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Historical documents

415 Hood to Department of External Affairs

Cablegram N29 LONDON, 25 November 1945, 7.26 p.m.

SECRET

The following are early impressions derived from my first visit to
the Hague.

1. Morale is higher than in Brussels and much higher than in
Paris. Losses and hardships during the occupation were severe but
the general attitude is not to dwell on the past but to work hard
for earliest possible reconstruction. Collaborationists have been
put away and are hardly referred to.

2. The food situation has improved in the past two months and in
many respects is now better than in England. Transport is an
overriding problem.

3. The present Government is handling internal controls well and
the Prime Minister Schermerhorn is respected and competent. A
large proportion of the Ministers, however, are well advanced in
years and the Government as a whole, not knowing how far it
represents the Country, tends to caution. It is said that a strong
swing to Communists will be revealed at elections early next year.

4. The above considerations are relevant to Indonesian question.

Dutch I discussed this with, who all spoke freely, were confident
that Holland could handle the situation itself. They took it for
granted that Dutch sovereignty would be restored very shortly. One
or two contemplated a 'partnership' with the Indonesians but the
majority did not think it would be necessary to go beyond the
terms of the Queen's broadcast of 1942. A general staff officer
told me that 30,000-40,000 troops were ready for despatch to the
Indies. He claimed that they were adequately equipped and trained,
but this I doubt.

5. These first impressions corroborated the view I had heard in
London, that the Metropolitan Dutch were uninformed on
developments in Java since 1942. Their determination and
confidence, however, is clearly a very real political factor in
the situation and has got to be taken account of. The feeling
towards Australia, so far as I have been able to judge, is, on the
personal level, most friendly and cordial, but beyond this puzzled
and resentful. The Dutch view is that they saved Australia from
invasion in 1942, that they recognise the good treatment which
their officials and evacuees have received in Australia, and that
they therefore entirely fail to understand how Australia can now
apparently be questioning their right to go back to the East
Indies. There is obviously much to be done in putting these
matters in their right perspective.

6. Since drafting the above I have seen your telegram 532 [1],
repeat of message from Macmahon Ball. I learnt at the Hague that
an emissary has recently been sent out to Batavia but his mission
was described as investigatory. [2] I have at present no knowledge
which would confirm offer reported from Batavia.

1 Dispatched 25 November, on file AA : A1838/2, 403/2/2/2,i. It
conatained the text of Ball's cablegram 18 to the External Affairs
Dept, dispatched 24 November, reporting private discussions with
an official from The Hague, suggesting a fundamental difference of
approach between Batavia and The Hague, and the probable
replacement of local officials by those from the Netherlands who
would offer Indonesians full self government. On file AA :

A1838/2, 401/1/2/1.

2 In a cablegram 22, dispatched 30 November, (on the file cited in
note 1) Ball identified the emissary as Lt Col Frozut, a personal
envoy of the Netherlands Prime Minister.


[AA : A1838/2, 403/2/2/2, i]
Last Updated: 11 September 2013
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