, is that if we want a seat on the Council we
must:-
(a) Support the regional principle for election to the Council.
(b) Secure demarcation of a favourable region.
(c) Secure support of the powers within it.
[AA:A1066, H45/765]