My telegram 16th October D No.1934. [1] Control of Japan.

Following is a summary of instructions which have now been sent to
the United Kingdom representative on the Far Eastern Commission
(my telegram 15th October D No.1921 [2]) as regards the line which
he is to follow. Begins.

(a) It is difficult to lay down precise instructions in the
absence of information about United States ideas on the activities
of the Commission now that the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics
appears unlikely to participate.

(b) His Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom, however,
attach great importance to obtaining a real voice in formulating
Allied policy affecting Japan and in controlling directives sent
to General MacArthur and those presented by him to the Japanese
Government. It was, of course, only on the understanding that the
United States Government were ready to consider amendments to the
terms of reference for this purpose that we agreed not to proceed
with our earlier proposal for a Control Council in Tokyo and thus
consented to make the Far Eastern Commission the principal channel
for exerting our influence on the treatment of Japan.

(c) It is essential that this channel should be made an effective
one. The principal means of ensuring this would seem to be to
exercise maximum control over the issue of directives to Supreme
Commander Allied Powers and over those which he, in turn, issues
to the Japanese authorities since this is now, and appears likely
to remain, the only means of giving effect to Allied policy
towards Japan. Our interest in the nature and effect of these
directives is very great for the following strategic, political
and economic reasons.

(I) In the field of strategy, while we do not doubt that the
present policy of the United States is to prevent Japanese
military resurgence, His Majesty's Government in the United
Kingdom cannot ignore their particular responsibility for the
defence of British territories and communications in the Far East
and Pacific and their general interest which they share with other
members of the British Commonwealth in preventing future Japanese
aggression. It follows that we must take a full part in the
framing of measures designed to fulfil this purpose.

(II) Politically we are concerned to take all possible steps to
ensure that actions taken by Supreme Commander Allied Powers and
orders given to the Japanese authorities should not defeat their
own object e.g. by causing a collapse of the Japanese
administrative system and consequent political chaos, and it is
equally important that we should have an effective voice in
formulating measures to be taken to encourage the development of a
peaceful and responsible Government.

(III) In the economic field the future position of Japan will
react directly upon the interests of many members of the British
Commonwealth and a divergence between British and United States
views is not unlikely on such subjects as the nature, extent and
division of reparations and the nature and direction of Japanese
foreign trade (both of which involve the question which Japanese
industries should be diminished, which encouraged and which left
unchanged) Japanese financial and industrial organisation, service
of Japanese loans, supply from Japan of consumer goods to British
territories in the Far East, and source of supplies to Japan of
essential food and relief.

(d) It was with these considerations in mind that the United
Kingdom Government prepared amended terms of reference for the Far
Eastern Commission (My telegram 30th September D No.1840 [3]
refers) and the United Kingdom representative is at the outset of
the Commission's work to propose on behalf of the United Kingdom
Government that the original terms of reference be amended
accordingly.

(e) It is assumed in the amended terms of reference that the Union
of Soviet Socialist Republics is to be represented on the
Commission. If she declines to be represented and if, after due
consideration of the difficulties which Russian non-participation
would involve, other powers concerned are prepared to carry on
without the Russians, His Majesty's Government in the United
Kingdom would be prepared to agree. But we do foresee that serious
difficulties might result from Russian non-participation. The
Union of Soviet Socialist Republics might in the first place
strengthen her hold on Manchuria and Northern Korea which she
might treat as an exclusively Russian zone. This would destroy
what hope there is of obtaining food and other emergency supplies
from Manchuria for Japan and would thus lay a greater burden on
the other Allied powers. Russian non-participation would also
greatly increase the difficulty of arriving at agreed decisions
about the treatment of Japanese in fields such as reparations, in
which a unified Allied policy is badly needed. It would, moreover,
jeopardise any prospect of a coordinated long term Allied policy
on such question as strategic and economic controls which may be
necessary after occupation is over to prevent the re-emergence of
Japan as a strong military power.

(f) For these reasons we consider Soviet participation most
desirable and we should associate ourselves with steps taken to
bring the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics in.

(g) The United Kingdom representative is to maintain closest touch
with the Canadian, Australian, New Zealand and Indian
representatives on the Commission.